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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE MINAS GERAIS INSTITUTO DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS DEPARTAMENTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS AMANDA AGUIAR COSTA DO DESASTRE À MUDANÇA UMA ANÁLISE DOS IMPACTOS DAS MOVIMENTAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NAS MUDANÇAS DAS NORMAS DE REGULAMENTAÇÃO DA ATIVIDADE MINERADORA APÓS OS ROMPIMENTOS DAS BARRAGENS DE MARIANA E BRUMADINHO Belo Horizonte 2024 Estou estudando as mobilizações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos grandes desastres ambientais ocorridos em 2015 e 2019 em Minas Gerais os rompimentos de barragens ocorridos nas cidades de Mariana e Brumadinho A magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais desses desastres tecnológicos levou a uma mobilização não apenas pelas consequências diretas em curto e longo prazo dos desastres em si mas também pela possibilidade de outros acontecerem da mesma maneira dada a falha na segurança desse modelo de alocação de rejeitos na construção na supervisão da estabilidade e consequentemente nas normas de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Ao redor do país existem centenas dessas barragens e uma quantidade impossível de ignorar é considerada de alto risco de rompimento Porque quero descobrir a influência da sociedade civil brasileira sobre a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e seu impacto nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação das atividades predatórias extrativistas Para explicar que a sociedade civil ao redirecionar a diplomacia ambiental brasileira foi capaz de gerar uma mudança das normas internacionais de regulamentação das atividades mineradoras aumentando a restrição de ação por meio da participação em fóruns e congressos e de criações de padrões de processos em parceria com organizações extremamente relevantes internacionalmente lutando não somente na busca pela responsabilização dos responsáveis pelo desastre mas também pela prevenção de outras catástrofes nos mesmos moldes Pergunta de Pesquisa Em que medida as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira pós desastres de Brumadinho e Mariana levaram à uma mudança na diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e consequentemente nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Hipótese de Investigação A sociedade civil brasileira frente a magnitude dos impactos gerados com os rompimentos das barragens pressionou o Estado Brasileiro para um redirecionamento de seu posicionamento internacionalmente para um ativismo ambiental significativamente mais presente de modo a reforçar a importância de regulamentar a atividade mineradora atuação que levou a uma maior restrição nos padrões globais Objetivos de Pesquisa o Objetivo Geral Analisar o impacto da busca da sociedade civil brasileira por melhores regulamentações das atividades extrativistas de grandes corporações em nível internacional o Objetivos Específicos a Mapear os processos e movimentos mais significativos da sociedade civil brasileira relacionados aos desastres ambientais ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho b Analisar a efetividade das estratégias de mobilização utilizadas pela sociedade civil brasileira c Identificar a relação entre os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira com um aumento no ativismo do Estado Brasileiro d Identificar a relação entre o aumento do ativismo do Estado Brasileiro e a mudança na regulamentação internacional para atuação de empresas mineradoras d Analisar as normas internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora antes e depois dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Justificativa Os desastres tecnológicos de Mariana e Brumadinho em Minas Gerais geraram enorme comoção na sociedade brasileira na época dadas as magnitudes dos impactos ambientais identificados tanto para o curto prazo quanto para o longo até então não tínhamos precedentes de desastres ambientais nesses moldes em nosso país O próprio modelo da alocação dos rejeitos dessas barragens era falho e apresentava riscos e para piorar existiam também falhas nos laudos de segurança cuja veracidade das situações descritas poderia ser questionada Esses eventos escancararam a necessidade de mudar como e o que era permitido das grandes corporações que comandam as atividades extrativistas e tanto movimentam nossa economia fazerem em nosso território pois afinal quem sente as consequências é o povo brasileiro algumas que indenização nenhuma pode pagar Eu como natural de Mariana percebi de perto como as pessoas diretamente atingidas foram impactadas a dores das perdas de familiares amigos lugares queridos que jamais verão novamente e até mesmo de memórias São pessoas que jamais virarão a esquina da casa da mãe depois de um almoço de domingo que de um dia para o outro perderam tudo e tiveram que viver por meses em hotéis Minha escola era também um hotel o contato era diário e depois de um tempo a casa do meu avô foi alugada para uma dessas famílias A nossa cidade sentiu e sente demais tem que haver justiça reparação e prevenção para que uma catástrofe dessa não aconteça novamente Acredito que essa pesquisa possa fazer a diferença para o campo visto que a emergência climática é sentida cada vez mais ao redor do mundo e atividades predatórias como a das mineradoras contribuem para seu agravo de modo que se faça necessário uma identificação de como surgem esses movimentos na sociedade internacional para a mudança de normas de atuação das empresas em uma busca de aprimorar os processos e impulsionar um desenvolvimento que seja sustentável dando para as gerações futuras as melhores condições possíveis Marco teórico Partindo da corrente de pensamento construtivista a realidade é construída por meio da linguagem conforme os processos de socialização acontecem construindo também a identidade que por sua vez interfere no processo de formação de significados Em suma a realidade é construída pelas identidades e significados e viceversa Mais especificamente na área das Relações Internacionais as normas e regras são criadas difundidas e internalizadas pelos atores do Sistema Internacional os Estados que assim como os seres humanos são atores racionais que possuem uma identidade que influencia na construção de significados compartilhados as regras e normas Para a emergência de normas e regras no Sistema Internacional primeiro acontecem os processos de externalização objetivação e internalização os quais perpassam a esfera doméstica e em cada um possui formas de legitimação justificação coação e até mesmo canais de comunicação Nessa pesquisa as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira externalizando suas demandas por meio da linguagem foram capazes de gerar um novo ciclo de emergência da norma ao influenciar na diplomacia ambiental brasileira por uma busca por mudanças na regulamentação internacional da ação das empresas mineradoras Metodologia Dado que o tema da pesquisa se trata de uma análise das mudanças das normas internacionais e do redirecionamento da diplomacia brasileira a partir das movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho os dados serão coletados em documentos entrevistas reportagens e manifestações nas redes sociais de modo a se fazer necessária uma abordagem qualitativa por meio de análises documentais de redes de conteúdo e de discurso para que sejam identificados todos os aspectos e relações importantes das variáveis que constituem o objeto httpswwwmpmgmpbrportalmenucomunicacaonoticiascomunidadesatingidas porrompimentodebarragememmarinacelebramacordoquepermiteatuacaode auditoriaindependenteedestacamatuacaodompmgshtml httpswwwotempocombreconomia2024526temorderompimentodebarragens emminascrescecommudancascl0 httpswwwcamaralegbrnoticias940199DESDOBRAMENTOSDOSCRIMES SOCIOAMBIENTAISDEBRUMADINHOEMARIANASAOALVOSDECOMISSAO DACAMARA httpswwwgreenpeaceorgbrasilblogongsinternacionaispedemaonuqueexclua valedopactoglobal httpsnewsunorgptstory2023011808747 httpswwwuneporgnewsandstoriespressreleaseinternationaladvisorypanel supportnewglobaltailingsmanagement httpswwwconjurcombr2017nov12segundaleituraacaopropostariodocebusca duvidosaprotecaoambiental httpswwwiucnorgptresourcesgreyliteratureumaestruturadeavaliacaodos impactosambientaisesociaisdedesastres httpswwwfundacaorenovaorgpainelriodoce DUFFIELD John What are International Institutions In International Studies Review Oxford Blackwell Publishing 2007 Nº 9 BUZAN Barry From international to world society English school theory and the social structure of globalisation Cambridge UK Cambridge UniversityPress 2004 p 161204 capítulo 06 estrutura do sistema GUZZINI Stefano Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations Disponível em httpbitly2jnl3dn legitimação AXELROD Robert KEOHANE Robert Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions World Politics Vol 38 No 1 Oct 1985 pp 226254 cooperação MÉTODOS DE ANÁLISE ANÁLISE DE REDES Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa em RI CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS Redes sociais mídias sociais Já existiam redes sociais antes das mídias sociais e da internet A importância do debate agênciaestrutura Comprometimento com a ideia de uma estrutura fraca regularidades que emergem de forma não intencional Efeitos não intencionais da ação intencional DEFINIÇÃO E APLICABILIDADE Análise de redes é um método para analisar dados das relações sociais É um campo focado em Relações ao invés de atributos Interdependência Efeitos emergentes e substantivos da estrutura Barcelona x Atlético de Madrid Jogo 1 0504 Lionel Messi Gerard Piqué Jordi Alba Dani Alves Neymar Andrés Iniesta Rafinha Luis Suárez Sergio Busquets Arda Turan Javier Mascherano Ivan Rakitic Sergi Roberto Atlético de Madrid x Barcelona Jogo 2 1304 Sergio Busquets Gerard Piqué Andrés Iniesta Neymar Jordi Alba Lionel Messi Javier Mascherano Arda Turan Ivan Rakitic Sergi Roberto Dani Alves Luis Suárez CONCEBENDO UM ESTUDO DE REDES 1 Identificar variáveischave Exige profunda intimidade do pesquisador com a problemática Identificar variável estrutural Variável que coloca em relação todos os atores do sistema social estudado Aquilo que circula Identificar atributos dos agentes Atributos monádicos idade gênero raça etc Identificar comportamentos dos agentes formas de ação que são susceptíveis de ser influenciadas pela posição que ocupam os agentes dentro da estrutura de relações 2 Coleta de dados Podem ser dados primários ou secundários Coleta primária questionário sociométrico Identificar interações dos respondentes Ex Roster free recall etc Coleta secundária análise de documentos Não possui receitas fixas para reconstruir estruturas em rede Criatividade e imaginação sociológica 3 Problemas com a coleta de dados Problemas éticos Garantir sigilo dos entrevistados Risco de viés na informação Distorções cognitivas na origem dos dados Decidirse entre nomes tipo de relação e posições posição relativa no sistema A rede reconstruída não é substância em si Representa percepção de indivíduos 4 Possibilidade de amostragem Universos relacionais estão geralmente circunscritos a mundos mais ou menos delimitados Usar amostragem corre o risco de deixar de fora atores chave da estrutura relacional em questão 5 Unidades de análise Unidade de análise pode ser os nós as relações ou ainda a estrutura como um todo Figura 20 Unidades de análise em estruturas relacionais Unidade de análise Agentes ou nós Pessoas Organizações Relações Tipo de recursos Formas de conectividade intermediação força de laços etc A rede vista como um todo Por exemplo como estrutura de pequeno mundo ou como nichos de clusterização latente Fonte Elaboração própria 6 Vantagens da análise de redes Nem sempre uma análise estatística ou focada em atributos e funções tipo organograma consegue lidar com a realidade social dinâmica e complexa das relações sociais Mas atenção Devido à sua própria natureza a construção e análise de dados em rede não é um trabalho teoricamente neutro Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions Robert Axelrod Robert O Keohane World Politics Vol 38 No 1 Oct 1985 pp 226254 Stable URL httplinksjstororgsicisici004388712819851029383A13C2263AACUASA3E20CO3B2A World Politics is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use available at httpwwwjstororgabouttermshtml JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides in part that unless you have obtained prior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal noncommercial use Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work Publisher contact information may be obtained at httpwwwjstororgjournalsjhuphtml Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for longterm preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world The Archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations It is an initiative of JSTOR a notforprofit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology For more information regarding JSTOR please contact supportjstororg httpwwwjstororg Sun Mar 16 180615 2008 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Strategies and Institutions By ROBERT AXELROD and ROBERT 0 KEOHANE A CHIEVING cooperation is difficult in world politics There is no common government to enforce rules and by the standards of domestic society international institutions are weak Cheating and de ception are endemic Yet as the articles in this symposium have shown cooperation is sometimes attained World politics is not a homogeneous state of war cooperation varies among issues and over time Before trying to draw conclusions about the factors that promote cooperation under anarchy let us recall the definitions of these key terms Cooperation is not equivalent to harmony Harmony requires complete identity of interests but cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary in terests In such situations cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others Cooperation thus defined is not necessarily good from a moral point of view Anarchy also needs to be defined clearly As used here the term refers to a lack of common government in world politics not to a denial that an international societyalbeit a fragmented onexists Clearly many international relationships continue over time and engender stable ex pectations about behavior To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in some issueareas even though they remain loose in others Likewise some issues may be closely linked through the operation of institutions while the boundaries of other issues as well as the norms and principles to be followed are subject to dispute Anarchy defined as lack of common government remains a constant but the degree to which interactions are structured and the means by which they are structured vary It has often been noted that militarysecurity issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy than do politicaleconomic W e would like to thank the other authors in this project for their helpful suggestions Robert Axelrod gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foun dation and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 227 ones Charles Lipson for instance has recently observed that political economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than military security 0nesI This does not mean however that analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks Indeed one of the major purposes of the present collection is to show that a single framework can throw light on both The case studies in this symposium have shown that the three di mensions discussed in the introductionmutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of playershelp us to understand the success and failure of attempts at cooperation in both military security and politicaleconomic relations Section I of this essay syn thesizes some of the findings of these case studies and thereby helps to specify some of the most important ways in which these three factors affect world politics It deals with issues in isolation from one another as separate games or as a series of games in order to clarify some basic analytic points In this section we follow the lead of game theorists who have tried to avoid complicating their models with extraneous material in order to reach interesting conclusions If the problem is a small event such as a duel between two airplanes our analysis of it may not depend on knowledge of the context eg the purpose of the war If the issue is of very high salience to participants such as the 1914 crisis or the Cuban missile crisis the extraneous issues such as tariffs or pollution of the Caribbean may be so insignificant that they can be ignored Either way the strategy of focusing only on the central inter action is clearly justified Yet if the issue is neither isolated nor allconsuming the context within which it takes place may have a decisive impact on its politics and its outcomes As the case studies illustrate world politics includes a rich variety of contexts Issues arise against distinctive backgrounds of past experience they are linked to other issues being dealt with simultaneously by the same actors and they are viewed by participants through the prisms of their expectations about the future To ignore the effects of context would be to overlook many of the most interesting questions raised by a gametheoretic perspective on the problem of cooperation In Section 11 we therefore consider the context of issues in so doing we move outward from the three dimensions on which this collection focuses toward broader considerations including linkages among issues multilevel games complications encountered by strategies of reciprocity I Lipson International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs World Politics 37 October 1984 123 228 WORLD POLITICS in complex situations and the role of international institutions Analysis of the context of games leads us to regard context as malleable not only can actors in world politics pursue different strategies within an estab lished context of interaction they may also seek to alter that context through building institutions embodying particular principles norms rules or procedures for the conduct of international relations In the conclusion we will argue that a contextual approach to strategyby leading us to see the importance of international institutionshelps us to forge necessary links between gametheoretic arguments and theories about international regimes Three situational dimensions affect the propensity of actors to co operate mutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of actors A PAYOFF STRUCTURE MUTUAL AND CONFLICTING PREFERENCES It is well established that the payoff structure for a game affects the level of cooperation For comparisons within a given type of game this idea was first formalized by Axelrod who established a measure of conflict of interest for specific games including Prisoners Dilemma Experimental evidence demonstrated that the greater the conflict of interest between the players the greater the likelihood that the players would in fact choose to defect Jervis has elaborated on these theories and shown that different types of games such as Stag Hunt and Chicken have different potentials for cooperation3 He has also applied his stra tegic analysis to historical and contemporary problems related to the security dilemma His work clearly indicates that international co operation is much easier to achieve in some game settings than in others Payoff structures often depend on events that take place outside of the control of the actors The economic depressions of 18731896 and of the early 1930s stimulated demands for protection by firms and in dividuals in distress and therefore reduced the incentives of governments to cooperate with one another The weakness and vacillation of the British and French governments before 1939 reduced the potential value Robert Axelrod Conflict of Interest An Axiomatic Approach Journal of Conflict Resolution 11 March 1967 8799 and Conflict of Interest A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics Chicago Markham 1970 3 Robert Jervis Cooperation under the Security Dilemma WorM Politics 30 January 1978 167214 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 229 of antiGerman alliances with those countries for the Soviet Union making a NaziSoviet pact seem relatively more attractive This is obvious enough Slightly less obvious is another point about mutuality of interests the payoff structure that determines mutuality of interests is not based simply upon objective factors but is grounded upon the actors perceptions of their own interests Perceptions define interests Therefore to understand the degree of mutuality of interests or to enhance this mutuality we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined One way to understand this process is to see it as involving a change in payoffs so that a game such as Prisoners Dilemma becomes either more or less conflictual To start with Prisoners Dilemma is a game in which both players have an incentive to defect no matter whether the other player cooperates or defects If the other player cooperates the first player prefers to defect DC CC On the other hand if the other player defects the first player still prefers to defect D D CD The dilemma is that if both defect both do worse than if both had coop erated CC DD Thus Prisoners Dilemma has a preference ordering for both players of DC CC D D CD4 Now consider a shift in the preferences of both players so that mutual cooperation is preferred to unilateral defection This makes the pref erence ordering CC DC D D CD which is a less conflictual game called Stag Hunt Jerviss study of the shift from balanceofpower systems to concerts suggests that after world wars the payoff matrix for the victors may temporarily be one of Stag Hunt fighting together results in a short lived preference for staying together After a war against a hegemonic power the other great powers often perceive a mutual interest in con tinuing to work together in order to ensure that the defeated wouldbe hegemon does not rise again They may even feel empathy for one another and take an interest in each others welfare These perceptions seem to have substantial momentum both among the mass public and in the bureaucracy Yet the cooperation that ensues is subject to fairly easy disruption As recovery from the war proceeds one or both parties may come to value cooperation less and relative gains more And if one side believes that its counterpart prefers to defect its own preference will shift to defection in order to avoid the worst payoff CD Actors can also move from Prisoners Dilemma to more conflictual 4 The definition of Prisoners Dilemma also includes one additional restriction CC DC CD2 This is to ensure that it is better to have mutual cooperation than to have an even chance of being the exploiter or the exploited 230 WORLD POLITICS games If both players come to believe that mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection the game becomes Deadlock with both sides havingpreferences ofDC D D CC CD Since the dominant strategy of each player is to defect regardless of what the other does the likely outcome is DD Players in Deadlock unlike those in Prisoners Dilemma will not benefit from repeated plays since mutual cooperation is not preferred to mutual defection Kenneth Oye provides a fine example of the movement from Pris oners Dilemma to Deadlock in his essay on monetary diplomacy in the I930S in this collection Shifts in beliefs not only about international regimes but particularly about desirable economic policy led leaders such as Franklin D Roosevelt to prefer unilateral uncoordinated action to international cooperation on the terms that appeared feasible Oye argues that the early 1930s do not mark a failure of coordination where common interests existed as in Prisoners Dilemma rather they in dicate the decay of these common interests as perceived by participants In their essay in the present collection Downs Rocke and Siverson argue that arms races are often games of Deadlock rather than Prisoners Dilemma making them much more difficult to resolve Beliefs are as important in the military area as in economics Consider for example Van Everas study of the beliefs leading to World War I By 1914 what Van Evera labels the cult of the offensive was universally accepted in the major European countries It was a congenial doctrine for military elites everywhere since it magnified the role of the military and reduced that of the diplomats It also happened to be disastrously wrong since its adherents failed to appreciate the overwhelming ad vantage that recent technological change had given to the defensive in what was soon to become trench warfare and overlooked the experi ences of the American Civil War and the RussoJapanese War Gripped by this cult of the offensive European leaders sought to gain safer borders by expanding national territories and took more seriously the possibility of successful aggressive war hence Germany and to a lesser extent other European powers adopted expansionist policies that brought them into collision with one another European leaders also felt greater compulsion to mobilize and strike first in a crisis since the penalty of moving late would be greater in an offensedominant world this compulsion then fueled the spiral of mobilization and counter mobilization that drove the July 1914 crisis out of control Had Euro peans recognized the actual power of the defense expansionism would have lost much of its appeal and the compulsion to mobilize and coun termobilize would have diminished Put differently the European payoff ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 231 structure actually would have rewarded cooperation but Europeans perceived a payoff structure that rewarded noncooperation and re sponded accordingly Beliefs not realities governed conduct The case of 1914 also illustrates a point made above subjective inter pretations by one side become objective reality for the other side When a European state adopted expansionist policies those nearby found them selves with an expansionist neighbor and had to adjust accordingly For instance Germanys expansionism though largely based on illusions led to a genuine change in Russias environment Russia adopted its inflexible war plan which required mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria partly because the Russians feared that Germany would strike into Russias northern territories once the Russian armies were embroiled with Austria Thus the Russian calculus was importantly affected by Russias image of German intent and Russia was driven to bellicose measures by fear of German bellicosity German expansionism was premised largely on illusions but for Russia this expansionism was a real danger that required a response This discussion of payoff structures should make it clear that the contributors to this volume do not assume that Prisoners Dilemmas are typical of world politics More powerful actors often face less powerful ones yielding asymmetric payoff matrices Furthermore even symmet rical games can take a variety of forms as illustrated by Stag Hunt Chicken and Deadlock What is important for our purposes is not to focus exclusively on Prisoners Dilemma per se but to emphasize the fundamental problem that it along with Stag Hunt and Chicken il lustrates In these games myopic pursuit of selfinterest can be disastrous Yet both sides can potentially benefit from cooperationif they can only achieve it Thus choices of strategies and variations in institutions are particularly important and the scope for the exercise of intelligence is considerable Our review of payoff structures also illustrates one of the major themes of this collection of essays that politicaleconomic and militarysecurity issues can be analyzed with the same analytical framework Admittedly economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual payoff structures than do those of military security Coordination among bankers as described by Lipson has been more extensive and successful than most arms control negotiations as analyzed by Downs and his colleagues and the patterns of trade conflict and cooperation described by Conybeare are hardly as conflictual as Van Everas story of World War I On the other hand the great power concerts discussed by Jervis as well as several of the arms control negotiations were more cooperative than the 232 WORLD POLITICS trade and monetary measures of 19301933 delineated in Oyes essay And postwar economic relations between the United States and Japan have been more conflictual than militarysecurity relations As an em pirical matter military issues may more often have payoff structures involving a great deal of conflict of interest but there is no theoretical reason to believe that this must always be the case5 B THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE In Prisoners Dilemma concern about the future helps to promote cooperation The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs the less the incentive to defect todaysince the other side is likely to retaliate tomrrow The cases discussed in the present essays support this argument and identify specific factors that help to make the shadow of the future an effective promoter of cooperation These factors include I long time horizons 2 regularity of stakes 3 reliability of information about the others actions 4 quick feedback about changes in the others actions The dimension of the shadow of the future seems to differentiate military from economic issues more sharply than does the dimension of payoffs Indeed its four components can be used to analyze some of the reasons why issues of international political economy may be settled more cooperatively than issues of international security even when the underlying payoff matrices are similarfor example when Prisoners Dilemma applies Most important is a combination of the first two factors long time horizons and regularity of stakes In economic rela tions actors have to expect that their relationships will continue over an indefinite period of time that is the games they play with each other will be iterated Typically neither side in an economic interaction can eliminate the other or change the nature of the game decisively in a single move In security affairs by contrast the possibility of a successful preemptive war can sometimes be a tempting occasion for the rational timing of surprise7 Another way to put this is that in the international political economy retaliation for defection will almost always be possible 5 For an earlier discussion of contemporary events using a common analytical framework to examine both economic and security relations see Oye The Domain of Choice in Kenneth A Oye Donald Rothchild and Robert J Lieber eds Eagle Entangled US Foreign Policy in a Complex WorM New York Longman 1979 333 Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation New York Basic Books 1984 7 Robert Axelrod The Rational Timing of Surprise WorM Politics 31 January 1979 22846 233 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY therefore a rational player considering defection has to consider its probability and its potential consequences In security affairs it may be possible to limit or destroy the opponents capacity for effective retal iation T o illustrate this point let us compare the case of 1914 with contem porary international debt negotiations In 1914 some Germans imbued with the cult of the offensive thought that a continental war would permanently solve Germanys security problems by restructuring power and territorial relations in Europe For these German leaders the temp tation to defect was huge largely because the shadow of the future seemed so small Indeed it seemed that future retaliation could be prevented or rendered ineffective by decisive German action Moreover in the opening move of a war the stakes would be far greater than usual because of the value of preempting before the other side was fully mobilized This perceived irregularity in the stakes further undercut the potential for sustained cooperation based upon reciprocity By contrast contemporary negotiations among banks and between banks and debtor countries are heavily affected by the shadow of the future That is not to say that the stakes of each game are the same indeed there are great discontinuities since deadlines for rescheduling take on importance for regulators banks and the reputations of bor rowers But the banks know that they will be dealing both with the debtor countries and with one another again and again Continuing interbank relationships imply as Lipson points out that small banks will think twice before doublecrossing large banks by refusing to par ticipate in rescheduling This is particularly true if the small banks are closely tied in a variety of ways to the large banks Continuing relations between banks and debtor countries give the banks incentives to co operate with the debtor countries not merely in order to facilitate debt servicing on loans already made but to stay in their good graces looking toward a more prosperous future The fact that Argentina Brazil and Mexico are so large and are perceived to be potentially wealthy is a significant bargaining asset for them now since it increases the banks expected profits from future lending and therefore enlarges the shadow of the future Indeed if these governments could credibly promise to favor in the future banks that help them now and to punish or ignore those that defect in these critical times they could further improve their bargaining positions but as sovereign governments whose leaders will be different in the future they cannot effectively do so Reliability of information about the others actions and promptness of feedback are also important in affecting the shadow of the future 234 WORLD POLITICS although they do not seem to differentiate militarysecurity from polit icaleconomic issues so clearly Because of the absence of military secrecy actors may sometimes have more reliable information on political economic than on militarysecurity issues Banks thrive on differential access to information and therefore hold it closely Furthermore since the systemic effects of politicaleconomic actions are often difficult to judge and cheating at the margin is frequently easy feedback between policy and results may be slow For instance the distribution of benefits from the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations is still a matter of conjecture and political contention rather than economic knowledge By contrast the superpowers publish lists of the precise number of missiles in each others inventories and we can assume that information about the effect of a military action by either sideshort of a devastating surprise attack that would destroy command and control facilitieswould be com municated almost immediately to the leaders of both states The length of the shadow of the future like the character of payoff structures is not necessarily dictated by the objective attributes of a situation On the contrary as we have just seen expectations are im portant International institutions may therefore be significant since institutions embody and affect actors expetations Thus institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues The principles and rules of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors In this way international regimes help to link the future with the present That is as true of arms control agreements in which willingness to make future agreements depends on others compliance with previous arrangements as it is in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which embodies norms and rules against which the behavior of members can be judged By sanctioning retaliation for those who violate rules regimes create expectations that a given violation will be treated not as an isolated case but as one in a series of interrelated actions C NUMBER OF ACTORS SANCTIONING PROBLEMS The ability of governments to cooperate in a mixedmotive game is affected not only by the payoff structure and the shadow of the future but also by the number of players in the game and by how their rela tionships are structured Axelrod has shown that reciprocity can be an Stephen DKrasner ed International Regimes Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1983 Robert 0 Keohane After Hegemony Cooperation and Dircord in the World Political Economy Princeton Princeton University Press 1984 235 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY effective strategy to induce cooperation among selfinterested players in the iterated bilateral Prisoners Dilemma where the values of each actors options are clearly specified9 However effective reciprocity de pends on three conditions I players can identify defectors 2 they are able to focus retaliation on defectors and 3 they have sufficient long run incentives to punish defectors When there are many actors these conditions are often more difficult to satisfy In such situations it may be impossible to identify much less to punish defection even if it is possible none of the cooperators may have an incentive to play the role of policeman Each cooperator may seek to be a freerider on the will ingness of others to enforce the rules We may call the difficulty of preventing defection through decen tralized retaliation the sanctioning problem Its first form the inability to identify defectors is illustrated by the terrorist bombings against American installations in Lebanon in 1983 The United States did not know at the time the bombings took place who was responsible The only state that could plausibly have been held responsible was Syria but since the Syrians denied responsibility retaliation against Damascus could have spread and deepened the conflict without punishing the terrorist groups themselves The issue of identifying defectors is one aspect of a fundamental problem besetting efforts to cooperate in world politics acquiring in a timely fashion adequate amounts of highquality information In order to maintain cooperation in games that reward unreciprocated defection such as Prisoners Dilemma governments must have confidence in their ability to monitor their counterparts actions sufficiently well to enable them to respond effectively to betrayal As Lipson has pointed out the greater perils of betrayal to the side that is betrayed in militarysecurity than in politicaleconomic relations put more severe demands on gathering information in the former than in the latter arealo The second form of the sanctioning problem occurs when players are unable to focus retaliation on defectors This difficulty is illustrated by Conybeares analysis of the AngloHanse trade wars The Hanseatic League was unable to punish English privateers for their depredations and instead retaliated against English merchants in Hanseatic towns This produced escalation rather than cooperation The third form of the sanctioning problem arises when some members of a group lack incentives to punish defectors This obstacle to co operation often arises where there are many actors some of which fail 9 Axelrod fn 6 Lipson fn I 236 WORLD POLITICS to cooperate in the common effort to achieve some collective good Oye observes that although British devaluation in 1931 hurt other countries no single government had the incentive to devote its own resources to bring about a revision of British policy This form of the sanctioning problemlack of incentives to punish defectorsalso arose in the debt negotiations of the 1980s T o prevent default it was necessary to arrange rescheduling agreements involving additional bank lending Smaller banks were tempted to refuse to provide new funds Only the fact that the large banks had strong incentives to put pressure on smaller ones to ante up prevented rescheduling agreements from unravelling like a cheap sweater When sanctioning problems are severe cooperation is in danger of collapsing One way to bolster it is to restructure the situation so that sanciioning becomes more feasible Sometimes this is done unilaterally Oye points out that external benefits or costs may be privatizable that is changes can be made in the situation so that the benefits and costs of ones actions are directed specifically at those with whom one has negotiated He argues that in the early 1930s Britain eventually succeeded in privatizing its international currency relationships by adopting ex change controls and attaching conditions negotiated bilaterally to new loans This transformation of the game permitted a modest revival of international lending based not on open access to British capital markets but on bilateral reciprocity As our examples kdicate sanctioning problems canoccur both in the international political economy and on militarysecurity issues They tend to be more severe on militarysecurity than on politicaleconomy issues due to the high costs of punishing defections the difficulties of monitoring behavior and the stringent demands for information that are imposed when successful defection can dramatically shorten the shadow of the future But since sanctioning problems occur on both types of issues issuearea alone cannot account for their incidence or severity To explain the incidence and severity of sanctioning problems we need to focus on the conditions that determine whether defection can be prevented through decentralized retaliation the ease of identi fying sources of action the ability of governments to focus retaliation or reward on particular targets and the incentives that exist for members of a group to punish defectors While the likelihood that these problems will arise may be enhanced by an increase in the number of actors involved difficulties may also appear on issues that seem at first glance to be strictly bilateral Consider for instance the example of 1914 In the Balkan crisis Austria sought 237 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY to impose sanctions against Serbia for its support of revolutionaries who tried to destroy the ethnically heterogeneous AustroHungarian empire But sanctions against Serbia implied punishment for Russia Serbias ally since Russian leaders were averse to accepting another Balkan setback Russian mobilization however could not be directed solely against Austria since Russia only had plans for general mobilizationll Thus neither Austria nor Russia was able to focus retaliation on the defector the actions of both helped to spread rather than to contain the crisis With more clever and moderate leadership Austria might have found a way to punish Serbia without threatening Russia And a detailed plan for mobilization only against Austria could have provided Russia with a more precisely directed measure to retaliate against Austrias ultimatum to Serbia Privatization is not the only way to maintain cooperation Moreover as some of our examples indicate it can be difficult to achieve Another way to resolve sanctioning problems is to construct international regimes to provide standards against which actions can be measured and to assign responsibility for applying sanctions Regimes provide information about actors compliance they facilitate the development and mainte nance of reputations they can be incorporated into actors rules of thumb for responding to others actions and they may even apportion respon sibility for decentralized enforcement of rules12 harles Lipsons discussion of the international lending regime that has been constructed by bankers reveals how regimes can promote co operation even when there are many actors no dominant power and no world central bank Creditor committees were established under the leadership of large moneycenter banks Each moneycenter bank then took responsibility for a number of relatively large regional banks which in turn were assigned similar responsibilities for smaller banks13 As a result a hierarchy of banks was created isolating smaller banks from one another and establishing responsibility for enforcing sanctions Small banks displaying tendencies toward defection were threatened with being outside the flow of information in the future and implicitly with not being offered participation in lucrative future loans This informal hierarchy of course was reinforced by the presence of the US Federal Reserve System looming in the background stories whether apocryphal or not of small bankers being told to cough up by high officials of Robert E Osgood and Robert W Tucker Force Order and Justice Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1967 esp chap 2 The Expansion of Force I Keohane fn 8 49132 Lipson Bankers Dilemmas in this collection 200225 238 WORLD POLITICS the Fed circulated in banking circles during the early 1980s It would have taken a bold president of a small bank to ignore both the banking hierarchy and the danger of arousing the Feds wrath by not participating in a rescheduling This reference to the role of institutions in transforming Nperson games into collections of twoperson games suggests once again the importance of the context within which games are played In isolation the basic concepts discussed in the introductionpayoff structures it eration and the number of playersprovide only a framework for analysis They take on greater significance as well as complexity when they are viewed within the broader context of other issues other games and the institutions that affect the course of world politics We now turn to the question of how the context of interaction affects political behavior and outcomes Whether cooperation can take place without central guidance depends not merely on the three gametheoretic dimensions we have emphasized so far but also on the context within which interaction takes place Context may of course mean many different things Any interaction takes place within the context of norms that are shared often implicitly by the participants John Ruggie has written of the deep structure of sovereignty in world politicsl4 and also of the way in which shifting values and norms of state intervention in societythe emergence and legitimation of the welfare stateaffected the world political economy between 1914 and 1945 International politicaleconomic bargaining was fundamentally changed by the shift during this period from laissez faire liberalism as a norm to what Ruggie calls embedded liberalisml5 Interactions also take place within the context of institutions Robert Keohane has argued elsewhere that even if one adopts the assumption that states are rational and selfinterested actors institutions can be shown to be important in world politics16 Institutions alter the payoff structures facing actors they may lengthen the shadow of the future John G Ruggie Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity Toward a Neorealist Synthesis World Politics 35 January 1983 26185 John G Ruggie International Regimes Transactions and Change Embedded Lib eralism in the Postwar Economic Order International Organization 36 Spring 1982 379 416 reprinted in Krasner fn 8 195231 Fred Hirsch The Ideological Underlay of Inflation in John Goldthorpe and Fred Hirsch eds The Political Economy of Injution London Martin Robertson 1978 26384 l6 Keohane fn 8 239 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY and they may enable Nperson games to be broken down into games with smaller numbers of actors Using the gametheoretic perspective of this symposium another way of looking at context may be especially revealing This aspect has to do with what we call multilevel games In such situations different games affect one another so that their outcomes become mutually contingent Three such situations are particularly important for world politics issue linkage domesticinternational connections and incompatibilities be tween games among different sets of actors After considering these situations we will turn to the implications of these multilevel games for the efficacy of a strategy of reciprocity in fostering cooperation A MULTILEVEL GAMES Issuelinkage Most issues are linked to other issues This means that games being played on different issuesdifferent chessboards in Stan ley Hoffmanns phrase1affect one another Connections between games become important when issues are linked Issuelinkage in this sense involves attempts to gain additional bar gaining leverage by making ones own behavior on a given issue con tingent on others actions toward other issuesls Issuelinkage may be employed by powerful states seeking to use resources from one issue area to affect the behavior of others elsewhere or it may be employed by outsiders attempting to break into what could otherwise be a closed game Linkage can be beneficial to both sides in a negotiation and can facilitate agreements that might not otherwise be possible19 Actors resources may differ so that it makes sense to trade one for the other the United States for instance may provide economic aid to Egypt in exchange for Egyptian support for American policy in the Middle East Furthermore different players may have preferences of different in tensities thus in a logrolling game each party trades its vote or policy position on an issue it values less highly for the others vote on one it values more highly The outstanding example of a successful bargaining linkage in our 7 Stanley Hoffmann International Organization and the International System Inter national Organization 24 Summer 1970 389413 l8Ernst B Haas refers to this as tactical issuelinkage contrasting it with substantive issuelinkage resulting from causal knowledge See Haas Why Collaborate Issuelinkage and International Regimes World Politics 32 April 1980 357405 at 372 For a sophisticated analysis of tactical issuelinkage see Michael McGinnis Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation Journal of Conjict Resolution forthcoming 19 Robert E Tollison and Thomas D Willett An Economic Theory of Mutually Ad vantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations International Organization 33 Fall 979 42549 240 WORLD POLITICS case studies is that of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 As Downs Rocke and Siverson show these arms control negotiations were suc cessful in part because they linked bargaining over arms with bargaining over other issues As part of an agreement to limit battleship construction Japan gave Britain and the United States guarantees regarding trade in China and limitations of fortification on certain Pacific islands Japan received legal recognition of its right to certain territory taken from Germany after World War I Bringing these issues into the negotiations to limit the building of battleships helped to make cooperation possible not only on these specific issues but on the whole package Of course not all issuelinkages promote agreement any more than each exercise of power can be expected to lead to cooperation Oye has distinguished between backscratching which he regards as welfare enhancing and blackmailing which may reduce welfare levels2o The backscratcher merely offers in return for compensation to refrain from acting in what would otherwise be its own best interest For instance a debtor country unable to make its payments on time without facing severe hardship or political revolution may offer to continue servicing its debts only if compensated with new loans and an easier payment schedule If this offer is rejected the debtor does what it would have done without the offer it defaults Backscratching entails a promise Blackmailing by contrast implies a threat As Schelling has pointed out the difference is that a promise is costly when it succeeds and a threat is costly when it failsll Black mailers threaten to act against their own interests unless compensated Thus a debtor country that would be hurt by defaulting may never theless threaten to do so unless compensation is offered This threat if carried out would leave both the debtor the blackmailer in this case and its creditors worse off than if it had merely acted in its own interest without bargaining at all If the blackmailing strategy works on the other hand the effect will be to transfer resources from the creditors to the debtor an action that will not necessarily improve overall welfare Although it may be difficult to differentiate between backscratching and blackmailing in practice the distinction helps us to recognize that issuelinkages have dangers as well as opportunities One side may demand so much of the other in other areas that cooperation will not take place even in the area of shared interests This accusation is fre lo Oye fn 5 Thomas C Schelling The Strategy of Conflict New York Oxford University Press 1964 177 241 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY quently made against Henry Kissingers version of linkage Kissinger insisted that the Soviets exercise great restraint in the Third World in return for American cooperation on arms control22 In Oyes terms Kissinger was trying to blackmail the Soviets by threatening to act against the United States own interests delay arms control unless the soviets compensated the United States with unilateral retraint The most intriguing point about linkage that is highlighted by the case studies is the existence of what could be called contextual issue linkage In such a situation a given bargain is placed within the context of a more important longterm relationship in such a way that the long term relationship affects the outcome of the particular bargaining proc ess Two cases of contextual issuelinkage show that this form can often work to reduce conflict even without affecting the preferences of the participants on the specific issues being discussed Oye notes that in 1936 the United States Britain and France were able to reach an agreement on international monetary reform because of the common security con cern over a rising Nazi Germany And as Downs and his colleagues point out by far the most important cause of cooperation in arms races that ended peacefully has been the activity of a third power For example the AngloFrench naval arms race of 18521853 was resolved when the two states formed an alliance in order to fight the Russians in the Crimean War International relations and domestic politics Similar analytic questions arise in considering connections between international relations and domestic politics Arms control negotiations involve not merely bar gaining between governments but within societies as well the Carter administration was able to resolve the SALT I1 game with the Soviet Union but not with the US Senate Trade issues typically also involve both international and domestic games In the Tokyo Round the same Carter administrationwith a different responsible party Robert Strausswas able to mesh international and domestic games playing them simultaneously rather than sequentially international first as had been done on some issues in the Kennedy Round a decade earlier The result in this case was that the Tokyo kound trade agreements with George W Breslauer Why Ditente Failed An Interpretation in Alexander L George and others Managing USSouiet Riualry Problems of Crisis Preuention Boulder CO Westview Press 1983 31940 John L Gaddis The Rise Fall and Future of Ditente Foreign Affairs 62 Winter 198384 35477 Stanley Hoffmann Detente in Joseph S Nye ed The Making ofAmericas Soviet Policy New Haven Yale University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations 1984 23164 3 Oye fn 5 17 242 WORLD POLITICS other countries were all ratified overwhelmingly by Congress in contrast to the rejection of some of the international agreements made in the Kennedy R0und4 Such domesticinternational connections are commonplace Fre quently the incentives provided by domestic bargaining games inhibit effective foreign policy and may exacerbate international conflict A well known case is that of American decision making during the early months of the Korean War General MacArthur was such a formidable figure in American politics that even his military superiors were reluctant to challenge his judgment in marching toward the Yalu River in the fall of 1950 yet this maneuver was so questionable that if it had not been for the domestic political games taking place serious reservations would have been expressed in the Pentagon and the White H0use5 Another type of domesticinternational linkage is discussed by Co nybeare in this collection During the 15th century the Hanseatic League responded to naval setbacks at the hands of Britain by financing and equipping Edward IV who upon defeating the ancastrians in the War of the Roses signed a treaty that was onesidedly favorable to the Hanses trading interests By intervening in British domestic politics the Hanse was thus able to triumph despite military weakness This technique intervening in a domestic political game as compensation for weakness at the international levelhas recently been employed in more subtle ways by small powers with strong interests in American foreign policy16 Compatibilities and incompatibilities among games Many different games take place in world politics involving different but overlapping sets of actors Sometimes the existence of more than one game makes it easier to attain cooperation but related games may also create diffi culties for one anothe That is games in world politics can be compatible or incompatible with each other One example of a set of compatible games is provided by cooperation in international economic negotiations among the major industrialized countries After World War 11 such cooperation was facilitated by the fact that these countries were military allies In contrast to Britains situation in the 19th century Americas ability to persuade other major trading states to accept the rules that it preferred was greatly enhanced by the fact that in the militarypolitical game the United States was a 24 Gilbert Winham Robert Strauss the MTN and the Control of Faction journal of WorM Trade Law 14 SeptemberOctober 1980 25 Alexander George and Richard Smoke Deterrence in American Foreign Policy New York Columbia University Press 1974 a6 Robert 0Keohane The Big Influence of Small Allies Foreign Policy No 2 Spring 1971 16182 243 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY senior partner rather than an adversary of the other major actors in the world economy To take another example Lipsons analysis of debt negotiations suggests that the negotiating game among large banks was rendered compatible with games between large and small banks by structuring the situation so that small banks could not coordinate with each other That is two sets of negotiations were made compatible by precluding a third one The case of 1914 illustrates the problem of incompatibility among games In noncrisis periods loyalty within an alliance was compatible with friendly relations across alliances But when the 1914 crisis occurred loyalty within an alliancesuch as Germanys support for Austria Rus sias for Serbia and Frances for Russiaimplied defection across al liances The increased cooperativeness of intraalliance games destroyed broader patterns of cooperation In the contemporary international political economy problems of incompatibility may also arise For instance negotiations on questions such as tariffs or energy policies are most likely to yield positive results for the advanced industrialized countries when only a few major players are involved in the initial negotiation Friction with others however especially the less developed countries may produce conflict on a larger scale Or to take a different example from the politics of international debt close and explicit collaboration among debtor countries could some fear disrupt relations between debtor governments and banks in the richer countries The contrast between the fate of SovietAmerican arms control in the 1970s and the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations illustrates the importance of multilevel games In the face of linkages to other con tentious issues complex domestic political games and a lack of rein forcement between politicaleconomic and militarysecurity games even shared interests a long shadow of the future and bilateralism may be insufficient to promote cooperation If the interaction happens to be an iterated game of Chicken the problem is even worse because each player has a strong incentive to avoid cooperation in the short run in order to develop a reputation for firmness in the long run Conversely even when there are quite severe conflicts of interest these may be overshadowed by more important mutual interests perhaps institutionalized in organ izations such as NATO Once again it is not sufficient to analyze a particular situation in isolation from its political context We must also analyze the patterns of expectations and the institutions created by human beings within which particular negotiations are located and in the light of which they are interpreted by participants 244 WORLD POLITICS B RECIPROCITY AS A STRATEGY IN MULTILEVEL GAMES Robert Axelrod has employed computer tournaments and theoretical analysis of the iterated twoplayer Prisoners Dilemma to show that a strategy based on reciprocitysuch as TitforTatcan be remarkably effective in promoting co0peration7 Even among pure egoists co operation can emerge if a small initial cluster of potential cooperators exists This argument suggests that governments may have incentives to practice reciprocity in a variety of situations that are characterized by mixtures of conflicting and complementary intereststhat is in certain nonzerosum games Evidence for this proposition is established best for the particular case of Prisoners Dilemma Axelrods theory suggests that in this game a strategy based on reciprocity can yield relatively high payoffs against a variety of other strategies Furthermore such a strategy helps the whole community by punishing players who use uncooperative strategies When payoff structures are those of Prisoners Dilemma therefore we can expect practitioners of reciprocity to attempt to insti tutionalize it as a general practice so that they will benefit from others use of the strategy as well as their own As we have noted above not every situation in which conflict or cooperation may occur can be categorized as Prisoners Dilemma Games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt are also significant Evidence on these cases is not as extensive as on Prisoners Dilemma Yet as Oyes intro duction points out there are good reasons to believe that reciprocity is an attractive strategy in a variety of nonzerosum situations The key conditions for the successful operation of reciprocity are that mutual cooperation can yield better results than mutual defection but that temptations for defection also exist In such situations reciprocity may permit extensive cooperation without making cooperative participants inordinately vulnerable to exploitation by others Furthermore it may deter uncooperative actions18 7 Axelrod fn 6 Consider the example of Stag Hunt defined by the preference ordering of both players as CC DC D D 1 CD If Player A is credibly committed to a strategy of reciprocity beginning with cooperation Bs incentives to cooperate are enhanced As commitment to cooperate ensures that B will not be doublecrossed which would leave B with the worst payoff Furthermore As commitment to retaliate against defection ensures that any de fection by B would lead after the first move not to Bs secondbest outcome DC but to its thirdbest outcome DD The game of Chicken provides another appropriate case in point In Chicken mutual cooperation is only the secondbest outcome for both players but mutual defection is worst for both Thus DC CC CD DD A credible strategy of reciprocity by Player A in Chicken ensures B of its secondbest outcome if it cooperates and guarantees that continual defection will in the long run provide it with its worst payoff Assuming that Bs shadow of the future is sufficiently long it should respond to As strategy of reciprocity by cooperating ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 245 It is not surprising therefore that reciprocity is a popular strategy for practical negotiators as well as for analysts in the laboratory Oyes analysis of monetary politics in the 1930s reveals that Britain developed such a strategy in its relations with the Scandinavian countries Con temporary discussions of international trade provide another case in point US officials have frequently defended reciprocity in trade rela tions on the grounds that pursuit of this strategy would deter discrim ination against American products by other countries and that relaxation of reciprocity would invite retaliation by others Even observers skeptical about reciprocity often agree In a policyoriented article critical of cur rent proposals that the united states should practice aggressive rec iprocity in trade negotiations William Cline argues that such action is rendered less effective by a high probability of foreign counterretalia tionl9 In Axelrods terms TitforTat which begins by cooperating and then retaliates once for each defection by the other player discourages exploitative strategiesaggressive reciprocity Thus the applicability of TitforTat does not seem to be limited to Prisoners Dilemma yet it is not a perfect strategy In the first place it can perpetuate conflict through an echo effect if the other player defects once TitforTat will respond with a defection and then if the other player does the same in response the result would be an unending echo of alternating defections30 In realworld politics as well as in the laboratory reciprocity can lead to feuds as well as to cooperation par ticularly when players have different perceptions of past outomes3 SovietAmerican ditente collapsed partly because each side concluded that the other was not practicing reciprocity but was on the contrary taking unilateral advantage of its own retraint3 Second even when many shared interests exist and judgments of equivalence are not dis torted reciprocity may lead to deadlock John W Evans has pointed out that in tariff negotiations conducted according to the principle of reciprocity potential concessions may become bargaining chips to be hoarded Tariffs that have no intrinsic economic value for a country that maintains them have acquired value because of the insistence of other countries on reciprocity in the bargaining process As a result tariff levels may be maintained in spite of the fact that a lower level Reciprocity A New Approach to World Trade Policy Institute for Inter national Economics Policy Analyses in International Economics 2 Washington September 984 25 J0 Axelrod fn 6 176 31 For an analysis of the spiral mode of conflict see Robert Jervis Perception and Misper ception in International Politics Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1976 esp 58 3 3See references cited in fn 22 Cline 9 246 WORLD POLITICS would raise the countrys real income33 Third when several actors negotiate separately and sequentially over issues that are substantively interdependent subsequent bargains may call previous agreements into question by altering the value of concessions that have been made This issue interdependence problem bedeviled trade negotiations under the conditional mostfavorednation clause prior to the institution of multilateral trade negotiations after World War 11 Conditional most favorednation treatment permitted discrimination among suppliers Later agreements between an importer and other suppliers therefore eroded the value of earlier concessions This led to complex acrimonious and frustrating patterns of bargaining Despite these difficulties reciprocity remains a valuable strategy for decentralized enforcement of cooperative agreements Players who are aware of the problems of echo effects bargaining deadlocks and issue interdependence can compensate for these pitfalls Axelrod observes that a better strategy than TitforTat might be to return only ninetenths of a tit for a tat35 The Tokyo Round dealt with the deadlock problem by beginning negotiations not on the basis of current tariff rates but rather on the basis of a formula for hypothetical large acrosstheboard tariff cuts with provisions for withdrawing offers on sensitive products or if adequate compensation was not received The problem of issue interdependence was dealt with in the trade area through multilater alization of tariff negotiations and adoption of unconditional most favorednation treatment These difficulties in applying reciprocity and the responses of players to them illustrate the significance of the institutions within which rec iprocity is practiced As noted above multilateral trade negotiations are a case in point In the militarysecurity area reciprocity has also been institutionalized For example stationing of American troops in Europe is linked to purchases of American military equipment by European governments NATO as an institution has helped member governments achieve a variety of such reciprocal arrangements The debt negotiations discussed by Lipson also illustrate how rec iprocity can be institutionalized in an Nperson game First the major actors are identified and bilateral negotiations take place between them or their agents The IMF and committees of banks negotiate with debtor countries At a second stage smaller banks are given the oppor 33 Evans The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy The Twilight of the GATT Cambridge Harvard University Press 1971 3132 34 See Robert 0Keohane Reciprocity in International Relations International Organ ization 40 Winter 1986 35 Axelrod fn 6 138 247 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY tunity to adhere to these bargains but not to influence their terms At this stage emphasis is placed on reciprocity at a different level although the smaller actors have the potential to act as freeriders efforts are made to ensure that they have incentives not to do so for fear that they may suffer in a larger game Small banks face the threat of being excluded from crucial relationships with big banks and from future lending consortia if they fail to provide funds for rescheduling loans As in the other cases described above strategies of reciprocity for debt rescheduling are adapted creatively to avoid the problems of issue interdependence that arise when there are many actors A THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION The contributors to Cooperation under Anarchy did not specifically set out to explore the role of perception in decision making but the im portance of perception has kept asserting itself The significance of perception including beliefs and cognition will come as no surprise to students of international p0litics3 Yet it is worth pointing out once again that decision making in ambiguous settings is heavily influenced by the ways in which the actors think about their problem While this point has been made in laboratory studies many times37 there is an important twist in international politics that does not get sufficient attention from the psychologists who study decision making in the laboratory Leaders of one state live far away from the leaders of other states They are far away not only in space but also in their cognitive framework their tacit assumptions differ about what is im portant what needs to be done and who bears the responsibility for change Put simply those acting on behalf of states often do not ap preciate how their own actions will affect others and how they will be interpreted by others As Van Evera concludes from his study of World War I preventing that war would have required dispelling extensive misperceptions that were prevalent in Europe before 1914 Other striking examples of the importance of perception also come from the security area For example Downs Rocke and Siverson have found that even when nations in arms races built defensive rather than J6 Jervis fn 31 37 For example Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman Judgment under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases Science 185 September 1974 2431 Richard Nisbet and Lee Ross Human Inference Strategies and Shortcomings of Social judgment Englewood Cliffs NJ PrenticeHall 1980 248 WORLD POLITICS offensive weapons it was usually done not to defuse the arms race but simply because they believed that such weapons offered the greatest amount of security per dollar Even more to the point is that many arms races were started or accelerated without serious appreciation of the consequences For example when the Soviet leaders deliberately exag gerated their bomber strength in 1955 and their ICBM capabilities several years later they did so for shortterm political advantages there is no evidence that they fully appreciated the longterm consequences that would follow when the United States geared up to take the threat seriously In general Downs Rocke and Siverson find that arms races are not often perceived as the result of actions chosen by others In the events leading to the outbreak of war national leaders may completely misunderstand the consequences of their acts Van Evera notes for example that in 1914 the Russian government did not realize that Russias mobilization would lead directly to Germanys mobilization and to war Another example of the impact of biased interpretations of events is provided by Jervis in his discussion of the decay of greatpower concerts which were undermined by divergent views of which side had made greater concessions to maintain cooperation While security issues provide the most dramatic examples govern ments may be no better at understanding how their actions in the realm of political economy will be seen by others Conybeares study shows that trade wars have sometimes begun when states held mistaken beliefs that other countries would be reluctant to raise tariffs on imported food in retaliation for new tariffs placed on their exported manufactured goods Trade wars have begun when states had exaggerated expectations about the tolerance of others for attempts at minor exploitation in widely accepted terms of trade B GROPING TOWARD NEW INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS Our project began with a set of hypotheses about how specific features of an international setting would affect the chances for the development of cooperation Factors included were mutuality of interests the shadow of the future and the number of actors These hypotheses have been supported by a broad set of cases that began in the 14th century and covered trade disputes monetary policy and debt rescheduling as well as arms races the outbreak of war and diplomatic concerts The three factors did in fact help to account for both cooperation and conflict We also discovered something else over and over again we observed that the actors were not satisfied with simply selecting strategies based upon the situation in which they found themselves In many cases we 249 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY saw deliberate efforts to change the very structure of the situation by changing the context in which each of them would be acting Decision makers themselves perceived more or less consciously that some aspects of the situations they faced tended to make cooperation difficult So they worked to alter these background conditions Among the problems they encountered were the following I how to provide incentives for cooperation so that cooperation would be rewarded over the long run and defection punished 2 how to monitor behavior so that cooperators and defectors could be identified 3 how to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation on defectors 4 how to link issues with one another in productive rather than self defeating ways and more generally how to play multilevel games without tripping over their own strategies A fundamental strategic concept in attaining these objectives is that of reciprocity Cooperation in world politics seems to be attained best not by providing benefits unilaterally to others but by conditional co operation Yet reciprocity encounters many problems in practice As Axelrod has demonstrated and as Van Everas discussion of 1914 il lustrates payoff structures in the strategic setting may be so malign that TitforTat cannot work Reciprocity requires the ability to recognize and retaliate against a defection And retaliation can spread acrimo niously Actors in world politics seek to deal with problems of reciprocity in part through the exercise of power Powerful actors structure relation ships so that countries committed to a given order can deal effectively with those that have lower levels of commitment This is done by establishing hierarchies as one would expect from Herbert Simons assertion that complex systems will be hierarchic in character In the present symposium the construction of hierarchy for the sake of co operation is best illustrated by Lipsons discussion of interbank networks to facilitate rescheduling of Third World debts but it is also evident in Jerviss discussion of greatpower concerts Another way to facilitate cooperation is to establish international regimes Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles norms rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations39 In ternational regimes have been extensive in the post1945 international 38 Simon The Sciences of the Artificial Cambridge MIT Press zd ed 1982chap 4 The Architecture of Complexity p 99 39 Krasner fn 8 3 250 WORLD POLITICS political economy as illustrated by the international trade regime cen tered on the GATT and the international monetary regime including the IMF as well as other organizations and networks40 Since the use of power can facilitate the construction of regimes this approach should be seen as complementary to rather than in contradiction with an emphasis on hierarchical authority Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense but they do change patterns of transaction costs and provide information to participants so that uncertainty is reduced Jervis argues that the Concert of Europe helped to facilitate cooperation by making it easier for governments to understand one another Lipson shows how in the regime for debt rescheduling the control of infor mation is used to faciliate cooperation on terms favored by the big banks He also indicates that one weapon in the hands of those banks is their ability to structure transaction costs the costs of negotiations involving major moneycenter banks are reduced while the costs of coordinating resistance by small banks are not Conybeares analysis implies that if England and the Hanseatic League had been able to form an interna tional trade regime they might have been able to make mutually ad vantageous bargains and to discipline some of their more unruly con stituents International regimes do not substitute for reciprocity rather they reinforce and institutionalize it Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly In sofar as they specify precisely what reciprocity means in the relevant issuearea they make it easier to establish a reputation for practicing reciprocity consistently Such reputations may become important assets precisely because others will be more willing to make agreements with governments that can be expected to respond to cooperation with co operation Of course compliance is difficult to assure and international regimes almost never have the power to enforce rules Nevertheless since governments with good reputations can more easily make agree ments than governments with bad ones international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation by making it both easier and more desirable to acquire a good reputation4 International regimes may also help to develop new norms as Ruggie has arged4 Yet few such examples are evident in the cases discussed in this volume The greatpower concerts discussed by Jervis embodied new norms but these did not last long and the new norms of the 1930s 40 Keohane fn 8 chaps 89 4 Ibid esp chaps 57 42 Ruggie fn 15 251 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY monetary system described by Oye were largely uncooperative and con nected with the breakdown rather than the institutionalization of a regime Major banks today are trying mightily to strengthen norms of repayment for debtors and of relending for banks but it is not at all clear that this will be successful Better examples of creating norms may be provided by the evolution of thinking on chemical and biological warfare and by the development under GATT of norms of non discriminationwhich are now as we have seen under pressure Ev idently it is difficult to develop new norms and they often decay in reaction to conspicuous violations Establishing hierarchies setting up international regimes and at tempting to gain acceptance for new norms are all attempts to change the context within which actors operate by changing the very structure of their interaction It is important to notice that these efforts have usually not been examples of forwardlooking rationality Rather they have been experimental trialanderror efforts to improve the current situation based upon recent experience Like other forms of trialand error experimentation they have not always worked Indeed it is in structive to enumerate the variety of ways in which such experiments can fail I The most important source of failure is that efforts to restructure the relationships may never get off the ground As Downs Rocke and Siverson note there was an active peace movement in the years before 1914 and World War I was preceded by a series of con ferences designed to secure arms control and strengthen inter national law but these efforts did not significantly affect the nature of world politics Similarly the shakiness of monetary arrange ments in the 1920s was perceived by many of the participants but conferences to deal with these weaknesses such as that at Genoa in 1922 failed to cope with them effectively The greatpower concerts discussed by Jervis seemed to get somewhat farther but were never sufficiently institutionalized to have much prospect of longevity 2 Some agreements are instituted but turn out to be selfcontradic tory We have noted that sequential bilateral negotiations under conditional mostfavorednation treatment may lead to a problem of infinite regress each bargain tends to require the renegotiation of many others Bilateral arms control agreements whose restraints could encourage third parties to increase their armaments in order to catch up with the major powers face a similar difficulty 3 Even successful arrangements are subject to decay Decay can result WORLD POLITICS from actors attempts to find loopholes in established rules The very success of GATT in reducing tariff rates contributed to an expansion of nontariff barriers and efforts to evade those barriers led to their progressive extension and tightening43 Likewise suc cessful cooperation in the area of security may lead governments to believe that their partners cooperation is not based on reciprocity but is unconditional Insofar as this belief is incorrect discord may ensue 4 In some cases changes that have nothing to do with the arrange ments make them obsolete Thus the international debt regime in place before the crisis of August 1982 was manifestly illequipped to handle a situation in which most Third World debts had to be rescheduled In this instance the old regime was adapted to meet new needs The Depression of the 1930s made the monetary or thodoxy of the gold exchange standard obsolete Indeed Oye argues that the cooperative international monetary arrangements of the 1920s hindered attempts at monetary cooperation during the 1930s The collapse of the old regime was a necessary condition for cre ation of a new one Eventually any institution is likely to become obsolete The question is under what conditions international institutionsbroadly defined as recognized patterns of practice around which expectations con verge44facilitate significant amounts of cooperation for a period of time Clearly such institutions can change the incentives for countries affected by them and can in turn affect the strategic choices governments make in their own selfinterest This interaction between incentives and institutions suggests the im portance of linking the upwardlooking theory of strategy with the downwardlooking theory of regimes The strategic approach is upward looking in that it examines what individual actors will choose to do and derives consequences for the entire system based on these choices Most of the analysis in this volume has followed this upwardlooking approach On the other hand much regime analysis has been downward looking in that it examines the implications for actors of the way the entire system is organized Some recent work has attempted to combine 43 Vinod Aggarwal The Unraveling of the MultiFiber Arrangement 1981 An Ex amination of Regime Change International Organization 37 Autumn 1983 61746 David B Yoffie Power and Protectionism Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries New York Columbia University Press 1983 44Oran R Young Regime Dynamics The Rise and Fall of International Regimes International Organization 36 Spring 1982 27798 reprinted in Krasner fn 8 93114 253 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY these two approachest5 but it has not yet been done in either a formally rigorous or an empirically comprehensive way The experimental groping by policy makers does not necessarily lead to stronger and ever more complex ways of achieving cooperation The process proceeds by fits and starts The success of each step is uncertain and there is always danger that prior achievements will come unstuck New experiments are often tried only under obvious pressure of events as in debt rescheduling And they are often dependent upon the active leadership of a few individuals or states who feel a serious need for change and who have the greatest resources The essays in this collection show that we are beginning to understand the structural conditions that affect strategic choices leading to co operation or discord These factors are mutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of actors Over a wide range of historical cases these three dimensions of situations do help account for the emer gence or nonemergence of cooperation under anarchy But in the course of this collective research we have also found that states are often dissatisfied with the structure of their own environment We have seen that governments have often tried to transform the struc tures within which they operate so as to make it possible for the countries involved to work together productively Some of these experiments have been successful others have been stillborn and still others have collapsed before fully realizing the dreams of their founders We understand the functions performed by international regimes and how they affect strat egies pursued by governments better than we did a number of years ago What we need now are theories that account for I when exper iments to restructure the international environment are tried and 2 whether a particular experiment is likely to succeed Even within a world of independent states that are jealously guarding their sovereignty and protecting their power room exists for new and better arrangements to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes in terms both of economic welfare and military security This does not mean that all endeavors to promote international co operation will yield good results Cooperation can be designed to help a few at the expense of the rest and it can accentuate as well as alleviate injustice in an imperfect world Yet the consequences of failure to co 45 In After Hegemony fn 8 Robert Keohane has sought to show how game theory which is upwardlooking can be combined fruitfully with the downwardlooking theories of public goods and market failure to develop a functional theory of international regimes But he has not formalized his theory and has applied it only to the postWorld War I1 international political economy 254 WORLD POLITICS operatefrom warfare to the intensification of depressionsmake us believe that more cooperation is often better than less If governments are prepared to grope their way toward a bettercoordinated future scholars should be prepared to study the process And in a world where states have often been dissatisfied with international anarchy scholars should be prepared to advance the learning processso that despite the reality of anarchy beneficial forms of international cooperation can be promoted Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations STEFANO GUZZINI Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Fredericiagade 18 1310 Copenhagen Tel 45 33455053 Fax 45 33455060 Email sguzzinicopridk First draft of a paper commissioned for a special issue of the Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia edited by Marco Clementi A revised shortened and translated version is expected to be forthcoming in 2003 Contents Introduction 1 Constructivism as a metatheoretical commitment The interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns Looping effects and the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world 2 Constructivisminspired theories of IR the debate with neorealism and neoinstitutionalism Identity in a critique of rationalist theories of action The constructivist synthesis taking interests more seriously as realists and ideas more seriously as institutionalists 3 The role of institutions in constructivist understandings of world politics The longterm institutions and the rules of the game The short term the postCold War is what we make made of it 1 Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations STEFANO GUZZINI Although Italy in comparison to its Northern neighbours is not a country of constructivists Lucarelli and Menotti 2002 many of the themes crucial to constructivism are common currency in Italian academia For constructivism stands for a series of debates in social theory which made a perhaps late yet virulent intrusion into the discipline of International Relations Its content is probably best understood as the focus which bundles recent discussions on epistemology and the sociology of knowledge on the agentstructure debate and the ontological status of social facts and on the reciprocal relationship between these two A first section will introduce constructivism as a metatheory or as Kratochwil 2000 100f called it a metatheoretical commitment It is on this level that it has become usual to compare it with positivism and now also with rationalist action theories as in the recent stateoftheart book published by former editors of International Organization Katzenstein Keohane et al 1999 As a metatheoretical commitment constructivism does not refer primarily to a theory which could be compared to other established theoretical schools in International Relations such as realism or liberalismpluralism or whatever one wants to call them Yet as a second section will show it still has implications for international theory Indeed a considerable part of the interest in metatheory does not stem from the faddishly abstract curiosities of IR researchers but from their diagnosis that some of the reasons underlying the theoretical blockages in IR is to be found at this level Two blockages have spurred most reaction On the one hand constructivism is a reaction against the narrow individualist conception of international politics underlying game theory and rational choice approaches On the other hand it opposes the naturalist leanings of diverse realist theories of international relations who claim to know 2 STEFANO GUZZINI 1 For the centrality of the assumption of circular history in realism see Bobbio 1981 the world as it really is ultimately unchangeable and historically circular1 leanings which ask for some version of scientific positivism Brown 1992 90 Not being a theory as the others finally implies that there is little sense in giving the constructivist reading of the role of institutions in todays international affairs What can be offered is a presentation of how some constructivisminspired theories think about the role of institutions both within the constitutive rules of international society and as practical fora for socialisation into such a society I will conclude on a way how some constructivists could understand todays world as the renewed social construction of power politics Wendt 1992 trying to put an end to the postCold War era the postCold War is what we make of it 1 Constructivism as a metatheoretical commitment Constructivism emphasises three major inspirations of recent theorising namely the interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns in the social sciences On the basis of this triple inspiration one can propose a definition of the metatheoretical commitment of constructivism and clarify both its social ontology and hermeneutic epistemology The interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns There are different ways for scientists to analyse a red traffic light Natural scientists could for instance be interested in the electric circuit that finally produces something we recognise as light with a certain colour Social scientists would relate the traffic light to the social world One way is a connection of the light to action like a driver stopping the car in front of it A pure behaviouralist understanding of such an action would apprehend it in terms of a stimulusreaction chain similar to Skinners rat experiments in which human choice is a blackbox a throughput Interpretivism but not only would oppose such a behaviouralist and positivist reduction of action It claims that the very action which counts as significant in the social world cannot be apprehended without interpretation that is without understanding the meaning that is given to it Weber 1988 1922 Even if two actors act the same way they might do Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 3 so for different reasons and those reasons are often crucial for understanding that action and for proper reaction It made a huge difference to containment politics during the Cold War if one assumed that the other be it the West or communism followed international rules because it was convinced of it or only because of physical constraint This necessary element of interpretation in human action is not reducible to the actors themselves but must comprise the significance given to it by other actors This point leads to the impact of the sociological turn in the social sciences Taking the sociological turn seriously implies that meaningful action and hence also the knowledge of both agent and observer is a social or intersubjective phenomenon Meaning is not something idiosyncratic to be studied through empathy There is no private language The actors capacity to attach the right meaning to a social event depends on the capacity to share a system of meanings within a group or society Hence interpretation as used here does not necessarily imply an act of conscious or intentional understanding but the sharing of what Searle 1995 127147 calls background abilities or what Bourdieu 1980 calls a habitus It cannot be reduced to cognitive psychology or to choice based on interests Instead as shown later in more detail the sociological turn emphasises the role of the social context within which identities and interests of both actor and acting observer are formed in the first place By the same token the fact of interpretation made by an actor is no different from that of an observer insofar as also this action relies on background abilities Yet when observers want to explain an action by someone else and when they address an audience different from the one in which the initial action has taken place then they will translate the interpretation given by the actor into an interpretation understandable within the background abilities of the other audience Generations of Kremlinologists have tried to explain Soviet actions by translating the assumed interpretation given by Soviet actors into the language of the respective policy environment so as to make them understandable When researchers address their own community with its often arcane codes and concepts they also retranslate from the meaning world at the level of action to the one at the level of observation Sparti 1992 1023 Hence social sciences have to carefully distinguish between the level of action 4 STEFANO GUZZINI proper and the level of observation They differ from naturalist approaches in that they need to reinterpret an already interpreted world Schutz 1962 1953 As this intersubjective or sociological turn shows the whole is finally inscribed in a reflection on the role of language in the social world and in its understanding Kratochwil 1989 Onuf 1989 for a discussion see Zehfuß 1998 Zehfuss 2001 Language works as the model case of intersubjectivity at the epistemological level It provides the paradigm for understanding meaning worlds where meaning is always already socially given to make communication possible in the first place and yet open through the common practice of this very communication Lastly language underlies also the understanding of the practical performative function of interpretation so important for constructivists First if interpretation is central for the social sciences constructivism asks for the effect this meaninggiving in turn has on the social world Constructivists insist that there are a series of institutional facts which exist only because social actors agree whether consciously or not in giving a certain meaning to them Money as distinguished from a sheet of paper for instance is Searles 1995 preferred example Second constructivism carries out the epistemological implications of the aforementioned If knowledge can be considered as an institutional fact since it relies on language and since concepts are the condition for the possibility of knowledge Kant then also knowledge is socially constructed Kuhn 1970 1962 Knowledge is not pregiven data passively registered by an observer Eskimos distinguish with many more words hence see many more things for what others would simply refer to as white This position asks for being sensitive to the effect of truth conventions but does not necessarily imply than anything goes Summarising my reconstruction Guzzini 2000 constructivism is a metatheory which is characterised as 1 Being particularly sensitive to the distinction between the level of action proper the level of observation and the relationship between the two usually theorised in terms of power 2 Having an epistemological position which stresses the social construction of meaning and hence knowledge Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 5 2 This definition has gained a certain consensus since also the latest stateoftheart article invokes it Adler 2002 For earlier discussions see Adler 1997 Checkel 1998 Hopf 1998 3 Having an ontological position which stresses the construction of social reality2 Looping effects and the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world What adds the somewhat constructivist spin to this tradition is related to the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of social reality For again setting the social world apart from the natural our understandings of people and their action can make a real difference to the latter For instance being identified as an opportunist state representative influences options in future negotiations The categories we use so they are shared have an effect on the facts and people Some Foucaultinspired research has been focusing on exactly this as eg when it analyses the way statistical categories produce what counts as significant facts when it analyses the authoritative way of understanding the world Indeed calling something in a particular way might produce the very fact Relying on the idea of a speech act the Copenhagen School of security studies has tried to show that calling an event a threat of national security the securitization of that event is doing something to it in that it allows the use of exceptional measures outside of the regular political process Wæver 1995 Buzan Wæver et al 1998 It becomes a security issue with all the standard operating procedures attached to it by being called one if the call is successfully received Inversely the redefinition of the event can also effect a desecuritisation as exemplified by the German Ostpolitik Ostpolitik offered a status quo on borders at the price of redefining their meaning By the same token it took economics and peoples movement to some extent out of the Soviet definition of national security In this approach the Helsinki process can be seen as a 6 STEFANO GUZZINI desecuritisation strategy which allows politics and diplomacy to work in an increasing number of areas Moreover human beings but not natural phenomena can become reflexively aware of attributions and influence their action in interaction with them This looping effect Hacking 1999 34 is one of the reasons for the importance of identity in constructivist writings theoretically see below and empirically The social process of identification is part of producing the very reality we are supposed to passively react to It made all the difference that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was no longer trying to make the USSR pass for the imperial challenger but wanted it to be perceived as an acceptable member of this international society The Chinese solution at TienanMen was no longer possible The satellites were left free When this identity change happened ie when the Soviet Union was no longer seen by the other as it used to be the Cold War came to an end This brings me to the last point namely the importance of selffulfilling prophecies in constructivist thought If money is money and not just paper because people identify it as such then it ceases to be so the moment this shared attribution goes missing When people stop trusting money money will through this very action become untrustworthy Some constructivism has been much inspired by earlier peace research which has insisted in the way Realpolitik becomes political reality not because of the alleged iron laws of world politics but because of the combined effect of actors believing in its truth Guzzini 2003 forthcom This does not imply that such a practice can be easily undone That practices are socially constructed does not imply anything about their stickiness some good will simply wont do Indeed the Cold War practice was very sticky often for reasons which can be analysed in terms of the dilemmas game theoreticians have come up with But such gametheoretical understanding of collectively sub optimal Nash equilibria is derivative from the very setting of the game For constructivists what is important is what happens before the neo utilitarian model purportedly kicks in Ruggie 1998 19 The potential stickiness and their possibly utilitarian explanation does not change the fundamental idea that these practices are the effect of the interrelationship of the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 7 3 Although rational choice does not necessarily entail such a behaviouralist theory of action it has become prominent in IR eg Waltz 2 Constructivisminspired theories of IR the debate with neorealism and neoinstitutionalism Given the space constraints I will move to the level of IR theorising by focusing on the agencystructure conception underlying IR theories It is here where constructivism is often compared with rationalism Such a debate immediately biases the discussion insofar as it makes all centre on the level of an action theory on which dialogue with rationalism makes sense rather than on a structural theory With this caveat in mind this section will show how the problematique of identity and identity formation can be seen as a crucial point to exemplify the difference between a constructivist and a rationalisminspired action theory This will also serve to clarify the difference with theories of the neoneo kind see Andreatta in this volume Identity in a critique of rationalist theories of action Identity comes into constructivist IR theorising as an opposition to the limited approach of utilitarian action theories for this opposition to neo utilitarianism see Ruggie 1998 Introduction A behaviouralist rational choice approach3 entails an individualist theory of action It makes two main assumptions about human behaviour First humans are selfinterested utility maximisers and second humans are choosing rationally on the basis of a consistent transitive preference ranking If A is preferred to B and B to C A should be preferred to C A straightforward and parsimonious theory of action derives from this basic depiction of selfinterest and rationality Once we know the desires of individuals their preferences as well as the beliefs about how to realise them we can deduce their rational behaviour Indeed as Keith Dowding has succinctly put it The three go together in a triangle of explanation and given any two of the triumvirate the third may be predicted and explained This is a behaviouralist theory of action since it is studying the behaviour of individuals that allow us to understand their beliefs by making assumptions about their desires or their desires by making assumptions about their beliefs We may understand both by making assumptions about different aspects of each Dowding 1991 23 8 STEFANO GUZZINI It is hence the situation or the set of incentives which suggests behaviour to the individual and besides the two behavioural assumptions carries the major weight in the explanation Structure does affect behaviour The neoneo debate can illustrate this approach for IR Neorealist rational choice can see structure linked to behavioural change only by assuming a different distribution of means which influences desire For this is the only variable component which taking rationality and the logic of interests as valuemaximisation for given influences calculus choice and hence behaviour As in Elsters famous use of the Biblical sour grape analogy where one comes to think oneself satisfied with sour grapes because the sweet ones are too high to reach actors readapt their desires according to their perceived share in the distribution of means Elster 1985 On their side neoinstitutionalist approaches often focus on how over time structure can influence individual beliefs which then independent of any material change can affect behaviour In both cases preferences can change interests do not Constructivists argue instead or better moreover that structure affects through shared beliefs the very definition of identity hence interests and eventually behaviour For such an argument to work constructivists have however first to redefine what is meant by a structure for the following see also Wendt 1995 7374 First structure must be understood as social practice not as objective constraint see the model case of language Second it cannot be materialist only or even mainly For material factors cannot constitute themselves as causes independent of the meaning given to them This meaning in turn is not something subjective again there is no private language but based on a set of shared understandings and knowledge In other words the structural level for the constructivist is ideational in two senses first structure itself includes an ideational component and second matter matters for social action only through shared beliefs Once structure ideationally redefined constructivists can reapprehend the effect such shared meanings can have on actual behaviour This is done mainly through the concept of identity As already mentioned the primary example for putting identity in front of the cart have been explanations of the end of the Cold War see Lebow and RisseKappen 1995 The Cold War itself is analysed as a set of interaction like a game in particular see Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 9 4 I use the concept role advertently since as Wendt 1992 explicitly notes role theory can in many respects be seen as a precursor of these constructivist concerns For the paradigmatic statement of roletheory see Holsti 1987 1970 For a more recent use see also Barnett 1993 5 Responding to earlier critics of realism Kenneth Waltz 1979 argues that neorealism is about security maximisation not power maximisation But by defining security related to relative gains and to power rank it still remains ultimately dependent of power for a similar argument see Grieco 1997 Fierke 1998 defined by a certain set of shared beliefs which define social roles and which have become part of the selfdefinition of agents4 The reproduction of these practices depends however on the roletaking itself not on a whatever nature of anarchy By rejecting the role classically defined for the Soviet Union Gorbachevs New Thinking could so successfully implemented change the very definition of Soviet interests and preferences What was unthinkable earlier like the free on site inspection of nuclear sites became strategy This constructivist move of bringing identity in opens up the Pandora box of the national interest again Finnemore 1996 Weldes 1999 There were precursors It did not go unnoticed that instead of being objectively deductible the notion of selfinterest or national interest as power or security maximisation5 has either a normativeprescriptive or a circular ring According to early realist writers Wolfers 1962 chapters 6 and 10 the maximisation of power has not empirically been nor can it be rationally shown to be the best strategy Aron 1962 chapter 3 argued that the aims of foreign policy cannot be reduced to one All complained that the very concept of power is so loosely used that it can be ex post adjusted whenever the expected powerwielder does not control an outcome for the most forceful critique see the articles collected in Baldwin 1989 Perhaps we should live with the idea that power is basically a tautological concept Barnes 1988 but this is not the way realism or for this matter any neo utilitarian theory in IR wanted to use it In response proponents of rationalism in international relations insisted that the formula valuemaximisation is not as narrow as used by its critics It does not at all exclude altruistic preferences Keohane 1984 74 Although this is strictly speaking not wrong it does strip theories based on rational choice of their predictive power and possibly more For if 10 STEFANO GUZZINI 6 Reducing ideas to causes has been the early charge against regime theory Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 a charge forcefully repeated Laffey and Weldes 1996 against some more recent institutionalist analysis Goldstein and Keohane 1993 behaviour can be either driven by egoism or altruism by one thing and its opposite then the explanation of human action becomes indeterminate SchmalzBruns 1995 354 Indeed rational choice inspired theories then risk becoming mere taxonomies a system of concepts which simply reformulates any behaviour into terms of rational action Then as with Waltzian realism Guzzini 1998 chapter 9 the biggest problem of rational choice inspired approaches would not be that they are wrong but that they can never be wrong Hence this response simply begs the ultimately significant question where these different interests actually come from the classical constructivist charge The present constructivist discussion on identity and interest formation adds a further twist however since it asks for more farreaching adjustments both on the level of the philosophy of science and on the level of social theory According to constructivists identity like ideas cannot be used in a classical causal analysis since structure and agency the shared set of beliefs and identity are coconstitutive6 It is the beliefs which define what can count as an agent property ie as identity and interests In a football game the relations and the embedded practical rules might make the referee to act in a certain way but also by constituting himher as a referee in the first place Applying this constitution of agents by structures to other sociological environment implies that the stronger an institutional environment is rolebound and here games are obviously rather extreme cases the more interests are defined through the attribution and acceptance of certain roles by certain agents But the central role of identity in constructivism exemplifies also a crucial difference on the level of social theorising It includes an element of change and dynamism The Soviet Union accepted a different role one which Ostpolitik had actually prepared for it RisseKappen 1994 Evangelista 1999 And when it did it did not change from midfielder to goal keeper Rather it walked out of the game In this rather particular case its identity was crucial in the very definition of the game both were co Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 11 constitutive Changing identity meant that the Soviet Union unmade the game and joined another one The constructivist synthesis taking interests more seriously as realists and ideas more seriously as institutionalists As the previous discussion already indicates the metatheoretical commitment of constructivism implies a type of theorising which often does not exclude insights from other approaches but redefines them as special cases within its own parameters Materialist utilitarianism is often what actors pursue their action is often rational but only under conditions not specified by rational choice itself Realism might well describe a particular political event yet for the wrong materialist reasons In particular Alexander Wendt 1999 has used such a synthesising and at times assimilating strategy for developing his version of constructivism for a discussion see Guzzini and Leander 2001 This assimilating strategy pushes the usual contenders in IR theorising into uneasy corners If neoutilitarians of a realist brand want to carve out anything particular of theirs it will have to come in a kind of neo Darwinian version For only human nature as an intrinsic material cause escapes the constructivist ontology Albeit with caveats some seem happy to go down that way Thayer 2000 Yet many realists would recoil And indeed even if that road is taken with some sympathy it ends up requiring a constructivist contribution since biological reductionism works no better than others SterlingFolker 2002 But also neoinstitutionalists do not stay unscathed For despite the impression that there is nothing new constructivistinspired theories do not just go on adding ideas and stir The claim is stronger For social action matter matters mainly through shared beliefs through what people make of it Indeed beliefs are not a second parallel cause for action but define how actors come to think of their interests in the first place Regime theory for instance has been going as far as conceptualising regimes as autonomous variables in the sense that regimes are at most parallel to an equally autonomous and deductively given material interest Krasner 1982 Instead constructivists would argue that the very conception of interests independent of shared beliefs ie of the ideational structure is 12 STEFANO GUZZINI erroneous SterlingFolker 2000 has rightly argued that neo institutionalism has de facto included such argument But it has not drawn the consequence which would be a rearrangement of its metatheory As already argued by Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 it would have to abolish the individualist bias in its agencystructure conception and as argued again by Kratochwil 1989 99102 shift to a different understanding of explanation not reducible to classical causality as exemplified by King Keohane et al 1994 It is this particular view of the world a certain understanding of politics which pushes for a metatheoretical grounding not only the other way round Certainly for Wendt it is the case that for being able to propose a coherent liberal theory of IR it requires first a constructivist metatheory Hence bringing identity into established action theories allows constructivism to beat other theories on their ground and make them face these theoretical dilemmas It is for not taking interests and indeed power seriously enough that neorealism is insufficient It is for not taking shared beliefs seriously enough that neoinstitutionalism is Whether or not identity is able to shoulder such a weight is however another issue 3 The role of institutions in constructivist understandings of world politics After having established first the tenets of constructivism as a metatheory and second the implications this has for IR theorising as compared to other established theories this last section will spell out the role institutions play in a constructivist understanding of world politics today It is important to stress that constructivists focus on institutions at a general societyconstituting level ie not necessarily in the sense of material international organisations yet see below They are to use Barry Buzans 2002 distinction mainly interested in primary institutions such as sovereignty not secondary institutions like the UN They share this interest obviously with the English School see Alessandro Colombo in this issue and with regime theory which somewhat ironically once dominated the journal International Organization by downgrading the actual study of Ios The focus on fundamental the international defining institutions implies that constructivisminspired thinking is rather interested in the Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 13 7 It is important to add that although some constructivists like Wendt have a nearly teleological vision of history not unsimilar to earlier functionalists there is nothing in longue durée As with the English School it makes therefore less sense to assume that after 1989 there have been changes Similarly constructivism shows up in the way one needs to analyse international relations the framework of analysis which can inspire many also divergent empirical hypotheses In the following I will not much cover secondary institutions There are two reasons for this On the one hand they are rather reflecting more fundamental changes in terms of international legitimacy such as for instance in the move for an International Criminal Court discussed in the post45 system Wright 1952 but realised only now 1989 is of importance primarily for the way IOs have contributed to the rules of the game in IR and not that much how the end of the Cold War then reduced to an exogenous shock has done to secondary institutions and their role On the other hand their function is pretty constant for constructivists and hence not much under the influence of events like the end of the Cold War In a way reminiscent of earlier studies Claude 1956 Haas 1964 and showing some neofunctionalist roots constructivists have engaged in showing the socialisation function of International Organizations for more detailed accounts of this role see Barnett and Finnemore 1999 Johnston 2001 The longterm institutions and the rules of the game Time frames are long for understanding change in primary institutions Rodney Hall 1999 has argued that ever since the existence of a state system there have been two fundamental historical shifts from the dynastic sovereign via the territorial sovereign to the national sovereign state Reus Smit 1997 1999 has claimed that it is this level of constitutional structures defining legitimate statehood and rightful state action which in turn define the meaning of sovereignty Similarly Alexander Wendt 1999 distinguishes three cultures of anarchyHobbesian Lockian and Kantian which define the rules of the game and he gives examples how historically and theoretically change from one to another can and did happen7 14 STEFANO GUZZINI constructivism which asks for a progressive view of history As fundamental agnostics constructivists would tend to be sceptical against both a progressive and a cyclical vision of history the latter typical of realism The norms that are diffused the culture they define are not necessarily moving for the better leaving for a moment the issue aside how to define the latter Constructivism seems more conform to the concept of historydependent institutionalism as developed by March and Olsen 1998 8 For an analysis of the literature on norm diffusion see Wiener 2003 forthcom This stress of rules of the cultures which define the game and of the central legitimacy norms constituting authorised agency in the society shows the main conduit of constructivist analysis of change the diffusion of norms Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 It is important to stress that constructivists see norms not as simple reflections of power but as better Weberians than realists see power and norms linked in authority through legitimacy As Weber insisted power without legitimacy is under constant potential pressure Many studies have insisted how change can happen not only in longer historical terms like in Halls study but also in individual cases such as in the demise of apartheid Klotz 1995 the diffusion of human rights in a spiral dynamic including the shaming of the pariah state Risse Ropp et al 1999 or the diffusion of norms in and beyond existing security communities Adler and Barnett 19988 If as already mentioned with the change of legitimating principles also the very identity of actors is affected then one of the main questions today would be about the very boundaries of that international society which is said to share such institutions The seem increasingly fuzzy and multifaceted It is perhaps not astounding that the majority of writers tend to simplify things In the English School tradition much is done by reading backwards to apparently easier times when one could talk of the classical European international society which tried to export itself elsewhere Bull 1977 1989 1984 In another simplification early poststructuralist writers tried to pinpoint this society in the community of realists ie in that international community which denies that an international community exists Ashley 1987 1988 an argument which has been differentiated in more recent constructivistEnglish School writings Cronin 1999 In the search of a society also some more recent constructivists end up focusing Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 15 9 The obvious implication for constructivists is that also the war of all against all can exist but only as the product of a social process nothing innate or natural The Hobbesian or also Schmittian description of politics can be correct for some international societies at some times they are no necessity not even in the last resort as all historical determinist theories would put it on the society of states only Wendt 1999 again in a way much reminiscent of the old English School Suganami 20019 This more classical and easier identification of international society appears however at a historical disjuncture For we arguably experience not only 1 a secular decline of the grip of classical European rules and institutions and the old conservative ideology which legitimated them already registered since the early days of IR ie a change of the society of states itself see also Alessandro Colombo in this issue but also 2 the constitution of transnational communities with a distinct language and certain clout be it what Strange 1989 1999 dubbed the business civilisation or the emergence of transnational civil networks Keck and Sikkink 1998 the Davos community and its discontents as it were What is at stake and what is in the focus of constructivist thought but not only is the very identity of this international society The short term the postCold War is what we make made of it So far I have relativised the impact a single event like the end of the Cold War could play in constructivist understandings of world politics For constructivists the way the Cold War ended was a proof to the reasonableness of their assumptions but part of a longer process not itself the cause of a new era This said we have now a series of variables in place with which to understand the postwall system the constitutive relationship between the identityroles and the rules of the game the institutions of international society I will close this piece by concentrating on one particular sensibility of constructivists the clash between international institutions and norm diffusion vs identity politics which cannot in itself however give the entire picture of institutional change as of today After 1989 international relations seemed to be set to be more domesticated Post45 Germany and Japan are the easy cases for the 16 STEFANO GUZZINI constructivist argument that interests derive from roles and identity and not simply from capabilities Berger 1996 1998 Katzenstein 1998a 1998b But also other countries in Europe mainly in the Nordic countries had come to take the changed identity of their security community seriously Similarly Soviet New Thinking tried to rethink Soviet identity South Africa shed off its apartheid identity 1989 came as moment in which those met in which a different vision of legitimate rule made its way Yet whereas some countries saw their identity in resonance with the emerging rules of international society others did not Most remarkably the US was to find it difficult to adapt to a new role Kuwait besides and on top of Berlin became the defining moment For constructivists Kuwait set in motion a remobilising of Cold War biases which threatened to close the window of opportunity opened after 1989 Guzzini 1994 The legitimation of the war was partly done in a language which seemed to herald a new world order but relied extensively on World War II metaphors and containment scripts Luke 1991 Constructivists were alarmed by the possible selffulfilling prophecies of some brands of realism which had undergird much US foreign policy debate and far from receding in 1990 immediately moved onto the stage The wall had hardly come down when John Mearsheimer 1990 already wrote that 1989 meant the return to oldtype European politics where Germany whether it wanted or not will become a more aggressive power again If all European partners had preemptively balanced as Mearsheimer suggested this might indeed have been the outcome Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilisations thesis Huntington 1993 far from being anything new mainly remobilised Cold war clusters He divides the world in different civilizations poles which occupy different cultural areas territories at the borders of which the former iron and bamboo curtain friction are likely to occur In particular the Western world democracy will face the combined onslaught of civilisations which by their nature cannot compromise totalitarianism In other words it was not a new problem which spurred a Western response but Western strategic solutions which were in search of a problem After a decade of heated debates it was as if a constructivist nightmare had come true when the US Presidential candidate George W Bush said during his campaign that we do not know what the enemy is but we know it is there Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 17 It is not a pregiven US identity which defines its foreign policy Its identity and foreign policy are constituting each other Campbell 1990 1992 Given the preponderant position these US identity processes play a major role in defining the game however Its remilitarisation and turn towards unilateralism Guzzini 2002 although similar to the first Reagan administration and hence not a purely postwall phenomenon runs now quite openly against the rules and the legitimacy of the international society and does not fit part of its own roleperception To some the US quite legitimately appears as the rogue superpower Huntington 1999 42 These processes in the US are at the heart of a diffusion of norms which undercut the existing institutionalisation of international society This applies not because the nature of anarchy or of US hegemony is like this it is the effect of particular international social practices And it only works if the other participants accept playing the game It is therefore not fortuitous that those countries in which the spirit of Ostpolitik and détente or of a security 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Theory of International Politics Cambridge Cambridge University Press Wiener Antje 2003 forthcom Die Wende zum Dialog Konstruktivistische Brückenstationen und ihre Zukunft in Gunther Hellmann Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn eds Forschungsstand und Perspektiven der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland BadenBaden Nomos Wolfers Arnold 1962 Discord and Collaboration Essays on International Politics Baltimore London The Johns Hopkins University Press Wright Quincy 1952 Proposal for an International Criminal Court American Journal of International Law 46 1 Januar pp 6072 Wæver Ole 1995 Securitization and desecuritization in Ronnie Lipschutz ed On Security New York Columbia University Press pp 4686 Zehfuß Maja 1998 Sprachlosigkeit schränkt ein Zur Bedeutung von Sprache in konstruktivistischen Theorien Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 5 1 Juni pp 109137 2001 Constructivisms in International Relations Wendt Onuf and Kratochwil in KnudErik Jørgensen and Karin M Fierke eds Constructing International Relations The Next Generation Armonk NY ME Sharpe pp 5475 MÉTODOS DE ANÁLISE ANÁLISE DOCUMENTAL Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa em RI O QUE É UMA PESQUISA DOCUMENTAL É um procedimento que se utiliza de métodos e técnicas para a apreensão compreensão e análise de documentos dos mais variados tipos PESQUISA DOCUMENTAL VS PESQUISA BIBLIOGRÁFICA Muitas vezes parecem se confundir Ambas possuem o documento e não o sujeito como objeto de investigação Retiram influência do pesquisador sobre os dados Mas não são sinônimos Pesquisa bibliográfica analisa documentos de domínio científico Livros artigos ensaios enciclopédias etc São fontes secundárias Não recorrem diretamente ao fatofenômeno da realidade empírica Pesquisa documental lida com documentos que ainda não receberam tratamento científico Costumam ser fontes primárias Requer análise mais cuidadosa exatamente pois não passaram por tratamento prévio O QUE SÃO DOCUMENTOS Documento tradicionalmente está ligado à ideia de prova inicialmente jurídica depois científica Até século XX ficava restrito a fontes escritas Escola de Annales amplia a ideia de documento para tudo aquilo que foi produzido pelo homem e que portanto contribui para sua compreensão As fontes documentais FONTES NÃO ESCRITAS ESCRITAS Os objectos e os vestígios materiais A iconografia As fontes orais A imagem e o som regis tados Os documentos oficiais arquivos Públicos Privados As fontes não oficiais A imprensa As revistas e publicações periódicas Os livros Os documentos intermediários As fontes estatísticas As estatísticas correntes As análises estatísticas Documento como qualquer suporte que contenha informação registrada formando uma unidade que possa servir para consulta estudo ou prova COLETA DE DOCUMENTOS Devese localizar textos pertinentes e avaliar sua credibilidade e representatividade Sempre tendo em mente a pergunta de investigação Investigador deve buscar compreender a mensagem contida no documento por mais fragmentado que possa parecer Dimensões da avaliação preliminar dos documentos 1 Contexto Contexto histórico de produção do documento Universo sociopolitico do autor e do público Evitar interpretar conteúdo do documento em função de valores modernos 2 Autor es Identidade interesses e motivação de quem produziu o documento Possibilita avaliar melhor a credibilidade do texto Elucida interpretação posicionamento e até deformações presentes no documento 3 Autenticidade e confiabilidade Verificar procedência do documento Identificar relação entre o autor e o que ele produz Testemunhou diretamente o fenômeno Qual a distância temporal entre fenômeno e a produção Possui conhecimento para tratar do fenômeno 4 Natureza do texto Algumas produções são feitas para contextos específicos e só podem ser entendidas dentro deles ou por pessoas já iniciadas neste contexto 5 Conceitoschave e lógica interna Decifrar jargões gírias regionalismos etc Delimitar adequadamente o sentido das palavras tendo em vista o conceito em que são empregadas Examinar lógica interna do documento Se é contraditório em seus próprios termos ANÁLISE DE DOCUMENTOS Documentos não existem isoladamente mas precisam ser situados em uma estrutura teórica para que seu conteúdo seja entendido Objetivo é fornecer interpretação coerente do documento levando em consideração a pergunta de investigação Recorrese geralmente a análise de conteúdo Análise de dados linguísticos frequência etc Investigação do conteúdo simbólico das mensagens Construir categorias de análise e identificálas nos documentos analisados Podem ser construídas a priori ou a partir daquilo que foi lidoobservado no documento Não são fixas Relacionar categorias através de sua frequência importância e conexões ao longo do documento Reler documento a partir das categorias criadas buscando aprofundamento ligação e ampliação Novo julgamento das categorias CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS A análise documental é comumente associada à pesquisa histórica mas marco temporal não é impeditivo Existem vários tipos de documento que podem ser analisados em pesquisas no campo das Relações Internacionais É uma forma de pesquisa portanto deve ser feita com o rigor metodológico adequado Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 janeirojunho 2012 2012 by Unisinos doi 104013rechtd20124101 Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Daniel Farber1 University of California Estados Unidos dfarberlawberkeleyedu Direito dos desastres e questões emergentes no Brasil Abstract Scholars around the world are beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in preparing for such events and responding to them after they occur This article offers an introduction to the field of disaster law with a particular focus on the United States and Brazil The article begins with an overview of disaster law and explains some unifying themes These themes connect risk mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding after disasters The remainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least worsened by failure to regulate risks in advance using land use law or environmental law Disaster law will become even more important in the future due to climate change and other developments such as population growth and expanded populations living near coasts and estuaries Key words Natural disasters nuclear power pollution oil spills climate change risk management Resumo Estudiosos de todo o mundo estão começando a focar no papel do jurídico na preparação para esses eventos e na reação a eles depois de sua ocorrência Este artigo oferece uma introdução ao campo do Direito dos desastres com um foco particular nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil O artigo começa com uma visão geral do Direito dos desastres e explica alguns temas unificadores Estes temas conectam a mitigação de riscos a resposta de emergência a indenização e a reconstrução após catástrofes O restante do artigo foca uma percepção crucial o dano das catástrofes é quase sempre causado ou no mínimo agravado por falta de regulação antecipada de riscos pelo direito fundiário e pelo direito ambiental O Direito dos desastres tornarseá ainda mais importante no futuro devido à mudança climática e outros desdobramentos como o crescimento populacional e o aumento das populações vivendo próximas a costas e estuários Palavraschave catástrofes naturais energia nuclear poluição derramamentos de óleo mudança climática gestão de riscos 1 University of California Berkeley School of Law Boalt Hall 2745 Bancroft Ave University of California Berkeley CA 947 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 3 2 Although this article focuses on the legal literature disasters are also the subject of a robust and growing body of work in economics and policy analysis See eg Kunreuther and Useem 2009 Introduction The last few decades have been punctuated by natural disasters and manmade accidents The disas ters include severe tsunamis cyclones and hurricanes while notable accidents include nuclear meltdowns and massive oil spills Legal scholars around the world are beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in preparing for such events and responding to them after they occur This article offers an overview of the field of disaster law with a particular focus on the United States and Brazil Traditionally Brazil has not been heavily exposed to natural disasters but insurance companies say that this situation is changing Natural disasters will likely become more frequent in Brazil and also more costly in terms of human lives and government expenditures said Fabio Corrias Swiss Res head of corporate solutions for Brazil and the rest of the Southern Cone Brazil has traditionally had a very low exposure to natural disasters but during the last five years the frequency of events such as heavy rains floods and avalanches has increased Corrias told a conference in Sao Paulo hosted by the Swiss reinsurer The latest such events occurred in January this year in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro when floods killed more than 800 people and left some 6000 homeless Corrias noted that due to lack of insurance and rein surance this event cost the public sector US460mn in emergency spending The area most exposed to natural disasters in Brazil is the south east due to high population density Corrias said Rindebro 2011 The Brazilian legal system is still adapting to these new issues arising from disasters One of those issues is risk mitigation For in stance lack of preparation may have contributed to hundreds of deaths from landslides The hillside areas around Rio lacked early warning systems or effective community organizations that might have helped residents to wake one another as the rains intensified last Tuesday night disaster ex perts and residents said Most people are believed to have died early Wednesday morning as they slept when waterloosened earth swept their houses away Kahn 2011 Illustrating the connection between disaster risks and inadequate regulation weak control of urban settle ment was also a contributing factor in the Rio landslides Rio de Janeiro State officials have cited irregular oc cupation of areas at risk of floods and landslides as the main reason that so many have been dying Carlos Minc Rios environment secretary said Thursday that the states civil defense authority urgently needed to relocate residents in highrisk areas Kahn 2011 quot ing Brazilian sources This article attempts to provide a framework for thinking about these emerging issues in Brazil without being so presumptuous as to suggest the correct solu tions for the Brazilian legal system It is tempting to think that disasters are either natural events completely out side of human control or are unavoidable accidents But human beings can plan ahead to reduce the probability of many disasters and reduce their harm as well as estab lishing procedures for rebuilding afterwards Legal schol ars in the United States and elsewhere are beginning to focus on disaster law as a field of study Hopefully some of the lessons may be useful in the Brazilian context Disasters strike unpredictably enough that we are somehow always surprised and never quite pre pared The risks are also diverse and the harms are dis tinctive an earthquake is not a hurricane and a hur ricane is not an oil spill But there is a deep underlying predictability to disasters Nothing is more predictable than the fact that some day again a major hurricane will hit a US or Caribbean city that heat waves will hit cit ies or that poorly regulated but dangerous industries will have devastating accidents It is also predictable that if we do not address climate change coastal cities around the world will be at greater risk and heat waves will be more devastating It is heartening that the legal academy is beginning to pay attention to these risks in a serious way but much more needs to be done2 Part I of this article provides an overview of disaster law and explains some unifying themes These themes connect risk mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding after disasters The re mainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least worsened by failure to regulate risks in advance using land use law or environmental law These regulatory fail ures set the stage for widespread harm but often are not appreciated in advance of the event Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 4 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 Part II illustrates this point with examples from around the world including Brazil Examples include floods and landslides nuclear reactor meltdowns oil spills and heat waves In each case lack of adequate con trol of risksa failure of the regulatory statecontrib uted to the tragic outcome Part III then focuses on a particular regulatory failure the failure of the international community to control climate change This failure will increase many kinds of disaster risks whether in developed countries like the United States or developing countries such as Brazil Disaster law will become even more important in the future due to climate change and other develop ments such as population growth and expanded popula tions living near coasts and estuaries Disasters and the Legal System Hurricane Katrina sparked interest by US legal scholars in disaster law More than any other disaster in American history Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp relief the limitations in the laws capacity to anticipate and respond to catastrophic events With problems ranging from the amplification of alreadyentrenched social injustices and the exhaustion and failure of com pensation systems to the paralysis on the ground result ing from ambiguous divisions of disaster management responsibilities among state and federal governments Katrina and its aftermath made manifest the American legal regimes inability to handle disaster risks effectively see American Bar Association 2007 The legal system plays a central role in disas ter prevention response and management3 For disas ter experts Hurricane Katrina was merely a further confirmation that the law is woefully unprepared to handle disasters A growing community of researchers recognizes this problem and is formulating solutions under the rubric of disaster law This emerging legal academic field encompasses a wideranging interdis ciplinary body of research seeking to inform and im prove disasterrelated decisionmaking as evidenced by recent books4 and a rapidly expanding number of law review articles5 The emergence of disaster law in the US may be compared to the birth of environmental law in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a small group of prac titioners and professors recognized the dire need for a coordinated legal approach to a sprawling and life threatening problem Lazarus 2004 p 47 Their efforts created a new field of legal studies6 the task and the potential of disaster law are no less critical in the cur rent tumultuous era Before plunging into a study of disaster law how ever we need to first identify the distinctive traits of natural and manmade disasters Section A addresses the definitional issue With this clearer definition of the sub ject matter Section B then sets forth a framework for understanding the legal and policy issues about disas ters the circle of disaster management What is a Disaster The common conception of disaster focuses on events that are sudden significant and natural But di saster is in practice a malleable term7 The suddenness criterion emphasizes the emergency period but an im portant consideration in defining the field is whether prevention and development of resilience before the event and compensation and rebuilding after the event are to be included With respect to naturalness it has been argued that there is actually no such thing as a natural disaster8 The second factor significance is to some extent in the eye of the beholder The third factor naturalness turns out to be somewhat misleading Physi cal phenomena are a necessary component of risk but they are only the starting point in addressing safety concernsto be fully effective the work of calculating and planning for disaster risk must account for acts of nature weaknesses of human nature and side effects of technology Farber et al 2010 p 3 2006 p 1085 1090 In this Article we will also consider tech nological disasters accidents that affect ecosystems or 3 These issues are the subject of Farber et al 2010 4 Farber et al 2010 Nolon and Rodriguez 2007 Verchick 2010 Hunter 2008 5 We can get some sense of the expansion from a Westlaw search flood insurance levees oil spill forest fire natural disaster For 20002005 the search produced 23 documents for 20062011 the search produced 105 documents search of JLR database on July 17 2011 A search for Hurricane Katrina in the same database on January 28 2011 produced 3302 documents of which 125 had the term in their titles 6 The conference resulted in the formation of the Environmental Law Institute Lazarus 2004 p 48 7 Dauber 1998 p 967 971 Although the category disaster at first may seem unproblematic I suggest that we should see its definition and boundaries as precisely what is at stake in many contests over the allocation of federal resources 8 Smith 2006 It is generally accepted among environmental geographers that there is no such thing as a natural disaster In every phase and aspect of a disaster causes vulnerability preparedness results and response and reconstructionthe contours of disaster and the difference between who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 5 large populations There are also hybrids where natural events cause technological accidents which in turn in tensify damage from the disaster The issue of suddenness deserves special atten tion Air pollution provides an example of how analysis of risk can be distorted by focusing on the suddenness of an event Although air pollution is often considered a chronic problem acute episodes are also possible Con sider the London pollution incident of 1952 Beginning on December 4 1952 winds over the Thames valley be gan to die down just as a temperature inversion was developing Wise 1968 p 1516 The next morning as emissions from coal fire stations and domestic chimneys entered the atmosphere the morning fog had become massively polluted and by early evening that day the death toll had begun Wise 1968 p 16 The killer smog lasted only four days but in that short time nearly one out of every two thousand residents of London died Wise 1968 p 16 The severity of the 1952 smog is hard to fathom today Even police cars were forced off the streets because of the lack of visibility Wise 1968 p 124 An observer reported that a brides dress had been turned nearly black because she and the groom had been compelled to walk a considerable distance from the church to the Underground station no taxis being available Wise 1968 p 131 Although this was a sudden episode it reflected a chronic problem and we would be led astray if we fo cused only on that episode The Killer Fog of 1952 was the culmination of centuries of serious pollution which as early as 1578 had resulted in a royal proclamation banning the burning of coal while Parliament was in ses sion Wise 1968 p 19 Reformers had struggled in vain for action against air pollution the problem of Britains polluted atmosphere was no nearer a solution than it had been at the turn of the century Wise 1968 p 50 Fortunately no Brazilian city has suffered a simi lar pollution crisis But the health effects of air pollution are still appreciable9 According to one Brazilian study In relation to respiratory mortality in the elderly it is estimated that over 600 deathsyear are attributable to the current mean PM10 corresponding to 49 of the total respiratory mortality observed in these cities For children under five years of age an estimated total of approximately 47 deaths from respiratory causes are attributable to PM10 levels representing 55 of all respiratory deaths recorded during the period It is also estimated that the observed PM10 levels in these Brazilian state capitals are responsible for 52 of hospital admissions from respiratory causes among children and 83 among the elderly totaling 4581 admissions per year in the seven cities Marcilio and Gouveia 2007 p S532 The findings of this Brazilian study also illustrate the complexity of the concept of a disaster If the same number of deaths occurred in one place in a week or two that would undoubtedly be considered a disaster But from the point of view of the victims it makes no difference whether the same number of deaths and ill nesses are found in only one city or in the seven cov ered in the study or whether the ill effects are spread over a year or concentrated in one week Thus we can be led astray in thinking that a disaster as an acute epi sode is fundamentally different than an equally harmful chronic condition Although the field of disaster law does not have sharp boundaries the core cases are fairly clear Hurri canes floods and earthquakes are clearly natural disas ters despite the importance of human factors in deter mining the extent of harm Humans play a more direct role in oil and chemical spills or nuclear accidents but the difference between natural disasters and human accidents is not fundamental Consequently both will be discussed in this article Given a better understanding of the nature of di sasters we next need to map the legal and policy issues and their interrelationships Part B provides a roadmap to disaster issues The Cycle of Disaster Law Presently disasters and their applicable legal re gimes are addressed within broad areas of legal study and practice most notably tort contracts administra tive and constitutional law Issues such as liability and risksharing breach of contract with possible defenses of commercial impracticability or frustration of pur pose and federalism each bear upon disaster response and management Disaster issues span insurance law tort law and administrative law which are normally considered very different fields This section considers the ways in which these disparate issues interconnect in the distinctive context of disasters What most char 9 A comprehensive study in 2011 showed that health effects are significant even when current Brazilian air pollution limits are met See Olmo 2011 p 681 Air pollu tion problems are significant even in smaller cities A 2006 study showed that air pollution episodes resulted in increased hospitalization for pneumonia in São José dos Campos See Nascimento et al 2006 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 6 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 acterizes the field is the cycle of disaster law a set of strategies including mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding with rebuilding complet ing the circle by including or failing to include mitigation measures Farber et al 2010 p 3 Figure 1 The Cycle of Disaster Law Risk Mitigation Part II and Part III of this article focus on mitigation It is important to realize that the risk of harm from disasters is not outside of human con trol With proper planning the risk of flooding can be reduced nuclear reactors and offshore oil rigs can be made safer and climate change can be limited Disasters are often caused or exacerbated by failures in environmental protection In a recent book Professor Robert Verchick highlights the importance of what he calls natural infrastructure that is the role of nature as a substructure in human flourishing in providing essential services such as protection against floods carbon sequestration and food supplies like fisheries Verchick 2010 p 22 As Professor Verchick explains an infrastructure perspective helps remind us that natural goods and services come as part of larger interconnected systems Verchick 2010 p 23 Dam aged builtinfrastructure can damage the environment damaged natural infrastructure can lead to or amplify natural disasters Emergency Response Combined with the disaster event itself this is the most dramatic phase of the di saster cycle Here the legal structure can provide clear lines of authority to respond to emergency conditions and can mandate the appropriate planning and training For example it is important to determine the role of the military in responding to disasters versus civilian authorities Compensation Although most of the publics at tention goes to prevention and emergency response victim compensation is a central focus of disaster law The legal system provides a mix of public and private sector methods for compensating victims of natural disasters Each of the methods that have been used to provide compensation for catastrophic risks has its limitations The first method of compensation is private insurance However the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks due to expense or underwriting risks exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract and the difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims create significant hurdles Insurance is not commonly considered as a way of dealing with risks in the area of environmental law perhaps because the harm relates to health rather than property But it may not always be feasible to eliminate environmental risks and insurance could provide a useful backup The second method of compensation litigation against responsible private parties also has its limita tions the need for proof of negligence or other basis for liability limits on the financial assets and insurance coverage of potential defendants and other judicial doc trines limiting recovery But in some cases liability can result in extraordinary damage awards Third is the possibility of obtaining compensa tion from the government through various routes tort claims against federal or state government for negli gence subject to immunity defenses claims under special compensation schemes for particular disasters and claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation for the taking or in some states damag ing of property In addition the United States govern ment provides flood insurance10 The US has no similar system of insurance for other hazards Instead the United States has a makeshift assem bly of jerryrigged components In the final analysis the US has what might well be ter med a patchwork system for providing financial com pensation for catastrophic loss Inevitably in such a multifaceted milieu where the tendency has been to develop discrete schemes in response to particulari zed categories of disasters or rely on general welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster relief in mind there will be ongoing finetuning of the system and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of the me asures in place Rabin and Bratis 2006 p 303 356 10 For a discussion of the system and issues about its functioning see MichelKerjan 2010 p 165 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 7 Rebuilding and Restoration When buildings are harmed or destroyed by a disaster they must be re built or space must be found for the same activities elsewhere Often rebuilding in the same place may be unwise and land use controls may be warranted When this is not feasible building requirements can be used to increase safety Natural resources damaged by disasters such as oil spills may recover naturally but they may also require cleanup efforts or active restoration to replace damaged plants and animals These phases of the cycle of disaster law are related to each other In the context of disaster law le gal rules interact in unique ways For example the avail ability of insurance coverage and public benefits after a disaster may affect predisaster mitigation measuresit follows that issues in land use disaster response miti gation and compensation cannot be considered in iso lation Individual courses on land use torts insurance administrative law etc cannot adequately treat the in teractions between these areas of law Complex interactions and structures character ize both the cycle of disaster law and also its com ponents Risk involves a network of interconnected strategies while disaster response involves careful in stitutional design and recovery involves the interplay between funding mechanisms some private some state or federal and local government efforts Other fields of law may touch on parts of the puzzle state and local government law insurance law land use law tort law but miss the larger picture Finally disaster law as a whole is unified by the concept of risk management Each stage of the cycle of disaster lawmitigation emergency response insur anceliability compensation government assistance re buildingis part of this risk management portfolio Miti gation efforts attempt to lessen the potential impact of disaster events before the fact while disaster response attempts to do so afterwards Insurance tort and gov ernment disaster assistance provide ways of spreading and shifting risks Rebuilding is in some sense just the mitigation phase for the next disaster down the road Risk management techniques for disasters are interwoven For instance the prospect of generous di saster assistance creates moral hazard which in turn may necessitate government intervention to ensure adequate mitigation In turn adequate mitigation before the fact reduces the need for disaster assistance or in surance after the event Disaster response can have a similar relationship with mitigation but then reduces the need for postdisaster assistance or other forms of risk spreading To complete the cycle postdisaster as sistance insurance and other forms of compensation help shape postdisaster rebuilding and the degree to which future disaster risks are mitigated Thus there is tight linkage between various risk management strate gies providing a conceptual framework for disaster law Part II will focus on the risk mitigation phase of disasters and what happens in the absence of mitigation when regulatory failures create accident risks or amplify risks from natural disasters This is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the circle of disaster management Yet this phase may have the greatest potential for re ducing the human toll from disasters Disaster Risks and Regulatory Failure People tend to think of a disaster as a physical phenomenon stemming from natural events or complex engineering projects such as a nuclear reactor Such physical phenomena are a necessary component of risk but they are only the starting point in addressing safety concerns Whether a risk materializes and the extent of the resulting harm are almost always mediated by human actions Those actions in turn take place inside organizations with their own histories and cultures To understand risk we need to see the human context as well as the physical events that cause harm Only then can we begin to determine the appropriate response to risk Disasters are dramatic events but we need to look past the events themselves to learn more about the sources of risk and their mitigation Doing so re veals that disasters are not simply accidents or Acts of Godthey also involve the failure of the legal system to effectively address risks Thus disaster law dealing with disaster preparation response and recovery is closely linked with regulatory law especially dealing specifically with land use planning and control of environmental risks That link between disaster harms and regulatory failure is the subject of the following four case studies As we will then discuss in Part III climate change will vastly strengthen this linkage between environmental law and disaster law We typically think of regulatory law as address ing longterm problems such as air and water pollution climate change and biodiversity In contrast we think of disasters as being sudden events although as discussed earlier this is a contestable idea But the two are inti mately related disasters are often the result of long term failure of regulations while pollution incidents like the 1952 London Killer Fog can be sudden and dev Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 8 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 astating The connections between chronic regulatory failures are explored below in the context of nuclear accidents oil spills heat waves and floods As discussed earlier although some of these events are often called natural disasters and others are called accidents the fundamental policy issues are similar Nuclear Accidents The story begins with a catastrophic natural event At 246 pm Japan standard time on March 11 2011 946pm PST on March 10 a 90 earthquake struck off the east coast of Honshu Japan 109 miles ENE of Fukushima and 231 miles NE of Tokyo USGS 2011 The earthquake also triggered a large tsunami that overwhelmed seawalls and contributed to massive destruction Onishi 2011 The tsunami waves spanned a great height the maximum height was 127 feet at Aneyoshi Miyako International Atomic Energy Agency 2011 As of July 14 more than fifteen thousand people were known to be dead over five thousand people were still missing More than 227000 buildings have totally or partially collapsed and 3559 roads 77 bridges and 29 railways have been damaged National Police Agency of Japan 2011 As of June 30 116213 people had been evacuated Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011 Economic losses from the earthquake are estimated at 210 billion making it the costliest natural disaster on record the overall economic loss for Hurricane Katrina was 125 billion Munich Re 2011 The earthquake itself was outside of human con trol but the regulatory dimension of the disaster involves nuclear power which turned out to be inadequately regulated for the emergency During the earthquake the Fukushima Daiichi lost outside powerconnection to the electrical grid Backup diesel generators came on at this time The Daini plant did not lose power but did face degraded safety systems International Atomic En ergy Agency 2011 About 46 minutes after the quake the first waves of a large tsunami reached the Fukushima Dai ichi power station The tsunami reached about 14 meters 45 feet at the Daiichi power station overwhelming the 6meter 18foot seawall The IAEA report provides a vivid sense of the posttsunami state at the nuclear plant The tsunami and associated large debris caused wi despread destruction of many buildings doors roads tanks and other site infrastructure at Fukushima Dai ichi including loss of heat sinks The operators were faced with a catastrophic unprecedented emergency scenario with no power reactor control or instru mentation and in addition severely affected commu nications systems both within and external to the site They had to work in darkness with almost no instru mentation and control systems to secure the safety of six reactors six nuclear fuel pools a common fuel pool and dry cask storage facilities International Ato mic Energy Agency 2011 p 1112 Explosions occurred at units 14 the explosions at units 13 were caused by a buildup of hydrogen and the cause for the explosion at unit 4 remains unknown Diesel generators at unit 6 remained functional in the aftermath of the tsunami and workers were able to use it to achieve a cold shutdown11 at units 5 and 6 Units 13 have still not yet achieved cold shutdown Nuclear Emergency Situations have been declared for both the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini power stations resulting in evacuations and emergency measures12 As the 2011 tsunami and its aftermath illustrate the interdependency of modern societies makes them especially prone to disruption by disasters as damage to basic networks interferes with the delivery of key services But overly optimistic regulators who failed to take into account the need for more rigorous regulation of nuclear plants may have contributed to the disaster It is important to keep in mind the possibility of catastrophic events when designing and siting potentially dangerous facilities such as nuclear reactors Long time periods between such events may give a false sense of security It might seem ridiculous to worry about an event that only occurs once every thousand years But this means that there is one chance in a thousand that the event will happen in any given year If a facility will be in operation for fifty years which is not impossible for many nuclear reactors then there is a 5 chance 50 x 11000 that the event will strike during the lifetime of the facility If the consequences would be sufficiently severe that is a possibility worth considering when planning the facility Oil and Chemical Spills The largest recent oil spill was the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill of 2010 On April 20 2010 while drilling at the Macondo Prospect about 83 kilometers 11 Cold shutdown is achieved after several days once the reactor is no longer critical temperatures below 200 Feven after the cooling rods are inserted and fission stops the radioactive products continue to generate significant heat 12 See the May 17th update of the TEPCO Roadmap towards Restoration here httpwwwtepcocojpenpresscorpcomreleasebetu11eimages110517e3pdf Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 9 southeast of Louisiana an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon caused by a blowout killed 11 of 126 crewmen Associated Press 2010b Two days later despite efforts to put out the blaze on the oil rig the Deepwater Ho rizon sank in 1500 meters of water13 Throughout the end of April May and June estimates of the flow of oil increased from 1000 barrels of crude per day bpd to 5000 bpd to as many as 60000 bpd Gillis 2010 On July 15 BP finally stopped the flow of oil for the first time in nearly three months Gillis 2010 And about three weeks later on August 4 BP executed a successful static kill and a cement plug introduced on September 19 left the well effectively dead and the crisis officially over Gillis 2010 Environmental and economy recov ery however will take much longer It is unclear to what extent oil will continue to wash up on the Gulf coast whether species such as the dwarf seahorse can over come the loss of so much of their habitat and whether dispersants used during cleanup efforts may have un foreseen consequences on the environment14 In terms of the root causes of the blowout the Presidential Commission investigating the accident identified management failures by industry and a dys functional regulatory system National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill ing 2010 p 122127 The accident resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP Halliburton and Transocean and by government officials who relying too much on industrys assertions of the safety of their operations failed to create and apply a program of regu latory oversight that would have properly minimized the risks of deepwater drilling National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 127 Thus the oil spill fundamentally stemmed from a failure of environmental regulation as well as negligence by private firms Brazil also suffered a major recent oil spill On November 7 2011 a pressure spike occurred during the drilling of an exploratory well at a depth of 1000 meters about 120 kilometers offshore According to Chevron although the well was immediately sealed leakage began from the seabed nearby and continued for four days15 Chevron was fined 50 million reals and it was reported that authorities were considering indictments against employees who were involved in the leak Carroll and Spinetto 2011 In addition a federal prosecutor filed a lawsuit for 11 billion in damages against Chevron al leging that Chevron and Transocean were not capable of controlling the damages caused by the leakage and that there was evidence of a lack of planning and envi ronmental management by the companies16 Concerns have also been expressed about the risk assessments used for drilling operations offshore of Brazil17 As was also true of the Fukushima accident oil spills may be in some sense accidental but they may also reflect organizational and regulatory failures Harm to the environment stemming from these accidents is not simply a random event but a reflection of failures by society to mitigate the risks appropriately Heat Waves A heat wave may seem like the least manmade of events The summer of 2003 was the hottest in Europe for at least five hundred years Larsen 2006 An anti cyclone high pressure area sat over Western Europe preventing cooler air from the Atlantic from entering UNEP 2003 Temperatures reached extraordinary heights The summer weather in Geneva was similar to the normal summer in Rio de Janeiro UNEP 2003 Temperatures in parts of Italy in August were over eight degrees centigrade warmer than the preceding year in Portugal temperatures were over forty degrees for many days while London had its first recorded tempera tures over thirtyeight degrees in history Larsen 2006 The prolonged heat was catastrophic Estimates of the total number of deaths begin at thirty thousand and run as high as fifty thousand Larsen 2006 In Paris alone there were over twelve hundred deaths Cadot et al 2007 p 466468 The estimate for France as a whole was over fourteen thousand Cadot et al 2007 p 466 468 The biggest risk factors were being a woman 75 13 The Guardian 2010 For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the spill see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 89122 14 Gillis 2010 The difficulties encountered in closing the well are discussed in National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 129170 15 Chevron Frade ResponseBackground httpchevroncomfraderesponsebackground 16 Reuters 2011 For a discussion of the contrasting roles of environmental criminal law in the United States and Brazil see Blomquist 2011 p 83 8892 and McAllis ter 2008 p 4 17 Vidal 2010 The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of Brazil in 1798 metres 5900 feet of waterdeeper than BPs Deepwater rig that exploded in April and led to the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico The 14page environment report prepared by the bank financing the drilling operations makes no mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent them Ministers have edited out all ECDGs comments assessing the risks involved in deepsea drilling in the Atlantic Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 10 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 years old and older and living alone at home Cadot et al 2007 p 466468 In addition to its health impacts the heat wave also impacted agriculture and caused nu merous forest fires destroying over 640000 hectares of forest roughly 2500 square miles an area about the size of Delaware UNEP 2003 The heat wave was extreme compared to histor ical temperatures but less abnormal compared to re cent decades because of the longterm increase of very hot days in Europe Rebetez et al 2006 p 569577 Although it is impossible to say whether climate change caused this particular heat wave it is possible to ask whether climate change increased the likelihood of such a heat wave Scientists have concluded that past human influence has more than doubled the risk of European mean summer temperatures as hot as 2003 and that the likelihood of such events is projected to increase 100fold over the next four decades18 Flooding Flooding is a familiar risk but the dangers may be underestimated because of this familiarity Hurri cane Katrina illustrates the seriousness of flood risks and the way that failures of risk management turned a relatively routine event into a catastrophe The impacts were severe killing more than 1500 leaving hundreds of thousands homeless and ravaging one of Americas most storied cities not to mention billions of dollars in property damage United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs 2006 11 to 114 21 to 22 Property damage estimates ap proach 100 billion United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs 2006 11 The New Orleans flood represented the tech nological failure of inadequate flood control measures against a predictable risky and potentially lethal event19 After floods in 1927 the US built levees along the Mississippi that have prevented silt from reaching Louisiana wetlands McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 Since the construction of these levees wet lands have been starved of sediment causing them to become waterlogged sink and die McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 The silt ends up uselessly collecting at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico Thus efforts to reduce flooding in the Mississippi River basin have increased the risk of flooding along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico After Hurricane Katrina it became apparent that the disappearance of the wetlands increased di saster risks to the region Wetlands absorb the impact of storms slowing them down once they make landfall Sullivan 2005 For every 12 kilometers of wetlands storm surges are reduced one meter Sullivan 2005 However New Orleans is now increasingly exposed to violent storms because so many of the wetlands have collapsed in part due to the levee system that surrounds the city Sullivan 2005 In addition barrier islands pro vide protection for half a million people from violent storms along with an international commercialindus trial complex worth billions Verchick 2010 p 34 Yet these barrier islands are rapidly disappearing Verchick 2010 p 3435 Although whether climate change contributed to Hurricane Katrina is unclear the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change considers it likely that climate change will lead to future Katrinas According to the IPCC it is likely that future tropical cyclones typhoons and hurricanes will become more intense with larger peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation asso ciated with ongoing increases of tropical SSTs IPCC 2007 p 15 We know with somewhat more confidence that climate change will destroy the wetlands that buffer storm surges Sea level rise is one of the most predict able consequences of climate change20 Apart from the unknown contribution from melting ice sheets in Green land and Antarctica21 the simple change in temperature of the oceans will contribute to thermal expansion just as increased temperature causes the mercury in a ther mometer to rise22 This rise in sea level will result in loss of coastal lands23 increased exposure to flood damage not to mention such other harms as salt water intrusion into estuaries and drinking water supplies24 The Katrina disaster illustrates the close rela tionship between disaster law and land use planning A key method of mitigating disaster risks is to avoid 18 Stott et al 2004 p 610 Fortunately nothing of this severity has struck Brazil although one heat wave in 2010 killed over thirty people See Associated Press 2010a 19 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system see McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 20 See eg Hasselman et al 2003 p 1923 Figure 2 predicting a two meter increase in sea level under a business as usual scenario by 2100 but only 20 centimeters under an optimum regulatory strategy 21 On the potential for catastrophic melting in these areas see Stern 2007 p 16 and IPCC 2007 p 16 22 Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks See Portner and Knust 2007 p 95 23 Pittock 2005 gives examples including China p 264 India Pakistan Bangladesh p 268 and the United States p 278 24 See Kolbert 2006 p 123124 British governmental study indicating that what are now hundredyear floods could become routine by late in this century See also Pittock 2005 p 118 stating that without adaptive measures annual flood losses would increase from 124 billion in different scenarios Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 11 putting people and key facilities in harms way More over land use controls can help maintain key buffers like coastal wetlands as a form of natural infrastructure Brazil has not suffered a storm of the scale of Ka trina but storms and flooding remain serious problems Torrential rains inundated a heavily populated steep sloped area about 40 miles north of Rio de Janeiro on Tuesday and Wednesday triggering flash floods and mudslides that have claimed at least 511 lives Rainfall amounts of approximately 300 mm 12 inches fell in just a few hours in the hardesthit regions Teresopolis and Nova Friburgo Many more people are missing and the death toll is expected to go much higher once rescuers reach remote villages that have been cut off from communications The death toll makes the Janu ary 2011 floods Brazils worst singleday natural di saster in its history Brazil suffers hundreds of deaths each year due to flooding and mudslides but the past 12 months have been particularly devastating Flooding and landslides near Rio in April last year killed 246 pe ople and did about 13 billion in damage and at least 85 people perished last January during a similar event Romm 2011 As noted earlier these losses are not simply un avoidable acts of nature they also reflect lack of prepara tion As one Brazilian expert explained The important thing is to plan Zoning and urban planning are needed and must take climatic aspects into account Frayssinet 2009 Moreover the victims are likely to be the poor who cannot afford to live in safer areas Frayssinet 2009 Hurricane Katrina also illustrates the link be tween disasters and inequality Equality issues were im possible to miss during the Hurricane Katrina disaster Consider the New Orleans Superdome which offered shelter of last resort The Dome was a brewing pub lic health disaster The number of people inside had doubled in twentyfour hours becoming a virtual city of twentythousand overwhelmingly poor and African American McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 235 For days it was clear to anyone watching television that the majority of people trapped in New Orleans were Afri can Americans most from the low end of the income spectrum McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 300 For much of New Orleans white population had departed before the storm hit while the remainder lived in ar eas closer to dry land and found it easier to escape McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 300 Ultimately the Congressional Research Service found that an estimat ed 272000 black people were displaced by flooding or damage accounting for 73 of the population affected by the storm in the parish Gabe 2005 p 14 1617 The connection of race and poverty with evacu ation rates was not unique to Katrina As the National Research Council found Research has shown that different racial ethnic in come and special needs groups respond in different ways to warning information and evacuation orders Lowerincome groups innercity residents and el derly persons are more likely to have to rely on public transportation rather than personal vehicles in order to evacuate Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences National Research Council Future Challenges and Opportunities 2006 p 129 Both globally and within the United States so cial injustice contributes so heavily to the incidence and intensity of natural disasters that the quest for equality may be regarded as a valuable tool for improving disas ter preparedness response mitigation compensation and rebuilding Farber et al 2010 p 204 In all four of these disaster examplesnuclear risks oil spills heat waves and floodingwe see a close relationship between a sudden catastrophic event and a longterm environmental problem or regulatory fail ure Good environmental law decreases the likelihood and severity of natural disasters Failure to protect the environment has the converse effect The greatest envi ronmental problem of our time is climate change Part III shows how climate change will bring environmental issues and even disaster law closer together Climate Change Planning for A SlowMoving Disaster Environmental law and disaster law encounter each other most fully in the arena of climate change Cli mate change happens over a period of many years but the effects may be as severe as any natural disaster Cli mate change is already underway With rare exceptions recent years rank at the top of the list of the warm est global temperatures Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 43 and depending on future emissions and climate sensitivity the world will end up 27 C warmer than it is today Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 129 Tempera ture change in the arctic will be about twice as large Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 133 Even warming of 2 C which may be the best we can hope for would leave the earth warmer than it has been in millions of years Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 225 Other changes are also foreseeable around the world Snow cover will decrease in most areas Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 147 and oceans will become Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 12 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 increasingly acidic Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 148 Even moderate climate change will trigger significant extinctions Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 162 and extreme events such as fires floods and heat waves will become more widespread25 Adaptation to these im pending changes poses serious challenges26 Extreme events such as floods and drought cause extensive dam age to many parts of society and thus a critical issue for adaptation is the degree to which frequency intensity and persistence of extreme events change Easterling III et al 2004 p 17 The effects of climate change have been mod eled in detail for the United States The US will expe rience significant temperature changes27 Temperatures are expected to rise everywhere but more inland than in coastal or southern areas in the continental United States with the greatest increases in Northern Alaska US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 29 In the Southeast United States even though absolute changes will be smaller the baseline is high resulting in many more very hot days later in this century US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 112 In the Midwest urban life will be burdened by increasing heat waves and decreased air quality US Global Change Re search Program 2010 p 117 Sea level rise due to climate change may cause dramatic losses in wetlands in the United States Laz aroff 2002 Twothirds of all US coastal wetlands would be lost with a onemeter rise in sea level Laz aroff 2002 p 84 This loss would be in addition to extensive past losses of wetlands in Louisiana Laz aroff 2002 p 84 and continued loss of lands The sa linity of remaining wetlands estuaries and tidal rivers would also change Lazaroff 2002 p 114 Hurricanes which may increase in intensity result in further loss of coastal lands Hurricane Katrina for example elimi nated over two hundred square miles roughly 500 km2 of wetlands Lazaroff 2002 p 115 What used to be a one hundredyear flood in New York City is now an eightyyear flood and may be a twentyyear flood by midcentury Cullen 2010 p 238 Correspondingly even more severe floods will become more frequent Changes stemming from sea level rise will not neces sarily be gradual There could be sudden loss of protec tive lands that buffer storm surges or in abrupt intru sions of salt water into aquifers US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 115 Sea level rise will also cause other harms in the United States Because the slope of coastal areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is low a fortycentimeter rise in sea level could result in as much as sixty meters of beach erosion and may cost billions of dollars Gross man 2003 p 1214 Finally as noted earlier sea level rise can result in widespread salt intrusion into aqui fers as well as severe beach erosion wetlands loss and flooding US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 114 Although the predictions are subject to uncer tainty climate change also appears to be a serious issue for Brazil Brazil is vulnerable to climate change not least due to its fragile biologically diverse ecosystems The tropical rain forest in the Amazon and the Pantanal wetland are of particular concern There is also concern that coral reefs along Brazilian coastlines could suffer from the effects of climate change Changing rainfall patterns especially in the drought affected northeastern region of the country will mean poorer water resources and a reduced water supply Floods which are already a serious problem for various regions may increase Coastal areas where the bulk of the population and economic activities are concentrated will be vulnerable to rising sea levels La Rovere and Pereira 2007 According to a report commissioned by the Eu ropean Commission After the long period of drought in 2005 omputeri zed forecasting systems detected that the integrity of the Amazon rainforests could be affected by the pro cesses of savannah expansion Over the past decades increases in temperature and erratic rainfall have led to a massive reversal in carbon absorption Trees are dying out more rapidly where the droughts have been most intense AGRIFOR Consult 2009 p 14 A recent report by the Hadley Centre in Britain reports that sea level rise could have a major impact on Brazil One study places Brazil within the top 15 countries simulated to show an increased exposure from SLR sea level rise relative to present in the 2070s based upon a global assessment of 136 port cities A 10 in tensification of the current 1in100year storm surge 25 These challenges are discussed in Bonyhady et al 2010 US Government Accountability Office 2010 26 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system see McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 27 The most recent information about US climate impacts can be found in US Global Change Research Program 2010 hereinafter US Impacts Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 13 combined with a 1m SLR could affect around 15 of Brazils coastal land area and 30 of the coastal popu lation Met Office Hadley Center 2011 p 121 Given these risks it is not too soon for major countries such as the United States and Brazil to begin planning to deal with the effects of climate change The US government is just beginning to seriously address adaptation issues following most of a decade in which climate change issues of all kinds were ignored or down played President Obama appointed a task force com posed of key federal agencies to investigate adaptation The Task Forces Report is a solid step forward in prepar ing the US to deal with the challenges of climate change The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 There are three key recommendations relating to domestic adaptation measures at the federal level First according to the Report adaptation needs to become a standard part of agency planning The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 10 2526 The plans should focus on ecosystems rather than either individual species or governmental ju risdictions The White House Council On Environmen tal Quality 2010 p 22 An important recommendation is that adaptation plans should prioritize the most vul nerable people places and infrastructure The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 11 Adaptation plans should prioritize helping people pla ces and infrastructure that are most vulnerable to cli mate impacts They should also be designed and imple mented with meaningful involvement from all parts of society Issues of inequality and environmental justice associated with climate change impacts and adaptation should be addressed The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 21 This recommendation has obvious relevance for disas ter planning as well Second the government needs to ensure that sci entific information about the impacts of climate change is easily accessible The White House Council On En vironmental Quality 2010 p 3033 Without solid sci entific information public and private sector decision makers cannot plan intelligently This effort would build on the US Geologic Survey and its National Climate As sessment The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 23 49 There is a similar need for public information regarding disaster risks Third the government needs to address climate impacts that cut across agency jurisdictions and missions The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 34 Unfortunately this is the case for many of the main impacts such as those that threaten water re sources The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3536 public health The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3738 oceans and coasts The White House Council On Envi ronmental Quality 2010 p 4243 and communities The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3940 Some important arenas for agency action are to improve wateruse efficiency The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 36 strengthen pub lic health systems The White House Council On Envi ronmental Quality 2010 p 38 integrate climate risks into insurance The White House Council On Environ mental Quality 2010 p 41 and develop an opensource risk assessment model The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 21 Some of these recommendations are relevant only for the United States but others provide useful guidance in other countries such as Brazil Disaster planning is increasingly connected with adaptation plan ning In the coming era disasters will result from inter linked changes in physical and ecological systems due to climate change Thus disaster planning will need to be part of a broader effort that takes into account climate change natural capital and societal resilience The events discussed in this articlenuclear ac cidents floods oil spills heat waves and severe air pol lutioncan all be classified as environmental disasters We can consider an environmental disaster to be one that destroys important environmental amenities or one in which harm to human interests is mediated by an environmental change The BP oil spill easily fits both criteria it was harmful to natural ecological systems and the harm was mediated by water pollution The 2003 European heat wave also damaged natural systems and it was at least made much more likely by human changes in the Earths atmosphere The tsunami was not caused by human activities but the ensuing nuclear reactor fail ures were as much a failure of effective regulation as they were the effect of the tsunami itself In the era of climate change environmental law will no longer be able to marginalize disaster law as a dis tant cousin Disasters both natural and humaninduced are an increasingly common feature of 21st century life appropriate legal guidance can ensure that disasters are anticipated and contained in a comprehensive and equi table manner Disaster law is a complex multifaceted and rapidly expanding body of thought one that ad dresses the dire need for a systematic thoughtful ap proach to managing the chaos of disasters 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Effects of Air Pollution on Childrens Health in a City in Southeastern Brazil Revista de Saude Publica 4017782 httpdxdoiorg101590S003489102006000100013 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 2010 Deep Water The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Available at httpwww oilspillcommissiongovfinalreport Access on 06082012 NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY OF JAPAN 2011 Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake Available at wwwnpagojparchive keibibikihigaijokyoepdf Access on 06082012 NOLON JR RODRIGUEZ D B 2007 Losing ground a nation on edge Washington DC Environmental Law Institute 491 p OLMO NRS 2011 A Review of LowLevel Air Pollution and Adverse Effects on Human Health Implications for Epidemiological Studies and Public Policy Clinics 664681690 httpdxdoiorg101590S180759322011000400025 ONISHI N 2011 Seawalls Offered Little Protection Against Tsunamis Crushing Waves NY 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2010 Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force Recommended Actions in Support of a National Climate Chan ge Adaptation Strategy Available at httpwwwwhitehousegovsites defaultfilesmicrositesceqInteragencyClimateChangeAdaptation ProgressReportpdf Access on 05242011 US GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM 2010 Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States US Impacts Available at http wwwglobalchangegovpublicationsreportsscientificassessmentsus impacts Access on 06082012 US GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 2010 Climate Change Adaptation Strategic Federal Planning Could Help Government Officials Make More Informed Decisions Available at httpwwwgao govproductsGAO10113 Access on 06082012 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME UNEP 2003 Impacts of Summer 2003 Heat Wave in Europe Environment Alert Bulle tin Available at httpwwwpreventionwebnetfiles1145ewheatwa veenpdf Access on 682012 UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURI TY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 2006 Hurricane Katrina A Na tion Still Unprepared Available at httpwwwgpogovfdsyspkgCRPT 109srpt322pdfCRPT109srpt322pdf Access on 06082012 USGS 2011 Earthquake Hazards Program Magnitude 90 Near the East Coast of Honshu Japan Available at httpearthquakeusgsgov earthquakeseqinthenews2011usc0001xgp Access on 06082012 VERCHICK RRM 2010 Facing Catastrophe Environmental Action for a PostKatrina World Cambridge Harvard University Press 336 p VIDAL J 2010 UK Backing Loans for Risky Offshore Oil Drilling in Brazil Guardian Available at httpwwwguardiancoukenviron ment2010jun30ukloansbraziloffshoredrillingINTCMPSRCH Access on 06082012 WISE W 1968 Killer Smog The Worlds Worst Air Pollution Disaster Lin coln Nebraska iUniverse 188 p Submetido 03022012 Aceite 14052012 What Are International Institutions Authors John Duffield Source International Studies Review Vol 9 No 1 Spring 2007 pp 122 Published by Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL httpwwwjstororgstable4621775 Accessed 08092013 0727 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use available at httpwwwjstororgpageinfoaboutpoliciestermsjsp JSTOR is a notforprofit service that helps scholars researchers and students discover use and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship For more information about JSTOR please contact supportjstororg Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize preserve and extend access to International Studies Review httpwwwjstororg This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Studies Review 2007 9 122 REFLECTION EVALUATION INTEGRATION What Are International Institutions1 JOHN DUFFIELD Department of Political Science Georgia State University International institutions are a central focus of international relations scholarship as well as of policymaking efforts around the world Despite their importance our scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted def inition of just what they are Instead scholars have employed a range of largely nonoverlapping conceptions contributing to a fragmentation of the literature and hindering theoretical cumulation This essay seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs It first reviews the principal ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcomings It then develops a definition that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that result from employing the new definition both in improving existing scholarship and by suggest ing valuable new avenues of research There are at least as many definitions of international institutions as there are theoretical perspectives Thomas Risse 2002605 Over the years international institutions of various typestreaties organiza tions regimes conventions and so onhave grown greatly in numbers and im portance Paralleling this growth the scholarly literature on international relations has seen successive waves of efforts to describe and explain institutional phenom ena Indeed international institutions have frequently been at the center of leading theoretical debates in the field Nevertheless this scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of inter national institutions an absence that has had several unfortunate consequences First the term is frequently used to refer to distinctly different empirical phenom ena such as intergovernmental organizations IGOs international regimes and sets of norms Not only does this practice result in much potential for confusion but it means that the findings of most studies of international institutions apply to only limited sets of institutional forms For example John Richards 1999 An earlier version of this essay was presented at Georgia State University Emory University and the annual meeting of the International Studies Association New Orleans 2002 The author wishes to thank the many individuals who have offered helpful comments and suggestions including Chip Carey Jeff Checkel Martha Finnemore Jeff Legro Cecilia Lynch Ron Mitchell Dan Reiter Michael Smith Nina Tannenwald and Al Yee as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of a number of journals 2007 International Studies Review Publishedby Blackwell Publishing 350 Main Street Malden MA02148 USA and 9600 Garsington Road Oxford OX4 2DQ UK This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 What Are International Institutions positive theory of international institutions in fact concerns only interstate regulatory agreements Second a number of scholarly works may have been unnecessarily flawed because of their failure to recognize the various distinct forms that international institutions can take As a result some studies have defined institutions in one way only to use the term later to refer to other forms For example Barbara Korem enos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001762 define international institu tions as explicit arrangements negotiated among international actors that prescribe proscribe andor authorize behavior yet they proceed to include in their analysis the very different form of international organization that performs various functions as actor or agent More seriously it may be unacknowledged variation in the nature of the institutions themselves rather than other factors that account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies seek to explain Third the international relations literature remains unnecessarily balkanized as adherents of different conceptions talk past one another when they attempt to communicate at all In particular the field is characterized by still largely isolated rationalist and constructivist camps which emphasize more or less formal rules and intersubjective norms respectively Although significant progress is being made within specific research programs the result has been a patchwork understanding of international institutions rather than the development of comprehensive theory As Martha Finnemore 1996b326 has noted incommensurable definitions mean that despite similarities in labeling rationalist and sociological approachesall called institutionalisthave little in common Not only do general claims about the causes or consequences of international institutions possess only limited validity but potentially important phenomena and interesting questions that transcend the conceptions employed by individual research programs may be overlooked In order to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs a broad definition of in ternational institutions that incorporates the most important institutional forms is required Certainly such a definition is a prerequisite for the development of any equally comprehensive theories on the subject As Elinor Ostrom 19864 has ar gued no scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of key terms Likewise a comprehensive definition would provide a common framework within which one could locate more specific types of inter national institutions and relate them to one another facilitating a fuller appreciation of their similarities and differences as well as the links between them This essay seeks to address this need It first reviews the principal ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcom ings It then develops a definition of international institutions that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence To this end international institutions are de fined here as relatively stable sets of related constitutive regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system the actors in the system including states as well as nonstate entities and their activities This definition integrates existing conceptions while expressing two important distinctions one ontological and one functional that are not simultaneously present in any existing definition A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that may result from employing this new definition It is proposed that this new definition will both improve existing scholarship and suggest new avenues of research Existing Definitions of International Institutions Robert Keohanes 1988382 critical observation that institutions are often dis cussed without being defined at all or after having been defined only casually is hardly less true today than when it was made nearly two decades ago Indeed even This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions parei 1102 JOHN DUFFIELD 3 works that purport to provide general surveys of institutional phenomena often offer only the most cursory discussions of the meaning of the term institution if they provide any at all In his landmark study The Anarchical Society for example Hedley Bull 1977 explores the contributions of the institutions of international society to international order without anywhere defining explicitly the former2 Likewise two otherwise valuable recent overviews of the institutional literature fail to grapple with the fundamental question ofjust what international institutions are At least Steven Weber 1997233 frankly acknowledges that he will sneak by the challenge of defining an institution with the justification that the approaches he discusses are sufficiently different that to develop one definition that will travel across them would be difficult In contrast the contribution by Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons 1998 on theoretical and empirical studies of international insti tutions in the special fiftieth anniversary issue of International Organization does not even raise the question of definitions and the preface by Martin and Simmons 20011 in a subsequent edited volume on international institutions offers only a oneparagraph definitional comment When scholars have paid careful attention to definitional issues they have some times offered conceptions that are excessively broad including elements that are best viewed as distinct from institutions For example K J Holsti 20042023 describes institutions in terms of patterned practices and actions sets of ideas or beliefs and norms and rules Although he is attentive to the causal links between these components many scholars would regard one or more of them as unneces sary or superfluous to a definition of institutions per se No less frustrating for students of international institutions has been the existence of several generally nonoverlapping conceptions that are less than comprehensive As a result wellintentioned efforts to bring clarity to the subject have in some ways only added to the confusion These conceptions can be grouped roughly into four categories institutions as formal organizations practices rules and norms Traditional Conceptions Institutions as Formal Organizations Traditionally scholars and others have frequently used the term international institution to refer to formal international organizations for example the inter national financial institutions of the International Monetary Fund IMF and the World Bank The equation of organizations with institutions may have made a certain amount of sense in the 1950s and 1960s when international organizations were the principal subject of institutional inquiry by scholars As studies of other international institutional forms such as regimes have proliferated in the past three decades however such a restricted construction of the concept has become misleading and as a result inappropriate Nevertheless the practice has remained common even in highly theoretical works For example Arthur Stein 199027 fn 3 implicitly equates international institutions with international organizations In Institutions and Collective Action Wayne Sandholtz 1993 explicitly identifies the Commission of the European Community as an institution In Institutions for the Earth Peter Haas Robert Keohane and Marc Levy 1993397 focus almost exclusively on the activities of international organizations Finally in Credibility Costs and Institutions Lisa Martin 1993423 operationalizes international institutions in terms of interna tional organizations 2See also Barry Buzan 2004169 More generally Buzan 2004167 acknowledges that most English School writers spend little if any time defining what they mean by the institutions of international society This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 What Are International Institutions Early Sociological Conceptions Institutions as Practices The emergence of the literature on international regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to the first conscious efforts by international relations scholars to view international institutions in broader terms and to define them systematically Leading regime theorists such as Oran Young 1980332 1986107 and Robert Keohane 198457 argued that regimes should be conceptualized as social insti tutions which in turn required that institutions be defined Young 198393 himself made the first careful attempt to provide a definition of international institutions Borrowing from sociology he developed an initial def inition of social institutions as recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge In the late 1980s Young 1989506 presented a more refined version identifiable practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occu pants of these roles Thus for Young international institutions are social insti tutions governing the activities of the members of international society Although pathbreaking Youngs initial attempt to define international institutions never developed a strong following within the community of international relations scholars The precise reasons for this lack of popularity are difficult to ascertain Nevertheless one can identify at least three aspects of Youngs definition that limited its usefulness and attractiveness In one sense this earlier sociological conception was too narrow Young 1986108 also 198932 drew a sharp distinction between social institutions and organizations which he defined as material entities possessing physical locations or seats offices personnel equipment and budgets According to Young 19891213 25 social institutions in general and international institutions in particular may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizations In fact this distinction was probably exaggerated In focusing on the material aspects of organizations Young overlooked the fact that many notably intergovernmental organizations are primarily sets of roles and rules In another sense this sociological conception was too broad at least in the view of many political scientists as revealed by Youngs 198933 statement that even war is a social institution see also Bull 1977 Young 1986107 Certainly the ways in which wars have been practiced at different times and places may have been shaped by social institutions but many would disagree with the assertion that wara state of open armed often prolonged conflict carried on between nations states or parties by one authoritative definition Morris 1975is a social institution given that it is not necessarily rule governed for example Holsti 2004 chapter 9 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the sociological conceptions from which Young drew inspiration however is the close degree to which they associate in stitutions with behavior Whether the precise term used is behavior or practice the primary emphasis is on the actions and activities of the actors concerned rather than other institutional features Consistent with this interpretation Young 198913 fn 5 explicitly notes the importance of a behavioral approach to the empirical identification of regimes Although this behavioral conception of insti tutions may have some uses it nevertheless requires limiting ones explanatory ambitions accordingly or risking committing the logical fallacy of first identifying institutions on the basis of observed behavior and then using them to explain that same behavior Keohane 199327 Rationalist Conceptions Institutions as Rules Much more common in the literature is the rationalist or rationalistic conception of institutions as sets of more or less formal rules In rationalist analysis agents are assumed to act rationally to maximize their utilities subject to external constraints This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 5 Figuring importantly among these constraints are institutions which in the ra tionalist conception are consciously constructed frameworks established by agents seeking to promote or protect their interests see Scott 199527 Krasner 199960 According to Simmons and Martin 2002194 most scholars have come to regard international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international be havior such that rules are often conceived of as statements that forbid require or permit particular kinds of actions Somewhat more broadly Keohane 1988343 19893 has defined institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules formal or informal that prescribe behavioral roles constrain activity and shape expect ations3 This definition and variations of it have been widely although not uni versally cited in theoretical studies of international institutions for example Martin 199239 Weber 1997233 Moreover a leading critic of institutional the ories has advanced a very similar definition Mearsheimer 199419958 thereby facilitating a constructive debate between those who find international institutions to be highly consequential and those who do not What have been the attractions of the rationalist conception of international institutions as rules especially in comparison with the sociological conception as expressed by Young Perhaps most importantly it distinguishes sharply between institutions and behavior given that the purpose of much rationalist theorizing is precisely to explain actions and outcomes for example Simmons and Martin 2002194 Thus this conception avoids the danger of tautological reasoning that has so concerned the critics of behavioral conceptions Indeed Young 1996x himself has offered a revised definition of institutions that like Keohanes places primary emphasis on rules and clearly differentiates between them and behavior As a result and in conjunction with rational actor assumptions more generally this conception has proven to be very productive in terms of generating powerful yet parsimonious explanatory theories Rationalist theories view international in stitutions as affecting behavior and outcomes by structuring the incentives and constraints that characterize the strategic environment within which instrumentally motivated utilitymaximizing actors operate More specifically institutional rules can reduce transaction costs establish benchmarks for evaluating the behavior of others provide information promote issue linkage and facilitate enforcement for example Keohane 1988386 Krasner 198869 Martin 19927 39 Despite its popularity and demonstrated usefulness the rationalist conception of international institutions as sets of more or less formal rules also contains features that have limited its acceptanceand will in all probability continue to do so As a practical matter this conception too seems to omit important classes of interna tional institutions It leaves unclear the status of international organizationssome definitions include them for example Keohane 198934 whereas others do not for example Simmons and Martin 2002194and international law And it would appear to have no place for the most fundamental institutions of the in ternational system such as state sovereignty4 These omissions may follow from two more fundamental limitations First the emphasis on rules that are consciously devised by those who would be subject to them necessarily obscures the intersubjective and deontic characteri stics that are often associated with institutions As an analyst of the kindred new 3Keohane did not himself describe this definition as rationalist Indeed he viewed it as being potentially useful for both rationalist and what he termed reflective approaches to the study of international institutions personal communication Nevertheless the equation of institutions with rules is strongly associated with rationalist schol arship not only in political science but in economics and in more recent years sociology as well And even Keohane for example 1990733 has sometimes emphasized the more formal forms 4Keohane 1988385 391 himself has treated sovereign statehood as an institution He has repeatedly described it however as a practice rather than as a set of rules per se in the context of those institutions that consist of general patterns of activity thereby verging on Youngs behavioral conception This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 What Are International Institutions institutionalism in economics has observed actors merely acknowledge the ex istence of the rule systemsrecognizing the validity of the ruleswithout neces sarily believing that the rules are fair or justified Scott 199536 Yet as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie 1986364368 argue in a seminal article on inter national regimes that could apply just as well to the broader concept of interna tional institutions we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior Hence the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity In addition they note what distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomenafrom strategic interaction let us sayis a specifically normative element Second the rationalist conceptions emphasis on the behavioral consequences of rules diverts attention from the ways in which institutions may endow actors with certain powers and capacities and in some cases even create them As Ruggie 1998871 has argued rationalist approaches lack any concept of constitutive rules Instead actors and their interests are typically treated as given and exog enous to the institutions in question see also Krasner 198869 Scott 199529 In contrast Young 19891516 to his credit places equal weight on the roles inherent in international institutions and the rights associated with them Constructivist Sociological Conceptions Institutions as Norms At least partly in response to the limitations of the dominant rationalist conception just discussed yet another sociological conception of international institutions which is commonly called constructivist has emerged in more recent years In the words of Finnemore and Sikkink 2001392 constructivists focus on the role of ideas norms knowledge culture and argument in politics stressing in par ticular the role of collectively held or intersubjective ideas and understandings on social life Accordingly the constructivist conception places primary and often explicit emphasis on the intersubjective aspect of international institutions As such constructivists regard institutions as fundamentally ideational phenomena involving ideas that are shared by members of a collectivity Wendt 199994 96 In contrast to the rationalist conception advocates of this perspective emphasize that institutions are often not created consciously by human beings but emerge slowly through a less deliberative process and that they are frequently taken for granted by the people who are affected by them Keohane 1988389 see also Barnett 1996159 The term that is most often employed to represent these qualities is norm Within this literature social institutions are generally viewed as consisting of norms or sets of norms for example Klotz 199519 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Wendt 199996 Norms in turn are usually defined by constructivists as socially shared expectations understandings or standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity for example Klotz 199514 Finnemore 1996a22 Katzenstein 19965 Legro 199733 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Boekle Rittberger and Wagner 2001106 Constructivists typically go on to distinguish between two main types of norms for example Klotz 19951415 Katzenstein 19965 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Ruggie 1998871 First there are regulative regulatory or prescrip tive norms These are similar to the rules stressed in rationalist conceptions insofar as they order and constrain behavior Unlike more or less formal rules however they have an essentially evaluative or deontic quality As Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 have written it is precisely the prescriptive or evaluative quality of oughtness that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules Second and representing a more fundamental departure from rationalist conceptions there are constitutive norms for example Keohane 1988382 Krasner 198867 Wendt and Duvall 19896063 Klotz 199519 Barnett 1996159 This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 7 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Ruggie 1998 These components of institutions generate agents endow them with certain capabilities and powers and determine their underlying identities interests and preferences They also define social ac tivities and categories of action Indeed in the words of John Searle 199527 they create the very possibility of certain activities Not only does the constructivist conception in contrast to the rationalist approach highlight the intersubjective and constitutive aspects of international institutions it also distinguishes if not always explicitly between institutions and practices unlike the earlier sociological approach see for example Wendt and Duvall 198962 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 Nevertheless the constructivist conception has not yet had an impact on the international relations literature comparable to that of the rationalist viewpoint In contrast to the sociological and rationalist conceptions considered above it continues to lack a prominent defini tional expression comparable with those provided by Young and Keohane More generally it is the least well developed of the various conceptions in no small part because many of its adherents have not been primarily concerned with exploring the nature determinants or consequences of international institutions per se an important exception is Risse 2002 A more fundamental problem is that in its attempt to correct for the thinness of its rationalist counterpart the constructivist conception may go too far in the other direction In particular it seems to neglect the formal features that are often characteristic of specific international institutions at least as they are popularly conceived Presumably many scholars would disagree with the conten tion that one must necessarily probe beneath the surface for intersubjective norms before one can regard a particular treaty or organization as an international institution A New Definition of International Institutions Even though several useful conceptions of international institutions can be found in the international relations literature each has limitations that prevent it from serv ing as an adequate foundation for the development of comprehensive theories of international institutions Still needed is an analytically coherent yet sufficiently encompassing definition that can facilitate theoretical progress on a broad front The following section aspires to provide such a definition This effort is based on several principles First an adequate definition should be comprehensive enough to accommodate all commonly regarded forms of interna tional institutions At the same time however a definition should not be so ex pansive as to be rendered analytically useless One must guard against blurring the distinction between international institutions and related but arguably distinct phenomena such as ideas in general or international cooperation Second in view of the diversity of international institutions a definition should facilitate the differentiation and comparison among specific forms But such a def inition should not go as far as Elinor Ostrom 19864 who has argued that the multiple referents for the term institution indicates sic that multiple concepts need to be separately identified and treated as separate terms Nevertheless any definition that does not simultaneously lay the groundwork for a taxonomy of international institutions would be inadequate Third and finally the definition should contain a logical basis for this differen tiation It is not sufficient simply to provide a list and description of different types of international institutions Rather it is important to place any taxonomy on a solid analytical footing if it is to have a substantial empirical and theoretical payoff see also Raymond 1997226 In view of these considerations it is proposed that international institutions be defined as relatively stable sets of related constitutive regulative and procedural This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 What Are International Institutions norms and rules that pertain to the international system the actors in the system including states as well as nonstate entities and their activities Any particular international institution need not contain all of these elements Indeed it might consist of only one for instance constitutive norms or procedural rules although most international institutions are unlikely to be so simple It is also important to acknowledge that the terms relatively stable and related are inherently sub jective so some clarification may be helpful By the former is meant that an in stitution will exhibit at least some persistence durability and resilience in the face of changing circumstances By the latter is meant that institutional elements are associated or connected in some meaningful way such as by a functional or formal relationship However where one locates the boundaries of any particular insti tution may not be obvious and may be disputed by others This definition clearly represents an amalgamation and synthesis of existing conceptions of international institutions and thus owes a substantial debt to the conceptual efforts of others especially Keohane and Young As such though it also seeks to express two important distinctionsone ontological and one functionalthat are not simultaneously present in any other definition and that serve as the analytical basis for a comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions These two distinctions are explored in some detail in the remainder of this section5 Ontological Distinctions Intersubjective versus Formal Elements The first distinction is between the intersubjective and formal elements of institu tions as emphasized by the constructivist and rationalist conceptions respectively Although these elements may often be tightly intertwined as a practical matter they can and should be distinguished conceptually In order to express this distinction let us use the word norms as used by constructivists to refer to the intersub jective elements and the word rules as used by rationalists to refer to the formal elements Admittedly this linguistic choice is not unproblematic and some readers may object to it The words norms and rules have been assigned numerous meanings in the international relations literature Typically moreover these mean ings are quite similar and the words are often used interchangeably see for example Keohane 1988383 Kratochwil 1989 Onuf 1989129130 Cortell and Davis 1996 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 Risse 2002604 Holsti 2004 Never theless such a distinction is not inconsistent with their broader usage and for lack of better terms would seem to provide an adequate way of expressing the onto logical difference that is of concern here Although few institutions may be entirely ideational in nature constructivists have made a compelling case for viewing them as intersubjective at least in part Thus to an important extent institutions may exist in the minds of people and need not be written down anywhere As such they may be characterized as shared mental models Denzau and North 1994 Wendt 199996 see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986764765 These features of institutions typically arise spontaneously rather than through a process of negotiation although they may subsequently be codified in writing or formal statements This has been the case for many human rights norms laws of war and diplomatic conventions Likewise given their implicitly consensual nature norms cannot be imposed although they can be 5These are not the only potentially important distinctions one can make among international institutions For example Young 198913 distinguishes between international ordersbroad framework arrangements governing the activities of all or almost all members of international societyand international regimes that are more spe cialized arrangements that pertain to welldefined activities resources or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of international society Similarly the English School literature differentiates between primary institutions which define the basic character and purpose of international society and secondary insti tutions which are more akin to regimes Buzan 2004xviii 167 This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 9 inculcated via such processes as persuasion and socialization see for example the norm life cycle described in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998895905 The other fundamental characteristic of the intersubjective elements of interna tional institutions that bears repeating is their deontic evaluative or normative quality6 They are shared beliefs about the way things should be or how things should be done Norms as the term is used here carry a sense of obligation a sense that they ought to be followed Chayes and Chayes 1995113 emphasis in the original see also Goertz and Diehl 1992638639 Raymond 1997217218 One conse quence of this characteristic of norms is that they are counterfactually valid No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm Not even many such occurrences necessarily do Rather whether a violation weakens a norm does not depend on how the community assesses the violation and responds to it Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986767 see also Raymond 1997218 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 For instance the fact that noncombatants are sometimes intentionally targeted in war does not necessarily mean there is no norm of noncombatant immunity Nevertheless norms do vary in strength Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 and as a result they are likely to exert differing degrees of influence The strength of a norm is determined by at least two factors One is the fraction of the members of a social system that share the norm or what has been called concordance Legro 199735 or commonality Boekle Rittberger and Wagner 2001 For example there is near universal agreement that chemical weapons should never be used Price 1995 whereas the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remains highly contested for example Roberts 2003 Another is the intensity with which the norm is typically held by members of the social system Some norms may involve little sense of obligation whereas others may be so deeply internalized as to be taken for granted Contrast the proscription of the use of force with the antislavery norm How do we know whether such institutions actually exist More specifically how can we assess how widely shared a particular norm is or how strongly it is held No scholarly consensus exists on the measurement of norms Nevertheless nonbehav ioral evidence for the existence of norms can be culled from a number of sources including surveys experiments interviews and participant observation see for example Hechter and Opp 2001 And in the study of international norms in which it is often difficult to interact directly with the actors involved one can and must examine what people say and write using such methods as content discourse and historical analysis see for example Raymond 1997 As Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 note because norms exist in the mind we can have only indirect evidence of their existence just as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action Nevertheless precisely because norms by definition embody a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study Indeed norms must be expressed from time to time verbally or on paper consciously or unconsciously for otherwise they could not be shared by members of a social group What people say and write not only reveals but reaffirms or reinforces their beliefs and in some cases even helps create new norms Thus a number of constructivist international relations scholars have pointed to the need to examine communicative processes or discourse in order to identify norms see for example Klotz 19952933 Finnemore 1996a2324 200315 Indeed as much as two decades ago Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986774 argued for the need for an interpretive approach to the study of regimes in light of their inherently dialogical nature In this sense identifying norms is akin to the process 6Likewise Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 maintain that both the intersubjective and the evaluative di mensions are inescapable when discussing norms and Goertz and Diehl 1992635 write that the term norm reflects the deontological component that is lacking in the term rule This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10 What Are International Institutions of determining whether a customary international law exists States must perceive that a particular practice is obligatory or required by law How then do we know this is the case According to international legal scholars an important part of the process is an examination of the statements of government leaders and spokes persons Arend 199948 Nevertheless reliance on evidence of this type sometimes poses novel challenges For instance the more strongly held a norm is the less evidence there may be of its existence Finnemore 1996a23 has pointed out that many norms are so intern alized and taken for granted that violations do not occur and the norm is hard to recognize As an illustration she cites the norm of statehood as the only appro priate and legitimate political unit in international politics Indeed so deeply root ed is this norm that most scholarship has treated and continues to treat states as naturally occurring and inevitable rather than as socially constructed and histor ically contingent Finnemore 1996a23 Intersubjective norms do not exhaust the characteristics of institutions however Institutions typically have formal elements as well to which above we assigned the term rules Indeed it is these elements of international institutions that are most familiar Consider as illustrations the United Nations Charter the North Atlantic Treaty the Kyoto Protocol or the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA As these examples suggest moreover the formal elements of interna tional institutions in contrast to norms can have an existence that is entirely separate from the agents that devised them Norms and other intersubjective phenomena require human consciousness to be sustained A related feature of rules as the term is used here is that they need not cor respond to what any affected party actually prefers or thinks should be the case In contrast to the intersubjective elements of international institutions they need not possess any evaluative or deontic content no moral opprobrium is necessarily at tached to their violation Rather rules simply concern what things are and how things are done for instance the membership of the UN Security Council the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization WTO and the voting rules of the IMF Indeed as these examples suggest rules may clash with the normative beliefs of many of the actors to which they apply Thus a rule may be imposed by one actor on others whereas a norm may not and those upon whom the rule is imposed may feel no sense of obligation to adhere to it although they may comply for other reasons Just as norms may vary in strength rules may exhibit differing degrees of for mality or formalization Charles Lipson 1991 has distinguished between more or less formal agreements on the basis of the level at which the agreement is made within the government and the form that it takes Thus a rule may be stated verbally such as through an oral agreement or written down such as in an inter state treaty Aust 2000 For their part treaties may simply be signed as in an executive agreement or be subject to formal ratification by a legislative body Other possibilities lying along this spectrum include memoranda of understanding exchanges of notes and joint communiques Similarly some international legal scholars have sought to make a distinction between hard legalization and various instruments of soft law Chinkin 1989 Abbott and Snidal 2000 Among the latter figure interstate agreements that are explicitly nonlegally binding such as the Helsinki Final Act nonbinding or voluntary resolutions formulated and adopted by international and regional organizations such as those issued by the UN General Assembly formal treaties that lack identifiable rights and obli gations and codes of conduct or guidelines adopted by IGOs The degree of formalization determines the strength of a rule especially when it is made legally binding Intentionally omitted from this definition is any conception of institutions as practices or patterns of behavior As noted above some scholars have defined This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 1 institutions in terms of practices but this approach has found little favor within the field of international relations Indeed the need to distinguish institutional norms and rules from behavior is a leading area of agreement among rationalists and constructivists One reason is that a pattern of behavior such as recurring attempts to maintain a balance of power may not conform to or be influenced by any particular norm or rule More fundamentally the equation of institutions with behavior or practices precludes the use of the former to explain the latter In practice specific institutional elements can assume a wide range of forms Some will be pure rules others will be pure norms and yet othersperhaps mostare best characterized by some combination of rulelike formal and norm like intersubjective characteristics For example a formal rule may be accompan ied by a strong intersubjective belief in its legitimacy Moreover the nature of a particular institutional element can change over time Thus a norm may become formalizedone can point to many illustrations from the laws of war human rights and diplomatic relationswhereas a formal rule may gradually lose moral force over time Nevertheless it should be possible to locate any particular institutional element at a given moment within a twodimensional ontological space Figure 1 attempts to do this using examples from a variety of domains One of the dimensionsin this case the verticalis defined in terms of the strength of the normlike character istics if any The other dimensionthe horizontal hereis determined by the degree of formalization of the rulelike characteristics if any It is important to stress that in this ontology the norm and rulelike characteristics are orthogonal to Strong Peaceful dispute settlement Racial equality Just war theory Anticipatory selfdefense Nuclear taboo pacta sunt servanda Strong norms not formalized USSoviet measures to reduce risk of nuclear war COCOM Wassenaar arrangement SALT II NATO force goals National selfdetermination UNGA resolutions Selfdefense ABM treaty Chemical Weapons Ban Anti slavery convention Partial test ban Formal rule strong norm Norm Strength Spheres of influence Humanitarian intervention Emergent norm not yet formalized USSoviet incidents at sea agreement Universal Declaration of Human Rights GATT rules Climate Change Convention Helsinki Final Act Rio Declaration Torture convention Nonintervention Land Mine Ban Nuclear non proliferation Anticorruption conventions WTO rules Comprehensive Test Ban Formal rule less than universal norm Weak or Nonexistent General disarmament Preventive war Balance of power Weak norm no formal rule USSoviet hotline agreement OPEC quotas Interwar strategic bombing agreement Unratified rule little normative content General proscription of the threat and use of force Protection of Wetlands Convention Territorial waters Navigational rules Postal conventions Formal rule weak or nonexistent norm Rule Low Degree of High formalization FIG 1 Locating Institutional Elements This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 What Are International Institutions one another rather than lying along a single continuum as is sometimes suggested see for example Steinmo 20017554 Functional Distinctions The second important distinction captured by the definition concerns the functions that different institutional elements perform These functions can be divided into three broad categories the constitutive the regulative and the procedural The distinction between the constitutive and regulative functions is already quite com monly made As explained below it is also useful to distinguish a third the pro cedural function Before proceeding it should be noted that some norms and rules may be both constitutive and regulative at the same time For example the rules regarding the movement of a chess piece simultaneously define what that piece is see also Schauer 19917 Similarly the documents establishing many international bodies also stipulate what those bodies can and cannot do But many norms and rules are not both constitutive and regulative thus it remains important to be able to distinguish analytically among these three functions7 Constitutive Function The constitutive function of international institutions is in a sense the most fundamental given that constitutive rules and norms create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind Schauer 19916 Without the prior constitution of actors for instance there can be no action to regulate Although some rationalist writings on institutions hint at their consti tutive role for example North 1990 this aspect has been developed primarily in the work of constructivists and the closely related English School theory of international relations see Buzan 2004 It is useful to distinguish among several more specific constitutive functions In the first place institutional rules and norms can create social entities actors and determine their very capabilities and other endowments related to action such as rights Indeed this phenomenon is perhaps most obvious in the realm of in ternational relations in which virtually all actors are institutionally constituted to an important extent The most familiar example of such entities is the sovereign state By now it has been well established that the state is a social construct see for example Biersteker and Weber 1996 Hall 1999 As an actor in the inter national system the state is essentially a bundle of roles and related rights as sociated with a given geographical territory that are determined by the basic rules of authority that define international relations Philpott 20013 The in stitution of state sovereignty has become increasingly formalized over the years but it still rests on a strong intersubjective basis The state is not the only institutionally constituted actor of consequence in international affairs however A number of others are associated with interna tional organizations Most common among these are collective intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly the North At lantic Council NAC the Council of Ministers of the European Union EU and the IMF Board of Governors as well as supranational executive bodies such as the UN Secretariat the European Commission and the staff of the World Bank Also possible but still quite rare are supranational judicial and legislative bodies composed of elected or appointed individuals such as the International Court of Justice the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament 7Young 1999 offers a typology of regime or institutional tasks that distinguishes between regulative proced ural programmatic and generative regimes Despite the seeming similarity his typology differs from the one offered here in an important respect Youngs typology refers to the overall task or tasks performed by a regime or institution while the present essay is concerned with the basic range of functions performed by institutional elem ents Thus any programmatic or generative regime for example can in principle be decomposed into some combination of constitutive regulative and procedural elements This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 13 Intergovernmental and supranational actors are typically constituted by formal treaties agreements and conventions among states such as the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty or the decisions of intergovernmental bodies such as the resolution establishing the UN Human Rights Council Yet other noteworthy institutionally constituted actors may involve individual persons Consider for example the UN Secretary General the NATO Supreme Allied Commander the DirectorGeneral of the WTO the President of the World Bank and diplomatic envoys Although the individuals involved already possess a physical existence rules and norms endow them with significant roles and rights Before proceeding it is important to recognize that international organizations are not institutions per se Rather they typically possess the qualities of both institutions as defined here and agents The UN Security Council for example is simultaneously a collective actor and an arena or forum in which member states interact In contrast to truly unitary actors moreover much of the activity of such collective bodies is aimed at setting regulative rules for members and authorizing legitimizing or condemning actions taken by them see Claude 1966 Whether it is more fruitful to regard an international organization as an institution or as an actor will depend upon the precise question that one seeks to answer As a prac tical matter however it may be difficult to distinguish between organizational actors on the one hand and the norms and rules that constitute them regulate their behavior toward other actors and determine their internal processes on the other Analytically distinct from the creation of actors is the role that institutions can play in determining their identities interests goals and preferences which is a prominent theme in the constructivist literature on norms see for example Klotz 1995 Jepperson Wendt and Katzenstein 1996 Katzenstein 1996 In some cases these characteristics may be conferred simultaneously with the very creation of an actor Thus the secretary general of an international organization will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and an interest in promoting the wellbeing of the organization and its membership In other cases however preexisting actors notably states and their leaders may acquire new identities and preferences as a result of their presence participation or embeddedness in an international institution through processes of persuasion and socialization Johnston 2001 In this regard particular attention has been paid to socializing processes within European institutions such as the EU and NATO see for example Checkel 2005 Moreover institutions may constitute activities and categories of action Dessler 1989455 Schauer 19916 Searle 199527 To be sure many forms of behavior especially those of a physical nature can and do take place without the mediation of institutions But institutions often play a role in determining their social meaning such as whether a use of force is to be viewed as an act of aggression or a justifiable intervention or whether a tariff is a violation of international law or a legitimate retaliatory activity They specify what counts as a particular activity And in some cases they may define activities that would not otherwise even exist such as the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council Like sovereignty the actions in which states may or must engage have become increasingly formalized over the years consider the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Law of Consular and Diplomatic Immunities But formalization is not a pre requisite for their existence even though it may affect their impact and influence Regulative Function Perhaps most familiar is the regulative function of insti tutions Many rules and norms seek to regulate the everyday behavior of actors see also Ostrom 199052 In this sense Young 198916 has defined rules as welldefined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that members of an institution are expected to perform or to refrain from performing under This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 14 What Are International Institutions appropriate circumstances Similarly constructivists typically describe norms as shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior Regulative or operational norms and rules can assume three basic forms Dessler 1989457 Schauer 199178 They may be prescriptive requiring or obligating actors to behave in certain ways Examples include the provision of military assistance to allies when attacked the payment of assessed dues to an international organization and intervention to prevent or stop genocide They may proscribe prohibit or forbid various actions Here one might cite the UN Charters broad injunction to refrain from the threat or use of force the ban on torture and restrictions on the application of quotas to traded goods Regulative norms and rules may also be permissive allowing actors to engage in actions that nevertheless remain optional such as selfdefense the imposition of tariffs up to agreed levels and the exploitation of resources on the continental shelf When fully specified such norms and rules indicate the type of action the relevant actors and the circumstances under which they are operative Another useful distinction is between primary norms and rules of behavior and secondary or auxiliary regulative elements intended to increase the likelihood of compliance with the primary ones The secondary category includes transpar ency norms and rules concerning the provision gathering and sharing of in formation about actors policies and actions in order to facilitate determinations of compliance and noncompliance Mitchell 1998 Examples are IMF reporting requirements inspection provisions in arms control agreements and surveillance rights such as those contained in the Open Skies Treaty This category also in cludes rules and norms regarding how actors should respond to instances of noncompliance by others Although such enforcement measures are somewhat rarer one can readily point to prominent examples such as the Covenant of the League of Nations which required members to sever all economic relations with an aggressor and the provisions in the WTO agreements that allow members to impose trade sanctions in certain circumstances Procedural Function The procedural function of international institutions bears a strong resemblance to the regulative function and might well be thought of as a subset of the latter Nevertheless institutional scholars have sometimes taken pains to differentiate between the two see for example Young 1989 Ostrom 1990 and some selfdescribed institutionalist studies have focused entirely on procedures for example Garrett and Tsebelis 1996 How do they differ Regulative rules and norms typically concern behavior that directly affects the physical world Ostrom 199050 whereas procedures typically govern ac tions by actors with respect to one another within the context of institutions or with respect to the institutions themselves In particular procedural arrange ments often provide mechanisms that allow participating actors to arrive at col lective choices regarding problems that arise in the issue areas covered by an institution Young 199928 Obviously a clear line does not always exist between these two functions in part because they are often closely related For example the UN Charter con tains both regulative elements such as the general prohibition on the threat and use of force and procedural elements notably the voting rules of the UN Gen eral Assembly and Security Council as well as important constitutive elements Likewise the institutions concerning international imports both regulate the restrictions that countries can place on trade and provide procedures for the negotiation of lower trade barriers and the resolution of disputes Although the procedural function of institutions is often associated with formal rules especially in the context of IGOs in some contexts it is performed primarily or exclusively by intersubjective norms Moreover even the decisionmaking procedures of IGOs are not always formalized Those of the UN Security Council EU and IMF are spelled out in considerable detail in This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 15 TABLE 1 Typology of International Institutions Ontological Forms Combinations of Norms and Intersubjective Rules Includes But Norms Not Limited to Includes Codified Customary Formal Rules Customary International Includes Imposed International Law Law and Some Regimes and Some Spontaneous Negotiated Negotiated Functions Regimes Regimes Regimes Constitutive Sovereignty Status of diplomats IGO constitutions statehood and for example IMF racial equality diplomatic missions Articles of eg Vienna Agreement ICAO Convention on Convention Diplomatic Relations Regulative Traditional laws of Codified laws of war Interstate includes regime war for example regulatory norms and rules for example Just Geneva agreements for War doctrine Conventions example 200 mile General Assembly limit GATT trade declarations rules postal conventions Open Skies Treaty Procedural Norms of Procedures for Formal IGO includes regime consensus treaty negotiation procedures procedures unanimity and ratification and for example sovereign interpretation Security Council equality one state eg Vienna voting rules WTO one vote Convention on the dispute resolution Law of Treaties procedure the agreements on which those bodies are based In contrast the North Atlantic Treaty is silent on the procedures to be followed by the NAC in which decision making has consequently been guided by the norms of sovereign equality and consensus Potential Contributions of the New Definition It is one thing to argue in the abstract that a particular definition is superior to the alternatives but yet another to demonstrate that its adoption will result in better theoretical and empirical research Accordingly this final section discusses three potential contributions of the new definition Clarifying the Nature of Particular International Institutions In the first place this definition can help scholars make clearer the nature of the particular institutions that are the subject of inquiry and thus the range of phe nomena to which their claims and findings actually apply The ontological and functional distinctions expressed in the definition provide the analytical basis for a This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 16 What Are International Institutions comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions as delineated in Table 1 Here the columns are defined in terms of the ontological nature of the institution ranging from the purely formal to the purely intersubjective or involving some combination of formal and intersubjective elements The rows capture the various functions that institutions can perform Consistent with the objective of providing a comprehensive definition of international institutions it should be possible to situate each of the distinct forms of international institutions within this taxonomy To be sure the task is complicated by the fact that many institutions have multiple elements often making it difficult to assign them to a single category As a result some scholars may object to the specific characterizations suggested here But such objections should not negate the value of attempting to clarify the nature of particular institutional elements Improving Existing Institutional Scholarship The failure to recognize important variations in institutional forms can result in flawed research on the causes and consequences of international institutions The definition proposed here can help illuminate such flaws and suggest how they might be remedied or avoided in the first place One potential problem that the definition may help prevent is the failure to specify the full range of possible out comes when treating international institutions as dependent variables An example can be found in the Rational Design project as presented by Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001 which seeks to explain differences in the forms that international institutions take An important recent contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions as dependent variables the project defines them as explicit arrangements negotiated among international actors that prescribe proscribe andor authorize behavior Koremenos Lipson and Snidal 2001762 By emphasizing the regulative function however this def inition neglects the important constitutive choices that are often involved in the creation of international institutions Not only must actors decide whether or not to establish formal organizations but they must choose between different types of bodies intergovernmental supranational and so on and determine what func tions authority and capabilities to grant to those bodies As a result of its con stricted focus the Rational Design project may overlook important tradeoffs in the design of international institutions A second potential pitfall that this definition may help with is the failure to specify the full range of relevant institutional causal variables when exploring the effects of international institutions thereby running the risk of omitted variable bias For example the explanatory framework employed in the Rational Design project overlooks the possibility that norms may also be an important determinant of in stitutional design A design that seems optimal on efficiency grounds may never theless be regarded as inappropriate or illegitimate and thus may not be chosen on the basis of normative considerations Indeed one of the case studies executed for the project on prisoners of war treaties shows how a preexisting set of norms were formalized in treaty form Morrow 2001 A similar oversight mars Jeffrey Legros 1997 otherwise valuable effort to com pare the relative impact of international norms and organizational culture Exam ining eight cases involving the use of particular means of warfarechemical weapons strategic bombing and submarine warfareduring World War II he finds that organizational culture provides a more consistent explanation of state preferences than do international norms Legros analysis does not however dis tinguish explicitly between the formal and intersubjective aspects of international institutions In fact some of the international norms that he considers such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol had important formal components Indeed the limited This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 17 data presented by Legro suggest a stronger correlation between state preferences and international institutions than the study found if the latter are measured in terms of formalization Consequently instead of generating a single prediction for each of the three institutions under consideration it might have been advisable to measure norm strength and rule formalization separately Doing so would have made it possible to assess the influence of both intersubjective and formal insti tutional elements as well as that of organizational culture A third potential problem that the definition may help avoid is the failure to identify and differentiate among distinct causal pathways as suggested by Andrew Cortell and James Daviss 1996 pathbreaking study of the ways in which inter national norms and rules affect state behavior through the actions of domestic political actors A key condition or intervening variable in their model of insti tutional influence is the domestic salience of a rule or norm They measure salience in terms of the legitimacy accorded the rule or norm in the domestic political context as well as level of domestic commitment indicated by declarations of support by authoritative actors ratification concrete alterations in policy choices and formal incorporation into domestic processes They then assess the model through an examination of two heuristic case studies of US policy making 1 the US semiconductor industrys efforts to persuade the Reagan Administration to press Japan to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT and 2 congressional efforts to pressure the Bush Administration to pursue a multilateral strategy following Iraqs invasion of Kuwait Because the study explicitly does not differentiate between formal and intersub jective institutional elements however it obscures the possibility that very different causal mechanisms may be at work in different international institutional contexts even if the outcomes are similar In particular the case studies suggest that different types of institutions lend themselves to different forms and degrees of domestic salience More formal institutions such as the GATT rules are more likely to be formally incorporated into domestic laws and procedures whereas the impact of primarily intersubjective phenomena such as the norm of collective security de pends largely on the extent to which they acquire legitimacy in the domestic con text Thus explicit recognition of the ontological distinction proposed here could help produce a richer more differentiated theory of institutional effects A fourth potential problem with which the definition proposed here could help concerns the failure to select institutional cases that are as comparable as possible which is suggested by Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martins 2001 useful effort to explain the effects of international institutions in terms of whether they promote convergence or divergence in state behavior These scholars hypothesize in par ticular that convergence is more likely to occur when states recognize that noncompliance will result in substantial externalities and the relevant institutions possess adequate monitoring mechanisms To establish the plausibility of this hypothesis they explored three cases that exhibit variation in the level of exter nalities 1 development aid cooperation among OECD countries 2 the estab lishment of the Single European Market and 3 international cooperation to limit stratospheric ozone depletion The three cases also however exhibit significant differences in the nature of the regulative rules and norms of state behavior on which the institutions were based Both the Single European Market and international cooperation on ozone involved formally agreed upon legally binding rules that lent themselves to enforcement In contrast the OECD development aid regime was based on a goal 07 of GNP annually that was neither legally binding nor enforceable Indeed this aspirational target did not even command a normative consensus given that many OECD members expressed reservations and two had not accepted it even with reser vations as late as 1985 Lumsdaine 1993247 Arguably these fundamental This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 18 What Are International Institutions differences in the nature of the basic rules and norms could by themselves account for much of the variation in institutional effects that Botcheva and Martin found Consequently future research on this subject might benefit from the careful se lection of cases involving institutions based on highly similar sets of regulative norms and rules Generating New Research Questions A further potential benefit of the definition proposed here is that it can help gen erate useful new research questions that might otherwise be overlooked The types of questions scholars ask are constrained by the assumptions that underlie their models Thus rationalists and constructivists by emphasizing the rule and norm like characteristics of international institutions respectively may have unnecessarily and inappropriately restricted the ambit of institutional research In their otherwise laudable survey of the institutional literature for example Martin and Simmons 1998742757 present a purely rationalist research agenda for the study of in stitutional effectsone which must perforce neglect the ways in which a large number of international institutions matter At least two broad sets of questions suggested by the definition seem worth pursuing One concerns the differing causal relationships between regulative norms and rules as independent variables on the one hand and international behavior and outcomes as dependent variables on the other The reconsideration of the Legro 1997 data above suggests that as a first step it is important to study the relative impact of regulative norms and rules under different circumstances Such work should in turn stimulate and inform efforts to develop a better com parative understanding of the different mechanisms through which formal rules and intersubjective norms operate to shape behavior the value of which is sug gested by the Cortell and Davis 1996 study Throughout this process scholars should be attentive to possible interactions between the intersubjective and formal elements of particular institutions rather than treating them simply as alternative explanatory variables What difference does it make for example whether or not a strong norm is formalized or a highly formalized rule is accompanied by a strong sense of obligation A second broad and potentially valuable area of research concerns the basic formsintersubjective or formalthat international institutions take For instance some otherwise functionally similar institutions such as the prohibitions on the use of chemical and nuclear weapons have assumed very different forms Why is this the case A related question is when and how the basic nature of institutions change Some primarily formal arrangements may acquire a strong intersubjective element of obligation over time whereas others may not and yet others may ex perience a loss of legitimacy Conversely states have formalized some international norms as treaties but not others And what roles might formal rules play in the development of norms and vice versa For example although Finnemore and Sikkink 1998900 do not explicitly differentiate between the two they state that in most cases an emergent norm must become institutionalized in specific sets of presumably formal rules and organizations before it is widely adopted Arguably their pathbreaking analysis of the norm life cycle would have been richer and more accurate if it had been informed by the definition presented here Conclusion This essay began with the premise that the formulation of adequate definitions of key concepts is essential to the process of theory development The scholarly lit erature on international institutions has suffered from the lack of a widely accepted definition that includes all the most important forms The purpose of this essay was This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 19 to remedy this deficiency by elaborating a comprehensive yet differentiated def inition of international institutions that can serve as a solid foundation for the development of a better understanding of their nature causes and consequences Integral to the definition are two distinctionsone ontological and one function althat in turn serve as the basis for a taxonomy within which all types of international institutions can be located This definition promises to advance the study of international institutions in several ways At a minimum it should promote an appreciation of the full range of possible institutional forms and simultaneously help clarify the extent and limits of existing and future studies of international institutions In addition the definition should help improve work on the subject by making scholars more attentive to potential variations in institutional forms Beyond simply helping remedy or pre vent the repetition of past mistakes it should stimulate the development of both richer and more comprehensive theories of international institutions And no less important the definition should help open potentially valuable avenues of research by generating new questions and inspiring fruitful comparisons Theoretical progress will inevitably occur as scholars seek increasingly to relate different in stitutional forms to one another At the same time by facilitating the differentiation of institutions into their constituent ontological and functional components the definition may help deepen our understanding of specific institutional types 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The International Political Economy and International Institutions Vol I Cheltenham Elgar YOUNG ORAN R 1999 Governance in World Affairs Ithaca Cornell University Press This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Cambridge Studies in International Relations From International to World Society English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation Barry Buzan CAMBRIDGE wwwcambridgeorg9780521833486 This page intentionally left blank From International to World Society Barry Buzan offers an extensive and long overdue critique and reap praisal of the English school approach to International Relations Start ing on the neglected concept of world society and bringing together the international society tradition and the Wendtian mode of construc tivism Buzan offers a new theoretical framework that can be used to address globalisation as a complex political interplay among state and nonstate actors This approach forces English school theory to confront neglectedquestionsbothaboutitsbasicconceptsandassumptionsand the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared how and why they are shared and by whom Buzan highlights the idea of pri mary institutions as the central contribution of English school theory and shows how this both differentiates English school theory from realism and neoliberal institutionalism and how it can be used to gen erate distinctive comparative and historical accounts of international society barry buzan is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and a Fellow of the British Academy He is the author coauthor or editor of over fifteen books and has published widely in academic journals No text detected CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 From International to World Society Editorial Board Steve Smith Managing editor Thomas Biersteker Phil Cerny Michael Cox A J R Groom Richard Higgott Kimberley Hutchings Caroline KennedyPipe Steve Lamy Michael Mastanduno Louis Pauly Ngaire Woods Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cam bridge University Press and the British International Studies Associ ation BISA The series will include a wide range of material from undergraduate textbooks and surveys to researchbased monographs and collaborative volumes The aim of the series is to publish the best new scholarship in International Studies from Europe North America and the rest of the world CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 95 Barry Buzan From international to world society English School theory and the social structure of globalisation 94 K J Holsti Taming the sovereigns Institutional change in international politics 93 Bruce Cronin Institutions for the common good International protection regimes in international society 92 Paul Keal European conquest and the rights of indigenous peoples The moral backwardness of international society 91 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver Regions and powers The structure of international security 90 A Claire Cutler Private power and global authority Transnational merchant law in the global political economy 93 Patrick M Morgan Deterrence now 92 Susan Sell Private power public law The globalization of intellectual property rights 87 Nina Tannenwald The nuclear taboo The United States and the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 86 Linda Weiss ed States in the global economy Bringing domestic institutions back in 85 Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker eds The emergence of private authority in global governance 84 Heather Rae State identities and the homogenisation of peoples List continues at the end of book From International to World Society English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation Barry Buzan cambridge university press Cambridge New York Melbourne Madrid Cape Town Singapore São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building Cambridge cb2 2ru UK First published in print format isbn13 9780521833486 isbn13 9780521541213 isbn13 9780511186813 Barry Buzan 2004 2004 Information on this title wwwcambridgeorg9780521833486 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press isbn10 0511186819 isbn10 0521833485 isbn10 0521541212 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or thirdparty internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is or will remain accurate or appropriate Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press New York wwwcambridgeorg hardback paperback paperback eBook EBL eBook EBL hardback To Richard Little US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES SKIN TEST REPORT DSRD NO 026334 SPONSOR XXXXXX COMPANY PO BOX 20274 NEW ORLEANS LA 701300274 Contents List of figures and tables xi Preface xiii List of abbreviations xv Glossary xvii Introduction 1 1 English school theory and its problems an overview 6 English school theory a summary 6 World society and the problems and potentials of English school theory 10 The main areas of weakness in English school theory 15 Is English school theory really theory 24 2 World society in English school theory 27 The intellectual history of world society within English school thinking 30 The pluralistsolidarist debate 45 Conclusions 62 3 Concepts of world society outside English school thinking 63 IR writers with a sociological turn Burton Luard and Shaw 66 Sociological conceptions of world society 70 Global civil society 77 Conclusions 87 4 Reimagining the English schools triad 90 State and nonstate 91 ix Contents Physicalmechanical and social concepts of system 98 Society and community 108 Individual and transnational 118 Conclusions reconstructing the English schools triad 128 5 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate 139 What type of values if shared count as solidarist 143 Does it make any difference to solidarism how and why any given values are shared 152 What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them 154 Conclusions 158 6 The primary institutions of international society 161 Definitional problems 163 The concept of primary institutions in English school literature 167 Hierarchy and functionalism within primary institutions 176 The range of institutions and the types of international society 190 Conclusions 195 7 Bringing geography back in 205 Exclusive globalism is not necessary 207 Unwarranted pessimism 212 Understanding the interplay among the interhuman transnational and interstate domains 217 Conclusions a vanguard theory of international social structures 222 8 Conclusions a portrait of contemporary interstate society 228 A snapshot of contemporary interstate society 231 Looking back what changed what didnt and why 240 Driving forces deeply rooted structures and contradictions 249 Conclusions where to from here 263 List of references 271 Index 284 x Figures and tables Figures 1 The classical Three Traditions model of English school theory page 9 2 The Three Traditions first revision 98 3 The Three Traditions second revision 109 4 The Three Traditions third revision 133 5 The Three Traditions fourth revision 159 Tables 1 Candidates for primary institutions of international society by author 174 2 The nested hierarchy of international institutions 184 3 Contemporary international institutions 187 4 The primary institutions of eighteenthcentury European interstate society 242 xi NA Preface This book started conscious life when I decided in the late 1990s to at tempt a reconvening of the English school Much of its agenda is already visible in a paper I wrote for the public launch of that project at the BISA Conference in 1999 and subsequently published in the Review of Inter national Studies as part of a forum on the English school That paper opens many of the criticisms of the English school classics and some of the suggestions as to how to develop and apply the theory that are fol lowed up here This book has deeper roots both in my earlier attempts to link English school ideas to American IR theory which I extend here and in my world historical writings with Richard Little which point strongly towards the English school as an excellent site for developing grand theory Its particular genesis was a growing feeling that a lot of the problems I saw in English school theory hinged on the concept of world society World society occupied a key place in a triad alongside international society and international system but was the Cinderella of English school theory attracting neither consistent usage nor and in contrast to international society any systematic attempt to explore its meaning The vagueness attending world society seemed to underpin a lot of the problems in English school theory about pluralism and soli darism and how to handle the cosmopolitan and transnational aspects of international life This dissatisfaction led me to apply for ESRC fund ing to look into world society I originally offered an article but as I dug into world society it quickly became obvious that I was writing a book and that it would have to take on the whole body of English school the ory In that sense writing this book has reminded me of the process of writing People States and Fear twenty years ago indeed this book could be titled Peoples States and Transnational Actors Then I was trying to un derstand the concept of security and had to follow the threads wherever xiii Preface they led without knowing what the whole thing would look like Now I have pursued the threads opened by world society and ended up fo cusing on institutions and the general theoretical framework of English school thinking I would like to thank the following for comments on all or parts of earlier versions of this work Mathias Albert William Bain Chris Brown Bruce Cronin Thomas Diez Tim Dunne Ana GonzalezPelaez Stefano Guzzini Lene Hansen Andrew Hurrell Dietrich Jung John Keane Morten Kelstrup Bob Keohane Anna Leander Richard Little Lene Mosegaard Madsen Ian Manners Noel Parker Nick Rengger John Ruggie Brian Schmidt Gerry Simpson Hidemi Suganami Ole Wæver Adam Watson Nick Wheeler Richard Whitman and several anony mous reviewers for the ESRC My special thanks to Richard Little Ole Wæver and the late Gerry Segal Without my extensive collaborations with them I would never have learned half of the things I needed to understand in order to write this book I dedicate it to Richard Little who as well as being a good friend has accompanied me on much of my intellectual journey towards the English school and who has played a big role in the success of its reconvening I am grateful to the ESRC award no R000239415A for funding a twoyear teaching buyout which enabled me to focus on this project and to the University of Westminster and then the London School of Economics for giving me leave I am also grateful to the late and much lamented Copenhagen Peace Research Institute COPRI for funding both my presence there and a regular seminar at which many drafts related to this book received incisive criticism xiv Abbreviations ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BIS Bank for International Settlements BISA British International Studies Association CEO Chief Executive Officer CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species COPRI Copenhagen Peace Research Institute CSD Centre for the Study of Democracy ECPR European Consortium for Political Research ESRC Economic and Social Research Council EU European Union FIDE International Chess Federation FIFA International Federation of Football Associations GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCS Global Civil Society IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development aka World Bank ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IGO Intergovernmental Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International NonGovernmental Organisation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPE International Political Economy IPSA International Political Science Association IR International Relations xv List of abbreviations ISA International Studies Association MFN Most Favoured Nation Montreal Protocol 1987 to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer 1987 NAFTA North American Free Trade Association NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference PKO peacekeeping operation QUANGO quasiautonomous nongovernmental organisation TNA transnational actor TNC transnational corporation UN United Nations UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 and Kyoto Protocol 1997 UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States WHO World Health Organisation WSRG World Society Research Group WTO World Trade Organisation xvi Glossary Binding forces coercion calculation belief Interhuman society social structures based on interactions amongst indi vidual human beings and in this book referred to as firstorder societies and mainly manifested as largescale patterns of shared identity International society has two meanings in this book 1 The classical English school usage is about the institutionalisa tion of shared interest and identity amongst states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory I call this interstate society 2 A more specific meaning developed along the way in this book to indicate situations in which the basic political and legal frame of international social structure is set by the statessystem with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within the order defined by interstate society Interstate society see international society definition 1 International system refers generally to the macro side of the interac tions that tie the human race together and more specifically to the interactions among states Its usage in classical English school think ing is close to that in realism being about power politics amongst states within a political structure of international anarchy Montreal Protocol 1987 to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer 1987 Pluralism defines secondorder societies of states with a relatively low de gree of shared norms rules and institutions amongst the states where the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition or possibly also the management of collective prob lems of common fate eg arms control environment xvii Glossary Primary institutions the institutions talked about by the English school as constitutive of both states and international society in that they define both the basic character and purpose of any such society For secondorder societies such institutions define the units that compose the society Secondary institutions the institutions talked about in regime theory are the products of certain types of international society most obviously liberal but possibly other types as well and are for the most part consciously designed by states Secondorder societies those in which the members are not individual human beings but durable collectivities of humans possessed of iden tities and actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts Solidarism can be used as a synonym for cosmopolitanism but in my usage defines international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms rules and institutions among states where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition but also on coop eration over a wider range of issues whether in pursuit of joint gains eg trade or realisation of shared values eg human rights State any form of postkinship territorially based politically cen tralised selfgoverning entity capable of generating an insideoutside structure The three domains interstate interhuman and transnational society Transnational society social structures composed of nonstate collective actors VanguardtheideacommontobothmilitarystrategyandLeninistthink ingthataleadingelementplaysacrucialroleinhowsocialmovements unfold World society has two meanings in this book 1 the traditional English school usage takes individuals nonstate organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts transcendence of the statessystem at the centre of IR theory 2 the usage developed in this book labelling situations in which no one of the three domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two but all are in play together xviii Introduction The most fundamental question you can ask in international theory is What is international society Wight 1987 222 After a long period of neglect the social or societal dimension of the international system is being brought back into fashion within Interna tional Relations IR by the upsurge of interest in constructivism For adherents of the English school this dimension was never out of fash ion with the consequence that English school thinking itself has been somewhat on the margins of the discipline In this book I will argue that English school theory has a lot to offer those interested in developing societal understandings of international systems albeit itself being in need of substantial redevelopment International society is the flagship idea of the English school It carves out a clearly bounded subject focused on the elements of society that states form among themselves This domain has been quite extensively developed conceptually and considerable work has also been done on the histories of international societies particularly the creation of the modern international society in Europe and its expansion to the rest of the planet World society also has a key place in English school theory but is much less well worked out While international society is focused on states world society implies something that reaches well beyond the state towards more cosmopolitan images of how humankind is or should be organised Quite what that something that defines world society is however remains at best contested and at worst simply un clear Since world society can be and is easily cast as a challenger to international society ambiguity about it is a major impediment to clear thinking about the social structure of international systems A key cause of this problem is a widespread failure in English school thinking to 1 From International to World Society distinguish clearly enough between normative theory and theory about norms It is a central focus of this book to address that problem Fortunately several other traditions of thought have grappled with world society sometimes using that label sometimes with variants such as global society or global civil society Latterly its popularity or that of its synonyms perhaps can be understood best as a way of getting to conceptual grips with the phenomenon of globalisation These other bodies of thought provide useful insights applicable to English school theory Consequently although this book is about English school theory gen erally and will have a lot to say about international society much of the argument in the early chapters will focus on trying to clarify world society The concept of world society and especially how world society and international society relate to each other is in my view both the biggest weakness in existing English school theory and the place where the biggest gains are to be found John Vincents 1988 211 observation that the need to work out the relationship between cosmopolitan culture and international order was one of the unfinished legacies of Bulls work remains true today English school theory has great potential to improve how globalisation is conceptualised but cannot do so unless it finds a coherent position on world society I plan to survey the basic ideas and approaches to world society and to attempt a coherent theoretical con struction of the concept My starting position is that there is not much to be gained and quite a lot to be lost analytically from simply using world society as a label for the totality of human interaction in all forms and at all levels Globalisation fills that role already My initial strategy will be to construct world society as a concept to capture the nonstate side of the international system and therefore as the complementopponent to the already welldeveloped idea of international society The book is aimed at two distinct but not mutually exclusive audi ences The narrower audience comprises those already working in the English school tradition plus followers of Wendts mode of construc tivism For the English school people it offers a comprehensive critique of English school theory and an ambitious detailed attempt to address this critique by developing a more purely social structural interpreta tion of the theory to set alongside its existing normative and historical strands For the Wendtians the book offers a friendly critique an exten sion of the logic and an application of the theory I seek to create a synthe sis between the structural elements of the BullVincent side of English school theory about international and world society and Wendts 1999 2 Introduction social theory of international politics I take from both sources a social structural reading of international society and a methodologically plu ralist rejection of the view that paradigms in IR are incommensurable I insert into both two things that they ignore or marginalise the inter national political economy and the subglobal level And I impose on both a more rigorous taxonomical scheme than either has attempted The result is a radical reinterpretation of English school theory from the ground up but one that remains supportive of and in touch with the basic aims of both English school and Wendtian theory to understand and interpret the composition and the dynamics of the social structure of international politics The broader audience is all of those in IR who acknowledge that globalisation represents an important way of labelling a set of sub stantial and significant changes in the international system but who despair about the analytical vacuousness of the G word To them I offer a Wendtinspired social structural interpretation of English school theory as a good solution to the problems of how to think both an alytically and normatively about globalisation English school theory is ideally tailored to address this problematique though it has not so far been much used in this way The English schools triad of concepts exactly captures the simultaneous existence of state and nonstate sys tems operating alongside and through each other without finding this conceptually problematic It keeps the old while bringing in the new and is thus well suited to looking at the transition from Westphalian to postWestphalian international politics whether this be at the level of globalisation or in regional developments such as the EU English school theory can handle the idea of a shift from balance of power and war to market and multilateralism as the dominant institutions of in ternational society and it provides an ideal framework for examining questions of intervention whether on human rights or other grounds Managing this expansion from interstate to world politics is important to IR as a discipline IRs core strengths are in the statessystem and it needs to combine these with other elements of the international system and to avoid ensnaring itself in the trap of unnecessary choices between stateandnonstatealternativesInmyviewEnglishschooltheoryshows how this can be done better than any available alternative This broader audience includes practically everyone engaged in the debates about IR theory Some of them may baulk initially at the idea of wadingthroughasustainedcritiqueofwhattheymayseeasasomewhat marginal and traditional body of IR theory Why they may ask should 3 From International to World Society we bother with something so demonstrably flawed They should take this book in three stages First it can be read as a relatively compact intro duction to a stimulating and useful body of theory with which they may not be very familiar Second it is a sustained attempt to bring together the IR tradition of thinking about international society and Wendtian constructivism and to set both of these against more sociological think ing about society generally and world society in particular Wendtian thinkingisbroadenedouttoincludenonstateactorsandEnglishschool theory is forced to confront neglected questions about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared how and why they are shared and by whom Third it is about developing out of this conjunc ture a theoretical framework that can be used to address globalisation as a complex social interplay among state and nonstate actors medi ated by a set of primary institutions This interplay can be captured as a finite though not simple set of structural possibilities governed by a relatively small number of key variables Using English school theory to address globalisation does not offer the predictive oversimplifications of neorealism and neoliberalism But by opening the way to a wider historical interpretation it does offer an escape from the Westphalian straitjacket It gives powerful grounds for differentiation and compar ison among types of international society and ways of understanding both what Westphalian international society evolved from and what it might be evolving into In that mode this book also speaks to those grappling with integration theory and how to understand and manage developments in the EU The plan is as follows Chapter 1 provides a quick overview of English school theory in order to set the context and to note some of the problems that a more social structural interpretation might redress Chapter 2 sets out a detailed exegesis of the world society concept in English school thinking establishing the role it plays in the debates about pluralism and solidarism the incoherence of its usage and its importance to the whole structure of English school thinking Chapter 3 surveys how others outside the English school have deployed the idea of world society and looks for ideas there which can be applied to the English school framework Chapter 4 engages four analytical tensions at the heart of English school theory state versus nonstate physical versus social concepts of system society versus community and in dividual versus transnational and develops a revised framework for thinking about international and world society Chapter 5 returns to the pluralistsolidarist debates focusing on the neglected question of what 4 Introduction counts as solidarism and particularly the place of the economic sector It reconstructs this debate as a way of thinking about the spectrum of interstate societies Chapter 6 explores the concept of the institutions of international society in English school theory relating them to usage in regime theory and attempting a comprehensive mapping of them and how they relate to types of international society Chapter 7 introduces geography arguing that the traditional focus on the global level needs to be balanced by an equal focus on international social structures at the subglobal scale Among other things bringing in a geographic variable opens the way into understanding the dynamics and evolution of inter national societies through a type of vanguard theory Chapter 8 uses the analytical lens developed in chapters 46 to sketch a portrait of contem porary international society to look back at the institutional change of the last two centuries that brought us to where we are now and to think about the forces driving it The chapter concludes with a consideration of the likely directions of its development and with proposals for the English school research agenda 5 1 English school theory and its problems an overview We need sharper analytical tools than those provided by Wight and Bull Dunne 2001b 66 This chapter starts with a summary of English school theory as it is conventionally understood The second section looks at the different strands tensions and potentials within the school and locates within them the line to be taken in the rest of this book The third section reviews the main areas of weakness in English school theory that sub sequent chapters will address and hopefully rectify The fourth sec tion tackles the question of whether English school theory is really theory English school theory a summary The English school can be thought of as an established body of both theoretical and empirical work dating back to the late 1950s Dunne 1998 Wæver 1998 Buzan 2001 Robert Jackson 1992 271 nicely sums up the English school conversation by seeing it as a variety of theoretical inquiries which conceive of international rela tions as a world not merely of power or prudence or wealth or capa bility or domination but also one of recognition association member ship equality equity legitimate interests rights reciprocity customs and conventions agreements and disagreements disputes offenses injuries damages reparations and the rest the normative vocabulary of human conduct Two core elements define the distinctiveness of the English school its three key concepts and its theoretically pluralist approach The three key concepts are international system international society and world 6 English school theory and its problems society Little 1995 1516 Within the English school discourse these are sometimes and perhaps misleadingly codified as Hobbes or some times Machiavelli Grotius and Kant Cutler 1991 They line up with Wights 1991 three traditions of IR theory Realism Rationalism and Revolutionism Broadly speaking these terms are now understood as follows r International system HobbesMachiavellirealism is about power politics amongst states and puts the structure and process of inter national anarchy at the centre of IR theory This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and neorealism and is thus well de veloped and clearly understood It also appears elsewhere as for ex ample in Tillys 1990 162 definition that states form a system to the extent that they interact with each other regularly and to the degree that their interaction affects the behaviour of each state It is based on an ontology of states and is generally approached with a positivist epistemologymaterialistandrationalistmethodologiesandstructural theories r International society Grotiusrationalism is about the institutionali sation of shared interest and identity amongst states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory This position has some parallels to regime theory but is much deeper having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications Hurrell 1991 1216 Dunne 1995 1403 International society has been the main focus of English school think ing and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear In parallel with international system it is also based on an ontology of states but is generally approached with a constructivist epistemology and historical methods r World society Kantrevolutionism takes individuals nonstate organ isations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts transcendence of the statessystem at the centre of IR theory Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism It could include com munism but as Wæver 1992 98 notes these days it is usually taken to mean liberalism This position has some parallels to transnation alism but carries a much more foundational link to normative po litical theory It clearly does not rest on an ontology of states but given the transnational element neither does it rest entirely on one of individuals Critical theory defines some but not all of the approaches 7 From International to World Society to it and in Wightian mode it is more about historically operating al ternative images of the international system as a whole than it is about capturing the nonstate aspects of the system1 Jackson 2000 16978 puts an interesting twist on the three traditions by viewing them as defining the diverse values that statespeople have to juggle in the conduct of foreign policy Realism he sees as giving pri ority to national responsibilities rationalism he sees as giving priority to international responsibilities and revolutionism which he prefers to call cosmopolitanism he sees as giving priority to humanitarian re sponsibilities He adds a fourth more recent value stewardship of the planet in effect giving priority to responsibility for the environment The classical English school framework is summarised in figure 1 below So far the main thrust of the English schools work has been to uncover the nature and function of international societies and to trace their history and development The basic idea of international society is quite simple just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by so also states live in an interna tional society which they shape and are shaped by This social element has to be put alongside realisms raw logic of anarchy if one is to get a meaningful picture of how systems of states operate When units are sentient how they perceive each other is a major determinant of how they interact If the units share a common identity a religion a sys tem of governance a language or even just a common set of rules or norms about how to determine relative status and how to conduct diplomacy then these intersubjective understandings not only condi tion their behaviour but also define the boundaries of a social system Within the idea of international society the principal debate has been that between pluralists and solidarists This hinges on the question of the type and extent of norms rules and institutions that an interna tional society can form without departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and nonintervention that define it as a system of states Pluraliststhinkthatthesovereigntynoninterventionprinciplesrestrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence Solidarists think that international society can develop quite wideranging norms rules and institutions covering both coexistence issues and coopera tion in pursuit of shared interests including some scope for collective enforcement As indicated on figure 1 pluralism and solidarism define the boundary zones respectively towards realism and revolutionism 1 I am grateful to Ole Wæver for this latter point 8 English school theory and its problems Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism Realism International System Grotianism Rationalism International Society Kantianism Revolutionism World Society PowerMaximising Imperial Messianic Universalist SecuritySeeking efensive Conservative Pluralist Progressive Solidarist volutionary Figure 1 The classical Three Traditions model of English school theory Note Titles in are Wights labels titles in are the analytical focus titles along the border zones are where the traditions blend into each other The main focus of English school work has centred on a synthesis of realism and rationalism This focus is nicely captured by Bull and Watsons 1984 1 classic definition of international society as a group of states or more generally a group of independent politi cal communities which not merely form a system in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements This definition neatly demonstrates the combination of the Hobbesian realist element of international system with the Grotianrationalist el ement of a socially constructed order It interleaves the logic of more material theories of the international system driven by billiard ball metaphors with the view that sentience makes a difference and that social systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones 9 From International to World Society But the pursuit of international society has obliged the English school to engage with the element of liberal revolutionism Once the idea of society was conceded one had to think not just of international society amongst states but also world society the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level transcending the state It is clear from figure 1 that world society is fundamental to the ability of English school theory to focus enquiry along these lines As captured in figure 1 the idea is that these three key concepts form a complete and interlinked picture of the IR universe Although each ele ment is conceptually and methodologically distinct they blur into each other at the boundaries In the English school perspective all three of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay the question being how strong they are in relation to each other Bull 1991 xviixviii Dunne 1995 1347 The three key concepts thus generate the second distinctive feature of the English school its theoretical pluralism Little 1998 2000 makes a strong case that the English school should be seen not just as a series of ontological statements about reality but more as a pluralist methodological approach By introducing international society as a third element not only as a via media between realism and liberalismcosmopolitanism but also as the keystone to an interdepen dent set of concepts English school theory transcends the binary op position between them that for long plagued debates about IR theory By assuming not only that all three elements always operate simulta neously but also that each carries its own distinctive ontological and epistemological package English school theory also transcends the as sumption often made in the socalled interparadigm debate that real ist liberal and marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable McKinlay and Little 1986 World society and the problems and potentials of English school theory As just noted the foundation of English school theory is the idea that international system international society and world society all exist simultaneously both as objects of discussion and as aspects of inter national reality This theoretically pluralist formulation takes the focus away from the oppositional eitheror approaches of much IR theory interparadigm debate realismidealism rationalistreflectivist etc and moves it towards a holistic synthesising approach that features the patterns of strength and interplay amongst the three pillars But world 10 English school theory and its problems society has been the Cinderella concept of English school theory receiv ing relatively little attention and almost no conceptual development To the extent that it gets discussed at all it is in the context of other concerns usually but not always human rights So long as daytoday world politics was dominated by the interna tional system and international society pillars with world society only a residual element in the background the English school could get away with treating world society as a Cinderella But if as many people think the world society element is rising in significance this neglect becomes untenable There are at least three compelling reasons for giving priority torectifyingthisweaknessFirstisthattheEnglishschoolneedstoclarify the nature of its own claim to the idea in relation to the claims of others using the concept Second is that English school theory itself cannot develop until the weak world society pillar is brought up to strength Third is that there is an opportunity to use English school theory to clarify the perennially unfocused but politically central debate about globalisation This opportunity depends on the English school getting its own theoretical house in order Even if the current assumptions about the rising importance of world society are wrong the English school still needs to sort out the concept partly in order to come to a judgement on the matter and partly to move to completion in the development of its distinctive theoretical approach On this latter point part of the case I want to make is that there is a pressing need for the English school to begin pulling away from its founding fathers Manning Wight Bull Vincent and others deserve much credit for originating an extremely interesting and already quite influential set of ideas Krasner 1999 46 acknowledges the English school as the best known sociological perspective in IR But as I hope to show they also deserve criticism both for not developing some of these ideas and for steering them down a number of narrow channels that while not dead ends and still of interest and importance in themselves have hamstrung the development of the theory Among other things I will show that some of the English schools founding fathers allowed their normative concerns with human rights to distort their theoretical reflections were too much in thrall to universalist principles of order and justice derived from debates in political theory and were too disin terested in international political economy These shortcomings blinded them and most of their successors to much of the actual development in international and world society The emphasis on universalism and also on the high politics issues of human rights and nonintervention 11 From International to World Society has strongly conditioned both the pessimism and the political plural ism that mark much of the schools classical work as has posing the hard test of willingness to support the collective enforcement of inter national law as a measure of solidarism Bull 1966a 52 The potential of English school theory as a basis for grand theory in IR Buzan and Little 2001 will not be realised unless English school theory can be disentan gled from its roots and presented in a more systematically structured way World society is the key to linking English school theory to the debate about globalisation Weller 2000 47 and as well to linking English school theory to the debates about the European Union Diez and Whitman 2000 Scholte 2000 89 5961 argues that globalisation is defined by a deterritorialisation of social life which has created new ac tors and networks alongside the existing territorial ones territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelation The more sen sible globalisation writers all agree that there is no simple zerosum game between globalisation and the statessystem Both Woods 2000 and Held et al 1999 agree with Scholtes idea that the statessystem and the nonstate systems coexist side by side and argue that states especially the stronger states and powers have played a major role in bringing globalisation into being and steering its development Some even think that the word globalisation is really a contemporary eu phemism for American economic dominance Kapstein 1999 468 see also Woods 2000 9 Either way as argued above English school the ory is ideally tailored to address this problematique because of the way in which it takes on board both the territorial and the nonterritorial elements By this point some readers will be shaking their heads in disapproval on the grounds that I am misrepresenting the English school They have a point It is possible to understand what English school theory represents in at least three different though potentially overlapping ways 1 as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen 2 as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of political theorists 3 as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system Manning 1962 is the classical exponent of the first view For Man ning the idea of international society was just that an idea What was important for him was that this was not just any idea or anyones 12 English school theory and its problems idea It was an idea incorporated in the official thinking of states about their mutual intercourse It formed part of the assumption that was prevalentasorthodoxamong thosewhotalkedandactedinthenamesof states For Manning understanding world politics necessarily involved Verstehen which meant for him that the analyst should understand the thoughts that underlie the actions of the states Thus for Manning the idea of international society was not an analysts idea invented exter nally to the practice Rather the analyst reconstructs the idea of inter national society already contained in the practice2 The central subjects of study in this perspective are diplomats and diplomatic practice see also Osiander 1994 111 The second view is most manifest in Wights 1991 idea of the three traditions but is also strongly present in the work of Bull 1966a b 1977a and Vincent 1986 and many others who participate in the de bates of the English school from the perspective of political theory eg Rengger 1992 1996 1999 Brown 1998 Halliday 1992 Linklater 1998 Jackson 2000 Wights three categories of international thought are ex tracted from writings by international lawyers political philosophers diplomats and statesmen In this version English school theory is a set of ideas which fill the minds of people as they think about andor par ticipate in world politics The three traditions can be seen as a kind of great conversation about international politics setting out the primary positions that are always in some sense in play in discussions about for eign policy and international relations The approaches and concerns of political theory are strong in this perspective They inform not only the influential strand of normative theory in English school thinking but also the disposition to think both in terms of universal principles and in terms of a level of analysis distinction between individuals and the state By universal principles I mean here those principles whose validity requires that they be applied to all the members of a specified group There is some tendency in this political theory understanding to treat English school theory as part of the history of ideas and there fore as essentially a philosophical debate as opposed to a discussion about the condition of the real world The scope for normative posi tioning within this debate is large At one end much of English school writing about pluralist international society could be read from a pro gressive perspective as justifying the history of imperialism At the other end there is a strong and persistent progressive concern to improve the 2 I am grateful to Hidemi Suganami for this formulation 13 From International to World Society condition of world politics by getting practitioners to change their con ceptual maps of world politics towards more enlightened forms This normativeapproachtoEnglishschooltheoryhasbeenthedominantone strongly influenced by the core questions of political theory What is the relationship between citizen and state How do we lead the good life and How is progress possible in international society The third view sees international system international society and world society as a set of analytical concepts designed to capture the ma terial and social structures of the international system Buzan and Little 2000 This is the one that I intend to develop in the chapters that fol low This view is strong in the work of Bull 1977 and even more so of James 1978 1986 1993 and is analogous to the structural approaches taken by nonEnglishschool IR theorists such as Waltz 1979 who is only interested in material structures and Wendt 1999 who sets up a social structural approach This approach does not have any necessary normative content in the sense of promoting preferred values though that is not excluded Norms and ideas play their role here as different forms of social structure not normative theory but theory about norms It is about finding sets of analytical constructs with which to describe and theorise about what goes on in the world and in that sense it is a positivist approach though not a materialist one One illustration of its potential strengths is shown by Littles 2000 4048 discussion of how English school theory leads to a much different understanding of the balance of power than one finds in the purely mechanical idea of it in neorealism As will become clear I am less driven by taking sides on nor mative questions or interpretations of political philosophy and more concerned to put into place the building blocks for a methodologically pluralist grand theory of IR Delineating these different approaches to the English school raises the question of how the normative and structural strands within it and the different goals they represent interact As a rule they have been blended together a practice most clearly visible in the works of Bull and Vincent and one that has come at the cost of a lack of clarity and pre cision in the analytical framework This is not to blame the normative theorists for without them precious little analytical development would have taken place at all But it is to assert the need to develop the social structural strand more in its own right and less as an annex to human rights concerns Whether the resulting conceptual scheme will make it easier or more difficult to pursue the traditional normative concerns of the English school remains to be seen and the outcome either way is 14 English school theory and its problems not a driving concern of this enterprise My concern is to set up a social structural interpretation of English school theory by disentangling this approach from the Wightean one In doing this it is absolutely not my intention to question the validity of the normative approach My aim is to set up the social structural interpretation alongside it as an alterna tive parallel reading of English school theory Some people will prefer one approach some the other though I do hope that clarifying the so cial structural approach will challenge those in the Wightean track to reflect on the conceptual incoherence on which some of their ideas seem to rest In addition I hope to expose the dynamics and driving forces underlying international society more clearly and to break out of the somewhat stultifying opposition between a selfparalysed set of plural ists and a selfconfined set of solidarists Will this still be English school theory Definitely for it remains linked to the classic texts the focus on international social structure and the methodological pluralism But it will not be English school theory as we have known it so far One last point on the theme of social structure is to remind the reader that the term society should not be read as in itself carrying any ne cessarily positive connotation To say that society in the sense of social structure is more fully developed in one place or time than in another is not to say that this is therefore an improvement in some moral sense As Luard 1976 340 reminds us a society may be closely knit yet marked by frequent conflict Many human societies have ritualised and insti tutionalised both intense violence rituals of sacrifice warrior cultures and huge degrees of inequality slavery ethnic religious caste and gen der discrimination The English school has been admirably forthright about this going so far as to classify war as an institution of Westphalian international society in Europe Despite the warnings of history it is nev ertheless easy in a sustained abstract discussion of society to slip into the assumption that society is essentially good and nice and that more of it is therefore better The main areas of weakness in English school theory For all of its many attractions English school theory is neither fully developed nor without problems many of which hinge in one way or another around the weakly developed world society pillar It would not be an exaggeration to say that English school theory is in serious need of a taxonomical overhaul John Vincent 1988 197 see also Richardson 15 From International to World Society 1990 178 said of Bull that his genius for making distinctions that went to the heart of a subjectmatter constituted the essence of his contribu tion to international relations Bulls distinctions have indeed provided much of the analytical leverage that has made the English school an attractive and insightful approach But in this book I want to argue that even Bulls distinctions are neither complete enough nor deeply enough developed to unleash the full potential of English school theory see also Hurrell 2002b xvxxii Bull was heading in the right direction but he did not have time to do more than carve out the opening stages of the path The areas of concern about the existing opus of English school the ory can be organised under five headings levels sectors boundaries normative conflicts and methodology Levels In much of both classical and contemporary English school writing there is a strong assumption that the only relevant level is the sys tem or global one This assumption applies to all three key concepts international system international society world society The general rule is that states are considered mainly as components of international systems andor as members of international society and that both in ternational system and society are assumed to be global phenomena Europe occupies a special place in this scheme because of its role as the original creator of what subsequently became the contemporary global international system and society Since the modern international sys tem is a closed one on a planetary scale assumptions of universalism become assumptions of global scale and vice versa To the extent that this systemlevel assumption is breached it is in the acknowledged his torical process of the international system and international society be coming global during the few hundred years preceding the nineteenth century Discussion of modern international society is almost wholly rooted in the assumption of a single global phenomenon Individuals and therefore world society are also treated as a collective whole in effect humankind There seem to be several reasons for this strong bias towards the systemglobal level In relation to states perhaps the main one is the dominance of a baseline story about the emergence of a distinctive European international system and society its transformation into a global international system and society and the ups and downs of that global international society since then Whatever the past might 16 English school theory and its problems have been the assumption is that for the last two centuries and for the foreseeable future international system and society are global phenom ena and to be studied as such Added to this is a strong normative disposition against subglobal developments of international society seeing these as divisive necessarily corrosive of global international society and prone to generate conflict Bull 1977a 27981 Vincent 1986 101 105 The systemglobal approach to individualshumankind has a different source Concern with individuals in English school literature largely focuses on the tension between human rights on the one hand and the state and the international society that legitimises the state and gives it primacy on the other In that context the approach is predomi nantly normative drawing on the debates from political theory In those debates the source of systemglobal assumptions is the idea whether drawn from natural law or pragmatic reasoning that the principles un derpinning human rights must be universal Vincent 1978 30 Cutler 1991 469 As Vincent 1986 117 argues What is right is something we seek one answer to not several This line of thinking dominates his argumentsdespitehiswarningelsewhere1986125againstthedangers of accepting any purportedly universalist doctrine Because the inter national system and international and world society are global the ref erent group for universal principles must necessarily be humankind as a whole Although Vincent does not spell it out one of those dangers is that both the possibility and the fact of regional level developments of in ternational society get ignored The main exception to this position is Wight who took the view 1991 49 that all known international so cieties have been subsystemic and therefore faced the problem of out siders barbarians in his language But Wight can be dismissed on the grounds that he was mainly interested in looking back into his tory before there was even a global international system let alone society Watson 1992 is also talking mostly about the selfcontained subglobal systems of the past rather than about regional subsystems within a global system Occasional hints can be found elsewhere that seem to admit at least the logical possibility of regional level develop ments in international society Bull 1977a 41 for example when talk ing of the three elements of Hobbesian Kantian and Grotian traditions notes that one of these three elements may predominate over the others in three different contexts in different historical phases of the states sys tem in different geographical theatres of its operation my emphasis 17 From International to World Society and in the policies of different states and statesmen But this opening is not followed up and indeed actively discouraged for the reasons given above To the extent that he thought about the European Community at all Bull 1982 was mainly interested in getting it to play a great power role at the global level It seems to me that this rejection of regional level developments sets a standard for international society so demanding that by itself this factor can explain the pessimism and pluralism that dominate most classical English school writing On the global level it is hardly surprising that international society strikes a fairly minimal lowest common denomina tor It is much more likely that one might find solidarist developments within a civilisational community such as in EUEurope over Bosnia and Kosovo than worldwide The assumption that such developments must be at odds with the development of global international society needs to be questioned Certainly they can be as during the Cold War when the great powers were ideologically divided over the nature of international society But it is neither necessary nor even probable that they must be When the leading edge of international society is amongst a large majority of the leading powers a case can be made with realists from Carr ideas as a form of power to Waltz socialisation and com petition in support that this might well be the key to progress in development at the global level This view is not out of line with the English schools own account of the expansion of international society Bull and Watson 1984a More on this in chapter 7 I will argue that there is a lot of room for differentiating between global internationalworld society on the one hand and subglobal and par ticularly regional internationalworld societies on the other Neither international nor world in this usage necessarily implies global just as Wallersteins worldsystems and world empires do not have to be global The empirical record suggests that different regional interna tional societies can build on common global international society foun dations as they have done in Europe the Islamic world and Southeast Asia and earlier amongst the communist states Given the apparent re gionalising tendencies in the postCold War international system Buzan and Wæver 2003 the scope for subglobal developments and their im plications for global ones needs to be investigated urgently So too does the possibility for nonWestern forms of international society or fusions between Western and nonWestern forms Among other things under standing the subglobal dimension of international society offers big insights into the problem of nonintervention 18 English school theory and its problems Sectors There are some similarities between the English schools problem with levels and its problem in sectors both involve a missing element that plays a crucial role in really existing international and world society Whereas under levels the missing element is subglobal or regional under sectors it is the economy Unlike with regions there seems to be no reason in principle why the economic sector should not feature in discussion of international and world society and this rather glaring omission is often pointed out Miller 1990 704 Richardson 1990 148 184 Hurrell 2002b xvii At various points along the way English school writers have acknowledged the economic sector Wight 1991 78 talks of the rationalist position in terms of diplomacy and commerce Bull in Wight 1977 16 notes trade as one of the four institutions in Wights understanding of a statessystem and mentions it in his theoretical dis cussion of rules about cooperation in society 1977 70 He makes clear that the economy is a major part of contemporary international society Bull 1990 723 and his discussion of justice Bull 1984c rested heavily on the need for a more equitable international political economy Al though Bull 1991 xixxx is critical of Wights disinterest in economics he nevertheless failed to develop this aspect in his own discussions of international society This is all the more surprising given that he made a feature of the economic sector in his critique of those who wanted to take a Hobbesian interpretation of international anarchy Bull 1966b 42 argued that trade symbolic as it is of the existence of overlapping through sic though different interests is the activity most character istic of international relationships as a whole Vincent although critical of Bull for ignoring the economy as a major component of international order Vincent 1988 196 204 also fails to develop the topic even though he does put it on the agenda in a ma jor way His book on human rights Vincent 1986 develops a case for making the right to subsistence the floor of a global human rights pro gramme He is fully aware that this implies a radical reshaping of the international economic order and that such a project might require a radical shift in patterns of political power in order that resources can reach the submerged 40 in developing countries That he understood the political side of the international economy is clear from his state ment that in regard to the failure to provide subsistence rights it is not this or that government whose legitimacy is in question but the whole international system in which we are all implicated Vincent 1986 127 19 From International to World Society 145 But as GonzalezPelaez 2002 points out this opening into inter national political economy IPE was not followed up either by Vincent or by his followers who have focused instead on the more directly vio lent abuses of citizens by their states such as torture and genocide The one exception to this rule was James Mayall 1982 1984 1989 who did begin to think about economic liberalism in international society terms and at one point Mayall 1982 even argued for the existence of a sense of community in the economic sphere despite differences between North and South Given that he was positioned at the LSE alongside Susan Strange he was well placed to bridge between the English school and IPEButheseemedtolosefaithinhisearlierinterpretationMayall1984 His more recent works 1990 2000 have focused largely on national ism and see economic nationalism returning on the back of national security concerns in such a way as to undermine economic solidarism This sidelining of the economic sector in representations of international society is surprising given both the enormous development of norms rules and institutions including ones with some powers of collective enforcement in this sector and the growth of IPE as a major branch of the study of international relations The English schools focus on the state might be one explanation It is clear that the English school formulation explicitly privileges the states system and international society on historical and pragmatic grounds as being the dominant form in the political sector This produces an emphasis on the high politics of collective security diplomacy and human rights which kept most classical English school writers quite close to realism But the state focus is also apparent in IPE so state centrism is not an adequate explanation Perhaps the main explanation is simple disinterest and lack of knowledge about the economy amongst the founding fathers If so there is no excuse for the perpetuation of this tradition Indeed there is an urgent need to reject it Their disinterest in the economic sector may have been reinforced by the ignoring of the regional level and certainly aggravated the drift towards a pessimistic and pluralist outlook in classical English school writing Boundaries As sketched out in figure 1 the theoretical scheme of the English school generates three primary boundaries separating or more loosely delin eating the frontier zones between its three key concepts Two of these do not seem problematic inasmuch as the concepts on either side of them line up clearly defensive realism and pluralism make a good fit as do 20 English school theory and its problems powermaximising imperialism and messianic universalism By con trast the boundary between the solidarist side of international society and the evolutionary side of world society is both unclear and controver sial It is not at all obvious where solidarist international society ends and world society begins This problem relates to that flagged above about the weak development of the world society concept As I will show in chapter 2 world society has functioned as a kind of intellectual dustbin into which all sorts of things have been thrown The world so ciety pillar contains Kantian conceptions of a homogenised system of states transnational ideas about nonstate actors cosmopolitan ideas about identity at the level of individualshumankind and ideas about ideological crusaders wanting to impose their universal truth on all of humanity At a minimum it has to be questioned how these things relate to each other within the world society pillar and the possibility has to be investigated that they cannot in fact all be accommodated within a single concept Normative conflicts There are two linked normative conflicts within the English school One is between advocates of pluralist and solidarist conceptions of interna tional society and the other is between states rights or international society and individual rights or world society The essence of the mat ter is whether individual rightsworld society necessarily conflict with states rightsinternational society or can be in harmony with them an issue with some close connections to the debates in political theory between cosmopolitans and communitarians In practice these largely add up to a single dispute Because of the boundary ambiguities be tween international and world society described above it is not clear whether pluralism and solidarism apply only to international society or whether solidarism somehow spills over into world society Many of the key sources of solidarist thinking such as natural law humanism and cosmopolitanism are deeply rooted in world society This ambigu ity means that it is not immediately clear whether this sometimes quite heated dispute is real or simply a product of unclear classifications and definitions Is international society just a system for preserving the dis tinctiveness and independence of states within a limited framework of shared rules or does it develop as the practice of regimes and regional cooperations seem to suggest into increasing degrees of harmonisation and integration At what point does solidarism become so progressive that it calls into question the existence of a statessystem or is it the case 21 From International to World Society that the understanding and practice of sovereignty evolve along with solidarism continuously solving the contradiction as it arises Methodology There are two problems here first the lack of any sustained attempt to construct a typology of international or world societies and second a lack of clarity in setting out exactly what is entailed in the theoretical pluralism underpinning English school theory Wight 1977 219 made an early start on the classification of types of international society with his differentiation between statessystems based on mutual recognition among sovereign entities and suzerain systems based on more hierarchical relations He added to this the idea of secondary statessystems composed of relations among suzerain sys tems Watson 1990 1026 1992 1318 followed this up with his more elaborate idea of a spectrum of international societies ranging from an archy through hegemony suzerainty and dominion to empire Both Wight and Watson were mainly looking backwards aiming at classifi cations for comparative history Except in the rather inconclusive work of Luard 1976 which was not part of the English school mainstream this start has not been followed up by those more interested in con temporary and future international societies One consequence of this neglect is that the Wight and Watson schemes overplay the coercive and underplay the consensual side of international society There is not much room in Watsons spectrum for something like the EU unless one takes the implausible but in some quarters politically popular view that it is a species of German empire The reasons that the English school has not developed a typology of international societies are not difficult to see Because the schools mainstream writers locked themselves into concern with the single global modern international society chose not to look at the regional level and failed to consider economic develop ments they did not have much reason to be interested in differentiating types Nevertheless from a theorybuilding perspective Wights opening suggests that several obvious questions can and should be asked about international and world societies What is their scale in relation to the overall system in which they sit How loosely or tightly are they bound together Is the nature of what binds them more rational contrac tual and constructed society Gesellschaft or more emotional identity based and historical community Gemeinschaft or some combination of these two Are the organising principles based on the idea of political 22 English school theory and its problems equality amongst the units Westphalian or political inequality amongst the units suzerain or functional differentiation among the units medieval or neomedieval These basic questions suggest not only a means for comparing instances of international society across history but also for monitoring the development and evolution of the layered global and regional international society in which we currently live If the key concepts of English school theory are to be understood as types of social structure then a robust typology is a necessary condition for being able to monitor structural change The second methodological problem concerns the incoherence of ontological and epistemological differentiation within the theoretical pluralism of the English school framework That there is significant ontological and epistemological differentiation amongst international system international society and world society is not in doubt Little 1998 2000 But just what that differentiation is is rather less clear Much hangs on which reading of English school theory one wants to pursue In Wightian 1991 1524 mode the focus is on the three Rs with real ists proceeding on the basis of inductively arrived at laws of human be haviour rationalists proceeding from ontological and teleological views about the nature of social reality and revolutionists proceeding from ethical and prescriptive imperatives If one comes at this with a more structural approach international sys tem and international society are pretty solidly based on an ontology of states World society at least in its cosmopolitan aspect is based on an ontology of individuals but given the confusion about what world society contains one has also to think about nonstate entities and in some versions also states The epistemological and methodological pic ture is even less clear Little 1998 745 sees international system as based on structural methodology and international society as based on agencybased methodology But as well as leaving out world so ciety this does not quite add up International systems can certainly be studied using structural theory but so can international and world so cieties as Little himself shows in later work Buzan and Little 2000 see also Wendt 1999 where constructivist elements are seen as structural More promising is Littles idea 2000 402 following from Linklater that each of the English schools three key concepts is associated with a dif ferent methodological approach international system with positivism international society with hermeneutics and interpretivism and world society with critical theory The linkage of international system and pos itivism seems fairly uncontroversial Less clear is why the interaction 23 From International to World Society aspects of international and world society cannot also be studied using positivist methods Similarly international society can indeed be stud ied using hermeneutic and interpretivist methods but it is not clear why these cannot also be applied to world society Critical theory certainly captures the revolutionist aspect of world society but it is less clear that it covers the cosmopolitan and Kantian aspects Some of this confusion perhaps a lot of it reflects the incoherence of the world society pillar of English school theory One other problem not of English school theory but of this book is of keeping consistency in the use of terms The very nature of the taxonomical overhaul which is central to this book makes such consis tency almost impossible Readers are therefore warned to keep aware as they proceed In the early chapters my usage of terms such as interna tional and world society reflects the usage in the existing literature From chapter 4 onwards I embark on a systematic critique and reworking of most of the basic concepts bringing in some new usages and attach ing more specific meanings to old ones Once this is done my usage of terms will reflect the new meanings though it will sometimes be neces sary such as in quotes from or references to the classical literature to use terms in their older sense I have tried to make my usage as consistent as possible but I cannot avoid some risk of confusion in the presentation Is English school theory really theory One final issue is the standing of English school thinking as theory I have already begun to refer to English school theory and will do so throughout the book but the question of what counts as theory is con troversial so the basis of my assertion needs to be explained In the Social Sciences the answer to the question of whether or not something qualifies as theory often depends on where it is asked Many Europeans use the term theory for anything that organises a field systematically structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of in terrelated concepts and categories Many Americans however often demand that a theory strictly explains and that it contains or is able to generate testable hypotheses of a causal nature English school theory clearly qualifies on the first European account but not on the second In its Wightian normative theory form English school theory cannot and does not want to meet the criteria for positivist theory But if the English school is presented not as normative theory but as theory about norms there is some potential to close the transAtlantic gap In the more 24 English school theory and its problems social structural approach unfolded in this book English school think ing has as much of a claim to theory as Wendts 1999 attempt to pose constructivism as a social theory of international politics In this form it provides social structural benchmarks for the evaluation of significant change in international orders Holsti 2002 sets out a taxonomy that enables comparisons to be made across time and space and provides some predictions and explanations of outcome such as Watsons 1990 1992 macrolevel theory about the inherent instabilities of anarchy and empire The English school also has two other claims to theoretical standing The first and most obvious is its importance as a selfconscious location for the practice of a methodologically pluralist approach to the study of international relations and therefore as a potential site for grand theory The assumption of incommensurability has been one of the main factors generating fragmentation in IR theory Among other things it made the idea of grand theory seem illegitimate or impossible But incommensu rability may have been more a temporary fashion in IR than an absolute epistemological judgement For a time it suited the discipline to think this way both to end pointless polemics amongst realists liberals and radicals and to establish the right to exist of paradigms other than real ism Now however incommensurability seems to be mainly a position of extremists whether ideological or epistemological who insist either that their own story is the only valid one or that their way of telling a story is the only valid one Some positivists and some postmodernists still take this position or are accused by the other side of doing so but doing so seems to be a preference rather than a logical necessity As suggested by the neoneo synthesis the fashion is swinging back to more tolerance of or even enthusiasm for theoretical pluralism though debate will doubtless remain active as to whether a pluralist approach requires giving all the stories equal weight or making some more equal than others Wendt 1999 90 155 is clearly trying to construct a via media between positivist epistemology and postpositivist ontology A more sophisticated set of paths around the incommensurability problem is sketched out by Wæver 1996 esp 16974 Having never surrendered to incommensurability the English school is well placed to capitalise on this turn of intellectual fashion The second claim is equally interesting but much less explored It con cerns an implicit but seemingly unselfconscious move into the novel domain of secondorder societies With this move English school think ing has transcended the conventional boundaries of both sociology and 25 From International to World Society political theory in one important way Its main concept of international society has moved the idea of society out of the state and away from individual human beings as members International society is not based on the crude idea of a domestic analogy Suganami 1989 which simply scales the society within states up to the global level Instead it argues for a new secondorder form of society where the members are not indi vidual human beings but durable collectivities of humans possessed of identities and actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts This move opens up an aspect of sociology that has not been much if at all explored by sociologists but that should be the natural meeting point between Sociology and Political Theory on the one hand and In ternational Relations on the other In what ways do such secondorder societies and communities differ from the societies and communities composed of individuals and how appropriate or not is theory de rived from firstorder societies to the study of secondorder ones If English school thinking counts as theory in these senses it is never theless for the reasons given above imperfect theory The next task is to address the weak pillar of world society and to see how to repair it 26 2 World society in English school theory As Little 2000 411 notes world society is the most problematic fea ture of the English school framework Yet that world society is crucial to English school theory cannot be in doubt If English school theory is to work as a vehicle for a methodologically pluralist approach to IR then each of its three pillars must have the same clarity and the same standing as the others Yet what world society means in relation to sol idarism is far from clear with a consequent blurring of the boundary between international and world society In figure 1 the conjunction of international system and realismHobbes is wholly conventional and that of international society and rationalismGrotius poses no obvious difficulties notwithstanding that there are substantial debates going on about how to interpret Hobbes Machiavelli and Grotius But the con junction of world society revolutionism and Kant rings several alarm bells Revolutionism seems particularly out of line with most of what is currently discussed under the heading of world society and it is not clear that Kant fits comfortably with either image Transnationalism cosmopolitanism and crusading universalist ideologies are implausibly crammed together in the world society segment To make matters worse the world society segment lacks a world system counterpart interna tional system and international society compose a clear set differen tiating physical systems of interaction from socially constructed ones World society is clearly aimed at socially constructed nonstate systems but what is its physical counterpart Little 2000 41213 thinks that for Bull transnationalism related to world society as international system does to international society but this was never worked out and on the face of it does not look very plausible more on this in chapter 4 Bull 1977a 27681 offers the idea of a world political system to play the physical counterpoint to world society seeing this as the totality of 27 From International to World Society state plus nonstate interactions Bull never worked up much enthusi asm for this idea seeing the statessystem as so dominant within it as to make the additional complication hardly worthwhile Vincent and his followers did pick up some of this idea but bundled it into an expanded concept of world society or latterly in the case of Dunne 2001b 38 an expanded master concept of international society It is hard to escape the conclusion that the concept of world society has served as a residual category for many in the English school Similar to the way in which the unit level served as a dumping ground for neorealist theory Keohane and Nye 1987 746 English school writers have used world society as a place to deposit all the things they did not want to talk about A further problem is the existence of a disagreement about the rela tionship between world society and international society The more his torical side of the school represented by Butterfield Wight and Watson think of world society in the form of shared culture as a prerequisite for international society As Wight 1977 33 puts it We must assume that a statessystem ie an international society will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members Likewise Bull 1977a 16 accepts that a common feature of the main historical cases of international societies is that they were all founded upon a common cul ture or civilisation1 Much of the historical record from classical Greece to early modern Europe supports this view suggesting that a common culture is a necessary condition for an international society As in the expansion of European international society states from other cultures may then join this core Bull and Watson 1984a Gong 1984 Zhang 1998 raising questions about how the norms rules and institutions of in ternational society interact with the domestic life of polities rooted in different civilisations and whether international norms are sustainable under these circumstances Those more concerned with the maintenance and development of international societies rather than their origins come from a different angle though the two concerns meet on the ground where established international societies expand into areas with a different culture as has happened in modern times This second position is quite complicated not least because most English school thinking about world society has taken place around the hotly contested subject of human rights Perhaps the central issue is the possibility of an ontological tension between the 1 According to Adam Watson interview this understanding of common culture as the starting point for international society derived from Heeren and was influential in the thinking of the British Committee 28 World society in English school theory development of world society particularly human rights and the main tenance of international society On one side the argument is that the development of individual rights in international law will undermine state sovereignty The expansion of individual rights threatens exter nal or juridical sovereignty both by facilitating grounds for outside intervention in the domestic life of the state and by weakening the states authority to act internationally It threatens internal or empiri cal sovereignty by restricting the rights of the state against its citizens In other words regardless of whether a measure of common culture is required as a foundation for international society any serious attempt to develop a world society by advancing a universalist human rights law for example will tend to undermine the states that are the foun dation of international society Linklater 1981 2337 1998 celebrates the potential of this assault on the Westphalian order but Bull 1977a 1513 1984 1118 is fearful of destructive dynamics between the two levels of society On the other side the solidarist argument seeks to link the right of recognition of sovereignty to some minimum observance by the state of the rights of its citizens Wæver 1992 1047 argues that the oppositional view of the rela tionship between international society and world society has become rooted in English school thinking and serves to cut off the possibility of positive interaction between them This oppositional view departs from the Wightian historical perspective and tends to construct plu ralist Westphaliantype international society as the defence against the dangers of both hard realism power politics and liberal utopianism universal harmony of interest Wæver agrees with Jones 1981 that this closure prevents the English school from moving into the inter esting ground on which international society is an intermediary vari able between the deeper liberal forces and international politics ie the growth of moral awareness of technological interdependence of inter national learning translated into a gradual maturing of international society which has in turn effects on the working of anarchy Wæver 1992 107 How did this confused view of world society develop and what can be done about it To begin answering this question it helps to look at the intellectual history of world society within English school think ing Doing so makes clear that quite radical shifts of understanding of the basic elements of English school theory have taken place since the ideas were first stated in British Committee work There are notewor thy differences of understanding even among the founding fathers and 29 From International to World Society while there is certainly awareness of some of the key splits no sys tematic attempt has been made either to track these or to sort them out English school theory needs to decide whether international soci ety and world society are mutually exclusive ideas state sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism mutually dependent ideas the need for an element of solidarism to underpin international society the need for a framework of political order to stabilise more liberal visions or some mixture of the two Or is world society simply a manifestation of hege monic dominance currently Americanisation or Westernisation and therefore simply an epiphenomenon of power structure The next section will trace the development of the world society con cept in English school thinking from Manning and Wight through Bull to Vincent in terms of direct discussion about it in the classical literature The second section will take an indirect approach using the pluralist solidarist debate to explore the boundary between international and world society Readers not wishing to engage with a detailed exegesis of the English school classics can simply read the summaries at the end of the next two sections The intellectual history of world society within English school thinking In the classical discussions of world society many of the ideas came out of political theory and international law and were strongly driven by normative agendas None of the founding fathers of the English school with the possible exception of Vincent was particularly interested in world society as such All of them were primarily concerned to develop the idea of international society World society thus only got thought about on the margins as an alternative to international society or in the context of debates about solidarist versus pluralist international societies In thinking about all this it helps to keep in mind how the founders of the English school were trying to position themselves between liber alism and realism in the debates about IR On one side was the liberal tradition summed up in Richard Cobdens famous aphorism that there should be as little intercourse as possible betwixt the Governments as much connection as possible between the nations of the world This remark both established an analytical distinction between the world of states and the world of civil society and staked out a clear posi tion against international society and in favour of world society On the 30 World society in English school theory other side was the cynicism of E H Carr 1946 801 who saw interna tional society as a deception practised by the powerful to legitimate their position and possession On world society Carr was equally damning 1946 162 There is a world community for the reason and no other that people talk and within certain limits behave as if there were a world community Carr saw this as a dangerous illusion given that this community is at best shallow and insubstantial and not capable of sup porting claims of morality because i the principle of equality between members of the community is not applied and is indeed not easily ap plicable in the world community and ii the principle that the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of the part which is a postu late of any fully integrated community is not generally accepted The English schools founding thinkers had also to position themselves in relation to the great clashes between universalist ideologies that marked the twentieth century and that were locked into the confrontation of the Cold War all around them Manning though not a member of the British Committee influenced the early thinking of Wight and Bull His position on world society set the template that was to shape the ideas of Bull and Vincent and through them more recent English school writers Manning 1962 177 wrote that Within beneath alongside behind and transcending the notional society of states there exists and for some purposes fairly effectively the nascent society of all mankind This view is in pretty direct opposition to Carrs It acknowledges some of the Cobdenite view though not setting it in opposition to international society But it does not say much about what the actual form and content of this nascent society of all mankind might be Neither does its rather convoluted spatial metaphor make clear whether Manning thought of international and world society as in any sense analytically separable This approach of talking about international and world society as somehow distinct but not making any systematic attempt to specify them was continued by Wight Perhaps the most widely cited of Wights remarks about world society is his proposition Wight 1977 33 that We must assume that a statessystem will not come into being with out a degree of cultural unity among its members This remark was made in the context of a discussion about the origins of historical states systems in classical Greece and postRoman Europe Although it does not mention world society it clearly sets up the proposition that cultural unity is something distinct from international society and in the con text of Wights analysis prior to it It infers the idea that world society is 31 From International to World Society defined by common culture shared perhaps at the level of individuals and certainly at the level of elites and that the development of interna tional society requires the existence of world society in these terms as a precondition As noted above this position has become the counterpoint to that of Bull and others who worried that world society development would undermine the sovereignty foundation of international society One of the differences between Wights view and that of other English school writers is that he accepted that all known international societies have been subsystemic Wight 1991 49 whereas their focus was on global international societies more on this in chapter 7 But a closer look at Wights writings on world society does not sug gest that he had a clear or coherent view of it and certainly not one that rested on this historical foundation Keene 2002 34 As James 1993 2778 observes Wight uses common culture so loosely that it is un clear whether he has in mind a deep historic sense of culture or the more superficial agreed rules that compose a contractual society Wights 1991 30 definition of international society suggests a conflation of the state and individual levels International society is prima facie a po litical and social fact attested to by the diplomatic system diplomatic society the acceptance of international law and writings of international lawyers and also by a certain instinct of sociability one whose effects are widely diffused among almost all individuals Elsewhere his idea of international society seems more clearly statecentred as when he presents it as a secondorder social contract amongst the several pri mary social contracts represented by states Wight 1991 137 or says that The most essential evidence for the existence of an international society is the existence of international law Wight 1979 107 or iden tifies the institutions of international society as diplomacy balance of power arbitration and war Wight 1991 141 These statements suggest a separation between the levels of states and individuals along with an almost complete ignoring of nonstate entities Another way to try to get at Wights understanding of world society is through its position in his three traditions approach to the study of IR In the early versions of this approach Wight 1987 1960 221 226 seems to hang between seeing the three traditions as component so cial elements of reality and seeing them as patterns of thought about international reality On the one hand he sees a sovereigntyanarchy social structure patterns of habitual intercourse diplomacy law com merce and patterns of moral solidarity On the other he sees modes of thought linked to Hobbes Locke and teleological historicists such 32 World society in English school theory as Kant Toynbee Hegel Marx and Spengler and finds all these three ways of thought within me Wight 1987 227 In the end Wights ap proach through traditions puts the focus very much on the sources of ideas in political theory and much less on the empirical realities of the international system Bull Wight 1991 xi nicely characterises Wights position on the three traditions as realism is about the blood and iron and immorality men rationalism is about the law and order and keep your word men and revolutionism is about the subversion and lib eration and missionary men Wights view of realism is fairly conven tional For him Realists are those who emphasize and concentrate upon the element of international anarchy Wight 1991 7 and who take a pessimistic view of human nature 1991 259 Realist thinking allows civilisations the right to expand according to their power to deny rights to barbarians to exploit them and even to treat them as nonhuman Wight 1991 5066 Realists see no international society because there is no social contract only a state of nature or a system at best there are limited and temporary management agreements amongst the great powers Only states are the subjects of international law Wight 1991 307 Rationalism in Wights view 1991 268 adds a civilising factor to the realist vision Rationalists are those who emphasize and concen trate upon the element of international intercourse Wight 1991 7 by international intercourse here Wight means diplomacy law and com merce Rationalists have a mixed view of human nature with reason as the key to dealing with the contradictions and they see both states and individuals as subjects of international law Wight 1991 259 367 They understand the state of nature as a quasisocial condition cre ated either by natural law or by limited forms of social contract It might be argued cogently that at any given moment the greater part of the totality of international relationships reposes on custom rather than force Wight 1991 39 For rationalists civilisations have paternalistic trusteeshiptype obligations to barbarians and an obligation to civilise them and barbarians should be accorded rights appropriate to a ward or an inferior culture Wight 1991 6682 Wight also notes 1991 134 that rationalism makes a presumption in favour of the existing inter national society and is therefore conservative This view of rationalism does not immediately strike one as very representative of what has be come the mainstream English school view on international society but it is not substantially at odds with it either Passages such as in the last analysis international society is a society of the whole human race 33 From International to World Society Wight 1991 36 again suggest that Wight had not crystallised out the distinction between international and world society Wights view of revolutionism is both interesting and very confusing From the outset initially classifying them as historicists Wights 1987 1960 2236 focus is on those who want to change the world have an idea of how it should be and usually have some mechanism in mind commerce enlightenment revolution war that will bring their visions to reality There is occasional incoherence such as his worrying assertion that Revolutionists are those who emphasise and concentrate upon the element of the society of states or international society Wight 1991 78 This seems almost incomprehensible the definition is a per fect fit with later interpretations of the Grotian or rationalist position But the rest of Wights discussion does not go down this line Instead it unfolds a largely negative view of the subversion and liberation and missionary men Wight 1991 268 acknowledged that revolutionism added a vitalizing factor to international relations but his main con cern was to inveigh against those who wanted to impose ideological uniformity on the international system For Wight revolutionists were cosmopolitan rather than internationalist for them the whole of international society transcends its parts Wight 1991 8 meaning that they assigned a transcendent value to some social vision of humankind other than the existing statessystem They focused on the ought side of politics desiring an international revolution which will renovate and unify the society of states Wight 1991 22 1987 2236 Revolutionists have an optimistic but fearful view of human nature what is right is potentially achievable but always threatened Wight 1991 259 The key point for Wight was that revolutionists wanted to overcome and replace the statessystem They could do so in one of three ways Wight 1991 408 1 by the creation of ideological homogeneity 2 by a successful doctrinal imperialism leading to a world empire or 3 via a cosmopolitan route producing a world society of individuals which overrides nations or states Linklater 2002 323 characterises Wights scheme as dividing revolutionism into three forms civitas maxima or world society of individuals doctrinal uniformity which is the Kantian vision of republican homogeneity and peace and doctrinal imperial ism or Stalinism which is the attempt by one power to impose its ideology onto the system Who the agents are supposed to be in these transformations is left unspecified they could be either or both of state or nonstate actors This view lines up badly with what is now thought of as world society The cosmopolitan scenario is the closest to current 34 World society in English school theory understandings of world society but sits in unreconciled tension with Wights argument that shared cultures have to underpin international societies Ideological homogeneity seems to depict a solidarist version of international society and the Stalinist model seems to belong to the imperialist side of realism What unites these is that all stand as alter native visions to the Westphalian society of states and that all move towards the creation of the global equivalent of domestic politics the question being whether the form is a stateless society a confederation of some sort or an empire Wights rendition of revolutionism is thus not an attempt to define world society as a nonstate parallel to international society in any struc tural sense His concern is much more with the ways in which systems of states as such might be overthrown transcended or replaced In that sense Wights revolutionism is about ideological rejection of the states system It consists of images of the future that can provide the basis for political action in the present aimed at solving the problem of the statessystem whether that problem is seen as the propensity towards war of the statessystem or its dividing up of the unity of humankind or its blocking of the right universal truth So although Wight is the key mover in setting up the three tradi tions approach his actual discussions fail to make any clear distinction between international and world society In his thinking perhaps re flecting its roots in political and legal theory the world is composed of states and individuals and his definitions often blend these two levels together paying little attention to transnational actors As noted in chap ter 1 Wights approach was more about identifying the core elements of a great conversation about world politics than it was about developing concepts aimed at capturing the social structures of the international system As becomes immediately apparent to anyone reading The Anarchical Society Bull had much more inclination towards tidy classifications and structural modes of thinking than did Wight Perhaps Bulls main ac complishment was to single out and clarify the concept of international society In doing so he shaped much subsequent writing and the nature of his contribution is comparable to Waltzs in singling out and clarify ing international system structure though Bull was always careful not to assert the necessary dominance of international society Bulls work provides a much crisper conceptualisation of interna tional society than Wights It therefore helps to delimit world society if only by exclusion particularly by offering a clear sense of international 35 From International to World Society society as being statebased and world society as being to do with transnational actors TNAs and individuals In his thinking about in ternational and world society Bull seemed to link them to two different ontologies in relation to his central concern with political order Inter national society he based on an ontology of states providing order top down in an anarchical society World society he based on an ontology of individuals working towards order from the bottom up This kind of thinking like Wights drew heavily on political theory and international law particularly in its use of a duality between state and individual This dualism creates problems for conceptualising world society by leaving no obvious place for TNAs more on this in chapter 4 One of the central problems for Bull was the persistent and not easily resolved tension between the pragmatic and normative aspects of order His interest in international society was largely pragmatic As he saw it the statebased approach provided both the only immediately avail able pathway to a degree of achievable international order and also a valuable via media between the extremes of realism and liberalism Bull shared Wights view that the statessystem represented a secondorder social construct underneath which lay a wider more fundamental and primordial world order that is a morally prior phenomenon to international order Bull 1977a 22 In Bulls view individuals are the ultimate irreducible unit of analysis and world order is the basic goal for which international order is only instrumental He argues that the law and morality of states have only a subordinate or derivative value compared to the rights and interests of the individual persons of whom humanity is made up Bull 1984 13 The problem is echoing Carr that world society doesnt exist in any substantive form and therefore its moral priority is unattached to any practical capability to deliver much world order The world society of individual human beings entitled to human rights as we understand them exists only as an ideal not as a reality Bull 1984 13 Much of this argument stems from simple com mon sense why do states exist if not in the end to serve the needs of their citizens an idea that later became a key element in the thinking of Vincent and his followers The tension is between on the one hand the many imperfections of states but their actual ability to deliver some measure of world order and on the other the possibility of better more just systems of order that nobody yet knows how to bring into existence ThisdualismrunsinparalleltothetensioninBullbetweennaturallaw the idea that law is inherent in nature and specifically human nature and like knowledge of the physical world can be discovered by reason 36 World society in English school theory out of which the primacy of the individual came and positive law that which is made by political process within and between states which was very much a product of the statessystem Bull leaned strongly in favour of positive law as the foundation and expression of international society but could not abandon the moral primacy of individuals that came out of natural law Wheeler and Dunne 1998 4750 point out that Bulls reason for rejecting the natural law position on world society other than as a fundamental normative referent was that such a society didnt exist in fact Thus the statessystem was de facto what one had to work with in pursuit of world order goals As Wheeler and Dunne argue the flaw in Bulls scheme is that it doesnt confront the potential and actual contradiction between states as the agents for world order and individuals as the moral referent How much can states misbehave towards individuals before forfeiting their moral and legal claims to sovereignty and nonintervention within international society Unlike Wight Bull did make an attempt to deliver a clear conceptu alisation of world society By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built The concept of world society in this sense stands to the totality of global social interaction as our concept of international society stands to the concept of the international system Bull 1977a 279 There are several things to note about this definition First it is consciously parallel to his definition of international society Bull and Watson 1984a 1 in which the physical interaction is taken as given and on top of which states have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements Second it is clearly and explicitly linked to the distinction between the physical and social that underpins his distinction between interna tional system Hobbes and international society Grotius Although confusingly put in the passage just cited Bull does in fact as noted above draw a distinction between world society and the world po litical system with the latter representing physical interaction Indeed Bull 1977a 24854 makes central to his whole analysis a general dis tinction between the physical aspect of systems interaction amongst units more or less in the absence of social structure and the social and 37 From International to World Society normative elements which constitute the social order degree of accep tance of common rules and institutions One can see here Bulls step away from Wights understanding of realism as a cast of mind or an un derstanding of the human condition towards a more structural view of it as the social or rather asocial condition of a system Yet even though he explicitly draws a parallel in these terms between world society and international society both representing the social dimension Bull fails to give much guidance about what the physical counterpart to world society actually is All he says is a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another in which get included both layers of government above and below the state and TNAs His world political system includes firms states and intergovernmental organisa tions IGOs a bundling together which blurs any distinction between international and world system and feels close to what Americans once labelled a world politics paradigm and now goes more under global isation And Bull 1977a 2703 27681 is anyway keen to downplay the idea of adding TNAs to the international system seeing them as being nothing new not necessarily generative of a world society and not yet threatening the historical primacy of the statessystem and in ternational society It remains unclear why the physical dimension gets no separate standing as world system paralleling international sys tems pairing with international society The logic of Bulls distinction between the physical and the social points towards a fourpart scheme with a separate quadrant for world system rather than the traditional English school scheme of three pillars shown in figure 1 Is it that a world system without a world society is inconceivable in a way that a statessystem without an international society is not Bull does not develop this line but I will return to it in chapter 4 Third it remains unclear from his definition exactly how Bull un derstands the connection between his conception of world society and Wights Kantian tradition Sometimes Bull depicts Kantianism in fairly neutral terms as being about the element of transnational solidarity and conflict cutting across the divisions among states Bull 1977a 41 leav ing ambiguous whether this is about people or TNAs But sometimes a more Wightian revolutionist view shows through when Kantianism is said to be about the transnational social bonds that link individ ual human beings and revolutionists look forward to the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan interna tional society 1977a 256 Bull thus makes a considerable advance on Wights development of world society but he also leaves a lot undone 38 World society in English school theory and still carries Wights normative disposition against the subversion and liberation and missionary men Indeed Suganami 2002 10 offers the thought that Bull and most others in the rationalist tradition felt themselves to be distant from revolutionism and that this explains why they did not devote much thought to the world society dimension of English school theory Also noteworthy is that Bull develops in his definitions a strictly globalist view of both international and world society He dismisses regional and other transnational developments as not necessarily con tributing to and possibly obstructing global developments Bull 1977a 27981 With this move Bull takes a quite different path from Wight Bull was concerned mainly with the evolution of the global interna tional society that developed out of European imperialism and his gaze was thus fixed forward Wights view was more historical making the idea of international and world societies as subsystemic phenomena un avoidable The assumption of global scale became a strong element in the English schools thinking about international and world society As will become apparent in the discussion of Vincent the global scale as sumption was also supported by some universal normative imperatives to do with human rights The global scale assumption is I will argue one of the major wrong turnings in the development of English school theory One of the curiosities here is that both the moral primacy of in dividuals and the assumption of universalism come out of the natural law tradition that Bull rejected yet remained strong in his conception of international and world society The work of Watson does not touch much on the world society ques tion Watson was more concerned to apply Bulls ideas about interna tional system and international society to the study of world history In that sense he was furthering Wights project to develop the field of comparative international societies Watsons significance here is that he explicitly sides with Wights view that all known international soci eties originated inside a dominant culture 1990 1001 Watson is keen to add the possibility that regulated crosscultural Gesellschaft interna tional societies might expand from such Gemeinschaft cores By picking up this key idea of Wights Watson not only kept alive but greatly strengthened the idea that shared culture in effect civilisation was a key element in world society To the extent that any of the founding fathers of English school theory took a particular interest in world society it was Vincent His abiding concern with human rights focused his work precisely on the tensions 39 From International to World Society between the individual and the state level and therefore placed him in the boundary zone between international and world society Like Wight and Bull he drew heavily on political theory and international law With his focus on human rights Vincent was trying to advance beyond Bulls rather pluralist understanding of international society towards the more solidarist conception with which Bull seemed to be struggling in his later work In order to see why Vincent talks about both international and world society in the way he does it helps to understand what he was and was not trying to do Vincent was not trying to set out a new clarification or specification of English school concepts His work is essentially a discus sion of human rights where these are seen as a challengers to pluralist international society and therefore a moral and political problem per se and b as representing the cosmopolitanism intrinsic to world soci ety World society gets discussed in this context and Vincent does not make it an object of enquiry in its own right For Vincent 1978 40 it is the standing of individuals in Western thought that gives them the right to make claims against the state international society and in the twentieth century this way of thinking is embodied in the human rights discourse Vincent is searching for a way out of the pluralist frame set by Bull particularly in seeking a way around Bulls concern that the cultivation of human rights law would almost inevitably be subversive of the key principles of international society sovereignty and nonintervention and therefore subversive of world order His angle of attack hangs on the degree to which the rights of states derive from their being man ifestations of the right of selfdetermination of peoples Vincent 1986 11318 This right in his view requires that states have some minimum degree of civil relationship with their citizens If a state is utterly delin quent in this regard by laying waste its own citizens or by bringing on secessionist movements Vincent 1986 115 and by its conduct outrages the conscience of mankind 1986 125 then its entitlement to the protection of the principle of nonintervention should be sus pended He qualifies such suspensions by saying that the circumstances triggering a right of humanitarian intervention must be extraordinary ones not routine Vincent 1986 126 though it is unclear why on moral grounds routine largescale violence by the state against its citizens such as that in Stalins USSR or in Burma under the military junta should be less of an offence against either the principle of a states duty to its citizens or the conscience of humankind than oneoff cases In this 40 World society in English school theory way Vincent offers a possible solution to the tension between a plural ist international society focused on sovereignty and nonintervention and the cosmopolitan or even revolutionist world society implicit in a doctrine of universal human rights His idea is the development of a more solidarist international society in which states become more alike internally and therefore more likely to find common ground in agreeing about when the right of humanitarian intervention overrides the prin ciple of nonintervention Vincent 1986 1502 In this context Vincent notes that the spread of a global culture makes international society work more smoothly 1986 151 and takes hope in the historical record by which the state has made deals with civil society coopting the ideol ogy of individualism by translating human rights into citizens rights With this line of thinking Vincent begins to blend together a statebased solidarist international society with an underlying world society of common culture Within the framework of this discussion Vincent offers various re marks about world society and international society These go in several directions making different readings of his position possible Gonzalez Pelaez 2002 Whereas Wight was more focused on revolutionists seek ing to overthrow international society Vincent leans towards defining world society in terms of those who oppose international society be cause they are excluded from it He offers one definition of world society as the individual and certain actors and institutions in world politics whose concerns have been regarded conventionally as falling outside the domain of diplomacy and international relations Vincent 1978 20 He is keen to make the point that nonstate actors are excluded by a statebased international society from having their justice claims con sidered I use the term world society to describe the framework of morality that encompasses groups of this kind whose claims not being accommodated by the society of states are voiced in a tone which is hos tile to it Vincent 1978 28 World society in this sense could also be a society of ideologically similar states out of step with mainstream inter national society he mentions republican states during the monarchical age and dictatorships of the proletariat amidst a liberal democratic ma jority He suggests that these excluded entities can include individuals claiming human rights tribes and cultural groups multinational corpo rations and exploited classes and shows how each of these has some au dience for the legitimacy of its claims to rights against the state Vincent 1978 29 Vincents theme of world society as oppositional to interna tional society can also be found in ReusSmit 1997 5668 and Barkin 41 From International to World Society 1998 235 Elsewhere Vincent hints at both more cosmopolitan and more Stalinist views Echoing Bull and James he sees world society in the sense of some great society of mankind Vincent 1978 289 or more specifically as some kind of merging of states transnational actors and individuals where all have rights in relation to each other Vincent 1978 37 1992 25361 Elsewhere he links world society specifically to TNAs Vincent 1992 262 Sometimes echoing Wight he sees a world society properly socalled might be one in which all human beings owed allegiance to one sovereign or one in which a universal cultural pattern prevailed such that no part of the society could mount a defence against it Vincent 1978 289 If one had to extract a dominant thread from all of this it would probably be that Vincents view of international and world society was more historical and moral than analytical Vincent was much less con cerned with abstracting a theory of international relations out of English school concepts than he was with identifying and trying to promote an evolution in human political affairs He did not so much see inter national society and world society as separate analytical constructs but rather understood them as two historical forces needing to grope to wards a reconciliation of their contradictions Vincents problematique narrowly taken is the disjuncture represented by human rights prob lems between the establishment of a pluralist international society of states on the one hand and repressed individuals and groups on the other Taken more broadly it is about the general exclusion from inter national society of a periphery composed of individuals groups some TNAs and possibly some types of state His lookedfor solution is to merge the two At times the form of this merger seems to lean towards a solidarist international society of liberal states In his view a fully sol idarist international society would be virtually a world society because all units would be alike in their domestic laws and values on humani tarian intervention Vincent 1986 104 But his dominant image merges international society into world society possibly growing out of Bulls idea of a world political system as mixing state and nonstate actors The difference is that Vincent elevates this mixture from system to so ciety Thus international society might admit institutions other than states as bearers of rights and duties in it recognizing to that extent their equality and welcoming them into what would then have become a world society Vincent 1978 37 Vincents preferred future is one in which a Westphaliantype international society defining itself as an exclusive club of states gives way to a world society that is no longer 42 World society in English school theory defined by opposition to international society Instead the new world society is defined by an inclusive somewhat neomedieval mixture of states groups transnational entities and individuals all sharing some key values and having legal standing in relation to each other Vincent 1986 92104 Since many international nongovernmental organisa tions INGOs have already achieved limited official standing within many IGOs Clark 1995 it might be argued that Vincents vision has moved some way towards practical realisation The normative and predictive force of this vision of merger may be considerable but from a theorybuilding point of view the consequences are huge and not necessarily good Going down Vincents route requires merging two of the pillars of English school theory into one thereby los ing all of the analytical purchase gained by keeping the ontologies of state and individuals distinct Those English school thinkers with pri marily normative concerns do not seem to care much about this cost Vincents approach is still alive and well in the mind of Dunne 2001a 7 Bull is arguably mistaken in interpreting international society as a society of states since many of the rules and institutions of interna tional society predated the emergence of the modern state It is time that the English School jettisoned the ontological primacy it attaches to the state Almeida 2000 International society existed before sovereign states and it will outlive sovereign states He goes further 2001b 378 to argue that world society should be folded back into international soci ety On the other hand Hill 1996 122 keeps the ontologies separate by distinguishing between international and world public opinion along the lines of states versus nonstate actors leading individuals firms NGOs religions and media Buzan and Little 2000 also operate by keeping the state and individual ontologies distinct There is a rift opening up here between those primarily concerned with normative argument and those interested in analytical leverage Thus from a theorybuilding perspective Vincent is more interesting for what he has to say about human rights than for what he contributes to the development of English school theory He does not really ad vance the conceptualisations of international and world society beyond the positions developed by Wight and Bull and in some ways his con ceptual landscape is less clear than Bulls Whether intentionally or not his focus on human rights blocked off any other considerations of what might constitute either solidarist international society or cosmopolitan world society most obviously shared economic norms rules and insti tutions Vincents human rights focus also reinforced Bulls mistake of 43 From International to World Society looking only at global developments Because for Vincent 1986 117 the principle of human rights had to be universal so also was his vi sion of world society The strong linkage between universal principles and global scale is nowhere more obvious than in Vincents thinking Consequently Vincent 1986 101 105 shared Bulls 1977a 27981 re jection of regionallevel developments like Bull seeing them as threats to potential global ones One can sum up key points from this intellectual history of world society in classical English school thinking as follows r The concept of world society generally has a marginal position in the literature It is mostly discussed in the context of other things and not systematically developed in itself It remains distinctly secondary to the development of international society and is somewhat blighted by its association with revolutionism which many rationalists found distasteful r Despite its marginality world society occupies a central position in English school thinking It is crucial to the persistent moral sense animating the search for order that the society of states was only a secondorder phenomenon underneath which lay the morally prior but as yet unrealised society of all humankind The later Bull and much more so Vincent saw it as the ideal to strive for r There nevertheless remains a strong division of political positions on world society with Wight and Bull more or less defending the necessity of international society to the provision of world order and Vincent seeking ways to reduce the bad human rights conse quences of the sovereigntynonintervention principles of interna tional society r World society remains something of an analytical dustbin uncom fortably containing revolutionism cosmopolitanism and transnation alism There is a fairly strong agreement that international society and world society at least for the present rest on an ontological distinc tion between the state level on the one hand and a rather complicated matrix of individuals and nonstate groups and TNAs on the other Vincent and Dunne wants to break down this distinction but Vincent like Bull and Wight starts by accepting its reality A second thread also exists in which world society is partly seen in terms of shared culture Gemeinschaft and partly in terms of more rational bar gained social structures Gesellschaft How or if these two elements of world society fit together is not really addressed Wight 1966 92 44 World society in English school theory perhaps provided the lead for this neglect with his view that since Sociologists have not agreed on a satisfactory distinction in usage between the words society and community he would use them interchangeably Failure to address this distinction led to the curious situation of having one view of world society as a precondition for international society another view of it as the enemy and a third one as the prospective partner in marriage r There has been no followup to Wights idea that commerce was part of the rationalist agenda r There is a strong presumption that international and world society have to be thought about in global terms and that regionalist or subsystemic developments of them must subtract from the whole by creating competing centres More recent works in the English school tradition have not really moved things forward Except as a normative goal world society re mains at the margins and has not been developed conceptually Wæver 1992 104 offers the definition that world society is the cultural ho mogeneity and interlinkage of societies but it is not clear what this contributes and it could also serve as a definition of liberal solidarism in an international society Dunne Wheeler and others whose princi pal concern is the human rights issue eg Knudsen have more or less stuck with Vincents position of wanting to merge international and world society on normative grounds Whether one wants to keep the ontologies of states and individuals separate or merge them the question of what constitutes world society still has to be answered As I have shown above it does not get a very clear answer in such direct discussions of it as exist But another way of approaching the question in the English school literature is through discussion of the boundary between international and world society where does international society stop and world society begin This discussion occurs within the debate about pluralism and solidarism The pluralistsolidarist debate The pluralistsolidarist debate is about the nature and potentiality of in ternational society and particularly about the actual and potential extent of shared norms rules and institutions within systems of states Within the English school this debate hinges mainly on questions of interna tional law as the foundation of international society and especially on 45 From International to World Society whether the international law in question should be or include natural law as it was for Grotius or positive law The main issue at stake in this debate has been human rights and the closely related questions of hu manitarian intervention and the responsibility of the West towards the third world Bull 1966a 1984 Vincent 1986 Dunne and Wheeler 1996 Linklater 1998 Wheeler and Dunne 1998 Knudsen 1999 Wheeler 2000 Mayall 2000 Jackson 2000 Without this focus there would have been much less theoretical development than has in fact taken place The new generation of solidarists in particular deserve credit for picking up the pluralistsolidarist distinction staked out by Bull and carrying it for ward Nevertheless the somewhat relentless focus on human rights by both pluralists and solidarists has kept the whole theory discussion in a much narrower frame than the general logic of the topic would allow The debate has sometimes been unhelpfully emotive Jackson 2000 with pluralism and solidarism cast against each other in almost zero sum terms This section aims both to sketch the English school debate as it has unfolded and to start looking at the pluralismsolidarism ques tion in a wider perspective by divorcing the terms of the debate from the human rights issue a process that will be completed in chapter 5 The basic positions can be summarised as follows Pluralist concep tions lean towards the realist side of rationalism see figure 1 They are strongly statecentric and empirical and consequently assume that international law is positive law ie only made by states They pre suppose that states are de facto the dominant unit of human society and that state sovereignty means practical legal and political primacy More discreetly pluralism like realism is about the preservation andor cultivation of the political and cultural difference and distinctness that are the legacy of human history All of this makes the scope for in ternational society pretty minimal restricted to shared concerns about the degree of international order under anarchy necessary for coexis tence and thus largely confined to agreements about mutual recog nition of sovereignty rules for diplomacy and promotion of the non intervention principle Jackson 2000 Mayall 2000 As Mayall 2000 14 puts it pluralism is the view that states like individuals can and do have differing inter ests and values and consequently that international society is limited to the creation of a framework that will allow them to coexist in rela tive harmony For pluralists one of the features that distinguishes international society from any other form of social organisation is its procedural and hence nondevelopmental character 46 World society in English school theory The assumption of major differences among the states and peoples in a systemissupportedbythinkingofinternationalsocietyonaglobalscale If international society must cover the whole system then the historical evidence is overwhelming that states are culturally and ideologically unlike Since this debate arose during the Cold War the evidence for the depth of cultural and ideological differences among states was all too palpable Bull 1977a 25760 Pluralism stresses the instrumental side of international society as a functional counterweight to the threat of excessive disorder whether that disorder comes from the absence of states a Hobbesian anarchy or from excesses of conflict between states whether driven by simple concerns about survival or by rival universalist ideological visions By contrast solidarist conceptions lean towards the Kantian side of rationalism As Mayall 2000 14 notes solidarists root their thinking in cosmopolitan values the view that humanity is one and that the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into reality It is probably fair to say that many sol idarists believe that some cosmopolitanism and concern for the rights of individuals is necessary for international society As Linklater 1998 24 puts it An elementary universalism underpins the society of states and contributes to the survival of international order On this if on not much else the pluralists and solidarists agree Jackson 2000 175 tak ing the view that world society is the domain in which responsibility is defined by ones membership in the human race Solidarists presup pose that the potential scope for international society is much wider than the nondevelopmental character that limits the pluralist vision possibly embracing shared norms rules and institutions about func tional cooperation over such things as limitations on the use of force and acceptable standards of civilisation with regard to the relationship between states and citizens ie human rights In this view sovereignty can in principle embrace many more degrees of political convergence than are conceivable under pluralism as it does for example within the EU Solidarism focuses on the possiblity of shared moral norms under pinning a more expansive and almost inevitably more interventionist understanding of international order The solidarist position is driven both normatively what states should do and what norms should be part of international society and empirically what states do do and what norms are becoming part of international society Because the pluralist position is entirely statebased it is rela tively straightforward and coherent The solidarist position is more 47 From International to World Society problematic Because it ties together state and nonstate actors and draws on cosmopolitan notions of individual rights and a community of humankind it cannot help but blur the boundary between international and world society There is also room for confusion about whether sol idarism requires specific types of ethical commitment such as human rights or whether it is simply about the degree and depth of shared normative agreement in general Consequently although the pluralist solidarist debate is mostly constructed as one about how states should and do behave within international society world society questions are constantly dancing around its edges Two questions about the structure of this debate arise 1 Are pluralism and solidarism positions on a spectrum between which movement is possible or mutually exclusive opposites about which a choice has to be made 2 Is solidarism something that can be discussed within the confines of international society or does it necessarily spill over into the domain of world society On question 1 it has been a matter of debate as to whether pluralism and solidarism are separated by fundamental differences or whether they simply represent different degrees of a fundamentally similar con dition As far as I can see the view that pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive rests on an argument over whether primacy of right is to be allocated to individuals or to states If one takes the reductionist view that individual human beings are the prime referent for rights and that they must be subjects of international law carrying rights of their own then this necessarily falls into conflict with the view that the claim of states to sovereignty the right to selfgovernment trumps all other claims to rights Either individual human beings possess rights of their own subjects of international law or they can only claim and exercise rights through the state objects of international law If pluralism is es sentially underpinned by realist views of state primacy and solidarism is essentially a cosmopolitan position then they do look mutually ex clusive This rift can be reinforced by different views of sovereignty If sovereignty is given an essentialist interpretation seeing it mostly in what Jackson 1990 calls empirical terms in which sovereignty de rives from the power of states to assert the claim to exclusive right to selfgovernment then states cannot surrender very much to shared norms rules and institutions without endangering the very quality that defines them as states The existential threat to sovereignty in this sense 48 World society in English school theory is especially acute in relation to questions about human rights which is one reason why this issue has featured so much in English school debates Human rights as Wheeler 1992 486 observes opens up fun damental issues about the relationship between states and their citizens and poses the conflict between order and justice in its starkest form for the society of states There have been advantages in pursuing the starkest form hard case but one cost has been to force the pluralistsolidarist debate into an excessive polarisation in which non intervention and human rights become mutually exclusive positions The alternative case is that the two concepts comprise the ends of a spectrum and represent degrees of difference rather than contradictory positions This view rests on a more juridical view of sovereignty in which the right to selfgovernment derives from international society Seen in this perspective sovereignty is more of a social contract than an essentialist condition and the terms in which it is understood are always open to negotiation A softer view of sovereignty along these lines poses no real contradiction to solidarist developments though these may well be cast in terms of individuals as the objects of international law rather than as independent subjects carrying their own rights In this case plu ralism simply defines international societies with a relatively low or nar row degree of shared norms rules and institutions amongst the states where the focus of international society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition or possibly also the management of collective problems of common fate eg arms control environment Solidarism defines international societies with a relatively high or wide degree of shared norms rules and institutions among states where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition but also on cooperation over a wider range of issues whether in pursuit of joint gains eg trade or realisation of shared values eg human rights At the pluralist end of the spectrum where international society is thin collective enforcement of rules will be difficult and rare Towards the solidarist end where international society is thicker a degree of collec tive enforcement in some areas might well become generally accepted as has happened already for aspects of trade and somewhat less clearly in relation to arms control In this view so long as one does not insist that individuals have rights apart from and above the state there is no contradiction between development of human rights and sovereignty If they wish states can agree among themselves on extensive guarantees for human rights and doing so is an exercise of their sovereignty not a questioning of it This was Vincents position and along with other 49 From International to World Society solidarists he saw cosmopolitan forces and TNAs as crucial in push ing states towards understanding themselves and their commitments in that way This difference of view matters because if pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive then they simply reproduce within the rational ist international society via media a version of the polarisation between realism and liberalism that splits IR theory more generally Placing this polarisation within the linking framework of international society and world society concepts lowers the ideological heat of the debate and opens the possibility of conducting it in a shared institutional and evo lutionarycontextButitfailstoescapetheessentialtensionwhichwould weaken the potential of the English school to offer its methodological pluralism as a foundation for grand theory If they are not mutually ex clusive but more ends of a spectrum then they reinforce the position of international society as the via media between statecentric realism and cosmopolitan world society This line of thinking leads automatically to question 2 and the nature of the boundary between international and world society There are two issues here What is the difference between a solidarist international so ciety on the one hand and a Kantian world society of homogenous states on the other And do increasing degrees of solidarism necessarily bring transnational units and individuals into the picture as in the thinking of the Vincentians so marrying international and world society On the first issue Bull clearly wants to draw a line He rejects the idea that an ideologically homogenous statessystem equates with solidarism Bull 1977a 245 He does so partly on the weak ground that it is unlikely to happen and the process of arriving at it would be highly conflict ual because of inability to agree on universal values and partly on the basis of a distinction between genuinely harmonious Kantian world societies an idea he rejects as utopian and international societies that have learned to regulate conflict and competition but have not elimi nated it In effect Bull tries to eliminate the idea of a Kantian model of ideologically harmonious states altogether Like Carr 1946 he rejects the possibility of ideological homogeneity leading to harmony And be cause he maintains a strong globalscale assumption about international and world society he can plausibly argue against the probability of ide ological harmony ever occurring Because he rejects the Kantian model Bull is able to avoid the boundary question by keeping solidarism firmly within the cast of international society Yet if international society is de fined in terms of a society of states and world society as the nonstate 50 World society in English school theory sector one begins to wonder what Kantianism is doing in the world society pillar of the English school triad in the first place If Kantianism means a society of states marked by a high degree of homogeneity in domestic structures values and laws then it is a type of international society not an element of world society This issue of homogeneity in the domestic structures of states was perhaps Vincents key point of departure from Bull For Vincent 1986 104 1502 a fully solidarist international society would be virtually a world society because all units would be alike in their domestic laws and values on humanitarian intervention Homogeneity would make it more likely that they would find common ground in agreeing about when the right of humanitarian intervention overrides the principle of nonintervention This line of thinking has more recently been explored by Armstrong 1999 in the context of developments in international law Armstrong talks in terms of world society seeing a shift from in ternational law for a society of states to world law for a world society of people His argument hinges on changes in the nature and inter ests of the leading states as they have become more democratic and interdependent and he acknowledges a certain imperial quality to this development as the leading states seek to impose their own standards of governance and commerce on to others Armstrong avoids the term solidarismyethisargumentisexactlyforaVincentstylesolidaristinter national society based on homogeneity in the domestic values of states Neither Bulls rejection nor Vincents advocacy answers the question of just how solidarist a statessystem can become before it can no longer be thought of as an international society The narrow way in which the pluralistsolidarist debate has been conducted within the English school largely focused on the single question of human rights has discouraged investigation of this question The second issue whether increasing degrees of solidarism necessar ily bring transnational units and individuals into the picture also raises questions that have not really been fully explored in English school writing Vincent and his followers assume that it does and want to merge international and world society Arguing from a different start ing point I have elsewhere Buzan 1993 made the case that solidarism can only develop up to a point without there being accompanying developments in world society I did not argue for merging the two concepts but did take the position that a solidarism confined to inter national society can only go so far before further development has to bring in world society elements These questions quickly link back to 51 From International to World Society whether pluralism and solidarism are opposed choices or positions on a spectrum Bull set out the pluralistsolidarist framework and so his conception of society is a good place to tap into this debate Bulls 1977a 537 conception of society comes out of a kind of sociological functionalism in which all human societies must be founded on understandings about security against violence observance of agreements and rules about property rights He sees rules as the key to sharpening up mere common interests into a clear sense of appropriate behaviour 1977a 6771 The making of rules ranges from the customary to the positive but whatever type they are they fall into three levels 1 Constitutional normative principles are the foundation setting out the basic ordering principle eg society of states universal empire state of nature cosmopolitan community etc In Bulls view what is essential for order is that one of these principles dominates because the principles are usually zerosum contestation equals disorder Contestation at this level is what defines Wights revolutionists For an international society the key principle is sovereignty This level is comparable to Waltzs first tier of structure organising principle of thesystemthoughBullsrangeofpossibilitiesiswiderthanWaltzs 2 Rules of coexistence are those which set out the minimum be havioural conditions for society and therefore hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements Here we find Bulls institutions of classical European international society diplomacy international law the balance of power war and the role of great powers 3 Rules to regulate cooperation in politics strategy society and econ omy 1977a 70 About these Bull says 1977a 70 Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or pri mary goals of international life but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objec tives than mere coexistence Here one would find everything from the UN system through arms control treaties to the regimes and institutions for managing trade finance environment and a host of technical issues from postage to allocation of orbital slots and broadcast frequencies Note first that this is a highly rational contractual rulebased con ception of society It has nothing at all to do with shared culture or the 52 World society in English school theory wefeeling of community and is by definition completely distinct from the shared culture civilisational precursors of international society that feature in Wights and Watsons work Note second that Bulls first and second levels mainly define the pluralist position on international society with sovereign states representing the choice of constitutional principle and the rules of coexistence reflecting a mainly Westphalian scheme Solidarism finds its scope mainly in the third tier of more ad vanced but secondary rules about cooperation though international law under rules of coexistence is sufficiently vague to allow in quite a bit of solidarism It is worth keeping this third tier in mind when con sidering Bulls position in the pluralistsolidarist debate Rules about cooperation seem to offer an openended scope for the development of solidarism Yet in his defence of pluralism and his fear of solidarism Bull seems to forget about this third tier Since this is where the big growth has been in contemporary international society especially in the economic sector the placing of this as a kind of shallow third tier comes into question and the odd juxtaposition of the classifications more ad vanced but secondary begins to look contradictory Develop enough down these secondary lines and the more advanced elements begin to bring the constitutive principles themselves into question The devel opment of the EU illustrates this potential and shows that the two are not necessarily contradictory in the disordering way that Bull seemed to think inevitable Why did Bulls underlying concern with order and his pessimism about its prospects drive him to box himself in like this when the underlying logic of his concepts does not seem to require doing so Bull sets out the terms for solidarism and pluralism Bull 1966a see also 1990 and Keene 2002 by exploring the positions represented re spectively by Grotius and Lassa Oppenheim The core of the argument is about whether the international law on which international society rests is to be understood as natural law Grotius solidarist or positive law Oppenheim pluralist According to Bull 1966a 64 it was Grotiuss view deriving from natural law that individual human beings are sub jects of international law and members of international society in their own right Because Grotian solidarism comes out of natural law it is inherently universalist in the sense of having to be applied to all of hu mankind While Bull accepts the universalism he rejects natural law as a basis for international society and particularly dismisses the idea that individuals have standing as subjects of international law and mem bers of international society in their own right He argues 1966a 68 that Grotiuss attachment of solidarism to natural law was rooted in the 53 From International to World Society needs of Grotiuss own times to fill the vacuum left by the declining force of divine or ecclesiastical law and the rudimentary character of ex isting voluntary or positive law and that Grotius stands at the birth of international society and is rightly regarded as one if its midwives 66 Seeing the Grotian position as relevant to a longpast set of historical conditions and fearing that Grotiuss blending of individual rights and state sovereignty was a recipe for conflict Bull plumps for Oppenheims view 1966a 73 it may still be held that the method he Oppenheim employed of gauging the role of law in international society in rela tion to the actual area of agreement between states is superior to one which sets up the law over and against the facts This view seemed to strengthen over time there are no rules that are valid independent of human will that are part of nature Natural law cannot accommodate the fact of moral disagreement so prominent in the domain of interna tional relations Bull 1979 181 For Bull international society is and should be based on positive law Bulls primary concern here is to restrict the idea of international so ciety to states and in that sense he is helping to draw a clear boundary between international society states and world society individuals Adopting the positive law position accomplishes this by putting in ternational law wholly into the hands of states But while identifying pluralism with positive international law Bull 1966a 648 does ex clude individuals as subjects of international law the distinction be tween positive and natural law does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing between pluralism and solidarism per se in terms of de gree of shared norms rules and institutions It is true that natural law provides one possible foundation for solidarism particularly where the concern is to establish a basis for human rights but as argued above this puts pluralism and solidarism necessarily at odds Remembering Bulls third tier of rules to regulate cooperation it seems clear that adherence to positive law does nothing to prevent states from developing such an extensive range of shared values including in the area of human rights that their relationship would have to be called solidarist This impor tant loophole seems to have escaped Bulls notice not least because his disinterest in both economic and regional developments blinded him to the very significant empirical developments of solidarism going on there Adherence to positive law not only opens the way for as much cooperation among states as they wish to have but since positive law is an expression of sovereignty does so in a way that does not necessarily or even probably bring sovereignty into question As Cutler notes it 54 World society in English school theory also undercuts the assumption of universalism on a global scale that is strong in Bulls thinking about international society Cutler 1991 469 Within a positive law framework states can by definition do what they like including forming solidarist regional or subsystemic international societies Acceptance of positive law draws a straight line between the pluralist and solidarist positions and eliminates the logic of their being opposed Pluralism simply becomes a lower degree of shared norms rules and institutions or a thinner body of positive law solidarism a higher one or a thicker body of positive law Bull never seemed to grasp this implication of his acceptance of posi tive law Instead he goes on to develop what seem like rather arbitrary criteria for solidarism namely that it is defined with respect to the en forcement of the law by states pluralism sees states as capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law 1966a 52 By the device of discussing it only in relation to high politics issues such as collective security and human rights this enforcement criterion is made to seem more demand ing than it often is In this perspective solidarism opposes alliances as sectional and favours collective security on a universalist basis Plural ists argue for the centrality of sovereignty and nonintervention as the key principles of international society and the only purposes for which they could be overridden were that of selfpreservation and that of the maintenance of the balance of power Bull 1966a 63 It is this very demanding concept of solidarism attached to collective security Bull 1977a 23840 that goes forward into The Anarchical Society where Bull 1489 sees solidarism as expressed by the development of consensual international law where norms and rules can achieve the status of inter national law not only if unanimously supported but also if supported by consensus Bull also 1977a 152 continued to identify solidarism with Grotiuss natural law position and this led him to the view that Carried to its logical extreme the doctrine of human rights and du ties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states For if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens and entitled to command their obedience has been subject to challenge and the structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy 55 From International to World Society This position does not change much in his later allegedly more soli darist work Bull 1984 13 The promotion of human rights on a world scale in a context in which there is no consensus as to their meaning and the priorities among them carries the danger that it will be subversive of coexistence among states on which the whole fabric of world order in our times depends The fierceness of Bulls defence of pluralism is understandable when seen as a response to a normatively driven solidarism based in natu ral law pitting a universalist principle of individual rights against the state and so compromising the principle of sovereignty But it does not make sense against the logic of Bulls own positive law position in which likeminded states are perfectly at liberty to agree human rights regimes amongst themselves without compromising the prin ciple of sovereignty Interestingly Manning 1962 1678 was crystal clear on this point What is essentially a system of law for sovereigns being premised on their very sovereignty does not by the fact of being strengthened put in jeopardy the sovereignties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence Not at any rate in logic Bulls globalscale universalist assumptions make the best the enemy of the good by cut ting off acknowledgement of subglobal human rights developments In principle Bull should have no difficulty with individuals as objects of international human rights law so long as that law is made by states If Bulls strong defence of pluralism was a response to the normative cosmopolitanism of human rights solidarists it has reaped its reward in spirited counterattacks The ongoing debate has made some progress but partly because it remains focused on the human rights question it has also carried forward many of the analytical weaknesses and distor tions from the earlier rounds Indeed since interest in collective security has fallen away the more recent pluralistsolidarist debate is almost ex clusively focused on human rights The assumption of universalism and therefore global scale still dominates on both sides as does the blindness or indifference towards all the realworld solidarist develop ments at the regional level and in the economic sector Some of the solidarists such as Knudsen 1999 remain committed to the natural law approach and so take Bull as a particular target Knudsen argues strongly against the polarisation between pluralism and solidarism which he sees as stemming from Bulls work He uses a Grotian position on human rights and international society to argue that human rights can be and in his view already is an institution of international society He brings individuals into international society 56 World society in English school theory through natural law but still holds solidarism to be an empirical feature of statebased international society Wheeler 2000 41 is distinctive for not appealing to natural law and makes it a priority to avoid clashes between international law and human rights Instead he builds his case on empirical grounds and seeks ways to strengthen the moves towards a human rights regime that he sees as already present in positive inter national law Vincent as sketched above does not explicitly enter into the pluralistsolidarist debate But the logic of his argument implic itly equates international society with a pluralist model and solidarism with a move to a world society in which states other groups and indi viduals all have legal standing in relation to each other Vincent 1986 92102 By threatening to merge world society into solidarism Vincent and his followers both lose the extremely central distinction between statebased international and nonstatebased world societies and divert attention from the necessary task of thinking through world so ciety more carefully and relating it to international society as a distinct factor Perhaps the most prominent current exponents of solidarism are Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler They correctly place Bull as rejecting the foundationalistuniversalismsaspectofrevolutionismandalsonatural law Dunne and Wheeler 1998 They recognise that Bulls idea of moral foundations in international society rested on positive law and they also see that this was in principle open ended as regards potential develop ment between pluralism and solidarism Rather than setting Bull up as a target they try to reinterpret him as a kind of protosolidarist perhaps hoping to enlist his status in order to help legitimate those concerned to build up the normative elements in English school theory They them selves seem to be in Vincents tradition seeing solidarism not as a feature or not of international societies but as intimately bound up in the tran sition from international to world society They try 1996 both to push Bull into a more solidarist position and to extend the Grotian line that solidarism crosses the boundary between international and world soci ety They draw attention rightly to the later Bulls concerns for justice as a component of order and to his awareness of the limits of pluralism ex posed by the Cold War ideological polarisation of the great powers They even 1996 92 want to pull out of Bull three paradigms of world poli tics realism pluralism and solidarism centred upon the themes of respectively power order and justice In terms of a structural interpre tation of English school theory this is a potentially huge move though one not yet worked out It would follow Wight in locating on normative 57 From International to World Society ground the entire theoretical foundation of the English school triad tak ing out of the equation the whole question of units states transnational individual and the stateindividual ontology on which the existing structural distinctions are built As I have argued above Bulls commit ment to positive law did provide an opening towards solidarism But it was an opening that Bull himself did not go through Bulls awareness of the pitfalls of pluralism and his sensitivity to justice claims were not sufficient to override his clear commitment to statecentric plural ism In particular they did not override his commitment to an ontology based on keeping states and individuals analytically distinct which is what makes his work a major contribution to developing a more social structural approach to English school theory Trying to coopt Bull into solidarism risks confusing the pluralistsolidarist question with that about the boundary between international and world society on which Bull was clear As I will argue in chapter 5 there are good analytical reasons for keeping the ideas of pluralism and solidarism distinct from the definitions of international and world society What this discussion reveals is that a great deal hinges on the question of what solidarism is understood to be If it is simply cosmopolitanism dressed up in English school jargon then pluralism and solidarism must be mutually exclusive and world society can only be achieved by mer ging international society into a wider cosmopolitan frame Something of this sort is hinted at in Linklaters 1996 78 idea of extending citizen ship both up and down from the state and having the state mediating between the different loyalties and identities present within modern societies If as might be inferred from Bulls discussion of rules and from some of Dunnes and Wheelers writing about positive interna tional law solidarism is better understood as being about the thickness of norms rules and institutions that states choose to create to manage their relations then pluralism and solidarism simply link positions on a spectrum and have no necessary contradiction Given its many costs the only reason to hold the cosmopolitan posi tion is either a dyedinthewool methodological individualism or the hope that doing so gives some political leverage against the many states that have so far proved unwilling to embrace a human rights agenda Against it is the argument made by Williams 2001 that world society contrary to the hopes of some solidarists is more thoroughly and deeply fragmented and diverse and therefore more embeddedly pluralist than international society Whereas states because they are like units and rel atively few in number do have the potential for solidarism underlined 58 World society in English school theory by Kant the diversity and unlikeness of the entities comprising the nonstate world make it a much more problematic site for the develop ment of solidarism The case for taking the less dogmatic line is not just the expedience of avoiding difficulties Sticking with the cosmopolitan view of solidarism confines one to a perilously narrow liberal view in which the issue of human rights dominates what solidarism is under stood to be It leaves one unable to describe as solidarist international societies that make no concession to individuals as subjects of inter national law but which nevertheless display a rich and deep array of shared norms rules and institutions some of which may give individ uals extensive rights as objects of international law On the face of it the inability to label such international societies as solidarist makes a non sense of much of what the pluralistsolidarist debate is about in terms of whether international society is about mere rules of coexistence or is as Mayall 2000 21 puts it about turning international society into an enterprise association that exists to pursue substantive goals of its own In substantive terms pluralism describes thin international soci eties where the shared values are few and the prime focus is on de vising rules for coexistence within a framework of sovereignty and nonintervention Solidarism is about thick international societies in which a wider range of values is shared and where the rules will be not only about coexistence but also about the pursuit of joint gains and the management of collective problems in a range of issueareas Thinking about pluralism and solidarism in terms of thin and thick sets of shared values runs usefully in parallel with Ruggies 1998 33 constructivist understanding of international systems the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material At the level of the international polity the concept of struc ture in social constructivism is suffused with ideational factors There can be no mutually comprehensible conduct of international relations constructivists hold without mutually recognised constitutive rules resting on collective intentionality These rules may be more or less thick or thin Similarly they may be constitutive of conflict or competition If one takes this view then pluralism and solidarism become ends of a spectrum They represent degrees of difference rather than contra dictory positions This position also allows one to keep solidarism as a feature of international society ie a society of states and therefore to 59 From International to World Society keep distinct the idea of international society as being about states and world society as about nonstate actors World society encompasses the individual and transnational domains and it remains a question to be investigated as to whether and how these tie into the development of solidarism Contrary to the Vincentians world society becomes not the necessary absorption of international society into a wider universe of in dividual and transnational rights but a distinct domain of actors whose relationshipwiththestatedomainneedstobeunderstoodAmongother things this perspective requires closer attention to the question of what the shared norms rules and institutions that define solidarism and plu ralism are about and what values they represent Answers to that may well condition the type of relationship between international and world society that develops and whether and how individuals and transna tionals become players in solidarism more on this in chapter 5 For those in the solidarist tradition there is an interesting and as yet not well explored area of linkage to other elements of IR theory to be found in the question of homogeneity of units Bulls pluralism is again a useful foil As noted above Bull rejected as Kantian and therefore world society the idea that solidarism could be produced by states becom ing more internally alike Vincent Armstrong and Dunne and Wheeler seem in many ways to hinge their ideas of solidarism precisely on the possibility of such homogenising developments If homogenisation is a route to solidarist international societies then IR theory offers grounds for optimism Several powerful trends in IR theory note the existence of homogenising forces and this would seem to work in favour of the normative approach to international society at least so long as lib eral states are in the ascendent in the international system as the model around which homogenisation occurs Halliday 1992 focuses on the issue of homogenisation of domestic structures among states as one of the keys to international and by implication world society He impli citlypicksuponthemesfromWightandcarriesthesameblurringofcat egories pluralistrealist transnationalnonstate links and homogeni sation among states in their internal character and structure Halliday notes the normative case for homogenisation Burke and democratic peace the Marxian idea of capitalism as the great homogenising force and the KantianFukuyama idea of science and technology and democracy as homogenising forces Halliday ignores entirely Waltzs 1979 argument about the operation of socialisation and competition as homogenising forces an idea picked up by me and adapted to thinking about international society Buzan 1993 Interestingly the 60 World society in English school theory Stanford school Meyer et al 1997 1448 also ignore the powerful homogenising argument in Waltz Unlike Halliday they acknowledge Waltz but they dismiss him as a microrealist even though they also take the striking isomorphism of the like units of the international sys tem as their key phenomenon for explanation Their explanation for isomorphism could be seen as complementary to that in Waltz more on this in chapter 3 If homogeneity is overdetermined in the interna tional system then the implications of this for solidarism need to be more closely investigated One can sum up key points from the pluralistsolidarist debate as follows r That the debate about solidarism in not primarily or even at all about shared identity or common culture In one sense it is about whether one starts from a cosmopolitan position driven by ethical commit ments or from a statecentric position driven by positive law In an other simpler and less politically charged sense it is about the extent and degree of institutionalisation of shared interests and values in sys tems of agreed rules of conduct Arguably it is also about collective enforcement of rules though whether this is a necessary condition for all rules is unclear r That there is confusion about the relationship between homogeneity of states on the one hand and solidarism on the other Does homo geneitypointtowardsKantianworldsocietyorsolidaristinternational society r That it remains a contested question as to whether solidarism is or should be a quality of interstate international societies or whether it is or should be a quality that necessarily bridges between and merges international and world society Is solidarism the quality that merges international and world society or is it a concept that can be applied to international society states and world society separately If the former then the distinction between international and world society as distinct pillars within English school theory collapses If the latter then the question is how the two relate particularly when and to what extent the development of solidarism in an interstate international society requires corresponding developments in world society r That there does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between acceptance of positive law as the foundation for international society and the development of solidarism 61 From International to World Society r That acceptance of positive law as the foundation for international society would seem to require or at least enable abandoning both the universalistglobalscale assumption inherited from natural law and the blindness to solidarist developments in areas other than human rights and collective security In practice neither has yet happened The pluralistsolidarist debate dances on the border between interna tional and world society But while it opens up some interesting and useful perspectives both on the border and on what lies on either side of it it still does not generate a clear understanding of world society Conclusions On the evidence in this chapter it does not overstate the case to say that as things stand the English schools understanding of world society is both incoherent and underdeveloped Yet this observation is not the basis for a contemptuous dismissal The reasons for it are perfectly un derstandable in the context of what the various writers discussed above were trying to do And the main point is that although the concept is neither well worked out nor clearly defined it is located in an extremely interesting and central position within an overall framework of IR the ory World society bears heavily on the most important debates within the English school so much so that even the relatively welldeveloped concept of international society cannot be properly understood without taking world society into close account For all of its shortcomings the English school approach to world society does show exactly why the concept is important and also shows where if not yet how it fits into a theoretically pluralist approach to IR theory My conclusion then is not that the English schools thinking on world society should be set aside but that it should be taken as the definition of a challenge There is in teresting and important thinking to be done in working out just what world society does mean how it fits into the larger frame of English school theory and what the consequences of a clearer view of it are for that larger frame In order to advance that project it helps now to look at the several bodies of thought outside the English school that also use the concept What other understandings of world society are there and do they offer insights which can be brought to bear on the difficulties that world society raises in the English school 62 3 Concepts of world society outside English school thinking The English school has successfully made the concept of international society its own Because the meaning of international society as the society that states form among themselves is quite specific there are not manyattemptstoimpartothermeaningstothetermThesamecannotbe said of world society As shown in chapter 2 the English schools usage of this term is confused diverse and on the margins of its discourse In addition many others have taken up the term or synonyms for it as a way of questioning the narrowness inherent in the statecentric quality of international society World society is used widely to bring nonstate actors into the social structure of the international system This chapter surveys these alternative conceptions with a view to the lessons they offer for thinking about the meaning of world society and how it should be staged in English school thinking There are in practice two broad ways of using the concept of world society The first typified by Bull is to see it as a specialised idea aimed at capturing the nonstate dimension of humankinds social order Buzan and Little 2000 for example use it as an expression meant to capture either or both of the society Gesellschaft or community Gemeinschaft aspects of the nonstate and individual levels of world politics In this formworldsocietyisdistinctfromandcounterpointedtointernational society The second way exemplified by Vincent and his followers and prevalent in most sociological approaches is to use the concept in an attempt to capture the macrodimension of human social organisation as a whole In this usage world society ultimately incorporates and supersedes international society Yet along the way it is often opposed to international society as a way of conceptualising the world social order 63 From International to World Society In the English schools discussions of international society and also more generally in the discussion about the structure of statessystems the distinction between the system element understood as interaction and the society element understood as socially constructed norms rules and institutions is in general explicit The terms international systemandinternationalsocietyareemployedspecificallyinthestruc tural side of English school theory to represent this distinction It also featuresstronglyinthedebatesbetweenneorealistswhosetheoryhangs on the material aspects of system and constructivists who want to develop more social views of international structure Curiously and regardless of whether or not one thinks the system society distinction tenable or not on which more in chapter 4 no sim ilar separation attends the discussions about world society As noted above Bull 1977 27681 did distinguish between world society and the world political system but this concern to differentiate the me chanical and the social in relation to the nonstate world has not become part of English school practice Outside the English school and indeed outside the mainstream of IR this issue has been addressed not by at tempting to distinguish between the mechanical or physical and the social but by setting up different understandings of what constitutes society Much of the nonEnglish school discussion about world soci ety can be understood as the taking of positions ranging from relatively light to relatively heavy in what definitional benchmarks are set for society On the lighter end world society becomes not much more than a synonym for Bulls world political system or what was referred to in chapter 2 as world system not Wallersteins meaning This view stresses global patterns of interaction and communication and in sym pathy with much of the literature on globalisation uses the term society mainly to distance itself from statecentric models of IR On the heavier end world society approximates Vincents holistic conception and is aimed at capturing the total interplay amongst states nonstate actors and individuals while carrying the sense that all the actors in the sys tem are conscious of their interconnectedness and share some important values This can come in fairly nonspecific forms where the emphasis is on the fact that a great deal of socially structured interaction is going on amongst many different types of actor on a planetary scale It can also come in more focused versions where the whole assemblage is characterised according to some dominant ordering principle such as capitalism or modernity 64 World society outside English school theory Bulls understanding of world society has the attraction of resting on clear assumptions about both world and society In relation to world Bulls position is that it is about the nonstate aspects of international systems and therefore distinct from international society In relation to society Bulls position is in parallel with that on international society that society is about shared values The shared values idea comes in different forms in that it can be arrived at by various routes coercive universalism imposition of shared values by force cosmopolitanism development of shared values at the level of individuals or Kantian development of shared values at the level of states The transnational element in English school world society thinking is not so obviously about shared values though a degree of necessity of shared values can be assumed to underlie it Transnational organisations whether firms or INGOs are by definition functionally differentiated and it can be argued that functionally differentiated organisations presuppose a sys tem of shared values in order to allow for their creation and operation within a division of labour In highly liberalised international systems like that amongst the contemporary Western states transnational or ganisations exist and function because of a framework of agreed rules and institutions Similarly the transnational system of medieval Europe wasstructuredbythesharedvaluesandinstitutionsofChristendomand feudalism Using world society to refer to nonstate elements means that while Bulls concept of world society is generally pitched at the global scale humankind as a whole it is not holistic in the sense of being about everything It represents a particular line of distinction within the frame of the international system overall The idea of shared values means that Bulls concept of society is a relatively strong one with quite demand ing criteria a view shared by Krasner 1999 48 The Vincentians share Bulls strong understanding of society as meaning shared values but not his narrow conception of world society as confined to the nonstate world Compared to Bull and at some risk of oversimplification it can be said that most nonEnglishschool users of the concept want to define world society more loosely along either or both of these lines That is to say like the Vincentians they want world to be used as a holistic umbrella term to include everything in the international system state nonstate and individual Rengger 1992 3669 also argues for incorporating the narrow idea of international society into a cosmopolitan frame But in contrast to almost everyone within the English school the other users 65 From International to World Society of world society want society to mean something less demanding than shared values and closer to what in English school and IR parlance would be thought of as system The most obvious motive behind these moves is consciousness of the shrinkage of time and space in the contem porary global political economy and the consequent need to take into account the multitudinous patterns of interaction and interdependence that knit the world together more tightly and more deeply than ever before Some of these concepts of world society are thus precursors of or analogues for globalisation A second motive probably springs from the direction and character of debates in different disciplines In IR the systemsociety distinction is well embedded In sociology the tradition of debate is more focused around how society is to be defined The rest of this chapter comprises a survey of world society and anal ogous concepts as they have been developed outside the English school The aim is to relate their ways of understanding world society to the problem of conceptualising world society within the English schools theoretical framework The first section looks at three writers located mainly within the IR debate but with a stronger sociological orientation than the IR mainstream John Burton Evan Luard and Martin Shaw The second section examines a range of debates and traditions located mainly in Sociology Luhmann the Stanford school the World Society Research Group and macrosociology The third section turns to a de bate that stems mainly from a mixture of political theory and political activism global civil society IR writers with a sociological turn Burton Luard and Shaw Two IR writers outside the English school who can be read in the same way as the Vincentians and Rengger ie as favouring an all inclusive interpretation of world are Burton and Luard Both men ploughed somewhat lonely furrows in IR and might best be thought of as forerunners of globalisation In that sense neither was responding to the same impulses that inspired the British Committee in particular and the English school more broadly even though they used similar concepts Burton 1972 1922 wanted to differentiate interstate relations which he saw as the dominant IR approach from a holistic approach that focused on the entire network or system or cobweb of human interactions In part he argues that the behaviour of states cannot be 66 World society outside English school theory understood without taking into account the wider context of human interactions In part his ambition was to shift the focus of analysis away from the particularities of states to the dynamics of the interhuman sys tem as a whole His idea of world society meant covering all the levels of analysis at once He wanted maps of human behaviour and the key to his perception of world society is perhaps found in the statement Burton 1972 45 that Communications and not power are the main organising influence in world society Like the English school Burton was reacting against the excesses of mechanistic statecentric realism in IR theory Unlike them he wanted to move much further away from the statessystem as the central frame for thinking about international relations Luard 1976 1990 was much more animated by the task of construct ing a specifically sociological approach to the study of international relations In his earlier work 1976 110 364 he insisted that his sub ject was the society of states but later 1990 he took the whole nexus of states transnational actors and individual networks as the unit of analysis Like Burton he did not differentiate between international and world society and he used the terms interchangeably 1990 2 His concern with consciousness of interrelatedness 1990 3 came close to Burtons focus on communications but he wanted to consider a whole set of variables structure motives means norms institutions elites and most of all ideology and the interplay amongst them as the ba sis for differentiating types of international society Luards approach was consciously sociological and comparative His 1976 book can be grouped with Wights and Watsons as comparative historical sociology approaches to international society His key theme which would res onate with most contemporary contstructivists was that in any given era there exists a common pattern of belief about the nature of interna tional society and the behaviour within it seen as normal 1976 110 This pattern of belief is a social structure that strongly conditions the behaviour of the units in the system no matter what their internal dif ferences He wanted to establish internationalworld society as a type of society with its own distinctive features larger looser with stronger subunits than others but still recognisably similar in structure to some of the larger states He wanted to open the study of society away from the tight smallscale community models of anthropology while keep ing the holistic focus allowed by the concept of society This type of thinking developed mostly in reaction to the statecentric models of international relations promoted by realism but also in some 67 From International to World Society ways by liberalism which has its own version of statecentrism The English school can be attacked also for statecentrism but only if it is interpreted as being about international society and nothing else Some do see it in this way Brown 1999 67 Keane 2001 256 and would be happy to think of it as the international society school With that interpretation the English school can easily be accused of sharing the statecentric ontology of realism and therefore as missing or worse ex cluding from consideration the rising salience of nonstate elements in the international system As has been shown above this is not a tenable interpretation of the English school Although the bulk of the schools work has indeed been in the area of international society its foundation is the theoretical pluralism embedded in the three traditions The three pillars of English school theory do encompass the holistic agenda Its big advantage over other holistic approaches is that it does not surren der ontological and epistemological distinctions and therefore retains a much greater degree of analytical leverage Most other holistic ap proaches dump everything into a single category often labelled world society so presenting an impossibly complicated subject for analysis While the English school can certainly be accused both of neglecting world society and of not making its meaning and content clear enough it cannot fairly be accused of realisms ontological or indeed episte mological narrowness Shaw also leans towards equating the English school with interna tional society but this is not his main point Like Luard Shaw is rightly concerned to raise the sociological consciousness of the IR community But rather than ignoring the English school as Luard largely did Shaw takes it as a target particularly the English schools strong conception of society as shared values Shaw wants a wide definition of world and a weak one of society In terms of world Shaw like Luard and perhaps Burton wants to reintegrate the study of the statessystem the global economy and global culture 1996 56 At some points he seems to take up an antistate position similar to that which Brown 1999 1014 attributes to Burton almost bringing him into line with Bulls view that international society and world society are in important ways opposed concepts He argues that The global society perspective there fore has an ideological significance which is ultimately opposed to that of international society Shaw 1996 60 Yet elsewhere 1996 55 he seems almost close to a three traditions position when he suggests but does not follow up that the key question is how global society and international society relate to each other 68 World society outside English school theory Shaw is on clearer ground when he argues that the definition of so ciety used by Bull and through him the English school is too demand ing In Shaws view the requirement for a substantial degree of social consensus works up to a point to identify international society but is the reason why Bull cannot bring world society into practical focus Shaw sees this strong definition of society as discredited He wants a weaker definition that rejects the distinction between system and society in order to bring the growing reality of a global society more clearly into focus Shaw 1996 54 Here Shaws critique comes close to the holistic line present in Burton and Luard World society exists through the so cial relations involved in global commodity production and exchange through global culture and mass media and through the increasing de velopment of world politics 1996 55 Although this definition is open to interpretation in different ways its thrust suggests a watering down of society to a meaning not much different from Bulls world political system Shaws apparent motive for wanting a weaker definition of society is to enable him to make a stronger empirical claim that a significant world society already exists and needs to be taken into account This is the po sition of some globalists and reflects promotional as much as analytical goals In this sense Shaw and others are quite right to draw attention to the difficulty that the strong definition of society poses for the English school It is pretty clear in Bulls writing that the demanding require ment for society leads directly to the conclusion that not much is to be found by way of really existing world society This in turn forces him to defend pluralist international society in the name of international order The gap between Bulls position and Shaws call for a weaker definition of world society draws attention back to the missing element of world system or in Bulls term world political system in the English school triad noted earlier Recall that in the English schools triad international system represents the physical interaction element at the level of states and international society the socially constructed one based on shared norms rules and institutions Recall also that world society is defined in parallel terms to international society but that there is no place in the triad scheme for a physical interaction analogue world system to international system The position of Shaw and the globalisationists might thus be understood in English school terms as a call to recognise the standing and significance of the world system element which is currently absent from the English schools theoretical scheme Its ab sence in English school thinking is probably explained by the tension 69 From International to World Society between the Wightian mode of thinking from which the three traditions derive and more structural modes In Wightian mode world system does not register because unlike the other three pillars it has not been part of the conversation about international relations The demand for it comes from structural logic Whether it is a good idea to address this problem as Shaw would have us do by conflating world system and world society so weakening what is meant by society is much more open to argument more on this in chapter 4 It is not clear what would be gained analytically from adopting Shaws approach other than a stronger basis for a claim that world society al ready exists In the end his expanded and weakened formulation con tains many of the same ambiguities as are found in the English school and his weaker concept of society pushes towards a mere system view and drains away the distinctiveness of a social as opposed to a merely mechanicalphysical approach Sociological conceptions of world society Sociology is of course the home discipline of society even though some of its leading lights Mann 1986 2 Wallerstein 1984 2 would like to abolish the concept on the grounds that no unit of analysis can be found that corresponds to it Most of Sociology has been concerned with so cieties composed of individual human beings and thus confined itself to entities that are subglobal in scale Some sociologists most notably in the subfield of historical sociology have become concerned with the state and power and developed a perspective on the global level not dissimilar to that of realism Mann 1986 Tilly 1990 Sociologists have not generally been attracted by the idea of secondorder societies such as the society of states with the consequence that this topic was left largely to IR and an intellectual community trained more in politics than sociology But quite a few sociologists have been attracted to macro conceptions of society and it is not surprising that several species of world society are to be found within the debates of sociology Luhmanns concept of world society represents a far more radical de parture from both standard IR and sociological theory than anything else discussed in this chapter Most IR theory has its roots in classical sociological theories which are in one way or another based on the idea that society is about various types of normative cohesion shared norms rules institutions values common identities andor cultures Most in sideoutsideunderstandingsofthestatesharethisapproachasdoesthe 70 World society outside English school theory English schools understanding of international and world society Luhmanns concept is opposed to all of this seeking to replace a nor mative understanding of society with one based on processes and struc tures of communication Albert 1999 According to the World Society ResearchGroupWSRG199589Luhmannwantstomoveawayfrom the old European concept of society based on normative expectations and towards cognitive expectations within networks of social relations based not on universal norms and their enforcement but on functional issues within science and the economy and other areas of organised human life Within these networks individuals have a willingness to learn and to reconsider their own claims As Diez 2000 34 puts it society for Luhmann is the agglomeration of a number of diversi fied functional systems such as law or the economy Each of these systems comes into being through communication and not through some grand normative foundations and operates according to its own codes with one basic code such as legalillegal in the case of law at its heart these systems or most of them are functionally and not territorially differentiated In fact politics and law are the only sys tems still territorially differentiated But if society exists only as and through a conglomerate of systems and if these systems because of their functional definition operate transnationally society is only possible on a world scale it is world society Luhmanns conception is basically hostile to distinctions between state and nonstate or amongst international system international so ciety and world society Its communication perspective does not priv ilege any particular form of organisation though it does have a place for organisations as a social form and it pushes norms identities and shared values well away from the centre of what forms society The only concession in this direction is that the process of communication itself requires the production of secure frameworks of expectation within the functional systems Albert 1999 258 In other words there have to be accepted rules of communication around basic codes such as legalillegal truefalse in order for functional subsystems to exist In one sense and probably only one Luhmanns view is similar to Shaws in that it is a weaker and therefore more really existing con ception of world society than that in the English school Bull might well have understood Luhmann as a rather convoluted statement about the world political system Moving away from the highly demanding cri teria for a society of shared valuesidentities means that more world society can be said to exist already which in turn supports claims that 71 From International to World Society the statessystem is not as dominant as its supporters assert and that the rising replacement system therefore deserves more attention than it is getting This is the standard stuff of academic politics Luhmann however is about much more than that agenda and it is probably a zero sum choice between following the Luhmannian scheme and developing most of the other ideas about world society including English school ones surveyed here Luhmanns emphasis on communication echoes Burtons and in that sense does fit into the general picture that glo balists are trying to sketch But in reconceptualising society in terms of communication Luhmann is going down a path that diverges from the one that the English school has carved out for itself Neither his notion of world nor his understanding of society lines up with English school usage From a Luhmannian position the English school is too similar to the classical sociological conceptions from which Luhmann is try ing to depart From an English school perspective Luhmanns scheme rips away the entire framework within which international society has been understood Consequently there is probably not much scope for complementarity between these two modes of thought It is tempting though probably wrong to link Luhmanns ideas to IR thinking about epistemic communities Haas 1992 In Luhmanns terms epistemic communities are too much about networks of individ uals rather than systems of communication But there is a link in the idea of recognising learning and participating in a structured system of knowledge language andor practice Nevertheless Luhmanns con cept of world society is too alien to help much in thinking about world society in an English school context If there is a lesson it is perhaps the rather oblique one that there is analytical advantage in adopting a normatively neutral view of world society The significance of this will become clear in the discussion of global civil society below Desite Shaws sociological critique of the English schools strong con cept of society there are other sociologists who want to tie the idea of world society to shared norms rules and institutions The Stanford School Thomas et al 1987 Meyer et al 1997 Boli and Thomas 1999 styling themselves macrophenomenological sociological institutionalists put global culture at the centre of their concept of world society They seem to be unaware of the work of Wight Bull and others in the English school who have focused on a society of states and like most other users of world society construct it as a holistic allembracing concept Their disinterest in the English school is unfortunate because a great deal of what they have to say focuses on states and how to explain the 72 World society outside English school theory striking isomorphism of like units in the international system In many ways their concerns are close to those of international society and run alongside the English schools debates on solidarism The core idea in the Stanford school or sometimes world polity approach is that there are powerful worldwide models about how humans should organise themselves These models are carried by academic and professional as sociations and by the network of intergovernmental organisations and are deeply embedded in all the levels of the international system IGOs states TNAs individuals Rather in line with Vincents vision of world society the Stanford school thinks it is already the case that legitimated actorhood operates at several levels Meyer et al 1997 168 and that these levels mutually reinforce and legitimate each other in terms of the shared values embodied in the worldwide models Individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles of citizenship while individuals and international organisations do the same via principles of human rights Between individuals and nation states lie any number of interest and functional groups that have stand ing as legitimated actors due to their connections with individuals and states These include religious ethnic occupational industrial class racial and genderbased groups and organisations all of which both depend on and conflict with actors at other levels For example indi vidual actors are entitled to demand equality while collective actors are entitled to promote functionally justified differentiation Meyer et al 1997 171 Conflict is intrinsic to this view of society imparting to it the dynamism that is generated by the rampant inconsistencies and conflicts within world culture itself Meyer et al 1997 172 The Stanford schools approach to world society hangs on the argu ment that this strong world culture has an independent existence and that it is the main cause of isomorphism among states They insist that world culture is a significant causal factor and that it is a systemic phe nomenon not just located in the units What is interesting about this effort from an English school perspective is how much it focuses on the centrality of the state which is acknowledged in world culture as the central institution even though accompanied by other legitimate actors Meyer et al 1997 16971 The Stanford school concede that much of what they identify as world culture is Western and that a good deal of the story is about how the poor and weak and peripheral copy the rich and strong and central Meyer et al 1997 1648 But sadly for the literature they do not explore the obvious link that this line of argument 73 From International to World Society creates both to neorealism and the English school They cite Waltz with out having registered that one of the most central features of his the ory parallels their concern with the phenomenon of isomorphism that under anarchy socialisation and competition imperatives generated by the structural pressures of balance of power result in like units In many ways the Stanford schools ideas are of greater relevance to English school thinking about international society than world so ciety Their idea that the legitimising ideas even for the statessystem are largely carried by nonstate actors Boli and Thomas 1999 gives an interesting twist to thinking about international society but is some what betrayed by the Western origins of most of both the ideas and the carriers It does however set down a marker about the importance of TNAs in world society One key insight is that the values of world society are often inconsistent and conflictual a theme perhaps underde veloped in English school thinking except in relation to human rights and sovereignty but wholly apparent to anyone who has investigated nationalism and sovereignty or the market and sovereignty It is well to be reminded that society is not necessarily either nice or harmonious more on this in chapters 5 and 6 The World Society Research Group WSRG 1995 2000 also stress a holistic multilevel approach to world and put some emphasis on shared culture and values as the essence of society They focus partic ularly on the Weberian differentiation between Gesellschaft society and Gemeinschaft community departing from the original Tonnies 1887 idea that society was a degraded development from community WSRG 2000 67 In this approach society is about rational agreements over mutual adjustments of interest It is based on the sorts of shared values that allow actors to make contracts governing their behaviour and inter action Community is about feelings of belonging together constituting a We that differentiates itself from Others Community is rooted in traditionandoraffectionSocietyisrootedincalculationofselfinterest This is an analytical distinction based on ideal types and the expectation is that all real social relations will be a mixture of the two forms WSRG 2000 7 12 It is almost impossible to imagine communities without contracts and difficult though perhaps not quite impossible to ima gine contracts in the complete absence of any sense of community eg as fellow human beings or at the ultimate stretch as fellow sentient life forms The WSRG approach bears some strong and explicit resemblance to the English schools triad except like Vincent they see international 74 World society outside English school theory system international society and world society as cumulative stages with world society incorporating the other two as the most developed social form WSRG 2000 1113 They think WSRG 1995 1417 that the English school represented curiously by Bull fair enough and Brown and Buzan both decidedly on the margins mistakenly locate society in international society and community in world society They disagree wanting to allow society formation processes amongst non state actors and community formation ones among states Their inter pretation of the English school on this point is I think mistaken though Brown 1995 could be read as they suggest Bull hardly discusses iden tity at all In my earlier work Buzan 1993 33340 I simply build the idea of identity into society both international and world while fail ing to recognise as the WSRG rightly does that the society and com munity conceptions are fundamentally different see also Wæver 1998 108 Nevertheless the WSRG approach raises a lot of interesting and stimulating questions that the English school has so far not confronted squarely The societycommunity distinction has big implications for soli darism and international society as well as for how world society is to be understood The WSRG raise the idea that there is interplay between society formation and community formation with the latter sometimes opposed to the former sometimes supportive of it 1995 245 They also take the view WSRG 2000 1213 along with Brown 1995 1006 that the idea of a universal sense of community ie a universal sense of identity is at the very least seriously problematic and at worst an oxymoron because a sense of being We requires an Other against which to define itself If true this poses major difficulties for some as pects of the world society concept The WSRG are keen to avoid any sense of inevitability about progress up the stages from system to so ciety to community Reverse movement is possible Weller 2000 also builds on the societycommunity distinction establishing society and community as different but interacting types of social relations He too takes the view that the relationship between them is complicated and not subject to simple generalisations about development from one to the other in either direction These questions about society and community are implicit in English schooldiscussionsofculturebuttheapproachestakenbytheWSRGand Weller point the way towards a much clearer formulation The society community question starts from the assumption that the two are dis tinct types of social relationship that are almost always colocated and 75 From International to World Society strongly interactive but with no clear pattern of determination running in either direction about what causes what In this form the question is structured similarly to the English schools triad which also features different social forms existing simultaneously with a strong but inde terminate relationship The last of the sociological approaches to world society might be la belled macrosociology As various writers have noted it is possible to lo cate a substantial amount of Marxian thinking in a world society frame Vincent 1978 2930 44 WSRG 2000 34 and others fit into this group as well The key linking this group together is the idea of a dominant or ganising principle for a macrolevel world society The notion of a central organising principle as the key to structure is familiar in IR through the work of Waltz particularly but also realists generally and the English school and more recently Wendt 1999 But whereas in IR the focus is almost always on the political order macrosociologists take a wider more multisectoral view Marxians have their own version of an already existingworldsocietydefinedbyacapitalistmodeofproductionandthe hierarchy of classes structured in the centreperiphery formation made famous by the world system theory of Wallerstein In its cruder forms the idea of a capitalist world society pits the forces of capital against the state creating a structure of dominance dependency and conflict With the movement to bring the state back in by recognising its relative au tonomy Marxian thinking and also much mainstream IPE took on the appearance of a holistic world society view This was consciously offered as an alternative to and critical view of the statecentric mainstream of IR theory Cox 1986 1994 Strange 1988 and Underhill 2000 all talk about the close interlinkage of states and markets and try to unfold a conceptualisation that expresses the simultaneous interplay of political economic and social forces Perhaps the work of this type that makes the most explicit use of world society is Jung 2001 Jung is amongst the holists who want to use world society to capture the whole human system His key organ ising principle reminiscent of Gellner 1988 is the distinction between tradition and modernity as a fundamental watershed in the organi sation of human society This distinction bears some relationship to that between community tradition and society modernity For Jung the tension between traditional social forms and rational social action is not only a historical divide but an ongoing dynamic in a world which is not yet modern but still an uneasy mix of modern and tra ditional social structures Like Shaw Jung rejects the English schools 76 World society outside English school theory normative integration criteria for society as too demanding wanting instead to understand society as the totality of social reproduction Jung 2001 452 The macrosociological way of thinking is undeniably powerful and attractive Reducing the entirety of the interhuman system to a single organising principle offers not only a seductive simplification but also the possibility of designing deductive theory stemming from the sin gle idea The danger is oversimplification with the consequent need as the Marxians discovered to bring things back in More specialised approaches to world society like that of the English school cannot com pete with the sweep of the single encompassing idea But by embedding some key differentiations early on they avoid the danger of oversim plification and retain a more detailed analytical toolkit Global civil society Eventhoughitdoesnotdeploythetermworldsocietyoneotherschool of thought requires close consideration here the discourse about global civil society Both world society and global civil society GCS highlight the political dimension of the nonstate universe and both also carry a liberal programme aimed at constraining andor reforming state power Both therefore share two problems how to define the content of the nonstate universe and how to handle the tensions between the needs of activists pursuing a normative agenda on the one hand and those of analysts needing a concept with which to capture the nonstate deter ritorialised elements in world politics on the other These problems are linked and examining the betterdeveloped GCS debate throws use ful light on how to develop the world society concept Activists are constrained not only by their campaigning needs but also by a dual meaning inherent in civil to define GCS in ways that construct it as nice Doing so raises two questions 1 how to handle the dark side of the nonstate world represented by various kinds of organised ex tremists and criminals and 2 how to handle the global economy and its nonstate actors whether as part of GCS or as one of its targets Analysts need a concept that captures the nonstate political universe whether nice or nasty The argument is that the needs of activists and analysts may well be irreconcilable The debates around these concepts have roots in classical ideological divisions Until recently they opened a divide between economic and social liberals but with the rise of con cern about terrorism they may return to a much older and deeper clash 77 From International to World Society between liberal and conservative views of the relationship between state and society The two concepts share a common foundation in the tradition of lib eral thinking about civil society which stretches back to the eighteenth centuryTheEnglishschoolsconceptofworldsocietycanbeunderstood asperhapsthefirstsystematicattempttolifttheliberalconceptualisation of civil society based on individualism and the right of association out of the state and place it alongside international society as part of a toolkit for understanding the international system It was in this sense more ambitious than the Kantian idea of an eventual convergence amongst republican states from which it mistakenly took its label It was also distinct from both early liberal versions of civil society and Marxian re actions to them that linked civil society closely to the social structures of capitalism the liberals positively the Marxians negatively Alexander 1998 If world society shared anything with the Marxians it was the attempt to question and possibly transcend the dominant frame work of states and nations as the defining entities at the international level The liberal idea of civil society always carried some cosmopolitan as sumptions about civilised communities separate from and transcend ing the framework of states and having distinct social andor legal codes Lipschutz 1996 1069 But the main thrust of civil society was at the domestic level counterpointing the state though at the same time being deeply entangled with it Depending on ones view of human nature the state might be seen in Hobbesian terms as a necessary con dition for civil society because civil society is dependent for its own functioning on the defended civil space created by the state or as irrel evant or even obstructive to civil society because human beings are perfectly capable of forming societies without an oppressive Leviathan Hobbes was pretty radical for his day and is claimed as a founder both by conservatives for the necessity of the state and liberals for his emphasis on individualism and a disarmed civil society For him the Leviathan state was necessary to contain the anarchic and violent qualities of an ungoverned and uncivil society the war of each against all The assumption was that unless constrained by a superior power human society lacks the ability to regulate itself and falls into thuggery and warlordism Later eighteenthcentury and onward liberal think ing starts both from a more positive view of human nature giving better prospects for uncoerced cooperation and from a sharp historical con sciousness that Leviathan has often been a profoundly flawed saviour 78 World society outside English school theory itself generating unacceptable amounts of violence and repression In this view if humans were properly educated and left more to them selves both a more efficient political economy and a more civil soci ety would be the probable outcome The civil society tradition reflects not only an analytical distinction between state and nonstate modes of social organisation but a deep and longstanding ideological battle be tween conservative and liberal understandings of the human condition and views about how best to achieve the good life Civil society thus has descriptive functions that which is not the state where civil takes its meaning from civilian and normative ones still nonstatebutwhereciviltakesitsmeaningmorefromcivilisedrepre senting a particular preferred form of social order In descriptive mode civil society is neutral about whether what composes it is good or bad or some mixture Those with a conservative view of human nature will tend to see civil society as the problem because the powerseeking ruthless and selfinterested nature of human beings generates conflict criminality injustice inequality and the state as the solution by impos ing disarmament and enforced laws Those with a more liberal view of human nature see the state as the problem because nothing constrains its monopoly of force which is therefore too frequently abused and civil society as the solution because of the natural sociability of humans and their rational tendency to seek joint gains in the less radical version as an organised democratic counterweight that can constrain the state and keep it minimal in the more radical version as an alternative to the state This normative side of civil society is both a great strength and a main weakness It is a strength because it opens up powerful opportunities for political mobilisations both within the state aimed at redefining the relationship between citizens and government and outside it possibly with the same aim of reforming the state possibly aimed at bypassing and superseding the state In this mode civil society had its most recent airing in the last decades of the Cold War when both state and nonstate actors in the West cultivated the emergence of civil society within the Soviet bloc as a way of undermining the totalitarian control and so cial atomisation that was the key to the power of communist parties Lipschutz 1996 103 Both state and nonstate actors in the West and nonstate actors in the East aimed at reforming the communist states by changing the balance within them between civil society and govern ment Some of the nonstate actors in the West also aimed at reforming the Western states which they saw as at least equally responsible for 79 From International to World Society generating the Cold War and the threat of nuclear obliteration of hu mankind Burke forthcoming The problem with defining civil society in this normative politically activist way is that it almost inevitably opens up a gap between what is incorporated in the wider descriptive meaning and what is incorpo rated in the narrower normative one In descriptive mode civil society equates with nonstate and therefore includes mafias pornography merchants and a host of other darkside entities as well as the nicer side of civil society There is of course plenty of room for disagreement about what counts as nice and what nasty religious organisations or terrorists or drug dealers might be placed in either camp according to individual taste There is a substantial grey zone occupied for example by those prepared to use nasty means violence against the property and staff of abortion clinics and research facilities that use live animals for good ends But regardless of either disagreements or grey zones it remains the case that a normative understanding of civil society will almost inevitably represent only a partial selection of what exists in the nonstate world Therefore if the term civil society is used in this nar rower way it cannot avoid both casting civil society as nice and leaving a vacuum about what term is to be used analytically to label the whole of the nonstate social world The shift to global civil society as a primary focus occurred during the 1990s and in one sense can be seen as a result of the stunning intellectual and political victory of liberalism represented by the end of the Cold War and the ideological collapse of communism Fukuyama 1992 With the communist Leviathan routed and democracy spreading two changes became apparent First and demonstrated in part by the role played by transnational civil society forces in the victory against communism it was clear that both the power of GCS and its scope for operation had increased A more liberaldemocratic system of states wound down the significance of national borders as barriers to many not all types of interaction and in doing so opened up substantial transnational eco nomic societal legal and political space in which nonstate actors could operate This development was already under way during the Cold War with many firms and some INGOs moving into transnational space But the ending of the Cold War gave neoliberal ideology more scope to blow away geopolitical barriers both opening up new areas for nonstate actors and giving them more leeway in areas already open The second change resulting from the ending of the Cold War was that with the spread of democratic states the domestic agenda of civil 80 World society outside English school theory society versus Leviathan became less relevant at least within core areas of Western civilisation It remained relevant in parts of the third world but there the problem was as much the failure of states as it was the impositions of overbearing Leviathans Failed states provided a new arena for the transnational vanguard of GCS in the form of aid and development INGOs Where there were still repressive Leviathans posing political andor cultural barriers to civil society the issue was no longer largely one between particular states and their citizens but between such states and coalitions of transnational and domestic civil society forces The ending of the Cold War thus strengthened both the descriptive and the normative aspects of what was now referred to as global civil society In the descriptive sense GCS was a kind of synonym for glob alisation It captured the general understanding that nonstate actors entities and structures of all sorts were a more influential part of inter national relations than they had been during the Cold War TNAs of all stripes were now out there some of them enabled by the liberal charac ter of the leading states some of them enabled by the political vacuums opening up where failed states were tearing holes in the fabric of in ternational society Not everyone agreed that this added up to global civil society Peterson 1992 388 for example seeing instead strongly connected national civil societies living in a system of many states But most analysts whether or not they advocated the continued primacy of the state were happy to concede that the transnational domain was uncommonly lively and there was little doubt that GCS in this sense was making a difference to international norms and rules through suc cessful campaigns on issues ranging from landmines and famine relief through debt and terms of trade to human rights and the environment But in the normative sense and in an ironic twist a substantial part of the newly confident political forces of GCS constructed globalisation mainly seen as the operation of neoliberal global capitalism as their principal target The most prominent public manifestation of GCS in the decade after the implosion of the Soviet Union was an antiglobalisation movement that bundled together a diverse transnational coalition ran ging from environmentalists and humanitarians through various kinds of cultural nationalists and socialists to outright anarchists Rather than pitching liberals against conservatives this move opened up the split always present in liberalism between economic liberals who put the market first and see it as the key to delivering the other goods on the lib eral agenda and social ones who start from individualism and human 81 From International to World Society rights and are much less tolerant of the inequalities generated by un constrained operation of markets McKinlay and Little 1986 The development of an antiglobalisation global civil society is rich with contradictions and highly instructive for any attempt to under stand the English schools concept of world society Among other things many of the transnational actors that compose GCS are in alliance with employed by funded by and sometimes even created by states andor state dominated IGOs Risse 2002 If globalisation is understood su perficially to be a neoliberal alliance of state and corporate elites then the opposition to it of GCS makes sense Globalisation is posed either as a conspiracy or as a set of impersonal structural forces In the hope of maintaining the engine of growth state elites rejig legal and polit ical frameworks to facilitate the operation of capital Corporate elites promise economic efficiency and growth and fatten themselves at the expense of workers the environment and civil society at large In this reading GCS is an activist manifesto picking up the Marxian tradition As Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 15 note GCS has increasingly occupied the emancipatory space left by the demise of socialism and national liberation This means that it often comes in the clothes of an aspirational left oppositional project aimed at creating a third force to resist both the statessystem and global capitalism Partly because it is a carrier of this ideological energy the definition of GCS remains hotly contested and not just in the details but in the basic conceptualisation The narrower more political understanding is rooted in the Gramscian understanding of civil society as a social force standing between state and market and attempting to call their power to account Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 17 define it as the sphere of ideas values institutions organisations networks and indi viduals located between the family the state and the market and oper ating beyond the confines of national societies polities and economies Tacked onto this is the idea that GCS is nice because it rests on ideas of trust and nonviolence and carries a commitment to common human values that go beyond ethnic religious or national boundaries Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 15 This definition feels close to what must have been in the minds of Bull 1977 and up to a point Vincent 1986 and his followers when they talked of world society It rests on the same idea of individuals and nonstate organisations as carriers of values in opposition to the impositions of a statecreated Westphalian interna tional society This view of GCS however is more clearly formulated than the English schools concept of world society particularly so in 82 World society outside English school theory relationtotheeconomicsectorEnglishschoolthinkershavebeenlargely silent about the economic sector and it could be inferred from that si lence that they agree with the political proponents of GCS in differenti ating the two in order to exclude the economic from the civil But on a deeper reading of globalisation GCS is itself part of the process Capitalism is a principal mover in the process of globalisation but not the only one and not necessarily the principal definition of what globalisation is about In this reading interestingly prefigured by Rosenau 1990 the key is the development of powerful people and a consequent acrosstheboard shift in the nature of authority structures and political relationships Starting from the industrial revolution it has served the interests of both state and capital to have bettereducated healthier and wealthier citizens and workers Only by improving the capacities of their citizensworkers could the state increase its power and capital increase its returns But as more and more individuals have become more capable they have become less subservient to authority more willing to define their own agendas and more able to create their own nodes and networks in pursuit of those agendas This development underpinned the flowering of Western democracy during the twentieth century and has a certain teleological force The question is not only the happy liberal one of what happens if democratising and decentralising forces begin seriously to transcend the state but also post 11 September the darker Hobbesian one of what happens if powerful people express themselves by organising crime and pursuing extremist agendas Rosenaus scheme 1990 40 generates an international system di vided between sovereigntybound and sovereigntyfree actors whose fate depends on both the balance of power between the two worlds and with echoes of the Stanford schools approach on whether or not they agree or differ on what the prevailing norms of the system should be This comes very close to the English schools division between interna tional and world society and reflects the same dilemma about whether the two are in tension or in harmony It reflects a complex interplay among political economic and social structures in which a strong histor ical line of development is changing the capabilities and requirements of all kinds of actors simultaneously Since capitalism is immensely effec tive at stimulating and spreading technological innovation this whole packageispushedandpulledbyopportunitiesanddangersarisingfrom new technological capabilities Powers of destruction become so great that total war becomes absurd and the planetary environment moves from being a background constant to a foreground variable Powers of 83 From International to World Society communication become so widespread and so cheap that geography no longer determines the shape of community and the world becomes a single information space Powers of transportation become so efficient and so dense that the world becomes a single market and interdepen dence effects ripple easily from one end of the planet to the other In this wider view of globalisation GCS cannot be separated from capi talism and can only be understood as part of it GCS exists through between and around states rather than just within them Rather than being counterpointed against a global state as civil society sometimes was against the territorial state it is itself part of and entangled with a loose and rather hazy structure of global governance This structure has been generated mostly by the leading capitalist states but now has a quasiautonomous standing A recent reflection on this wider more analytical understanding of global civil society is offered by John Keane 2001 He rejects the Gram scian separation of civil society from the economic sector on the grounds that this generates a major misunderstanding of what GCS is and how it works Like Rosenau he sees the global economy as part of GCS with turbocapitalism as one of the driving forces underpinning it the contemporary thickening and stretching of networks of socio economic institutions across borders to all four corners of the earth such that peaceful or civil effects of these nongovernmental net works are felt everywhere It comprises organisations civic and business initiatives coalitions social movement linguistic com munities and cultural identities All of them deliberately organise themselves and conduct their crossborder social activities business and politics outside the boundaries of governmental structures with a minimum of violence and a maximum of respect for the principle of civilised powersharing among different ways of life Keane 2001 234 Keanes more comprehensive definition fleshes out an understanding of GCS that goes much further towards filling the nonstate side of a statenonstate distinction He correctly points out that there is no sharp line between state and nonstate Keane 2001 35 Within demo cratic states there are numerous quasiautonomous nongovernmental organisations QUANGOs that blur the boundary and during the Cold War communist states were notorious for constructing shortleash ver sions of QUANGOs such as the various official peace councils Similarly at the global level many INGOs receive support and funding from gov ernments whether they be humanitarian aid organisations or various 84 World society outside English school theory forms of ideological fifth column The Red Cross for example is closely integrated into the statessystem as a key supporter for some aspects of international law Keane seems absolutely right in insisting that the nonstate dimension cannot be understood without incorporating the economic sector even though doing so necessarily wrecks some of the emancipatory political agenda that the activists want to pin on to the concept But although Keanes definition is more analytical he does not wholly abandon the political project Keane is also committed to the idea that GCS is nice in the sense of committed to nonviolence civility and tolerance His incorporation of the economic sector however makes it difficult for him to maintain coherence on this issue Although he rightly points out that the corporate world by and large supports the value of nonviolence in the interests of business efficiency he also concedes that Inequalities of power bullying and fanatical violent attempts to de globalise are chronic features of global civil society Keane 2001 33 39 This hints strongly though it does not explore that there is a dark side to global civil society Keane 2001 40 is also rightly aware that GCS does not stand above the grimy issues of force and coercion Because it is vulnerable to ruthless uncivil elements whether statebased or not GCS needs protection and can most easily acquire it from states On the grounds that civil carries two meanings nonstate and civilised both Keane although he comes closer to acknowledging it and Anheier Glasius and Kaldor marginalise the dark side of the nonstate world from their definitions of GCS If the narrower andor nicer view of GCS is accepted then for analytical purposes one would need a parallel concept of global uncivil society to cover what has been left out of the nonstate picture This would be true whether or not ones purpose was primarily analytical or primarily political The existence of such uncivil society and the need to contain it is of course the prime Hobbesian justification for the existence of the state and by extension also for the existence of an international society created and maintained by states Nothing could illustrate this more clearly than the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 The dark side of the nonstate world is a problem for the advocates of both global civil society and world society The GCS school espe cially its activist wing is stuck with the nice meaning of civil which pushes it towards regarding the nonstate as inherently a good thing It does not take a vast amount of empirical research to demonstrate that both the benign and the malign views of civil society are incorrect as 85 From International to World Society characterisations of the whole nonstate world In reality there is always a mixture of the two The nice nonviolent side of civil society both do mestic and global is to be found everywhere in voluntary associations NGOs INGOs and firms But the nasty side is everywhere too in the form of crime hoodlum anarchism and selfrighteous extremists of all stripes The antiglobalisation movement has run up against this in the form of its anarchist wing which is useful at generating media attention but destructive to its political image The neoliberaldriven globalisation of the last decade also has to come to terms with the consequence that opening borders for commerce is a boon to organised criminals and ex tremists Indeed after the events of 11 September there is firm ground for expecting that the politics of global civil societyworld society will shift away from economic versus social liberal and back more into the frame of liberal versus conservative AlQaeda has highlighted the dark side of global uncivil society and in doing so has strengthened the Hobbesian case for the state andor international society as a necessary defence against the disorders of an underregulated human condition Because GCS rests on the same distinction between state and nonstate as does world society there are many useful lessons here for English school thinking The GCS literature has a better developed view of the economic sector than can be found in English school thinking Its nor mative commitments run in parallel to the solidarist wing of the English school but in principle the English school is better placed to take into account the dark side of the nonstate world First its concept of world society is not restricted to civil and therefore has an easier time in in corporating the whole of the nonstate world Second it is less focused on transnational actors and therefore better placed to deal with the nonstate identity components of world politics such as Islam Islam is an excellent example of a world society element that is not in itself a transnational actor It is a nonstate identity that does not have ac tor quality itself but which carries a mobilising power that enables a range of nonstate and state actors When it mobilises terrorism it is a much stronger challenge to international society than human rights because it privatises the use of force thus undermining the foundations of the Westphalian political order Third world society is better adapted to thinking about the global level having originally been designed for that purpose GCS is still hung about with many of the political trap pings carried over from its roots in the debates about civil society These make it an effective idea for activists but a problematic one for analysts Whatever their flaws concepts such as GCS and world society are an 86 World society outside English school theory essential part of the toolkit that we need to develop if we are to equip ourselves to think meaningfully about globalisation If this discussion highlights anything it is the necessity to encompass the whole of the nonstate political universe when trying to conceptualise the politics of globalisation Conclusions Setting this review of concepts of world society from outside the English school against the English schools discussion of world society reviewed in chapter 2 the lessons for any attempt to rethink world society can be summed up as follows r There is a need to take a position on whether world means all types of social relations or just the nonstate universe and whether it has to mean global in extent or can apply to subglobal levels There are two contrary pressures on this decision first the advantages of coining a single concept to encompass a whole sphere of activity and second the dangers of creating an overburdened idea into which too many things get thrown and which loses the analytical power of drawing distinctions r There is a need to take a position on how society is understood whetherinaweakersenseclosetowhatisgenerallymeantbysystem in IR or whether in the stronger sense of shared values and identities from classical sociology r In conjunction with the previous point there is a need to take seriously the distinction between society and community and the interrelation ships between them and to investigate the implication of thinking in this way for international and world society both separately and in how they relate to each other In this context there is also a need to think about whether there can be a global community given the need for an Other against which to define a We r There is a need to be aware of the tensions between the analytical and activist uses of concepts both in terms of the inevitable normative implications of any analytical construct of society or world and the inevitable costs to descriptive accuracy of any activist application of these concepts r There is a need to take into account the dark side as well as the nice aspects of the nonstate world and to understand that society is just as easily a site for conflict as it is a site for peace and harmony 87 From International to World Society My own response to these points is twofold First I take the message that we need to look closely at all of the key terms in English school the ory with a view to clarifying meanings This is especially so for the three concepts that make up the English schools triad and for pluralism and solidarism Second I want to move away from any attempt to lump too much together under a single heading The rather sorry condition of the globalisation debate stands as a warning against creating undifferenti ated concepts and in my view the English schools rendition of world society is running the same risk I have no problem with holism but I want the whole to be composed of analytically distinct parts whose operation and interaction become the subject of study Wholes that sub sume everything within them have the same attractions and the same drawbacks as the idea of god they explain everything and nothing Even if one rejects the move of the Vincentians and Luard Burton Shaw many Marxians and the WSRG of aggregating states into world society there is probably still too much in the world society box As currently constructed in both English school and some other formula tions it contains both the physical interaction and socially constructed sides without these being clearly distinguished along international sys teminternational society lines Within the socially constructed side it contains both the Gesellschaft society and Gemeinschaft community elements which seem deserving of analytical distinction though also tied together in complicated ways And it also contains the individual cosmopolitancommunitarian element of identities on one side and the world of transnational actors on the other My inclinations lean towards the strategy of Rosenau and Bull which is to find the point of interest in the balance between the state and the nonstate worlds In the distant future the state may well have become obsolete and humankind may find itself organised in some deterritori alised neomedieval form In the meantime we seem to be in the presence of a shift away from a pure Westphalian mode of international relations in which the key tension is among rival states For now and for some decades to come the interesting question is about how the state and the nonstate worlds do and will interact with each other What makes this question interesting is more than just shifts in the distribution of power or immediate relevance to real world events On top of these is the deep and excruciating tension between the state and nonstate worlds In some ways they are deeply antagonistic both in concept and in practice In other ways they are deeply interdependent again both in concept and in practice This tension it seems to me is the big 88 World society outside English school theory political question of our time and in order to get at it analytically it is vital to keep the two worlds conceptually distinct The next stage of this enquiry is to take the lessons learned in this chapter and use them to unpack and remake the contents not just of world society but also of international society and indeed the English schools whole classical triad as set out in figure 1 89 4 Reimagining the English schools triad The survey in chapter 3 exposed four underlying conceptual dyads on which much of the discussion and the confusion about international and world society hang r state and nonstate levels and whether or not the distinction between them is what defines the difference between international and world society r physical or mechanical and social concepts of system and whether the distinction along these lines between international system and international society should be retained andor carried over into one between world system and world society r society and community and whether or not these two conceptions of social relations need to play a larger role in thinking about both international and world society and what the implications of their doing so are for understanding pluralism and solidarism r individuals and transnational actors as the units of analysis that define world society and whether or not they can comfortably be considered together or whether more analytical leverage is acquired by keeping them distinct The choices posed by these dyads need to be made explicit and to be resolved in some way before any clear sense can be made of English school theory as a social structural project For the reasons given above my starting position will be to reject the inclinations of the Vincentians and many of the nonEnglish school users of world society to construct world society in holistic terms that combine the state and nonstate into a kind of higher or better developed social form Instead I will pro ceed from the position that state and nonstate represent distinct social domains that are simultaneously mutually supporting and in tension 90 Reimagining the English schools triad with each other This is the chapter in which I begin to redefine some established terms and to introduce new vocabulary State and nonstate I have already committed myself to defending this distinction so what has to be done here is to deepen the explanation for this move and to support it against alternative interpretations English school theory is based on the idea that there is something special and unique about the state or more generally about any sort of independent political community that justifies giving it a prominent and distinctive role in the conceptualisation of international relations In English school theory both international system and international society are concepts built around the state as the defining unit So the first and in some ways most important step in bringing the concept of world society into focus is to establish the desirability and in terms of a structural presentation of English school theory the necessity of making a sharp separation between state and international society on the one hand and nonstate and world society on the other On this point I intend to defend a position close to that of Bull and up to a point James and Jackson Any conflation of state and nonstate will ef fectively destroy the analytical leverage of the English schools triad and create an unmanageable object of analysis in the name of holism There is nothing unusual in privileging the state in this way It remains special because of its central role in the processes of law organised vio lence taxation political legitimacy territoriality and in some ways social identity This view is of course central to all forms of political realism There are many other routes including the English school to the same conclusion Marxians historical sociologists and IPE have all brought the state back in the Stanford school reaches the same conclusion from a more legal and normative perspective as does Brown 1995 1056 discussing world community from the perspective of political theory Controversy rightly attends this privileging of the state if it is taken as some realists do to the extreme of excluding all other types of ac tors from the definition of the international system or world politics or world system or globality That is not my intention Rather I want to preserve the distinctive idea of a society of states in order to acknowledge the special role of the state in the overall picture of human social relations while at the same time acknowledging the signifi cance of other elements cosmopolitanism TNAs in that picture In the 91 From International to World Society English school triad international system and international society cap ture the distinctiveness of the state while world society is the vehicle for bringing the nonstate elements into the picture In other words while there is no doubt that significant deterritorialisation has taken place in human affairs territory remains a crucial factor for many key aspects of humankinds social economic and especially political structures If I am right in accepting Rosenaus 1990 argument that the central political question of our time is the working out of a new balance between the territorial and the nonterritorial modes of human organisation then it is vital to keep the territorial element in clear focus Differentiating between state and nonstate places an immediate bur den on definitions What counts as a state On this issue I intend to stick with the traditions in most realism historical sociology and the English school note the latters phrase states or independent political com munitiesoftakingabroadviewRealistsunderstandthestatethrough the idea that conflict groups are the building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life Gilpin 1986 305 and that interpretation en ables them to see states of one sort or another stretching back at least 5000 years The definition used in Buzan and Little 2000 442 puts less emphasis on conflict and will serve as my benchmark here any form of postkinship territoriallybased politically centralized selfgoverning entity capable of generating an insideoutside structure This notion of state takes in citystates and empires kingdoms republics various forms of national state and the late modern or in some view postmod ern states emerging in the twentyfirst century Its emphasis is on the political and the territorial though it does not require either sovereignty Paul 1999 or hard boundaries both of which are quite recent inven tions Using a broad definition like this means that one should expect to find much variation in the character and institutions of international society depending on what sort of state is dominant more on this in chapter 6 One tricky part in this approach comes in setting values for indepen dent and politically centralised and insideoutside On a generous reading the EU or the later Holy Roman Empire might count as states under this definition raising the awkward problem of having two sorts of entity in the same territory and therefore at least two layers of insideoutside In the case of the EU its political centralisation is weak but it is definitely independent territorial and capable of generating an insideoutside structure Similar problems arise for various types of dominion or commonwealth or protectorate where independence is 92 Reimagining the English schools triad not total but sufficient Other sorts of mixed entities combining political with other elements such as the chartered companies of the seventeenth century or the Roman church in some periods also pose boundary prob lemsraisinganothertrickyquestionabouthowtodrawthelinebetween what counts as part of the state and what counts as nonstate In most postmodern states there are substantial numbers of QUANGOs sitting on the boundary between the two There are also IGOs on which I take the position set out in Buzan and Little 2000 2667 that these are cre ations of the statessystem and for the most part best seen as part of social interaction capacity Different analysts might well want to reach different conclusions about exactly where to draw the line in such cases But these are familiar problems of classification in the social sciences With this definition the general location of the line is clear enough and the contents of the inevitable grey zone between state and nonstate relatively tightly constrained A firm analytical separation between state and nonstate however drawn has some substantial consequences for the English school triad In terms of Bull and Wight it means two things First Kantianism al most certainly has to move out of the world society section and into the solidarist end of international society Bulls case against doing this reviewed in chapter 2 is unconvincing As Jackson 2000 180 notes Kantianism is based on increasing homogeneity in the domestic struc tures of states with a liberal international society becoming the support ing framework for cosmopolitan values Its key idea important also to the Vincentians is that a convergence in the dominant domestic social values of states will generate a solidarist international society amongst them Since this is about a form of solidarist as opposed to Westphalian pluralist statessystem it has to count as a species of thick international society and not a type of world society Second a pretty strong case emerges for moving the coercive universalism element of revolution ism ie unifying the world by force into the imperial end of the realist spectrum Unipolarity is after all the extreme position on the realist spectrum Hansen 2000 Statebased seekers after imperial power or world domination will if they are efficient almost always carry a uni versalist ideology to justify their claims and in social structural terms this seems to belong in the realist domain more than to world society These moves mark a sharp departure from the Wightian understand ing of world society Moving Kantianism and coercive universalism out of the world society pillar might be thought to do violence to the Wightian conception of revolutionism as historically operating ideas 93 From International to World Society that work to challenge the statessystem In one sense such a move does reflect the priorities of a structural approach as opposed to a political theory one and the normative drive of Wights scheme is sacrificed But on second look the contradiction is perhaps more apparent than real The baseline for Wights discussion was not the statessystem per se but the particular pluralist Westphalian form of it that dominated modern history Because his view of a statessystem was quite narrowly cast the scope for revolutionism was large A less realist view of the state makes more room for evolutions of statessystems into different types Wights ideas remain in play but they are located and understood differently At this stage of the argument the separation between state and non state has two consequences for those working in Vincents tradition First for now it requires rejecting their move to use world society as a term to cover the merger of state and nonstate This rejection is not done on descriptive or normative grounds and it does not mean that the human rights issues they want to examine cannot or should not be a prominent feature of English school work The rejection is done on analytical grounds and simply means that their agenda needs to be looked at in terms of the interplay between international and world so ciety on human rights more on this below Second a more analytical approach to the concept of the state creates a tension with those in the solidarist tradition who want to insert into the definition of states that they only exist to promote the welfare and security of their citizens Dunne 2001b 7 With the quite broad definition of state given above most states in history would not comply with this highly liberal view yet would be perfectly capable of being members of international soci ety As discussed in chapter 3 society is not necessarily nice in a moral sense and neither is the state Dunnes move is part of a normative ar gument aimed at shifting the contemporary foundations on which the juridical side of sovereignty is based It is an aspirational ought seeking to become an actual is and aimed at promoting the development of a particular type of state liberal democratic within a particular type of liberal solidarist international society But states can and do have many other purposes and they can be members of some types of international society even when their concerns for the welfare and security of their citizens are low I do not want to lose sight of all of these other possibil ities in international society by taking on an excessively liberal or even modern view of what gets defined as a state If the state sector is to be treated as distinctive and as embodied in the concepts of international system and international society then it 94 Reimagining the English schools triad follows that English school theory has to take a keen interest in the evolv ing character of both the state and sovereignty as the defining concept of the state In this sense Dunne and the Vincentians are quite right to focus on these issues Unlike neorealism which largely confines itself to the international system pillar takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over the units English school theory is much more insideout than outsidein International society is constructed by the units and particularly by the dominant units in the system and consequently reflects their domestic character Hollis and Smith 1991 95 In this sense Wendts 1992 view that anarchy is what states make of it is a restatement of the English schools general position English school theory especially in the pluralist versions of Bull and Jackson accepts as true for international society the neorealist injunction that international systems are largely defined by the domi nant units within them but it does not follow neorealism in presetting the character of states This being so the English school needs to be par ticularly interested in the evolution of the leading modern states from absolutist to nationalist to democratic to postmodern charting the im pact on international society of these domestic transformations Buzan and Little 2000 24375 It must also be interested in the question of sovereignty not as a static concept but as an evolving institution of mod ern international society Any solidaristprogressive view of interna tional society requires sharp moves away from essentialist conceptions of what sovereignty is and how it works As the case of the EU illustrates thick international societies have to unpack and redistribute elements of sovereignty English school theory needs to understand all of this better than it now does Bull saw solidarism as problematic because of its incompatibility with the Westphalian state A more flexible approach sees it as part and parcel of how the postmodern state is itself evolving It does not go too far to say that both postmodern states and premod ern weak ones may only be sustainable within strong international societies In defending a statenonstate approach to international and world society I have claimed to be building on Bulls thinking But it is pos sible to read Bull to support a different and more Vincentian interpre tation than mine of the internationalworld society distinction1 In this argument Bull derives the international versus world society distinc tion from his inquiry into world order Bull saw the state as the main 1 I am grateful to Stefano Guzzini and Ole Wæver for this insight 95 From International to World Society present and future supplier of such world order as was obtainable and world society as a potential threat to this through its questioning of sovereignty in pursuit of human rights objectives Vincents jumble of ideas about world society also contained a formulation that set world society as the excluded and oppositional voices to the Westphalian or der and this view links back to Wights understanding of revolutionism as ideas opposed to the existing interstate order Staying within Bulls focus on international order but adding to it some of the globalist views about the roles of nonstate actors it is possible to construct a Bullian and in some ways a Vincentian argument that the providers of world order are now not just states but states plus the whole array of IGOs and INGOs that provide and support global governance Boli and Thomas 1999 148 Keck and Sikkink 1998 199217 RisseKappen 1995b Held et al 1999 In this view the Red Cross and Amnesty International and the WHO the WTO and the IAEA are as much providers of world or der as are states This way of thinking supposes rightly that history has moved on and that the sources of international order have evolved substantially since Bull was observing the international system Hurrell 2002 xvxxii It also supposes perhaps more arguably that Bulls com mitment to the order problematique would have opened his eyes to this if he were looking at the twentyfirstcentury world In this perspective international society is represented not just by states but by Davos cul ture comprising both the dominant structure of ordering ideas and all of the providers of order within that framework whether states IGOs or INGOs World society then becomes more Wightian comprising the set of political ideas that can be used to mobilise opposition to this hege monic consensus and the set of actors whether states IGOs or INGOs that promote such opposition The nub of the tension between this interpretation and mine is whether the focus of the differentiation between international and world society rests on the type of actor state vs nonstate or on attitude to wards the dominant ideas and institutions of internationalworld order supportive or opposed Wight would almost certainly opt for the lat ter view though as shown in chapter 2 his three traditions thinking never led him to any very clear conceptualisation of international and world society Bull clearly leaned towards the distinction based on type of actor being driven to do so by his rather narrow Westphalian in terpretation of sovereignty Whether he would change his mind now is a moot point but a defensible hypothesis Vincent was torn leaning sometimes towards Wight sometimes towards Bull But in the end both 96 Reimagining the English schools triad Vincent and his followers have opted for a solidarist vision in which they hope via a kind of extended Kantian homogenisation based on liberal values to reduce or eliminate the differences in attitude so cre ating a world society in which states and nonstate actors share a set of norms rules and institutions It seems to me that trying to define the difference between interna tional and world society on the basis of support for or opposition to the dominant order while certainly viable is a less interesting and less useful approach than the focus on types of unit On technical grounds the difficulties of trying to draw a line between state and nonstate pale into insignificance compared to those posed by finding the boundary between opposition and support On which side does one put reformers and those who question and pressure from within How does one deal with the large mass of indifference that is nearly always the third posi tion in any political polarisation Opposition to a dominant order is no doubt a deep and durable feature of human society though its particular forms and intensities vary hugely across times and places On analytical grounds I would argue that the distinction between territorial and non territorial modes of organisation is just as deep and durable Nonstate actors represent an enduring feature of human social organisation that would exist even in a solidarist world And as I hope to show below keeping the state and the nonstate distinct opens up analytical opportu nities not available through the alternative approach for thinking about nonliberal types of international society As I argued in chapter 1 this is not a zerosum game English school theory can support a number of different interpretations and my hope is that setting out a structural interpretation will not only generate interesting insights in itself but also stimulate and challenge the other interpretations to improve their act The consequences for the standard view of English school theory set out in figure 1 of defining international and world society in terms of type of actor are sketched in figure 2 This first step towards an explicitly structural interpretation of English school theory more or less leaves in place the international system and international society pillars of the triad It moves Kantianism out of the world society pillar and into the international society one and coercive universalism out of the world society pillar and into the international system one Those two moves leave unclear what then defines the boundary zones between what remains in the world society pillar nonstate actors and the other two pillars That problem is confronted in the next section 97 From International to World Society International System of states International Society of states World Society of transnational actors and individuals PowerMaximising Imperial Coercive Universalism SecuritySeeking efensive Conservative Pluralist Progressive Solidarist antian Figure 2 The Three Traditions first revision with the three pillars seen in structural terms and reserving world society to nonstate units Physicalmechanical and social concepts of system Underpinning the idea of system in English school theory and clearly evidentinBullandWatsons1984b1definitionofinternationalsociety aretwodifferentmodesofinteractionphysicalandsocialIhavealready made some play with this distinction pointing out the inconsistency of having it for the domain of states but not for the domain of world society Bull and Watsons definition is widely cited within the English school and as far as I am aware has not been contested Its distinction between international system and international society seems to rest on a separation of the physical system from the social one a group of states or more generally a group of independent politi cal communities which not merely form a system in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements 98 Reimagining the English schools triad System here represents the physical mode of interaction typical of the mechanistic realiststyle analyses of the balance of power as an auto matic process rooted in the relative material capabilities of states The social side is minimally present through the element of calculation though as will become clear further on in this chapter calculation could also underpin the common rules and institutions The main social ele ment is represented by the establishment and maintenance of common rules and institutions for the conduct of interstate relations This dis tinction is deeply embedded in quite a bit of IR theory other than the English school drawing the lines for example between the materialist theories of neorealism and various institutionalist and constructivist approaches to understanding international order Despite its embeddedness in IR theory it might nevertheless be ar gued that the distinction between physical and social is not nearly as interesting as it first appears There is no doubt that taking a physical mechanical view of international systems is one way of theorising about them as the endless debates about polarity amongst both IR theorists and the policy community attest As some readers will know I have been and remain a participant in those debates myself The point to be made here is that one can cover much of the ground claimed by phys ical theories such as neorealism from within a social structural theory whereas the reverse move is not possible The key to such an interpreta tion is the high degree of overlap between physical and social systems All human social interaction presupposes the existence of physical inter action of some sort and physical interaction without social content is if not quite impossible at least rather rare and marginal in human affairs Almeida 2001 Alan James 1993 demonstrates in some detail that Bulls distinction between the two is shot through with ambiguities and difficulties leading him to the conclusion that international system is a meaningless idea and international society is the key concept Taking a different tack Jackson 2000 11316 interprets Bulls system as not representing a physical but a social ie Hobbesian interpretation to cover the domain of realism Adam Watson 1987 1990 though accept ing Bulls distinction is one of the few within the English school to have thought hard and empirically about the boundary between interna tional system and international society that the distinction necessitates His detailed agonisings over the difficulties of drawing it reinforce the idea that few physical interactions in international relations are without significant social content He concludes definitively that no interna tional ie in the terms used here physical system as defined by Bull 99 From International to World Society has operated without some regulatory rules and institutions Watson 1987 1512 Beyond the English school most of the physical interactions which excite globalists and those promoting holistic conceptions of world so ciety require significant social content Everything from the internet to epistemic communities depends on some shared social background in order for communication to occur The most primitive physical inter actions such as trading practices which go back a very long way in human history require some basic social understanding about both the nature of the act and the relative values of different goods Even war often reflects social agreements about honour terms of surrender treat ment of the dead and suchlike If all human interaction is in some sense social and rulebound then what results is not a distinction between international systems and international societies but a spectrum of in ternational societies ranging from weak or thin or poorly developed or conflictual to strong or thick or well developed or cooperative The one obvious direct exception to this rule where asocial purely physical systems of interaction can occur is wars of extermination Humans by and large do not negotiate with ants and termites they simply try to destroy them just as ants and termites sometimes try to destroy each other Such asocial systems of interaction are mostly of interest to historians andor science fiction fans Looking backwards the initial thirteenthcentury encounters between the Mongols and the agrarian civilisations in China and the Middle East come about as close to being asocial as one can get Instances of exterminism where invaders treated the local inhabitants as vermin can also be found in the records of European imperial expansion Asocial systems and battles of exter mination are much more common in the Manichaean structure of much popular science fiction from H G Wells War of the Worlds to Alien Independence Day Starship Troopers and the Borg episodes of Star Trek The Borg greeting of Resistance is futile you will be assimilated hardly counts as social interaction Where contact is direct the assump tion that asocial systems will necessarily be conflictual seems sound War is the only interaction that can be carried on without any social de velopment and complete indifference seems unlikely in the presence of sustained contact Direct asocial systems will therefore almost certainly be built around conflict groups Although rare they do represent a pos sible form of physical international system What is seen through some neorealist eyes as the mechanistic operation of the balance of power can also be interpreted as the behavioural characteristics of a particular 100 Reimagining the English schools triad type of social structure If states understand themselves and their rela tions in what Wendt 1999 calls Hobbesian enemy or Lockean rival terms then that type of social structure will broadly conform to realist expectations Treating international systems as social does not rule out the options of materialist theory It then becomes a hypothesis to ex plore whether material factors such as polarity shape the social world so strongly that they can act as reliable predictors for behaviour There is one other case where asocial systems are possible but here the lack of sociality rests not on unwillingness to allow the existence of the other but on limited interaction capacity The defining case here is the Eurasian trading system that connected Han China and classical Rome Significant quantities of goods moved between Rome and China enough to make a noticeable impact on their economies notably the drainage of specie from Rome But this was relay trade There was no direct contact between Rome and China The goods moved along a series of trading stages each one of which represented a social structure but which did not provide any social connection between Rome and China In this sense Rome and China were part of a physical economic system even though each link in the chain was social Buzan and Little 2000 916 If one treats these cases of pure wars of extermination and relay trad ing systems as marginal to the general pattern of modern international relationsthentheargumentfordissolvingthedistinctionbetweenphys ical and social systems as a major distinction within English school the ory and adopting Jamess reading of Bull runs as follows social inter action cannot occur without physical interaction so for most practical purposes the two are bundled together The key question is therefore not about the distinction between physical and social systems but about howanyphysicalsocialsystemisstructuredWhatisthedominanttype of interaction What are the dominant units What is the distribution of capability What is the interaction capacity of the system What type of social structure is it and how is it maintained Dissolving the distinction between physical and social systems or at least downgrading it to what Wendt 1999 10938 calls rump mate rialism helpfully removes the question discussed in earlier chapters about why there is no world system as a counterpart to world soci ety Instead it turns the spotlight on to whether English school theory needs to retain the distinction between international system and inter national society It is important to reiterate that this move does not take the physical out of the analysis altogether Physical elements such as 101 From International to World Society the distribution of power and the nature of interaction capacity remain central to the analysis of all social systems What changes is that the physical aspect ceases to provide the principal basis for distinguish ing one type of international system from another Instead of thinking in a frame of two basic forms international systems and international societies this move pushes one inexorably down the path of seeking a classification scheme for a spectrum of types of international soci ety an idea already inherent in Wendts 1992 famous proposition that anarchy is what states make of it English school theory contains some elements for such a scheme but no systematic attempt Wight 1977 explored the difference between statessystems and suzerain systems and Watson 1990 1992 Wæver 1996 continued that line with his pen dulum theory about the spectrum from anarchy to empire of centred to decentred international societies In addition the whole debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about types of international society with the Westphalian model at the pluralist end and something else not very clearly specified at the solidarist one more on this in chapter 5 There is a sustained but not all that systematic attempt at a typology in Luard 1976 which runs parallel to English school thinking at many points Wendt 1999 has taken up his own challenge with a scheme for classi fying what kind of socialisation a system has and how it is maintained Usefully Wendts scheme runs in quite close parallel to the structural interpretation of English school theory that I am presenting here see Suganami 2001 Indeed some of Wendts conceptualisation most no tably his classification of three types of international social structure as Hobbesian Lockean and Kantian are derived from the English schools three traditions though Wendts scheme is limited by being wholly statebased no world society component His social structures rest on the nature of the dominant roles in the system or subsystem respectively enemy rival and friend However from an English school perspective it may well be the case that Wendts most interesting con tribution is his taking up of the issue of how norms and values the building blocks of any sort of society are internalised by the actors involved In other words Wendt shifts the focus from what the shared norms rules and institutions are and who shares them to the means by which these norms are held in place as a form of social practice As far as I am aware this core issue of theory has not been raised specif ically either in the English school or any other of the debates about world society though it is often present implicitly Wendt himself does 102 Reimagining the English schools triad not develop the idea very far There is perhaps the beginning of an ap proach to it in Bulls concerns about what it is that creates compliance to international law whether mere utilitarian calculus or some more constitutive sense of legimacy about rules or shared identity as part of a moral community Alderson and Hurrell 2000 31 But this lead has not been systematically followed up Wendt 1999 24750 offers three possibilities which he sees as both degrees and modes of internalisation coercion calculation and be lief Something close to this formulation is also present in Kratochwils 1989 97 much more complicated account which talks of institutional sanctions Hobbes ruleutilitarianism Hume and emotional at tachment Durkheim in Hurds 1999 set of coercion selfinterest and legitimacy as the determinants of social behaviour and with co ercion excluded in March and Olsens 1998 94854 discussion of the bases of social action in terms of either a logic of expected consequences calculation or a logic of appropriateness belief In all of these schemes the shallowest and least stable is coercion when the social structure is essentially imposed by an outside power A social structure built on this foundation is hardly internalised at all and is unlikely to survive the removal of its outside supporter The underlying fragility of a social system of coercively imposed norms is amply illustrated by the rapid collapse of the Soviet empire and then the Soviet Union itself and many similar cases can be found in the history of empires In the middle is calculation when the social structure rests on rational assessments of selfinterest Such a structure is only superficially internalised and remains stable only so long as the ratios of costs and benefits remain favourable to it A concert of powers for example will collapse if one power comes to believe that it can and should seek hegemony and a liberal trading system will collapse if enough of its members begin to think that the costs of exposing their societies and economies to global trade and finance outweigh the benefits As Hurd 1999 387 puts it a social system that relies primarily on selfinterest will necessarily be thin and tenuously held together and subject to drastic changes in response to shifts in the structure of payoffs The deepest and most stable mode is belief where actors support the social structure because they accept it as legitimate and in so doing incorporate it into their own conception of their identity Deep internalisation of this sort can survive quite ma jor changes of circumstance as shown by many cases of the persistence of religion long after its sponsoring imperial power has faded away Christianity after Rome Islam after the Abbasid dynasty Buddhism 103 From International to World Society after the Mauryan Empire Wendt offers the penetrating twist that in principle each of these modes of socialisation can apply to any of his three social structures Thus a seemingly Kantian social structure of friendship might be based on coercion and thus unstable the Soviet Union and its socialist fraternity while a Hobbesian social structure might well be based on the deeply internalised values of a warrior cul ture and thus held as legitimate eg Klingons for Star Trek fans or a long history of nomadic barbarian warrior cultures for others most visible these days in places like Somalia and Afghanistan A Lockean social structure mixing limited rivalry and limited cooperation might be supported only by instrumental calculation as some fear about the current global economy or it might be quite deeply internalised on the basis of Enlightenment beliefs about human nature or about the best way to achieve economic progress Wendts scheme is attractively neat and simple and at first glance seems to cover the main possibilities On reflection however one could question it in several ways For one thing it is based on an analogy with individual behaviour that misses out some important differences that affect the way states or other collective actors internalise shared val ues Hurrell 2002 1456 for example points out the incorporation of norms into bureaucratic structures and procedures and into legal codes domestic and international as forms of internalisation that would be distinctive to collective entities Perhaps more troubling is that Wendts three categories all require conscious awareness of the mechanism on the part of the actors concerned Is there a case for considering a fourth cat egory to cover behaviour that is driven by unconscious internalisation of norms whether as traditions or as doxa the unquestioned norms embedded in the social background of any society Guzzini 1993 466 There is also room for debate about whether a value is held if what holds it in place is coercion If contracts signed under duress are not legal do values held under duress actually count as values Some might think not Wendts and Hurds schemes force one to rely on sus tained behaviour as the indicator that a value is held This rather be havioural view of values will not convince everyone and will be particu larlyproblematicforthosenormativetheoristsforwhomtheholdingofa value equates with belief in it more on this below These issues deserve more thought than I have space to indulge in here In what follows I am simply going to try to apply Wendts scheme as given on the grounds that it opens up vital and inadequately explored ground within English schooltheoryIleaveopenthepossibilitythatothersmightwanttorefine 104 Reimagining the English schools triad the ideas if this first rough cut turns out to be interesting It seems to me that the issue of how norms are held in place is a crucial one in any un derstanding of how international or world societies develop and how stable or unstable they might be I will make extensive use of Wendts formulation in both the later sections of this chapter and in subsequent chapters of this book Inter alia Wendts scheme offers insight into Watsons 1990 1992 pendulum theory that international societies swing back and forth on a spectrum from extreme independence anarchy through hegemony suzerainty and dominion to empire Empire is too crude a term for the hierarchical end of the spectrum The social structure of empire is held together by a mixture of coercion calculation and belief in which coercion is generally the largest element and belief the smallest Rome was created and maintained by its army but it had enough legitimacy to fuel a millennium of nostalgia after its fall More purely brutal empires such as the Mongol and the Assyrian left much less nostalgia amongst theirformersubjectsAnalternativeformofhierarchyisconfederation where belief is generally the largest element and coercion the smallest These two types of construction are different enough so that using the label empire for both misleads more than it clarifies Wendts separation of modedepth of socialisation is helpful here It allows one to think of a single form of social structure eg hierarchy at the extreme end of Watsons spectrum while leaving open the question of whether this is achieved and maintained more by coercion Wights Stalinism more by calculation as some fear and some hope about the EU or more by belief a deeply rooted federation such as the US Thinking along these Wendtian lines poses some probing questions for how the history of international society is told The question of what holds norms in place is implicit in the English schools accounts of the spread of Western international society which involved a good deal of coercive imposition of a standard of civilisation as well as some cal culated and some principled acceptance Gong 1984 Bull and Watson 1984 This stillexpanding literature could usefully incorporate Wendts ideas Similar though less militarised coercive practices continue today Armstrong 1999 55861 and can most clearly be seen in action in the operation of conditionality imposed on periphery states by the core whether in relation to applications for NATO EU or WTO member ship or bids for loans from the IMF and World Bank But perhaps the real challenge opened up here is to those following in Vincents tradi tion of promoting human rights objectives in pursuit of a more solidarist 105 From International to World Society international society It is perfectly clear that Western individualist ver sions of human rights are held as legitimate and deeply internalised by a substantial community of states and people It is just as clear that any attempt to impose these values on a universalist global basis will re quire the use of coercive and calculative modes of socialisation against those who do not share them Is this a desirable and durable way to pursue the creation of a more solidarist international society More on this in chapters 5 and 8 Abandoning the physicalsocial distinction as a primary organising device for theory effectively collapses one pillar of the English school triad reducing the scheme to a dyad between international and world society In so doing it heightens the need to think systematically about the range of structural possibilities within international and world so cieties This task has so far only been picked away at and not addressed systematically by the English school and not much addressed by other versions of world society either many of which tend towards even more homogenous interpretations Going down this route means following Wendt and other construc tivists in privileging the social over the physical According to this way of thinking it will matter both what the shared norms rules and in stitutions are and how they are held in place Wendts scheme adds a new dimension to the solidarismpluralism debate It asks not only how many and what type of values are shared and whether they are about just survival or about more ambitious pursuit of joint gains but also about the mode of socialisation in play Privileging the social also raises questions about what happens to the neorealist types of structural analysis that would previously have fitted into the international system pillar of the English schools triad The first thing to note is that Waltzs 1979 first two tiers are social rather than material anyway organis ing principle and structural and functional differentiation are about the social structures created by political ideas not material capabilities These two ideas can stay in play without contradiction in the scheme set out in figure 2 Distribution of capabilities is more obviously physical and like interaction capacity has to be treated as an essential question that one asks of any social system Neorealists assume that the inter national system is composed of enemies and rivals and that polarity therefore matters primarily in relation to military and political security But as thinking about hegemonic stability in IPE suggests polarity can also matter and in a very different way in a system or a subsystem 106 Reimagining the English schools triad composed of rivals and friends In a social structural perspective polar ity does not determine the nature of the game or the players but it does affect how the game will be played whether it be a Hobbesian Grotian or Kantian one The consequences of the argument in this section for the first revi sion view of English school theory set out in figure 2 are sketched in the second revision in figure 3 and are quite radical Dropping system as representing a distinctive physical asocial form of interstate relations means eliminating or rather relocating in a redefined form one of the three main pillars in the classic English school triad of concepts In return for this the problem of the missing system side complementing world society also disappears This revision when combined with the one in figure 2 solves the boundary problem created there by changing the na ture of the boundary between international and world society Instead of being a frontier where one classification blends into another it becomes a clear separation based on type of actor In addition and following from the incorporation of Wendts ideas one can begin to see the spectrum of types of international society set out in the plan view Pluralism and solidarism no longer as in the classical English school triad of figure 1 define the outer boundaries of international society Instead they oc cupy the middle part of the spectrum Cronin 1999 817 conducts a similar exercise in defining types of international community His spec trum has international state of nature at the asocial end of the spectrum and universal collective security at my confederative end In between are balance of power great power concert pluralist security community common security system and amalgamated security community He ac companies this with a second spectrum of degrees of identity starting from hostility Other as antiself and proceeding through rivalry in difference cohesion some sense of common good and group identity altruism willingness to sacrifice for others to symbiosis shared core identity dissolves selfOther distinction Beyond solidarism one finds the Kantian model where the states composing international society become very alike domestically and confederalism where the de gree of political integration is on the border of transforming a system of states into a single hierarchical political entity Beyond pluralism which more or less stands for Wendts Lockean social structure one finds more Hobbesian social structures based on enemy relationships At the extreme end of this side of the spectrum one finds the asocial scenario sketched above where enemies are locked into a permanent 107 From International to World Society war of extermination In this view international society incorporates the whole spectrum of social structures possible between states from virtually nothing therefore absolutely conflictual to the brink of com plete political integration If one stays true to Wendts scheme then it is necessary to add a di mension of thickness to the plan view set out in the elevation view to take into account not just the type of social structure but also its modedepth of internalisation For every position on this spectrum one has to ask on what mixture of coercion calculation and belief the ob served social structure rests On the pluralistHobbesian side the ob served social structure could be deeply internalised as an expression of a warrior culture or it could be a shallower instrumental calculation based on the existence of some bad apples in the basket and fear of them amongst the other states or it could be coerced by the existence of one very powerful warrior state that threatens all the others Similarly on the solidaristKantian side the observed social structure could be deeply internalised as a result of shared belief in liberal principles or it could be the result of more instrumental calculations of advantage or it could be a result of a coercive hegemonic or imperial power able and willing to impose its values on others The English school has implicitly rested its understanding of society on belief and has therefore not asked this question with anything like the necessary clarity and consistency But as its accounts of the expansion of European international society to global scale show coercion and calculation matter Much of the non European world was simply forced into international society through the process of colonisation and decolonisation The few that escaped such as the Ottoman Empire China and Japan were much motivated by the prospect of coercion and calculated the need to adapt in order to survive Society even when defined in strong terms as shared values can rest on other foundations than belief Following Wendt figure 3 re quires this question to be asked of all types of international and world society Society and community If one is going to deploy the concept of society then the question of def inition and meaning cannot be avoided Both humility and caution are called for here Sociologists have been debating the meaning of society for generations without coming to any very clear resolution Mayhew 1968 It is unlikely that IR theorists are going to solve this problem but 108 Reimagining the English schools triad International Society of states World Society of transnational actors and individuals Asocial Con Federative antian Solidarist Pluralist o esian Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION BELIEF CALCULATION DEEP Figure 3 The Three Traditions second revision dropping the physical element of international system extending the spectrum of types of international society and adding Wendts modedepth of internalisation if they are going to deploy the concept then they must at least take a position especially so if like the English school they want to defend the strong version of society based on shared values highlighted in chapter 3 In general the concept of society aims to identify what it is that constitutes individuals into durable groups in such a way as to give the group ontological status societies can reproduce them selves and outlive the particular individuals that compose them at any given point Defining societies as bounded units has proved particu larly difficult So has deciding what kind of binding forces constitute the 109 From International to World Society essential ingredient that makes a collection of individuals into a soci ety must it be deep internalisation in the form of shared belief about identity or can society be calculated or even in some sense coerced in which case shared behaviour is sufficient to identify it The liter ature about society is almost totally based on the idea that however they might be structured societies are composed of individual human beings The English schools core idea that the units of international society are states secondorder societies composed of collective units rather than individuals is a striking departure recently picked up by some constructivists This departure deserves more attention than it has received Societies can and have been defined in political economic historical identity cultural and communication terms These can perhaps with the exception of Luhmann and his followers be simplified down to two main lines of approach One focuses on patterns of interaction struc tured by shared norms and rules while the other focuses on identity and wefeeling as the key to society These two lines are captured by the distinction first drawn by Tonnies 1887 between society Gesellschaft and community Gemeinschaft There is a long history of debate around these terms much of it bound up in the distinction between the tradi tional and the modern and analysis of the process of modernisation Much of this debate is freighted with German historical baggage not relevant to the IR debate about secondorder societies To oversimplify this history Gemeinschaft community broadly represents the organic premodern smallscale way exemplified by clans and tribes that hu mans grouped themselves together in before the onset of modernity In this sense community is a deep concept implying not only membership of an identity group but also a degree of responsibility towards the other members of the group It would be almost impossible to apply the con cept in this form to a loose secondorder construct such as international society and difficult if not quite impossible to imagine applying it to world society As Luard 1976 vii observes there is reason to doubt whether the aggregation of states possesses the common values and assumptions which are by definition the essential conditions of com munity Gesellschaftsociety broadly represents the rational contractual largescale way of organising humankind that has become dominant since the onset of modernity In principle and in practice Gesellschaft fits comfortably with the international domain Luard 1976 viii sees inter national society as possessing some common customs and traditions common expectations concerning the relationships and behaviour to be 110 Reimagining the English schools triad expected among its members even in many cases common institutions for discussing common problems There is plenty of room in this longstanding sociological formulation for casting the two as opposed forces and for mounting polemics in support of or opposition to one or the other progressive versus con servative views As shown in chapter 3 the world society approach of Dietrich Jung seeks to build a macrohistorical sociology understand ing of the contemporary international system directly on the basis of the interplay between tradition and modernity set up in the Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft formulation of the German debate But as pointed out by the WSRG there is another way of building on this tradition Instead of taking it as a macrohistorical sociological approach one can instead extract the essential distinction embedded in GemeinschaftGesellschaft and use it to identify different types of social relations in any histori cal context This second more abstract approach is the one I intend to pursue Jungs approach is more or less an alternative to the existing IR traditions and is interesting for that reason The approach of distin guishingbetweensocietyandcommunityastypesofsocialrelationships is powerful because it offers insight into the existing IR debates about international and world society From here on in I will signal this move away from the traditional GemeinschaftGesellschaft conception and all of the political and intellectual battles associated with it by abandoning the German terminology and sticking to the English terms community and society The principal cost of the abstraction away from history is that one dilutes the traditional organic deep sense of community by adding in the idea that communities can also be consciously constructed In the formulation proposed here society becomes essentially about agreed arrangements concerning expected behaviour norms rules in stitutions and community becomes essentially about shared identity wefeeling In this sense community can be quite shallow as for ex ample amongst the worldwide fandom of Manchester United or Elvis Presley The main advantage of the move is that it divorces society and community from a particular interpretation of history and makes them available as concepts for analysing the rather different world of second order societies whether international or world at the levels above the state The distinction between society and community features quite strongly in some of the schools of thought about world society sur veyed in chapter 3 It is not unknown in English school thinking but neither is it much explored and what is said leans in contradictory 111 From International to World Society directions2 Wights 1977 33 muchcited idea that We must assume that a statessystem ie an international society will not come into be ing without a degree of cultural unity among its members seems to lean towards community as a key element in international society though culture can be read in both society and community senses Adam Watson personal conversation says that community was what the British Committee had in mind when it talked about common culture Bull by contrast seems to lean firmly towards a society interpretation His idea of society 1977 45 as noted in chapter 2 rests on the presence of rules of coexistence regarding limits on the use of force provisions for the sanctity of contracts and arrangements for the assignment of prop erty rights The key question is whether society and community rep resent fundamentally different forms of social relationship or are just different elements within what can be considered a single phenomenon If they are fundamentally different forms then the question has to be put as to whether they can be conflated within concepts such as inter national and world society If they are aspects of a single phenomenon a wider sense of society then such bundling together is both more eas ily justified and less analytically suspect In some of my earlier writing Buzan 1993 33340 I simply added the element of identity into the concept of society without adequately recognising the need to ask this question In trying to formulate a position on whether society and community are fundamentally different or aspects of a single phenomenon Chris Browns 1995a attempt to draw a distinction among system society and community is instructive not least because it addresses the prob lemmoreorlessinthetermsoftheEnglishschoolsclassicalthreepillars He defines a system as existing when whatever rules and regularities exist in the world are the product solely of an interplay of forces and devoid of any kind of normative content Brown 1995a 185 That def inition would also satisfy most neorealists and some readings of Bull Community he places as the polar opposite of system seeing it as a heavily contested concept at the centre of which is the idea that whatever order exists in a community is normatively groundedbasedonrelationshipswhichconstituteanetworkofmutual claims rights duties and obligations that pull people together in ways that are qualitatively different from the impersonal forces which create 2 I am grateful to Ana GonzalezPelaez for pointing out to me the potential significance of community in English school thinking 112 Reimagining the English schools triad a system Community implies the idea of common interests and at least an emerging common identity The notion of community on a world scale implies a cosmopolitan belief in the oneness of humanity What is central is the idea of unity based on notions of fellow feeling 1995a 185 This understanding of community is echoed by Cronin 1999 4 com munities require some degree of group cohesion and a shared sense of self Between these two Brown positions society which lacks the affective unity of community Society is a normgoverned form of association but the norms in ques tion emerge out of the requirements for social cooperation and do not necessarily require commitment to any common projects common interest or common identity beyond what is required for social coex istence the norms that constitute society are different from those that would constitute a world community They are essentially the norms that are required for successful pursuit of peaceful coexistence by states whereas the norms involved in world community are nei ther limited to those of coexistence nor restricted in their application to interstate relations Brown 1995a 186 italics in the original Although Brown ignores the link his formulation runs in close parallel withthedistinctionbetweenpluralismasabouttherulesofcoexistence and solidarism as about common projects collective responsibility and shared identity in English school thinking Browns formulation provides a useful path into the society community question not least because it is troubling in a number of ways Most obviously the complexity and vagueness of his definition of community squeezes the space left for defining society This is per haps explained by his concerns as a political theorist to put norms or the absence of them at the centre of his definitions One consequence of his squeezed definition is his attempt to limit society to states and therefore in my understanding to international society whereas com munity is by implication allowed to apply to states and other entities including individuals This raises but does not really answer the ques tion of just what sorts of units the concepts of society and community can or cannot be applied to a crucial issue if one is to develop the idea of secondorder societies Browns approach to community runs close to Vincents idea of world society as states plus transnational actors plus individuals and again his position is echoed by Cronin 2002a 66 who defines international communities as 113 From International to World Society historicallysituated collectivities of regional political actors who main tain formal ongoing relations with each other in international affairs on the basis of an integrated set of procedural and political norms Such actors include government officials diplomats and representa tives from international and transnational organisations and social movements These definitions contain elements of the societycommunity distinc tion particularly in allocating affective and shared identity elements to community But the main drift is to see community as a thicker form incorporating the thinner form of mere society and adding to it ele ments of shared values and identities Brown denies 1995a 186 that he is posing system society and community as a spectrum But he doesnt develop the reasons for his denial and his overall presentation strongly suggests exactly such a developmental sequence with system being the simplest and most basic construction where interaction generates some mechanical rules society adding a layer of conscious rulemaking among states onto that and community being the most fully developed form bringing in elements of identity and more elaborate forms of nor mative kinship This developmental spectrum model is also strong in the thinking of Vincent and the WSRG This question of development is vital because as noted in the dis cussion of the WSRG in chapter 3 determining what the relationship is between society and community remains one of the unresolved con troversies at the core of the sociological debate That there is a strong relationship of some sort is not in doubt for the two are frequently co located and nearly always interactive But what that relationship might be is hotly contested with no clear pattern of determination running in either direction about what causes what In the sociological tradition of Tonnies WSRG 2000 6 community is an organic historical idea that comes before and is in some ways superior to the rational but hol low society relationships typical of modernity Gellner 1988 61 is also in this tradition arguing for a rough law of the intellectual history of mankind logical and social coherence are inversely related In other words Gellner thinks that primitive human societies perform better in terms of community and identity and more advanced ones perform better in terms of society and rationality and that the two characteris tics being contradictory are inversely related to each other This same opposition can also be seen in debates that pose religion a strong form of community against science the ultimate in modernist rationality Wight 1977 seems to think that community in the sense of shared 114 Reimagining the English schools triad culture precedes the development of international society though his view of the relationship is more positive than Gellners Yet if one re calls the work of Vincent and probably most of those in the solidarist tradition of the English school the view is like that of Chris Brown the other way around Their hope seems to be that a sense of community a normative kinship will grow out of the thinner practice of society Bull seems to fear that society and community will prove to be contra dictory with community undermining society Whatever else might be true it seems clear that an inadequate distinction between society and community lies at the heart of some of the central confusions in English school theory Is it that the world society pillar in English school theory is actually about community so representing a semantic wrong turn Or is the problem more serious than that with the society and commu nity elements simply not having been given adequate recognition in the whole theoretical construction of both international and world society Resolving this question in some way becomes even more important if one accepts the argument made in the previous section for priv ileging the social over the physical in conceptualising international system structure If the social is in fact made up of two distinct in tertwined types of relationship the connections between which are complex and indeterminate then making the social central carries an obligation to be clear about what is understood to compose it In this regard it is of more than passing interest that Wendts understand ing of social structure is strongly linked to identity and therefore in the terms set out here to community When states engage in egoistic foreign policies more is going on than simply an attempt to realize given selfish ends They are also instantiating and reproducing a particular conception of who they are Wendt 1999 3401 Structural change is a problem of collective identity formation it occurs when actors re define who they are and what they want We are or become what we do Wendt 1999 338 336 342 Wendt links his constructivist approach to the idea that social interaction is not just about the adjust ment of behaviour to price as the rationalist would see it but also about the reproduction of the agents involved of their identities and interests Wendt 1999 316 The strong implication of these remarks is that for Wendt the types of social structure represented by Hobbes Locke and Kant are all rooted in identity and are therefore species of community In Wendts scheme the distinction between society and commu nity seems to emerge most clearly in his discussion about modes and depths of socialisation outlined in the previous section The rational 115 From International to World Society contractual calculated instrumental definition of society fits closely with Wendts middle mode of internalisation calculation of self interest whereas the internalisation of identity that defines community seems close to the internalisation of belief that forms Wendts third and deepest mode of internalisation But as explained above Wendt specif ically does not tie together the modedepth of internalisation and the type of social structure and keeping this relationship open is one of the powerful and innovative elements in his scheme How to fit Wendts thinking with the societycommunity discussion is something of a puzzle In Wendts scheme it is not immediately obvious whether societycommunity is a distinction between two different types of social relations or a statement about how any society in the general sense is internalised His Kantian structure of friendship is indeterminate as regards society or community and could be read either way Wendt 1999 297308 The simplest way through this minefield and also the one best suited to dealing with the secondorder societies of interest to IR is to accept the arguments offered by Weller 2000 and the WSRG 2000 Their for mulation treats as distinct forms of social relationship on the one hand contractual social relations based on agreements about rational self interest ie society and on the other hand social relations of shared identity based on affection or tradition ie community This Weberian formulation is open about the units to which the concepts might apply individuals nonstate actors nations states civilisations and takes society and community as ideal types seldom if ever found in pure form It postulates the near certainty that the two will always come en tangled with each other in some way but argues that the relationship is both complex and indeterminate as to which precedes or causes which and whether they will be harmonious or conflictual Indirect support for this move can be found in the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas 2001 whose use of two variables integration and regulation to characterise any human collectivity runs in quite close parallel to the communitysociety scheme proposed here From an English school perspective this move has the attraction of providing some leverage on the strong version of society as shared values that Shaw and others criticise it for Perhaps the main cost other of course than the inconvenience of having to think again about things previously taken for granted is that one more or less has to abandon hopes for both predictive theory not a great loss to most English school types and linear developmental models perhaps of concern to some 116 Reimagining the English schools triad solidarists Given the apparent absence of any clear lines of general causality between society and community in either direction students of the subject will largely be confined to situational and comparative analysis This loss is balanced by the gain that the indeterminacy of the societycommunity relationship takes the heat out of the worry that world society and international society must in some way be necessarily at odds with each other They can be but they can also be mutually supportive Some epistemic communities for example might well be opposed to the statebased international society some human rights and environmentalist groups but others may well be deeply entwined with it international law for example or big science research projects in astronomy space exploration and physics Another benefit is to enable the English school to take up Wellers 2000 648 idea that one key variable affecting what the relationship between society and community will be is whether their geographical boundaries are the same or different Bringing the geography of society and community into line has of course been one driving rationale behind the nationstate which if nothing else underlines the political salience of Wellers question Wellers question is a neat way of formulating the many agonisings of the English school about the expansion of European international society into areas not sharing the history of European civil isation It is also a way of addressing the English schools reluctance to talk about regional international societies as anything other than a threat to global international society more on this in chapter 7 It is also worth noting that there is an opportunity here for the English school and indeed others of like mind in IR to make a distinctive con tribution to the wider debate about society The relationship between society and community has not yet been sorted out in any definitive manner by either political theorists or sociologists Common to their en deavours has been the assumption that both society and community are composed of individual human beings There is scope for IR theorists to play here in that the consequences of social structure are almost cer tainly quite different when the units concerned are not individuals but collectivities with ontological status of their own If such secondorder societies are indeed fundamentally different from societies composed of individual human beings then there will be limits to both the lessons and the problems that can be carried over to the international level from discussions about primary human societies Some even within IR reject the idea of secondorder societies al together Jones 1981 5 on the grounds presumably deriving from a 117 From International to World Society strongly held methodological individualism that societies can only be composed of individual human beings Anyone taking that view has to reject any concept of international society altogether and confine themselves at most to a reductionist idea of world society Doing so it seems to me throws away a hugely important concept for understand ing international relations The main insights so far developed in IR on secondorder societies come in reflections about international anarchy and suggest that such societies do differ significantly from primary ones The question has been to what extent if any the Hobbesian war of each against all image of primary anarchy carries over to international ie secondary anarchies Bull 1977 4651 Buzan 1991 21 378 148ff The lesson from those discussions is that the secondorder structures are indeed different from the primary ones because the nature of the constituent social units individual human beings versus states is pro foundly different on issues ranging from physical vulnerability through processes of reproduction to death If what is true for international an archy is true for international society as seems likely then IR theorists have a responsibility to develop distinctive models of society to cover this secondorder domain If secondorder societies are different from primary ones then study of them may open up new perspectives on how society and community interrelate Such a question is compatible with the central project of the English school and could also be taken up by constructivists such as Cronin 1999 and Wendt 1999 who are already working with the idea of secondorder societies If one takes the bold step of treating society and community as distinct forms of social relationship between which lines of causality are indeter minate what are the consequences for thinking about international and world society How in other words is the distinction between society and community to be worked into a revision of figure 4 Before turning to that task it helps first to deal with the last of the dyads defining this chapter individuals and transnational actors TNAs Individual and transnational I suggested in chapter 1 that world society had become something of an intellectual dustbin in English school theory and this could still be a problem even if one confined its content to nonstate entities If world society is about a mixture of nongovernmental organisations and indi viduals then the question is whether or not the logic of transnational ism and the logic of cosmopolitanism can comfortably be composed as a 118 Reimagining the English schools triad single coherent phenomenon or whether more analytical leverage is ac quired by keeping them distinct In order to get to grips with this issue it helps to go back to basics The exegesis of English school and other world society theories conducted in chapters 2 and 3 revealed considerable consistency in the analytical construction of what the relevant units are Three types of unit are in constant play states transnational actors and individuals Taxonomic logic suggests that this trilogy could and should be abstracted into two general types individuals on the one hand and various kinds of collective units ie substantially autonomous social collectivities sufficiently well structured both to reproduce themselves and to have decisionmaking processes which enable them to behave in a selfconscious fashion on the other Collective units in this sense would be problematic or even nonsensical for methodological indi vidualists Because such units are understood to have sufficient actor quality to constitute them as distinctive agents in a social world they have to be understood in methodologically collective terms In practice however taxonomic neatness surrenders to the primacy of the state and the collective units category remains divided into state and nonstate The English school and realism International Law Historical Sociology and much neoliberalism privilege the state as still central to international order providing the essential political framework for much else On this basis a strong distinction is made between states and TNAs eg firms INGOs mafias etc Alan James 1993 288 for exam ple argues that nonstate actors are not members of international society because they do not possess the attributes that would give them the right of admission But they can be seen as participants in the international society that is created and maintained by sovereign states This view is widely reflected in the literature on TNAs Vincent 1992 261 Keck and Sikkink 1998 217 RisseKappen 1995b 280300 Krasner 1995 258 Noortmann Arts and Reinalda 2001 299301 for example argue that while nonstate actors have become part of the institutional structure of international politics and policymaking their influence in comparison with states should not be exaggerated The position in international law is complicated Noortmann 2001 5976 argues that the positivist tradition in international law automatically privileges the state as the sole subject of international law while other traditions make more room for nonstate actors He argues 2001 64 6974 that no intrinsic rule of international law that excludes nonstate actors from acquiring a degree of legal personality exists and that de facto transnational corporations TNCs are so heavily bound up in international legal rights and duties 119 From International to World Society and can make and be held to legal claims to such an extent that they must have standing as effective subjects of international law INGOs have a much less clear position but even though they are usually de nied standing as subjects of international law they often have formal standing with IGOs So at this point I run into the argument made and accepted in the previous section for setting the state apart as a distinct focus for anal ysis using the concept of international society Acknowledging the risk of perpetuating a historical privileging of the state that justifies itself mainly by looking backwards I nevertheless have to accept the divi sion of collective units into state and nonstate The grounds for doing this are that the state remains central to the political structuring of hu mankind with no obvious successor in sight and no obvious way of doing without political structure of some sort I exclude IGOs as actors on the grounds set out in Buzan and Little 2000 2667 that because of their generally low actor quality IGOs are more generally part of social interaction capacity than units in their own right So while it would make more strictly taxonomical sense to bundle states and TNAs together TNAs nevertheless get pushed down into world society along with their unnatural partner individuals Can this pairing be sustained To answer this question it helps to conduct a thought experiment around the three basic types of unit in play and the sorts of systems they might form Given that we are looking at three types of autonomous actor what kinds of social systems can they form If one accepts the trilogy of unit types then it follows that there can be three types of pure basic international social systems interstate state tostate interaction transnational TNAtoTNA interaction and in terhuman individualtoindividual interaction Nothing forbids these from coexisting and indeed overlapping eg statetoTNA etc In the ory and in practice all sorts of mixtures are possible Such mixing often without thinking too hard about it has been part of English school thinking eg Vincents idea of world society as states TNAs indi viduals The same tendency can be found in Cronins 1999 338 2002b idea of transnational political community among elites both state and nonstate as a kind of Davosculture counterweight to the realist logic of anarchy and his understanding of the UN Cronin 2002a 54 as an institutional embodiment of an international community that inte grates both state and transnational actors But it is nevertheless a useful foundational exercise to start by thinking through each of these types of social system in pure form In doing this and with a view to the goal of 120 Reimagining the English schools triad revising figure 3 in the light of the discussion in this section and the pre vious one it is helpful to try to bring the societycommunity distinction into play in relation to the three pure forms In the case of states the ideas of international society and with some what less coherence international community are pretty well estab lished in IR theory International society has been the primary focus of English school writing and is about the instrumental norms rules and institutions created and maintained by states or independent political communities whether consciously or not to bring a degree of order into their system of relationships As shown in figure 3 such societies can range from being quite thin or minimalist to quite thick covering a wide range of issues in considerable depth Warrior societies might generate a Hobbesian international society where the main rules are about conflict and honour Pluralist international societies might well take Westphalian form with the states wishing to preserve maximum autonomy and distinctiveness and therefore agreeing mainly on the principles necessary for coexistence sovereignty nonintervention and rules for diplomacy More solidarist international societies will want to do more than that moving beyond coexistence to pursuit of com mon interests defined in terms of joint gains The will to move towards solidarist arrangements arises most easily if states become more inter nally alike and therefore share a wider array of ideas and values about human rights or market economies or property rights for example In principle solidarist international societies could generate a very wide array of shared norms rules and institutions covering economy law politics environment education and so on The EU is a living example of this potentiality International community has not been systematically discussed by the English school but in the meaning of community set out in the pre vious section would hinge on shared identity and wefeeling among states Shared identity like instrumental cooperation can range from low to high intensity and can come in either exclusive one overriding identity or multiple forms The identity that many individuals feel as members of the human race for example is generally of fairly low inten sity and is seldom if ever exclusive By contrast many individuals have high intensity and sometimes exclusive identity with family clan reli gion nation or some ideologically motivated party or movement This is the basis of the realists emphasis on conflict groups noted above How does this work with states In the contemporary international so ciety the bottom line of shared identity that could define international 121 From International to World Society community is mutual recognition of sovereignty All states that share such mutual recognition acknowledge each other as being the same type of entity and this is nearly universal But that is a fairly low intensity wefeeling and certainly does not stand in the way of stronger generally subglobal forms of interstate community such as the late communist community the club of Western liberal democracies the community of Islamic states or going back a bit in Western history Christendom Other types of more instrumental identity groupings can arise such as landlocked states great powers and the third world Most of the more intense forms of international community are not universal and none of them is very intense in an absolute sense International community might well thus exist to some degree on a global scale but is unlikely to be as strong there as on subglobal scales How is one to read this depiction of international community in re lation to the question much agonised about in political theory about whether the very nature of shared identity requires an Other there fore ruling out the possibility of a universal identity Can there be an Us without a Them Both the WSRG 2000 13 17 and Brown 1995b 1006 note that this question raises contradictions in the idea of uni versal community that could make it impossible to achieve in practice Browns solution is to pose international society seen as a secondorder society of collective units each of which comprises a primary commu nity of individuals as the via media between the reality of particularist communitarianism and the probably hopeless aspiration to universal ist cosmopolitanism In his scheme secondorder society is called in to rescue primary society from the impossibility of achieving unity in the absence of an Other If these arguments are taken seriously they rule out the possibility of universal international andor world communi ties One possibility is that what may be true for primary communities of individuals may not necessarily hold for second order communities of states Perhaps states do not require an Other in order to create a universal community In support of that would be the weak but still extant global community of states based on mutual acceptance as like units on the basis of sovereignty This community pretty much incorpo rates all the members of the class of states Another possibility is that states do require an Other but they find it in the form of individuals or ganised in forms other than itself eg primary anarchy or transnational neomedievalism Ole Wæver also raises the possibility exemplified in the history of the EU that states could find their collective Other in a fear of returning to their own violenceridden past Buzan and Wæver 122 Reimagining the English schools triad 2003 ch 11 There will of course be attempts to finesse this problem by linking a subglobal identity to the good of the whole Carr 1946 801 The practice of the Western states of representing themselves as the international community generally hinges on an appeal to Western values that are understood to be universal even if they are contested by some outside the West Trying to visualise pure transnational and interhuman societies and communities set apart from an accompanying statessystem takes one away from much of history and onto unfamiliar ground It raises ques tions about whether the concept of world society can be thought of inde pendently from statessystems therefore having the same ontological standing or whether it is somehow dependent on an accompanying international society therefore only an epiphenomenon Starting with individuals as the unit underlines the case for taking a social view of international systems made in the previous section It is scarcely possible to imagine purely asocial interhuman systems in any realistic sense Hobbess image of the war of each against all captures one possibility but has no basis in what we know about human social life be fore the coming of Leviathan Buzan and Little 2000 part II Humans acting as individuals in a system very quickly find powerful reasons to form cooperative groups especially if fighting is in prospect It is almost impossible to imagine a largescale interhuman society or com munity coming into being without first going through many stages of development focused on collective units of one sort or another Without going through the intermediary stages of collective units how would the whole population of humans ever establish communication with each other or learn how to align their identities or coordinate their ac tions on a large scale Given a numerous and geographically dispersed population the processes by which humans interact seem inevitably fated to form collective entities each of which encompasses only a small part of the total human population These entities might be collective units of some kind possessing actor quality andor they might be pat terns of shared identity religious ethnic etc with network types of association amongst individuals poised somewhere in between Iftheentitiesareclearlyunitswithactorqualitythenwemovestraight into the realm of transnational or state units This makes it difficult to imagine world society in terms of individuals because a secondorder transnational or interstate society would form before any fullscale in terhuman system could arise An interhuman world society unmediated by collective units can just about be imagined in a world vastly more 123 From International to World Society technologically and socially developed than our own when evolutions of the internet have become both universal and deeply embedded in hu man society and probably physiology as well But such a development would only come about as a result of long evolution through interunit societies of some sort It is thus difficult to think about world societies of individuals without immediately conjuring up collective units of one sort or another and thus departing from the individualasunit scenario It is much easier to see individuals in the community terms of shared identity without encountering this problem The idea of shared identity among individuals is well covered in the extensive literature on com munitarianism and cosmopolitanism which is one of the major stocks in trade of political theory Humans seem to fall naturally into identity groups based on such things as kinship ethnicity language religion andor political allegiance The entities thus formed do not necessar ily or even usually have actor quality The problem in relation to any idea of world community is as noted above that such associations form more easily on small scales than on larger ones and that universal com munity amongst individuals is on some readings impossible because of the lack of an Other against which to define shared identity Commu nity certainly operates but when does it become justified to use the term world In a strict usage world would have to mean global and in that case world community in terms of individuals would only occur after a very long period of development and aggregation of shared identities on a smaller scale With this meaning it could just about be argued that humankind is beginning to develop a world community because of the widespread acceptance of the principle that all humans are equal and possessed of some basic shared human rights But a looser meaning of world along the lines of Wallersteins world systems and world em pires can also be justified and offers more scope Here world means occurring on a large scale relative to other aspects of human organisa tion and having substantially selfcontained qualities With this usage a variety of religious and civilisational foundations for claims about world communities can come into play In either case the necessity of development through successive aggregations from smaller to more en compassing groups means that the idea of world community amongst individuals would have to be part of a set of multiple identities some thing that moderated the effects of more sectional parochial types of wefeeling rather than replacing them It is hard to imagine an overrid ing identity of humankind without a large range of lessthanuniversal identities being embedded in it 124 Reimagining the English schools triad Turning to TNAs as the unit reinforces the case for taking a social view of international systems Imagining a purely physical transnational sys tem is almost as problematic as for the interhuman case TNAs represent a division of labour and a differentiation of function and such develop ments can hardly be contemplated outside the context of some sort of societycommunity Amongst transnational actors society is easier to imagine and com munity more difficult Pure transnational world societies are easier to imagine because they are analogous to that other system of collective units formed by states But envisaging pure transnational societies re quires that one eliminate states or more generally types of collec tive unit claiming exclusive powers of government and rights to use force over defined territories and peoples Eliminating states leaves be hind an almost infinite array of functionally specific entities that ranges from hobbyist clubs and sporting associations through mafias and re ligious institutions to firms and interest lobbies and professional as sociations RisseKappen 1995a Boli and Thomas 1999 Noortmann Arts and Reinalda 2001 303 Risse 2002 Only one historical exam ple comes even close to this model in medieval Europe both property rights and political rights or more to the point duties were divided up across a range of entities from guilds crusading orders and monasteries through bishops barons and princes to cities Holy Roman emperors and popes Ruggie 1983 1993 Fischer 1992 Buzan and Little 1996 This medievalmodelisnotpurelytransnationalsincesomeofitscomponents citystatessomekingswouldcountasstatesunderthedefinitiongiven above and the same is true of Hedley Bulls muchcited idea of neo medievalism which captured the possibility that the future might de velop a similar mix The Westphalian statessystem eventually replaced the medieval one and gave it a bad press as the dark ages But me dieval Europe nonetheless stands as an exemplar of the possibility of a predominantly transnational world society It is perfectly possible to imagine firms and indeed clubs mafias and various other types of association agreeing pluralist type rules of recognition and conventions of communication amongst others of a similar type and working out practical measures of coexistence Cartel agreements amongst firms or mafias not to compete with one another in certain markets or territories are parallel to rules of non intervention among states It is harder to imagine why different types of transnational organisation would behave in this way Because states or firms are the same type of entity they may well fall into zerosum 125 From International to World Society rivalry and therefore have need of rules of coexistence But chess clubs and steel manufacturers hardly compete for the same social terrain and can as well remain indifferent to each other as seek structured social relations Similarly it is not difficult to imagine elements of solidarism in transnational societies Chess or sports clubs may want to cooperate in setting up systemwide standards and tournaments Firms may want to agree on common standards for everything from screws to software systems Stock exchanges might want to make their buying and selling practices interoperable As with states therefore other types of collec tive units have choices about how they relate to each other and these choices can range from zerosum rivalry through pluralist modes of coexistence to more solidarist modes of cooperation in pursuit of joint gains and interoperability There is perhaps some echo in this image of Luhmanns idea of world society as consisting of distinct functional systems of communication each structured by its own basic code into selfreferential communities It is more difficult to think about a purely transnational world com munity the problem being that unlike states and individuals the units of the transnational world are similar only in the sense that they are not states Little else about them is similar and therefore the founda tions for shared identity are hard to imagine Partly for this reason Williams 2001 rightly points out that world society contrary to the hopes of some solidarists is perhaps more embeddedly pluralist and more problematic as a site for the development of solidarism than in ternational society World communities of transnational actors might develop among similar types all chess clubs all mining companies all terrorist groups but this would be so narrow as to make the term world seem inappropriate Perhaps the only plausible route to a widely based transnational world community would be if the shared iden tity as nonstate became strong For that to happen not only would a core political rivalry between the state and nonstate worlds have to develop but also a sophisticated consciousness of division of labour among the different types of nonstate units such that they could con struct a shared identity as part of a grand idea about the human social world Such a scenario probably exists only in the minds of the more ex treme proponents of globalisation global civil society andor classical anarchism In principle a transnational world society could exist in the ab sence of states notwithstanding the nonsense that would make of the term transnational itself and is therefore a possible alternative to 126 Reimagining the English schools triad international society It can also exist in conjunction with states as now when transnational and international society overlap and interweave Taking all this into account the answer to the opening question of this section Can the logic of transnationalism and the logic of cos mopolitanism be composed as a single coherent phenomenon labelled world societycommunity would seem to be no The ontological dif ference between individuals and transnational actors is profound and it leads to quite different logics and potentialities in the way in which each of these types of units can or cannot form societies and communities Thinking about the individual level is very largely focused on ques tions of identity and community This is reflected in the debates within political theory about cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism As demonstrated it is actually quite difficult to think about a pure interhu man society because the dynamics of society almost immediately jump to the transnational andor state levels By contrast thinking about the transnational level is mostly focused on questions of society While it is not impossible to think about community at the transnational level the huge diversity of actor types among TNAs tends to impose pretty strict limits on how far shared identity can go Following the argument made on pp 918 about favouring type of unit as the key to distinguishing between international and world society I cannot avoid the conclusion that individuals and transnational actors should not be bundled together In terms of revising figure 3 this move has two consequences First it would seem to destroy the concept of world society as used in figures 13 This rather alarming development is balanced by the fact that in doing so the separation of the individual and transnational worlds opens up ways around some of the dilemmas for English school theory posed by world society and exposed most clearly in the examination of Vincents work Second it creates strong reasons to divide the nonstate into two and thereby restore a triadic structure but now with each of the three pillars defined by a distinct type of unit individuals TNAs states Buried in all of this argument has been a major departure from the role that individual human beings play in the normative verson of English school theory3 In that tradition individuals are of primary interest as the carriers of moral rights It is the individual that matters whether singly as him or herself or collectively as humankind In the structural version of English school theory emerging here the focus is not on the 3 I am grateful to Lene Mosegaard Madsen for pointing this out 127 From International to World Society individual as such but on the patterns of shared identity that group human beings into various forms of community A structural approach does not do well at dealing with individual units It necessarily seeks patterns on a larger scale At this point everything is in place to undertake the revision of figure 3 and to reconsider the meaning of both international and world society Conclusions reconstructing the English schools triad To sum up the argument above has defended the following proposi tions r That there are strong reasons for keeping a distinction between state and nonstate as a feature of the analysis figure 2 r That the physicalsocial distinction should be largely set aside in English school theory Given the heavy overlap between them the two should be considered together within the context of a range of types of social system figure 3 r That society and community need to be considered as distinct forms of social relationship nearly always linked but with little or no deter minate causality in either direction r That the individual and the transnational have such different ontolo gical foundations that bundling them together as a collective non state or world society category is not sustainable The task in this section is to work out the consequences of the last two of these conclusions for reconstructing the English schools triad and to apply these to revising figure 3 Recallthatinconstructingfigure3IfollowedWendtJamesandothers in abandoning the idea of a purely physical mechanistic international system The consequence of that move was extending the range of in ternational society to cover a wider spectrum than pluralist to solidarist This spectrum went from asocial very rare and Hobbesian at one ex treme through pluralist and solidarist to Kantian with confederative forming the borderline with hierarchical modes of political order at the other extreme In line with Wendt I accepted that enemy and rival were as much forms of social relationship as friend I also ac cepted the Wendtian move of separating out the type of international 128 Reimagining the English schools triad society from the modedepth of its internalisation coercion calculation or belief I noted that Wendts formulation left quite a bit of ambiguity as to where and how the societycommunity distinction as discussed above pp 10818 fitted into his scheme and that thread is one of the keys to designing figure 4 Wendts scheme rests on a distinction between the type of society ie what values are shared and the modedepth of internalisation of the values ie how and why they are shared I can see no reason why this distinction should not apply to any kind of society whether a primary one composed of individuals or a secondorder one composed of states or TNAs If one accepts the distinction between what and howwhy as is done in figure 3 then the societycommunity distinction clearly belongs in the howwhy dimension The what dimension identifies the form or type of social structure as determined by the character of the norms rules and institutions that make it up The societycommunity distinc tion does not address the range of values that define the differences between the various positions along the spectrum of international so cial structures shown in figure 4 Following Wendts logic society and community are about the binding forces which hold any type of social structure together The first step in revising figure 3 is therefore to locate the societycommunity distinction within Wendts howwhy dimension Note that this move has the result of colocating society and com munity with coercion This is a radical departure from those tradi tions which have tended to see coercion and violence as the absence of societycommunity as the problem that societycommunity should in some way address Yet coercion is never far from the surface of discus sions about society Think of Hobbess Leviathan or of Marxian under standings of capitalism It is also the case that if one follows the construc tivist logic of treating all human interactions as social then violence and coercion have to be counted as forms of society and investigated as such Wendt 1999 254 thus rightly puts coercion into the howwhy dimension alongside society and community and forming a spectrum with them of degrees of cultural internalization This move also occurs as a conse quence of extending the domain of international society to cover what was seen previously as physical and mechanistic conflict dynamics at the Hobbesian end of the spectrum Enmity is also social and coercion is one of the ways in which collective behaviour can be shaped Follow ing this logic society becomes synonymous with Wendts calculation which as noted above is a very comfortable fit Wendts presentation of calculation is closely parallel to the rationalist instrumental modernist 129 From International to World Society understandings of what society means in the sociological debates Community then has to become synonymous with Wendts belief At first glance this is not such an immediately comfortable fit though nei ther is it all that jarring If community is understood as shared identity it might be thought to represent something similar to but narrower than shared belief Shared identity is of course a form of shared belief viz Andersons 1983 famous imagined communities But does shared belief necessarily generate shared identity On reflection and with the caveat that good communication is also required in order to establish as common knowledge that belief is shared it is difficult to imagine that it doesnt In discussing their logic of appropriateness March and Olsen 1998 951 also make this link noting that for this type of mo tive the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests I conclude that calculation and society and belief and com munity are substantively close enough to confirm that the distinction between society and community does belong in the howwhy dimension of Wendts scheme and not in the what dimension Society and community and coercion thus represent the binding forces by which social structures of any sort can be created and sus tained They do not determine the values defining the social structure and in principle each can apply to any type of social structure Wendt is clear that he wants to see his types of social structure in mutually exclusive terms either Hobbesian or Lockean or Kantian but not mix tures He goes in a similar direction about the disposition of the three components of the howwhy dimension That each can apply to any so cial structure is a powerful insight set up in a 3 3 matrix of coercion calculation and belief with his Hobbesian Lockean and Kantian types of social structure Wendt 1999 254 Wendts assumption that the types of social structure in the what dimension will always have a sufficiently clear pattern of enemy rival or friend to give them clear and mutu ally exclusive designations is already bordering on heroic simplification Buzan and Wæver 2003 though it might just about be sustainable for analytical purposes But to assume the same about the three elements of the howwhy dimension is not sustainable Almost any social structure one can think of will be held together by some mixture of coercion calculation and belief The necessity of mix ture and how to deal with it is what defines politics Empires might mainlybeheldtogetherbycoercionbutonecouldnotunderstandeither the Roman or British empire without adding in substantial elements of calculation the economic advantages of being in the empire and belief 130 Reimagining the English schools triad local elites sharing some of the values of the empire Similarly liberal democracies might be held together mainly by belief but the substantial role of calculation is indicated by fears about whether democracy can be sustained without economic growth No democracies have been able to do without some coercive institutions that have primarily domestic functions Much of Westphalian pluralist international society rests not just on the societycalculation element of agreed norms rules and insti tutions but also on the communitybelief acknowledgement amongst the states that they are the same type of sovereign entity and thus share an identity The issue of communitybelief emerges even more strongly for solidarist international societies where an everextending range of cooperative norms rules and institutions is likely both to reflect and encourage a move towards increasing similarity in the domestic struc tures and values of the states concerned Thecasefortreatingcoercioncalculationandbeliefassimultaneously present in all but a few extreme cases of theoretically possible types of social structure is reinforced by the nature of the sociological and po litical theory debates about society and community Recall that in these debates society and community are generally held to represent distinct forms of social relationship that are nevertheless nearly always found chained together in some degree They are distinct as ideal types but in practice they are found mixed together in complex and fundamentally indeterminate ways sometimes in tension with each other sometimes complementaryThenatureoftherelationshipbetweensocietyandcom munity is much disputed but the fact that there always is a relationship is generally accepted There is a recurrent disposition in the literature to see this link in terms of layering or hierarchy Those of a more historical disposition much of the sociological debate reviewed in chapter 3 put community as the earlier primitive form and society as the later more sophisticated though not necessarily better development By contrast those of a more structural inclination Browns formulation discussed in pp 11214 also the WSRGs approach and Wendt tend to see society as the simpler more basic less demanding form and community as the more difficult and usually desirable thing to develop as the deep form of social integration Understanding society and community as elements of the howwhy dimension helpfully keeps in focus that neither society nor community is necessarily nice That they are part of the means that hold any set of shared values together and do not determine what those values are untangles some of the problems revealed in the discussion of global 131 From International to World Society civil society in chapter 3 Social structures that can be characterised as societies or communities in the traditional usage of those terms can just as easily be sites of conflict as well as zones of cooperation and harmony as any reflection on the experience of family clan nation or religion quickly reveals and any study of civil war underlines Putting society and community into the howwhy dimension makes it less easy to lose sight of that dual character In the formulation adopted here I am therefore following Wendt in adding coercion into the societycommunity mix but not following him in treating coercion calculation and belief as mutually exclusive features In dealing with the howwhy dimension the English schools three traditions approach of assuming that all elements are always in play seems much more appropriate complementing the conclusion reached above pp 11828 that the three types of unit that compose society are likewise always in play to some degree With these qualifications figure 4 can thus build on the strength of Wendts insight that the issue of modedepth of internalisation applies across the whole range of types of international society Sticking with Wendts scheme as begun in figure 3 offers an interesting way of taking on board the societycommunity distinction It also has the advantage of separating out and bringing into clearer focus the question of what the shared values are that compose international and world societies This issue has major implications for the English schools pluralistsolidarist debate which has not investigated sufficiently the question of what the values are that can constitute solidarism and not really investigated at all how the issue of modedepth of internalisation bears on the under standing of solidarism More on this in chapter 5 Given the cumulative shifts and refinements of definition what do the traditional concepts of international and world society now represent The necessary revisions to figure 3 can be summarised and explained as follows 1 TheelevationviewrepresentingWendtsmodedepthofinternalisa tion remains the same and I stay with Wendts language for labelling the howwhy dimension As noted applying the howwhy classifica tions of coercion calculation and belief to interhuman and transna tional societies does not seem to pose any problems 2 The top half of the pie in plan view representing the what spectrum of types of international society remains the same subject to a change of label set out in point 4 below 132 Reimagining the English schools triad Interstate Societies Asocial Con Federative antian Solidarist Pluralist o esian Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION DEEP CALCULATION Interhuman Societies Transnational Societies Fragmented Pure Mediaevalism No TNAs Universal Identities Largescale Imagined Communities Coalitions of Like TNAs TNA Coalitions Across Type Competing TNAs BELIEF Figure 4 The Three Traditions third revision a social structural reinterpretation of the English schools triad 3 The bottom half of the pie previously representing world society gets cut into two quarters representing the distinct domains within the scheme occupied by individuals and TNAs This returns to an approximation of the original English school triad but now based on type of unit and linked by the common substrate of the howwhy dimension The three domains are now separated by the hard bound aries resulting from defining them in terms of different types of constitutive unit They are not a spectrum as the three traditions of the classical English school model were generally taken to be Mayall 2000 13 Consequently interest shifts from what defines 133 From International to World Society these borders now clear to how the three domains as so consti tuted interact with each other Because the boundaries are hard no significance now attaches to the placement of the interhuman and transnational segments of the pie they could be reversed or perhaps even better given as three separate selfcontained circles The key English school idea that the three traditions are understood to be simultaneously in play is preserved but now on the grounds that social formations involving the three types of unit are always ex pected to be present in international systems to some degree At a minimum each domain in the triad constitutes part of the operating environment for the other two At a maximum conditions in one do main may determine what options are possible in the others more on this below Although the triadic structure is restored the do mains no longer represent equal proportions of the pie as they did in figures 1 and 2 This might be thought to privilege the state over the other two and if so that would be consistent with the arguments on pp 918 for doing so It might also be thought to diminish the place of the state because in figures 1 and 2 the statebased elements oc cupied twothirds of the pie international system and international society and that thought is also justified In the background of the relationship amongst these three domains is Vincents 1988 210 sharp observation that authority must reside somewhere if order is to obtain anywhere 4 In figure 4 the three domains represent pure or ideal type forms of society based on different constitutive units as discussed on pp 11828 To reflect this and also to underline the shift to defin ing the domains more clearly in terms of their constitutive units they are labelled interstate societies transnational societies and inter human societies Societies is given in the plural to reflect the point made in chapter 1 and followed up in chapter 7 below that in ternational and world societies are not just phenomena found on a global scale but also ones found simultaneously in regional and other subglobal forms Somewhat irritatingly society is used here in its general sense incorporating all types of social cohesion There is no obvious escape from the confusion caused by society carrying both this general meaning and the more specific one discussed at length above A key part of the argument in this book is that the elements that make up international society are not found only at the global level but also and simultaneously at a range of subglobal scales 134 Reimagining the English schools triad 5 As noted in point 2 the spectrum of interstate societies from figure 3 remains unchanged but there is a need to consider the detailed con tents of the what dimension for both transnational and interhuman societies As argued on pp 11828 the differentiation between in terhuman and transnational societies hinges on the distinction be tween primary and secondorder societies ie societies composed of groups of humans on the one hand and of groups of TNAs on the other The difficult bit in this distinction is that if interhuman soci eties achieve actor quality they become TNAs Interhuman societies are thus largely constructed in terms of shared identities with net works posing the main ambiguity about classification On this basis the what dimension of the interhuman pillar runs across a spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated In thinking about this one needs to start with the range of scales on which human identity groups occur The minimum interhuman society is the basic family clan unit necessary for reproduction In the middle of the range one finds large imagined communities such as nations religions and various kinds of functional networks These may be defined in such a way as to always or necessarily exclude some section of the human race such as Gemeinschaft concepts of nationalism or supporters of a particular football club or may be failed universalisms which in principle could include the whole human race but in practice act as dividers all universal religions and political ideologies At the maximum end of the spectrum would be universally shared identi ties which could vary from the minimum recognition by all humans of each other as likeunits paralleling pluralism among states to the advent of a world civilisation linking all of humankind together in a complex web of shared values and elaborated identities In sim ple terms the spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated would represent the exclusive dominance of smallscale groups on one end and the exclusive dominance of a universal identity on the other But since humans in more complex societies generally hold multiple identities this spectrum cannot in the real world represent a spectrum of staged mutually exclusive positions All or at least many will exist simultaneously The minimum position will always exist The maximum universalist one may or may not exist but if it does it will not eliminate the ones in the rest of the spectrum Therefore the spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated will almost always represent a complex mixture the most interest ing question being whether anything at all exists towards the highly 135 From International to World Society integrated end of the spectrum and if it does how strong it is and how deeply rooted Again to reiterate because the boundaries are now hard no significance attaches to the placing of Fragmented next to Asocial or Universal Identities next to No TNAs The question of how to characterise the what dimension for a pure transnational society is a more consciously artificial exercise because as argued above pure transnational societies are rather difficult to imagine Easiest is to start thinking in terms of a weaktostrong spec trum of global civil society defined in terms of TNAs At one end of the spectrum it is perfectly easy to imagine an international sys tem in which no TNAs existed though historical examples of this might be difficult to find The requirement would be a domineer ing interstate society in which the states either suppressed nonstate actors altogether or contained them tightly each within its own bor ders Next would come fragmented transnational societies in which similar types of TNAs build up shared norms rules institutions and identities among themselves In the middle of the spectrum one wouldfindcoalitionsinvolvinglinksamongdifferenttypesofTNAs such as one often finds in peace movements that tie together pure peace groups with religious political and trade union organisations At the strong end would be a kind of pure transnational neome dievalism in which many different types of TNAs recognised each other on the basis of principles of functional differentiation amongst the different types of units and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of unit in relation to each other As already argued in this scheme each domain is at a minimum part of the operating environment of the other two but is there any more systematic relationship among the three domains Notwithstanding the widespread tendency to privilege the state the three are ontologically distinct Both TNAs and states can reproduce themselves in the absence or presence of the other and being collective units they are distinct from individuals But it does not require much hard thinking to show that the societies formed by each type of unit quite quickly begin to play into each other Although it is true that patterns of shared identity among human beings can and do occur on large scales the historical record shows pretty clearly that the creation of the larger imagined com munities such as nations and religions depended heavily on states and TNAs to promote them the Christian churches the later Roman Empire the Abassid Caliphate etc And while it is possible to imagine states 136 Reimagining the English schools triad and TNAs being composed of entirely atomised human individuals the historical record again makes abundantly clear that the developmental potential of both states and TNAs is closely linked to their ability to in tegrate themselves with the shared identity of the people who compose them As Ahrne 1998 89 notes How to make people participate with a moral enthusiasm and at the same time follow orders and rules is in fact a common problem in much organisation theory Obsession with nationalism as the key to linking the three domains is very evident in the attempt common to both IR and political theory and very much alive in the mythology of modernist realworld politics to tie the human sense of shared identitycommunity into the state But as many postmod ernists and globalists of various stripes celebrate and as increasingly acknowledged even in realpolitik circles postCold War there is a new world disorder defined by the degree to which interhuman identities whether kinship ethnonational religious politicalideological cultural or epistemic have spilled out of state containers often with the encour agement of the state though frequently also against its will World his tory with its migrations of peoples and its comings and goings of states and empires has bequeathed humankind a thoroughly mixed condition in which there are both strong overlaps and strong disjunctures between the interhuman and interstate social structures If one blends TNAs into this picture it is clear that the interesting question is less about idealtype transnational societies and mostly about how TNAs relate to the society of states The main development at present is the trend for TNAs to form functional networks among them selves the Bank for International Settlements BIS the International Political Science Association IPSA the International Chess Federation FIDE the European Roundtable business CEOs and innumerable others representing everything from football clubs to trade unions But this trend is less interesting as a study of pure transnational societies than it is as a study of the interplay between the transnational domain and the interstate one The least imaginitive and most politicised way of formulating this relationship is in zerosum terms where gains for one equal losses for the other and the outcome has to be the elimina tion or subordination of one by the other RisseKappen 1995a 313 Much more relevant is to ask how these two domains of human soci ety are redefining each other and what problems and potentialities this development opens up That enquiry takes us away from the mostly static definitional con ceptualisings of society that have occupied this chapter and towards the 137 From International to World Society question of social dynamics and the forces that drive change and evo lution in international social structures I will have more to say about these driving forces in the chapters that follow These questions take us beyond the limits of this chapter To address them one needs to look more closely both at what difference is made by variations in the howwhy dimension across the different types of society and at how the institutions of international society relate to each other To get at this one needs first to look more closely at the questions encompassed in the pluralistsolidarist debate Just what are the kinds of shared values and identities that qualify for movement across the spectrum of types of interstate society This will be done in chapters 5 and 6 Second one needs to look at the geographical dimension If the assumption that international and world society have to be global is abandoned and subglobal levels of society are brought into the picture then there can be no single answer to how interhuman transnational and interstate societies interact with each other at any given point in time and re gional differentiation emerges as a key driving force for change This will be the subject of chapter 7 Astute readers will also have noticed that the terms international society and world society are not present in figure 4 Do these key terms of classical English school usage disappear in a more structural interpretation or if not how are they to be de ployed This question too is best left until we have looked more closely at the pluralistsolidarist debate In the meantime I will use the three terms developed in this chapter interhuman transnational interstate when I want to confine the meaning to a specific domain and the two traditional terms when referring to usage within the existing English school debates 138 5 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate On the basis of the arguments in chapter 4 and the progressive revisions to the English schools three pillars I can now return to the pluralist solidarist debate In chapter 2 I argued that pluralism and solidarism should be understood not as mutually exclusive positions but as positions on a spectrum representing respectively thin and thick sets of shared norms rules and institutions The basic differentiation between thin and thick was qualified by some discussion about the nature of the values shared with pluralism associated with rules about coexis tence and solidarism potentially extending much beyond that I used Bulls ideas about rules of cooperation and the centrality of positive in ternational law to question the reasons behind his pluralism arguing that these can be seen also as a powerful key to an understanding of solidarism wider than the one Bull himself employed I argued against basing solidarism on cosmopolitanism because that approach confines its meaning to a narrow band largely occupied by human rights and therefore excludes much that is of great empirical and theoretical sig nificance to the concept I also argued for allowing solidarism to be a feature of interstate societies and not using it as a vehicle to imply some necessary conflation between international and world society In this chapter I want to pick up these arguments and examine them in more detail Since pluralism already has a fairly welldeveloped image I will concentrate particularly on solidarism the content of which has not been explored in anything like the same depth The debate about pluralism and solidarism is absolutely central to English school theory andhowthedebateisconstructedmakesabigdifferencetowhatcanand cannot be done with the theory In this chapter the initial focus will be on pluralism and solidarism as the key to defining types of interstate society This approach opens the way not only to the economic sector but also 139 From International to World Society brings in other features of solidarism for which substantial empirical referents can be found It also turns ones attention to the question of the institutionsofinternationalsocietywhichwillbethesubjectofchapter6 Classical English school writing discusses a set of pluralist institutions without offering much either in the way of criteria for distinguishing what does and what does not count as an institution in this sense or thoughts about how the institutions of international society change One way of cutting through the complexities of the pluralist solidarist debate is to say that pluralism is what happens when pes simistsrealistsconservatives think about international society and solidarism is what happens when optimistsidealistsliberals do so There is an element of truth in this view but it is problematic for one big reason pessimistic and optimistic evaluations do not arise only as a result of the predispositions of certain charactertypes They can arise also as a result of how the things being evaluated are themselves de fined and interpreted As I hope to show in what follows thinking more carefully about what pluralism and solidarism mean changes the basis on which they are evaluated The detailed discussions of pluralism and solidarism in chapter 2 and in this chapter are thus necessary It matters how things are defined If one accepts the thinthick characterisation of pluralism solidarism developed in chapter 2 then the way forward in this enquiry is to first focus on developing an understanding of solidarism in inter state society and then ask how this might relate to the interhuman and transnational domains Recall that if one accepts the argument that all of international relations is social that enemies is just as much a social structure as rivals or friends then the term interstate society covers a wide spectrum of phenomena ranging from Hobbesian social structures on one end to Kantian at the other In this perspective the debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about types of interstate society with pluralism representing a Westphalian model and solidarism covering a swath of the spectrum from pluralismplus through Kantianism homogenous state domestic structures on liberal lines to the fringes of federation at which point the international dissolves into a single polity Thinking along these lines might be con strued as picking up Mannings 1962 165 idea of international society as a game of letsplaystates What are the constitutive rules of the game of states at the very least sovereignty territoriality diplomacy and how many basic variations within the pluralistsolidarist spec trum do these rules allow of the way in which the game can be played 140 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Where are the boundaries beyond which one is playing a game other than states Does the pursuit of solidarism eventually depart from the game of states and become some other game empire cosmopolitanism federation In the discussion of solidarism in chapter 2 some quite different interpretations were in play Some perhaps most notably Linklater understand solidarism as a specifically liberal linkage between state sovereignty and individual rights The link to human rights has played particularly strongly in English school thinking about solidarism In Vincent Bull Mayall Jackson and others one finds cosmopolitanism as the key to solidarism and for Bull also one finds the question of provi sions for enforcement Suganami 2002 13 sees the pluralistsolidarist debate as differing judgments about the extent of solidarity or potential solidarity in international society and I want to make explicit the cri teria for differentiating judgements At the risk of stating the obvious solidarism rests on the idea of solidarity which implies not only that a unity of interests and sympathies exists amongst a set of actors but that this unity is of a type sufficient to generate capability for collective ac tion Two ideas are the key to unlocking the full meaning of solidarism shared values and the use of these to support collective action In chapter 2 I argued that solidarism was crudely about the number of shared values with many possible candidates for what those values might be But there was already a hint in that argument that the type of values coexistence or cooperation was also a factor in the pluralist solidarist distinction In order to tease out this argument further it helps to investigate three questions about solidarism 1 What type of values if shared count as solidarist 2 Does it make any difference to the question of solidarism how and why any given values are shared 3 What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them These questions have so far only been addressed indirectly if at all in the pluralistsolidarist debate They need to be examined in their own right In one sense they can be seen as asking where the border is between pluralism and solidarism At what point and by what criteria does an interstate society move from being pluralist to solidarist Pluralist in terstate societies are easy to visualise Pluralism generally stands for the familiar Westphalian model based on mutual recognition of sovereignty 141 From International to World Society and nonintervention This model is widely used in both realist and En glish school writing and has easy referents in much modern European and world history Science fiction also registers here One of the things that lifts the universe of Star Trek above its asocial compatriots in the genre from War of the Worlds to Independence Day and Starship Troopers is its development of a pluralist galactic interstate society with diplomacy alliances rules of nonintervention the prime directive and suchlike Neumann 2001 Contemplating solidarist interstate societies puts one on less familiar ground The classic English school thinkers have not much developed this image except in terms of human rights and those who have tried most notably Vincent quickly cross the border into world society by bringing in TNAs and individuals Yet it is a useful discipline to start by confining the exploration of solidarism to interstate societies The most obvious example of a solidarist interstate society that we have albeit only as a subsystem is the EU and the English school has only just be gun to engage with this regional development Diez and Whitman 2000 Manners 2002 If one accepts the argument from chapter 2 that positive international law is the key to interstate society then there is scope for a progressive development of interstate society in which the states work out agreed norms rules and institutions covering various functional areassuchastradefinancepropertyrightshumanrightspollutionand health and safety standards standards of calibration and measurement and suchlike The EU example suggests that progressive solidarism of this sort must necessarily involve major parallel developments in the transnational and interhuman domains and that the liberal version of interstate society as international society is certainly one possibility But it is not the only possibility One could imagine for example an in terstate society that is solidarist in the sense of being based on a high degree of ideological uniformity but where the shared values are na tionalist rather than liberal In such circumstances governments might well develop a quite solidarist interstate society based on their shared view of the political ideal while still also agreeing that each had the right and the duty to develop and foster its own distinctive national culture insulated from the others Intimations of a benign nationalist scenario along these lines can be found in Herz 1950 For theory purposes it is important to keep open the idea of solidarism as something that can happen purely within state systems interstate societies without ne cessarily requiring the spillovers into the interhuman and transnational domains that inevitably at some point become a feature of the liberal 142 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate vision of solidarism As I will show later starting out with the focus on interstate societies is crucial to the subsequent move of asking how developments in the interstate domain relate to those in the interhuman and transnational domains What type of values if shared count as solidarist Since the image of pluralism is relatively clear and since pluralism is the foundation on which solidarism has to be built it makes a good place to start thinking about the criteria that distinguish solidarism from plu ralism Much of the writing about pluralism stresses the centrality of rules of coexistence as the essence of what pluralist international so cieties are about with Jackson 2000 providing perhaps the strongest statement Because it privileges tolerance of difference coexistence is a relatively undemanding social goal One of its enduring attractions is that almost however understood it does not threaten the constitutive rules of the game of states Pluralism does not require moving much beyond the raw selfcentredness and selfinterest of egoistic sovereign actors only that they recognise that their own survival and selfinterest can be enhanced by agreeing some basic rules with the other actors in the system Pluralist international societies thus encompass the first two of Bulls three types of rules discussed in chapter 2 constitutive prin ciples agreed as a society of states rather than a universal empire or a cosmopolitan community or and rules of coexistence which hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements Taken together these provide the basis for Bulls conception of the institutions of classical European international society diplomacy international law the bal ance of power war and the role of great powers to which should cer tainly be added sovereigntynonintervention Sovereignty is the des ignator of property rights and the basis for rules of recognition and its corollary nonintervention sets the basic frame for political relations As James 1999 468 puts it sovereignty is the constitutive principle of interstate relations The balance of power war and the role of the great powers are about how the system is managed to put some limits on violence Diplomacy and international law are about communica tion negotiation and the sanctity of agreements These institutions all play into each other and as Mayall 2000 94 notes international law is the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or falls This classical view of the institutions of international 143 From International to World Society society pretty much sums up the modern European historical expe rience of a pluralist interstate society seeking order through rules of coexistence I will return to the question of the institutions of international soci ety in chapter 6 but at this point one has to ask whether the classical portrait of pluralism just given represents the maximum that pluralism can encompass without spilling over into solidarism In other words how far does the logic of coexistence stretch Bulls 1977a 6771 for mulation wants to draw a line between constitutive rules and rules of coexistence on the one hand and rules of cooperation on the other defining the latter 1977a 70 as prescribing behaviour that is appro priate not to the elementary or primary goals of international life but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence As noted in chapter 2 Bulls rules of cooperation suggest one way of defining solidarism by drawing the line between it and pluralisms limitation to rules of coex istence Alas even a brief reflection on the modern history of pluralist interstate society suggests that Bulls distinction between rules of coex istence and rules of cooperation is too problematic to serve as the way of distinguishing between pluralist and solidarist interstate societies The unquestionably pluralist and mainly European interstate society ofthelaternineteenthcenturyforexamplewasdistinctiveforsettingup the first wave of intergovernmental organisations IGOs These aimed mostly at smoothing technical interoperability between states and peo ples the Universal Postal Union the International Telecommunications Union the International Bureau of Weights and Measures and suchlike These would certainly have to count as rules of cooperation fitting with the idea of more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence Yet they also seem in essence to be about coexistence Like diplomacy they are about redu cing unnecessary frictions and inefficiencies in the intercourse of states and peoples They do not threaten sovereignty and they do not repre sent any substantial collective project at odds with a pluralist structure One can see the presentday equivalent of these more advanced arrange ments of coexistence in the bodies that allocate radio frequencies and orbital slots for geostationary satellites Such arrangements like their nineteenthcentury precursors reflect the pursuit of coexistence in a more technically advanced environment 144 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Examples of state behaviour from the Cold War suggest that the principle of coexistence might even be pushed into rules about deal ing with shared dangers and common fates Given the lamenting in English school classics about the deterioration of international society resulting from the Cold War rivalry of the superpowers there can be little doubt that the interstate society of that time at least at the global level counted as pluralist or even subpluralist Hobbesian Yet the US and the Soviet Union were able to sustain a dialogue and establish a significant array of norms rules and institutions in areas where their fates were linked and they saw common dangers The whole process of detente between them rested on a dialogue about arms control and the need to avoid unstable military configurations and unwanted cri sis escalations A limited amount of inspection was eventually allowed though this issue was always deeply controversial So even between en emies fear of nuclear war made it possible to establish quite extensive cooperation around a shared interest in survival adding its own nuance to the meaning of coexistence It is not difficult to imagine other such grounds for cooperation for example in response to a clear and present global environmental danger for which countermeasures were within reach The measures taken to preserve the ozone layer fall comfortably within a logic of coexistence where the emphasis is on measures ne cessary to maintain the conditions of existence for the members of the society All such developments would be compatible with a pluralist in ternational society committed to preserving its differences and taking a hard view of sovereignty and nonintervention So perhaps would the array of cooperations observed by those neoliberal institutionalists who work with rational choice theory and seek to derive the logic of inter national cooperation from the calculations of egoistic actors in pursuit of their own selfinterest Milner 1997 Snidal 1993 Under pluralism coexistence is rooted in the selfinterest of the states composing interstate society Selfinterest certainly stretches to cooper ation in pursuit of a livable international order but it keeps the focus on differences among the states and does not require that they agree on anything beyond the basics or that they hold any common values other than an interest in survival and the avoidance of unwanted disorder It nevertheless needs to be noted that pluralism does not exclude the mem bers of interstate society from sharing a degree of common identity The institution of sovereignty serves as a kind of bottom line for shared iden tity inasmuch as the states are required to recognise each other as being the same type of entity with the same legal standing Buzan 1993 But 145 From International to World Society classical European interstate society also shared a conception of itself as Christendom or la grande republique and the idea that a shared culture of some sort was if not necessary then extremely helpful in underpinning interstate society is a commonplace in the WightWatson historical side of English school thinking Pluralism therefore does not rule out an element of community States in a pluralist society may share a weak common identity as the Europeans shared Christendom and as the Atlantic states currently share the idea of being Western They may well use this primarily to differentiate themselves from nonmembers as when nineteenthcentury Europeans defined themselves as civilised and others as barbarian or savage and now when the West defines itself as the first world in distinction from various second third and fourth worlds But this useful differentiation between us and them does not stop the members of a pluralist interstate society from construct ing strong differentiations among themselves In Europe this was done first in terms of rival monarchs and raison detat and later and more notoriously in terms of a social Darwinist reading of nationalism If neither shared identity nor Bulls rules of cooperation provide the key to differentiating pluralism from solidarism what does Obviously one cannot go on stretching the meaning of coexistence forever Just as obviously solidarism almost certainly builds on the foundations laid down by pluralism or at least must do so in its early and middle stages whatever it might evolve into in its more advanced forms At least some of Bulls essentially Westphalian institutions can easily be envisaged as operating in and contributing to a solidarist interstate society most obviously diplomacy and international law but also great power man agement and war The portrait of pluralism painted above suggests two principles on which a departure into solidarism might be constructed Both could be added to coexistence yet both also move away from the key defining qualities of pluralism 1 States might abandon the pursuit of difference and exclusivity as their main raison dˆetre and cultivate becoming more alike as a con scious goal One might expect that there would be a correlation on the one hand between solidarism and a substantial degree of homogeneity amongst the domestic constitutions of the members and on the other between diversity in the domestic constitutions of members and pluralism 2 States might acknowledge common values among them that go be yond survival and coexistence and which they agree to pursue by 146 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate coordinating their policies undertaking collective action creating appropriate norms rules and organisations and revising the insti tutions of interstate society The first of these principles reflects a Kantian logic of convergence The second is suggested by Mayalls 2000 21 idea of an enterprise association that exists to pursue substantive goals of its own Mayall clearly thinks that pursuing substantive goals of its own transcends an understanding of pluralism as based on coexistence and I imagine most pluralists would agree He links this idea to cosmopolitanism but that link is not necessary to the idea and in what follows I will take it as being only one among several possibilities underpinning solidarism In practice convergence and pursuit of a joint project will often overlap sometimes substantially but this overlap is not a necessary one for all possible scenarios For convergence among states to move into the realm of solidarism it would have to grow beyond the basic acknowledgement among them that they are all the same type of sovereign entity which is the base line of pluralism This additional commonality might be thought of as a conscious move towards greater homogeneity in domestic structures and values among a set of states It might be a Kantian community of liberaldemocracies as most existing discussions of solidarism pre suppose Or it might equally be a community of communist peoples republics or Islamic states or monarchies or any other form of ideolog ical standardisation It is essential for a sound theoretical development of solidarism to keep these nonliberal options open The human rights focus of most solidarist writing has obscured them from view and gen erated a too narrow and too controversial understanding of what sol idarism is about I do not include here the cultivation of instrumental commonalities such as all landlocked states or all developing countries Those can occur under pluralism as a matter of forming alliances on particular issues Convergence in the sense necessary for solidarism has to involve a deeper sort of wefeeling It has to involve a package of values that is associated not just with belonging to the same civilisation which was true for the states of classical pluralist Europe but also with a substantial degree of convergence in the norms rules institutions and goals of the states concerned Pluralism is abandoned when states not only recognise that they are alike in this sense but see that a significant degree of similarity is valuable and seek to reinforce the security and legitimacy of their own values by consciously linking with others who 147 From International to World Society are likeminded building a shared identity with them Convergence in this sense begins to look like a form of community and in its stronger forms will involve acceptance of some responsibility for other mem bers of the community The literature on pluralist security communities Deutsch et al 1957 Adler and Barnett 1998 explores exactly this type of development Although convergence is still hard to find on a global scale on a sub global scale it shows up rather strongly The EU is a pretty advanced case of conscious convergence among states and many of its stresses and strains result from the continuous necessity of adjusting to this pro cess The socalled Atlantic community or in slightly wider form the West or the liberal democracies represent weaker but still significant instances of convergence around liberal democracy Outside the West one might see such bodies as the Arab League the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference as representing at least aspirations in this direction though mostly not backed up by much substance Even globally the picture is not entirely bleak Recall the argument made in chapter 2 about the apparent overdetermination of homogeneity of units in the international system If the many theories that point in this direction are right then the underpinnings of conver gence are built into the operation of interstate society in several different ways They may not yet have manifested their strength sufficiently to underpin any global solidarism but they might be given some credit for pushing things along to where the logic of likeunits is strong enough at least to support Coexistence forms of pluralism Indeed if homogenisa tion is overdetermined in the international system then it should work in favour both of solidarist society and international and world com munity But homogenisation is a tricky element in human affairs While it may serve as a necessary condition for the development of both so ciety and community it is not therefore a sufficient one Wendt 1999 3537 Groups of similar entities are prone to the notorious narcissism of small differences that afflicts everything from religious communities to academic associations and can lead to extreme social polarisations and violence Wendt tried to tackle the question of homogeneity by dis tinguishing two types isomorphic which he sees as similar to Waltzs idea of like units structural and functional similarity see Buzan and Little 1996 and ideological difference or not in the constitutive princi ples of political legitimacy But it is not clear why there are only these two since one could easily head the way of Rosenaus 1966 pretheory and the failed 1960s project of comparative foreign policy to construct 148 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate typologies of states This approach tends to be defeated by the huge number of significant variables on which states may or may not be alike Homogeneity emerges as a subject in need of much more thinking It could well be that increasing homogeneity amongst the dominant social units in the international system rather than the processes of globali sation is actually the main key to developments in international and world society But what kinds of likeness are crucial and how intense do they have to be The second principle on which an advance into solidarism can be constructed is that states might cooperate in one or more joint projects in pursuit of one or more common values Such projects can of course come in as many different forms as there are common values that might be taken up in this way And joint projects also raise the issue of enforce ment At the pluralist end of the spectrum where international society is thin collective enforcement of rules will be difficult and rare Towards the solidarist end where international society is thicker a degree of col lective enforcement in some areas might well become generally accepted and common Bulls original idea of seeing collective security as a form of solidarism certainly seems right But collective security usually comes attached to a universalist condition anything less than universal par ticipation is not true collective security but mere alliancemaking This definition sets an impossibly high standard and therefore contributed to pluralist pessimism and rejection of solidarism as utopian A softer understanding of collective security which allowed subglobal devel opments such as NATO opens up a more positive view Surely NATOs development of joint command structures and extensive interoperabil ity of forces not to mention its agreement that an attack on one shall be treated as an attack on all has a solidarist ring about it Jackson 2000 3515 The joint pursuit of human rights is by far the bestdeveloped theme in the solidarist literature From Vincents 1986 146 call quoting Henry Kissinger that all governments should accept the removal of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition as the objective of the inter national community as a whole to Wheelers 2000 Knudsens 1999 and others calls for greater protection of human beings against violent abuse by their governments solidarists have campaigned both to pro mote the development of a human rights project by interstate society and to increase awareness that a legal basis for this is already emergent Weller 2002 700 Because it is heavily aspirational and promotional much of this literature depends on linking solidarism to supposedly 149 From International to World Society universalist cosmopolitan values As noted above pursuit of a human rights agenda raises difficult questions about ends and means that have not been adequately explored If observance of human rights has to be imposed on those who do not share belief in the value andor do not calculate observance of it as being to their advantage then one faces the problem that this project can in the short term only be expanded by coercive means Here as elsewhere solidarists cannot escape the dilemma apparent in the whole story of the expansion of international society that rules about a standard of civilisation are generally spread from a subglobal core by a mixture of means in which coercion is often prominent This problem is what animates the more extreme defenders of tolerant noninterventionist pluralism such as Jackson 2000 The universalist requirement also means that too little attention has been given to substantial solidarist developments on a subglobal scale for example in the EU As Jackson 2000 1767 points out environmentalism is another dis tinctive area for solidarist development The idea that states andor citizens should have trusteeship or stewardship of the planet itself is a value quite distinct from human rights As I have argued above ele ments of environmentalism can develop and have done so within the pluralist logic of coexistence But this agenda readily spills over into a much more ambitious collective project encompassing everything from the preservation of particular species and their environments to man agement of the planetary climate It could easily be argued that as with human rights the environmentalist agenda represents a leading aspir ational element of solidarism but also one in which not insignificant practical measures have already been accomplished eg restraints on trade in endangered species or products derived from them restraints on various types of pollution Collective security human rights and environmentalism still repre sent the aspirational more than the empirical side of solidarism a cam paign for collective selfimprovement of the human condition There have been some practical developments but these are small in relation to what most solidarists would like to see What strikes me as pecu liar is the way in which the focus on human rights has resulted in the almost complete ignoring of two other areas in which real solidarist de velopments have been most spectacular the pursuit of joint gain and the pursuit of knowledge It is long past time to begin repairing the English schools neglect of the economic sector The most obvious exemplar of solidarism in the 150 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate pursuit of joint gains lies in liberal understandings of how to organise the economic sector In order to realise joint gains a liberal interna tional economy has to be organised around a host of rules about trade property rights legal process investment banking corporate law and suchlike Unless states can cooperate to liberalise trade and finance so liberal theory goes they will remain stuck with lower levels of growth and innovation higher costs and lower efficiencies than would other wise be the case In order to realise these gains states have both to open their borders and coordinate their behaviours in selected but systematic ways In other words they have to agree to homogenise their domestic structures in a number of quite central respects Over the past half century this has in fact been done to a quite remarkable degree though still short of what the more strident neoliberals continue to demand Al though initially subglobal this development of solidarism is now nearly global in extent What is more it is held in place by an elaborate mix ture of belief calculation and coercion and displays all the complexities of thickness surveyed below see pp 1547 These qualities make it an ideal case study for both the what and the howwhy of solidarism in action and provide excellent leverage on the question of instability in solidarist arrangements The liberal economic project even includes some significant enforcement measures thus meeting the hard test of willingness to support the collective enforcement of international law that was one of Bulls 1966a 52 benchmarks for solidarism There is a pressing need for the English school to bring its perspective to bear on the work in IPE Also neglected is the collective pursuit of knowledge again an area in which the actual record of solidarist achievement is quite impressive International cooperation in big science projects such as physics as tronomy and space exploration now has a substantial record from the multinational projects to pursue highenergy physics through global coordination of astronomical observations to innumerable joint space probes and the international space station Some of this lies in the transnational domain but a great deal is interstate In contrast to the eco nomic sector coercion plays almost no role Belief not only in the pur suit of knowledge for its own sake but also in the means by which such knowledge can be pursued is sufficiently widespread in the world to underpin cooperation motivated by belief and the calculation of joint gain It is worth noting that this kind of joint project is highly constrained under pluralism where it might cut too closely to concerns about tech nologies with military applications 151 From International to World Society All of these joint projects threaten sovereignty if it is defined in strict pluralist terms As the solidarists have long recognised in relation to hu man rights such projects require states to redefine how their sovereignty and their boundaries operate and this is what differentiates solidarist societies from pluralist ones Does it make any difference to solidarism how and why any given values are shared Since pluralism is rooted in the survival instincts and selfinterests of states it does not raise serious questions about either what values are shared or how and why they are shared If there are shared values they will either be instrumental technical ones such as those to do with com munication and common standards or ones closely related to survival questions such as those associated with arms control or environmental management Solidarism by contrast rests on the idea that states share values that are beyond concerns about survival and coexistence and sig nificant enough to underpin the pursuit of joint projects andor conver gence For solidarism therefore the twin questions of what values are shared and how and why they are shared become central Because the pluralistsolidarist debate got hung up on the particular issue of human rights the English school has not investigated sufficiently the question of what the range of values is that can constitute solidarism and not confronted directly the difficult questions about the binding forces that underpin shared values Given both the background of English school work on the expansion of international society and the particular na ture of the human rights issue this neglect is surprising The general history about how a European interstate society became a global one is a story in which persuasion and conversion played some role but coercion was the main engine by which a standard of civilisation was imposed Gong 1984 Bull and Watson 1984a As noted in chapter 4 see pp 98108 similar though usually less militarised coercive practices continue today and the war against Iraq in 2003 could easily be read as old style coercive imposition of a standard of civilisation The human rights issue likewise features coercion Solidarists would prefer it if all states came around to accepting the values of human rights But they do not shy away from advocating military intervention on hu manitarian grounds and they advocate making recognition of sovereign rights conditional on observance of a human rights standard of civilisa tion rooted in cosmopolitan values Wheeler 2000 288310 Solidarists 152 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate therefore cannot avoid confronting the double normative implication inherent in their stance of human rights advocacy Moral questions arise not only in relation to what values are shared but also in relation to how and why they are shared In its bluntest form the moral issue here is whether it is right to use bad means coercion to impose observance of good values human rights In principle this moral dualism applies to any shared values that might define the what dimension of solidarism explored above pp 14352 As Hurrell 2002a 149 argues the decline of consentbased adherence to international society gives rise to tensions between sets of rules that seek to moderate amongst different values and those that seek to promote and enforce a single set of universal values Recall the discussion from chapter 4 of Wendts degrees and modes of internalisation coercion calculation and belief and how these were incorporated as the howwhy dimension in figure 4 Wendts insight is that the different means by which social structures of any sort can be created and sustained do not determine the values defining the social structure In principle any type of social structure can be supported by any type of means The upshot of this argument is that one has to ask of any type of solidarist international society whether the shared values on display rest mainly on coercion calculation or belief SolidaristKantian social structures could be deeply internalised as a result of shared be lief in liberal principles andor they could be a result of instrumental calculations of advantage andor they could be a result of a coercive suzerain able and willing to impose its values on others If understood in terms of sustained patterns of behaviour solidarism is not necessarily about belief Hurrell 2002a 1434 opens the way to this interpretation with his argument that norms encompass both regularities of behaviour among actors and a prescriptive sense of what ought to be done But note the ambiguity of ought It seems to imply beliefs that differen tiate right from wrong in an ethical sense but could also be read in a more rational consequentialist mode of the need to respond to the imperatives of calculation or coercion you ought to behave properly or you will be punished In this view people share the value of human rights or economic liberalism or so long as they behave appropriately to the value and regardless of why they do so The key to solidarism is what values are shared not howwhy they are shared which will always be a mix of coercion calculation and belief Belief is the preferable form of solidarism but not the necessary one especially where solidarism is based on pursuit of joint gain The pursuit of joint 153 From International to World Society gains in the economic sector might be based in part on shared belief in the tenets of economic liberalism but its mainstay is more likely to be calculations of advantage and some weaker players will simply be coerced into going along The projection of a standard of civilisation will also rest on some mixture of coercion calculation and belief As the solidarist literature on human rights makes clear coercion is not ruled out in the pursuit of solidarist international society that the right values are observed is more important than howwhy they are observed Thus Wendts question about depth of internalisation is highly relevant for understanding solidarism Where solidarism is based mainly on belief it will be most durable Where based on calculation or coercion it will be much more vulnerable to changes of circumstance These variations in binding forces matter but they do not define what solidarism is What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them I have argued that pluralism and solidarism should be seen as a spec trum ranging from thin to thick in terms of the values shared amongst the states composing interstate society The implication in figure 4 was that relative thinness and thickness along these lines could be used to set benchmarks for demarcating progression from pluralist through soli darist to Kantian internationalsocieties As noted above this approach is in harmony with the several writers Almeida 2001 James 1993 Watson 1987 1512 who observe that even the most primitive international systems have some elements of international society in terms of shared norms rules institutions I share Almeidas 2002 understanding that pluralism and solidarism are not necessary opposites but can coexist The argument above pp 14352 suggested that qualitative factors to do with the type of shared value should be one criterion for judging the thinness or thickness of interstate societies Values relating to the survival and selfinterest of the states and to coexistence defined plu ralism and therefore thinness Values to do with convergence and the pursuit of joint projects defined solidarism and therefore thickness But if one accepts the general idea of a spectrum from thin to thick definedintermsofthetypeofvaluessharedthisstillleavessomeques tionsaboutwhatthinandthickmeanTheargumentabovepp1524 154 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate reinforced the primacy of what values are shared by making the case that the howwhy of shared values coercion calculation belief applies to all the types of values across the spectrum So the type of values shared does matter Since solidarism builds on pluralism it is also pretty easy to make the case that the number of shared values also matters Moving into the solidarist part of the spectrum will mean adding new values to those already accumulated under pluralism which could as explained above on the logic of coexistence encompass quite a wide range of coop eration It is not difficult to envisage that international societies pursuing convergence will pursue extensions in the number and type of values shared This still leaves the tricky questions of who holds the values and how strongly they do so When one says that a state shares a given value with other states what does this mean At a minimum it means that the present leadership of that state holds that value At a maximum it means that the value is widely diffused throughout the elites and the mass of ordinary citizens In between lie innumerable configurations of contestation and indiffer ence The value may be strongly supported by one political party and its followers and strongly opposed by another and its supporters Or it may be widely supported among the elites but regarded with suspicion or hostility by a substantial part of the population the Davos culture versus the antiglobalisation movement If this pattern extends across state borders such that a set of ruling elites support a value but their citizens mostly oppose it one finds the grounds for tension between international and world society that so worries some English school writers As with the howwhy dimension discussed above variations of this kind will make a difference to the stability of international society opening up the possibility that even quite advanced seemingly soli darist international societies may in fact be quite fragile and vulnerable to sudden reversals because of domestic political changes in key coun tries Thus a value such as human rights or economic liberalism might be quite widely held if viewed simply as a matter of current government policy across a set of states but be fragile because of the way it is held within some or all of those states On top of who holds the value there is the additional question of how strongly those who hold it do so Any person can hold any value with a degree of commitment ranging from passionate and overrid ing to a rather mild and marginal acceptance One may hold oneself to be a Christian or a Japanese or a Manchester United supporter or 155 From International to World Society whatever with a strength positioned anywhere on this spectrum Some values most notably fundamentalist religion and hypernationalism are associated with attempts to cultivate a single overriding commit ment Others will usually be found in an array of overlapping beliefs the famous layers of postmodern identity ranging from member of the human race to supporter of local football team This question is not the same as Wendts one about modedepth of internalisation though the two may interact with each other Belief may range from overriding to mild It is easy to find for example fanatical Christians or Muslims or whose whole lives revolve almost entirely around their religious beliefs and Muslims or for whom their faith is still belief but of a very background sort It is also the case that coercion might in duce a high degree of conforming behaviour in some individuals and only very superficial conforming in others a spectrum that could be ob served in relation to communist ideology in what during the Cold War were called the Eastern European states Although not the same as the howwhy dimension this variable also affects the stability of a solidarist international society One useful perspective on this question of how strongly values are held can be found in the special issue of International Organization on legalisation 2000 543 see also Ratner 1998 The argument there is that legalisation of international agreements among states varies on a spectrum from soft to hard How soft or hard any particular arrange ment is depends on a combination of how binding its terms are on the participants how precise the terms of the agreement are in terms of prescriptions and proscriptions on behaviour and how much power is delegated by the signatories to institutions or third parties to mon itor manage and enforce the terms Goldstein et al 2000 Abbott et al 2000 The argument is that soft and hard legalisations do not neces sarily correlate with soft badweak and hard goodstrong Soft legalisation is better for some kinds of circumstances hard for others Abbott and Snidal 2000 This approach gives a nice insight into the thickness or thinness of institutionalisation Another useful perspective is Krasners 1999 44 spectrum of hightolow conformity with princi ples and norms Adding in the variables of how many shared values held by who and how strongly held and how legalised makes the question of thinthick quite complicated It is easy to imagine many combinations and permu tations that could present themselves as solidarist in terms of the type and number of values shared amongst states These would vary not 156 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate only as regards the particular character and number of values shared but also in terms of how widely and deeply they were shared within and therefore between the states concerned A solidarist interstate society might hinge mainly on shared values to do with economics or mainly on human rights These values might be held widely or narrowly andor strongly or weakly What this scope for variation suggests is that degree of thinness or thickness of interstate society does not offer the type of simplification necessary for it to be theorised and used as a benchmark to define either causes or effects in formal theory The possible vari ance within any given position on the spectrum requires that cases be looked at individually and analyses made according to the particular balance of these factors within them There is scope here for comparative method What this discussion of thinness and thickness most usefully reveals is that analysts of interstate society need to focus as much on the stability of sets of shared values among states as on what the shared values are Krasner199944comesclosetothiswithhisdiscussionofthedurability of institutions the degree to which they change with change of circum stance Recall that what values are held is not affected by the howwhy dimension Wendts modedepth of internalisation Especially when one is dealing with societies of states this variable has to be considered separately It is entirely possible to envisage interstate societies that in a daytoday operational sense share a sufficient number and type of val ues additional to coexistence to count as solidarist but that are largely held together by coercion and calculation The former Soviet bloc gives the flavour as do some of the great empires of history Adding to this howwhy argument the thinthick issues raised here make the stability of interstate societies a separate question from their degree of advance ment in terms of a pluralistsolidarist spectrum Any given interstate society will be more stable to the extent that its shared values are inter nalised more by belief than by calculation or coercion are held broadly rather than narrowly within states do not inspire widespread andor substantial opposition within the state and are held strongly rather than weakly by those who do hold them It will be less stable to the extent that its shared values are internalised more by coercion than by calculation or belief are held narrowly within the states attract widespread andor substantial opposition within the state and are held weakly by those who do hold them Crucial to the stability or not of any interstate society as a whole will be whether these things are true within and between the leading powers 157 From International to World Society Conclusions Whether or not people agree with the interpretation I have put on the pluralistsolidarist debate in this chapter I hope it at least challenges them to make their own positions clearer and provides a benchmark against which to do so I hope I have demonstrated that although sol idarism may be linked to cosmopolitanism the link is not a necessary one and pretending that it is has large costs in terms of how solidarism is understood I hope also to have made a strong case that pluralism and solidarism can be used to think about societies of states and that they are best cast as defining the basis for a typology of interstate societies All I have done here is to establish that solidarism does not necessarily have to be seen as a mixture of international and world society This move opens up analytical space for a range of nonliberal solidarisms Certain mainly liberal forms of solidarism will automatically involve extensions of rights responsibilities and recognitions to individuals and TNAs and thus tie together interstate interhuman and transnational so ciety in important ways But some will not Those campaigning in the name of solidarism need to be aware that they are advocating a partic ular type of solidarist international society and not solidarism per se They also need to add to their concerns about what values are shared an equal concern with those variables that affect the stability of solidarist international societies how and why are values shared by whom how strongly and with what degree of opposition Taking all this into consideration figure 4 requires some further re vision First pluralism and solidarism need to be repositioned so that they define the spectrum of types of interstate society rather than being positions within it as they are in figures 14 This move reflects the con clusion that solidarism is determined largely by the type of value shared and within that the number of values shared It allows for the idea that solidarism at least initially builds on pluralism to become pluralism plus but can then develop into a variety of thicker versions Second having withdrawn pluralism and solidarism from the role of identify ing only two types of international society I relabel the spectrum with a set of benchmark positions identifying types of interstate society At this point it seems appropriate to abandon the English schools and Wendts tradition of linking types of interstate society to iconic political theo rists Tying types of interstate society to Hobbes Locke Grotius and Kant has some appeal but it is fundamentally Westerncentric and for nonWestern cases easily gets in the way Instead I will adopt a set of 158 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Interstate Societies Asocial Confederative Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION DEEP CALCULATION Interhuman Societies Transnational Societies Fragmented Pure Mediaevalism No TNAs Universal Identities Largescale Imagined Communities Coalitions of Like TNAs TNA Coalitions Across Type Competing TNAs Convergence Cooperative Coexistence Power Political Pl ur ali st S ol id ar is t BELIEF Figure 5 The Three Traditions fourth revision repositioning the pluralist and solidarist spectrum more neutral functionally based labels These changes are set out in figure 5 The new set of positions along the spectrum of interstate societies can be summarised as follows r Asocial is confined to the rather rare condition found mostly in science fiction where the only contact between states is wars of extermination unaccompanied by diplomacy or any other form of social contact r Power political represents here much the same as Hobbesian does for Wendt and the traditional English schools international system pil lar namely an international society based largely on enmity and the 159 From International to World Society possibility of war but where there is also some diplomacy alliance making and trade Survival is the main motive for the states and no values are necessarily shared Institutions will be minimal mostly confined to rules of recognition and diplomacy r Coexistence occupies some of the zone taken by Wendts 1999 27997 uncomfortably broad Lockean category focusing on the exemplar of modern Europe and meaning by it the kind of Westphalian system in which the core institutions of international society are the balance of power sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power manage ment war and international law In the English school literature this form is labelled pluralist and incorporates the realist side of Grotian r Cooperative requires developments that go significantly beyond coexis tence but short of extensive domestic convergence It incorporates the more solidarist side of what the English school calls Grotian but might come in many guises depending on what type of values are shared and howwhy they are shared Probably war gets downgraded as an institution and other institutions might arise to reflect the solidarist joint projects more on this in chapter 6 r Convergence means the development of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar po litical legal and economic forms The range of shared values has to be wide enough and substantial enough to generate similar forms of government liberal democracies Islamic theocracies communist to talitarianisms and legal systems based on similar values in respect of such basic issues as property rights human rights and the rela tionship between government and citizens One would expect quite radical changes in the pattern of institutions of international society This definition makes clear the divorce of solidarism from cosmopoli tanism In a society of states the Kantian form of solidarism around liberal values identified by the English school and Wendt is one option but not the only one r Confederative defines the border zone between a solidarist interstate so ciety and the creation of a single political entity between anarchy and hierarchy in Waltzs terminology It is a convergence international so ciety with the addition of significant intergovernmental organisations EU model The idea that each of these types with the probable exception of asocial can be held in place by any mixture of coercion calculation and belief remains unchanged 160 6 The primary institutions of international society The debate about pluralism and solidarism leads into the question of the institutions of international society It seems safe to say that there will be a close relationship between where an international society is located on the pluralistsolidarist spectrum and either what type of in stitutions it has or how it interprets any given institution A number of authors have for example tracked the evolution of sovereignty re lating it inter alia to changes in the internal character of the dominant states Keohane 1995 ReusSmit 1997 Barkin 1998 Sørensen 1999 The concept of institutions is central to English school thinking for three reasons first because it fleshes out the substantive content of interna tional society second because it underpins what English school writers mean by order in international relations and third because the partic ular understanding of institutions in English school thinking is one of the main things that differentiates it from the mainstream rationalist neoliberal institutionalist study of international regimes Quite a bit has been written about the similarities and differences between the English school approach to institutions and that of regime theory Keohane 1988 Hurrell 1991 Evans and Wilson 1992 Buzan 1993 Wæver 1998 10912 Alderson and Hurrell 2000 There is general agreement that these two bodies of literature overlap at several points and that there is significant complementarity between them The essential differences are 1 regime theory is more focused on contemporary events while the English school has a mainly historical perspective 2 regime theory is primarily concerned with particular human constructed arrangements formally or informally organised Keo hane 1988 383 whereas the English school is primarily concerned with historically constructed normative structures Alderson and 161 From International to World Society Hurrell 2000 27 the shared culture elements that precede rational cooperation or what Keohane 1988 385 calls enduring fundamen tal practices which shape and constrain the formation evolution and demise of the more specific institutions Onuf 2002 labels this distinction as evolved versus designed institutions 3 CloselytiedtothepreviouspointisthattheEnglishschoolhasplaced a lot of emphasis on the way in which the institutions of interna tional society and its members are mutually constitutive To pick up Mannings metaphor of the game of states for the English school institutions define what the pieces are and how the game is played Regime theory tends to take both actors and their preferences as given and to define the game as cooperation under anarchy This difference is complemented and reinforced by one of method with regime theory largely wedded to rationalist method Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 and the English school resting on history normative political theory and international legal theory 4 regime theory has applied itself intensively to institutionalisation around economic and technological issues both of which have been neglected by the English school which has concentrated mainly on the politicomilitary sector 5 regime theory has pursued its analysis mainly in terms of actors pursuing selfinterest using the mechanisms of rational cooperation while the English school has focused mainly on common interests andsharedvaluesandthemechanismsofinternationalorderEvans and Wilson 1992 3379 6 de facto but not in principle regime theory has mainly studied sub global phenomena Its stockintrade is studies of specific regimes which usually embody a subset of states negotiating rules about some specific issue fishing pollution shipping arms control trade etc The English school has subordinated the subglobal to the sys temic level talking mainly about the character and operation of international society as a whole The fact that there are two schools of thought within mainstream IR not to mention others outside IR both claiming the concept of insti tutions is in itself a recipe for confusion Wæver 1998 10912 This situation is not helped by a pervasive ambiguity in what differentiates many of the associated concepts such as norms rules and principles The first section takes a brief look at the definitional problems with these concepts The second reviews how the concept of institutions is 162 The primary institutions of international society handled in the English school literature The third examines the con cept of institutions through the lenses of hierarchy and functionalism with a particular look at the distinction between constitutive and reg ulatory rules The fourth surveys the relationship between the range of institutions and the types of international society The fifth section concludes by reflecting on three questions the relationship if any be tween institutions in the English school sense and more materialist structuralinterpretationsofthesamephenomenaandthetwoquestions left hanging in chapter 4 one about how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other and the other about the fate of the concepts international and world society in my structural scheme Definitional problems The terms norms rules values and principles are scattered throughout the literature of both regime theory and the English school yet it is seldom clear what if anything differentiates them and in many usagestheyseeminterchangeableAllarelinkedbytheideathattheirex istence should shape expectations about the behaviour of the members of a social group But what are the differences among shared norms and shared values and shared principles Are norms and rules just shaded variations of the same thing Perhaps the bestknown attempt to con front this is Krasners 1983 2 see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 76971 definition of regimes as implicit or explicit principles norms rules and decisionmaking pro cedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations Principles are beliefs of fact causation and rectitude Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for ac tions Decisionmaking procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice This is quite helpful but does not really produce clear mutually exclu sive concepts There does not for example seem to be much difference between a principle understood as a belief of rectitude and a norm understood as behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations Principles might serve as general propositions from which rules can be deduced but inductive reasoning might also lead from rules to prin ciples Krasners distinction between norms and rules seems to hinge on the degree of formality Both aim to regulate behaviour and both 163 From International to World Society carry the sense that they are authoritative though neither can be seen as causal Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 767 In Krasners scheme norms feel more like the customs of a society with rules occupying the more for mal written possibly legal end of the spectrum Yet norms could also be written down and the general understanding of rules includes custom ary practices It is fundamentally unclear how or whether these two concepts can be disentangled The task is not made easier by Krasners opening move of declaring that all of these concepts can be implicit or explicit which weakens the basis for a distinction between norms and rules on grounds of degree of informality It is also unclear what the standing of decisionmaking procedures is in this scheme Identifying them as prevailing practices simply disguises the fact that they could be principles or norms or rules They do not seem to be something that falls outside the first three concepts Krasner does not mention values and this term is much more important in the English school literature than in the regime theory one A conventional understanding of val ues in the social sense is the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group Moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards easily embraces principles norms and rules The unavoidable entanglements among Krasners concepts perhaps explainwhythesetermsaresooftengroupedtogethernormsrulesand principles or norms rules and institutions Even Kratochwil 1989 10 uses rules norms and principles as synonyms and though he promises to distinguish them later in the book it is far from clear that he ever does so Despite the difficulties Krasners formulation does suggest some helpful distinctions that are worth keeping in mind The idea that norms represent the customary implicit end of the authoritative social regulation of behaviour and rules the more specific explicit end can often be useful and I will try to retain that sense when I use the terms separately The concept of institutions shares some of the ambiguities that attend rules In common usage institution can be understood either in quite specific terms as an organisation or establishment founded for a spe cific purpose or in more general ones as an established custom law or relationship in a society or community Hanks 1986 As noted above these different meanings play strongly into what distinguishes English school theory from regime theory Regime theory is mostly concerned with the first sense though as noted regimes go beyond the idea of intergovernmental organisation Keohane 1988 3835 is keen to draw a distinction between specific institutions understood as things that 164 The primary institutions of international society can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms identifiable in space and time and more fundamental practices providing insti tutionalized constraints at a more enduring level a distinction also pursued by Wæver 1998 10912 Keohane puts particular emphasis on rules arguing that specific institutions exist where there is a per sistent set of rules that must constrain activity shape expectation and prescribe roles This confines his meaning of institution either to for mal organisations with capacity for purposive action or international regimes comprising complexes of rules and organisations a distinc tion also made by Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 This comes close to making the meaning of institution synonymous with intergovernmen tal organisations and legal frameworks Some IR definitions of institution act to blur these two meanings Krasner 1999 43 for example sees institutions as formal or informal structures of norms and rules that are created by actors to increase their utility This formulation seems to lean towards designed rather than evolved institutions but since created is unmodified could be read either way A more elaborate blurring is offered by March and Olson 1998 948 institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them Here the first sentence seems to speak to Keohanes specific institutions the second to his more fundamental practices From the Stanford school Meyer et al 1987 13 we get a definition that leans quite definitelytowardsthefundamentalpracticessideWeseeinstitutionsas cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities andactivitiesintegratingthemintolargerschemesWeseebothpatterns of activity and the units involved in them individuals and other social entities as constructed by such wider rules Although Wæver 1998 112 thinks that the English school operates across these meanings and is confused about its position a case can be made that in fact it largely takes the second more general sense of institution as its starting point Bull 1977a 40 74 goes out of his way to make clear that when he talks of institutions he does not mean in tergovernmental organisations or administrative machinery Bull wants to get at Keohanes fundamental practices Keohane mainly discusses only one member of this category sovereignty which he also picks up in later work Keohane 1995 though he acknowledges that there are 165 From International to World Society others including Bulls set 1988 383 The English school has explored a range of candidates within this deeper sense of institution and it is on this basis that much of its claim to distinctiveness rests Standing back from the IR debates the English schools understand ing of institutions feels close to that developed by Searle 1995 Searle argues that institutions are created when a social function and status are allocated to something but which do not reflect its intrinsic physical properties A wall keeps people out physically whereas markers can do so socially if accepted by those concerned Money is the easiest example where an exchange commodity evolved into paper money which has no intrinsic value other than its status of recognition as money Money and much else in the social world is kept in place by collective agree ment or acceptance Searles idea is that human societies contain large numbers of institutions in this sense and consequently large numbers of what he calls institutional facts resulting from them eg husbands and wives resulting from the institution of marriage For Searle 1995 2 26 institutional facts are a subset of social facts which arise out of collective intentionality Social facts are distinct from brute facts which exist without human thought affecting them He notes 57 that each use of the institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users to the institution which underlines the concern with practices in the IR literature on this subject Both the specific designed and the deeper evolved understandings represent legitimate interpretations of institutions and there is no good reason for trying to exclude one or the other from its meaning Neither meaning is contested and since the essential difference between them is clear the issue is simply to find a way of clarifying which meaning is in play Given the influence of international lawyers on Bull it is perhaps worth pointing out that the distinction between primary and secondary institutions does not derive from Harts 1961 7999 well known formulation about primary and secondary rules Harts concern was to distinguish between primary rules defining illegitimate activ ity in any society and secondary rules which are about transforming custom into a formal framework of law and justice The institutions talked about in regime theory are the products of a certain type of in ternational society most obviously liberal but possibly other types as well and are for the most part consciously designed by states The insti tutions talked about by the English school are constitutive of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and pur pose of any such society For secondorder societies where the members 166 The primary institutions of international society are themselves collective actors such institutions define the units that compose the society Searle 1995 35 argues that social facts in gen eral and institutional facts especially are hierarchically structured On this basis and given that there is no disagreement about the English schools institutions reflecting something more fundamental it does not seem unreasonable to call what the English school and the Stanford school wants to get at primary institutions and those referred to by regime theory as secondary institutions The concept of primary institutions in English school literature If the English schools focus is primary institutions how are these de fined and what range of possibilities is encompassed Regime theorists dealing with secondary institutions can make do with general defini tions such as those provided by Krasner and Keohane Within such definitions there are nearly infinite possibilities for types of formal or ganisation and regime An indication of the type and range of diversity can be found in the discussion about hard and soft law referred to in chapter 5 and the three independent variables obligation precision delegation that produce degrees of hardness and softness in legalisa tion Goldstein et al 2000 Abbott et al 2000 Dealing with primary institutions is a rather different proposition Most English school writ ers spend little if any time defining what they mean by the institutions of international society concentrating instead on listing and discussing a relatively small number that they take to define the essence of what ever international society they are examining Since the idea of primary institutions is not controversial even for those who wish to focus on sec ondary institutions the English schools neglect of definitions though a shortcoming in its literature does not weaken its general position Usage of the term institutions within the English school literature fits pretty well with the key features of primary institutions identified by others viz r that they are relatively fundamental and durable practices that are evolved more than designed and r that they are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other With this understanding in mind and given that the English school lit erature is the main one making a sustained effort to develop the idea 167 From International to World Society of primary institutions for international society it is worth surveying its candidates for the primary institutions as a starting point for an in vestigation into what this universe might contain It seems immediately clear for example that secondorder societies being simpler and hav ing many fewer members than Searles firstorder human societies will contain a relatively small number of primary institutions Wight 1979 111 says that the institutions of international society are according to its nature which implies that institutions will be dif ferent from one type of international society to another This is consis tent with his more historical work Wight 1977 2933 479 in which he identifies various institutions of premodern international societies including messengers conferences and congresses a diplomatic lan guage trade religious sites and festivals Wight does not attempt any distinction between primary and secondary institutions and his list could be boiled down to diplomacy trade and religious sites and fes tivals Also looking backward ReusSmit 1997 notes arbitration as a distinctive feature of classical Greek international society and Cohen 1998 could easily be read as a study of diplomacy as an institution in ancient and classical times In a study of premodern China Zhang 2001 looks at sovereignty diplomacy balance of power and a form of ritual analogous to international law during Chinas anarchic phase 770221 BC and adds the idea that the tribute system was an insti tution of the classical Sinocentric international society in East Asia Warner 2001 6976 shows just how different from Westphalian mod els the institutions of classical Islamic international society were in the process illustrating both the contradictions when the West imposed it self and the range of possibilities within the idea of primary institu tions These ideas about premodern institutions suggest an evolution from the simpler arrangements of tribes citystates and empires in the ancient and classical period into the more sophisticated Westphalian criteria of the modern states system with some overlap in the role of dynastic principles Wight 1979 11112 goes on to enumerate those of what from the context is the international society of the first half of the twentieth century as diplomacy alliances guarantees war and neutrality Somewhat inconsistently he then says that Diplomacy is the institution for negotiating Alliances are the institution for effect ing a common interest Arbitration is an institution for the settlement of minor differences between states War is the institution for the final settlement of differences Elsewhere Wight 1977 11052 puts a lot of emphasis on diplomacy sovereignty international law and balance of 168 The primary institutions of international society power as distinctive to European international society but he does not anywhere draw together his various comments on institutions into a coherent discussion Bull puts institutions on the map for the English school and his set of five institutions of international interstate society diplomacy international law the balance of power war and the role of great pow ers occupies the whole central third of his 1977 book Yet Bull never gives a full definition of what constitutes an institution nor does he set out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from this category Neither does he attempt to explain the difference between his set and Wights Both by noting Wights institutions for premodern international soci eties and by himself setting out a variety of alternative possibilities for future international society Bull appears to accept the idea that primary institutions can and do change but he offers little guidance about how institutions arise and disappear His core statement on institutions is firmly within the Westphalian straitjacket 1977 74 States collaborate with one another in varying degrees in what may be called the institutions of international society the balance of power international law the diplomatic mechanism the managerial system of the great powers and war By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society or serve as a surro gate central authority in the international system They are rather an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration The location of this set in the overall structure of Bulls argument is that they derive from the second of his three types of rules rules of coexist ence which are those setting out the minimum behavioural conditions for society see chapter 2 In Bulls scheme rules of coexistence hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of prop erty rights and sanctity of agreements This placing explains both the pluralist character of these institutions which occurs by definition as rules of coexistence and the curious absence of sovereignty which falls under Bulls first set of rules about the constitutive normative prin ciple of world politics Indeed Bull 1977a 71 does say that it is states themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states but he does not develop this idea whereas the other five get a chapter each 169 From International to World Society Bulls presentation of institutions can be read in two ways either it reflects his pluralist predisposition or it reflects his understanding of the history and present condition of interstate society As argued in chapter 2 there is scope in Bulls institutions for solidarist develop ment But he makes little attempt to explore this or to develop a general definition of primary institutions or to explore the range of possibili ties that might be covered by institutions of international society One possible lead for such an exploration is suggested by the link between Bulls choice of institutions and the explicitly functional quality of his understanding of society Do his ideas about society being constituted by limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements open a functional path into thinking about primary institu tions More on this below Bulls failure both to give a clear definition of primary institutions and to relate to earlier work continues into and in some ways worsens within the more contemporary English school literature For example Mayall 2000 14950 says The framework that I have adopted describes the context of interna tional relations in terms of a set of institutions law diplomacy the balance of power etc and principles Some of these sovereignty territorial integrity and nonintervention have been around since the beginning of the modern statessystem Others selfdetermination nondiscrimination respect for fundamental human rights etc have been added more recently do all these institutions and principles have equal weight or are they arranged in a hierarchy And if so is it fixed Curiously he does not mention nationalism which might be thought to be his major contribution to the English school literature Mayall 1990 2000 and which clearly meets the criteria for primary institutions given above Mayall 2000 94 identifies international law as a kind of master institution the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or falls This view is supported by Kratochwils 1989 251 argument that the international legal order exists simply by virtue of its role in defining the game of international relations and Nardins 1998 20 see contra Nardin Whelan 1998 501 that international so ciety is not merely regulated by international law but constituted by it The arguments made in chapter 2 about the centrality of positive international law to international society might also be taken as rea son to privilege international law in this way Aside from Mayalls 170 The primary institutions of international society exasperating etceteras which leave one wondering what the full sets might look like we are offered a distinction between institutions and principles with no explanation as to what the difference might be or any clear setting out of which items belong in which category His good questions about weight and change seem to apply to both together and therefore to suggest that perhaps there is no difference and Mayall in any case does not attempt to answer them Perhaps picking up on Bulls undeveloped point and in contrast to Mayalls and Kratochwils elevation of international law James 1999 468 says that sovereignty is the constitutive principle of interstate rela tions though in earlier work James 1978 he identifies diplomacy in ternational law and sovereignty as the key phenomena indicating the presence of international society Interestingly James 1978 3 also hints at a functional understanding of institutions by talking of sovereignty in terms of rules about who can be a member of international society The emphasis on sovereignty is also shared by Jackson 2000 10212 who although he does not mount a direct discussion of institutions also talks about diplomacy colonialism international law and war in terms compatible with an institutional view ReusSmit 1997 focuses on inter national law and multilateralism as the key contemporary institutions of interstate society and Keohane 1995 also seems to lean towards multilateralism To add to the mixture some solidarists Knudsen 1999 39ff want to push human rights almost to the status of an institution while others Wheeler 2000 talk about it more ambiguously in terms of a norm of international society As with Mayalls distinction between institutions and principles it is not clear what if anything draws the line between institutions and norms of international society Both carry a sense of being durable features and in that sense social structures of a society and both are about constituting roles and actors and shaping expectations of behaviour If the concept of primary institutions is to play a coherent role in English school theory then we need to improve our understanding of what it does and does not represent The existing discussion suggests several points needing further thought r that there is an urgent need to acknowledge the centrality of primary institutions in English school theory to generate consistency in the use and understanding of the concept and to make clear what does and does not count as a primary institution 171 From International to World Society r thatBullsclassicsetoffiveinstitutionsismuchmoreastatementabout historical pluralist international societies than any kind of universal foralltime set and that consequently there is a need to flesh out the wider range of primary institutions r that institutions can change and that processes of creation and decay need to be part of the picture r that perhaps not all primary institutions are equal and that some sort of hierarchy may need to be introduced r that a functional understanding of primary institutions is worth investigating A timely paper by Holsti 2002 has begun a systematic and stimulat ing attempt to take the taxonomy of primary international institutions in hand Holstis starting point is a concern to develop primary institu tions as benchmarks for monitoring significant change in international systems Holsti 2002 6 sees institutions in this sense as embodying three essential elements practices ideas and normsrules in varying mixtures He adds Holsti 2002 910 a key distinction between foun dational and procedural institutions Foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors They also define the funda mental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based Procedural institutions are repetitive practices ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors including the conduct of both conflict and normal intercourse Although Holsti divides institutions into two types it is clear that he is not repeating the division between primary and sec ondary institutions his procedural institutions are still primary in con cept not regimes or IGOs Like Mayall Holsti shies away from giving definitive lists but he includes as foundational institutions sovereignty states territoriality and the fundamental principles of international law Among procedural institutions he includes diplomacy war trade and colonialism A similar move is made by ReusSmit 1997 55666 when he identifies three layers in modern international society The deepest layer he calls constitutional structures which are similar to Holstis foundational institutions Constitutional structures reflect a hierarchy of deep constitutive values a shared belief about the moral purpose of centalized political organisation an organising principle of sovereignty and a norm of pure procedural justice Picking up the functional theme he says that these structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs principles and norms that perform two functions in ordering 172 The primary institutions of international society international societies they define what constitutes a legitimate actor entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action The middle layer ReusSmit calls fundamental institutions which he sees as basic rules of practice such as bilateralism multilateralism and international law This does not feel quite the same as Holstis procedural institutions but the concept is not elaborated enough to tease out the difference either in principle or practice and the difference is perhaps not large ReusSmits third layer is issuespecific regimes which brings us back to the distinc tion between primary and secondary institutions Although they con tain some embellishments both Holstis and ReusSmits definitions of primary institutions are broadly in line with the definitions discussed above Holstis approach tackles the question of change and evolution in in ternational institutions and thereby allows both entry into and exit from BullspluralistmodelInthisaspecthisworkrunsinparallelwithothers who have not only focused on institutions but also on the process of institutionalisation Krasner 1999 44 raises the question of durability which he defines as whether principles and norms endure or change with change of circumstances The Stanford school Meyer et al 1987 13 define institutionalisation as the process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come to be normatively and cognitively held in place and practically taken for granted as lawful whether as a matter of formal law custom or knowledge March and Olsen 1998 95969 draw attention to the way in which the development of inter action and competence tends to lead to institutionalisation and to the need to study how political history evolves in terms of institutions I will look more closely at the process of institutionalisation in chapter 8 Holsti shows how new institutions arise trade and some old ones drop out of use altogether colonialism see also Keene 2002 60144 and it is apparent that any study of institutional dynamics must incor porate both the rise and consolidation of institutions and their decay and demise He argues that war has decayed as an institution of con temporary international society taking a similar view to Mayalls 2000 19 remark that in the twentieth century war became regarded more as the breakdown of international society than as a sign of its operation Other institutions have become much more elaborate and complicated international law dipomacy In general Holsti sets up a scheme that invites observers to look not just for the existence or not of institutions but whether the trend is for those that do exist to strengthen weaken 173 Table 1 Candidates for primary institutions of international society by authorc Wight Bull Mayalla Holstib James Jackson Religious sites and festivals Dynastic principles Trade Trade P Diplomacy Diplomacy Diplomacy I DiplomacyP Diplomacy Diplomacy Alliances Guarantees War War War P War Neutrality Arbitration Balance of Power Balance of Power Balance of Power I Great power management International Law International Law International Law I International Law F International Law International Law The State The State F Sovereignty Sovereignty P Sovereignty F Sovereignty Sovereignty Territorial Integrity P Territoriality F Political boundaries Nonintervention P SelfDetermination P NonDiscrimination P Human Rights P Colonialism P Colonialism Notes a for Mayall I institution and P principle b for Holsti F foundational institution and P procedural institution c words underlined are where the author identifies an institution as principal or master or bedrock The primary institutions of international society or evolve internally Holstis scheme and ReusSmits also address explicitly the question of hierarchy among primary institutions and not just between primary and secondary ones though more think ing is needed about this Holstis statement 2002 13 that sovereignty is the bedrock for all other international institutions reinforces the discord between on the one hand the seemingly similar positions of Alan James and Robert Jackson cited above and on the other Mayalls Kratochwils and Nardins virtually identical statements about interna tional law The whole idea of bedrock institutions seems to suggest a special status for some even within the foundational category It is also unclear in these discussions whether the claims for bedrock status are general to any interstate society or specific to the Westphalian one and its contemporary derivative In addition Holstis inclusion of the state as a foundational institution alongside sovereignty and territoriality looks problematic It is not clear that anything of consequence is left if one subtracts sovereignty and territoriality from the state Neither is it clear that the state fits within Holstis definition If as he says foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors and the fundamental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based then actors cannot be primary institutions This ar gument also undercuts Bulls unexplored classification of the state as the principal institution of international society Primary institutions have to reflect some shared principle norm or value In this instance states would be the actors constituted by the combination of sovereignty and territoriality Although not identifying all of the writers who have had something to say about primary institutions the current state of play on primary institutions in English school literature is roughly summarised in table 1 One might want to add to it ReusSmits and Keohanes idea that multilateralism is an institution if not of interstate society globally at least amongst the Western states and their circle This summary is inspiring because it is clearly getting at something basic and important about international social structure that is not cov ered either by secondary institutions or by Wendts broad classification of basic types of social order It is also both instructive and a bit de pressing It is depressing because it reveals something approaching in difference towards both conceptual clarity and cumulative debate The English schools interest in primary institutions might be a candidate for the coherent research program that Keohane 1988 392 accuses the re flectivists of lacking but to qualify will require much more systematic 175 From International to World Society thinking than it has received so far The summary is instructive on two grounds First because it suggests that there is a lot more to primary institutions than sovereignty As Onuf 2002 228 astutely observes it is a feature of realist thinking that sovereignty is the only rule that matters for the constitution of anarchy A systematic approach through primary institutions would thus settle once and for all what it is that differentiates English school theory from realism Second primary in stitutions do have some kind of lifecycle in which they rise evolve and decline and this dynamic itself needs to be a focus of study more on this in chapter 8 The summary also suggests a recurrent desire to differentiate primary institutions into some sort of hierarchy between the deeper and more constitutive and the less deep and more procedu ral Alongside this and not clearly connected to it are the hints about a functional understanding of primary institutions How can one be gin to transform the English schools lists into a coherent taxonomy I will begin with ideas about hierarchy and then turn to the functional question Hierarchy and functionalism within primary institutions What lies behind the persistent tendency in writings about primary in stitutionseithertofingersomeoneinstitutionasprimaryormasteror to make some more general distinction Mayalls institutions and prin ciples Holstis procedural and foundational institutions ReusSmits constitutional structures and fundamental institutions The idea of a primary or master institution implies that one deep practice essen tially generates or shapes all of the others The idea of two layers of primary institutions implies that some are deeper than others Looking first at the notion of layers Holstis and ReusSmits dis tinctions are based on the idea that some proceduralfoundational institutions are about repetitive practices and interactions while others foundationalconstitutional structures are about how the actors and the basic rules of the game among them are constituted A distinction along these lines is similar to the one used by Ruggie 1998 and others eg Kratochwil 1989 26 Searle 1995 278 Sørensen 1999 between reg ulative and constitutive rules Since as argued above pp 1637 norms rules principles and values all overlap and since institutions embody all of them it seems reasonable to transpose the logic developed around constitutive and regulatory rules to the discussion about different types 176 The primary institutions of international society of primary institutions Regulative rules are intended to have causal effects on a preexisting activity while constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any particular consciously organised social activity they specify what counts as that activity Ruggie 1998 22 Searle 1995 114 argues that institutions always consist in constitutive rules practices procedures that have the form X counts as Y in context C It seems that the strange status of the state in Bulls scheme and his silence about sovereignty reflect the positioning of his institutions within his rules of coexistence category which leaves out the institu tions to be found under his constitutive rules Bull thus comes close to falling foul of the criticism made by Ruggie 1998 25 of neorealists and neoliberals that they exclude constitutive rules and that the scope of their theories is confined to regulative rules that coordinate be haviour in a preconstituted world Yet that would not be quite fair since several of Bulls institutions do seem to fit under Holstis foun dational category and Ruggies constitutive one At first glance it is not exactly clear how one would interpret Bulls three types of rules in the light of Holstis and Ruggies dyadic classifications Bulls consti tutive rules probably fit within Holstis foundational institutions and Ruggies constitutive rules His rules of cooperation probably fit within Holstis procedural institutions and Ruggies regulative rules and may also overlap with secondary institutions But quite where Bulls rules of coexistence and hence his five institutions fit is not immediately obvious We are in the murky waters signposted by Hurrell 2002a 145 when he noted the absence of any clear answer as to what ac tually are the most important constitutive rules in international rela tions One thing that is clear is that this debate is about a different concern from Harts 1961 distinction between primary and secondary rules which is more narrowly aimed at how custom is transformed into law Just what does count as constitutive in relation to interstate societies Since the English school has in part justified its distinctiveness from mainly American regime theory by pointing to the constitutive quality of what it means by institutions getting some sort of coherent answer to this question is essential to the standing of English school theory As already noted Bulls idea of constitutive rules is the social struc tural analogue to Waltzs first tier of structure comprising the ordering principle of the system that defines whether it is a society of states a universal empire a cosmopolitan society or whatever Bulls rules of coexistence are heavily shaped by the prior choice of sovereign 177 From International to World Society territorial states within this first tier of constitutive rules The rules of coexistence then set out the minimum behavioural conditions for society in other words a kind of bottom line necessary for some sort of interstate society to exist Holstis and ReusSmits deepest layers define both the key actors and the fundamental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based Ruggies idea is that constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any par ticular consciously organised social activity with the example of a game eg chess Searle 1995 278 giving clear guidance As in chess the rules define the pieces the environment in which the pieces act and the ways in which they relate to each other and that environment Tak ing all these ideas together and staying with a game metaphor chess or Mannings game of states it becomes apparent that there are two core elements in the idea of constitutive institutions one is that such institutions define the main piecesplayers in the game the other that they define the basic rules by which the piecesplayers relate to each other This sounds relatively simple but is not One problem concerns the separability of piecesplayers on the one hand and the rules of en gagement on the other These might be separate as in chess but they might also be linked as in the mutual constitution resolution to the agentstructure problem Sovereignty as the defining quality of states piecesplayers cannot be disentangled from anarchy as the defin ing quality of system structure and therefore the rules of the game This link is dynamic and as the several accounts of the evolution of sovereignty noted above make clear both states and the game they play change over time Sovereignty may stay constant as the key constitu tive institution but the practices that it legitimises are under continuous renegotiation This changeability within a constant is less of a contrast to chess than might be imagined the rules of chess have changed quite fre quently without the identity of the game coming into question Hassner 2003 A second problem lies in the conflation of pieces and players In chess the pieces are constituted by the rules but the pieces are not the players and although the activity of chess may be constituted by its rules the people who play it are not except in the very limited sense of being temporarily constituted as chess players In the game of states this distinction is much less clear The pieces and the players are still separable pieces states players political leaders and diplomats but they are closely interlinked as captured in the distinction between roleandidiosyncraticvariablesinthestudyofforeignpolicymaking 178 The primary institutions of international society Where the pieces states are composed of sentient social actors then what the pieces are and how they relate to each other will inevitably be connected On this basis Holsti and ReusSmit would seem to be correct in proposing that for the game of states constitutive institutions must define both the main actors and the basic rules by which they relate to each other What does such a conclusion mean in practical terms The clearest candidates for the status of constitutive institutions will be those that bear directly on the definition of the principal actorsplayers in the game Taking the cue from Bulls discussion of constitutive principles for the game of states in Westphalian form the key constitutive institu tions would be sovereignty and territoriality for the game of empires it would be suzerainty for a cosmopolitian community it would be human rights and for a neomedieval system it would be the set of principles that differentiated the main types of actors and set out their rights and responsibilities in relation to each other For something like the EU the constitutive institution remains sovereignty but accompanied by in tegration and subsidiarity the investment of authority at the lowest possible level of an institutional hierarchy McLean 1996 482 It is not impossible for some of these rules to coexist During the colonial era for example the European states system was constituted by sovereignty but the European powers related to the rest of the world on the basis of suzerainty which defined a range of imperial entities from dominions through protectorates to colonies Holsti and Keene 2000 2002 are thus quite right to identify colonialism as a key institution of pre1945 European international society Thinking just about what constitutes the actorsplayers pushes one towards the idea of master or princi pal primary institutions where perhaps one or two key foundational practices do seem to set up the rest of the game Moving to constitutive institutions focused on the basic rules of en gagement is more difficult Where is the boundary between what counts as basic or fundamental rules coexistence for Bull rules that de fine the game for Ruggie fundamental principles defining relations for Holsti and ReusSmit and cooperationregulativeprocedural rules Bulls idea of rules of cooperation being about secondary issues those more advanced rules agreed by states beyond mere coexistence looks immediately problematic Such rules can include trade and human rights both of which might well count as constitutive in the sense that they impact quickly and deeply on what practices are legitimised or not by sovereignty and therefore how the key players are defined 179 From International to World Society Both Holstis and ReusSmits procedural rules and Ruggies regula tive ones are trying to define a level that is relatively superficial in the sense that it downplays or eliminates the constitutive element Holstis procedural institutions are repetitive practices ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors Ruggies regulative rules are intended to have causal effects on a preexisting activity The idea here is to capture as it were the regular practices that sentient players engage in once the actors are established the basic rules are in place and the game of states is under way But this seemingly clear distinction is hard to sustain Even at the level of secondary institutions there are plausible claims that the buildup of networks of regimes eventually entangles states to such an extent as to change quite fundamentally the nature of relations among them more legal and institutionalised less war and thus to call into question the neorealist understanding of what anarchy means Such claims are intrinsic to much of the discussion of globalisation and world society and are not difficult to find in other literatures Keohane and Nye 1977 Wendt 1999 Milner 1991 In effect such claims connect even secondary institutions at least in their cumulative effect as expressions of the primary institution of multilateralism to constitutive status Holsti counts both trade and war as procedural institutions yet there are compelling arguments that both have major effects on the constitution and behaviour of states eg Keohane and Nye 1977 Tilly 1990 One key element in the difficulty of drawing a boundary between constitutive institutions and regulatory rules is the breakdown of the analogy between games such as chess where the pieces are not the play ers and games such as states where the pieces and the players are more closely intertwined In the game of states the players can reinter pret existing institutions as they go along Ashleys 1987 411 seem ingly convoluted definition of international community is close to the sense of primary institutions and captures this idea of essential fluidity well international community can only be seen as a never completed prod uct of multiple historical practices a stillcontested product of struggle to impose interpretation upon interpretation In its form it can only be understood as a network of historically fabricated practical under standings precedents skills and procedures that define competent international subjectivity and that occupy a precariously held social space pried open amidst contending historical forces multiple inter pretations and plural practices 180 The primary institutions of international society As Holstis discussion makes clear within the game of states even quite basic institutions colonialism in his set which does define actors in the system can disappear as the game evolves or at least atrophy to the point where the label is no longer an acceptable way of charac terising practices Holsti tracks substantial changes of interpretation in other primary institutions as well such as sovereignty see also Keohane 1995 Barkin 1998 Sørensen 1999 war and international law The shared norms or principles represented by primary institutions can endure in a general sense while the particular rules and institutional facts that they legitimise undergo substantial change The problem is how to dis tinguish between those institutions that change the nature of the game and the character of the key players and those that dont Drawing any such distinction in a definitive way is certain to be both difficult and controversial There is endless scope for dispute as to what extent new institutions the market or human rights change either the game or the players and over what time periods they do so In terms of the discus sion in chapter 5 the question is does solidarism change the game of states and at what point do those changes add up to a new game for which the name game of states is no longer appropriate A suggestive answer to this question is provided by the tendency of EU studies to drift away from both IR and Politics implying that at least in the minds of many of those who study it the EU cannot be adequately understood either as a state or as a game of states Taking all of this into consideration one can make the follow ing general characterisation of the primary institutions of interstate society r Primary institutions are durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies amd embodying a mix of norms rules and principles In some cases these shared practices and values may be extended to and accepted by nonstate actors r In order to count as a primary institution such practices must play a constitutive role in relation to both the piecesplayers and the rules of the game There is probably not a useful distinction to be made between constitutive and regulatory or fundamental and procedural primary institutions r Although durable primary institutions are neither permanent nor fixed They will typically undergo a historical pattern of rise evo lution and decline that is long by the standards of a human lifetime 181 From International to World Society Changes in the practices within an institution may be a sign of vigour and adaptation as those in sovereignty over the last couple of cen turies or of decline as in the narrowing legitimacy of war over the last halfcentury One needs to distinguish between changes in and changes of primary institutions Although I have argued that a constitutiveregulatory distinction cannot be used as the basis for a hierarchy within primary institutions the sense in the literature that there needs to be a hierarchy is strong It is also uncontestable that there needs to be a better taxonomy of primary institutions The simplest solution to the hierarchy problem is to treat it as an issue of nesting Some primary institutions can be understood as containing or generating others International law for example can be seen as a general institution a set of fundamental principles and also as the container of the potentially endless particular laws about a wide variety of specific issues that can be built up within it and which mostly fall under what I have labelled here as secondary institutions The trick is to find primary institutions that stand alone Looking again at table 1 it is clear that some of the candidates do stand alone whereas others are derivative Sovereignty is a good candidate for a master institution of West phalian international society Within it one could bundle up May alls principles of nonintervention selfdetermination and non discrimination A good case could be made for seeing international law as derivative from sovereignty Although there could in principle be international law without sovereignty as Mosler 1980 1 argues before sovereignty in ancient and classical times there was no conception of a universal community of rules or laws on this question see Onuma 2000 Zhang 2001 Without international law it is difficult to imag ine much international relations among sovereign entities other than war Territoriality or territorial integrity is distinct from sovereignty and not necessary to it Sovereignty can in principle exist without being territorial even though in practice that might be difficult to implement Territoriality is therefore a distinct master institution of Westphalian interstate societies Ruggie 1993 It might be argued that boundaries are a derivative institution from territoriality though it could also be argued that territoriality and boundaries are opposite sides of the same coin As argued above sovereignty and territoriality together constitute 182 The primary institutions of international society the essence of the Westphalian state and so eliminate Bulls and Holstis attempt to see the state itself as a primary institution Diplomacy is another good candidate for a master institution In his torical terms it predates sovereignty and it easily bundles up Wights messengers conferences and congresses diplomatic language and arbitration and ReusSmits multilateralism Balance of power is a clear fourth Westphalian master institution When understood as a recognised social practice and shared value rather than as a mechanical consequence of anarchy balance of power contains alliances guarantees neutrality and great power management It also contains war again when understood as a social practice Searle 1995 8990 which as Wight noted is the institution for the final settlement of differences Of the list in table 1 that leaves religious sites and festivals dynastic principles trade human rights and colonialism as not clearly deriva tive or subordinate to any other master institution Religious sites and festivals have dropped away as a feature of modern European interna tional society but clearly played a central role in ancient and classical times and retain unquestionable importance in subglobal international societies notably those of the Islamic Jewish and Hindu worlds Dy nastic principles have also faded out of European international society but they were crucial in its early phases and were prominent also in ancient and classical times Trade is another very old practice in hu man affairs and does not depend on any of the four master institutions listed above Buzan and Little 2000 Whether trade as such is the in stitution or particular principles applying to it such as protectionism or the market is an interesting question needing more thought A good case can be made that over the past century and a half there has been a battle between these two principles of how to govern trade and that since the end of the Cold War the market has emerged clearly as one of the major primary institutions of contemporary interstate society Even with that resolution however there remains a vigorous battle between economic and embedded liberals for the soul of the market As noted above human rights is a cosmopolitan institution but it can also be picked up as a shared value in an interstate society Probably it is not a master institution in itself but derivative from the principle of equality of people established as part of decolonisation Conversely colonialism was a derivative primary institution of international society up to 1945 resting on the general principle of inequality of peoples 183 From International to World Society Table 2 The nested hierarchy of international institutions Primary Institutions Master Derivative Sovereignty Nonintervention International law Territoriality Boundaries Diplomacy Messengersdiplomats ConferencesCongresses Multilateralism Diplomatic language Arbitration Balance of power Antihegemonism Alliances Guarantees Neutrality War Great power management Equality of people Human Rights Humanitarian intervention Inequality of people Colonialism Dynasticism Trade Market Protectionism Hegemonic stability Nationalism Selfdetermination Popular sovereignty Democracy On the basis of this discussion and setting aside religious sites and festivals and dynastic principles on the grounds that they are mostly of historical interest a simple logic of nesting generates a preliminary pattern of master and derivative primary institutions applying to mod ern interstate societies as set out in table 2 I am aware that some will find the dispositions in table 2 controversial and I offer them more as a way of opening than of closing a debate about nesting as one way of dealing with the problem of hierarchy within primary institutions that is not resolved by the distinction between constitutive and regulatory rules Of course tables 1 and 2 do not contain all of the possible primary institutions and neither do they tell us what the contemporary pat tern looks like Given the pluralist dispositions of the authors involved these lists have not only an interstate but also a specific Westphalian 184 The primary institutions of international society bias and even there are not complete One thing that is noticeable about trade human rights and colonialism in relation to sovereignty territori ality diplomacy and balance of power is that they dont fit comfortably together Sovereignty territoriality diplomacy and balance of power are a harmonious set They do not guarantee peace but they complement each other comfortably and contain no necessary contradictions The market human rights and colonialism raise contradictions The contra diction between human rights on the one hand and sovereigntynon intervention on the other is well developed in the English school liter ature Bull 1977a Mayall 2000 Jackson 2000 Colonialism contradicts sovereignty by creating a society of unequals a mix of Westphalian and imperial forms Keene 2002 The market principle creates tensions with sovereignty and territoriality not to mention balance of power in ways that have been well explored in the literatures of IPE and globalisation Given the problem of contradictions it is not without significance that nationalism which given its importance as the political legitimiser for sovereignty might well be thought a quite longstanding master institu tion of interstate society is not part of table 1 Like trade human rights and colonialism nationalism and its corollaries popular sovereignty and the right of selfdetermination create contradictions with some of the other master institutions sovereignty territoriality trade even at times diplomacy a story well told by Mayall 1990 Nationalism as Mayall 2000 84 notes sacralises territory by making sovereignty pop ular It can also underpin the solidarist call derided by Jackson 2000 366 to make democracy a universal institution of interstate society It is perhaps no accident that the English school classics avoided talk of trade and nationalism for fear of disrupting the harmony of their core Westphalian set of institutions Bull and more recently Jackson put the pursuit of order as their first priority A consequent disinclination to take on board disruptive institutions would be of a piece with their often fierce resistance to human rights which creates similar tensions Although the potential for contradictions among primary institutions is real it is also sometimes overdone The fear that the WTO regime degrades sovereignty by imposing rules and restrictions on states for example is a common part of the debate about globalisation In defence the OECD 1998 1314 7790 argues that since states agree to the rules in pursuit of what they define as their own national interests the trade regime is an exercise of sovereignty not a surrender of it This line is close to Mannings cited in chapter 2 that What is essentially a system 185 From International to World Society of law for sovereigns being premised on their very sovereignty does not by the fact of being strengthened put in jeopardy the sovereign ties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence Not at any rate in logic Those classics of the English school that subordinate the exploration of tensions among primary institutions to the concern for order block one of the most interesting insights to be gained from the study of primary institutions that tensions among them are a key driv ing force in the evolution of interstate society More on this in chapters 7 and 8 Another missing primary institution is environmentalism discussed by Jackson 2000 1758 as a fourth area of responsibility after national international and humanitarian involving stewardship or trusteeship of the planet This was little if at all discussed by earlier English school writers in part because the issue was not then as prominent as it later became As discussed in chapter 5 environmental stewardship can up to a point be fitted into a pluralist logic of coexistence but it can also become a solidarist project It might be argued that environmentalism as a master institution is generating derivative institutions such as the right to survival for all species Taking these additions into account and focusing in on the particular pattern of contemporary international institutions is the task of table 3 Here it is also possible to begin seeing roughly how primary and sec ondary institutions relate to each other though I have not tried to trace all of the crosslinkages where secondary institutions might well link to or express more than one primary institution eg the UNGA linking to sovereignty diplomacy selfdetermination Note also how in this more specific focus the market and great power management move to the sta tus of primary institutions with their own derivatives Again as with table 2 I offer this interpretation as a way of opening a discussion that the English school and others interested in international institutions need to have I will look in more detail at the institutions of contemporary inter national society and the dynamics that drive them in chapter 8 There remains the question of exploring the path opened by Bull James and ReusSmit towards a functional understanding of primary institutions Onecouldalsoderivefunctionalleaningsfromthediscussionaboutcon stitutive rules being what define the players and the rules of the game Heading in that direction requires abandoning the empirical inductive approach with which I started and turning towards a more deductive 186 The primary institutions of international society Table 3 Contemporary international institutions Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions Master Derivative examples of Sovereignty Nonintervention UN General Assembly International law Most regimes ICJ ICC Territoriality Boundaries Some PKOs Diplomacy Bilateralism Embassies Multilateralism United Nations Conferences Most IGOs regimes Great power management Alliances NATO War UN Security Council Balance of power Equality of people Human rights UNHCR Humanitarian intervention Market Trade liberalisation GATTWTO MFN agreements Financial liberalisation Hegemonic stability IBRD IMF BIS Nationalism Selfdetermination Some PKOs Popular sovereignty Democracy Environmental stewardship Species survival Climate stability CITES UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol IPCC Montreal Protocol etc approach Jack Donnelly 2002 213 has made a preliminary start down this path choosing a functional logic as a way both of building on Bulls understanding of society and of addressing the manifest shortcomings of the English schools simple lists Without giving much explanation as to why he offers five types of political functions as likely to be per formed in any international society and begins to allocate institutions to them communicating and interacting diplomacy heralds and messen gers the ancient Greek practice of proxeny making and applying rules international law regulating the use of force war just war rules vari ous practices specifying the right to bear arms aggregating interests and power alliances spheres of influence IGOs feudal obligations religious solidarity and allocating jurisdiction and establishing status sovereignty suzerainty universal empire Donnellys paper is his first cut at a large 187 From International to World Society project and while understandably unsatisfactory in some respects at this early stage is nevertheless usefully suggestive not least in starting from the requirements of secondorder international societies rather than assuming as Bull does that one can start from the requirements of any form of society Unlike firstorder societies secondorder societies do not have to deal with some basic human functions such as sex birth and death But be cause unlike the individual humans who compose firstorder societies their entities are both collective and socially constructed they do have distinctive problems about communication and recognition As James and ReusSmit emphasise secondorder societies have a particular need to specify what kinds of collective actors are allowed membership and what not Since the entities are collective they also need rules about how communication is to be conducted and which voice from within is to be treated as authoritative Beyond that the obvious historic core concerns of secondorder societies are with war and commerce which are captured by Bulls emphasis respectively on constraints on the use of force and allocation of property rights To pursue either commerce or restraints on the resort to war necessitates bringing in Bulls third element of society which is understandings about the sanctity of agree ments One could therefore start a functional analysis of the primary institutions of international society with these five In terms of the in stitutions discussed earlier in this chapter the allocations might go as follows Membership the importance of defining the membership of a second order society was apparent in the discussion above about constitutive rules and who the playersactors are Membership partly overlaps with Donnellys category of allocating jurisdiction and establishing status but also goes beyond it potentially taking in such identity issues as feudal obligations and religious solidarity which Donnelly places under aggregating interests and power It is thus not just about Bulls constitutive rules but also contains equalityinequality of peo ple or not and their derivatives human rightscolonialism and dy nasticism nationalism and its derivatives selfdetermination popular sovereignty and democracy and other variations on the question of identity that would bear on the standard of civilisation that deter mines whether entities are admitted to or excluded from international society Authoritative communication this is close to Donnellys classification and is mainly about diplomacy and its antecedents 188 The primary institutions of international society Limits to the use of force it is difficult to make a tight distinction be tween this function and membership It would obviously include many of the classic Westphalian institutions emphasised by English school pluralists great power management war alliances neutrality and bal ance of power But at least for Westphaliantype interstate societies it would be difficult to exclude from this function some of the institu tions that also determine membership for example colonialism dy nasticism and human rights As I have argued elsewhere Buzan 1996 membership of international society has security implications in and of itself not necessarily guaranteeing survival but giving some protection against being treated asa terra nullius whose inhabitantscanbe treated as nonhuman Allocation of property rights curiously Donnelly does not pick up this aspect of Bulls functional approach to society thereby perpetuating the English schools neglect of the economic sector Allocation of prop erty rights has both political and economic aspects respectively about who governs where and who owns what Whether these aspects can be treated as distinct as in Tillys 1990 counterpointing of coercion and capital or whether they are intertwined as in Ruggies 1983 argument that private property and sovereignty emerged together remains con troversial On the political side the obvious Westphalian institutions are territoriality and boundaries though as the feudal model indicates this kind of hard territoriality is not the only way of allocating prop erty rights On the economic side property rights points towards the institutions associated with trade and finance In societies where the environment has become an issue institutions associated with steward ship would also come under this heading Sanctity of agreements this is close to Donnellys making and apply ing rules and is mainly about international law and its antecedents This discussion does no more than open the door on the question of how to understand the primary institutions of international society in functional terms I do not have the space here to develop this line of thinking further but the desirability of doing so is apparent for at least two reasons First a functional framing is one way of giving theoretical grounding to the English schools so far rather ad hoc and empirical approach to institutions and moreover doing so in terms that can be linked into Bulls work Second Donnelly is no doubt correct in thinking that a functional approach would greatly facilitate the WightWatson project of comparing international societies across space and time In the meantime it is useful to try to get a somewhat more systematic sense 189 From International to World Society of the possible range of primary institutions beyond the Westphalian model To do this one needs to look at different types of interstate society through the crude functional lens just established The range of institutions and the types of international society Firstorder interhuman societies are typically complicated and may well have large numbers of defining institutions Searle 1995 Second ordersocietieswilltypicallyhavefewermembersandfewerinstitutions but they can take many forms and shapes and therefore even though the number of primary institutions within any given international soci ety may be fairly small the overall possibilities for such institutions are if not infinite at least very numerous I am therefore unable to escape the etcetera problem for which I earlier pilloried Mayall and others although at least now one can see why On the basis of the thinthick argument in chapter 5 one would expect fewer institutions at the plural ist end of the spectrum and more at the solidarist end Exactly what the primary institutions of any given international society are is a matter for close empirical enquiry conducted within functional guidelines Holsti is quite right to link the question of how to benchmark change in inter national systems to the study of the institutions that define what the so ciety is and what the rules of its game are Especially in games where the pieces are the players institutions are open to change whether change of meaning and practice eg sovereignty war or risedecline of the institution as such eg market colonialism Even with a functional frame one cannot set out a definitive list of primary institutions for all times and places yet it is nevertheless inter esting and instructive to try to think through the question of primary institutions in relation to the four types of interstate social order set out in figure 5 In particular such an exercise enables one to revisit the issue of change in the context of the idea from the discussion of pluralism and solidarism above that solidarist forms of interstate society at least initially build on pluralist foundations One has to keep in mind that each model can in principle be held together by any mix of coercion calculation and belief A Power Political interstate society was defined as based largely on enmity and the possibility of war and therefore as thin in terms of primary institutions Survival is the main motive for the states and no values are necessarily shared Secondary institutions are unlikely to 190 The primary institutions of international society exist at all At a minimum a Power Political society will require means of authoritative communication even if only for alliance making and therefore some form of diplomacy By historical experience there is also likely to be some institutionalisation around property rights Trade becomes an institution when there is shared practice for granting par ticular rights to merchants which was common even in ancient and classical times Buzan and Little 2000 It is easy to find historical cases where diplomacy and trade existed without there being any shared political principle It also seems likely that some sort of territoriality would be important because of its intrinsic relationship to the pro cesses of war and conquest though this might well not take the form of hard boundaries Empires and tribes usually have fuzzy frontiers rather than fixed lines In such a thin society there may well not be much elaboration around the rules of membership Sovereignty might or might not be an institution in a Hobbesian society which could just as easily rest on suzerainty or even on the simple pragmatic test of whatever kind of entity is able to field significant military force In most of ancient and classical times for example international systems were composed of a mix of citystates empires nomadic barbarians and huntergatherer bands This does not rule out that Power Political interstate societies could also feature shared political institutions such as dynasticism or suzerainty as they did for much of classical history and also early modern European history By definition Power Political interstate societies are unlikely to feature major constraints on the use of force though war may well be a strong candidate for an institution in the sense of a general acceptance of conquest as a legitimate way to establish political claims Any society will require some method of establishing the sanctity of agreements even if only the value placed on word of honour but the ruthless survivalism of a Power Political one is unlikely to feature much in the way of developed international law A Coexistence interstate society was defined as based on the model of a Westphalian balance of power system in which the balance of power is accepted as an organising principle by the great powers and sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power management war and international law are the core institutions of international society This is Bulls pluralist international society close to the experience of modern European history up to 1945 In functional terms these clas sic institutions already cover a quite welldeveloped means of author itative communication diplomacy membership sovereignty limits 191 From International to World Society to the use of force war balance of power great power management property rights territoriality and sanctity of agreements international law Yet the classical pluralist presentation of institutions in the En glish school literature does not exhaust the possibilities In terms of membership colonialism is an option for such a society provided that it has room to expand outside its core Holsti 2002 Keene 2000 2002 and so also is dynasticism as it was in Europe well into the nine teenth century A standard of civilisation embodying other cultural andor religious identity markers might well also be applied to mem bership as it was by the Europeans before 1945 In terms of property rights Coexistence interstate societies can also generate economic in stitutions more sophisticated than the basic trading practices that can be found even in Power Political interstate societies Coexistence interstate societies might well keep the mercantilist practices and principles inherited from Power Political forebears but they might also seek to improve on them In the case of nineteenthcentury Europe the Gold Standard could be seen as one such development as perhaps could the attempts to move towards liberal trading prac tices such as agreed tariff reductions and mostfavourednation agree ments As Coexistence societies move towards the Cooperative model they may well begin to generate secondary institutions in the form of regimes and IGOs as began to happen during the late nineteenth century The most important institution missing from the English schools es sentially Coexistence set is nationalism which bears on both member ship and the political side of property rights Mayall 1990 2000 has long been the champion of giving full recognition to this as a constitu tive institution arguing that during the nineteenth century it melded with the institution of sovereignty and transformed it in a number of quitefundamentalwaysNationalselfdeterminationnotonlydisplaced dynasticism as the key to political legitimacy it also sacralised terri tory Mayall 2000 84 and imposed limits on the legitimate uses of war Hurrell 2002a 145 reinforces Mayalls position with his suggestion that national selfdetermination is the most important constitutive norm of the modern era Nationalism like sovereignty has spread well beyond its European origins It has been instrumental in the demise of colo nialism as an institution of Western interstate society It is part of the explanation for the decline of war as an institution and through its link to popular sovereignty is also implicated in the rise of the solidarist agendas of human rights and democracy 192 The primary institutions of international society A Cooperative interstate society was defined as based on developments that go significantly beyond coexistence but short of extensive domes tic convergence This definition implies a considerable carryover of institutions from the Coexistence model and it would be surprising if a Cooperative interstate society did not possess a fairly rich collection of secondary institutions It is not difficult to imagine that sovereignty territoriality nationalism diplomacy and international law remain in place albeit with some elaboration and reinterpretation Judging by the UN Charter the practices within the EU and the still vigorous and interesting debate about unipolarity and multipolarity great power management can also remain in place It seems highly likely however that Cooperative interstate societies will have more elaborate criteria for membership more stringent institutions concerning the sanctity of agreements and greater restraints on the use of force Indeed such soci eties may well downgrade or even eliminate war as an institution Recall Mayalls 2000 19 remark that in the twentieth century war became re garded more as the breakdown of international society than as a sign of its operation If interstate society is engaged in solidarist cooperative projects then allowing free scope for war as a legitimate way of chang ing political control becomes problematic Neither the liberal economic project nor the big science one can be pursued at least not universally in an interstate society where war remains one of the core institutions War may not be eliminated but its legitimate use gets squeezed into a relatively narrow range closely centred on the right to selfdefence and not in violation of the right of national selfdetermination The squeez ing of war in this way seems likely to downgrade the balance of power as an institution at least in the robust sense of its meaning in a Coex istence interstate society In the contemporary international system this whole nexus of questions is under test by the apparent desire of the US to reassert a right to war for the purposes of combating terrorism and containing rogue states Whether and how downgrading of balance of power happens may well depend on what kind of solidarist projects a Cooperative inter state society pursues and the question of what other primary institu tions such a society might have also hangs on this question It will make a difference whether the joint project is big science human rights col lective security the pursuit of joint economic gain environmentalism universal religion or some combination of these or others If contempo rary Western interstate society is taken as a model for the possibilities then the most obvious candidate for elevation to the status of primary 193 From International to World Society institution would be the market The market means more than just trade It is a principle of organisation and legitimation that affects both how states define and constitute themselves what kind of other actors they give standing to and how they interpret sovereignty and territorial ity The market does not necessarily eliminate balance of power as an institution but it does make its operation much more complicated and contradictory than it would be under mercantilist rules I have elsewhere Buzan and Wæver 2003 labelled this the liberalrealist dilemma and it is most visible in contemporary Western Japanese and Taiwanese rela tions with China Realist or balancing logic suggests that it is unwise to trade with and invest in and thus empower states one may later have to fight Liberal or market logic suggests that one can reduce the prob ability of having to fight by allowing the operation of a market economy to democratise and entangle potential enemies A Convergence interstate society was defined as based on the devel opment of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar political legal and economic forms This implies not only a thick development of institutions across all the functions but also extremely exacting conditions for membership Ex actly what this type of society would look like depends hugely on what model of political economy its member states were converging around liberal democracy Islamic theocracy absolutist hereditary monarchy hierarchical empire communist totalitarianism etc This choice would largely determine the practices and legal systems that would define the institutions Some pluralist institutions might well still be in play though it seems unlikely that war and balance of power would play much of a role In a liberal Kantian version of Convergence interstate society the market property rights human rights and democratic rela tions between government and citizens might well feature as primary institutions But if the convergence model was Islamic communist or some other then the institutions would be radically different All three of these forms would probably bring sovereignty and territoriality se riously into question not necessarily in Holstis 2002 89 scheme by makingthemobsoletebuteitherbyincreasingtheircomplexityortrans formingtheirmainfunctionsConvergencewouldalmostcertainlypush nonintervention as a corollary of sovereignty towards obsolescence for many purposes As Convergence developments moved towards Con federalism and the border between international systems and unified ones one would expect a change in the character of its secondary insti tutions There would not just be significant IGOs of the forum kind like 194 The primary institutions of international society the UN but also secondary institutions of a more integrative sort like those in the EU By this stage restraints on the use of force would have to be nearly total diplomacy largely transformed into something more like the process of domestic politics and international law transformed into something more like domestic law with institutions of enforce ment to back it up One can draw from this discussion the following conclusions r That it is possible using a functional frame to go some way towards identifying the institutions that would go along with different forms of macro secondorder societies but that the possible range of such societies is large and all of their particularities impossible to predict r That norms and therefore institutions can change This change may be driven by changes in the domestic societies of the member states or as Hurrell 2002a 1467 argues about contemporary international society by promotion by TNAs by the discursive tendency of norms to expand by filling in gaps by analogy by responses to new problems andor by debate in IGOs r That there are master institutions in the sense that some primary institutions nest inside others but not in the sense that some are con stitutive and others regulatory r That while solidarist evolution does build on pluralist foundations initially it does so not just by direct accumulation but as solidarism thickens by dropping or downgrading or transforming some key pluralist institutions r That as Hurrell 2002a 1434 observes the set of institutions constituting any given interstate society may well contain contra dictionstensions among themselves These contradictionstensions may well be a key dynamic in the evolution or decay of any given interstate society More on this in chapter 8 r Thatoneneedstobewareofthelimitationsofapurelypoliticomilitary approach to conceptualising institutions Economic societal and envi ronmental institutions can be just as constitutive of players and rules of the game in interstate societies as can the narrow set of strictly politicomilitary ones Conclusions Three issues remain to be discussed 1 the relationship if any between institutions in the English school sense and more materialist structural 195 From International to World Society interpretations of the same phenomena 2 the question left hanging in chapter 4 of how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other and 3 the vocabulary question also left hanging in chapter 4 about the fate of the concepts international and world society In the discussion of primary institutions above it was noted that war as an institution became more problematic as interstate society moved away from pluralist constructions and towards solidarist ones This problematisation was not to do with technical issues such as the ad vent of weapons of mass destruction which might well bring war into question even within Hobbesian or Lockean interstate societies Rather it concerned the contradiction between war as an institution and the other institutions that might be cultivated by more solidarist interstate societies War become increasingly incompatible with solidarist projects such as big science or the institutionalisation of the market How is one to link this perspective to the more materialist one made famous by Tillys phrase that war makes the state and the state makes war which implicitly underpins much realist theorising about international rela tions From this perspective war is constitutive of states not in the form of a constitutive rule but as a mechanical Darwinian structure which favours the survival of units that are more like modern states and drives into extinction or subordination other older types of unit that are less clearly organised around strict sovereignty and hard bound aries If war itself gets driven towards extinction what then becomes of the state Although the logics driving this type of structural thinking are different from those underpinning primary institutions in the English school sense the two do cross paths when one comes to consider the impact of the market Like war the market can be seen both as a me chanical structure and as an institution of interstate and interhuman and transnational society In both perspectives there are some areas of overlap and complementarity between the two but also an underly ing contradiction that becomes more powerful as the market approaches globalscaleWarmightuptoapointsupportthemarketwhenthegame is to grab control of subglobal shares But when the market becomes global war becomes a costly disruption to trade production and finan cial markets As institutions war and the market become increasingly incompatible in solidarist interstate societies As mechanical structures they seem also to fall into a zerosum game for what makes the state and what the state makes It could well be argued that in contemporary interstate societies it is the market that makes the state and the state that 196 The primary institutions of international society makes markets To the extent that this is true the shift in balance between these two constitutes not just a shift in the institutions of interstate so ciety but also a transformation in the Darwinian structures that shape the principal units in the international system Buzan and Little 2000 3627 The second issue is how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other The main point I want to underline here is the need to remain aware that liberal models of solidarism are not the only option for thinking about this question From a contemporary Westernperspectiveinsideliberalismitisalltooeasytolosesightofthis fact The liberal model of solidarism offers a very particular and quite compelling answer to how the interhuman transnational and interstate will relate to each other as solidarism develops Liberal arguments con tain a strong logic that although the three units of individuals TNAs and states are ontologically distinct the interhuman transnational and interstate societies that they form will be closely interrelated in a quite particular way As I have argued elsewhere Buzan 1993 there are grounds for think ing that interstate societies aspiring to solidarism especially if their constitutent states are democratic will have to be accompanied by matching elements of cosmopolitan world society among their citizens if the solidarist international society is to be sustainable In other words the twentieth centurys obsession with nationalism as the link between the interhuman and the interstate domains has to be broadened out to incorporate the wider forms of interhuman society necessary to support a solidarist interstate agenda whether in human rights democracy or economic interdependenceglobalisation In addition pursuit of the lib eral economic project necessitates the creation and support of a host of transnational economic actors In parallel with these developments in identity and economy liberal interstate societies will need to promote andor allow the development of a corresponding transnational civil society sufficient to carry the political burden created by moves into wider identities and more global markets And while liberal solidarist interstate societies will need to encourage transnational civil society the states composing them will need to adapt themselves by creating IGOs to deal with the forces of transnational uncivil society to which the pro cesses of integration also give space Amongst other things dealing with transnational uncivil society can lead to reformulations of the institu tion of war as visible in the post2001 war on terrorism Buzan 2003 Liberal solidarism will be unable to develop far unless the interstate 197 From International to World Society domain can carry with it degrees and types of interhuman and transna tional society appropriate to the degree and type of norms rules insti tutions and identities that they want to share amongst their members A liberal interstate society will require parallel developments of cos mopolitanism in the interhuman domain and of economic and civil so ciety actors in the transnational domain Without such developments the pursuit of the interstate project will be impossible beyond a rather basic level In a liberal perspective more interstate solidarism requires more cosmopolitanism in the interhuman domain and more TNAs and coop eration amongst TNAs to support it Conversely the desired cosmopoli tan developments in the interhuman and transnational domains cannot take place without the provision of law order and security from the in terstate domain Liberal solidarism develops as a close nexus amongst the three domains The EU provides an instructive case for investigating this liberal nexus Its ongoing debate about the tension between further integration oftheEUiedeepeningofitsinternationalandtransnationalsocietyon the one hand and the absence of any strong European identity amongst its citizens ie lagging development in the interhuman domain on the other Smith 1992 and the endless debates about the EUs sec ondary institutions from police to parliament all provide an advanced case study for looking at the development of liberal solidarism Among other things the EU case raises the question of where the driving forces for the development of international society are located The EU has been primarily stateled which explains why the interhuman domain is the laggard In other cases one might find the driving forces within the interhuman or transnational domains Through liberal lenses it looks to be the case that as one moves to wards the confederative end of the interstate society spectrum ever more room is created for interhuman and transnational society It also appears that the interstate development depends on progress in the other two and at least in the minds of the more extreme sorts of global ists that the processprogress mightshould if it has not already eventually topple the state as the dominant unit in the international sys tem That the three domains have historically interacted with each other is beyond question For example the present scale of interhuman soci eties was heavily shaped by the influence of earlier TNAs the Catholic and Orthodox churches and statesempires Rome China Abbasid In turn these collective actors depended in their time on being able to tie their own organisation and legitimacy to the structures of interhuman 198 The primary institutions of international society society In a realist world of competitive states national states those that make their subjects into citizens and define themselves in terms of pop ular sovereignty will outperform absolutist states both economically and militarily The dynamics of the interstate society will thus work to make interhuman society conform to its political geography both in terms of nationalism and wider interstate society developments such as the EU the West the Communist bloc etc But how the three do mains interact with each other depends on what sort of values are in play and where they are located Liberal values encourage a broadly complementary relationship amongst the three making developments in each dependent on matching developments in the other two But even within liberalism more contradictory readings are possible It can be argued that empowering transnational capitalist actors unleashes forces that not only assault patterns of identity in the interhuman do main but also tend to atomise the interhuman world into individuals consumers Capitalist transnationals can also be seen as contradic tory to the state tending to hollow it out and shrink its domains of legitimate action The liberal model in sum can raise a highly political agenda in which developments in one domain force quite extreme pat terns on the other two and the nature of these questions may well vary depending on the stage of development that liberalism is in whether national as in the nineteenth century or globalist as in the twenty first Similar sorts of thought exercises could be conducted for nonliberal international societies Islamic values for example could also be read as weakening the state domain by placing individual loyalty to the umma above the loyalty of citizens to states The ofttold story of how a West phalian statessystem emerged out of European medievalism displays similar tensions between the demands of a universal religion on the one hand and the demands of state sovereignty on the other In the political sphere there was a zerosum game between the emergent states and the Catholic church between the interstate and transnational domains of society It seems clear that in a communist interstate society there would be little or no room for TNAs and strong assaults on religious and na tional identities in the interhuman domain From the historical record classical empires tended to constrain the development of transnational economic actors and often did not care too much about patterns of iden tity in the interhuman domain being more concerned with obedience than identity In sum the liberal model is not the only template on which one can and should think about the relationship among the three 199 From International to World Society domains Even within the liberal model different interpretations of the relationship are possible according to which ideological perspective one takes on capitalism This brief look at alternatives also underlines the question about where the driving forces for the social structure of international sys tems are located Physical interaction capacity obviously matters for the technical ability to move goods people and information around the system conditions the opportunities of actors in all the domains and across all of history The work of tracing this factor across history has been done by Buzan and Little 2000 Beyond that the question of driv ing forces turns to which if any of the domains dominates the other two Is it that developments in the state pillar push and pull developments in the transnational and interhuman domains Or is it that autonomous developments in the interhuman domain the rise of a consciousness of being a member of humankind and the transnational one the rise of powerful TNAs of various kinds force the state domain to adapt Even within the liberal model this chickenegg problem presents itself Most realists will take the view that states are the drivers many glo balists that the interhuman and transnational domains are taking over Campaigners for solidarist developments will try to mobilise the in terhuman domain to influence the transnational one and use both to influence states Or depending on issues and circumstances they may try to mobilise the state to influence the transnational and interhuman domains Both the realist and globalist positions contain elements of the truth but the argument between them is more interesting as a political phenomenon than as an analytical question What is interesting analytically are the constraints and opportunities that developments in any one of these domains pose for the other two Embedded patterns in the interhuman domain might act as a brake on or a facilitator for developments towards deeper forms of interstate society the difference depending on the geographical overlap or not of the relevant patterns in the two domains A good example of this is the classical English school question about the relationship between interstate society and underlying cultural patterns The assumption was that an underlying civilisational pattern would facilitate the develop ment of an interstate society classical Greece earlymodern Europe whereas the lack thereof would be a problem the expansion of West ern interstate society to global scale Similarly the character of inter state society very much conditions the possibilities for TNAs but once they are established and powerful TNAs also condition and restrain the 200 The primary institutions of international society possibilities for interstate society The units in each domain have to op erate in the conditions created by the units in the other two domains but the units in each domain can up to a point and given time also shape the nature of the other two domains This is a highly dynamic universe in which agents and structure are engaged in a continuous game of mutual tensions and mutual constitutions Both complementarities and contradictions are possible Liberal solidarism must have supporting cosmopolitan and transnational developments A communist interstate society is hard to envisage in a world in which transnational actors are strong but a communist world society in which the communist party is the primary institution and the state has atrophied is just about possible to imagine In this sense it is difficult to imagine developments in any one domain getting too far out of line with developments in the other two and easy to see that some primary institutions necessarily extend beyond the strictly interstate domain The range of possibilities is large Some types of solidarist societies will require big developments in the transnational domain others not Although I have argued that there is a lot of room for interplay among the three domains it remains true in the contemporary world that states are still the most powerful and focused unit states can shove and shape the others more easily than they can be shoved and shaped by them But this is far from saying that states can shape the other two domains as they wish Change is at best slow and powers of resistance can be great Politics leadership imagination and a host of other factors affect the way in which the three domains play into each other and whether opportunities for change get taken up or whether possibilities for re sistance are effective or not It is probably not possible to postulate a mechanical set of relationships among the three domains What is pos sible is to set a mechanism of analysis that ensures that this relation ship and the changes in it become a central focus of any examina tion of international social structures I will have a first crack at this in chapter 8 The other question left over from chapter 4 was the fate of the terms international and world society World society disappeared in chapter 4 p 138 because of the decision to separate the interhuman and the transnational into two distinct analytical domains International so ciety has disappeared because the triad in figures 4 and 5 is now based on types of unit making the term interstate a necessary tightening up of usage and reflecting more traditional English school formulations such as society of states or statessystems The term international 201 From International to World Society though often used to mean interstate has always carried a certain ambi guity Buzan and Little 2000 323 which makes it awkward to use as a label for the strictly statebased domain But given that there does seem to be considerable institutional linkage among the three domains the ambiguity of international becomes useful There is a need for terms to encompass the complex patterns that result when one looks at the interhuman transnational and interstate domains all together Myproposalistouseinternationalsocietytoindicatesomethinglikethe arrangement that emerged during the twentieth century Mayall 2000 1725 where the basic political and legal frame is set by the states system with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within the order defined by interstate society This would roughly accord with Jamess view cited above that individuals and TNAs are participants in international society rather than members of it or with the arguments in chapter 2 about individuals being dependent objects of international law rather than independent subjects of it with standing in their own right It also feels close to the alternative interpretation of Bull given on pp 956 where following his imperative about international order in the conditions prevailing in the early twentyfirst century could lead one to a Davosculture view of who it is that now provides it This usage takes advantage of both the ambiguity and the statecentrism built into the term international Defining international society in this way means that the term cannot be applied to the classical Westphalian period of European history The resolute pluralism of that period the relative ab sence of TNAs and political nationalism and the widespread disregard for the interhuman sector displayed by slavery imperial expropriation and on occasions genocide mark the Westphalian system as an inter state society well towards the Power Political side of the Coexistence model There may well have been some institutions in the interhuman and transnational domains but these would not have been closely tied into those in the interstate domain Following this reasoning world society then becomes a vehicle for dropping the assumption that states are the dominant units and inter state society the dominant domain In world societies no one of the three domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two but all are in play together This feels close to Bulls neomedieval idea and to that one of Vincents versions of world society that hinged on a rightsbased community among states individuals and TNAs see chapter 2 and GonzalezPelaez 2002 3841 2469 Buzan and Little 2000 3657 414 202 The primary institutions of international society discuss something close to it under the label postmodern international society Given my criticisms of Vincent for his lack of clarity about the boundary between international and world society this move will strike some readers as sweetly ironic But Vincent used world society in sev eral senses perhaps the main one taking off from the Wightian idea of opposition to international society The usage proposed here does maintain the same blurring of boundaries between international and world society in traditional English school usage but it proceeds from a position in which the traditional meanings of international and world society have been abandoned Neither does it carry any of Vincents and Wights sense of opposition to andor exclusion from interstate society A world society in my sense would be based on principles of functional differentiation amongst the various types of entities in play and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of unit in relation both to each other and to different types States and firms for example would have to accept the historical evidence that neither performs efficiently when it tries to do the others job and that their respective legal rights and obligations need to be clearly demar cated Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as hold ing legal and political status independently not as a gift from either of the others Individuals and firms would thus become subjects of inter national law in their own right Humankind has not yet seen a world society in this sense though the EU may be heading in that direction Such a development is certainly within the range of imagination and it presents a far more plausible and engaging goal than the oversimplifica tions of anarchists hyperliberals hyperglobalists and dyedinthewool realists who can only see the future in terms of the victory of one domain over the others Using these definitions international and world society come back into play carrying specific clearly defined meanings and representing an important distinction of relevance to contemporary world politics That said one might still complain rightly that my definitions leave gaps in the labelling scheme Logically one would also have to have la bels for situations in which either of the nonstate domains dominated over the other two It might also be possible to imagine situations in which one would simply need to discuss the three domains separately without bundling them together in some linking classification For the reasons already argued in chapter 4 scenarios of nonstate dominance are hard to imagine and seem unlikely Unbundled scenarios probably 203 From International to World Society require introduction of the geographic variable which is the subject of chapter 7 On reflection therefore it seems to me that interstate inter national and world society plus the option to discuss interstate inter human and transnational separately cover almost all of the interesting cases whether historical contemporary or foreseeable within the next few decades 204 7 Bringing geography back in Throughout the previous chapters I have registered a steady drumbeat of dissatisfaction with the combination of neglect and resistance that marks the attitude of most classical English school writers towards the subglobalregional level Subglobal and regional manifestations of in ternational social structure have either been marginalised by a focus on global scale and universal principles or resisted because seen as threats to the development of global scale international society Wights and Watsons explorations of historical statessystems do not count because most of those systems were substantially selfcontained and not part of a global scale interstatesystem I am not the only dissatisfied customer of the classical English school tradition in this regard Zhang 2002 6 notes that A cursory survey of the existing literature reveals a strange silence on the part of International Society scholars on regionalism Deliberations by scholars of the English School on regional levels of international society in the twentieth century are until very recently muted if not entirely invisible Such silence is best reflected in an important essay on regionalism in 1995 by Andrew Hurrell The comprehensive survey of Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective conducted by Hurrell contains no specific mentioning of either the English school or International Society perspective It is remarkable that Hedley Bull is mentioned only once towards the end of his book as that archregional sceptic Fawcett and Hurrell 1995 327 Even critical International Society as summarized nicely by Dunne 1995 does not seem to have made much dent on the studies of regionalism Zhangs point is underlined by the fact that Hurrell is a leading figure among contemporary English school writers Zhang 2002 7 goes on to note that the main concern of English school writers has been to study 205 From International to World Society how a group of states come to form a society when they develop distinc tive norms common rules and institutions and when they perceive themselves to have common purpose in international life and to share the workings of common institutions for the conduct of their relations Since there is nothing in this definition that excludes the regional he puzzles quite rightly as to why interest has not been applied at the regional level when there are many interesting and distinctive cases to be found there It is certainly fair to point the finger at Bull as mainly responsible for this state of affairs But it is worth noting that his oftencited 1982 article on Civilian Power Europe should not be taken as exemplary for that attitude either generally or in relation to the English schools neglect of the EU Bulls argument was not about regional international society at all It was about global Cold War power politics His aim was to reject the idea of civilian power Europe as a significant actor on the global stage and to call for more development of the EU particularly in foreign and defence policy in order to give it the wherewithal to distance itself from the US Despite its importance the question of subglobal manifestations of social structure in the international system has had to be left until near the end of this book because it was necessary first to develop the ana lytical tools that I propose should be used to examine such structures at any level global or regional Now it is time to bring geography back in At this point it will come as no surprise to readers that I plan to make a strong case for reversing the neglect of subglobal develop ments in interstate and interhuman society that has marked English school analyses of the contemporary international system In the next section I make the case that exclusion of the subglobal is simply not necessary within the terms of English school theory and that taking the regional level on board opens up a rich set of cases both for com parative purposes and to help in thinking about theory In the second section I argue that confining the debate about secondorder society to the global level has fed pessimistic pluralist interpretations of interstate society and starved optimistic solidarist ones In the third I show how this confinement has sealed off the possibility of exploring how differ ences in territoriality affect the classical literatures concerns about the interplay of international and world society In the fourth I develop the idea that the subglobal level is essential for revealing what might be called a vanguard theory about how international society spreads and grows Such a theory is implicit in the English schools account of the 206 Bringing geography back in expansion of contemporary international society but with the excep tion of an oblique presence in Watsons concern with hegemony absent from its main theoretical works A reluctance to confront coercion as a mechanism explains some of this disjuncture but much is also explained by failure to give the subglobal its proper place in the theory Exclusive globalism is not necessary The question of whether international and world society must be con sidered only as universal global scale phenomena has already been given a quite thorough airing in the section on levels in chapter 1 pp 1618 The underlying issue is the scale or scales on which it is appropriate to think about interstate interhuman and transnational so cieties In English school thinking the assumption of global scale arose from a combination of the history of the expansion of European interna tional society the influence of universal normative principles in political theory a fear amplified by the Cold War that subglobal developments would necessarily undermine global ones and a blindness to empirical developments of international society in the world economy In their defence it might be argued that for most of the classical English school writers decolonisation was a central event defining the context of their writing and at least initially decolonisation seemed more a globallevel event than a regional one Among nonEnglish school thinkers about world society enthusiasm for global scale seems to stem mainly from a desire to generate a holistic conception of the international system broadly compatible with a globalisation perspective The first thing to note is that an attack on the global scale requirement is not an attack on holism per se The goal remains that of building up a complete picture of the social structure of the international system and the global level is a key component of that picture But to restrict the concepts of macrosocial structure to the global level is to crush the re quirements of empirical and theoretical enquiry under the demands of a normative agenda The classic English school definition of international society has as its referent a group of states or more generally a group of independent political communities which leaves entirely open the question of scale Other traditions of theoretical enquiry within and around IR from balance of power and polarity through regime theory to Wallersteins world systems and world empires all apply their key concepts to either the systemic or the subsystemic level Interestingly Bullsinfrequentlyciteddefinitionofworldsocietyunlikehisfrequently 207 From International to World Society cited one of international society does make the global requirement ex plicit no doubt reflecting its origins in cosmopolitan thinking about the totality of humankind By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built The concept of world society in this sense stands to the totality of global social interaction as our concept of international society stands to the concept of the international system Bull 1977a 279 my italics Whatever the reasons for it this strong bias towards globalist universalist requirements for international and world society and against the subglobal level has to be discarded if English school theory is to develop its full potential It is perhaps not going too far to say that blindness towards the subglobal level whether in interstate terms or in interhuman andor transnational ones is the most damaging legacy that the classical English school writers left to their successors Looking first at the interstate domain it is perfectly clear that a global scalepluralistinterstatesocietyexistsonthebasisofeffectivelyuniversal acceptance of basic Westphalian institutions such as sovereignty terri toriality diplomacy and international law But it is just as clear that this global society is unevenly developed to a very marked degree Moving on from Vincents famous eggbox metaphor of international society in which states were the eggs and international society the box one might see this unevenness as a pan of fried eggs Although nearly all the states in the system belong to a thin pluralist interstate society the layer of eggwhite there are subglobal andor regional clusters sitting on that common substrate that are both much more thickly developed than the global common and up to a point developed separately and in different ways from each other the yolks The EU East Asia and North America for example all stand out as subglobal interstate societies that are more thickly developed within themselves Yet even though a great deal of their extra thickness arises from similar concerns to facilitate economic exchange these three are quite sharply differentiated from each other in the modes and values that bind them Helleiner 1994 The EU is heavily institutionalised and pursuing both social market and single market ob jectives Its attempt to move beyond Westphalian international politics has produced perhaps the only example of a convergence interstate so ciety ever seen and the only one that even begins to approach a world 208 Bringing geography back in society as I have defined that term NAFTA is less ambitious organ ised mainly around a set of neoliberal rules and has no commitment to equalisationorfactormovementEastAsiahasfewinstitutionsorformal rules and is largely organised by statesanctioned private capital and a tiered system of development Lesser attempts to create thicker liberal regional interstateinternational societies by cultivating joint economic development can be found in Mercosur and various other regional eco nomic cooperations Above some of these regional efforts one can find larger looser thinner versions of the same thing labelled the West or the Atlantic Community or the AsiaPacific A quite different form of relative thickness compared to the global common reflecting concern with more political andor cultural values could no doubt be found by looking at the arrangements of ASEAN or among the community of Islamic states or the Arab League Subglobal developments that are just different rather than thicker are perhaps exemplified by the con tested versions of human rights rooted in the West Islam and various Asian cultures There is thus strong empirical evidence particularly but not only in the economic sector that distinctive development of interstate societies is flourishing at the subglobal level What is more this evidence sug gests a rather balanced assessment of how subglobal developments might impact on global interstate society As the fried eggs metaphor emphasises there is no simple eitheror choice about global and sub global developments In the contemporary international system the thinner global interstate society is shared by all and the subglobal developments build on top of that A secondorder pluralism is pos sible when subglobal interstate societies seek rules of coexistence with each other at the global level There are clearly no grounds for any au tomatic assumption that subglobal developments must fall into rivalry with each other and so weaken global social developments This can happen as the Cold War showed all too clearly especially when rival ideologies are in play Fear of conflict across levels can certainly be found in that body of mostly liberal concerns that regional economic blocs will undermine the liberal international economic order at the global level creating some kind of replay of the 1930s But against this is the argument that regional economic groupings are mainly responses to the global economic order and that their existence may well serve to stabilise that order against the periodic instabilities that affect the trad ing and financial arrangements of all liberal economic orders Short of that such blocs offer options to strengthen the position of participating 209 From International to World Society states within the global economy so creating synergies rather than con tradictions between the two levels The need to look at the subglobal level is just as obvious if one turns to world society or what I recast in chapter 4 and figure 5 as interhu man and transnational society Recall that interhuman society is largely about collective identity Looking at the interhuman domain through this lens what one sees in a very broad brush picture is an inverse correlation between scale on the one hand and the intensity of shared identity on the other Families clans tribes and nations mostly shine strongly whereas humankind or members of the planetary ecosystem are still little more than background glow albeit up from nothing in the quite recent past There are exceptions to this pattern Some na tional identities embrace huge numbers of people and large territories A handful of religions most notably Christianity and Islam have suc ceeded in creating vast subsystemic communities Some civilisations Western Confucian hold a similarly sized scale but less intensely In matters of identity parochialism still rules Despite some breakthroughs to larger scale universal scale identity remains strikingly weak In mat ters of identity the subglobal yolks rest only on the very thin substrate of white provided by the general acceptance that all human beings are equal Transnational society is almost by definition less amenable to geo graphicalclassificationthaneitherinterhumanorinterstatesocietyNev ertheless and again in very broad brush the view is one in which higher intensities of norms rules and institutions are found on the smaller scales than on the larger ones Clubs firms lobbies associations and suchlike are all more intensely organised locally than globally But in the transnational realm of society it is possible to achieve large even global scale in an extremely thin way Some firms and INGOs do this and be hind them and expanding fast through the internet is a huge array of interest groups of many kinds now able to organise in real time on a global scale even for relatively tiny numbers of people The network of scholars interested in the English school for example amounts to several hundred people at best yet having members on all continents can plausibly claim to be global In the transnational domain however these numerous globalisms tend to be separate rather than coordinated In terms of the classifications in figure 5 the bulk of what one would find would be located in competing TNAs eg firms and coalitions of like TNAs eg global umbrella bodies for all political science associations 210 Bringing geography back in or all banks with some development of TNA coalitions across type eg the antiglobalisation movement There are thus many globalisms in the transnational domain but the global level as such is interesting more for how these many TNAs interplay with interstate society than how they interplay with each other In sum the subglobal level is thickly occupied regardless of whether one looks at the interstate interhuman or transnational domain Inter estingly echoing the insight of Williams 2001 the global level is rea sonably well developed only in the interstate domain The diplomatic and political structure of global international society and the regimes and institutions of the global economy are altogether more substantial than either the faint glow of shared identity as humankind or the distant prospect of either a pure transnational society or a world society All of this suggests a serious need to take the subglobal level of inter state and international society on board in English school thinking The combination of antiregionalism and antieconomic predispositions in classical English school writing has meant that a rich array of empirical developments has been neglected This is bad enough in itself but it also represents three more serious losses First it means that a whole set of opportunities for the comparative study of contemporary international society has been ignored Diez and Whitman 2000 2002 Zhang 2002 Second it means that the interplay between empirical studies and the development of theory has been substantially impoverished As Ratner 1998 71 767 notes for example the regional level often generates much more robust mechanisms for enforcement the key test of soli darism in the English school classics than can be found on the global level This impoverishment is most obvious in the neglect of the EU If the EU is not the thickest most ambitious and most highly developed interstate society ever seen then it is difficult to imagine what it is As such study of it should be playing a leading role in thinking about how solidaristinterstatesocietiesparticularlyliberalonescandevelopwhat problems arise as they get thicker and where the boundary is between a convergence interstate society on the one hand and the creation of a new actor at the global level on the other The EU not only raises many of the classical questions of English school theory about pluralism versus solidarism and international versus world society but also provides a mine of empirical cases and evidence against which the debates about theory can be sharpened Better theory might then allow the English school to play a constructive role in the debates about the EU 211 From International to World Society The third and perhaps most serious loss from the neglect of sub global developments is that it has sustained an emaciated conceptual isation of what the whole idea of internationalworld society is about Secondorder society at the global level is almost inevitably thin but subglobal developments may well be much thicker The whole frame work of interstate interhuman and transnational societies needs to be understood as the interplay between subglobal and global levels As I will show in the next three sections bringing the regional level back in changes both the structural and the normative frameworks of debate about contemporary international society Unwarranted pessimism I argued in chapter 1 that in several ways the pluralists within the English school have virtually determined a pessimistic evaluation of international society from the way they have set up the problem Their ignoring of the economic sector and other areas of solidarist devel opment was discussed in chapter 5 Given the predisposition of most English school writers to focus on the global level and given that for much of the nineteenth century and again increasingly so since the later twentieth century the economic sector has functioned strongly at the global level this omission is to say the least odd It was perhaps understandable during the Cold War when the principles of global eco nomic organisation were a central part of what was under dispute but this does not forgive its general neglect In this section I want to draw attention to two other sources of pluralist pessimism both of which relate to an excessive focus on the global level though going in quite different directions The first is relatively simple involving a privileging of the global level by either neglect of or hostility to subglobal societal developments The problem generated by this move is that it makes the test for solidarist international society so hard that pessimismpluralism becomes the obvious conclusion especially so in the absence of the economic sector Current examples of this mode of thinking are recent books by Jackson 2000 and Mayall 2000 Solidarism is firmly located in the idea that humanity is one Mayall 2000 14 and then rejected on the grounds that there is too much diversity and too little democracy in the human condition to sustain solidarist goals The second is more complicated involving what seems to me to be a gross misreading of nineteenthcentury interstate society as being thicker and stronger than it actually was The consequence of this 212 Bringing geography back in move is unwarranted pessimism in evaluations of how interstate and international society have evolved both globally and regionally since then MostEnglishschoolwritershaveeitherignoredtheregionallevelorif theyhavepaidattentiontoithaveseenitinnegativeoppositionalterms in relation to the development of global international society Neglect seemstoderivemostlyfromtransposingaconcernwithuniversalvalues into an assumption that the relevant domain must be the global one This screens out places where major solidarist developments have in fact occurred most obviously within the EU and NAFTA but also within the wider Western community and not insignificantly in South America Mercosur South East Asia ASEAN and to a lesser exent among the Islamic states As a result it sets an extremely high standard for any sense of progress towards solidarism by demanding that it occur on a global scale Following Zhangs reasoning I can think of no good reason why this practice should be sustained Easier to understand is the fear that subsystem developments would necessarily or even just probably be subversive of international order This fear was one of the themes that came out of the discussion of Bull and Vincent in chapter 2 and it can also be found in Brown 1995a 1956 Such fears perhaps made sense to those responding to the con ditions of the Cold War when interstate society was polarised into com peting camps It is certainly true that having two or more different sub global interstate societies in play at the same time entails a risk that they will fall into conflict But if it is posed as a general principle that sub global developments in the social structure of the international system must necessarily or probably be in contradiction to globallevel ones then this idea needs to be questioned As a general principle it commits the same error as realist assumptions that powers must necessarily be in conflict There are two other possibilities One is that different subglobal interstate societies will find ways to coexist a kind of secondorder version of pluralism This possibility is enhanced by the fact that sub global interstate societies may well share a common substrate building differences on top of certain shared norms rules and institutions Even the Cold War particularly its detente phases can be understood in this way Neither side abandoned key shared primary institutions such as sovereignty diplomacy international law or the primacy of great pow ers and together they pursued some significant measures of coexistence most notably in arms control The third possibility that could overlap with either of the other two is that subglobal developments of interstate 213 From International to World Society society serve as the basis for a process of vanguardled strengthening of interstate society at the global level A very plausible case can be made that social developments are most easily nurtured subsystemically and spread from there to the global level Indeed the surprise here is that the English schools whole account of the expansion of interstate soci ety over the last two centuries is quite hard to read in any other way and the same goes for the Stanford school Everything from antislavery to Westphalian modes of diplomacy and recognition followed a van guardist pattern It cannot be denied that such uneven development raises the possibility of conflict But it also raises the opportunity for the mechanisms of socialisation and competition with or without elements of coercion to spread a variety of norms rules and institutions up to the global level Seen in this perspective there is as much reason for op timism as pessimism in subglobal developments of interstate society More on vanguardism in the last section of this chapter The second source of pessimism arises from an idealised reading of nineteenthcentury interstate society and a consequently bleak view of its twentiethcentury successor Miller 1990 747 Bull and others see the nineteenth century as the high point of interstate society be cause the relatively coherent and welldeveloped interstate society of the European subsystem held sway over the entire planet During the nineteenth century there was a quite strong commitment by the great powers to a set of shared values and this was reinforced by a com mon EuropeanChristian culture On this basis Bull and others take a rather depressed view of subsequent developments They see decoloni sation as not only bringing a host of weak states into interstate society but also as undermining its civilisational coherence by the inevitable introduction of a multicultural social background In this perspective decolonisation at best diluted and at worst corroded the stock of shared values on which interstate society rests The descent of Europe into its civil war of 191445 and the fragmentation of the West into ideological factions representing opposed views about the future of industrial soci ety liberal democracy communism fascism compounded the problem of weakened shared values and shrank the area of consensus amongst the great powers This process culminated in the Cold War in which a zerosum ideological confrontation between two superpowers drove global interstate society to the margins by unleashing and legitimising a host of mutually exclusive and competitive social values Bull 1977 3840 25760 31517 Kedourie 1984 Bozeman 1984 Bull and Watson 1984b 42535 214 Bringing geography back in In my view this perspective is not only ethnocentrically narrow and misleadingly gloomy but also fundamentally mistaken about what in terstate society is and how it develops It is certainly true that the Euro pean ascendency created a global imperium and thus an exceptionally high level of societal homogeneity amongst the dominant powers It is also true that this imperium set the conditions for a global interstate so ciety both by intensifying the density of the system and by making all parts of it deeply aware that they were locked into a pattern of interac tion powerful enough to shape the major conditions of their societal and political survival But this imperium can only itself be called a global international or even interstate society at risk of ignoring the huge in equalities of political and legal status between the colonisers and the colonised To assume that imposed values represent a strong society in the same sense that shared values do is to ignore Wendts insight that it matters whether shared values are put and kept in place by coercion calculation or belief It is also to ignore the idea essential not just to any progressive view of interstate society but also to the more conservative Westphalian model of such societies that some substantial perception of equalstatusmustexistamongstitsmembersKeenes20002002ideaof colonial international society and Holstis 2002 idea that colonialism was up to the Second World War an institution of interstate society both suggest a need to consider more of a disjuncture than is acknowledged in The Expansion of International Society between the interstate society that emerged after 1945 and the one that preceded it At the very least as noted in chapter 6 there was a major change in the core institutions of interstate society before and after the Second World War as colonialism became obsolete and sovereign equality became universal The lack of sovereign equality on a global scale until decolonisation occurred meant that there was no truly global Westphalian interstate society before 1945 The nineteenth century represented not a global interstate society but a mostly imperial global extension of a largely regional European inter state society On this basis comparing late twentiethcentury interstate society with its nineteenthcentury predecessor assumes a false conti nuity at the global level and is not comparing like with like Seen from this perspective many of the reasons for pessimism about the condition of contemporary interstate society disappear There has been no great decline of coherence and homogeneity during the twen tieth century because there was no real peak of these things at the end of the nineteenth Colonial interstate society might have been more ho mogenous among the Western states but half the world was coerced 215 From International to World Society into a subordinate position What we have witnessed during the twen tieth century is a huge process of transformation A narrowly based coercive global imperium collapsed and was replaced by a thin global interstate society resting largely on voluntary acceptance of Westphalian primary institutions Keene 2002 The sources of global interaction are now located all through the system rather than being located primarily in one part of it and most of the units in the system relate to each other voluntarily as legal equals rather than as a coerced hierarchy of states mandates protectorates dependencies and colonies It might be ob jected that the formal position of legal equality still allows huge amounts of practical inequality between core and periphery While this is true there is nevertheless a profound difference between secondorder soci eties in which the formal position is one of legal equality and those in which it is not Indeed the shift from colonial interstate society to global Westphalian norms might be counted as a gigantic progessive step in twentiethcentury international history This new global interstate soci ety was born out of the collapse of the old one and in many important ways was created by it The European imperium generated the need for a global interstate society and provided much of the political form within which it took shape The question is therefore not how much ground has been lost since the heyday of European power but what legacy was left by the old interstate society for the new How much of European interstate society did the nonEuropean states accept and how much did they reject The main reason for thinking that interstate society is in relatively good shape by historical standards is the near universal acceptance of the sovereign territorial state as the fundamental unit of political le gitimacy This expansion can be seen as the great though unintended political legacy of the European imperium So successful was the Euro pean state in unleashing human potential that it overwhelmed all other forms of political organisation in the system To escape from European domination it was necessary to adopt European political forms Some achieved this by copying others had it imposed on them by the process of decolonisation As even Bull and Watson 1984b 4345 acknowl edge much of European interstate society was accepted by the rest of the world when they achieved independence The key primary insti tutions of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy international law and nationalism became accepted worldwide And this argument can be ex tended to tackle at least some of the concerns about multiculturalism 216 Bringing geography back in weakening the cultural foundations of interstate society Certainly there is less cultural cohesion underpinning contemporary global interstate society than there was behind the European colonial interstate society of the nineteenth century But the European imperium left behind more than just a global acceptance of the sovereign state and pluralist inter state society It also embedded nationalism science the idea of progress and more recently the market as more or less universally accepted ideas about human social organisation Without adopting this wider set al most no state can either compete effectively in power terms or establish a genuine legitimacy with its own population Buzan and Segal 1998a The existence of this Westernistic culture does not eliminate the prob lems of multiculturalism But it does represent a substantial transforma tion in the cultural underpinnings of interstate society that should not be ignored in assessments of progress Understanding the interplay among the interhuman transnational and interstate domains The argument for bringing geography back in is essential if one is to pursue the layered understanding of international social structure de veloped in this book The key point emerged in chapter 4 in the context of the discussion about differentiating society and community Weller 2000 648 noted that the relationship between society and community depends significantly on whether their geographical boundaries are the same or different Bringing the geography of society and community into line has of course been the driving rationale behind the nationstate Where community and society occupy the same space as in a classical nationstate the element of identity eg nationalism may well play a crucial role in balancing some of the divisive effects of society and pol itics eg the class antagonism generated by capitalist economies the need for political parties to play the role of loyal opposition when out of power But where identity and society are not in the same space as in the contemporary problematique of globalisation they might well be antagonistic forces eg nationalist reactions against economic liber alism Similarly in Wightian mode the community element of civili sations represented by shared culture and identity may well facilitate the development of interstate and transnational society It is less clear why the community elements of cosmopolitanism feared by Bull should 217 From International to World Society contradict the society elements of interstate society unless values such as human rights are imposed by coercion on those not accepting them The case that community facilitates the formation of a secondorder society looks relatively easy to make Whether or not secondorder so ciety necessarily or even usually leads towards the formation of com munity is a much more open question Wellers question is a neat way of formulating the many agonisings of the English school about the expansion of European interstate society into areas not sharing the history of European civilisation It is also a way of addressing the English schools reluctance to talk about regional interstate societies as anything other than a threat to global interstate society His insight it seems to me should be one of the starting points for enquiry about the contemporary condition of and prospects for the social structure of the international system To understand the social structure of the international system at the global level requires that one also understand what is going on at the levels beneath Translating Wellers question into the framework developed in this book requires not only looking at how geography operates within each of the three domains interhuman transnational interstate but also picking up his core concern about how it operates across the three domains Within the interstate domain geography plays in two primary ways first in the relationship between the global and subglobal levels and second in the relationship between different subglobal interstate so cieties Both of these types of relationship can range along the spec trum from antagonistic at one end through indifferent in the middle to complementary at the other end Where the relationships are on the indifferenttocomplementary side then geography will mostly be of descriptive use in identifying distributional patterns For example the subglobal Islamic interhuman society and the interstate society in East Asia are for the most part indifferent to each other and both are broadly complementary to the global international society But where the re lationships are on the indifferenttoantagonistic side then geography becomes central to understanding the dynamics of the international so cial structure as a whole One example of tension between the subglobal and global levels is the interplay between the economic and social lib eral agendas of Western interstate society on the one hand and the more Westphalian pluralist norms of global interstate society on the other Western liberalism threatens the sovereignty territoriality and borders of those who do not agree with its values Examples of antagonism be tween different subglobal interstate societies can be found in the story 218 Bringing geography back in of how European interstate society ran up against and eventually over whelmed the imperial suzerainvassal societies of Asia and also in the competition between East and West during the Cold War The interplay between subglobal and global interstate societies also allows a much more nuanced and useful view of the heated debate about intervention The question of intervention blends elements of norma tive and legal debate and connects both to current affairs Is interven tion a right or a duty and for what ends and with what effects Given the arguments around the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 the subject is as important possibly more important now than in the past and is likely to remain a key focus of the English school agenda If it is pos sible to build distinctive subglobalregional international societies on the common foundations provided by global international society then this arrangement frames the issue of intervention in the form of three questions 1 How legitimatelegal is intervention within the global rules and norms ie the lowest common denominator of interstate society 2 How legitimatelegal is intervention within the rules and norms of a given subglobalregional interstate society such as EUEurope or the Arab League 3 How legitimatelegal is intervention across the boundary between distinctive subglobalregional interstate societies eg from the West into Africa Asia or the Middle East Questions about the legitimacy and legality of intervention relate so intimately to the issue of sovereignty that it is impossible to separate them But sovereignty means different things at the pluralist and soli darist ends of interstate society In a pure Westphalian interstate society virtually all intervention is both illegal and illegitimate except against forces aiming to disrupt or overthrow the interstate order In a thick solidarist international society such as that represented by the EU the agreed unpacking of sovereignty and the establishment of agreements about elements of justice and the rights of individuals and nonstate ac tors makes many more kinds of intervention both legal and legitimate There may be many inbetween cases where legality and legitimacy part company as in aspects of the recent Western interventions in Iraq and the Balkans Wheeler 2000 Since interstate society is de facto dif ferentiated quite radically at the regional level it is absurd to confine a discussion of the de jure aspects of intervention by imposing an as sumption that interstate society is a single globalscale phenomenon 219 From International to World Society Each intervention has to be considered in relation to the specific charac teristics of its location and whether it is within a subregional society or crosses boundaries between such societies If NATOs intervention in former Yugoslavia had been presented and understood as an affair of EuropeanWestern interstate society it would have triggered much less resistance from China and others who feared it might be setting a global precedent In the interhuman domain geography also plays quite strongly be cause patterns of collective identity often cluster Most national identi ties are geographically clustered to a substantial degree as to a lesser extent are most religious and civilisational identities Since individual humans often hold more than one identity simultaneously the question is how the patterns of distribution overlap and which takes priority as a mobiliser or legitimator of political action Some identities will fit inside others like Russian dolls eg Danish within Scandinavian within Eu ropean within Western whereas others may be relatively diffuse and have complicated patterns of overlap eg religious identities in relation to ethnonational ones The transnational domain does not easily lend itself to geographical thinking The key questions for TNAs is not about their geographical distribution but about the thinnessthickness of their relationship to geography As already noted TNAs of various kinds might all be able to claim global or regional standing the English school network FIFA Ford yet with huge variation in the actual substantive content of that claim quite large for Ford and FIFA pretty thin for the English school network For the transnational domain the question of geography be comes more interesting in the relationship among the three domains It is when one turns to the interplay among the three domains that Wellers concern about how patterns of identity interact with patterns shaped mainly by contractual bargains comes mainly into focus In the classical English school literature this concern took the form of three questions r was it a necessary precondition for the formation of an interstate soci ety that it be underpinned by a preexisting common culture as had been the case for ancient Greece and modern Europe r did the expansion of an interstate society beyond the area of its original common culture necessarily mean that expansion came at the expense of cohesion as the pluralists think about decolonisation and 220 Bringing geography back in r did the rise of cosmopolitan values necessarily threaten the founda tions of interstate society most particularly with respect to human rights These questions remain valid and it is not difficult to fit plenty of other contemporary questions about both policy and theory into this heading The problem of how to press on with European integration when the interstate mechanisms have outrun the rather weak sense of European identity amongst the peoples of the EU is one of the most obvious Another the globalisation problematique is how to sustain the economic liberalisation being driven by the core states and firms when its culturally homogenising consequences trigger nationalist re actions Huntingtons 1996 worrying clash of civilisations thesis fits here made all the more alarming by the escalation of securitisation be tween the Islamic world and the West that followed on from 11 Septem ber the breakdown of the peace process between Israel and the Pales tinians and the US invasion of Iraq So too do his incisive observations Huntington 1996 13554 about torn states such as Russia Turkey Mexico and Australia unsure of which civilisation they belong to and cleft states such as Israel Sudan and Sri Lanka divided by starkly different identities in the interhuman domain Also under this heading are things such as Asian values and the ASEAN way panArabism panIslamism and panAfricanism and any other attempts to ascribe a political quality to a cultural zone In a general sense all of this can be understood as being about how political economic and cultural geography play into each other At the macrolevel interest focuses on the relationship between the larger pat terns in the interhuman domain and the subglobal and global social structures in the interstate domain Do subglobal interstate develop ments follow the cultural patterns in the interhuman domain as they appear to do for example with the West and if so how closely tied are these two factors How does the existence of only a very weak identity at the level of humankind constrain the possibilities for in terstate and transnational society at the global level Conversely how does the operation of interstate and transnational society affect the rise and demise of identities in the interhuman domain Does the existence of global TNAs and of a global interstate society cultivate the growth of universal human identity or stimulate localist reactions and identity differentiations or both 221 From International to World Society Wellers implicit hypothesis is that identity on the one hand and the machineries of rational contractual relations on the other more easily reinforce each other when they occupy the same territorial space and provide grounds for conflict when they do not This idea and its ac companying assumption that the three domains are generally present in any largescale social structure seems an excellent starting point for almost any enquiry into the social structure of the international system More on this in chapter 8 Conclusions a vanguard theory of international social structures A crucial reason for bringing the subglobal level into English school theory is to open up space for a vanguard explanation of the dynam ics of international social structure By vanguard I mean the idea com mon to both military strategy and Leninist thinking that a leading ele ment plays a crucial role in how a social movement unfolds As noted above a vanguard theory of how interstate society expands is implicit in the way the English school has presented the story of the expansion of EuropeanWestern interstate society to global scale In historical terms the development of a global interstate society has been a function of the expansion of the West From the fifteenth century onwards the rise of European power first eroded and then crushed the longstanding configuration of four substantially selfcontained civilisational areas in Europe the Middle East South Asia and East Asia Buzan and Little 2000 241345 By the end of the nineteenth century virtually the whole of the international system was either created in the image of Europe as in the Americas and Australia or directly subordinated to Europe as in the African and Asian colonies or hellbent on catching up with Europe as in Japan Russia and more slowly China The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and apparently permanent rise in the level of interaction and thus density and interdependence took place but also that Western norms and values and institutions dominated the whole system This mixture of coercion and copying and persuasion as already noted runs in very close parallel to Waltzs idea that anarchy generates like units through processes of socialisation and competi tion Although the story of the expansion of interstate society is part of the English schools stockintrade no attempt seems to have been made to develop a vanguard explanation about the development of 222 Bringing geography back in interstateinternational society as such Suganami 2002 14 hints at the subglobal possibilities with his talk of a solidarist core or pockets and the idea that pluralism might evolve into solidarism but does not attempt to link these two arguments Yet looking back on this history it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that Europe played the vanguard role for the development of contemporary interstate society Vanguard explanations not only fit well with the history of interstate society they also create grounds for opposing the assumption that subglobal developments of interstate society must necessarily be contradictory to globallevel ones regional developments might not be mainly problematic for global ones but possibly essential to them In addition such explanations give open examination to the role of coercion in interstate society The danger of accepting vanguard explanations is well known from the Marxist experience namely that claims to be the wave of the future and the justification of violent means on that basis can be made by extremists of all sorts In this application there is also a risk that vanguardism privileges the influence of the powerful eg the West and obscures the contribution of oppositional forces eg anticolonial movements Used in historical perspective a vanguard explanation for the devel opmentofcontemporaryinterstatesocietybringsintofocusasetofprob lematic normative issues surrounding the role of coercion In so doing it picks up the questions raised by Wendt and discussed in chapters 4 and 5 about the binding forces that hold the shared values and practices of any society in place Quite explicit in the vanguard story of global in terstate society is the role of violence and coercion in spreading to global scale norms rules and institutions developed in Europe Also explicit in that story despite the misgivings of many English school writers about the consequences of decolonisation for interstate society is that several of the values that were carried outward by the force of West ern military superiority have over time become internalised by those peoples on whom they were originally imposed Nationalism territorial sovereignty international law diplomacy and science are the most obvi ous examples joined more recently and perhaps still controversially by the market However morally distasteful it may be to acknowledge the efficacy of coercion in shaping values it nonetheless remains true that most of these values are unquestionably now universally held values in interstate society They are no longer held in place mainly if at all by force but in many places have become internalised as widespread be liefs especially diplomacy science nationalism international law and 223 From International to World Society sovereignty The market is still held in place coercively in some parts of the system and by calculation in others but it too has a substantial worldwide constituency of believers more numerous and more influen tial in some places than in others What starts out as imperial imposition canbecomeinternalisedandacceptedbythoseonwhomitwasimposed though there is nothing inevitable about this and imposition can just as easily breed rejection as the demise of the Soviet Union demonstrated Where the values imposed by coercion bring improvement to the lives of peoples whether in terms of wealth or power or social cohesion then they have a chance of enduring beyond the coercion that originally carried them In addition to the obvious moral reservations it might also be objected that this vanguard interpretation is of only historical interest Can it be dismissed as a kind of oneoff experience no longer really relevant in an age in which imperial conquest has become not just unfashionable but also substantially illegal Any such opinion would in my view be mistaken While it may be true that vanguardism will no longer be driven primarily by military conquest the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 with its aim of promoting democracy in the Arab world certainly fits in the vanguardist mould and will be a very interesting test of whether coercion can change values Yet unless there is a major breakdown of the present interstate order the extension of interstate society by mili tary means will be confined to relatively marginal cases such as Serbia Afghanistan Iraq and possibly North Korea Vanguardism can work in other ways especially so when the distribution of power in the in ternational system remains markedly uneven The neoimperial qualities inherent in the present condition of interstate society are noticed by Nye 19901667whenhearguesthattheUSneedstoestablishinternational norms consistent with its society and get other countries to want what it wants A more coercive interpretation of this view has emerged in the Bush administration post 11 September A lopsided distribution of power enables the strong to impose themselves on the weak through all kinds of softer forms of coercion usually labelled conditionality and applied in relation to access to diplomatic recognition aid loans markets weapons and memberships of various IGOs most obviously NATO EU WTO This type of coercion is especially effective if the strong are not ideologically divided among themselves as they were for much of the twentieth century but all more or less on board in their own subglobal interstateinternational society If the social structure of the international system has a strong coreperiphery form where the 224 Bringing geography back in core is relatively homogenous then imposition of a standard of civili sation is much facilitated After the end of the Cold War there was some prospect that a fairly homogenous core would become a durable feature but with the diplo matic disarray surrounding the war against Iraq in 2003 this looks at the time of writing April 2003 to be less likely If the US persists in pur suing a project of neoimperial vanguardism it may have to rely more on the lopsided distribution of power than on a consensus backed by a concert of the great powers The vanguard whether composed of a con cert of great powers or a single superpower can try to impose its values by coercion conquest or fear of takeover but it can also operate more socially Others might emulate the core adopting its values for several reasons They might simply be overawed and copy in order to conform and to obtain the same results They might be persuaded by normative argument They might emulate for competitive reasons fearing loss of wealth or power if they fail to adapt and hoping to outdo the vanguard at its own game Whatever the mechanisms and whatever the rationales the effect is one of a subglobal vanguard leading a global development In the first classical imperial round of this process the main effect was to expand Westphalian interstate society from European to global scale In the second phase now in its early stages the main attempt will be to increase the number and depth of shared values both by elaborating the logic of coexistence within pluralism and by inviting participation in solidarist joint projects such as liberal economics big science and the pursuit of human rights If this succeeds it will push global interstate society towards a more solidarist formation from Power Political to Coexistence to Cooperative perhaps in places even to Kantian Conver gence If it fails badly by seriously dividing the core or by pushing too hard on contested values most obviously democracy human rights or by failing to deliver promised effects eg economic development and better distributed wealth or by delivering damaging sideeffects envi ronmental disaster economic meltdown political instability it could give rise once again to oppositional subglobal interstateinternational societies Between these two options lies a mixture of some movement towards solidarism at the global level combined with some development of dif ferentiated regional or subglobal interstateinternational societies The model for this is already apparent in the international political economy where it is broadly accepted that regional economic groupings are both alternatives to a global economic order and ways of operating more 225 From International to World Society effectively within such a global order Buzan Wæver and de Wilde 1998 11215 Subglobal structures play a delicate game both with each other competitors in some senses codependent in others and with the global level too much subglobalism will destroy the global level to the potential disadvantage of all A vanguard interpretation of how international social structures de velop and decay draws attention to the domestic character of the leading powers as a key factor in understanding the dynamics of the interna tional social structure Recall the argument in chapter 4 pp 917 on the English school needing to make the internal evolution of the leading states and the impact of their projection of their domestic values out ward a focus of historical and empirical work see also Buzan and Little 2000 3747 Imperialism may or may not work as a way of expanding international social structures in space and depth but whether it does or not will depend on the type of values projected the methods by which they are projected how they are evaluated morally by the recipients and how well or badly they fit with other social values in play in the cultures either that are exposed to them or on which they are imposed All of this in turn will depend on the nature of the states and societies that lie at the core of the international system Those with a taste for counterfactual history can explore this question by thinking through the likely consequences if Germany had won the First World War or Germany and Japan the Second World War or the Soviet Union and China the Third Cold World War If fascist or communist powers now formed the core what would interstate society look like What would the main institutions be Certainly it would not look at all like what we have today and the degree of difference shows how much the question of the domestic character of the dominant power matters to what sort of international social structures do and do not get put in place The process and outcomes of these wars can be seen also as aspects of the vanguard process in operation This line of reasoning ties up to the argument unfolded in chapter 5 pp 1489 about homogeneity I made the case there that one needed to be open minded about what sort of ideology underpinned interstate so ciety Much of the English school account tells only a liberal story either because it is looking at European history becoming global history or be causeitisspecificallyconcernedwithpromotingliberalvaluesButother stories are perfectly possible and some of them have real as opposed to counterfactual histories The interstate societies of the ancient and clas sical world were driven almost entirely by the values of imperial ruling 226 Bringing geography back in elites The international social structures of the classical Islamic world however one might best describe their mix of interhuman transnational and interstate were certainly not liberal The absolutist phase of Euro pean interstate society was dominated by mercantilist and aristocratic values not liberal ones Fascism and communism had only rather brief historical runs but a close look at how Germany Japan and the Soviet Union operated within the spheres they did control would give some hints as to what would have happened had they come to dominate the whole of the international system One could look also perhaps at Chinas long history as the core of an imperial system and glean some insights as to what the world would be like if an undemocratic China rather than the US was the sole superpower From a theoretical perspec tive and also a historical one it is important not to lose sight of the fact that forms of international social structure other than liberal ones are possible and that these too can be understood within the frame of English school theory Yet the historical legacy we have is that the three world wars of the twentieth century were about what form of political economy was going to shape the future of industrial society and liberalism emerged victori ous in all three rounds It is thus not at all unreasonable to look closely at the particular character of the interstate and international societies generated by a liberal core But one has to keep in mind that liberal values are not universally dominant Other sorts of values are still in play worldwide and at the subglobal level for example in the Islamic world and much of East Asia liberal values are not dominant within the local interstate societies If one is going to bring the regional and the subglobal levels back into the study of international social structures as I have argued should be done then these nonliberal alternatives are of more than historical and theoretical interest Some of them are still strongly in play at the subglobal level How this mixture of the global and subglobal works in the contemporary world is the subject of chapter 8 227 8 Conclusions a portrait of contemporary interstate society In chapter 1 I set out both my dissatisfactions with English school the ory and the reasons why I nevertheless thought it well worth pursu ing I committed myself to trying to shine some light on the important but murky relationship between international and world society and to developing a structural interpretation of English school ideas con structing them as a theory about norms rather than a normative theory I also committed myself to using the methodological pluralism of English school theory and its ability to look at several things at once as a way of unpacking the problem of globalisation and gaining more leverage on it This agenda took me much deeper than I had originally intended and with some help from various thinkers both inside and outside the English school I have ended up with a rather radical revi sion of the classical three traditions I hope I have also ended up with a plausible way of looking at the complex package of things that constitute the globalisation problematique Since misunderstandings seem to occur with frightening ease in academic debates let me state very clearly for the record that I do not intend that this structural rewriting of English school theory should replace or override the normative version of English school thinking which I labelled Wightian in chapter 1 Wights three traditions of de bate about international relations and the ongoing tensions between a prevailing orthodoxy and the various visions that challenge it remains a valid and necessary understanding of English school theory What I hope I have accomplished is to set up a structural interpretation alongside that normative one as an alternative but complementary way of understanding English school theory I hope of course that some people will see merit in this alternative and take it up I also hope that the more rigorous approach to taxonomy in the structural 228 Conclusions version will challenge various aspects of the debate in the normative version and stimulate those pursuing that line to reconsider some of their assumptions Perhaps the main theme throughout the preceding chapters has been that English school theory has not clearly enough distinguished between the structural and normative strands that weave through it and that this practice has compromised the presentation of both elements The structural element has never been clearly developed and the normative element often flounders in conceptual confusion as indicated by the nearly total incoherence about the central concept of world society We need both the normative and the structural interpretations of English school theory standing side by side complementing and questioning each other Over the preceding seven chapters I have constructed what I hope is a clearer and more internally consistent English school lens through which to look at the questions posed by globalisation This lens has several filters which select for the following r from chapter 4 the three domains interhuman transnational and in terstate and from Wendt the howwhy dimension of shared values in terms of coercion calculation and belief r from chapter 5 pluralismsolidarism and the spectrum of types of interstate society plus the interplay among the three domains Soli darism here includes a wider range of shared values particularly economic ones than are normally found in English school analyses r from chapter 6 primary institutions and the way these play into types of interstate society both as defining features and as benchmarks for change r from chapter 7 the distinction between global and subglobal espe cially regional levels and the consequent question of how they inter act particularly the idea of vanguardism as a basic mechanism for the development of international social structure These filters are I propose the minimum toolkit that one needs in order to approach the issue of globalisation They do not offer clean and simple hypotheses like those available from neorealism but they do offer an escape from the severe loss of analytical leverage that results from bundling huge complexities into a single concept whether it be god or globalisation English school theory holds on to the obligation to think in holistic terms and it is prepared to look straight into the eyes of the complexity that necessarily results Although I have borrowed ideas from Wendt and in some ways recast English school theory in Wendtian 229 From International to World Society terms although substantially modified ones I have not followed him into the confines of statecentrism If this book is read as a critique of Wendt then the main point of departure is keeping the nonstate domains in play alongside the interstate one The social structure of the international system is very complicated and I do not think that one can understand globalisation without taking into account both the state and the nonstate domains While I share Wendts view that states are still the dominant type of actor in the international system and likely to remain so for some time I have aimed for a theory that in principle allows for this not to be the case Doing that it seems to me is a crucial move if one is not to block off the ability to see fundamental changes of social structure Buzan and Little 2001 If Wendt was aiming at the possibility of a social structural theory in parallel to neorealism then I think this will eventually mislead more than enlighten Any given international social structure will represent a complicated mixture of domains and levels not to mention mixtures of coercion calculation and belief and much about its particular workings will depend crucially on how the mixture is composed This opens the way to interpretive and comparative theory but probably not to the hard causeeffect theory beloved of positivists In this last chapter it seems fitting to give this new lens a trial run by turning it towards the contemporary international system and seeing what kind of view it reveals In one chapter it will not be possible to sketch more than a general portrait One function of this portrait relates to the English school and is to demonstrate the difference of view us ing this social structural lens as opposed to the constricted pluralist one that still dominates most English school writing including the writing of the solidarists My aim is both to fill in the gaps that have been the focus of criticism in preceding chapters and to give a hint at what an English school take on globalisation looks like The second function is to offer a contrast between an English school account of what the interna tional system now looks like how it got to where it is and what driving forces it sees as the main movers of history and the familiar accounts available from other mainstream IR theories Here the emphasis will be on primary institutions as the main comparative advantage of an English school approach combined with a commitment to always ask ing what mixture of coercion calculation and belief holds these insti tutions in place Neorealism cannot ask this kind of question and by moving towards it neoliberalism largely follows suit Constructivists canasksuchquestionsbutsofarlackaholisticandhistoricalframework comparable to that developed by the English school 230 Conclusions In the next section I will set out a static portrait of contemporary in terstate society looking at both the global and subglobal levels Since I will be focusing on an interstate society whose core is mainly liberal but some of whose periphery and semiperiphery is not this view will contribute to investigating the features of the liberal form of a Co operative interstate society with a strong interplay among the three domains and developments in the interstate sector being interdepen dent with those in the interhuman and transnational ones The second section looks back briefly to the interstate societies before the Second World War The purpose is to get some sense of how institutions have changed and to take advantage of the powers of hindsight to look at the possible dynamics driving both the changes and the continuities The third section focuses on the stability of contemporary interstate society What are its internal contradictions How do the interplays between global and subglobal levels and among the interstate transnational and interhuman domains affect the stability of interstate society How much do external developments in for example technology and envi ronment influence its stability and development Are there changes in the binding forces that hold it together and is the global level stable in itself or dependent on a vanguard The fourth section concludes with a speculation on what the pattern of dynamics at play in contemporary interstate society suggests about its possible futures and some thoughts on where to from here in the English school research programme A snapshot of contemporary interstate society How would one set about characterising contemporary interstate soci ety in terms of the ideas unfolded in the preceding chapters Perhaps the most obvious point to begin at is the one underlined by literatures as diverse as Huntingtons clash of civilisations and the many inter pretations of the postCold War international system as two worlds or core and periphery These literatures suggests that contemporary in terstate society is a layered diverse phenomenon It certainly has sig nificant standing at the system level where there is a globalscale so cial structure but this is accompanied by more diverse and in places much deeper subglobal structures These levels need to be examined separately At the global level the dominant view in the English school litera ture is that interstate society is firmly towards the pluralist end of the spectrum with not even the solidarists claiming much beyond that 231 From International to World Society I have argued that this view is too pessimistic both because it ignores subglobal developments not strictly relevant here since I am consid ering only the global level at this point and because it does not count developments in the economic sector as part of interstate society which is relevant In terms of the general spectrum of types of interstate so ciety set out in figure 5 and elaborated in chapter 6 pp 1905 above it would be unreasonable to characterise contemporary interstate so ciety as either Power Political or Convergence Institutions are much too well developed and war much too constrained to see the world as Power Political and the degree of structural and ideological diversity amongst states much too high and resistance to the idea of homoge nization much too strong to see it as Convergence The middle of the spectrum comprises the Coexistence model which emphasises the pri macy of states and the limitation of interstate society to pluralist rules and the Cooperation one where many institutions will at least initially be carried over from the Coexistence model significant downgrading of war and balance of power is likely and some joint projects become a feature of shared values If the economic sector is allowed in as a shared value of contemporary interstate society then it is difficult to argue that it fits with the Coexistence model For sure much remains that fits a logic of coexistence including some quite elaborate arrangements for arms control and environmental management But the widespread ac ceptance of liberal rules for the world economy cannot reasonably be characterised as coexistence and neither can more tentative acceptance of some elements of human rights These represent a clear move into the Cooperative logic of collective pursuit of shared values economic growth and development human rights So one can start this exer cise by positioning contemporary global interstate society towards the pluralist side of the Cooperative model Picking up from table 3 and looking at the primary institutions of this global society sovereignty and territoriality and therefore the state still feature strongly as master institutions Of the derivatives from these nonintervention is still quite robust though no longer as absolute as it once was being under pressure both from human rights and US claims to a broad right of preventive action in pursuit of its national security Bush 2002 International law has become hugely elaborate support ing many secondary institutions Diplomacy remains a master institu tion with multilateralism the most significant derivative though under threat from US unilateralism and again a host of secondary institu tions Great power management remains robust as a general principle 232 Conclusions but under stress from differences between unipolar and multipolar in terpretations Of its derivatives alliances are no longer the most salient feature of the political landscape and war is much hedged about with restrictions and largely ruled out amongst the major powers Balance of power is somewhat harder to characterise Certainly it does not op erate in the same vigorous way that characterised it up to the end of the Cold War The increasing adoption of liberal economic values has severelymoderatedantihegemonismasexemplifiedinteraliabyaquite widespread willingness among the powers to collaborate in big science projects Nationalism and its derivatives selfdetermination and pop ular sovereignty remain strong but democracy is not a globally shared value Equality of people is strong as a master institution but despite significant advances its derivatives human rights and humanitarian intervention remain contested It it still controversial whether to count themasgloballevelinstitutionsornotThemarkethasfinallytriumphed as a master institution strongly tied into multilateralism and with trade and financial liberalisation as its major derivatives Environmental stew ardship probably now registers as a master institution but more with a logic of coexistence than with the force of a joint project Because this modestly Cooperative interstate society is dominantly liberal in character one would expect and one finds a lot of interplay between the three domains interstate interhuman transnational With equality of people and the market as strong primary institutions both individuals and even more so TNAs of various kinds are given sub stantial rights and standings within the secondary institutions of inter state society Firms political lobbying groups and interest groups are allowed and often encouraged to operate transnationally and can ac quire legal rights and responsibilities within the framework of interstate society TNAs and individuals are allowed to accumulate and use huge amounts of capital and organisational resources and to play openly and covertly in the political processes of bilateral diplomacy conferencing and multilateralism Powerful TNAs and individuals have a big enough role to justify labelling the global level an international society They have been important movers of interstate society on human rights environ ment and some arms control issues Their position makes it reasonable to ask whether or not they are the dominant driving force behind the rise of the market to such a strong position among the institutions of contemporary international society If we live in a modestly Cooperative and ideologically liberal global international society what are the binding forces coercion calculation 233 From International to World Society belief that hold it together and how stable is it Given the size and the complexity of this society the number and variety of both its members and its institutions it would almost certainly distort the truth too much to attempt a Wendtstyle single overall characterisation As I argued in chapter 4 coercion calculation and belief will almost always come in mixtures Without a much deeper investigation it is not possible to give more than an impressionistic account of this aspect of contemporary international society but common sense will perhaps save this from be ing too controversial If one focuses on the interstate society then many of the institutions appear to be held in place by belief At the level of states sovereignty territoriality nonintervention diplomacy interna tional law great power management nationalism selfdetermination not all versions popular sovereignty and equality of peoples are all pretty deeply internalised and not contested as principles Particular in stances or applications may excite controversy for example resentments of great power management or opposition to some selfdetermination bids based on cultural nationalism But the basic institutions of plu ralist interstate society have wide support among states and pretty wide support amongst peoples and TNAs Most liberation movements seek sovereignty Most TNAs want and need a stable legal framework Although these institutions were originally imposed coercively by the West it is far from clear that they are now held in place primarily by Western power and influence Even if Western power declined it does not seem unreasonable to think that most of these pluralist institutions would remain in place as too might the modest level of commitment to environmental stewardship The same cannot yet be said for the more solidarist elements of con temporary international society Should the backing for human rights and humanitarian intervention by the West weaken for any reason it does not seem likely that they would retain much standing as global institutions even though they would retain strong constituencies of in terstate support regionally and more widely in the transnational and interhuman domains But at the global interstate level they are held in place more by calculation and coercion than by belief Whether the same is true of the market and its derivatives is an interesting important and difficult question Until the end of the Cold War the market was one of the core contested issues among the great powers the rival principle being centrally planned economics But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of central planning by China the market has become a global institution in the sense that most states conform to 234 Conclusions market rules and powerful secondary institutions exist to support this IMF WTO World Bank While many states support this out of belief it could be argued that many others adhere to it because of calculation or soft forms of coercion One does not see much of gunboats being sent in to open markets as was done during colonial times but for most periphery states access to aid loans and markets is frequently made conditional on compliance with market rules Many calculate that their wellbeing or even survival depend on such compliance and thus go along voluntarily Others are subject to more direct forms of arm twisting such as sanctions Because compliance is nearly universal the market is a major institution of contemporary international society Amongst many adherence is rooted in belief but for a significant number this in stitution is held in place by and serves the interests of Western power If that power were to decline weakening coercion and changing the balance of calculation it is not clear that the market would survive as a global institution In sum although this is a modestly Cooperative international society its Coexistence elements are quite deeprooted and stable whereas its Cooperative ones as yet have shallower roots and could more easily which is not to say easily be swept away by changes in the distribution of power An argument can be made that the interstate domain at the global level is increasingly supported by a global scale Westernistic civilisation or Mondo culture which influences not just state elites but also TNAs and popular culture Buzan and Segal 1998a b Up to a century ago relatively few people thought of themselves as members of the human race in any meaningful way Empire was common outright slavery only recently pushed to the margins unequal treatment routine and the idea of a common humanity very marginal except within some religious traditions Few people knew much or cared much about what was happening on other parts of the planet Now many more people do know at least something about what goes on elsewhere and up to a point care about it even if very unevenly and in ways heavily shaped by patterns of media attention For the past halfcentury there has been a general acceptance that all humans are equal even if this is still violated in practice in many ways and places These things matter in that they contribute to the stability of a global interstate society by embeddingitsideasnotjustinstateelitesbutinthemindsofthepeoples as well The picture at the subglobalregional level is as one might expect much more mixed The fried egg metaphor I floated earlier suggests that 235 From International to World Society subglobal societies seen as the yolks would rest on and share the common white representing the global level just described This metaphor carries the important implication that there is a substantial degree of compatibility between the societal developments at the sub global level and those at the global level and for those attuned to racism the idea of the substrate being white will also carry some resonance If no such compatibility exists then the global level itself does not exist To say compatibility must exist is not to imply that harmony must exist amongstthesubglobalsocietiesonlythattheymustagreetosharesome institutions In principle the nature of the relationships both among the subglobal societies and between them and the global level remains open and historically contingent It is possible for subglobal interstate societies to be strong rivals as they were during the Cold War and yet still share adherence to some globallevel institutions sovereignty territoriality diplomacy I referred to this earlier as secondorder plu ralism Such pluralism could encompass intersocietal relations ranging from friendship through indifference to hostility Subglobal interna tional societies lose their point if there are no significant differences among them and if the differences become too great then the global level disappears I can see no reason to agree with the hypothesis assumed in some English school writings that subglobal societal developments must necessarily be rivals or necessarily degrade the global level They might do so Or they might not In the contemporary international system one can identify quite a few subglobal mostly regional interstate andor international societies Even a brief survey reveals that what is striking about them is that most are quite well in tune with the institutions at the global level and that there are no fierce hostilities among them of the kind that defined the Cold War There are in other words no competing universalisms of the type that so worried Bull and Wight It can certainly be argued that the West and particularly the US sees itself as a universalism but unlike during the Cold War the other subglobal interstate societies are broadly concerned with maintaining their distinctiveness at the subglobal level not trying to remake the global level in their own image Perhaps the most obvious candidate for a subglobal international so ciety is the West Because the West serves as the core for global level international society there is no puzzle about its compatibility with the global level The West is a clear case of the fried eggs metaphor where the yolk is thicker than the white because it represents a wider set of shared institutions Within the circle of Western states some of 236 Conclusions the things that are either hotly contested at the global level or held in place by calculation or coercion are deeply internalised and sta ble at this subglobal level Within Western international society the market is broadly accepted democracy even more so and there is agreement on a substantial array of human rights Individuals and nonstate actors have wellestablished rights and responsibilities and the whole subsystem is laced together with a dense network of sec ondary institutions and transnational networks The West as a whole has achieved fullyfledged Cooperative status and is often referred to as the international community GonzalezPelaez 2002 4759 though at the time of writing this development is coming under severe pressure from the unilateralist and in some ways imperial policies of the Bush administration The West is not monolithic Some parts of it have distinctive Coop erative projects of their own most obviously NAFTA and more on the edges of the West Mercosur Although these largely embrace the same sorts of institutions as the West as a whole the market democracy elements of human rights they generate distinctive secondary institu tions for the pursuit of those shared goals Other parts of the West most notably the EU are progressing well into the Kantian version of the Con vergencemodelbyembracingbothsubstantialelementsofhomogeneity in their state structures and by constructing strong secondary institu tions including some IGOs with a quasigovernmental character the European Commission the European Parliament the European Court of Justice The contrast between the Convergence goals of the EU and the robust rejection of convergence by the US has become much more visible under the Bush administration even generating its own litera ture Kagan 2002 Because the West is the core of the global interstate society it cannot just be considered as a more thickly developed sub system It is also the centre of power that supports the global interstate society and the repository of the more contested institutions which that core projects into global interstate society and to some extent supports coercively the market human rights democracyInthissensetheWest generally is still playing the role of vanguard to global interstate society pressing its own values and institutions onto societies that in varying degrees want to resist them and which use the earlier round of pluralist institutions especially sovereignty territoriality diplomacy to do so Although it is too early to judge at the time of writing the 2003 war against Iraq by the US seems to suggest that the Bush administration has in mind a much more aggressive and imperial style of vanguardism 237 From International to World Society though whether this can be sustained or will work remains to be seen as does the extent to which pursuit of it will undermine the cohesion of the West as the core of global international society There is a subglobal interstate society in East Asia which is mostly Coexistence in character Unlike the West and talk of Asian values notwithstanding East Asia enjoys little or no overall shared culture beyond that provided by the global level and its interstate society is defined by strong adherence to sovereignty territoriality and nation alism The region as a whole is far from being a security community even though within it the ASEAN states have built up quite a successful security regime If it were not restrained by the ringholder presence of the US East Asia would probably have war as a more prominent in stitution Yet East Asia also has some Cooperative qualities Mostly it resists the Western pressure on human rights and democracy but many of its states have accepted a limited version of the market as necessary to their own power and stability Economic nationalism remains strong but with the understanding that the national economic development of each depends on a degree of openness to trade and investment and acceptance of some market rules Until the late 1990s there was also acceptance of the distinctive Japanese model of capitalism There is a common understanding among most of the leaderships that pursuit of economic interdependence both requires and supports restraints on the operation of the balance of power and war East Asia has some still rather weak secondary institutions and it is far from clear that as China grows strong this regional interstate society will be able to sustain a commitment to absolute gains in the face of relative ones that might change the distribution of power among the member states Buzan and Wæver 2003 14280 Turning to areas more clearly within the global periphery one finds a variety of other yolks embedded in the global white Russia is busy try ing to adapt to the global institutions having previously been the failed side in the Cold Wars struggle of competing universalisms South Asia strangely manages to be less on the regional level than the global norm not so much a yolk sitting on the white as a thin area of the white Althoughit does havesome very weak regionalsecondaryinstitutions South Asia is basically on the Power Political side of the Coexistence model War is an everpresent possibility India and Pakistan have trou ble sustaining diplomatic relations there is relatively little trade and investment within the region and no parallel to the East Asian joint development idea 238 Conclusions Something of the same might initially be thought about the Islamic international society centred on the Middle East and West Asia There too war remains a vigorous institution and there is little commitment within the region to joint economic development There is also fierce resistance to Western impositions of human rights and democracy Yet while in the interstate domain this might also look like being on the Power Political side of the Coexistence model there are other things going on As in South Asia the statessystem and basic Westphalian institutions are robust There are some mostly weak secondary insti tutions most notably the Arab League and the Organization of the Is lamic Conference OIC as well as a variety of subregional IGOs Arab Maghreb Union Gulf Cooperation Council And although the states system has proved surprisingly robust both Arab nationalism and Islam constitute powerful and where they overlap intertwined elements of collective identity within the interhuman domain These strong inter human components of this subglobal society are concentrated in the same area as the interstate component but also reach out to a thinner global constituency Among other things they are powerful drivers of hostility to Israel and Iran Although Islam is not organised as a hierar chical church these patterns of identity support a substantial element of TNAs ranging from philosophical Sufi sects to alQaeda While the interstate side of this subglobal international society is largely in con formity with the Westphalian elements of global interstate society a case might be made that the interhuman and transnational elements are at least potentially and up to a point in practice in tension with it Although most of the states in this society have succeeded at least par tially in coopting Islamic legitimacy into their own structures there re mains a tension between the universalist claims and pulls of the umma and the secular and sectional claims of the state In some senses the idea of an Islamic state is a contradiction in terms So long as those senses retain the capacity to mobilise people as demonstrated by alQaeda the Islamic international society will remain in tension both with itself and as demonstrated most recently by the invasion of Iraq with the global international society Buzan and Wæver 2003 185216 Africa is perhaps the most difficult of the periphery areas to charac terise in these terms On the one hand so many of its states are weak or even failed that it is hard put to meet Westphalian criteria in prac tice Civil war of one sort or another is common the dominant form of indigenous TNA is the armed insurgency group and borders in many places are more notional than functional On the other hand Africa 239 From International to World Society possesses a modestly impressive set of regional and subregional sec ondary institutions Interstate wars are relatively uncommon Its states are strong defenders of the principles of sovereignty nonintervention and diplomacy and there is at least rhetorical commitment to joint de velopment Because of the weakness of its local political economic and social structures Africa is heavily penetrated by both external powers and outside TNAs It is the most peripheral part of the periphery and the place where many of the local state structures would not survive if they were not held in place and supported by the institutions of global interstate society Jackson 1990 Buzan and Wæver 2003 21751 In sum there is quite a lot of variation at the subglobal level Some parts are more developed or at least thicker in the sense of more sol idarist than the global level and act in part as a vanguard using their power to project contested values on a global scale Other parts are less developed or thinner more pluralist most notably in retaining war as an active institution less hedged about with restraints than the global level Some parts are seeking to pursue their own variations within the broad framework of global level institutions others seek to defend ele ments of cultural distinctiveness At present and with the possible ex ception of the US there are no clashing universalisms where subglobal interstatesocietiesseektoimposetheirnormsonthewholeplanetThere are certainly tensions most obviously around the war on terrorism but more generally between the human rights and democracy vanguardism of the West and the mostly African Middle Eastern and Asian societies in which those values clash with indigenous cultural traditions These tensions look enduring and their outcome uncertain But against them stand the really quite impressive and quite stable set of interstate in stitutions that are common both to the global level and to most of the subglobal ones While there is a lot going on in terms of globalisation in all three domains there is also a lot going on in all three domains of a much more localist or regional character Looking back what changed what didnt and why I do not have the space here to conduct a detailed stepbystep analysis of how the international social structure has evolved and changed over the last two centuries It is nonetheless possible and quite useful to exploit the powers of hindsight by taking a quick look back As set out in chapter 7 pp 21417 above there already exists a classical English 240 Conclusions school account of this period told as the expansion of European inter state society to the rest of the world I have argued that this account rests on an idealised view of the nineteenth century leading to an unduly pes simistic view of developments in the twentieth This classical account therefore serves as one benchmark against which to develop an alter native interpretation based on the theoretical framework developed in chapters 47 Picking up on Holstis idea of using primary institutions as a benchmark for change provides another analytical tool On these lines and in contrast to liberals such as Ikenberry 2001 who use sec ondary institutions to structure a historical account it is also possible to build on the work of Mayall and Keene Mayalls studies on nation alism trace out and up to a point explain some of the most important changes in primary institutions during this period Keenes 2002 dis cussion of colonialism provides a similar service One can ask whether these are changes within or between the main models that occupy the pluralistsolidarist spectrum One can also look for significant changes andor continuities in other elements of international social structure the three domains the question of binding forces and geographical scope and subdivision In the previous section I argued that contemporary global level in terstate society was modestly Cooperative I gave its master primary institutions as sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power man agement nationalism the market equality of people and environmen tal stewardship and its derivative institutions as nonintervention international law multilateralism balance of power war though now extremely hedged about with restrictions selfdetermination popu lar sovereignty and trade and financial liberalisation Embedded in this global level I identified a number of subglobal interstate societies some much thicker than the global substrate some a bit thinner but most more or less in harmony with the pluralist end of the global level structure A significant feature of this whole ensemble was its coreperiphery structure in which the West played the role of past and present vanguard in creating supporting and in some respects pushing for extension of the institutions at the global level If this is a fair characterisation of what we have now where did we come from and what changed and what remained the same to bring us to this point ItisIthinkfairtoaccepttheEnglishschoolsclassicalassumptionthat the contemporary global international society evolved primarily out of developments in Europe Since a global interstate society of any sort is difficult to trace much before the middle of the nineteenth century it is 241 From International to World Society thus reasonable to use European interstate society as the starting bench mark against which to track the changes that bring us to the present If we take eighteenthcentury Europe as representative of a classical Westphaliansocietyofstatesitsprimaryinstitutionscanbesummarised as follows Table 4 The primary institutions of eighteenthcentury European interstate society Primary Institutions Master Derivative Sovereignty Nonintervention International law Territoriality Borders Diplomacy Messengersdiplomats Treaties Diplomatic language Balance of power Antihegemonism Alliances Guarantees Neutrality War Great power management Inequality of peoples Colonialism Trade Mercantilism Dynasticism Elite genealogy and marriage Starting from this characterisation of eighteenthcentury Europe one can attempt to fill in the gap between then and now Overall we seem to be tracking a shift from a European interstate society located close to the Power Political side of the Coexistence model and not global in scale to the global scale modestly Cooperative international society of the present day Obviously quite a lot of eighteenthcentury institutions have survived and the question is whether and how these have changed intermsoftheunderstandingofwhattheyrepresentandthepracticesle gitimised by them Earlier discussion already suggests that sovereignty war and international law have undergone substantial internal changes Just as obviously some eighteenthcentury institutions have dropped away inequality of peoples colonialism mercantilism dynasticism elite genealogy and marriage and more arguably alliances and several additional institutions have been taken on board nationalism equality of people selfdetermination popular sovereignty the market multilat eralism environmental stewardship Many of these exits and entrances are linked pairs occupying the same functional space eg mercantilism and market inequality of peoples and equality of peoples colonial ism and selfdetermination dynasticism and popular sovereignty For 242 Conclusions both the exits and entrances the question is when and why this hap pened Table 4 also makes clear that the whole universe of secondary institutions came into being after the eighteenth century and again the questions are when and why It was probably the case that the institu tions and operations of this eighteenthcentury interstate society were largely detached from the interhuman domain except for the idea of Christendom In the transnational domain the Roman church remained a player and some banking and trading networks were also important but apart from these the transnational domain was thinly populated in comparison with the present day Since eighteenthcentury Europe had mainly colonial relations with the rest of the world and an international system was not yet fully global in extent and very thin in many places it is hard to think in terms of global and subglobal levels of interstate society Because there has been no attempt within the English school to think systematically about primary institutions there is almost no work that attempts to analyse the expansion and evolution of international so ciety in this way Holstis 2002 paper has already been discussed in chapter 6 Watson 1992 152250 contains some hints but since he is more concerned to highlight the role of hegemony within the anarchy hierarchy spectrum he does not deal systematically with institutions He is nevertheless good at tracking the development of diplomacy war and the balance of power as institutions and touches on dynasticism international law and nationalism Mayalls 1990 2000 work on na tionalism brings in many other primary institutions and provides not only a starting point but also something of a model for how to approach the interplay and tensions among primary institutions as a key dynamic shaping how interstate societies evolve Mayall focuses his main effort on identifying the impact of nation alism on the interstate society into which it was introduced For the purposes of this analysis I will accept the general understanding that nationalism came into vogue in Europe during the nineteenth century having intellectual roots developed during the eighteenth It can be ex plained multiply as a product of romantic thinking as a political tool for peoples seeking to free themselves from empires primarily Ottoman and AustroHungarian and as a response by state elites both to military pressures the use of the levee en masse by revolutionary France and to the class tensions identified by Marx as arising from the practices of in dustrial capitalism Whatever its source during the nineteenth century nationalism was increasingly taken on board as a primary institution 243 From International to World Society both by European interstate society and by the global interstate society that Europe was unintentionally making through colonialism This pro cess did much more than simply add another primary institution into the mix As Mayall traces with some care it played a key role in both the reinterpretation of some Westphalian institutions and the demise of others Mayalls 1990 2000 main observations are as follows r Nationalism underlay the shift from dynastic to popular sovereignty and was also a strand leading into the development of human rights in the West 1990 2 Nationalism supported selfdetermination but introduced a tension about who constitutes any given nation ethno nationalism or political nationalism This in turn confused the prin ciple of selfdetermination adopted after the First World War though also becoming one of the tensions that undermined colonialism 1990 3849 2000 3966 r Diplomacy survived the coming of nationalism but nationalism modified the Westphalian primary institutions of sovereignty non intervention war territoriality and balance of power without elimi nating them Even postmodern states still retain sovereignty and terri toriality though they use them differently 2000 6778 Nationalism weakened the principle of mutual recognition by setting the nation state ideal against the much more mixed reality but strengthened commitment to sovereign equality It created tensions between liberal inclinations to restrain the use of force and interpretations of national ism that elevated war to be the mechanism of social Darwinism And it hugely deepened the relationship between governments and peo ples role of the state in society 1990 2537 Nationalism challenged territoriality not as such but by hanging its legitimacy on national cri teria and generating problems of irredentism and secessionism 1990 5063 r Dynasticism political aggression and imperialismcolonialism were all delegitimised by nationalism 1990 35 r In some ways nationalism was entangled with liberalism and thus developed as an institution alongside the market Yet despite this shared parentage nationalism and the market are often in ten sion with nationalism challenging the market in ways ranging from cultural and political autarky projects through imperatives of de fence selfreliance to labour mobility and migration 1990 70110 Economic nationalism was also a feature of both communist and many third world states 1990 11144 This general tension does not mean 244 Conclusions that the nationstate idea is not also complementary to the liberal project in many ways including defence democracy law and cur rency 1990 1501 r Because international law is made by states there are tensions be tween international law and democracy except where all states are democracies Mayall 2000 94 Using Mayalls insights as a starting point and adding in the exits and entrances already noted between eighteenthcentury and contemporary interstate society one can compile the following sketch about how why and when the primary institutions of interstate society changed over the last two centuries During the nineteenth century nationalism consolidated as an insti tution of European interstate society with resultant tensions between its derivatives selfdetermination and popular sovereignty and the stability of local not overseas empires Ottoman AustroHungarian Russian There was sustained tension between mercantilism and the market as to which would be the dominant derivative of trade Later in the century came the first development of secondary institutions in response to growing trade and communication and the rapid shrinking of the world by technologies of transportation and communication In terstate society became global in scale as European and later US and Japanese empires filled up the international system This was a largely colonial interstate society with a European core A Western hemisphere semiperiphery and later East Asian developments centred on the rise of Japan began to introduce a significant independent subglobal level while most of Africa Asia and the Pacific had subordinate political and social status During this period sovereignty diplomacy international law territoriality borders the balance of power antihegemonism al liances and war did not alter much though the concert of Europe de veloped as an early form of multilateral great power management After the First World War and in no small measure in reaction to its horrors interstate war began to be downgraded as an acceptable general instrument amongst the members of interstate society mostly because of fear that technologically driven powers of destruction threat ened to wreck European civilisation Diplomacy came under chal lenge in some European countries and the US because of its removal from popular sovereignty and public opinion but it largely survived this turbulence unaltered The mandate system began to question the legitimacy of colonialism and its derivatives Mayall 2000 1725 and 245 From International to World Society a major consolidation of selfdetermination and popular sovereignty within European international society Wilsonianism began the corro sive seepage of these ideas into the colonies Dynasticism and its deriva tives were largely eliminated as institutions of interstate society under the pressure of nationalism and popular sovereignty though some dy nastic practices remained as features of domestic politics in some states There was a major development of secondary institutions especially global forum organisations and along with that the beginning of a ma jor expansion of positive international law foreshadowed by the two Hague Conferences on the laws of war late in the nineteenth century During this period nationalism changed the understanding of territori ality and borders and also completed the shifting of the legitimation of sovereignty from dynastic rights to peoples The competition between mercantilism and market continued as did central roles for alliances balance of power and antihegemonism The Second World War and the understanding of the processes lead ing up to it likewise generated further changes in the institutions of interstate society These reactions consolidated the market as an insti tution of Western international society and linked this strongly to the shrinking legitimacy of war which under pressure from fear of nu clear weapons was increasingly confined to an ultimate right of self defence validated by sovereignty and nationalism At the same time the long tension between the market and the communist version of mercantilism entered what now looks like the last phase of the strug gle for dominance and democracy was consolidating as a primary in stitution of Western international society After 1945 and outside the Soviet sphere there was a rapid demise of inequality of peoples and its derivatives colonialism and the right of conquest This took place under pressure from the spread of nationalism selfdetermination and pop ular sovereignty from European to global interstate society Alongside this was a concomitant rise of equality of peoples as an institution of global interstate society The winding down of colonialism meant that an interstate society based on sovereign equality became global in scale This expansion opened up the way for a variety of subglobalregional developments previously overlaid by colonialism and it was during this period that the differentiation between global and subglobal inter national social structures spread to the whole system At least within the Western sphere multilateral diplomacy flourished as an institution and many issues that might previously have led to war were handled in a variety of conferences and IGOs This rise of multilateralism was 246 Conclusions accompanied by a rapid expansion of both secondary institutions and TNAs linked into Western interstate society The rise of secondary in stitutions was linked to two things first the impact of decolonisation which released dozens of weak states into the system many not ca pable of fulfilling independently either their internal management or their diplomatic roles and second the rise of the market within the Western sphere and the need for management of what was becoming a global economy Within this context international law continued to become more extensive and elaborate not only among states but also between them and TNAs and to a lesser extent individuals Within the West and particularly so within the developing EU sovereignty terri toriality and borders were adapted to meet the conditions created by a more extensive embracing of the market In the wider global soci ety sovereignty and nonintervention remained robust as did balance of power antihegemonism and alliances Environmental stewardship began to emerge as a new institution and one substantially driven from the interhuman and transnational domains up into the interstate one After the ending of the Cold War the market became a strong insti tution at the global level and interstate war was pushed even further to the margins The implosion of the Soviet Union created perhaps the last major round of decolonisation One consequence of all this was a reduction in the importance of alliances which while still present no longer functioned within interstate society in the same central way that they had done traditionally Another consequence was the weakening of antihegemonism as exemplified inter alia by a quite widespread will ingness among the powers both to open their economies and accept the risks of interdependence and to collaborate in various big science projects Asking whether the balance of power as a master institution was in decay was at least not an unreasonable question though great power management remained strong Nau 2001 585 for example argues that when national identities converge as they have recently among the democratic great powers they may temper and even elim inate the struggle for power There was room for thinking that in many ways the market multilateralism and the host of secondary in stitutions associated with them had taken over from war balance of power and their derivatives as the institutions that now shaped how sovereignty and territoriality were to be understood Yet with the US left as the sole superpower multilateralism came under some hard questioning as Washington adopted more unilateralist attitudes and 247 From International to World Society practices and turned against many of the secondary institutions it had been the prime mover in creating So also after 11 September and more so after the invasion of Iraq did the place of war with the US claiming and exercising rights of preventive attack With the West as a whole in a dominant position the projection globally of its concerns about human rights and democracy raised tensions not only with non intervention but also with the problem that the social conditions ne cessary to sustain democracy and human rights as a standard of civil isation simply did not exist in many parts of the world Mayall 2000 8893 10620 Environmental stewardship continued to grow as an institution which like human rights had strong roots in the nonstate domains This rough sketch of the development of interstate society over the past two centuries reveals both substantial continuity and a good deal of change Perhaps diplomacy and nonintervention have been the most stable institutions in the sense both of remaining in place and not being fundamentally reinterpreted The practice of diplomacy has of course changed with better communications and more multilateralism but its essential principles remain pretty much the same Nonintervention has recently come under challenge both by human rights campaigners and by the new claims of the US for rights of preemption yet this institution also has so far kept its basic shape rather well By contrast sovereignty territoriality and borders though remaining central have been substan tially reinterpreted to accommodate nationalism and the market Both interstate war and the balance of power have been pushed towards the margins as institutions not least by the rise of the market as a dominant institution Overall this brief sketch presents a very different picture from the classical rather pessimistic account of the English school outlined in chapter 7 pp 21217 It also provides a much fuller portrait than ei ther neorealism which tells the story in terms of changes in polarity or neoliberalism with its emphasis on secondary institutions These theo reticalapproachessimplycannotgeneratethequestionsthatanimatethe English schools approach The development of global interstate society is of course susceptible to a variety of normative assessments depending on the values used But it is difficult to see it as a story of retreat from some nineteenthcentury pinnacle and quite possible to interpret it as in many ways a progressive story albeit one with ups and downs Perhaps the really central change over the last 200 years has been the shift from 248 Conclusions a coreperiphery mediated by imperial power and war to one based on universalised Westphalian principles and multilateralism Within that shift a greater scope for geographical differentiation has opened up as the process of decolonisation not only allowed the periphery to join a global interstate society on much more equal political terms but also allowed subglobal interstate societies to form and develop in distinc tive ways If interstate society is understood only at the global level and primarily as a phenomenon of great powers then it is indeed possible to see the Cold War as a rather depressing time But if one builds into the picture decolonisation as well as superpower rivalry and looks not just at the global level but also the subglobal one then even the Cold War has quite a bit to be cheerful about The costs of losing a degree of cultural homogeneity underpinning interstate society are a legitimate source of concern but need to be balanced both by the gains of losing colonialism and dynasticism and by the development of elements of a global culture not just at the level of elites but also and increasingly in the interhuman and transnational domains In the West and increas ingly beyond it we have an international and not just an interstate society Also clear from this story is that the changes in interstate society have many sources War has been one of the key movers on both global and subglobal levels though its central role now seems to be giving way to the market Deeper developments in society economy and technology in the form both of revolutions and steadier incremental transforma tions also motivate institutional change So too does the interplay be tween different institutions and the tensions and contradictions among them which lead to both reinterpretions of institutions that remain sta ble and the atrophy of some old institutions and the entry of some new ones And there is the interplay amongst the three domains already discussed in chapter 6 These driving forces are the subject of the next section Driving forces deeply rooted structures and contradictions Having looked at how things are in contemporary international society and then at what changed to make them that way the next step is to focus on the driving forces that kept some institutions stable drove some from the field and inspired or pressed for the development of new ones The 249 From International to World Society focus on continuity and change of primary institutions provides a single frame of reference within which to capture the daunting array of vari ables that constitute the problematique of globalisation The enormous complexity of globalisation means that any single dominant cause is unlikely Both the dynamics and the statics of international society re flect interplays among a variety of factors some material some social In this section I will look briefly at the five main explanatory factors that arise out of the framework and analysis developed above tensions and contradictions among primary institutions the dynamics of societal geography and the distribution of power the nature of binding forces and the character of leading powers the interplay among the three domains and the pressures of material conditions Tensions and contradictions among primary institutions There was quite a bit of discussion of this in the previous section build ing on Mayalls contribution and also in chapter 6 where I pointed out that while some primary institutions composed a relatively coher ent mutually supportive set notably the classical pluralist package of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy balance of power and inter national law others were both practically and intrinsically in tension both with some of these and sometimes with each other nationalism human rights the market The basic point here is that there should be no expectation that the primary institutions composing any inter state or international society should necessarily or even probably all be in harmony with each other Harmony should not be excluded as a possibility and might have interesting implications for stability if it happened But it is probably the exception rather than the rule This should not be surprising Contradictions within a set of values all held to be central are the everyday stuff of both individual morality and the practice of domestic politics in most states If some of the primary in stitutions of any society are in tension with each other then one must expect that tension to be a pressure for change both of and in institu tions That said however one should not underestimate the capability of powerful and generally successful societies to sustain and even profit from a degree of tension among their primary institutions The merit of Mayalls analysis was precisely that he showed how the introduction of nationalism as a primary institution created tensions and consequently changed the understanding of some other primary institutions ter ritoriality sovereignty market and undermined others colonialism 250 Conclusions dynasticism At the same time these other institutions affected how nationalism was interpreted for example in relation to self determination In contemporary international society there is a central tension between the market on the one hand and sovereignty national ism and war on the other The attempt by the Western core to promote human rights and democracy on a global scale produces tensions of a different sort but should human rights and democracy be accepted as primary institutions of global international society that would not en tirely remove their tension with sovereignty and nonintervention not to mention war so creating pressure for adaptation and reinterpreta tion in both directions Building on Vincents idea of a basic right to subsistence GonzalezPelaez 2002 explores the tensions among hu man rights sovereignty and the market The point here is that such tensions are likely to be a common feature of interstateinternational societies and that in and of themselves they constitute an important dynamic of change If one is curious as to why the pluralist package of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy balance of power and interna tional law has proved so durable both in practice and in its intellectual appeal then the answer lies at least in part in the harmony amongst them In practice this harmony produces a degree of mutual support allowing a degree of flexibility and reinterpretation which has enabled this package to adapt to the rise of new institutions Intellectually the harmony is naturally attractive to those whose main concern is order The dynamics of societal geography and the distribution of power The relevance of societal geography and the distribution of power is ob vious from three points already made above First the classical English schools story of the expansion of international society rests on a con centration of power in a specific geographical area and the use of that power to expand control into weaker areas in the process expanding international society That whole process depends on strong differences in societal geography Second in the previous section it was possible to use the three world wars of the twentieth century as plausible bench marks for significant turning points in the evolution of the institutions of interstate society Since the outcomes of these wars both reflected and generated new distributions of power there is a strong suggestion that this matters in the development of interstate society Third the idea that 251 From International to World Society the distribution of power matters is an area of common understanding between realists and English school pluralists Both emphasise the lead ing role of the major powers in defining the character of the international system Waltzs poles of power taken up by neorealists and Bulls great responsibles Thedifficultyhereisthatwehavetwosensesofdistributionofpower in play the neorealist and pluralist sense of polarity as number of great powers and a more general sense of the overall distribution of power within the international system What matters for the dynamics of in terstateinternational society is probably not the distribution of power in the sense of great powers and polarity as such European interstate society expanded even though or even to a degree because the Euro pean great powers were fighting amongst themselves on a regular basis More important for the dynamics of international society is the lineup between the distribution of power and the character of the leading pow ers are the great powers strongly divided ideologically as during the interwar years and the Cold War or relatively tolerant of each others domestic arrangements as now And of course it matters a lot what ideology is dominant among the great powers It makes a difference that the liberal democracies and not the totalitarians won the wars of the twentieth century More on this below pp 3617 The distribution of power within the international system more gen erally points toward the distinction between the global and subglobal levels explored in chapter 7 It also points towards the idea that at least in terms of the historical record a vanguard model is a prominent feature of how interstate and international societies develop From Watsons 1992 many empires of ancient and classical times to the expansion of European interstate society it has been historically common for a cen tre of power to grow up in one part of the system and then to expand and in varying degrees impose its own social political and economic order onto a wider realm This centre of power might be a single politi cal entity Rome the Han Empire or it might be a subsystem of states Sumeria classical Greece modern Europe and Watson 1992 31617 notes the tension that this creates in contemporary international society between the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention and the reality of hegemonic practice by great powers This vanguard element explains the coreperiphery structure of contemporary interstate society which in turn opens the question of whether the global or any systemic level is stable in itself or whether that stability depends on a vanguard to uphold it 252 Conclusions The nature of binding forces and the character of leading powers I have argued strongly in earlier chapters in favour of Wendts approach of separating the forces that bind societies together coercion calcula tion belief from the shared values that define whether and how a society is pluralist or solidarist One major consequence of this move is to open up the possibility of both coercive Convergence societies and Power Political warrior cultures held together by belief Another is to challenge the advocates of solidarist norms to come clean about what methods they will and will not accept in pursuit of their goals The same challenge applies to historical and normative evaluations of how con temporary interstate society was made I argued in chapter 5 pp 1547 that among other things the particular composition of binding forces playscentrallyintotheissueofwhetheranygivensocietyisstableornot withforcestowardsthebeliefendfavouringstabilityandforcestowards the coercion end suggesting instability or at least stability contingent on an ability to maintain a large difference in power at a manageable cost This approach means that the pattern of binding forces is itself part of the social structure of interstate society In a crude way it suggests the hypothesis that other things being equal interstate and international societies based on coercion will be less stable than those based on calcu lation which will be less stable than those based on beliefidentity This is a slightly more systematic way of formulating the fairly common place insight Watson 1992 127 that legitimacy is crucial to the stability of any political order More agonisingly on the normative side Wendts approach raises the question of whether coercion is an effective or ac ceptable means for holding a value in place until it becomes accepted by calculation andor belief The historical record makes it perfectly clear that coercion has played a huge role in the making and breaking of interstate and international societies from Sumeria onwards Empires that were ruthlessly coercive Assyrian Mongol Soviet collapsed to tally even though their trade benefits would also have created some bonds of calculation Those that offered more whether through cul ture religion or citizenship Rome China were either more durable in themselves or left behind durable residues that fed into subsequent interstate or international societies The fact that Swedish kings were carving statues of Roman emperors onto the bowsprits of their war ships a thousand years after the fall of Rome is testimony to the power of such legacies Antislavery was initially imposed by the European 253 From International to World Society powers Watson 1992 273 but eventually became a universal norm largely sustained by belief Indeed the whole edifice of European inter state society was initially imposed by coercion but has become univer sally accepted at least by calculation and in many places as belief Buzan and Segal 1998a Watson 1992 2589 argues that by the nineteeth century many coun tries were eager to join European international society Although some of this eagerness can be attributed to fear of coercion calculation also played a part along the lines of Waltzs mechanism of socialisation It was clear that the pluralist package of primary institutions generated power both material and social more effectively than any rival Tilly 1990 Thus a combination of coercion extinction and copying calcula tion brought more and more states into the Western interstate society and over time belief in sovereign equality in nationalism in territori alty in diplomacy kept them there Much the same might be said about the market initially imposed by coercion now held in place by a broad mixture of belief calculation and coercion Sometimes coercion works as a way of transplanting values and sometimes the Soviet experiment it doesnt The central political weakness of the fascist experiment during the interwar years was that its narrow ethnicracist legitimising idea pretty much meant that beyond a fairly small sphere it could only be held in place by coercion and had little prospect for translation into support by calculation andor belief From a liberal perspective the central threat of communism was precisely that like liberalism it had real potential to be accepted as a universal belief Onecanconcludefromthisdiscussionthatboththenatureofthebind ing forces in the sense of their distribution at any given point in time and the interplay among them in relation to any given value or set of values in the sense of the actual or potential shifting either up or down the coercioncalculationbelief spectrum are a key part of the dynamics of stability and change in the structure of interstateinternational soci eties As suggested above this argument links the nature of the binding forces to the character of the leading powers There are two elements in play in this linkage The first is to do with the particular nature of the values espoused by the leading powers and the way in which those values favour or moderate the use of coercion in promoting them The second assuming that there is more than one great power in the system is about the degree of ideological homogeneity versus ideological dif ferencehostility among the powers the Convergence model versus the divergence assumption that underpins pluralism 254 Conclusions The nature of the values espoused by the leading powers and how these relate to the dynamics of binding force is an extremely complicated question At one end of the spectrum one finds the fascist example al ready mentioned where the nature of the values espoused virtually guarantees a strong emphasis on coercion because of the lack of much basis for calculation and belief beyond a narrow ethnicracial circle In the middle of the spectrum one might place the case of the communist powers Unlike fascism communist values could be and were con structed as universal In terms of the values themselves it was an open question as to how they should be promoted and in practice there was for a time a successful mixture of belief the use of propaganda and example and coercion the imposition of communist governments by conquest or revolution At the other end of the spectrum one might find at least some liberals whose espousal of democracy and human rights would carry the conviction that these values cannot and should not be imposed by force But here too there is much room for ambiguity Other liberal values such as the market have quite frequently been imposed by force the openings of Japan and China in the midnineteenth cen tury Even democracy and human rights were successfully imposed on the Axis powers by conquest after the Second World War and as I write an attempt to do the same thing is underway in Iraq Liberal values are certainly not intrinsically immune from the lure of coercion though they can be constructed in that way more easily than many other values The question of how values link to binding forces cannot be answered only with reference to the nature of the values themselves Equally or possibly more relevant is the social context into which any value is projected Fascist values will almost always have to be carried by force beyond the ethnic group that promotes them Dynastic values might well carry fairly easily across quite different cultures as demonstrated by many empires throughout history Communist values might well carry more easily into societies with their own traditions of collectivism as they did in parts of Asia than into societies with more individualist traditions And vice versa for liberal values which might well carry more easily into cultures with individualist traditions than cultures with collectivist ones This kind of positional analysis suggests something about how values will be evaluated morally at the receiving end and therefore whether more or less coercion will be necessary to insert them An easy or difficult fit of values will probably play a big role in how binding forces work or dont work Regardless of this there is also an efficacy factor which is whether given values are seen to produce 255 From International to World Society an advantage for one or more sectors of society This element points towards calculation and perhaps in the longer run belief and wasis a key part of the promotion of both communist and liberal values Liberals assume that people will come their way because they will first see the advantages of doing so and having entered into the practice come to accept the values as a matter of belief If adherence to some values does indeed make some wealthier more knowledgeable more powerful or more interesting than adherence to others then this facilitates the move away from coercion towards belief It was part of the crisis of the communist world in the later stages of the Cold War that its values visibly lagged in many of these practical respects compared with those of the West At present one could apply this way of thinking to the concern about the US that it is moving sharply away from the practice of projecting its values by a logic of persuasion and towards the coercive end of the spectrum The US has been spectacularly successful over the last halfcentury not only in promoting the market international law and multilateralism but also in building a host of secondary institutions to reinforce the binding mechanisms of calculation beloved of the ratio nal choice approach and belief beloved of the normative theorists Yet now the combination of unipolarity a massive and for the time being quite easily sustained military superiority 11 September a national le gitimising cause for unilateralism and extreme modes of securitisation and the deeper strands of American exceptionalism American values seen as universal truths seem to be driving away from that tradition The US vigorously attacks much of what it has created the UN and many of its agencies claims exceptional rights over international law and asserts the right to use force preemptively against targets of its own choosing Iraq If this trend continues we may soon be concerned less about relative versus absolute gains than about relative versus absolute losses On the impact of convergence versus divergence in the ideological character of the leading powers it is tempting but almost certainly wrong to propose that convergence equates with less coercion and di vergence with more The model case of convergence is the argument about democracy and peace The twentieth century with its three ideo logical world wars is a model case of divergence But it is not clear that ideological convergence of any kind breeds harmony Among fas cist powers it almost certainly would not Amongst communist pow ers it certainly did not and neither did it amongst dynastic powers or 256 Conclusions Christian or Islamic or Confucian ones Although ideological divergence easily can lead to conflict it does not necessarily do so Pluralism as sumes that some common interests and values can be found amongst divergent ideologies on the basis of a logic of coexistence but it is also the case that difference could breed indifference or tolerance The current debate about whether or not Islam is or must be hostile to liberal val ues and vice versa or whether there are acceptable interpretations that make them more compatible is an example of the room for manoeuvre available in secondorder pluralism in this respect The interplay among the three domains I opened this discussion in chapter 6 p 195 focusing particularly on the liberal model and its expectations and requirements of high inter play among the three domains In terms of seeing this interplay as one of the driving forces affecting the international social structure there are two ways historical and ideological of approaching the question The historical route reflects the concerns of the WightWatson wing of the English school about the interplay between preexisting cultures and the formation of interstate societies This question generates the hypothesis that a shared culture is either a necessary or at least a very advantageous condition for the development of an interstate society as in classical Greece and early modern Europe The historical ap proach awards a certain primacy to the interhuman domain It sets up the largerscale patterns of individual identity expressed in civilisations and the universal religions as foundational for secondorder societies Doing this risks essentialising the social structures in the interhuman domain without asking where they came from In the case of Europe the civilisational substrate of Christendom on which the Westphalian interstate society was constructed was itself a leftover of the Roman empire Without the influence of Rome it is far from clear that the Euro pean peoples would have become Christian This creates a chickenegg problem about whether interhuman social structures have to precede interstate ones or vice versa In the longer run it seems clear that there is a process of mutual constitution between the social structures in the interhuman domain and those in the interstate domain Each feeds into the other through a series of cycles Perhaps the key dynamic identified by this approach hinges on the question of what happens when an interstate or international society expands beyond its cultural home base Must such expansion necessar ily weaken the interstate society Many English school writers thought 257 From International to World Society that decolonisation had done so to Western international society and Huntingtons 1996 clash of civilisations thesis can be read as a more polemical version of the same argument The underlying idea here is that when the social structures within the interstate and interhuman do mains line up then this reinforces their stability and when they dont line up the disjuncture undermines stability This is close to Wellers 2000 discussion cited at several points in earlier chapters underlin ing the importance of social geography Weller draws attention to the potential stabilities available where patterns of identity and patterns of rational contractual relations occupy the same territorial space and the potential instabilities when they do not This is a hypothesis worth exploring through detailed case studies Although it identifies a potentially important dynamic arising from the interplay between domains it also carries a danger While interstate so ciety is regarded as being relatively fluid and capable of expanding or contracting quite easily the social structures in the interhuman domain are regarded as relatively static and fixed If this is true then expansions of interstate society will inescapably be challenged by disjunctures in the interhuman domain Thinking in this way marginalises the possibil ity that expansions within the interstate domain are in themselves part of the mechanism by which social structures in the interhuman domain are created Here the argument loops back to that made in the previ ous paragraph It also connects to the discussions in chapter 4 about how society and community link together in a strong but indeter minate way Putting this idea in play casts the problem of expansion of interstateinternational society into a different light The question then becomes one not of an inevitable existential contradiction between the two domains but a much more dynamic one about how quickly and how effectively the interstate society can remake the social structure of the interhuman domain on which it rests Must there be a clash of civil isations as Huntington and some hard realists think or do we already see elements of an emergent Mondo culture as some globalists and world society advocates discern and many antiglobalisationists target as McDonaldisation The greatest and most successful empires such as Rome China and in different form the West flourish by spreading their culture and changing how those within them think about their identity They do this both by coopting elements of the local cultures in classical times by absorbing their gods and festivals now by commodi fying local culture and by offering attractive new practices Patterns of identity may be slower moving than patterns of power but they are not 258 Conclusions static How this question is answered obviously connects quickly and strongly to the discussion of binding forces above If developments in the interhuman domain lag behind those in the interstate one is coer cion an effective and legitimate means of holding things in place until the interhuman domain comes around in terms of calculation andor belief The historical record suggests that sometimes this works and sometimes not The ethical questions are altogether more complicated By contrast the approach through ideology tends to give primacy to the interstate domain This approach focuses on how any particular type of interstate international or world society incorporates the three domains into its governing ideas As I argued in chapter 5 there are good reasons to think that states will generally be the dominant actors as they have been within the frame of human history to date and seem likely to be at least for some decades to come Although it is possible to imagine world societies in which states are not dominant it remains true in the contemporary world that states are still the most powerful and focused unit and can shove and shape the others more easily than individuals and TNAs can shove and shape them not least because of their dominant command of the instruments of coercion It is neverthe less important as argued in chapter 6 not to drift unthinkingly into the assumption that the only relevant model of interstate society whether pluralist or solidarist is a liberal one There are many other models and what the relationship among the three domains will be depends heavily on the type of interstate society in play Liberal interstate societies will be ideologically disposed to give political and legal space to individu als and TNAs Other types of interstate society most obviously those based on totalitarian ideologies such as communism and fascism will be ideologically disposed to give little or no political and legal space to individuals and TNAs Yet other types of interstate or international or world society eg Islamic Sumerian Mayan might well have different mixtures The liberal model is of course of huge interest because it is the one we are living in and by whose truth claims we are surrounded Liberal international societies certainly open up enormous scope for interplay among the three domains by recognising and empowering individuals and TNAs Yet liberalism can also be accused of feeding off the inter human domain while at the same time undermining its structures of identity Liberalism focuses on the individual both as the fundamental bearer of rights and responsibilities and as the consumer encouraged to cultivate individualism by differentiating him or herself through 259 From International to World Society the acquisition of a unique portfolio of goods and services It sets this focus on the individual into the context of universal values human rights and practices the market which easily cast as parochial and backwardlooking many of the social structures in the interhuman do main whether national civilisational or religious Looking at liberalism in this way links back to the argument just made about the interplay of the interhuman and interstate domains posing two alternative views Does liberalisms elevation of the individual serve well for the expan sion of interstate society by offering attractive universal foundations for wider social structures in the interhuman domain Or does it just atomise threatening the older patterns of identity in the interhuman domain The former view is supported by the success of Westernisa tionAmericanisation in spreading its own fashions of dress music film and news reporting around the world The latter view is exempli fied by nationalist or religious fundamentalist reactions to globalisation in many parts of the international system Liberal interstate societies should thus be expected to excite strong dynamics between the inter state and interhuman domains by mounting a fundamental assault on traditional cultural practices and identities These dynamics will nor mally be played out by a mixture of coercion calculation and belief But perhaps even more important is the way in which liberal inter state societies empower the transnational domain In principle liberal ism favours a minimal state and the maximum liberty for individuals consistent with maintaining social order In practice this means the em powerment of civil society and the right of people to establish organ isations for a wide range of purposes Translated to the international sphere this means that state borders have to be permeable to trade travel ideas capital and a wide range of INGOs including multina tional firms interest groups and lobbies A liberal international society is likely to open up a substantial transnational space in which TNAs of various kinds have legal rights and considerable autonomy to act across state borders This feature creates a strong pressure on states to harmonise their domestic arrangements on a wide range of issues from property rights and border controls to accounting practices and prod uct standards This pressure in turn underlies a tendency towards a Kantian Convergence model of interstate society The logic of a liberal interstate society thus points towards international and eventually even world society as I defined them in chapter 6 pp 2014 In a liberal international society TNAs can and have become very powerful actors Huge global corporations command wealth resources 260 Conclusions and knowledge that surpass those of many of the poorer weaker states in the system and pressure even the more powerful states to compete for their investment Transnational interest groups and lobbies can harass states directly over issues such as human rights and pollution and a host of quieter TNAs can slowly leach away the authority and character of the state by providing alternative points of reference for its citizens Because liberalism ties its political legitimacy and fortune to sustained economic growth the rise of the transnational domain as a crucial element in the global economy itself becomes a crucial element in the wealth power and legitimacy of the core capitalist political economies All of this is of course the stuff that drives the idea of globalisation In the context of this discussion however the point of interest is that liberal interstate societies perhaps more than any other create a powerful dynamic be tween the interstate and the transnational domains At a minimum the transnational sector becomes a driving force in favour of reinterpreting primary institutions such as sovereignty and nonintervention and pro moting new ones such as the market and human rights At a maximum as thought by some globalisation enthusiasts the transnational domain becomes the location of the vanguard driving the social structure of humankind towards some form of world society By this point in the discussion any readers who had doubts about what happened in chapter 4 when I overthrew the classic English school triad and replaced it with the three domains should be able to make up their minds I hope I have shown how the three domains work as an analytical tool and why they give a much clearer structural picture than would be possible by sticking with the traditional understandings of international system international society and world society The pressures of material conditions interaction capacity human powers of destruction and the planetary environment In thinking about the driving forces behind international social struc tures one cannot neglect a range of material factors that define the con ditions in which the game of states is played Changes in these condi tions can be critical drivers of changes in the primary and secondary institutions of interstate society One obvious example of this is the rise of awareness starting in the 1960s but visible further back in Malthu sian thinking that the planetary environment is a finite resource and that rising human numbers and capabilities have moved it from being an independent variable running on its own logic to an increasingly 261 From International to World Society dependent one affected by an increasing range of human activities As the physical vulnerability of the planetary environment to human ac tivity increased so environmental stewardship rose in prominence as a primary institution of interstate and international society Without that physical change of circumstance it is hard to imagine that the institu tional change would have occurred though it is possible to imagine that the institutional change would not have occurred despite the phys ical change had international society been differently constituted than it was A similar logic attends the rise in human powers of destruction which fed a fear of war and thus helped to weaken war and the balance of power as central primary institutions of interstate society By fear of war here I do not just mean exhaustion from a particular war as after the Thirty Years War and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars but existential fear of war as such arising from concern that the destruction involved would lead to the collapse or even extinction of the societies engaged in it This fear was benchmarked by the First World War which gave the first full experience of industrialised war and re inforced later by the arrival of nuclear weapons A more general case can be made that the rapid complex and univer sal growth of interaction capacity from the nineteenth century onwards is a key driver in the shaping of international relations By interaction capacity I mean the physical and social technologies that determine the possibilities for transportation and communication within any social system This case has been set out at length elsewhere Buzan Jones and Little 1993 Buzan and Little 2000 The physical technologies determine the size and degree of integration not only of the international system as a whole but also of the units and subsystems within it The social technologies that affect interaction capacity include some primary insti tutions diplomacy international law and many secondary ones forum organisations such as the UN Once rising interaction capacity had cre ated a fully global international system during the nineteenth century its continued increase shaped both the speed and intensity of interac tion within the system and the number and type of people who had access to those capabilities What started with the telegraph and the steamship as tools for government and business elites evolved into the internet with its rapidly widening access to communication and in formation resources for all sorts of people These social and physical technologies both make possible and in some ways express a liberal international society They underpin the rise of the market as a pri mary institution and it is hard to imagine that without them either 262 Conclusions equality of peoples or the beginnings of a global culture would have developed The social structures of humankind are substantially driven by inter nal logics and contradictions but they are also shaped by the physical environment within which they operate Mostly that pressure comes from human impacts as with interaction capacity the capacity for de struction in war and the alteration of the ecosystem both by various kinds of pollution and by direct destruction of lifeforms and change of landscape Sometimes it can come from nature as would be the case with the return of the ice age or the prospect of a large asteroid colliding with the planet Conclusions where to from here There are two senses of where to from here that I need to address in this final section first in terms of saying something about where the presentday international society might be heading and second in terms of indicating the direction of the research programme implied by this book To gaze into the future means that one has to take the analytical frame work set out above and ask whether in terms of the various elements it identifies there is a momentum or discernible direction to the evolu tion of contemporary international society Do the dynamics explored in the previous section seem to line up in some coherent way or do they pull against each other making outcomes uncertain This is not the type of theory that enables one to quantify the variables and seek statistical inferences But it is the type of theory that enables one to combine a structural approach with a historical account and so generate an anal ysis that is sufficiently simplified to make big questions about direction and momentum reasonably clear and approachable One can look at the stability or not of the pattern of primary institutions and explore its implications for movement along the pluralistsolidarist spectrum Alongside that one also has to look at the interplay among the three domains at the stability or not of the geographical patterns of interna tional social structure between the global and subglobal levels and at the balance among the binding forces I argued in the first section of this chapter that the contemporary global interstate society was modestly Cooperative and ideologically liberal with its pluralist elements widely embedded by belief but its solidarist elements presenting a much more mixed picture of coercion calculation and belief It could be classified 263 From International to World Society as an international society dominated by states but giving rights to non state actors I also argued that the cultivation of difference in subglobal interstate and international societies was largely compatible with the global level Barring catastrophic interruptions a case can be made that there is a lot of inertia in this general pattern Much that has remained sta ble is likely to continue to do so and much that has been changing will continue to move in the same directions The general structure of a secondorder pluralism in which subglobal interstateinternational societiescultivatedifferenceswithouteitherdepartingfromglobalinter state society or trying to dominate it might well be robust as might the overall coreperiphery structure with the West as the dominant core It is a more open question whether the incremental drift of the West into further Cooperative developments will continue both generally and in the more Kantian case of the EU It could be that this process has for the time being reached its limits and will either stay relatively static or even fall back as a result of transatlantic political divergence or within the EU resistance to further integration At the global level the pluralist institutions look pretty stable as does the continuance of con troversy about human rights and democracy The big question is about the stability of the market Because the international politics surround ing the market are always fractious and turbulent it is particularly hard to see whether the battles over trade and finance are essentially within a stable institution or whether they are about the fate of the institution itself Given that the global market delivers so much in terms of wealth and power and given the huge costs of dismantling it now that most economies are structured towards it the odds have to favour its contin uance almost certainly with no diminution of the associated disputes and probably with a similar mix of coercion calculation and belief The market is sustained inter alia by the widespread belief that it is a major factor in the downgrading of war and by its central role in fulfilling the liberal vision of international society It is also sustained by its strong interlinkage with multilateralism and the many secondary institutions they have jointly spawned The principal material forces that play on international social structure fear of war concern about environment increase of interaction capacity all have strong momentum and are unlikely to change Other than catastrophic disruptions of some sort there are two de velopments afoot in contemporary international society that have the potential to derail this inertia and produce some significant changes 264 Conclusions of direction the war on terrorism and the unipolar distribution of powerresultingfromtheUSbeingthelastsuperpowerThesetwodevel opments are quite strongly linked US superpowerdom does not depend on terrorism as such but the exercise of it could be significantly shaped by the war on terrorism Terrorism at least in its alQaeda form is significantly dependent on US superpowerdom because that defines its main target This link means that they have the potential to reinforce each other September 11 and the subsequent war on terrorism can be seen as a serious turning in the interplay between the interstate and transna tional domains As argued above liberal interstate societies encourage and empower the transnational domain seeing the development of a global economy and a global civil society as good and desirable in and of themselves In many ways the market is the main expression of the liberal cultivation of the transnational domain Extreme terrorism pre pared to resort to suicide attacks and seeming to have no moral con straint about attacks on civilians or the use of weapons of mass destruc tion exposes the darkest possible side of the transnational domain The availability of communications money and technologies of destruction to such groups exposes the contradictions of liberalism at their most extreme Hatefilled fanatics wielding weapons of mass destruction not only threaten to change the balance of power between the state and transnational domains but also threaten the practical sustainability of the liberal model itself If uncivil society becomes seen as the main source of threat then as discussed in the third section of chapter 3 lib eral logic gets pushed in a Power Political direction in which Leviathan is necessary to impose order and a civil sphere Because the openness of a liberalised economy provides opportunities for transnational extremists of all sorts to operate on a global scale the traditional Hobbesian domes tic security agenda gets pushed up to the international level becoming a problem for international society against global uncivil society If the understanding of war as an institution of interstate society shifts in this direction away from the statetostate assumptions of the Westphalian model then much more imperial approaches to world order easily fol low This logic is one of the most worrying aspects of the USBritish invasion of Iraq Any such development of course depends on the practical serious ness of the threat 11 September exposed the potential seriousness of this threat but if the war on terrorism proves effective at preventing repetitions on that scale then probably not much will change on this 265 From International to World Society account As anyone who lives in Britain or Spain can testify modern societies can tolerate a certain level of terrorism without undergoing major structural changes But if terrorists use weapons of mass destruc tion then the scenario is quite different That would cast 11 September as the opening round of a new clash of civilisations or perhaps not a new one but a taking up of the cudgels for a second round of the clash of civilisations that began several hundred years ago with the expansion of the West at the expense of other civilisations As clashing expressions of the transnational domain terrorism and the market become crucial factors in the fate of liberal international society The effects of sustained terrorism could shrink and degrade the market as a primary institution and maintaining the market could become the legitimising cause for the war on terrorism The question of the US is at the time of writing the more worrying be cause it is a concrete development whereas terrorism despite Septem ber 11 is still a hypothetical one in terms of its ability to change the development of global international society In a nutshell the question is whether or not the US is turning its back on the pursuit of a multi lateralist liberal international order and restyling itself in more impe rial mode As one observer puts it There is hardly a single international institution that has not been questioned undermined or outright aban doned by the United States in the name of its need to protect its sovereign interests Barber 2001 xxii The empirical evidence for such a turn is mixed and vulnerable to the success or failure of the USs attempt to reconstruct Iraq as a liberal democracy It is also unclear whether present developments represent the peculiarities of the second Bush adminis tration or some deeper turn in US politics which has been reinforced by 11 September Also unclear is whether this turn is driven primarily by the logic of a unipolar structure the US being effectively unbalanced in a military sense by the other great powers or whether it arises from the domestic character of American exceptionalism with to oversimplify somewhat its extreme demands for national security its claim to own the future and its uncritical belief in the essential goodness and right ness of American society The causes for concern are visible in several directions the Manichaean with us or against us rhetoric associated with the war on terrorism the attack on the framework of secondary institutions that the US was instrumental in building up over the last halfcentury the claim to a unilateral right to preemptive war and its exercise against Iraq and the general undermining of multilateralism by its preference for unilateral action and ad hoc coalitions 266 Conclusions A serious and sustained move by the leading power along these lines could if sustained alter the present shape and direction of the interna tional social structure It could reverse the decay of war as an institution and halt or reverse the rise of multilateralism and international law In extremis it could put a huge strain on sovereignty and nonintervention by asserting a right to change regimes on grounds either of support for terrorism or attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction that might be used against the US or US allies such as Israel It could revive the institution of antihegemonism by casting the US more in the role of a threat rather than as a carrier of acceptable universal values If Europe and Japan begin to fear or oppose the US some extremely hard choices would follow Should they begin to distance themselves from the US rethinking their bandwagoning posture and weakening the West as a coherent core Or should they accept a more naked less Gramscian form of hegemony with implications of suzerainty in the requirement to acknowledge that American exceptionalism here defined in terms of the requirement of the single superpower role legitimates the US stand ing outside and above the secondary institutions and international laws that form the framework of multilateralism for the rest of interstate soci ety Could the EU survive if its close association with and dependence on the US became a central point of controversy Perhaps not as sug gested by the splits over the Iraq war Reactions against a more imperial US could also change the balance between the global and the subglobal levels of social structure with the former weakening back to a more barebones pluralism and the latter becoming more differentiated and more selfcontained a scenario close to that of a world of blocs The interplay amongst primary institutions provides a useful way of thinking about this scenario It could be argued that the rise of multilat eralism and the market as primary institutions are closely linked OECD 1998 801 It could be argued further that their associated network of secondary institutions has been a critical factor in the downgrading of the role of balance of power alliances antihegemonism and to a lesser extent war If multilateralism is itself downgraded by sustained US at tacks on it then a resurgence of these older institutions is a likely result In this sense the accumulation of empirical evidence by neoliberal insti tutionalists that secondary institutions do facilitate cooperation under anarchy is highly relevant Those secondary institutions have been the front line of a deeper primary institution of multilateralism that has defined what constitutes normal practice in managing international so ciety It is not clear that the Bush administration recognises this fact 267 From International to World Society and therefore understands the probable cumulative consequences of its actions Nor is it clear how far the US can go in downgrading multi lateralism without beginning to jeopardise the market and whether US interests in sustaining the market therefore act as a brake on its unilat eralism Needless to say the adoption of a more imperial posture by the US would necessarily change the balance among the binding forces of interstateinternational society One of the remarkable features of US hegemony over the past halfcentury was its ability to build a consen sual international order that was increasingly held together by calcula tion and belief rather than coercion and which operated multilaterally throughahostofmediatingsecondaryinstitutionsEmpiresdonotwork that way Coercion is their first tool and loyalty their first demand If the US turns strongly and durably in this direction then the consequences for interstate and international society will be large The second sense of where to from here concerns the direction of the research project implied in this book and its implications for those who work in or listen to the English school tradition What should be the research priorities of those who want to pursue a more social structural approach to English school theory and what are the implications for those within the more Wightian and Vincentian normative traditions Totheextentthatthisbookisanopeningratherthanaclosingaprovo cation rather than a definitive rendering more probably much more needs to be said about the framework set out here I know that I have not fully mastered the subject of primary institutions and since this is the key to the English schools claims more work needs to be done on both the conceptualisation of primary institutions and on linking this con ceptualisation more systematically to the neoliberal institutionalist and regime theory studies of secondary institutions One question that may be central to exploring this linkage is where are the limits of constitu tive effects in international society Is the boundary between primary and secondary institutions understandable in terms of the difference between constitutive effects and regulatory practices defined and cre ated by preconstituted actors within a preconstituted game I rather suspect not but this question needs to be addressed A more coherent understanding of institutions also needs to be read into the historical account As implied in this chapter I think that the concept of primary institutions offers considerable scope for revising the English schools accounts of the expansion and evolution of international society The same could be said of pluralism and solidarism I have set out what I think is a clearer rendition of the pluralistsolidarist spectrum but it is 268 Conclusions not one with which I expect everyone to agree I hope that those who disagree will take it as a challenge to revisit their own conceptions and see how they stand up to the points raised Among other things those interested in solidarism need to face up to the issue of convergence and the question posed by Vincent as to whether the only way of making solidarist development compatible with sovereignty and its derivatives is for states to become more alike internally What are the implications for this way of thinking of the wider arguments about homogenising forces that can be found in the IR literature In particular I hope those in the solidarist tradition will think hard about why they have excluded the economic sector and what the implications are of bringing it on board It seems to me that there are interesting opportunities to bring English school thinking and International Political Economy work into closer contact not least in thinking about the interplay of the market and multilateralism with other institutions In thinking about all of this it is important to recognise that solidarism like society is not necessar ily nice Solidarity is about shared interests and sympathies and can encompass a wide range of values Also to those in the solidarist wing and as well the historical WightWatson one there is the challenge to make more explicit the role of binding forces both in evaluating the historical record and in advocacy of solidarist developments in human rights and other areas If vanguardism is to be accepted as a key mechanism for advancing international society both historically and in the present then the ques tion about the role of coercion in the pursuit of the market and human rights cannot be evaded How are we to deal with the tension between moral doubts about means versus historical evidence that coercion can work as a way of implanting primary institutions on the global level and the moral imperative to do something now How do advocates of solidarism deal with the reality and the legitimacy of secondorder pluralism versus the push towards global homogenization implied in the pursuit of universal values I have given the concept of world society an empirically marginal role describing an extreme form of liberal development and replaced its present main functions with the idea of the interplay amongst the interstate interhuman and transnational domains Wighteans may not want to give up the idea of world society as that which is in opposition to interstate society or based on political programmes with an alternative foundation to the sovereign state and I have no problem with that us age continuing in the normative discourse But present usage of world 269 From International to World Society society covers so many meanings as to sow more confusion than clarity and this weakens the structural potential of English school theory If my solution is not liked perhaps it will stimulate other suggestions about how to deal with this problem More straightforwardly the framework in this book invites much more study of subglobal international social structures and the way in which they interact with the global level Some ideas here might be gleaned from work I have done with Ole Wæver Buzan and Wæver 2003 which confronts the globalsubglobal problem in the context of regional security complexes and global polarity Bringing in the sub global also requires retelling the story of the expansion and evolution of international society It opens up prospects for linking English school thinkingtoregionalistworkparticularlythestudyoftheEUMorework needs to be done on the particular characteristics of liberal international societies and this would be helped if it could be contrasted with more specifically theoretical understandings of the nonliberal possibilities for interstate international and world societies In sum there is scope for an English school research programme that takes the particular qualities and characteristics of secondorder soci eties as its subject the pluralistsolidarist spectrum as its basic bench mark and primary institutions as its principal object of investigation Such a programme would focus on mapping and explaining the evolu tion of primary institutions in secondorder societies Its investigations would take systematically into account the role of sociopolitical geogra phy the interplay among the interstate interhuman and transnational domains and the effect of binding forces This programme offers re search opportunities of both a macro and a 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Carsten Holbraad London Penguin 2nd edition 1987 1960 An Anatomy of International Thought Review of International Studies 133 2217 1991 International Theory The Three Traditions ed Brian Porter and Gabriele Wight Leicester University PressRoyal Institute of International Affairs Williams John 2001 New Spaces New Places Territory and Change in Inter national Society paper presented to the ECPR PanEuropean International Relations Conference University of Kent September 14 pp Woods Ngaire ed 2000 The Political Economy of Globalisation Basingstoke Macmillan WSRG World Society Research Group 1995 In Search of World Society DarmstadtFrankfurtM World Society Research Group Working Paper No 1 Updated version as Introduction World Society in Mathias Albert Lothar Brock Klaus Dieter Wolf eds 2000 Civilizing World Politics Society and Community Beyond the State Lanham Rowman Littlefield 117 Zhang Yongjin 1998 China in International Society since 1949 Basingstoke Macmillan 282 List of references 2001 System Empire and State in Chinese International Relations in Michael Cox Tim Dunne and Ken Booth eds Empires Systems and States Great Transformations in International Politics Cambridge University Press 4363 2002 Towards a Regional International Society Making Sense of Regional isms in Asia paper at ISA Convention New Orleans March 15 pp 283 Index Abbasid Dynasty 103 136 198 Abbott Kenneth 156 167 Adler Emanuel 148 Afghanistan 224 Africa 222 239240 245 Albert Mathias 71 Alderson Kai 103 161 Alexander Jeffrey 78 alliances 168 233 Almeida Joao de 43 99 154 AlQaeda 86 239 265 altruism 107 Americas 222 Amnesty International 96 anarchy 22 95 105 118 222 Ancient Greece 28 31 168 200 220 252 257 Ancient Rome 101 105 130 198 252 253 257 258 Anderson Benedict 130 Anheier Helmut 82 85 antihegemonism 233 247 267 Arab League 148 209 239 Arab Maghreb Union 239 arbitration 168 Armstrong David 51 60 105 Arts Bas 119 125 ASEAN 209 213 221 238 Ashley Richard 180 Asia 209 222 245 255 East Asia 208 209 218 222 227 238 South Asia 222 238 Southeast Asia 18 213 West Asia 239 asocial societies 159 Assyrians 105 253 Atlantic community 148 209 Australia 221 222 AustroHungarian empire 243 245 balance of power 143144 168 169 183 194 233 Balkans invervention in 219 banking 151 barbarians 33 104 146 191 Barber Benjamin 266 Barkin Samuel 41 161 181 Barnett Michael 148 belief binding force 103104 108 129131 communities 116 130 contemporary society 234 empires 105 social structures 130131 132 153154 and stability 157 binding forces contemporary society 233235 future research 269 meaning xvii nature 109 and primary institutions 253257 shared values 153154 157 215 223224 social systems 103106 108 129 132 and US imperialism 268 Boli John 72 74 96 125 Bozeman Adda 214 Britain 130 266 Brown Chris 13 68 75 91 112 113114 115 122 131 213 Buddhism 103 Bull Hedley 2 6 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 2728 29 30 31 32 33 3539 40 42 4344 46 47 5051 5256 5758 60 63 64 65 69 75 82 88 91 93 284 Index 9597 98 99100 101 103 105 112113 118 125 139 141 143 144 149 152 165 166 169171 172 174 175 177178 179 183 185 186 191 202 205 206 207208 213 214 216 217 236 Burke Edmund 60 61 Burke Patrick 80 Burma 40 Burton John 6667 68 69 88 Bush administration 232 237 267 Butterfield Herbert 28 calculation 103 105 108 116 129131 132 153154 157 capitalism 8384 129 199 238 Carr E H 18 31 36 50 123 cartels 125 Catholic Church 93 198 199 chartered companies 93 chess 178 180 China central planning 234 Cold War 226 and East Asia 238 empire 101 198 227 253 258 and Europe 222 and Kosovo intervention 220 liberalrealist dilemma 194 Mongols 100 nineteenth century 255 noncolonisation 108 primary institutions 168 Christendom 122 146 198 243 257 Christianity 65 103 136 210 214 257 citystates 191 civil society concept 7880 empowerment 260261 global civil society 7787 civilisations clash of civilisations 221 231 258 266 standards 225 248 clans 121 Clark Ann Marie 43 clash of civilisations 221 231 258 266 cleft states 221 clubs 125126 135 137 210 Cobden Richard 30 31 coercion binding force 103 105 108 129131 132 contemporary society 152154 empires 105 130131 future research 269 omnipresence 129 Soviet Union 40 104 157 253 254 and stability 157 253254 United States 224225 coexistence 143 144146 160 169 177 179 coexistence interstate societies 160 191192 232 235 Cohen Raymond 168 cohesion 107 Cold War 18 31 47 57 7981 145 209 213 214 226 236 249 256 collective enforcement 149 151 collective security 20 55 56 149 150 colonialism decolonisation 207 214 220 223 247 258 demise 192 expropriation 202 and global interstate society 215216 internationalisation effect 108 postWorld War I 245 postWorld War II 246 primary institution 171 172 173 179 181 183 241 common cultures 220 257 common humanity 235 communications 67 71 188 191 communism 7 214 227 254 255 communist community 122 communist interstate societies 199 201 communist states 18 244 256 communist values 256 communist world society 201 communitysociety distinction 7476 87 108118 128 217218 companies 119 125126 210 company law 151 confederations 105 107 160 conflict groups 121 Confucian civilisations 210 257 constructivism 1 2 4 7 59 64 106 230 convergence interstate societies 160 194195 232 237 256257 cooperation 144 177 cooperative interstate societies 160 193194 231 232235 237 238 241 cosmopolitanism xviii 7 8 21 27 47 217 221 counterfactual history 226 Cox Robert 76 critical theory 2324 Cronin Bruce 107 113 118 120 crusading orders 125 cultural patterns 200 285 Index cultures shared cultures 220 257 Cutler Claire 7 17 54 Darwinism 146 196 197 Davos culture 96 120 155 202 de Wilde Jaap 226 decolonisation 207 214 220 223 247 258 democracies 122 214 democracy 185 233 255 demography 261 Deutsch Karl 148 Diez Thomas 12 71 142 211 diplomacy English school 20 32 33 143 146 function 188 practice 13 primary institution 168 169 171 172 183 232 survival 248 discrimination 15 distribution of power 251252 265 domains of international relations contemporary society 233 driving forces 200 249263 English school key concepts 6 10 13 16 20 23 32 228229 interactions 197201 217222 257261 meaning xviii models 9 98 109 133 reconstructing English School concepts 128138 261 terminology 201204 dominion 22 105 Donnelly Jack 187189 Douglas Mary 116 doxa 104 driving forces 200 249263 Dunne Tim 6 7 10 28 37 43 44 45 46 5758 60 9495 205 Durkheim Emile 103 dynastic principles 183 191 255 East Asia 208 209 218 222 227 238 economic sector and English school 11 1920 212 and global civil society 85 market as primary institution 194 196197 233 234235 246 266 267 neglect 150151 212 269 regional groupings 209210 225 stability of market 264 empires coercion 130 253254 268 and English school 22 105 institutions 191 and nationalism 243 245 world empires 207 enforcement collective enforcement 149 151 English school boundaries 2021 contribution 1 34 and economy 1920 212 future directions 268270 global network 210 220 levels 1618 liberal story 226227 methodology 2224 normative conflicts 2122 normative theories 12 11 13 1415 pluralism 10 primary institutions concept 23 32 167176 and regime theory 161162 sectors 1920 strands 1214 and subglobal developments 1718 213 summary 610 theory 2426 triad models 9 98 109 133 triad of key concepts 6 10 13 16 20 23 32 128138 228229 261 unwarranted pessimism 212217 weaknesses 1524 and world society 1015 21 2762 8687 enmity 129 140 environment 8 145 150 186 233 261263 equality 215 235 246 Europe eighteenthcentury primary institutions 243 nineteenth century 144 146 214216 absolutist phase 227 against US 267 and Asian societies 219 binding forces 253 Christianity 257 coexistence interstate society 191192 colonialism 100 179 218 222224 241 245 252 common culture 220 and development of global society 1617 241243 early modern period 191 200 257 Greek heritage 28 31 and Kosovo 18 Middle Ages 23 65 125 nationalism 243246 286 Index primary institutions 242 use of war 15 Westphalian period 202 European Union binding forces 105 convergence society 195 208 237 debates 12 development 53 English school neglect 206 211 213 global role 18 IGOs 237 integration 4 105 221 liberal solidarism 198 membership conditions 224 motivation 122 nature 22 92 121 160 181 power management 193 solidarist interstate society 142 148 and sovereignty 95 subglobal unit 208209 survival 267 world society 203 Evans Tony 161 162 extermination wars 100101 108 families 121 fascism 214 227 254 255 256 Fawcett L L E 205 federations 105 107 feudalism 65 firstorder societies meaning xvii Fischer Markus 125 France 262 friendship 116 Fukuyama Francis 60 80 Gellner Ernest 76 114 Gemeinschaft 22 39 44 63 74 110111 genocide 20 202 geography social geography 117 251252 258 Germany 22 226 227 Gesellschaft 22 39 44 63 74 110111 Gilpin Robert 92 Glasius Marlies 82 85 global civil society 2 7782 8586 87 global society terminology 2 globalisation antiglobalisation 82 86 155 debate 11 definition 12 phenomenon 4 terminology 2 3 and TNAs 261 or world society 38 66 globalism exclusive globalism 207212 tension with subglobal levels 218219 Gold Standard 192 Goldstein Judith 156 167 Gong Gerritt 28 105 152 GonzalezPelaez Ana 20 41 202 237 251 Gramsci Antonio 82 84 great power management 232 234 Greece See Ancient Greece Grotius Hugo 7 9 17 27 34 37 46 5354 55 158 guarantees 168 guilds 125 Gulf Cooperation Council 148 239 Guzzini Stefano 104 Haas Peter 72 Hague Conferences 246 Halliday Fred 13 Han Empire 101 252 Hanks Patrick 164 Hansen Birthe 93 Hart H L A 166 177 Hassner Ron 178 Heeren Arnold 28 Hegel Friedrich 33 hegemony 22 30 105 Held David 12 96 Helleiner Eric 208 hermeneutics 23 Herz John 142 Hill Chris 43 historical overview 240249 Hobbes Thomas 7 9 17 19 27 32 37 47 78 83 85 86 101 102 103 107 115 118 123 129 158 Hollis Martin 95 Holsti Kalevi 25 172175 176 177 178 179180 181 183 190 192 194 215 241 243 Holy Roman Empire 92 125 homogeneity 148149 215 226 human rights coercion 152153 255 controversy 233 debate 2829 46 and English school 1112 focus of solidarist debate 147 149150 primacy 179 183 right to subsistence 19 and state sovereignty 17 20 2829 4849 5556 universalism 17 44 150 287 Index human rights cont western version 105106 and world society 4041 humanism 21 humanitarian intervention 4041 46 233 Hume David 103 huntergatherers 191 Huntington Samuel 221 231 258 Hurd Ian 103 104 Hurrell Andrew 7 16 19 96 103 104 153 161 177 192 195 205 IAEA 96 IGOs 93 96 120 246 Ikenberry John 241 imagined communities 130 136 IMF 105 235 imperialism 237 Independence Day 142 indifference 107 individuals objects of international law 56 202 participants in international society 202 subjects of international law 53 54 and transnationals 118128 INGOs 43 84 96 119 120 210 260 institutions driving forces 249263 institutional sanctions 103 list 187 meaning 161163 164167 pressure of material conditions 261263 primary See primary institutions primary and secondary 167 secondary See secondary institutions stability 264 interhuman domain 258259 interhuman societies xvii 127 207212 International Atomic Energy Agency 96 International Bureau of Weights and Measures 144 international community 121123 180 international law compliance to 103 increase 232 and international society 32 natural or positive law 45 46 objects 56 and pluralism 143144 primary institution 168 169 170 171 172 175 182 sanctity of agreements 189 and solidarism 146 subjects 33 48 53 54 US attacks on 267268 international relations key concepts See domains of international relations unwarranted pessimism 212217 international society definition 9 32 English school 1 8 121 evidence 32 exclusive globalism 207212 historical changes 240249 institutions See primary institutions and international system 98108 meaning xvii 1 7 63 64 nonWestern forms 18 physical and social modes 98 postmodern 203 and range of institutions 190195 and states 121 terminology 24 201 202 types 2223 190195 unwarranted pessimism 212217 vanguard theory 222227 and world societies 2 28 202204 international systems homogeneity of units 148149 215 and international society 98108 meaning xvii 7 64 physical and social concepts 98108 128 International Telecommunications Union 144 interpretivism 23 interstate societies nineteenth century 214216 coexistence societies 160 191192 232 235 convergence societies 160 194195 232 237 256257 cooperative 160 193194 231 232235 237 238 241 exclusive globalism 207212 historical changes 240249 interstate domain 258259 meaning xvii postWorld War II history 246248 power political 159160 190191 232 238 239 preWorld War II history 243246 regional vanguard role 222227 snapshot of contemporary society 231 spectrum 159160 190195 232235 and underlying cultural patterns 200 intervention 219220 investment 151 Iran 239 288 Index Iraq imposition of democracy 255 266 Iraq invasion 2003 152 219 221 224 225 237 239 248 256 265 267 Islam 103 199 209 210 221 257 259 Islamic world 18 122 209 213 218 221 227 239 Israel 221 239 267 Jackson Robert 6 8 13 46 47 48 91 93 95 99 141 143 149 150 171 174 175 185 186 212 240 James Alan 14 32 42 91 99 101 119 143 154 171 174 175 186 188 202 Japan 108 222 226 227 238 245 255 267 Jones Roy 29 117 262 Jung Dietrich 7677 111 Kagan Robert 237 Kaldor Mary 82 85 Kant Immanuel 7 17 21 27 33 34 38 47 5051 59 60 65 78 9394 102 107 115 158 Kapstein Ethan 12 Keane John 8485 Keck Margaret 96 119 Kedourie Elie 214 Keene Edward 32 53 173 179 185 192 215 216 241 Keohane Robert 28 161 162 164166 167 171 175 180 181 Kissinger Henry 149 Knudsen Tonny Brems 45 46 5657 149 171 Kosovo 18 Krasner Stephen 11 65 119 156 157 163164 165 167 173 Kratochwil Friedrich 103 162 163 164 165 170 175 176 Leninism xviii 222 liberalism adoption of values 256 and coercion 255 concept of civil society 7880 democracies 214 English school 226227 international societies 259261 liberal solidarist model 197200 revolutionism 7 10 tradition 3031 utopianism 29 victory 80 Linklater Andrew 13 23 29 34 46 47 58 141 Lipschutz Ronnie 78 79 Little Richard 7 10 12 14 23 27 43 63 82 92 93 95 101 120 123 125 148 183 191 200 202 222 226 230 262 lobbies 210 Locke John 32 101 102 107 115 158 Luard Evan 15 22 66 67 69 88 102 110 Luhmann Niklas 7072 110 126 Machiavelli Niccolo 7 27 macrosociology 7677 mafias 119 125126 Malthus Thomas 261 Manchester United 111 Mann Michael 70 Manners Ian 151 Manning C A W 11 1213 30 31 56 140 162 178 185 March James 103 130 165 173 market 194 196197 233 234235 246 264 266 267 Marx Karl 33 60 243 Marxism 76 78 91 129 223 material conditions 261263 Mauryan Empire 104 Mayall James 20 46 47 59 133 141 143 147 170171 173 174 175 176 182 185 190 192 193 202 212 241 243246 248 250 Mayans 259 Mayhew Leon 108 McDonaldisation 258 McKinlay R D 10 82 McLean Iain 179 Mercosur 209 213 237 Mexico 221 Meyer John 61 72 73 165 173 Middle Ages 23 65 125 Middle East 100 222 239 Miller J D B 19 214 Milner Helen 145 180 monasteries 125 Mondo culture 235 258 money 166 Mongols 100 105 253 Mosler Hermann 182 multiculturalism 217 multilateralism 171 183 232 246 247 266 267268 NAFTA 209 213 237 Nardin Terry 170 175 national security 265 266 289 Index nationalism nineteenthcentury Europe 146 twentiethcentury obsession 197 coexistence societies 192 communities 135 contemporary society 233 economic 20 postWorld War II 246 preWorld War II 243246 primary institution 185 241 250 and shared identity 137 NATO 105 149 220 224 natural law 21 36 46 5356 Nau Henry 247 neoimperialism 224 225 neoliberalism 4 7 230 248 neomedievalism 43 122 125 179 202 neorealism 4 28 64 95 106 230 248 Neumann Iver 142 neutrality 168 nomads 191 nonintervention principle 46 55 143 232 248 nonstate actors and states 9197 and world society 63 74 Noortmann Math 119 125 norms 12 11 13 1415 2122 163164 North America 208 North Korea 224 Nye Joseph 28 180 224 OECD 185 267 Olsen Johan 103 130 165 173 Onuf Nicholas 162 176 Onuma Yasuaki 182 Oppenheim Lassa 5354 Organisation of the Islamic Conferences 148 239 Orthodox Church 198 Oslander Andreas 13 Other 75 107 122123 124 Ottoman Empire 108 243 245 ozone layer 145 Pacific 245 Palestinians 221 panAfricanism 221 panArabism 221 panIslamism 221 parochialism 210 Paul Darel 92 pendulum theory 105 Peterson M J 81 pluralism concepts 4647 143146 contemporary interstate society 231 English school 10 future research 268269 institutions 143144 251 meaning xvii 141142 pessimism of pluralists 212217 pluralistsolidarist debate 8 4562 102 107108 139143 268269 second order pluralism 236 popular sovereignty 233 244 246 see nationalism positivism 7 23 24 37 46 5356 119 power political societies 159160 190191 232 238 239 Presley Elvis 111 primary institutions benchmark for change 241 and binding forces 253257 change 181 195 242 characterisation 181182 coexistence interstate societies 191192 constitutional structures 172 contemporary society 234235 contradictions 250251 and distribution of power 251252 driving forces 249263 dynamics 176 195 251252 English school 32 52 167176 Europe 242 243 foundational institutions 172 functions 186190 195 fundamental institutions 173 future research 268 hierarchy 175 176184 186 195 historical overview 240249 issuespecific regimes 173 list 174 187 and material conditions 261263 meaning xviii 167 power political interstate societies 190191 procedural institutions 172 180 process of institutionalisation 173 and societal geography 251252 stability 264 tensions 250251 and types of international society 190195 universal acceptance 216217 principles meaning 163164 property rights 143 151 189 191 192 290 Index QUANGOs 84 93 radio frequencies 144 rationalism 7 8 9 3334 Ratner Stephen 156 211 realism 7 8 9 33 Red Cross 85 96 regime theory 78 161162 regimes meaning 163 regionalism See subglobal societies Reinalda Bob 119 125 religions 121 136 183 210 Rengger Nicholas 13 65 republicanism 146 ReusSmit Christian 41 161 168 171 172173 175 176 178 179180 183 186 188 revolutionism 7 8 10 27 3435 Richardson James 15 19 right to subsistence 251 Risse Thomas 82 125 RisseKappen Thomas 96 119 125 137 rivalry 107 Rome See Ancient Rome Rosenau James 83 88 92 148 Ruggie John 59 125 162 163 164 165 176177 178 179180 182 189 rules meaning 163164 Russia 221 222 238 sacrifice 15 107 satellites 144 Scholte Jan Aart 12 science 114 117 151 233 Searle John 166 167 168 176 177 178 183 190 secondorder societies allocation of property rights 189 communications 188 and English school 25 26 functional problems 188190 limits to use of force 188189 meaning xvii xviii membership 188 rejection of idea 117118 sanctity of agreements 189 and sociologists 70 states 110 secondary institutions coexistence societies 192 Europe 243 list 187 meaning xviii 167 rise 247 US attack on 266 267268 Segal Gerald 217 235 254 selfdetermination 40 185 192 233 244 246 September 11 attacks 83 85 86 197 221 224 248 256 265266 Serbia 224 shared cultures 257 shared identity 130 137138 145146 220 shared values Asian values 238 binding forces 102 103106 153154 157 215 223224 253257 English school 68 quality 131132 reasons for 152154 social structures 70 74 solidarist values 143 stability 157 thickthin 139 140 154157 transnational organisations 65 world society 72 Shaw Martin 6870 71 88 116 Sikkink Kathryn 96 119 slavery 15 202 253 Smith Anthony 198 Smith Steve 95 Snidal Duncan 145 156 social Darwinism 146 244 social systems binding forces 103106 108 129 132 and physical systems 98108 128 vanguard theory 222227 society communitysociety distinction 7476 87 108118 128 217218 concept 71 87 connotation 15 definition 69 108110 sociological approaches 63 6677 sociology 70 solidarism concepts 21 47 212 examples 148 future research 268269 and international society 8 liberal models 197200 meaning xviii 141 nonliberal models 199200 pluralistsolidarist debate 8 4562 102 107108 139143 268269 shared values 143 and world society 27 Sørensen Georg 161 176 181 South America 213 South Asia 222 238 291 Index Southeast Asia 18 213 sovereign equality 215 sovereignty See state sovereignty Soviet Union coercion 40 104 157 253 254 Cold War 145 226 collapse 103 104 224 234 247 empire 227 Spain 266 Spengler Oswald 33 Sri Lanka 221 Stalinism 34 35 40 42 105 standard of civilisation 225 248 Stanford School 61 7274 83 91 165 173 214 Star Trek 100 104 142 Starship Troopers 142 state sovereignty bedrock institution 175 176 182 centrality 55 continuation 232 evolution 161 and human rights 17 2829 40 4849 5556 nonintervention 143 219220 power political interstate societies 191 primary institution 168 171 172 and sovereign equality 215 universal acceptance 216217 and world society 32 states centrality 8 20 46 6768 119120 201 230 classification of systems 22 cleft states 221 definition 9293 94 elimination 125127 and geography 117 meaning xviii and nonstate actors 9197 primary institution 172 183 selfinterest 145 torn states 221 uniqueness 9192 units of international society 110 Westphalian See Westphalian model stock exchanges 126 Strange Susan 20 76 subglobal societies antagonism and neglect 1718 39 44 45 187 213 collective security 149 contemporary society 235240 economic blocs 209210 225 and exclusive globalism 207212 future research 270 and interaction of IR domains 217222 interventions 219220 pluralist pessimism 212217 subversion of international order 213214 tensions with global levels 218219 vanguard movements 214 222227 237238 252 West 236238 subsistence right to 251 Sudan 221 Sufis 239 Suganami Hidemi 26 39 102 141 223 suicide attacks 265 Sumeria 252 259 suzerainty 22 23 105 179 191 Sweden 253 symbiosis 107 systems physical and social 98108 technology 262263 telecommunications 144 terra nullius 189 territoriality 97 172 182183 191 232 terrorism 86 240 265268 theory nature 2426 Third World 46 81 122 244 Thomas George 72 74 96 125 Tilly Charles 7 70 180 189 196 254 Tonnies F 74 110 114 torn states 221 torture 20 Toynbee Arnold 33 trade coexistence interstate societies 192 Eurasian system 101 liberal economies 151 market as primary institution 194 196197 233 234235 246 266 267 power political interstate societies 191 practices 100 primary institution 19 33 45 172 180 183 185186 trade unions 137 traditions 104 111 transnational actors capitalism 199 contemporary society 233 260261 corporations 119 125126 210 dark side 86 265 functional networks 137 historical 198 and individuals 118128 organisations nature of 65 292 Index participants in international society 202 and regional developments 220 role 38 transnational societies xviii 207212 transnationalism and world society 7 27 tribes 191 Turkey 221 uncivil society 8586 87 197 265 Underhill Geoffrey 76 unilateralism 232 256 266 United Nations 193 256 262 United States coercion 256 Cold War 145 and East Asia 238 economic dominance 12 and EU 206 federation 105 hegemony 30 247 imperialism 224 225 237 245 268 invasion of Iraq 219 221 224 237 248 256 265 267 national security 232 preemptive war 248 266 rejection of convergence 237 superpower 265268 unilateralism 232 256 266 universalist delusion 236 240 256 266 use of war 193 war on terrorism 240 265268 Universal Postal Union 144 universalism assumptions 1618 39 56 269 English school 11 human rights 44 150 and liberalism 260 meaning 1314 65 United States 236 240 256 266 and world society 27 utopianism 29 values meaning 163164 shared See shared values vanguard meaning xviii 222 subglobal societies 214 237238 252 theory of international social structures 222227 Vincent John 2 11 13 14 15 17 1920 28 30 31 36 3944 46 49 51 57 60 63 64 65 76 82 88 90 93 9597 113 114 115 119 120 127 134 141 142 149 202203 208 213 251 269 Wæver Ole 6 7 18 25 26 29 45 75 102 122 130 161 162 165 194 238 239 240 270 Wallerstein Immanuel 18 64 70 76 124 207 Waltz Kenneth 14 18 35 52 60 61 76 106 148 160 177 222 254 war elimination 193 196197 fear of war 262 First World War 262 limits 188189 191 233 post 911 use 197 preemptive war 248 266 primary institution 143144 168 169 171 172 180 265268 war on terrorism 240 265268 wars of extermination 100101 108 War of the Worlds 142 Warner Caroline M 168 warrior societies 121 Watson Adam 9 17 18 2223 25 28 37 39 67 98 99 102 105 112 152 154 205 214 216 243 252 253 254 257 weapons of mass destruction 265 266 Weber Max 74 116 Weller Christopher 2000 12 75 116 117 149 217 218 220 221 258 Wells H G 100 142 Wendt Alexander 2 4 14 23 25 76 95 101 102108 115116 118 128129 148 153154 156 157 158 159 160 175 215 223 229230 253 West clash with Islamic world 221 contemporary society 235 empire 258 globalism and subglobalism 210 218 shared values 237 subglobal society 236238 universalism 123 values 83 105106 108 146 209 West Asia 239 Westphalian model alternatives 35 binding forces 131 European history 202 and human rights 29 and interventions 219 nature 23 origins 125 199 pluralism 141 primary institutions 169 principles 182 and solidarism 146 293 Index Westphalian model cont straitjacket 4 transition 3 42 88 and war 15 Wheeler Nicholas 37 45 46 49 5758 60 149 152 171 219 Whelan Frederick 170 Whitman Richard 12 142 211 Wight Martin 1 6 7 8 11 1314 17 19 2223 28 29 30 3135 44 57 67 9394 96 102 105 112 114 168169 174 183 203 205 228 236 257 269 Williams John 58 126 211 Wilson Peter 161 162 Wilson Woodrow 246 Woods Ngaire 12 World Bank 105 235 World Health Organisation 96 world political system 64 69 world polity 73 world society alternative views 6366 analytical dustbin 28 44 88 118 definitions 37 41 45 207208 English school 12 1015 21 2762 and exclusive globalism 207212 global civil society 7787 or globalisation 66 intellectual history 30 45 and international society 2 28 202204 meaning xviii 78 nonstate actors 63 redefining 269270 rise 11 sociological approaches 63 6677 and solidarism 27 terminology 24 201 202204 units 119121 World Society Research Group 71 7476 88 111 114 116 122 131 world systems 207 WTO 96 105 185 224 235 Yugoslavia 220 Zhang Yongjin 28 168 182 205206 211 294 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 83 Maja Zehfuss Constructivism in international relations The politics of reality 82 Paul K Huth and Todd Allee The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the twentieth century 81 Neta C Crawford Argument and change in world politics Ethics decolonization and humanitarian intervention 80 Douglas Lemke Regions of war and peace 79 Richard Shapcott Justice community and dialogue in international relations 78 Phil Steinberg The social construction of the ocean 77 Christine Sylvester Feminist international relations An unfinished journey 76 Kenneth A Schultz Democracy and coercive diplomacy 75 David Houghton US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis 74 Cecilia Albin Justice and fairness in international negotiation 73 Martin Shaw Theory of the global state Globality as an unfinished revolution 72 Frank C Zagare and D Marc Kilgour Perfect deterrence 71 Robert OBrien Anne Marie Goetz Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams Contesting global governance Multilateral economic institutions and global social movements 70 Roland Bleiker Popular dissent human agency and global politics 69 Bill McSweeney Security identity and interests A sociology of international relations 68 Molly Cochran Normative theory in international relations A pragmatic approach 67 Alexander Wendt Social theory of international politics 66 Thomas Risse Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink eds The power of human rights International norms and domestic change 65 Daniel W Drezner The sanctions paradox Economic statecraft and international relations 64 Viva Ona Bartkus The dynamic of secession 63 John A Vasquez The power of power politics From classical realism to neotraditionalism 62 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett eds Security communities 61 Charles Jones E H Carr and international relations A duty to lie 60 Jeffrey W Knopf Domestic society and international cooperation The impact of protest on US arms control policy 59 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf The republican legacy in international thought 58 Daniel S Geller and J David Singer Nations at war A scientific study of international conflict 57 Randall D Germain The international organization of credit States and global finance in the world economy 56 N Piers Ludlow Dealing with Britain The six and the first UK application to the EEC 55 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger Theories of international regimes 54 Miranda A Schreurs and Elizabeth C Economy eds The internationalization of environmental protection 53 James N Rosenau Along the domesticforeign frontier Exploring governance in a turbulent world 52 John M Hobson The wealth of states A comparative sociology of international economic and political change 51 Kalevi J Holsti The state war and the state of war 50 Christopher Clapham Africa and the international system The politics of state survival 49 Susan Strange The retreat of the state The diffusion of power in the world economy 48 William I Robinson Promoting polyarchy Globalization US intervention and hegemony 47 Roger Spegele Political realism in international theory 46 Thomas J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds State sovereignty as social construct 45 Mervyn Frost Ethics in international relations A constitutive theory 44 Mark W Zacher with Brent A Sutton Governing global networks International regimes for transportation and communications 43 Mark Neufeld The restructuring of international relations theory 42 Thomas RisseKappen ed Bringing transnational relations back in Nonstate actors domestic structures and international institutions 41 Hayward R Alker Rediscoveries and reformulations Humanistic methodologies for international studies 40 Robert W Cox with Timothy J Sinclair Approaches to world order 39 Jens Bartelson A genealogy of sovereignty 38 Mark Rupert Producing hegemony The politics of mass production and American global power 37 Cynthia Weber Simulating sovereignty Intervention the state and symbolic exchange 36 Gary Goertz Contexts of international politics 35 James L Richardson Crisis diplomacy The great powers since the midnineteenth century 34 Bradley S Klein Strategic studies and world order The global politics of deterrence 33 T V Paul Asymmetric conflicts war initiation by weaker powers 32 Christine Sylvester Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era 31 Peter J Schraeder US foreign policy toward Africa Incrementalism crisis and change 30 Graham Spinardi From polaris to trident the development of US fleet ballistic missile technology 29 David A Welch Justice and the genesis of war 28 Russell J Leng Interstate crisis behavior 18161980 realism versus reciprocity 27 John A Vasquez The war puzzle 26 Stephen Gill ed Gramsci historical materialism and international relations 25 Mike Bowker and Robin Brown eds From cold war to collapse theory and world politics in the 1980s 24 R B J Walker Insideoutside international relations as political theory 23 Edward Reiss The strategic defense initiative 22 Keith Krause Arms and the state patterns of military production and trade 21 Roger Buckley USJapan alliance diplomacy 19451990 20 James N Rosenau and ErnstOtto Czempiel eds Governance without government order and change in world politics 19 Michael Nicholson Rationality and the analysis of international conflict 18 John Stopford and Susan Strange Rival states rival firms Competition for world market shares 17 Terry Nardin and David R Mapel eds Traditions of international ethics 16 Charles F Doran Systems in crisis New imperatives of high politics at centurys end 15 Deon Geldenhuys Isolated states a comparative analysis 14 Kalevi J Holsti Peace and war armed conflicts and international order 16481989 13 Saki Dockrill Britains policy for west German rearmament 19501955 12 Robert H Jackson Quasistates sovereignty international relations and the third world 11 James Barber and John Barratt South Africas foreign policy The search for status and security 19451988 10 James Mayall Nationalism and international society 9 William Bloom Personal identity national identity and international relations 8 Zeev Maoz National choices and international processes 7 Ian Clark The hierarchy of states Reform and resistance in the international order 6 Hidemi Suganami The domestic analogy and world order proposals 5 Stephen Gill American hegemony and the trilateral commission 4 Michael C Pugh The ANZUS crisis nuclear visiting and deterrence 3 Michael Nicholson Formal theories in international relations 2 Friedrich V Kratochwil Rules norms and decisions On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 1 Myles L C Robertson Soviet policy towards Japan An analysis of trends in the 1970s and 1980s 182 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Aperfeiçoamentos reativos de políticas ambientais lições dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Michelle Cristina dos Reis Bragaa Alberto de Freitas Castro Fonsecab a Master in Environmental Engineering Researcher Programa de PósGraduação em Engenharia Ambiental Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto Ouro Preto Brazil Email michellebragaalunoufopedubr b PhD in Sustainable Development Researcher Programa de PósGraduação em Engenharia Ambiental Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto Ouro Preto Brazil Email albertoufopedubr doi1018472SustDebv12n1202139412 Received 19082021 Accepted 25112021 ARTICLE VARIA ABSTRACT The State is not always able to proactively improve environmental policies Eventually policy improvements are a result of disasters that expose preexisting problems This situation is reflected in the state of Minas Gerais Brazil where after the failures of the Fundão and B1 tailings dam in Mariana and Brumadinho several problems in dam safety and emergency policies were exposed This study had a twofold objective 1 to identify the mechanisms used by the government of Minas Gerais to improve environmental policies and 2 to understand how the Mariana and Brumadinhos disasters affected dam safety and emergency policies Based on semistructured interviews and regulatory analysis the study revealed that the state government of Minas Gerais has been predominantly reactive in controlling environmental policies Additionally it was observed that the disasters catalysed a learning process that culminated in potentially better dam safety policies Keywords Environmental Policy Assessment Environmental Disasters Tailings Dams Regulatory Learning RESUMO O Estado nem sempre é capaz de aperfeiçoar políticas ambientais de maneira proativa Eventualmente melhorias políticas se dão em reação a desastres que expõem contundentemente problemas preexistentes Essa situação está refletida no estado de Minas Gerais Brasil onde após as rupturas das barragens de rejeito de Fundão em Mariana e B1 em Brumadinho ficaram expostas lacunas nas políticas de segurança e emergência de barragens Este estudo teve dois objetivos 1 identificar os mecanismos utilizados pelo governo de Minas Gerais para aperfeiçoar políticas ambientais e 2 183 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 entender como os desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho afetaram as políticas de segurança e emergência de barragens Baseado em entrevistas semiestruturadas e análises regulatórias o estudo revelou que o Estado tem sido predominantemente reativo no controle de políticas ambientais Adicionalmente foi observado que os desastres ocorridos catalisaram um processo de aprendizagem que culminou em políticas de barragens potencialmente melhores Palavraschave Avaliação de Políticas Ambientais Desastres Ambientais Barragens de Rejeito Aprendizagem regulatória 1 INTRODUCTION DISASTERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Environmental policies are imperfect and need constant monitoring and performance evaluation to support learning processes ASSIS et al 2012 BELLONI SOUZA MAGALHÃES 2003 The improvement of environmental policies however does not always happen proactively While suddenly and forcefully exposing preexisting problems catastrophic events often function as catalysts for change EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Many environmental disasters have driven the creation and improvement of environmental public policies HOGAN 2007 POTT ESTRELA 2017 In London four years after the Great Smog of 1952 the Clean Air Act was created thus establishing measures to control pollution caused by burning coal WALLER 1971 In 1956 in Japan there was a significant episode of mercury contamination in the Minamata Bay that stimulated discussions on the use of chemical compounds and their effects on flora and fauna thus leading to the ban of DDT and to an environmental movement that would gain strength in the following decade HOGAN 2007 In 1977 toxic substances including dioxin were released due to an explosion in the chemical industry in Seveso Italy HOGAN 2007 Years after this disaster the Seveso Directive was regulated to prevent accidents involving dangerous substances and limit their adverse effects on the environment and society POTT ESTRELA 2017 Still in the late 1970s hazardous waste disposal and human occupation in the Love Canal USA unfolded into reproductive problems among women and into high levels of chemical contaminants in the soil and air This led to the approval of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act Superfund which gave the Environmental Protection Agency EPA the authority to respond to releases of hazardous substances that could endanger public health or the environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2018 HOGAN 2007 An accident in the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania USA in 1979 triggered debates around the use of atomic energy Years later in 1986 the explosion of a nuclear reactor in Chernobyl Ukraine increased environmental awareness in Europe and promoted favourable conditions for the implementation of environmental policies FREY 2000 In the 1980s there was also a leak of toxic gases from a pesticide industry in Bhopal India which resulted in the approval of the Convention 174 of the International Labor Organization ILO aimed at preventing industrial accidents and reducing their risks and consequences POTT ESTRELA 2017 A similar phenomenon of reactive improvement of environmental policies recently occurred in Minas Gerais Brazil after the failures of the Fundão tailings dam failures in Mariana in 2015 and of the B1 tailings dam Brumadinho in 2019 These disasters in addition to killing hundreds of people caused severe biophysical and socioeconomic damage The magnitude of these damages shed light on the many flaws and limitations of existing dam safety and emergency policies MILANEZ et al 2019 At the state and federal levels various legal and regulatory changes were triggered by the failures of these dams However the political and institutional learning of these failures remains fragmented and marginally explored in the literature This article sought to answer the following questions How does the Minas Gerais state government monitor and improve its environmental policies How did the dam failures affect the States institutional 184 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 regulatory learning More specifically the study had a twofold objective 1 to identify the mechanisms used by the government of Minas Gerais to improve environmental policies and 2 to understand how the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters affected dam safety and emergency policies 2 POSTDISASTER POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNINGS Catastrophic events can reveal organisational dysfunctions and stimulate reflections regarding the analysis diagnosis and prevention capacity of the actors involved in policymaking thus opening up opportunities for dialogue and collaborative learning between groups and organisations EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 LLORY MONTMAYEUL 2014 Disasters in particular have a considerable level of leverage to trigger change as they attract the attention of managers regulators and other stakeholders generating significant pressure to investigate understand and implement improvements including in the regulatory system EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 However the postdisaster learning process is not trivial several technical organisational or cultural obstacles must be overcome EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Learning involves identifying deficiencies and implementing changes at various levels of the system where different actors are involved Through the establishment of laws governments make priorities explicit and define limits guiding or restricting the behaviour of public agencies and entrepreneurs Subsequently these laws are interpreted and regulated To be operational these regulations have to adapt to the particular contexts of each project taking into account the existing resources and procedures Finally at the technicaloperational level legal requirements are put into practice RASMUSSEN 1997 In addition to these interactions the different actors are influenced by external pressure during the learning process whether political economic or technological as illustrated in Figure 1 22 WHEAT AND DERIVATIVES SECTOR The wheat and derivatives segment comprises the manufacture of wheat flour wheat milling the manufacture of semolina and wheat bran the manufacture of other wheat derivatives and the manufacture of flour and mixed pasta powder and prepared for the manufacture of bread cakes cookies etc ECONODATA 2020 According to this database this segment consists of 798 companies distributed between 26 Brazilian states as shown in Figure 1 Figure 1 Interactions between actors in the process of creating and improving policies laws and regulations Source Adapted from RASMUSSEN 1997 185 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Postdisaster learning encompasses the steps of reporting analysing planning implementing and monitoring effectiveness EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Some organisational or cultural issues however may impair learning such as the absence or poor quality of information and records the absence of statistical and trend analysis to support decisions on future investments or organisational changes unfamiliarity of root causes restriction of human and financial resources among others EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 In many cases politicalinstitutional lessons learned in the postdisaster context are translated into laws and regulations Which by itself does not guarantee the effectiveness of the requirements For Barros et al 2012 legal requirements are only efficient if they are well applied fulfilled and assimilated by social agents These authors further state that Having good laws is the first and most crucial step but its not enough The standard is just a starting point For its effectiveness it is necessary to establish conditions that make its application feasible such as the hiring of specialised technicians adequate infrastructure and financial resources to carry out the work in addition to an educated public aware of environmental issues BARROS et al 2012 p173 Furthermore understanding the causes of a disaster by itself does not contribute to political institutional learning The behavioural change of organisations whether they are private enterprises or public bodies the constant search for technical knowledge and the critical sense of the interested parties are some of the preponderant factors for learning from disasters Effective actions are therefore crucial for learning EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Finally it should be noted that limited learning leads to the recurrence of disasters The failure of the Fundão dam in 2015 exemplifies this issue Despite the several changes in the instruments for managing the safety and emergency plans of dams after the event there was the second disaster in Brumadinho and an even more catastrophic one in terms of loss of human lives This situation indicates that the analyses of the disasters were superficial being limited to the identification of direct causes such as technical and human flaws Root causes which are generally organisational were not adequately remedied EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 A technical study was written by Poemas 2015 published shortly after the Mariana disaster indicated limitations in the institutional learning of the environmental agencies and dam inspectors at the state and federal levels Such institutions were going through institutional capacity problems such as lack of personnel equipment and resources to promote more effective and efficient inspections Even after the disasters the National Mining Agency ANM continues to face budget restrictions and delays in the availability of resources which hinder the proper development of planned actions AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2020 The failures of the tailings dams in Minas Gerais offer therefore a fertile ground for evaluating reactive improvements in environmental policies 3 EVOLUTION OF TAILINGS DAMS SAFETY AND EMERGENCY POLICIES AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS The first dams designed to contain tailings from mining activities were built at the beginning of the 20th century Previously tailings were directly discarded into the environment as their impacts were considered insignificant or acceptable by governments and society ÁVILA 2012 Tailings dams are complex structures that demand strict regulations and adequate management to reduce their many risks In addition to the inherent hazards to the construction methods tailings properties may change over time and project changes may jeopardise initial safety assumptions INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON LARGE DAMS 2001 186 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 After the 1960s guidelines for dam safety management were established in Brazil by creating an institution currently known as the Brazilian Dam Committee whose acronym in Portuguese is CBDB In the 1980s and 1990s CBDB published books on Brazilian dams safety procedures and guidelines for inspection auscultation and instrumentation MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 The Federal Ministry of Mines and Energy in the late 1980s created a workgroup to standardise preventive and maintenance procedures aimed at dam safety This group prepared a report dealing with monitoring and instrumentation the frequency of inspection general guidelines to be followed in accidents and the definition of responsibilities for carrying out the actions MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 In 1996 CBDB drafted an Ordinance containing guidelines for assessing the safety of dams and proposing the creation of the National Dam Safety Council However this proposal was not pursued by the government In 1999 CBDB prepared the Basic Guide for Dam Safety MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 In 2002 the Dam Management Program started in Minas Gerais indicating criteria for dam classification minimum requirements to be included in the management system and considered in environmental studies related to the main stages of dams licensing procedures MINAS GERAIS 2002 The pioneering role of the government of Minas Gerais is primarily a result of disruptive events that occurred previously in 1986 and 2001 During the 2000s guidelines were therefore established in Minas Gerais to support technical security audits and the mandatory submission of the Declaration of Stability Condition DCE of the dams to the environmental agency More vital legislation on dam safety came with the sanction of Law nº 123342010 which established the National Policy for Dam Safety PNSB The bill that culminated in this law was drafted reactively after dam failures in 2001 and 2003 in Minas Gerais reinforcing the need to approve specific legislation on this subject ESTANISLAU BELLEZZIA 2017 MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 Furthermore many problems were recognised including latent vulnerabilities in projects and issues in the construction and operation of existing structures AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2018 Before the PNSB there were voluntary isolated initiatives by some entrepreneurs who were trying to implement in their Brazilian facilities the same operational and safety standards adopted internationally in their dams AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2018 There was a general lack of articulation between competent authorities in the public sphere which dealt separately with the many issues related to dams ZONTA TROCATE 2016 In this sense the PNSB was an attempt to expand government control over dams based on inspections and compilation of information thus allowing for improved dam safety management BRASIL 2010 One of PNSBs principles is that developers are legally responsible for the dams safety thus being required to implement actions to guarantee it including effective management systems and compliance with the regulations In the case of mining tailings dams government safety inspections are the responsibility of the National Mining Agency ANM However environmental agencies can carry other inspections that make up Brazils National System of Environmental Institutions whose acronym in Portuguese is Sisnama ANM the national mining agency established regulations for managing the safety and emergency of mining dams in 2012 and 2013 But after the Fundão dam failure these regulations were unified and further enhanced to incorporate the learning outcomes of this disaster BRASIL 2012 2013 2017 After the Brumadinho disaster a proposed bill culminated in Law 140662020 which changed the previous PNSB incorporating new requirements There were intense regulatory changes at the state and federal levels leading to various new regulations BRASIL 2020 187 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 In Minas Gerais after the collapse of the B1 dam the State Policy for Dam Safety Pesb was established through Law nº 232912019 being applied to dams designed to contain andor dispose of mining tailings residues water or other liquids that are associated with industrial or mining activities being more restrictive than the PNSB MINAS GERAIS 2019 The Pesb established some principles such as the prevalence of the most protective norm for the environment and communities as well as the prioritisation of actions of prevention inspection and monitoring by state environmental agencies and entities Furthermore it determined that they should articulate with the bodies and entities responsible for the PNSB in information sharing and inspections The requirements of the Pesb were regulated in specific normative acts as shown in Figure 2 Figure 2 State Dam Safety Policy and its Main Regulations Source Authors 2021 Given the context mentioned above this article will discuss the roles of Mariana and Brumadinho in promoting regulatory learning 4 METHODS This study addressed the particular context of Minas Gerais which is a leading Brazilian state in mineral production with decades of experience in implementing different types of environmental policies including policies aimed at the safety and emergency management of dams Two qualitative data collection and analysis approaches were adopted in this research semistructured interviews and content analysis In semistructured interviews the researcher asks predetermined but open questions to obtain greater depth in answers Thus there is more control over the topics investigated than in unstructured interviews and there is no fixed interval of responses for each question AYRES 2008 We opted for this methodological approach to capture deeper and contextual elements in respondents answers The interviews were carried out with eight professionals who work in different departments of the State Government Environmental System whose Portuguese acronym is Sisema The respondents were intentionally chosen because of their knowledge and experience with other environmental policy instruments The interviews were all telephonebased and lasted an average of 45 minutes between 30 and 60 minutes They were recorded using a smartphone application and later transcribed and analysed All respondents were aware of the purpose of the study and signed an Informed Consent Form previously approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Federal University of Ouro Preto The participants were coded to preserve their identities P1 to P8 Table 1 presents the details of the methodology used in the interviews 188 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Table 1 Methodology used in semistructured interviews Number of respondents Eight identified as P1 to P8 Date of the interviews January2019 February2019 and March2020 Respondents profile Managers and analysts from the State Secretary for the Environment and Sustainable Development Semad State Forest Institute IEF Institute for Water Management Igam and State Environment Foundation Feam responsible for the implementation and control of environmental policy instruments Main interview content Respondents profile and experience performance controls administrative and territorial challenges and priorities in improving environmental policy instruments Types of questions Open Questionnaire type Semistructured Communication media Phone calls recorded through smartphone app Data analysis Transcription coding and analysis of patterns and relevant content Source Authors 2021 Through interviews we sought to investigate the studys first objective namely how the state government monitors and evaluates the performance of environmental policies More specifically the following themes were explored which technologies tools or indicators are used the main challenges faced and the perception of professionals about the effectiveness of environmental policies in the state In the context of this research effectiveness is understood as the achievement of the objective proposed by a policy be it the change or maintenance of specific environmental conditions The primary purpose of the interviews was to obtain a general overview of policy learning and control at the state government Specificities of one or another environmental policy instrument were not further explored The content analysis of policies laws and regulations related to dam safety and emergency management required careful evaluations of textual material KRIPPENDORFF 2004 This method included categorising qualitative textual data into groups of similar entities to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes JULIEN 2008 This method proved to be suitable for analysing the temporal evolution of legal instruments aimed at tailings dams This study evaluated the primary laws and regulations enacted until 31 May 2021 at the state level in Minas Gerais and at the federal level A matrix was used to organise the legal and regulatory changes that took place after the failures Based on the identified changes we discuss the learning process triggered by the disasters 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 51 EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN MINAS GERAIS The interviewees pointed out a series of issues that hinder or prevent the control of the performance of environmental policies in Minas Gerais the lack of systematic monitoring of the improvement of environmental quality the absence of constant monitoring of environmental data incompatible systems which are restricted to administrative controls and even the inexistence of methods among others were reported 189 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Participant P1 who held several managerial positions related to protected areas and conservation policies stated that there are some tools that we use that bring some indicators but they are of little significance there is no such systematic monitoring in connection with the environmental quality of the territory Participant P2 who has extensive managerial experience in inspection and administrative sanctions reported that he uses a basic system that cannot verify the instruments effectiveness in terms of environmental quality outcomes Respondents cited the importance of using systems to manage environmental policy instruments and control their performance However several problems were reported in the existing systems such as low reliability modernisation and customisation Interviewee P6 who worked in the management of water resources and sustainable development policies stated today our database is very inconsistent because the old system did not have control over the consistency of the data released by the analysts The inspection mentioned above and sanctions manager P2 reported that the system does have some condition to generate some reports but we do not use it daily And he added we need a better system thats for sure theres even a reliability problem in it too The precarious systematisation and availability of data reported by the research participants is not a recent issue in environmental agencies in Minas Gerais Ribeiro 2005 detected in his study that in many cases data were available in these institutions Still they were not presented in an organised and systematic way demanding further collection and reporting This situation was also observed by Assis et al 2012 in an analysis of Brazilian environmental policies The scarcity of information about the performance of environmental policies coordinated by the state government makes it difficult for public agencies to implement and improve policies as well as prioritise efforts leading to institutional disparities while some instruments have staff and resources for its execution others receive little attention and are underutilised Regarding the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments there were different perceptions among interviewees This was already expected since other devices have different characteristics effects levels of regulation and institutional maturity It was reported by participant P4 who has extensive experience in forest and vegetation removal approvals and management that when there is a tangle of norms related to a particular environmental policy instrument it adds complexity making it impractical to manage effectiveness Participants P2 P3 P5 and P7 were of the general opinion that the state environmental policies are effective arguing that they contribute to the control of pollution and environmental degradation act as barriers to the irregular occupation of natural areas or promote environmental awareness using penalties and sanctions In other words they see effectiveness in the mere existence of environmental policies This perception that the absence of policies would aggravate environmental quality corroborates the view of Moura 2016 who stated there is a perception that many environmental problems have been worsening in the country while the instruments devised for environmental policy have not advanced at a sufficient pace and intensity in the changes necessary for better management of the environment Even so there is no doubt that the deterioration of environmental quality in this period would have been more serious if these regulatory economic voluntary or informational tools had not been used to address environmental problems MOURA 2016 p 139 140 However it is noteworthy that contributing to a goal and achieving a goal are different issues as assumed in the concept of effectiveness The limitation of human resources low investments in the technical qualification of the teams insufficiency or poor distribution of financial resources decisions distorted by political influences lack of articulation between environmental agencies lack of clear priorities and a focus on document analysis to the detriment of inspection were pointed out by the 190 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 several interviewees as the main bottlenecks for the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments For example participants P1 P2 and P3 externalised during the interviews that it is not effective due to lack of resources and resources include people and financial resources as well So there is a lack of money and we waste a lot of time trying to resolve things and in the end we always come up against some government decision lack of resources a new year a state bureaucracy P1 the environment demands many different focuses there is licensing there is inspection so we stay in a pot sic waiting for many other priorities to be met P2 the money is used for many other things except for its core activity for its effective purpose the money that is collected is not applied as it should be P3 For Moura 2016 institutional structures and participation processes involving social and economic agents determine the quality of environmental policies For this author the populations involvement in the elaboration execution and evaluation of policies is one of the pillars of success In this regard the interviewees mentioned that public participation in environmental policies occurs through consultations meetings hearings technical chambers and councils Participatory management was mentioned in the interviews as an essential step towards the effectiveness of the instruments which corroborates Assis et al 2012 p18 who stated It is essential that different actors who may have conflicting visions and objectives be incorporated into the assessment Despite the recognition of the importance of civil society participation in the formulation of effective environmental public policies there are structural issues in Minas Gerais that lead to the pseudo social involvement in public hearings and State Council for Environmental Policy Copam chambers CARNEIRO 2005 MOURA 2016 SALHEB et al 2009 The interviews demonstrated weak preparation and articulation among state environmental agencies when evaluating the performance of policies thus reinforcing the obscure causeandeffect relationship between policies and environmental quality on the ground The lack of priorities and evidence of effectiveness hinders the improvement of policies as several relevant aspects such as the management capacity of environmental agencies and entities are not considered in decisionmaking Difficulties and challenges in evaluating the performance of environmental policies pointed out by the interviewees were also identified in the literature It was observed that in Minas Gerais difficulties in measuring progress in environmental policies result from a lack of structured assessment mechanisms For Moura 2016 without these mechanisms notions of effectiveness will remain imprecise or partial The existence of a continuous learning system was not evidenced in the interviews This situation hinders the preventive action of the State The occurrence of disasters in Minas Gerais is likely a symptom of the inefficiency of the policy control Unwanted events become catalysts for a learning process that reactively seeks improvements based on the causes and consequences of what happened However the difficulties presented by the interviewees cannot represent an impediment to the performance evaluation of environmental policies They must reinforce the search for knowledge and investments so that the evaluation is helpful to direct policies promoting improvements and the efficient allocation of public resources based on participatory and democratic mechanisms 191 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 52 POSTDISASTER LEARNING IN MINAS GERAIS ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON DAM SAFETY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The second part of this study focused more specifically on policy changes aimed at dam safety and emergency management which reflect a reaction to the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters This part sought to understand the details of the changes and the bulk of the lessons learned This part however was not based on interviews but as previously explained in the methods section on content analysis of laws and regulations As shown in Table 2 an intense legislative and regulatory activity was identified after the Mariana disaster and above all after the Brumadinho disaster Table 2 Laws and regulations aimed at the safety and emergency management of tailings dams STATE LEGISLATION Marianas predisaster Resolution Semad nº 992002 January 29 2002 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 622002 December 17 2002 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 742004 September 9 2004 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 872005 June 17 2005 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 1242008 October 9 2008 State Decree nº 448442008 June 25 2008 Marianas postdisaster State Decree n 468922015 November 20 2015 State Law nº 219722016 January 21 2016 State Decree n 469932016 May 2 2016 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2102016 September 21 2016 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2172017 December 06 2017 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2282018 November 28 2018 Brumadinhos postdisaster Resolution Semad nº 27622019 January 29 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 27652019 January 30 2019 State Law nº 232912019 February 25 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 27842019 March 21 2019 Official Notice GMGCedec nº 022019 June 25 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 28332019 August 26 2019 State Decree nº 477392019 October 18 2019 State Decree nº 480782020 November 5 2020 State Decree nº 481402021 February 25 2021 Resolution SemadFeamIEFIgam nº 30492021 March 2 2021 Ordinance IMA nº 20472021 March 31 2021 Ordinance IephaMG nº 72021 April 9 2021 Ordinance Feam nº 6782021 May 6 2021 Ordinance Feam nº 6792021 May 6 2021 Technical Instruction GMGCedec nº 012021 May 21 2021 192 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 FEDERAL LEGISLATION Marianas predisaster Federal Law nº 123342010 September 20 2010 Ordinance DNPM nº 4162012 September 03 2012 Ordinance DNPM nº 5262013 December 09 2013 Marianas postdisaster Ordinance DNPM nº 142016 January 15 2016 Ordinance Secretaria Nacional de Proteção e Defesa Civil nº 1872016 October 26 2016 Ordinance DNPM nº 703892017 May 17 2017 Brumadinhos postdisaster Resolution of the Ministerial Council for the Oversight of Disaster Responses nº 12019 January 28 2019 Resolution of the Ministerial Council for the Oversight of Disaster Responses nº 22019 January 28 2019 Resolution ANM n 42019 February 15 2019 Resolution ANM n 132019 August 8 2019 Resolution ANM n 322020 May 11 2020 Resolution ANM n 402020 July 6 2020 Federal Law nº 140662020 September 30 2020 Resolution ANM nº 512020 December 24 2020 Resolution ANM nº 562021 January 28 2021 Source Authors 2021 The study identified that there was particularly in Minas Gerais an incremental learning process Years before the publication of the PNSB the State already had a dam classification system and required documents and data on the dam structures during the environmental licensing process The state government was the precursor of several changes later implemented at the federal level for mining dams and other dams Table 3 exemplifies the pioneering role of Minas Gerais Table 3 Examples of pioneering dam safety regulations in Minas Gerais Description State Level Federal Level Mining dams andor other types Dam Registration Resolution Semad nº 992002 Federal Law nº 123342010 Determines the registration of professionals who attest to the stability of dams State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Determines measures to rescue people animals and cultural heritage mitigate environmental impacts and ensure water supply State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Determines upstream dam decharacterization decommissioning Resolution SemadFeam n 27652019 Resolution ANM nº 42019 Determines the analysis and approval of Emergency Action Plana State Decree nº 480782020 Resolution ANM nº 512020 Establishes guidelines for the elaboration of flood studies Official Notice GMG Cedec nº 022019 Resolution ANM nº 322020 Determines public hearings to present the Emergency Action Plan State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Source Authors 2021 193 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 It was found that some learnings catalysed by the failure of the Fundão dam were materialised only after the collapse of the B1 dam An example is the implementation of the State Policy for Dam Safety Pesb which resulted from the Popular Initiative Law Project called Sea of Mud Never Again proposed in July 2016 After the collapse of the B1 dam the urgency and relevance of the law mentioned above was more clearly perceived thus leading to its sanction one month after the dam break Therefore it was necessary the occurrence of two disasters for the implementation of some determinations at the state level such as detailing of flood studies methodology mandatory three phase environmental licensing for dam construction and change the requirement of a guarantee to ensure socioenvironmental recovery public hearings to discuss the conceptual design of dams environmental licenses conditioned to the approval of Emergency Action Plans by various sector entities requirement for the prioritisation of disposal alternatives that minimise social and environmental risks and promote the dewatering of tailings and residues creation of Dam Management Information System Sigibar and compatibility of the state and federal dam classification systems At the federal level the ANM mainly after the failure of the B1 dam established new requirements related to dam safety and emergency management Furthermore a cooperation agreement was signed with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD to review the regulation and governance of the mineral sector The ANM aims to identify regulatory barriers that may hinder the implementation of public policies and correct inefficiencies in the mineral sector based on the best global practices from countries such as Canada Australia and the United States AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2020 In its preliminary report the OECD highlighted the need to optimise inspection activities to reduce the risks of accidents AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2021 A large part of the effort of public and private institutions has been focused on improving emergency management by dealing with procedures that can avoid failures or minimise damage resulting from them especially loss of life It is worth mentioning that in response to the Brumadinho disaster the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management was established which based on the lessons learned from recent failures and existing good practices set out global guidelines for the safe management of dams UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 2020 While the mining industrys interests prevailed in its preparation this Standard defined auditable principles and requirements that emphasise the relevance of engagement and communication with stakeholders throughout the entire life cycle of dams HOPKINS KEMP 2021 The analysis carried out here suggests that changes in legal requirements are not enough to prevent new disasters It is necessary that developers comply with legal requirements and that the supervisory and regulatory bodies have sufficient financial and human resources to monitor compliance with their determinations If laws and regulations disregard the capacity of supervisory bodies or licensing entities the effectiveness of existing policies is compromised Regulatory changes in the context of developing economies like Brazil must be accompanied by capacitybuilding and intuitional strengthening 6 FINAL REMARKS The proactive performance assessment of environmental policies enables a better understanding of policies actual implications and opportunities for improvement thus legitimising political changes and helping governments to make more scientific and evidencebased decisions which can ultimately contribute to the enhanced distribution and use of resources ASSIS et al 2012 BELLONI SOUZA MAGALHÃES 2003 CRABBE LEROY 2008 MICKWITZ 2006 In Brazil however the socioenvironmental effects of policies are not constantly monitored making their assessment and consequently politicalinstitutional learning difficult Specifically in Minas Gerais 194 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 interviewees suggested that state environmental agencies still have weak control and articulation in assessing policies Environmental disasters become a natural catalyst of policy improvement in this context as reflected in tailings dams recent legislative and regulatory changes The failures of the Fundão and B1 dams stimulated discussions about the effectiveness of dam safety and emergency policies and therefore accelerated a learning process Regrettably however the Fundão disaster was not enough It was necessary for the second disaster of Brumadinho to simulate more meaningful learning MILANEZ 2021 This article identified several institutional challenges faced by the government of Minas Gerais that hinder or prevent the control of environmental policies and consequently the prioritisation of correction and preventive measures In the present study empirical evidence was obtained about the capacity of public institutions and it was found that the perception of professionals working in state environmental agencies corroborates previous studies When it comes to dam safety and emergency management the assessment carried out revealed that the changes that took place were not mere coincidences the vast majority of if not all regulatory changes are directly related to the causes or consequences of both disasters Advances in dam safety could occur due to studies methodologies and good practices disseminated among professionals but not in the speed and intensity observed here The identified challenges of policy effectiveness evaluations are mainly related to mismatches between laws intended objectives and their actual implementation budget cuts lack of personnel and technical resources and lack of knowledge or disregard for the benefits of policies at different levels of management It is therefore necessary among other aspects to strengthen the institutional capacity of government agencies Mariana and Brumadinho demonstrated no zero risk for tailings dams no matter how good the engineering projects and legal requirements safeguard these structures Developers must comply with legal requirements and the supervisory and regulatory bodies need sufficient human and financial resources to monitor compliance with their determinations ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Capes for the Masters scholarship and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development CNPq for the research scholarship 132558 20181 as well as for the financial support to the project 311201 20180 REFERENCES 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de Ação de Emergência das Barragens de Mineração PAEBM Brasília 2013 BRASIL Portaria no 70389 de 17 de maio de 2017 Cria o Cadastro Nacional de Barragens de Mineração o Sistema Integrado de Gestão em Segurança de Barragens de Mineração e estabelece a periodicidade de execução ou atualização e a qualificação dos responsáveis técnicos Brasília 2017 BRASIL Lei no 14066 de 30 de setembro de 2020 Altera a Lei no 12334 de 20 de setembro de 2010 que estabelece a Política Nacional de Segurança de Barragens PNSB e outras Brasília 2020 CARNEIRO E J A oligarquização da política ambiental mineira A insustentável leveza da política ambiental desenvolvimento e conflitos socioambientais Belo Horizonte 2005 CRABBÉ A LEROY P The Handbook of Environmental Policy Evaluation London Earthscan 2008 DENSCOMBE M The Good Research Guide for smallscale social research projects New York Open University Press 2007 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY What is Superfund Available at httpswwwepagovsuperfund whatsuperfund 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httpsussdamswildapricotorgresourcesDocumentsICOLD2001Bulletin121pdf Accessed in 2 out 2020 196 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 JULIEN H Content Analysis In GIVEN L M Ed The Sage Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods v 1 2 p 120122 Thousand Oaks Sage Publications 2008 KRIPPENDORFF K Content analysis an introduction to its methodology Thousand Oaks Sage Publications 2004 LLORY M MONTMAYEUL R O acidente e a organização Belo Horizonte Fabrefactum 2014 MELLO F M PIASENTIN C A história das Barragens no Brasil séculos XIX XX e XXI cinquenta anos do Comitê Brasileiro de Barragens Rio de Janeiro CBDB 2011 MICKWITZ P Environmental Policy Evaluation concepts ans practice Saarijärvi Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters 2006 MILANEZ B et al Minas não há mais avaliação dos aspectos econômicos e institucionais do desastre da Vale na Bacia do Rio Paraopeba Versos Textos para Discussão PoEMAS 2019 MILANEZ B Mapping industrial disaster recovery lessons from mining dam failures in Brazil The Extractive Industries and Society v 8 Issue 2 June 2021 MINAS GERAIS Deliberação Normativa Copam no 62 de 17 de dezembro de 2002 Dispõe sobre critérios de classificação de barragens de contenção de rejeitos de resíduos e de reservatório de água em empreendimentos industriais e de mineração no Estado de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte 2002 MINAS GERAIS Lei 23291 de 25 de fevereiro de 2019 Institui a política estadual de segurança de barragens Belo Horizonte 2019 MOURA A M M DE Governança Ambiental no Brasil instituições atores e políticas públicas Brasília Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 2016 POEMAS Antes fosse mais leve a carga avaliação dos aspectos econômicos políticos e sociais do desastre da SamarcoValeBHP em Mariana MG Mimeo 2015 POTT C M ESTRELA C C Histórico ambiental desastres ambientais e o despertar de um novo pensamento Estudos Avançados v 31 n 89 p 271283 2017 RASMUSSEN J Risk Management in a dynamic society a modelling problem Safety Science v 27 n 2 p 183 213 1997 RIBEIRO J C J Desenvolvimento de modelo para avaliação de desempenho de política pública de meio ambiente estudo de caso Estado de Minas Gerais 2005 Tese Doutorado em Saneamento Meio Ambiente e Recursos Hídricos Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte SALHEB G J M et al Políticas públicas e meio ambiente reflexões preliminares Revista Internacional de Direito Ambiental e Políticas Públicas v 1 n 1 p 527 2009 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME International Council on Mining and Metals Principles for Responsible Investment Padrão Global da Indústria para Gestão de Rejeitos 2020 Available at httpsibram orgbrwpcontentuploads202008globaltailingsstandardPTpdf Accessed in 1 maio 2021 WALLER R E Air Pollution and Community Health London 1971 ZONTA M TROCATE C A questão mineral no Brasil Antes fosse mais leve a carga reflexões sobre o desastre da SamarcoValeBHP Billiton Marabá Editorial iGuana 2016 v 2 PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE MINAS GERAIS INSTITUTO DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS DEPARTAMENTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS AMANDA AGUIAR COSTA DO DESASTRE À MUDANÇA UMA ANÁLISE DOS IMPACTOS DAS MOVIMENTAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NAS MUDANÇAS DAS NORMAS DE REGULAMENTAÇÃO DA ATIVIDADE MINERADORA APÓS OS ROMPIMENTOS DAS BARRAGENS DE MARIANA E BRUMADINHO Belo Horizonte 2024 Estou estudando as mobilizações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos grandes desastres ambientais ocorridos em 2015 e 2019 em Minas Gerais os rompimentos de barragens ocorridos nas cidades de Mariana e Brumadinho A magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais desses desastres tecnológicos levou a uma mobilização não apenas pelas consequências diretas em curto e longo prazo dos desastres em si mas também pela possibilidade de outros acontecerem da mesma maneira dada a falha na segurança desse modelo de alocação de rejeitos na construção na supervisão da estabilidade e consequentemente nas normas de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Ao redor do país existem centenas dessas barragens e uma quantidade impossível de ignorar é considerada de alto risco de rompimento Porque quero descobrir a influência da sociedade civil brasileira sobre a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e seu impacto nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação das atividades predatórias extrativistas Para explicar que a sociedade civil ao redirecionar a diplomacia ambiental brasileira foi capaz de gerar uma mudança das normas internacionais de regulamentação das atividades mineradoras aumentando a restrição de ação por meio da participação em fóruns e congressos e de criações de padrões de processos em parceria com organizações extremamente relevantes internacionalmente lutando não somente na busca pela responsabilização dos responsáveis pelo desastre mas também pela prevenção de outras catástrofes nos mesmos moldes Pergunta de Pesquisa Em que medida as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira pós desastres de Brumadinho e Mariana levaram à uma mudança na diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e consequentemente nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Hipótese de Investigação A sociedade civil brasileira frente a magnitude dos impactos gerados com os rompimentos das barragens pressionou o Estado Brasileiro para um redirecionamento de seu posicionamento internacionalmente para um ativismo ambiental significativamente mais presente de modo a reforçar a importância de regulamentar a atividade mineradora atuação que levou a uma maior restrição nos padrões globais Objetivos de Pesquisa o Objetivo Geral Analisar o impacto da busca da sociedade civil brasileira por melhores regulamentações das atividades extrativistas de grandes corporações em nível internacional o Objetivos Específicos a Mapear os processos e movimentos mais significativos da sociedade civil brasileira relacionados aos desastres ambientais ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho b Analisar a efetividade das estratégias de mobilização utilizadas pela sociedade civil brasileira c Identificar a relação entre os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira com um aumento no ativismo do Estado Brasileiro d Identificar a relação entre o aumento do ativismo do Estado Brasileiro e a mudança na regulamentação internacional para atuação de empresas mineradoras d Analisar as normas internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora antes e depois dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Justificativa Os desastres tecnológicos ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho ambos no estado de Minas Gerais Brasil constituem eventos de notável gravidade cujas consequências se estendem para além das fronteiras temporais e geográficas Em primeiro lugar é essencial destacar que tais desastres desencadearam uma profunda comoção na sociedade brasileira e internacional dada a magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais observados os quais se revelam tanto no curto quanto no longo prazo O Brasil até aquele momento não havia registrado precedentes de desastres ambientais com tais características e dimensões As falhas estruturais evidenciadas no modelo de alocação dos rejeitos nas barragens conjugadas com deficiências nos laudos de segurança suscitaram graves questionamentos sobre a veracidade e a integridade das situações descritas nesses documentos Tais falhas revelaramse cruciais na compreensão dos riscos envolvidos e na subsequente materialização dos desastres Esses eventos explicitam de forma contundente a necessidade imperativa de uma revisão crítica das práticas permitidas às grandes corporações que operam no setor extrativista Essas corporações que desempenham um papel substancial na movimentação da economia nacional devem operar sob regulamentações que minimizem os riscos de tragédias ambientais visto que as consequências dessas operações são sentidas sobretudo pela população brasileira frequentemente de modo irreparável e para além do que qualquer compensação financeira possa cobrir Ao experienciar diretamente os efeitos devastadores desses desastres em Mariana como nativo desta localidade pude observar de perto o impacto profundo e duradouro sobre a vida das pessoas diretamente afetadas As perdas de familiares amigos locais queridos e até mesmo memórias representam danos inestimáveis que moldam permanentemente a identidade e a memória coletiva da comunidade A dor das perdas a devastação de locais com valor sentimental inigualável e a desintegração de redes sociais e culturais refletemse em traumas que em muitos casos persistem por gerações O deslocamento de famílias forçadas a habitar em acomodações temporárias como hotéis transformou espaços de vida diária incluindo minha própria escola em refúgios para aqueles que perderam tudo O contato constante com essas realidades e a ocupação da casa de meu avô por uma das famílias desalojadas destacam a intensidade com que a comunidade local foi e continua a ser afetada Este sofrimento cotidiano ressalta a necessidade urgente de justiça reparação e sobretudo medidas preventivas robustas para evitar a recorrência de tais catástrofes A relevância desta pesquisa se insere no contexto mais amplo da emergência climática global um fenômeno cada vez mais perceptível e preocupante As atividades predatórias das mineradoras ao contribuírem significativamente para o agravamento das crises ambientais exigem um escrutínio rigoroso e uma reformulação das normas que regem suas operações Esta pesquisa se propõe a identificar como surgem e se desenvolvem os movimentos na sociedade internacional que impulsionam a mudança nas normas regulatórias das atividades empresariais A busca por aprimorar os processos de governança corporativa e normativa visa não apenas mitigar os impactos ambientais mas também promover um desenvolvimento que seja verdadeiramente sustentável garantindo às futuras gerações condições ambientais e sociais melhores do que as que se experimentam atualmente Assim este estudo busca contribuir substancialmente para o campo das Relações Internacionais ao fornecer uma análise detalhada de como crises ambientais de grande escala influenciam a evolução das normas e práticas internacionais A expectativa é que ao explorar os processos de emergência e adaptação das normas esta pesquisa ofereça insights valiosos para a formulação de políticas mais eficazes e preventivas que não só respondam às crises ambientais mas também as previnam promovendo um ambiente global mais seguro e sustentável para todos Marco teórico Partindo da perspectiva teórica construtivista a concepção de realidade nas Relações Internacionais é essencialmente construída e mantida por meio de processos contínuos de interação social onde a linguagem desempenha um papel fundamental De acordo com essa abordagem os processos de socialização são centrais na construção da realidade uma vez que eles moldam as identidades dos atores e simultaneamente contribuem para a formação dos significados que esses atores atribuem ao mundo ao seu redor Em outras palavras a realidade é um constructo dinâmico que emerge da interação entre identidades e significados que se reforçam e se reconstroem mutuamente No contexto das Relações Internacionais as normas e regras que regem o comportamento dos Estados e outros atores do Sistema Internacional são criadas difundidas e eventualmente internalizadas através de processos complexos de interação social e política Os Estados considerados como atores racionais e dotados de identidades próprias desempenham um papel central na construção de significados compartilhados que se manifestam na forma de normas e regras internacionais A formação e emergência de normas e regras no Sistema Internacional seguem um ciclo que pode ser dividido em três fases principais externalização objetivação e internalização Cada uma dessas fases é caracterizada por distintos mecanismos de legitimação justificação coação e a utilização de canais de comunicação variados para a disseminação e aceitação dessas normas 1 Externalização Na fase de externalização os atores começam a articular novas ideias e normas geralmente em resposta a mudanças contextuais ou a problemas emergentes que demandam novos marcos regulatórios ou comportamentais Esse processo envolve a projeção de ideias e expectativas para além das fronteiras domésticas buscando influenciar outros atores no sistema internacional A linguagem e a retórica desempenham um papel crucial nesta fase pois são utilizadas para comunicar argumentar e convencer outros atores da validade e necessidade das novas normas propostas 2 Objetivação A fase de objetivação referese ao momento em que as normas começam a ser institucionalizadas e ganham um status mais concreto dentro do sistema internacional Durante esta fase as normas deixam de ser meras propostas para se tornarem elementos reconhecidos e incorporados nas práticas e instituições internacionais Este processo de institucionalização pode envolver a codificação das normas em tratados resoluções ou outros instrumentos de governança bem como a criação de mecanismos de monitoramento e implementação 3 Internalização Por fim a fase de internalização ocorre quando as normas se tornam amplamente aceitas e integradas nas práticas cotidianas dos atores internacionais Nesta fase as normas deixam de ser contestadas e passam a ser vistas como parte integrante do comportamento esperado dos Estados e outros atores globais A internalização implica que as normas foram aceitas não apenas formalmente mas também normativamente influenciando as identidades e comportamentos dos atores de forma profunda e duradoura Aplicação na Pesquisa Neste estudo a análise se concentrará em como os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira ao externalizar suas demandas e preocupações através de processos comunicativos e linguísticos foram capazes de influenciar significativamente a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e promover mudanças na regulamentação internacional relativa à ação das empresas mineradoras A mobilização e articulação de demandas da sociedade civil podem ser vistas como exemplos claros de externalização onde novas normas são propostas em resposta aos impactos devastadores dos desastres ambientais de Mariana e Brumadinho Esses movimentos demonstram como atores nãoestatais podem desempenhar um papel crucial na formação de normas ao influenciar os processos de legitimação e justificação que conduzem à objetivação e eventualmente à internalização dessas normas no sistema internacional O estudo investigará portanto a dinâmica através da qual a sociedade civil consegue moldar a diplomacia ambiental e contribuir para a emergência de novas normas internacionais que visem um maior controle e regulamentação das atividades mineradoras promovendo assim um modelo de desenvolvimento mais sustentável e eticamente responsável METODOLOGIA Abordagem Metodológica A presente pesquisa adota uma abordagem qualitativa para explorar como as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira em resposta aos desastres ambientais de Mariana e Brumadinho influenciaram as mudanças nas normas internacionais e a reorientação da diplomacia ambiental brasileira Essa escolha metodológica se fundamenta na necessidade de compreender os processos subjacentes e as dinâmicas sociais complexas que moldam a formação e a transformação de normas e políticas no Sistema Internacional Métodos de Coleta de Dados A coleta de dados será realizada através de uma análise abrangente de documentos entrevistas reportagens e manifestações em redes sociais A seguir detalhamse os principais métodos de coleta 1 Análise Documental A análise documental será empregada para examinar uma vasta gama de documentos relacionados aos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho incluindo relatórios técnicos acordos institucionais e regulatórios e publicações acadêmicas Este método permitirá a identificação e a análise das normas e práticas emergentes que moldaram as respostas institucionais e a diplomacia ambiental brasileira Conforme aponta o documento Métodos de Análise Análise Documental a avaliação de documentos deve considerar a autenticidade a credibilidade e o contexto de produção dos mesmos com o objetivo de interpretar de forma adequada as mensagens contidas 2 Entrevistas Serão realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas com representantes de organizações nãogovernamentais autoridades governamentais e especialistas em direito ambiental e relações internacionais As entrevistas têm como objetivo captar perspectivas diversificadas sobre os impactos dos desastres e a resposta normativa subsequente De acordo com Ayres 2008 as entrevistas semiestruturadas são adequadas para obter um entendimento mais profundo e contextualizado das percepções dos participantes uma vez que permitem maior flexibilidade nas respostas e a exploração de tópicos relevantes 3 Reportagens e Mídia Social Serão analisadas reportagens e manifestações em redes sociais para compreender como os desastres foram retratados e discutidos publicamente e como esses discursos podem ter influenciado a formulação de normas e políticas A análise dessas fontes permitirá avaliar a mobilização social e a influência da opinião pública na agenda política e na diplomacia ambiental Métodos de Análise de Dados A análise dos dados coletados será conduzida através de uma combinação de análises documental de redes de conteúdo e de discurso conforme descrito a seguir 1 Análise Documental A análise documental envolverá a identificação e categorização de temas emergentes nos documentos revisados como padrões normativos diretrizes regulatórias e respostas políticas Este método permitirá mapear a evolução das normas e avaliar como os documentos refletem e influenciam as mudanças nas práticas internacionais 2 Análise de Redes A análise de redes será aplicada para mapear as interações entre os diversos atores envolvidos nos desdobramentos dos desastres Isso inclui a análise das conexões entre organizações da sociedade civil agências governamentais e corporações mineradoras Conforme o documento Análise de Redes sugere este método é eficaz para analisar dados das relações sociais e identificar variáveischave e comportamentos dos agentes que influenciam a estrutura de relações 3 Análise de Conteúdo A análise de conteúdo será utilizada para examinar as narrativas presentes em entrevistas reportagens e redes sociais identificando a frequência e a importância de categorias temáticas Este método permitirá uma interpretação coerente das mensagens e a identificação de padrões e significados atribuídos aos desastres e suas consequências 4 Análise de Discurso A análise de discurso focará na forma como os discursos sobre os desastres e suas repercussões são construídos e legitimados Guzzini 2003 ressalta a importância da análise de discurso para entender como as instituições e as normas são moldadas e sustentadas por meio de processos discursivos Procedimentos de Legitimidade e 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de 3 de setembro de 2012 Cria o Cadastro Nacional de Barragens de Mineração e dispõe sobre o Plano de Segurança Revisão Periódica de Segurança e Inspeções Regulares e Especiais de Segurança das Barragens de Mineração Diário Oficial da União Brasília DF 4 set 2012 Seção 1 p 1 BRASIL Portaria no 526 de 9 de dezembro de 2013 Estabelece a periodicidade de atualização e revisão a qualificação do responsável técnico o conteúdo mínimo e o nível de detalhamento do Plano de Ação de Emergência das Barragens de Mineração PAEBM Diário Oficial da União Brasília DF 10 dez 2013 Seção 1 p 1 BRAGA Michelle Cristina dos Reis FONSECA Alberto de Freitas Castro Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate v 12 n 3 p 182196 dez 2021 CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS Desdobramentos dos crimes socioambientais de Brumadinho e Mariana são alvos de comissão da Câmara Disponível em httpswwwcamaralegbrnoticias940199DESDOBRAMENTOSDOS CRIMESSOCIOAMBIENTAISDEBRUMADINHOEMARIANASAOALVOS DECOMISSAODACAMARA Acesso em 10 jun 2024 FUNDAÇÃO RENOVA Painel Rio Doce Disponível em httpswwwfundacaorenovaorgpainelriodoce Acesso em 12 jun 2024 GREENPEACE ONGs internacionais pedem à ONU que exclua Vale do Pacto Global Disponível em httpswwwgreenpeaceorgbrasilblogongs internacionaispedemaonuqueexcluavaledopactoglobal Acesso em 8 jun 2024 INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE Uma estrutura de avaliação dos impactos ambientais e sociais de desastres Disponível em httpswwwiucnorgptresourcesgreyliteratureumaestruturadeavaliacao dosimpactosambientaisesociaisdedesastres Acesso em 11 jun 2024 MINAS GERAIS Lei no 23291 de 25 de fevereiro de 2019 Institui a política estadual de segurança de barragens Diário Oficial do Estado de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte 26 fev 2019 Seção 1 p 1 MINAS GERAIS Resolução Semad no 2765 de 29 de janeiro de 2019 Dispõe sobre medidas emergenciais para segurança de barragens no estado de Minas Gerais Diário 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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE MINAS GERAIS INSTITUTO DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS DEPARTAMENTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS AMANDA AGUIAR COSTA DO DESASTRE À MUDANÇA UMA ANÁLISE DOS IMPACTOS DAS MOVIMENTAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NAS MUDANÇAS DAS NORMAS DE REGULAMENTAÇÃO DA ATIVIDADE MINERADORA APÓS OS ROMPIMENTOS DAS BARRAGENS DE MARIANA E BRUMADINHO Belo Horizonte 2024 Estou estudando as mobilizações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos grandes desastres ambientais ocorridos em 2015 e 2019 em Minas Gerais os rompimentos de barragens ocorridos nas cidades de Mariana e Brumadinho A magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais desses desastres tecnológicos levou a uma mobilização não apenas pelas consequências diretas em curto e longo prazo dos desastres em si mas também pela possibilidade de outros acontecerem da mesma maneira dada a falha na segurança desse modelo de alocação de rejeitos na construção na supervisão da estabilidade e consequentemente nas normas de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Ao redor do país existem centenas dessas barragens e uma quantidade impossível de ignorar é considerada de alto risco de rompimento Porque quero descobrir a influência da sociedade civil brasileira sobre a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e seu impacto nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação das atividades predatórias extrativistas Para explicar que a sociedade civil ao redirecionar a diplomacia ambiental brasileira foi capaz de gerar uma mudança das normas internacionais de regulamentação das atividades mineradoras aumentando a restrição de ação por meio da participação em fóruns e congressos e de criações de padrões de processos em parceria com organizações extremamente relevantes internacionalmente lutando não somente na busca pela responsabilização dos responsáveis pelo desastre mas também pela prevenção de outras catástrofes nos mesmos moldes Pergunta de Pesquisa Em que medida as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira pós desastres de Brumadinho e Mariana levaram à uma mudança na diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e consequentemente nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Hipótese de Investigação A sociedade civil brasileira frente a magnitude dos impactos gerados com os rompimentos das barragens pressionou o Estado Brasileiro para um redirecionamento de seu posicionamento internacionalmente para um ativismo ambiental significativamente mais presente de modo a reforçar a importância de regulamentar a atividade mineradora atuação que levou a uma maior restrição nos padrões globais Objetivos de Pesquisa o Objetivo Geral Analisar o impacto da busca da sociedade civil brasileira por melhores regulamentações das atividades extrativistas de grandes corporações em nível internacional o Objetivos Específicos a Mapear os processos e movimentos mais significativos da sociedade civil brasileira relacionados aos desastres ambientais ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho b Analisar a efetividade das estratégias de mobilização utilizadas pela sociedade civil brasileira c Identificar a relação entre os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira com um aumento no ativismo do Estado Brasileiro d Identificar a relação entre o aumento do ativismo do Estado Brasileiro e a mudança na regulamentação internacional para atuação de empresas mineradoras d Analisar as normas internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora antes e depois dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Justificativa Os desastres tecnológicos de Mariana e Brumadinho em Minas Gerais geraram enorme comoção na sociedade brasileira na época dadas as magnitudes dos impactos ambientais identificados tanto para o curto prazo quanto para o longo até então não tínhamos precedentes de desastres ambientais nesses moldes em nosso país O próprio modelo da alocação dos rejeitos dessas barragens era falho e apresentava riscos e para piorar existiam também falhas nos laudos de segurança cuja veracidade das situações descritas poderia ser questionada Esses eventos escancararam a necessidade de mudar como e o que era permitido das grandes corporações que comandam as atividades extrativistas e tanto movimentam nossa economia fazerem em nosso território pois afinal quem sente as consequências é o povo brasileiro algumas que indenização nenhuma pode pagar Eu como natural de Mariana percebi de perto como as pessoas diretamente atingidas foram impactadas a dores das perdas de familiares amigos lugares queridos que jamais verão novamente e até mesmo de memórias São pessoas que jamais virarão a esquina da casa da mãe depois de um almoço de domingo que de um dia para o outro perderam tudo e tiveram que viver por meses em hotéis Minha escola era também um hotel o contato era diário e depois de um tempo a casa do meu avô foi alugada para uma dessas famílias A nossa cidade sentiu e sente demais tem que haver justiça reparação e prevenção para que uma catástrofe dessa não aconteça novamente Acredito que essa pesquisa possa fazer a diferença para o campo visto que a emergência climática é sentida cada vez mais ao redor do mundo e atividades predatórias como a das mineradoras contribuem para seu agravo de modo que se faça necessário uma identificação de como surgem esses movimentos na sociedade internacional para a mudança de normas de atuação das empresas em uma busca de aprimorar os processos e impulsionar um desenvolvimento que seja sustentável dando para as gerações futuras as melhores condições possíveis Marco teórico Partindo da corrente de pensamento construtivista a realidade é construída por meio da linguagem conforme os processos de socialização acontecem construindo também a identidade que por sua vez interfere no processo de formação de significados Em suma a realidade é construída pelas identidades e significados e viceversa Mais especificamente na área das Relações Internacionais as normas e regras são criadas difundidas e internalizadas pelos atores do Sistema Internacional os Estados que assim como os seres humanos são atores racionais que possuem uma identidade que influencia na construção de significados compartilhados as regras e normas Para a emergência de normas e regras no Sistema Internacional primeiro acontecem os processos de externalização objetivação e internalização os quais perpassam a esfera doméstica e em cada um possui formas de legitimação justificação coação e até mesmo canais de comunicação Nessa pesquisa as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira externalizando suas demandas por meio da linguagem foram capazes de gerar um novo ciclo de emergência da norma ao influenciar na diplomacia ambiental brasileira por uma busca por mudanças na regulamentação internacional da ação das empresas mineradoras Metodologia Dado que o tema da pesquisa se trata de uma análise das mudanças das normas internacionais e do redirecionamento da diplomacia brasileira a partir das movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho os dados serão coletados em documentos entrevistas reportagens e manifestações nas redes sociais de modo a se fazer necessária uma abordagem qualitativa por meio de análises documentais de redes de conteúdo e de discurso para que sejam identificados todos os aspectos e relações importantes das variáveis que constituem o objeto httpswwwmpmgmpbrportalmenucomunicacaonoticiascomunidadesatingidas porrompimentodebarragememmarinacelebramacordoquepermiteatuacaode auditoriaindependenteedestacamatuacaodompmgshtml httpswwwotempocombreconomia2024526temorderompimentodebarragens emminascrescecommudancascl0 httpswwwcamaralegbrnoticias940199DESDOBRAMENTOSDOSCRIMES SOCIOAMBIENTAISDEBRUMADINHOEMARIANASAOALVOSDECOMISSAO DACAMARA httpswwwgreenpeaceorgbrasilblogongsinternacionaispedemaonuqueexclua valedopactoglobal httpsnewsunorgptstory2023011808747 httpswwwuneporgnewsandstoriespressreleaseinternationaladvisorypanel supportnewglobaltailingsmanagement httpswwwconjurcombr2017nov12segundaleituraacaopropostariodocebusca duvidosaprotecaoambiental httpswwwiucnorgptresourcesgreyliteratureumaestruturadeavaliacaodos impactosambientaisesociaisdedesastres httpswwwfundacaorenovaorgpainelriodoce DUFFIELD John What are International Institutions In International Studies Review Oxford Blackwell Publishing 2007 Nº 9 BUZAN Barry From international to world society English school theory and the social structure of globalisation Cambridge UK Cambridge UniversityPress 2004 p 161204 capítulo 06 estrutura do sistema GUZZINI Stefano Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations Disponível em httpbitly2jnl3dn legitimação AXELROD Robert KEOHANE Robert Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions World Politics Vol 38 No 1 Oct 1985 pp 226254 cooperação MÉTODOS DE ANÁLISE ANÁLISE DE REDES Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa em RI CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS Redes sociais mídias sociais Já existiam redes sociais antes das mídias sociais e da internet A importância do debate agênciaestrutura Comprometimento com a ideia de uma estrutura fraca regularidades que emergem de forma não intencional Efeitos não intencionais da ação intencional DEFINIÇÃO E APLICABILIDADE Análise de redes é um método para analisar dados das relações sociais É um campo focado em Relações ao invés de atributos Interdependência Efeitos emergentes e substantivos da estrutura Barcelona x Atlético de Madrid Jogo 1 0504 Lionel Messi Gerard Piqué Jordi Alba Dani Alves Neymar Andrés Iniesta Rafinha Luis Suárez Sergio Busquets Arda Turan Javier Mascherano Ivan Rakitic Sergi Roberto Atlético de Madrid x Barcelona Jogo 2 1304 Sergio Busquets Gerard Piqué Andrés Iniesta Neymar Jordi Alba Lionel Messi Javier Mascherano Arda Turan Ivan Rakitic Sergi Roberto Dani Alves Luis Suárez CONCEBENDO UM ESTUDO DE REDES 1 Identificar variáveischave Exige profunda intimidade do pesquisador com a problemática Identificar variável estrutural Variável que coloca em relação todos os atores do sistema social estudado Aquilo que circula Identificar atributos dos agentes Atributos monádicos idade gênero raça etc Identificar comportamentos dos agentes formas de ação que são susceptíveis de ser influenciadas pela posição que ocupam os agentes dentro da estrutura de relações 2 Coleta de dados Podem ser dados primários ou secundários Coleta primária questionário sociométrico Identificar interações dos respondentes Ex Roster free recall etc Coleta secundária análise de documentos Não possui receitas fixas para reconstruir estruturas em rede Criatividade e imaginação sociológica 3 Problemas com a coleta de dados Problemas éticos Garantir sigilo dos entrevistados Risco de viés na informação Distorções cognitivas na origem dos dados Decidirse entre nomes tipo de relação e posições posição relativa no sistema A rede reconstruída não é substância em si Representa percepção de indivíduos 4 Possibilidade de amostragem Universos relacionais estão geralmente circunscritos a mundos mais ou menos delimitados Usar amostragem corre o risco de deixar de fora atores chave da estrutura relacional em questão 5 Unidades de análise Unidade de análise pode ser os nós as relações ou ainda a estrutura como um todo Figura 20 Unidades de análise em estruturas relacionais Unidade de análise Agentes ou nós Pessoas Organizações Relações Tipo de recursos Formas de conectividade intermediação força de laços etc A rede vista como um todo Por exemplo como estrutura de pequeno mundo ou como nichos de clusterização latente Fonte Elaboração própria 6 Vantagens da análise de redes Nem sempre uma análise estatística ou focada em atributos e funções tipo organograma consegue lidar com a realidade social dinâmica e complexa das relações sociais Mas atenção Devido à sua própria natureza a construção e análise de dados em rede não é um trabalho teoricamente neutro Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy Strategies and Institutions Robert Axelrod Robert O Keohane World Politics Vol 38 No 1 Oct 1985 pp 226254 Stable URL httplinksjstororgsicisici004388712819851029383A13C2263AACUASA3E20CO3B2A World Politics is currently published by The Johns Hopkins University Press Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use available at httpwwwjstororgabouttermshtml JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides in part that unless you have obtained prior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal noncommercial use Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work Publisher contact information may be obtained at httpwwwjstororgjournalsjhuphtml Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for longterm preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world The Archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations It is an initiative of JSTOR a notforprofit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology For more information regarding JSTOR please contact supportjstororg httpwwwjstororg Sun Mar 16 180615 2008 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Strategies and Institutions By ROBERT AXELROD and ROBERT 0 KEOHANE A CHIEVING cooperation is difficult in world politics There is no common government to enforce rules and by the standards of domestic society international institutions are weak Cheating and de ception are endemic Yet as the articles in this symposium have shown cooperation is sometimes attained World politics is not a homogeneous state of war cooperation varies among issues and over time Before trying to draw conclusions about the factors that promote cooperation under anarchy let us recall the definitions of these key terms Cooperation is not equivalent to harmony Harmony requires complete identity of interests but cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary in terests In such situations cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others Cooperation thus defined is not necessarily good from a moral point of view Anarchy also needs to be defined clearly As used here the term refers to a lack of common government in world politics not to a denial that an international societyalbeit a fragmented onexists Clearly many international relationships continue over time and engender stable ex pectations about behavior To say that world politics is anarchic does not imply that it entirely lacks organization Relationships among actors may be carefully structured in some issueareas even though they remain loose in others Likewise some issues may be closely linked through the operation of institutions while the boundaries of other issues as well as the norms and principles to be followed are subject to dispute Anarchy defined as lack of common government remains a constant but the degree to which interactions are structured and the means by which they are structured vary It has often been noted that militarysecurity issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy than do politicaleconomic W e would like to thank the other authors in this project for their helpful suggestions Robert Axelrod gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the National Science Foun dation and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 227 ones Charles Lipson for instance has recently observed that political economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than military security 0nesI This does not mean however that analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks Indeed one of the major purposes of the present collection is to show that a single framework can throw light on both The case studies in this symposium have shown that the three di mensions discussed in the introductionmutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of playershelp us to understand the success and failure of attempts at cooperation in both military security and politicaleconomic relations Section I of this essay syn thesizes some of the findings of these case studies and thereby helps to specify some of the most important ways in which these three factors affect world politics It deals with issues in isolation from one another as separate games or as a series of games in order to clarify some basic analytic points In this section we follow the lead of game theorists who have tried to avoid complicating their models with extraneous material in order to reach interesting conclusions If the problem is a small event such as a duel between two airplanes our analysis of it may not depend on knowledge of the context eg the purpose of the war If the issue is of very high salience to participants such as the 1914 crisis or the Cuban missile crisis the extraneous issues such as tariffs or pollution of the Caribbean may be so insignificant that they can be ignored Either way the strategy of focusing only on the central inter action is clearly justified Yet if the issue is neither isolated nor allconsuming the context within which it takes place may have a decisive impact on its politics and its outcomes As the case studies illustrate world politics includes a rich variety of contexts Issues arise against distinctive backgrounds of past experience they are linked to other issues being dealt with simultaneously by the same actors and they are viewed by participants through the prisms of their expectations about the future To ignore the effects of context would be to overlook many of the most interesting questions raised by a gametheoretic perspective on the problem of cooperation In Section 11 we therefore consider the context of issues in so doing we move outward from the three dimensions on which this collection focuses toward broader considerations including linkages among issues multilevel games complications encountered by strategies of reciprocity I Lipson International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs World Politics 37 October 1984 123 228 WORLD POLITICS in complex situations and the role of international institutions Analysis of the context of games leads us to regard context as malleable not only can actors in world politics pursue different strategies within an estab lished context of interaction they may also seek to alter that context through building institutions embodying particular principles norms rules or procedures for the conduct of international relations In the conclusion we will argue that a contextual approach to strategyby leading us to see the importance of international institutionshelps us to forge necessary links between gametheoretic arguments and theories about international regimes Three situational dimensions affect the propensity of actors to co operate mutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of actors A PAYOFF STRUCTURE MUTUAL AND CONFLICTING PREFERENCES It is well established that the payoff structure for a game affects the level of cooperation For comparisons within a given type of game this idea was first formalized by Axelrod who established a measure of conflict of interest for specific games including Prisoners Dilemma Experimental evidence demonstrated that the greater the conflict of interest between the players the greater the likelihood that the players would in fact choose to defect Jervis has elaborated on these theories and shown that different types of games such as Stag Hunt and Chicken have different potentials for cooperation3 He has also applied his stra tegic analysis to historical and contemporary problems related to the security dilemma His work clearly indicates that international co operation is much easier to achieve in some game settings than in others Payoff structures often depend on events that take place outside of the control of the actors The economic depressions of 18731896 and of the early 1930s stimulated demands for protection by firms and in dividuals in distress and therefore reduced the incentives of governments to cooperate with one another The weakness and vacillation of the British and French governments before 1939 reduced the potential value Robert Axelrod Conflict of Interest An Axiomatic Approach Journal of Conflict Resolution 11 March 1967 8799 and Conflict of Interest A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications to Politics Chicago Markham 1970 3 Robert Jervis Cooperation under the Security Dilemma WorM Politics 30 January 1978 167214 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 229 of antiGerman alliances with those countries for the Soviet Union making a NaziSoviet pact seem relatively more attractive This is obvious enough Slightly less obvious is another point about mutuality of interests the payoff structure that determines mutuality of interests is not based simply upon objective factors but is grounded upon the actors perceptions of their own interests Perceptions define interests Therefore to understand the degree of mutuality of interests or to enhance this mutuality we must understand the process by which interests are perceived and preferences determined One way to understand this process is to see it as involving a change in payoffs so that a game such as Prisoners Dilemma becomes either more or less conflictual To start with Prisoners Dilemma is a game in which both players have an incentive to defect no matter whether the other player cooperates or defects If the other player cooperates the first player prefers to defect DC CC On the other hand if the other player defects the first player still prefers to defect D D CD The dilemma is that if both defect both do worse than if both had coop erated CC DD Thus Prisoners Dilemma has a preference ordering for both players of DC CC D D CD4 Now consider a shift in the preferences of both players so that mutual cooperation is preferred to unilateral defection This makes the pref erence ordering CC DC D D CD which is a less conflictual game called Stag Hunt Jerviss study of the shift from balanceofpower systems to concerts suggests that after world wars the payoff matrix for the victors may temporarily be one of Stag Hunt fighting together results in a short lived preference for staying together After a war against a hegemonic power the other great powers often perceive a mutual interest in con tinuing to work together in order to ensure that the defeated wouldbe hegemon does not rise again They may even feel empathy for one another and take an interest in each others welfare These perceptions seem to have substantial momentum both among the mass public and in the bureaucracy Yet the cooperation that ensues is subject to fairly easy disruption As recovery from the war proceeds one or both parties may come to value cooperation less and relative gains more And if one side believes that its counterpart prefers to defect its own preference will shift to defection in order to avoid the worst payoff CD Actors can also move from Prisoners Dilemma to more conflictual 4 The definition of Prisoners Dilemma also includes one additional restriction CC DC CD2 This is to ensure that it is better to have mutual cooperation than to have an even chance of being the exploiter or the exploited 230 WORLD POLITICS games If both players come to believe that mutual cooperation is worse than mutual defection the game becomes Deadlock with both sides havingpreferences ofDC D D CC CD Since the dominant strategy of each player is to defect regardless of what the other does the likely outcome is DD Players in Deadlock unlike those in Prisoners Dilemma will not benefit from repeated plays since mutual cooperation is not preferred to mutual defection Kenneth Oye provides a fine example of the movement from Pris oners Dilemma to Deadlock in his essay on monetary diplomacy in the I930S in this collection Shifts in beliefs not only about international regimes but particularly about desirable economic policy led leaders such as Franklin D Roosevelt to prefer unilateral uncoordinated action to international cooperation on the terms that appeared feasible Oye argues that the early 1930s do not mark a failure of coordination where common interests existed as in Prisoners Dilemma rather they in dicate the decay of these common interests as perceived by participants In their essay in the present collection Downs Rocke and Siverson argue that arms races are often games of Deadlock rather than Prisoners Dilemma making them much more difficult to resolve Beliefs are as important in the military area as in economics Consider for example Van Everas study of the beliefs leading to World War I By 1914 what Van Evera labels the cult of the offensive was universally accepted in the major European countries It was a congenial doctrine for military elites everywhere since it magnified the role of the military and reduced that of the diplomats It also happened to be disastrously wrong since its adherents failed to appreciate the overwhelming ad vantage that recent technological change had given to the defensive in what was soon to become trench warfare and overlooked the experi ences of the American Civil War and the RussoJapanese War Gripped by this cult of the offensive European leaders sought to gain safer borders by expanding national territories and took more seriously the possibility of successful aggressive war hence Germany and to a lesser extent other European powers adopted expansionist policies that brought them into collision with one another European leaders also felt greater compulsion to mobilize and strike first in a crisis since the penalty of moving late would be greater in an offensedominant world this compulsion then fueled the spiral of mobilization and counter mobilization that drove the July 1914 crisis out of control Had Euro peans recognized the actual power of the defense expansionism would have lost much of its appeal and the compulsion to mobilize and coun termobilize would have diminished Put differently the European payoff ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 231 structure actually would have rewarded cooperation but Europeans perceived a payoff structure that rewarded noncooperation and re sponded accordingly Beliefs not realities governed conduct The case of 1914 also illustrates a point made above subjective inter pretations by one side become objective reality for the other side When a European state adopted expansionist policies those nearby found them selves with an expansionist neighbor and had to adjust accordingly For instance Germanys expansionism though largely based on illusions led to a genuine change in Russias environment Russia adopted its inflexible war plan which required mobilization against Germany as well as against Austria partly because the Russians feared that Germany would strike into Russias northern territories once the Russian armies were embroiled with Austria Thus the Russian calculus was importantly affected by Russias image of German intent and Russia was driven to bellicose measures by fear of German bellicosity German expansionism was premised largely on illusions but for Russia this expansionism was a real danger that required a response This discussion of payoff structures should make it clear that the contributors to this volume do not assume that Prisoners Dilemmas are typical of world politics More powerful actors often face less powerful ones yielding asymmetric payoff matrices Furthermore even symmet rical games can take a variety of forms as illustrated by Stag Hunt Chicken and Deadlock What is important for our purposes is not to focus exclusively on Prisoners Dilemma per se but to emphasize the fundamental problem that it along with Stag Hunt and Chicken il lustrates In these games myopic pursuit of selfinterest can be disastrous Yet both sides can potentially benefit from cooperationif they can only achieve it Thus choices of strategies and variations in institutions are particularly important and the scope for the exercise of intelligence is considerable Our review of payoff structures also illustrates one of the major themes of this collection of essays that politicaleconomic and militarysecurity issues can be analyzed with the same analytical framework Admittedly economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual payoff structures than do those of military security Coordination among bankers as described by Lipson has been more extensive and successful than most arms control negotiations as analyzed by Downs and his colleagues and the patterns of trade conflict and cooperation described by Conybeare are hardly as conflictual as Van Everas story of World War I On the other hand the great power concerts discussed by Jervis as well as several of the arms control negotiations were more cooperative than the 232 WORLD POLITICS trade and monetary measures of 19301933 delineated in Oyes essay And postwar economic relations between the United States and Japan have been more conflictual than militarysecurity relations As an em pirical matter military issues may more often have payoff structures involving a great deal of conflict of interest but there is no theoretical reason to believe that this must always be the case5 B THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE In Prisoners Dilemma concern about the future helps to promote cooperation The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs the less the incentive to defect todaysince the other side is likely to retaliate tomrrow The cases discussed in the present essays support this argument and identify specific factors that help to make the shadow of the future an effective promoter of cooperation These factors include I long time horizons 2 regularity of stakes 3 reliability of information about the others actions 4 quick feedback about changes in the others actions The dimension of the shadow of the future seems to differentiate military from economic issues more sharply than does the dimension of payoffs Indeed its four components can be used to analyze some of the reasons why issues of international political economy may be settled more cooperatively than issues of international security even when the underlying payoff matrices are similarfor example when Prisoners Dilemma applies Most important is a combination of the first two factors long time horizons and regularity of stakes In economic rela tions actors have to expect that their relationships will continue over an indefinite period of time that is the games they play with each other will be iterated Typically neither side in an economic interaction can eliminate the other or change the nature of the game decisively in a single move In security affairs by contrast the possibility of a successful preemptive war can sometimes be a tempting occasion for the rational timing of surprise7 Another way to put this is that in the international political economy retaliation for defection will almost always be possible 5 For an earlier discussion of contemporary events using a common analytical framework to examine both economic and security relations see Oye The Domain of Choice in Kenneth A Oye Donald Rothchild and Robert J Lieber eds Eagle Entangled US Foreign Policy in a Complex WorM New York Longman 1979 333 Robert Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation New York Basic Books 1984 7 Robert Axelrod The Rational Timing of Surprise WorM Politics 31 January 1979 22846 233 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY therefore a rational player considering defection has to consider its probability and its potential consequences In security affairs it may be possible to limit or destroy the opponents capacity for effective retal iation T o illustrate this point let us compare the case of 1914 with contem porary international debt negotiations In 1914 some Germans imbued with the cult of the offensive thought that a continental war would permanently solve Germanys security problems by restructuring power and territorial relations in Europe For these German leaders the temp tation to defect was huge largely because the shadow of the future seemed so small Indeed it seemed that future retaliation could be prevented or rendered ineffective by decisive German action Moreover in the opening move of a war the stakes would be far greater than usual because of the value of preempting before the other side was fully mobilized This perceived irregularity in the stakes further undercut the potential for sustained cooperation based upon reciprocity By contrast contemporary negotiations among banks and between banks and debtor countries are heavily affected by the shadow of the future That is not to say that the stakes of each game are the same indeed there are great discontinuities since deadlines for rescheduling take on importance for regulators banks and the reputations of bor rowers But the banks know that they will be dealing both with the debtor countries and with one another again and again Continuing interbank relationships imply as Lipson points out that small banks will think twice before doublecrossing large banks by refusing to par ticipate in rescheduling This is particularly true if the small banks are closely tied in a variety of ways to the large banks Continuing relations between banks and debtor countries give the banks incentives to co operate with the debtor countries not merely in order to facilitate debt servicing on loans already made but to stay in their good graces looking toward a more prosperous future The fact that Argentina Brazil and Mexico are so large and are perceived to be potentially wealthy is a significant bargaining asset for them now since it increases the banks expected profits from future lending and therefore enlarges the shadow of the future Indeed if these governments could credibly promise to favor in the future banks that help them now and to punish or ignore those that defect in these critical times they could further improve their bargaining positions but as sovereign governments whose leaders will be different in the future they cannot effectively do so Reliability of information about the others actions and promptness of feedback are also important in affecting the shadow of the future 234 WORLD POLITICS although they do not seem to differentiate militarysecurity from polit icaleconomic issues so clearly Because of the absence of military secrecy actors may sometimes have more reliable information on political economic than on militarysecurity issues Banks thrive on differential access to information and therefore hold it closely Furthermore since the systemic effects of politicaleconomic actions are often difficult to judge and cheating at the margin is frequently easy feedback between policy and results may be slow For instance the distribution of benefits from the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations is still a matter of conjecture and political contention rather than economic knowledge By contrast the superpowers publish lists of the precise number of missiles in each others inventories and we can assume that information about the effect of a military action by either sideshort of a devastating surprise attack that would destroy command and control facilitieswould be com municated almost immediately to the leaders of both states The length of the shadow of the future like the character of payoff structures is not necessarily dictated by the objective attributes of a situation On the contrary as we have just seen expectations are im portant International institutions may therefore be significant since institutions embody and affect actors expetations Thus institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues The principles and rules of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors In this way international regimes help to link the future with the present That is as true of arms control agreements in which willingness to make future agreements depends on others compliance with previous arrangements as it is in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which embodies norms and rules against which the behavior of members can be judged By sanctioning retaliation for those who violate rules regimes create expectations that a given violation will be treated not as an isolated case but as one in a series of interrelated actions C NUMBER OF ACTORS SANCTIONING PROBLEMS The ability of governments to cooperate in a mixedmotive game is affected not only by the payoff structure and the shadow of the future but also by the number of players in the game and by how their rela tionships are structured Axelrod has shown that reciprocity can be an Stephen DKrasner ed International Regimes Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1983 Robert 0 Keohane After Hegemony Cooperation and Dircord in the World Political Economy Princeton Princeton University Press 1984 235 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY effective strategy to induce cooperation among selfinterested players in the iterated bilateral Prisoners Dilemma where the values of each actors options are clearly specified9 However effective reciprocity de pends on three conditions I players can identify defectors 2 they are able to focus retaliation on defectors and 3 they have sufficient long run incentives to punish defectors When there are many actors these conditions are often more difficult to satisfy In such situations it may be impossible to identify much less to punish defection even if it is possible none of the cooperators may have an incentive to play the role of policeman Each cooperator may seek to be a freerider on the will ingness of others to enforce the rules We may call the difficulty of preventing defection through decen tralized retaliation the sanctioning problem Its first form the inability to identify defectors is illustrated by the terrorist bombings against American installations in Lebanon in 1983 The United States did not know at the time the bombings took place who was responsible The only state that could plausibly have been held responsible was Syria but since the Syrians denied responsibility retaliation against Damascus could have spread and deepened the conflict without punishing the terrorist groups themselves The issue of identifying defectors is one aspect of a fundamental problem besetting efforts to cooperate in world politics acquiring in a timely fashion adequate amounts of highquality information In order to maintain cooperation in games that reward unreciprocated defection such as Prisoners Dilemma governments must have confidence in their ability to monitor their counterparts actions sufficiently well to enable them to respond effectively to betrayal As Lipson has pointed out the greater perils of betrayal to the side that is betrayed in militarysecurity than in politicaleconomic relations put more severe demands on gathering information in the former than in the latter arealo The second form of the sanctioning problem occurs when players are unable to focus retaliation on defectors This difficulty is illustrated by Conybeares analysis of the AngloHanse trade wars The Hanseatic League was unable to punish English privateers for their depredations and instead retaliated against English merchants in Hanseatic towns This produced escalation rather than cooperation The third form of the sanctioning problem arises when some members of a group lack incentives to punish defectors This obstacle to co operation often arises where there are many actors some of which fail 9 Axelrod fn 6 Lipson fn I 236 WORLD POLITICS to cooperate in the common effort to achieve some collective good Oye observes that although British devaluation in 1931 hurt other countries no single government had the incentive to devote its own resources to bring about a revision of British policy This form of the sanctioning problemlack of incentives to punish defectorsalso arose in the debt negotiations of the 1980s T o prevent default it was necessary to arrange rescheduling agreements involving additional bank lending Smaller banks were tempted to refuse to provide new funds Only the fact that the large banks had strong incentives to put pressure on smaller ones to ante up prevented rescheduling agreements from unravelling like a cheap sweater When sanctioning problems are severe cooperation is in danger of collapsing One way to bolster it is to restructure the situation so that sanciioning becomes more feasible Sometimes this is done unilaterally Oye points out that external benefits or costs may be privatizable that is changes can be made in the situation so that the benefits and costs of ones actions are directed specifically at those with whom one has negotiated He argues that in the early 1930s Britain eventually succeeded in privatizing its international currency relationships by adopting ex change controls and attaching conditions negotiated bilaterally to new loans This transformation of the game permitted a modest revival of international lending based not on open access to British capital markets but on bilateral reciprocity As our examples kdicate sanctioning problems canoccur both in the international political economy and on militarysecurity issues They tend to be more severe on militarysecurity than on politicaleconomy issues due to the high costs of punishing defections the difficulties of monitoring behavior and the stringent demands for information that are imposed when successful defection can dramatically shorten the shadow of the future But since sanctioning problems occur on both types of issues issuearea alone cannot account for their incidence or severity To explain the incidence and severity of sanctioning problems we need to focus on the conditions that determine whether defection can be prevented through decentralized retaliation the ease of identi fying sources of action the ability of governments to focus retaliation or reward on particular targets and the incentives that exist for members of a group to punish defectors While the likelihood that these problems will arise may be enhanced by an increase in the number of actors involved difficulties may also appear on issues that seem at first glance to be strictly bilateral Consider for instance the example of 1914 In the Balkan crisis Austria sought 237 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY to impose sanctions against Serbia for its support of revolutionaries who tried to destroy the ethnically heterogeneous AustroHungarian empire But sanctions against Serbia implied punishment for Russia Serbias ally since Russian leaders were averse to accepting another Balkan setback Russian mobilization however could not be directed solely against Austria since Russia only had plans for general mobilizationll Thus neither Austria nor Russia was able to focus retaliation on the defector the actions of both helped to spread rather than to contain the crisis With more clever and moderate leadership Austria might have found a way to punish Serbia without threatening Russia And a detailed plan for mobilization only against Austria could have provided Russia with a more precisely directed measure to retaliate against Austrias ultimatum to Serbia Privatization is not the only way to maintain cooperation Moreover as some of our examples indicate it can be difficult to achieve Another way to resolve sanctioning problems is to construct international regimes to provide standards against which actions can be measured and to assign responsibility for applying sanctions Regimes provide information about actors compliance they facilitate the development and mainte nance of reputations they can be incorporated into actors rules of thumb for responding to others actions and they may even apportion respon sibility for decentralized enforcement of rules12 harles Lipsons discussion of the international lending regime that has been constructed by bankers reveals how regimes can promote co operation even when there are many actors no dominant power and no world central bank Creditor committees were established under the leadership of large moneycenter banks Each moneycenter bank then took responsibility for a number of relatively large regional banks which in turn were assigned similar responsibilities for smaller banks13 As a result a hierarchy of banks was created isolating smaller banks from one another and establishing responsibility for enforcing sanctions Small banks displaying tendencies toward defection were threatened with being outside the flow of information in the future and implicitly with not being offered participation in lucrative future loans This informal hierarchy of course was reinforced by the presence of the US Federal Reserve System looming in the background stories whether apocryphal or not of small bankers being told to cough up by high officials of Robert E Osgood and Robert W Tucker Force Order and Justice Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press 1967 esp chap 2 The Expansion of Force I Keohane fn 8 49132 Lipson Bankers Dilemmas in this collection 200225 238 WORLD POLITICS the Fed circulated in banking circles during the early 1980s It would have taken a bold president of a small bank to ignore both the banking hierarchy and the danger of arousing the Feds wrath by not participating in a rescheduling This reference to the role of institutions in transforming Nperson games into collections of twoperson games suggests once again the importance of the context within which games are played In isolation the basic concepts discussed in the introductionpayoff structures it eration and the number of playersprovide only a framework for analysis They take on greater significance as well as complexity when they are viewed within the broader context of other issues other games and the institutions that affect the course of world politics We now turn to the question of how the context of interaction affects political behavior and outcomes Whether cooperation can take place without central guidance depends not merely on the three gametheoretic dimensions we have emphasized so far but also on the context within which interaction takes place Context may of course mean many different things Any interaction takes place within the context of norms that are shared often implicitly by the participants John Ruggie has written of the deep structure of sovereignty in world politicsl4 and also of the way in which shifting values and norms of state intervention in societythe emergence and legitimation of the welfare stateaffected the world political economy between 1914 and 1945 International politicaleconomic bargaining was fundamentally changed by the shift during this period from laissez faire liberalism as a norm to what Ruggie calls embedded liberalisml5 Interactions also take place within the context of institutions Robert Keohane has argued elsewhere that even if one adopts the assumption that states are rational and selfinterested actors institutions can be shown to be important in world politics16 Institutions alter the payoff structures facing actors they may lengthen the shadow of the future John G Ruggie Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity Toward a Neorealist Synthesis World Politics 35 January 1983 26185 John G Ruggie International Regimes Transactions and Change Embedded Lib eralism in the Postwar Economic Order International Organization 36 Spring 1982 379 416 reprinted in Krasner fn 8 195231 Fred Hirsch The Ideological Underlay of Inflation in John Goldthorpe and Fred Hirsch eds The Political Economy of Injution London Martin Robertson 1978 26384 l6 Keohane fn 8 239 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY and they may enable Nperson games to be broken down into games with smaller numbers of actors Using the gametheoretic perspective of this symposium another way of looking at context may be especially revealing This aspect has to do with what we call multilevel games In such situations different games affect one another so that their outcomes become mutually contingent Three such situations are particularly important for world politics issue linkage domesticinternational connections and incompatibilities be tween games among different sets of actors After considering these situations we will turn to the implications of these multilevel games for the efficacy of a strategy of reciprocity in fostering cooperation A MULTILEVEL GAMES Issuelinkage Most issues are linked to other issues This means that games being played on different issuesdifferent chessboards in Stan ley Hoffmanns phrase1affect one another Connections between games become important when issues are linked Issuelinkage in this sense involves attempts to gain additional bar gaining leverage by making ones own behavior on a given issue con tingent on others actions toward other issuesls Issuelinkage may be employed by powerful states seeking to use resources from one issue area to affect the behavior of others elsewhere or it may be employed by outsiders attempting to break into what could otherwise be a closed game Linkage can be beneficial to both sides in a negotiation and can facilitate agreements that might not otherwise be possible19 Actors resources may differ so that it makes sense to trade one for the other the United States for instance may provide economic aid to Egypt in exchange for Egyptian support for American policy in the Middle East Furthermore different players may have preferences of different in tensities thus in a logrolling game each party trades its vote or policy position on an issue it values less highly for the others vote on one it values more highly The outstanding example of a successful bargaining linkage in our 7 Stanley Hoffmann International Organization and the International System Inter national Organization 24 Summer 1970 389413 l8Ernst B Haas refers to this as tactical issuelinkage contrasting it with substantive issuelinkage resulting from causal knowledge See Haas Why Collaborate Issuelinkage and International Regimes World Politics 32 April 1980 357405 at 372 For a sophisticated analysis of tactical issuelinkage see Michael McGinnis Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation Journal of Conjict Resolution forthcoming 19 Robert E Tollison and Thomas D Willett An Economic Theory of Mutually Ad vantageous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations International Organization 33 Fall 979 42549 240 WORLD POLITICS case studies is that of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 As Downs Rocke and Siverson show these arms control negotiations were suc cessful in part because they linked bargaining over arms with bargaining over other issues As part of an agreement to limit battleship construction Japan gave Britain and the United States guarantees regarding trade in China and limitations of fortification on certain Pacific islands Japan received legal recognition of its right to certain territory taken from Germany after World War I Bringing these issues into the negotiations to limit the building of battleships helped to make cooperation possible not only on these specific issues but on the whole package Of course not all issuelinkages promote agreement any more than each exercise of power can be expected to lead to cooperation Oye has distinguished between backscratching which he regards as welfare enhancing and blackmailing which may reduce welfare levels2o The backscratcher merely offers in return for compensation to refrain from acting in what would otherwise be its own best interest For instance a debtor country unable to make its payments on time without facing severe hardship or political revolution may offer to continue servicing its debts only if compensated with new loans and an easier payment schedule If this offer is rejected the debtor does what it would have done without the offer it defaults Backscratching entails a promise Blackmailing by contrast implies a threat As Schelling has pointed out the difference is that a promise is costly when it succeeds and a threat is costly when it failsll Black mailers threaten to act against their own interests unless compensated Thus a debtor country that would be hurt by defaulting may never theless threaten to do so unless compensation is offered This threat if carried out would leave both the debtor the blackmailer in this case and its creditors worse off than if it had merely acted in its own interest without bargaining at all If the blackmailing strategy works on the other hand the effect will be to transfer resources from the creditors to the debtor an action that will not necessarily improve overall welfare Although it may be difficult to differentiate between backscratching and blackmailing in practice the distinction helps us to recognize that issuelinkages have dangers as well as opportunities One side may demand so much of the other in other areas that cooperation will not take place even in the area of shared interests This accusation is fre lo Oye fn 5 Thomas C Schelling The Strategy of Conflict New York Oxford University Press 1964 177 241 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY quently made against Henry Kissingers version of linkage Kissinger insisted that the Soviets exercise great restraint in the Third World in return for American cooperation on arms control22 In Oyes terms Kissinger was trying to blackmail the Soviets by threatening to act against the United States own interests delay arms control unless the soviets compensated the United States with unilateral retraint The most intriguing point about linkage that is highlighted by the case studies is the existence of what could be called contextual issue linkage In such a situation a given bargain is placed within the context of a more important longterm relationship in such a way that the long term relationship affects the outcome of the particular bargaining proc ess Two cases of contextual issuelinkage show that this form can often work to reduce conflict even without affecting the preferences of the participants on the specific issues being discussed Oye notes that in 1936 the United States Britain and France were able to reach an agreement on international monetary reform because of the common security con cern over a rising Nazi Germany And as Downs and his colleagues point out by far the most important cause of cooperation in arms races that ended peacefully has been the activity of a third power For example the AngloFrench naval arms race of 18521853 was resolved when the two states formed an alliance in order to fight the Russians in the Crimean War International relations and domestic politics Similar analytic questions arise in considering connections between international relations and domestic politics Arms control negotiations involve not merely bar gaining between governments but within societies as well the Carter administration was able to resolve the SALT I1 game with the Soviet Union but not with the US Senate Trade issues typically also involve both international and domestic games In the Tokyo Round the same Carter administrationwith a different responsible party Robert Strausswas able to mesh international and domestic games playing them simultaneously rather than sequentially international first as had been done on some issues in the Kennedy Round a decade earlier The result in this case was that the Tokyo kound trade agreements with George W Breslauer Why Ditente Failed An Interpretation in Alexander L George and others Managing USSouiet Riualry Problems of Crisis Preuention Boulder CO Westview Press 1983 31940 John L Gaddis The Rise Fall and Future of Ditente Foreign Affairs 62 Winter 198384 35477 Stanley Hoffmann Detente in Joseph S Nye ed The Making ofAmericas Soviet Policy New Haven Yale University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations 1984 23164 3 Oye fn 5 17 242 WORLD POLITICS other countries were all ratified overwhelmingly by Congress in contrast to the rejection of some of the international agreements made in the Kennedy R0und4 Such domesticinternational connections are commonplace Fre quently the incentives provided by domestic bargaining games inhibit effective foreign policy and may exacerbate international conflict A well known case is that of American decision making during the early months of the Korean War General MacArthur was such a formidable figure in American politics that even his military superiors were reluctant to challenge his judgment in marching toward the Yalu River in the fall of 1950 yet this maneuver was so questionable that if it had not been for the domestic political games taking place serious reservations would have been expressed in the Pentagon and the White H0use5 Another type of domesticinternational linkage is discussed by Co nybeare in this collection During the 15th century the Hanseatic League responded to naval setbacks at the hands of Britain by financing and equipping Edward IV who upon defeating the ancastrians in the War of the Roses signed a treaty that was onesidedly favorable to the Hanses trading interests By intervening in British domestic politics the Hanse was thus able to triumph despite military weakness This technique intervening in a domestic political game as compensation for weakness at the international levelhas recently been employed in more subtle ways by small powers with strong interests in American foreign policy16 Compatibilities and incompatibilities among games Many different games take place in world politics involving different but overlapping sets of actors Sometimes the existence of more than one game makes it easier to attain cooperation but related games may also create diffi culties for one anothe That is games in world politics can be compatible or incompatible with each other One example of a set of compatible games is provided by cooperation in international economic negotiations among the major industrialized countries After World War 11 such cooperation was facilitated by the fact that these countries were military allies In contrast to Britains situation in the 19th century Americas ability to persuade other major trading states to accept the rules that it preferred was greatly enhanced by the fact that in the militarypolitical game the United States was a 24 Gilbert Winham Robert Strauss the MTN and the Control of Faction journal of WorM Trade Law 14 SeptemberOctober 1980 25 Alexander George and Richard Smoke Deterrence in American Foreign Policy New York Columbia University Press 1974 a6 Robert 0Keohane The Big Influence of Small Allies Foreign Policy No 2 Spring 1971 16182 243 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY senior partner rather than an adversary of the other major actors in the world economy To take another example Lipsons analysis of debt negotiations suggests that the negotiating game among large banks was rendered compatible with games between large and small banks by structuring the situation so that small banks could not coordinate with each other That is two sets of negotiations were made compatible by precluding a third one The case of 1914 illustrates the problem of incompatibility among games In noncrisis periods loyalty within an alliance was compatible with friendly relations across alliances But when the 1914 crisis occurred loyalty within an alliancesuch as Germanys support for Austria Rus sias for Serbia and Frances for Russiaimplied defection across al liances The increased cooperativeness of intraalliance games destroyed broader patterns of cooperation In the contemporary international political economy problems of incompatibility may also arise For instance negotiations on questions such as tariffs or energy policies are most likely to yield positive results for the advanced industrialized countries when only a few major players are involved in the initial negotiation Friction with others however especially the less developed countries may produce conflict on a larger scale Or to take a different example from the politics of international debt close and explicit collaboration among debtor countries could some fear disrupt relations between debtor governments and banks in the richer countries The contrast between the fate of SovietAmerican arms control in the 1970s and the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations illustrates the importance of multilevel games In the face of linkages to other con tentious issues complex domestic political games and a lack of rein forcement between politicaleconomic and militarysecurity games even shared interests a long shadow of the future and bilateralism may be insufficient to promote cooperation If the interaction happens to be an iterated game of Chicken the problem is even worse because each player has a strong incentive to avoid cooperation in the short run in order to develop a reputation for firmness in the long run Conversely even when there are quite severe conflicts of interest these may be overshadowed by more important mutual interests perhaps institutionalized in organ izations such as NATO Once again it is not sufficient to analyze a particular situation in isolation from its political context We must also analyze the patterns of expectations and the institutions created by human beings within which particular negotiations are located and in the light of which they are interpreted by participants 244 WORLD POLITICS B RECIPROCITY AS A STRATEGY IN MULTILEVEL GAMES Robert Axelrod has employed computer tournaments and theoretical analysis of the iterated twoplayer Prisoners Dilemma to show that a strategy based on reciprocitysuch as TitforTatcan be remarkably effective in promoting co0peration7 Even among pure egoists co operation can emerge if a small initial cluster of potential cooperators exists This argument suggests that governments may have incentives to practice reciprocity in a variety of situations that are characterized by mixtures of conflicting and complementary intereststhat is in certain nonzerosum games Evidence for this proposition is established best for the particular case of Prisoners Dilemma Axelrods theory suggests that in this game a strategy based on reciprocity can yield relatively high payoffs against a variety of other strategies Furthermore such a strategy helps the whole community by punishing players who use uncooperative strategies When payoff structures are those of Prisoners Dilemma therefore we can expect practitioners of reciprocity to attempt to insti tutionalize it as a general practice so that they will benefit from others use of the strategy as well as their own As we have noted above not every situation in which conflict or cooperation may occur can be categorized as Prisoners Dilemma Games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt are also significant Evidence on these cases is not as extensive as on Prisoners Dilemma Yet as Oyes intro duction points out there are good reasons to believe that reciprocity is an attractive strategy in a variety of nonzerosum situations The key conditions for the successful operation of reciprocity are that mutual cooperation can yield better results than mutual defection but that temptations for defection also exist In such situations reciprocity may permit extensive cooperation without making cooperative participants inordinately vulnerable to exploitation by others Furthermore it may deter uncooperative actions18 7 Axelrod fn 6 Consider the example of Stag Hunt defined by the preference ordering of both players as CC DC D D 1 CD If Player A is credibly committed to a strategy of reciprocity beginning with cooperation Bs incentives to cooperate are enhanced As commitment to cooperate ensures that B will not be doublecrossed which would leave B with the worst payoff Furthermore As commitment to retaliate against defection ensures that any de fection by B would lead after the first move not to Bs secondbest outcome DC but to its thirdbest outcome DD The game of Chicken provides another appropriate case in point In Chicken mutual cooperation is only the secondbest outcome for both players but mutual defection is worst for both Thus DC CC CD DD A credible strategy of reciprocity by Player A in Chicken ensures B of its secondbest outcome if it cooperates and guarantees that continual defection will in the long run provide it with its worst payoff Assuming that Bs shadow of the future is sufficiently long it should respond to As strategy of reciprocity by cooperating ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 245 It is not surprising therefore that reciprocity is a popular strategy for practical negotiators as well as for analysts in the laboratory Oyes analysis of monetary politics in the 1930s reveals that Britain developed such a strategy in its relations with the Scandinavian countries Con temporary discussions of international trade provide another case in point US officials have frequently defended reciprocity in trade rela tions on the grounds that pursuit of this strategy would deter discrim ination against American products by other countries and that relaxation of reciprocity would invite retaliation by others Even observers skeptical about reciprocity often agree In a policyoriented article critical of cur rent proposals that the united states should practice aggressive rec iprocity in trade negotiations William Cline argues that such action is rendered less effective by a high probability of foreign counterretalia tionl9 In Axelrods terms TitforTat which begins by cooperating and then retaliates once for each defection by the other player discourages exploitative strategiesaggressive reciprocity Thus the applicability of TitforTat does not seem to be limited to Prisoners Dilemma yet it is not a perfect strategy In the first place it can perpetuate conflict through an echo effect if the other player defects once TitforTat will respond with a defection and then if the other player does the same in response the result would be an unending echo of alternating defections30 In realworld politics as well as in the laboratory reciprocity can lead to feuds as well as to cooperation par ticularly when players have different perceptions of past outomes3 SovietAmerican ditente collapsed partly because each side concluded that the other was not practicing reciprocity but was on the contrary taking unilateral advantage of its own retraint3 Second even when many shared interests exist and judgments of equivalence are not dis torted reciprocity may lead to deadlock John W Evans has pointed out that in tariff negotiations conducted according to the principle of reciprocity potential concessions may become bargaining chips to be hoarded Tariffs that have no intrinsic economic value for a country that maintains them have acquired value because of the insistence of other countries on reciprocity in the bargaining process As a result tariff levels may be maintained in spite of the fact that a lower level Reciprocity A New Approach to World Trade Policy Institute for Inter national Economics Policy Analyses in International Economics 2 Washington September 984 25 J0 Axelrod fn 6 176 31 For an analysis of the spiral mode of conflict see Robert Jervis Perception and Misper ception in International Politics Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 1976 esp 58 3 3See references cited in fn 22 Cline 9 246 WORLD POLITICS would raise the countrys real income33 Third when several actors negotiate separately and sequentially over issues that are substantively interdependent subsequent bargains may call previous agreements into question by altering the value of concessions that have been made This issue interdependence problem bedeviled trade negotiations under the conditional mostfavorednation clause prior to the institution of multilateral trade negotiations after World War 11 Conditional most favorednation treatment permitted discrimination among suppliers Later agreements between an importer and other suppliers therefore eroded the value of earlier concessions This led to complex acrimonious and frustrating patterns of bargaining Despite these difficulties reciprocity remains a valuable strategy for decentralized enforcement of cooperative agreements Players who are aware of the problems of echo effects bargaining deadlocks and issue interdependence can compensate for these pitfalls Axelrod observes that a better strategy than TitforTat might be to return only ninetenths of a tit for a tat35 The Tokyo Round dealt with the deadlock problem by beginning negotiations not on the basis of current tariff rates but rather on the basis of a formula for hypothetical large acrosstheboard tariff cuts with provisions for withdrawing offers on sensitive products or if adequate compensation was not received The problem of issue interdependence was dealt with in the trade area through multilater alization of tariff negotiations and adoption of unconditional most favorednation treatment These difficulties in applying reciprocity and the responses of players to them illustrate the significance of the institutions within which rec iprocity is practiced As noted above multilateral trade negotiations are a case in point In the militarysecurity area reciprocity has also been institutionalized For example stationing of American troops in Europe is linked to purchases of American military equipment by European governments NATO as an institution has helped member governments achieve a variety of such reciprocal arrangements The debt negotiations discussed by Lipson also illustrate how rec iprocity can be institutionalized in an Nperson game First the major actors are identified and bilateral negotiations take place between them or their agents The IMF and committees of banks negotiate with debtor countries At a second stage smaller banks are given the oppor 33 Evans The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy The Twilight of the GATT Cambridge Harvard University Press 1971 3132 34 See Robert 0Keohane Reciprocity in International Relations International Organ ization 40 Winter 1986 35 Axelrod fn 6 138 247 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY tunity to adhere to these bargains but not to influence their terms At this stage emphasis is placed on reciprocity at a different level although the smaller actors have the potential to act as freeriders efforts are made to ensure that they have incentives not to do so for fear that they may suffer in a larger game Small banks face the threat of being excluded from crucial relationships with big banks and from future lending consortia if they fail to provide funds for rescheduling loans As in the other cases described above strategies of reciprocity for debt rescheduling are adapted creatively to avoid the problems of issue interdependence that arise when there are many actors A THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION The contributors to Cooperation under Anarchy did not specifically set out to explore the role of perception in decision making but the im portance of perception has kept asserting itself The significance of perception including beliefs and cognition will come as no surprise to students of international p0litics3 Yet it is worth pointing out once again that decision making in ambiguous settings is heavily influenced by the ways in which the actors think about their problem While this point has been made in laboratory studies many times37 there is an important twist in international politics that does not get sufficient attention from the psychologists who study decision making in the laboratory Leaders of one state live far away from the leaders of other states They are far away not only in space but also in their cognitive framework their tacit assumptions differ about what is im portant what needs to be done and who bears the responsibility for change Put simply those acting on behalf of states often do not ap preciate how their own actions will affect others and how they will be interpreted by others As Van Evera concludes from his study of World War I preventing that war would have required dispelling extensive misperceptions that were prevalent in Europe before 1914 Other striking examples of the importance of perception also come from the security area For example Downs Rocke and Siverson have found that even when nations in arms races built defensive rather than J6 Jervis fn 31 37 For example Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman Judgment under Uncertainty Heuristics and Biases Science 185 September 1974 2431 Richard Nisbet and Lee Ross Human Inference Strategies and Shortcomings of Social judgment Englewood Cliffs NJ PrenticeHall 1980 248 WORLD POLITICS offensive weapons it was usually done not to defuse the arms race but simply because they believed that such weapons offered the greatest amount of security per dollar Even more to the point is that many arms races were started or accelerated without serious appreciation of the consequences For example when the Soviet leaders deliberately exag gerated their bomber strength in 1955 and their ICBM capabilities several years later they did so for shortterm political advantages there is no evidence that they fully appreciated the longterm consequences that would follow when the United States geared up to take the threat seriously In general Downs Rocke and Siverson find that arms races are not often perceived as the result of actions chosen by others In the events leading to the outbreak of war national leaders may completely misunderstand the consequences of their acts Van Evera notes for example that in 1914 the Russian government did not realize that Russias mobilization would lead directly to Germanys mobilization and to war Another example of the impact of biased interpretations of events is provided by Jervis in his discussion of the decay of greatpower concerts which were undermined by divergent views of which side had made greater concessions to maintain cooperation While security issues provide the most dramatic examples govern ments may be no better at understanding how their actions in the realm of political economy will be seen by others Conybeares study shows that trade wars have sometimes begun when states held mistaken beliefs that other countries would be reluctant to raise tariffs on imported food in retaliation for new tariffs placed on their exported manufactured goods Trade wars have begun when states had exaggerated expectations about the tolerance of others for attempts at minor exploitation in widely accepted terms of trade B GROPING TOWARD NEW INSTITUTIONS AND NORMS Our project began with a set of hypotheses about how specific features of an international setting would affect the chances for the development of cooperation Factors included were mutuality of interests the shadow of the future and the number of actors These hypotheses have been supported by a broad set of cases that began in the 14th century and covered trade disputes monetary policy and debt rescheduling as well as arms races the outbreak of war and diplomatic concerts The three factors did in fact help to account for both cooperation and conflict We also discovered something else over and over again we observed that the actors were not satisfied with simply selecting strategies based upon the situation in which they found themselves In many cases we 249 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY saw deliberate efforts to change the very structure of the situation by changing the context in which each of them would be acting Decision makers themselves perceived more or less consciously that some aspects of the situations they faced tended to make cooperation difficult So they worked to alter these background conditions Among the problems they encountered were the following I how to provide incentives for cooperation so that cooperation would be rewarded over the long run and defection punished 2 how to monitor behavior so that cooperators and defectors could be identified 3 how to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation on defectors 4 how to link issues with one another in productive rather than self defeating ways and more generally how to play multilevel games without tripping over their own strategies A fundamental strategic concept in attaining these objectives is that of reciprocity Cooperation in world politics seems to be attained best not by providing benefits unilaterally to others but by conditional co operation Yet reciprocity encounters many problems in practice As Axelrod has demonstrated and as Van Everas discussion of 1914 il lustrates payoff structures in the strategic setting may be so malign that TitforTat cannot work Reciprocity requires the ability to recognize and retaliate against a defection And retaliation can spread acrimo niously Actors in world politics seek to deal with problems of reciprocity in part through the exercise of power Powerful actors structure relation ships so that countries committed to a given order can deal effectively with those that have lower levels of commitment This is done by establishing hierarchies as one would expect from Herbert Simons assertion that complex systems will be hierarchic in character In the present symposium the construction of hierarchy for the sake of co operation is best illustrated by Lipsons discussion of interbank networks to facilitate rescheduling of Third World debts but it is also evident in Jerviss discussion of greatpower concerts Another way to facilitate cooperation is to establish international regimes Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles norms rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations39 In ternational regimes have been extensive in the post1945 international 38 Simon The Sciences of the Artificial Cambridge MIT Press zd ed 1982chap 4 The Architecture of Complexity p 99 39 Krasner fn 8 3 250 WORLD POLITICS political economy as illustrated by the international trade regime cen tered on the GATT and the international monetary regime including the IMF as well as other organizations and networks40 Since the use of power can facilitate the construction of regimes this approach should be seen as complementary to rather than in contradiction with an emphasis on hierarchical authority Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense but they do change patterns of transaction costs and provide information to participants so that uncertainty is reduced Jervis argues that the Concert of Europe helped to facilitate cooperation by making it easier for governments to understand one another Lipson shows how in the regime for debt rescheduling the control of infor mation is used to faciliate cooperation on terms favored by the big banks He also indicates that one weapon in the hands of those banks is their ability to structure transaction costs the costs of negotiations involving major moneycenter banks are reduced while the costs of coordinating resistance by small banks are not Conybeares analysis implies that if England and the Hanseatic League had been able to form an interna tional trade regime they might have been able to make mutually ad vantageous bargains and to discipline some of their more unruly con stituents International regimes do not substitute for reciprocity rather they reinforce and institutionalize it Regimes incorporating the norm of reciprocity delegitimize defection and thereby make it more costly In sofar as they specify precisely what reciprocity means in the relevant issuearea they make it easier to establish a reputation for practicing reciprocity consistently Such reputations may become important assets precisely because others will be more willing to make agreements with governments that can be expected to respond to cooperation with co operation Of course compliance is difficult to assure and international regimes almost never have the power to enforce rules Nevertheless since governments with good reputations can more easily make agree ments than governments with bad ones international regimes can help to facilitate cooperation by making it both easier and more desirable to acquire a good reputation4 International regimes may also help to develop new norms as Ruggie has arged4 Yet few such examples are evident in the cases discussed in this volume The greatpower concerts discussed by Jervis embodied new norms but these did not last long and the new norms of the 1930s 40 Keohane fn 8 chaps 89 4 Ibid esp chaps 57 42 Ruggie fn 15 251 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY monetary system described by Oye were largely uncooperative and con nected with the breakdown rather than the institutionalization of a regime Major banks today are trying mightily to strengthen norms of repayment for debtors and of relending for banks but it is not at all clear that this will be successful Better examples of creating norms may be provided by the evolution of thinking on chemical and biological warfare and by the development under GATT of norms of non discriminationwhich are now as we have seen under pressure Ev idently it is difficult to develop new norms and they often decay in reaction to conspicuous violations Establishing hierarchies setting up international regimes and at tempting to gain acceptance for new norms are all attempts to change the context within which actors operate by changing the very structure of their interaction It is important to notice that these efforts have usually not been examples of forwardlooking rationality Rather they have been experimental trialanderror efforts to improve the current situation based upon recent experience Like other forms of trialand error experimentation they have not always worked Indeed it is in structive to enumerate the variety of ways in which such experiments can fail I The most important source of failure is that efforts to restructure the relationships may never get off the ground As Downs Rocke and Siverson note there was an active peace movement in the years before 1914 and World War I was preceded by a series of con ferences designed to secure arms control and strengthen inter national law but these efforts did not significantly affect the nature of world politics Similarly the shakiness of monetary arrange ments in the 1920s was perceived by many of the participants but conferences to deal with these weaknesses such as that at Genoa in 1922 failed to cope with them effectively The greatpower concerts discussed by Jervis seemed to get somewhat farther but were never sufficiently institutionalized to have much prospect of longevity 2 Some agreements are instituted but turn out to be selfcontradic tory We have noted that sequential bilateral negotiations under conditional mostfavorednation treatment may lead to a problem of infinite regress each bargain tends to require the renegotiation of many others Bilateral arms control agreements whose restraints could encourage third parties to increase their armaments in order to catch up with the major powers face a similar difficulty 3 Even successful arrangements are subject to decay Decay can result WORLD POLITICS from actors attempts to find loopholes in established rules The very success of GATT in reducing tariff rates contributed to an expansion of nontariff barriers and efforts to evade those barriers led to their progressive extension and tightening43 Likewise suc cessful cooperation in the area of security may lead governments to believe that their partners cooperation is not based on reciprocity but is unconditional Insofar as this belief is incorrect discord may ensue 4 In some cases changes that have nothing to do with the arrange ments make them obsolete Thus the international debt regime in place before the crisis of August 1982 was manifestly illequipped to handle a situation in which most Third World debts had to be rescheduled In this instance the old regime was adapted to meet new needs The Depression of the 1930s made the monetary or thodoxy of the gold exchange standard obsolete Indeed Oye argues that the cooperative international monetary arrangements of the 1920s hindered attempts at monetary cooperation during the 1930s The collapse of the old regime was a necessary condition for cre ation of a new one Eventually any institution is likely to become obsolete The question is under what conditions international institutionsbroadly defined as recognized patterns of practice around which expectations con verge44facilitate significant amounts of cooperation for a period of time Clearly such institutions can change the incentives for countries affected by them and can in turn affect the strategic choices governments make in their own selfinterest This interaction between incentives and institutions suggests the im portance of linking the upwardlooking theory of strategy with the downwardlooking theory of regimes The strategic approach is upward looking in that it examines what individual actors will choose to do and derives consequences for the entire system based on these choices Most of the analysis in this volume has followed this upwardlooking approach On the other hand much regime analysis has been downward looking in that it examines the implications for actors of the way the entire system is organized Some recent work has attempted to combine 43 Vinod Aggarwal The Unraveling of the MultiFiber Arrangement 1981 An Ex amination of Regime Change International Organization 37 Autumn 1983 61746 David B Yoffie Power and Protectionism Strategies of the Newly Industrializing Countries New York Columbia University Press 1983 44Oran R Young Regime Dynamics The Rise and Fall of International Regimes International Organization 36 Spring 1982 27798 reprinted in Krasner fn 8 93114 253 ACHIEVING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY these two approachest5 but it has not yet been done in either a formally rigorous or an empirically comprehensive way The experimental groping by policy makers does not necessarily lead to stronger and ever more complex ways of achieving cooperation The process proceeds by fits and starts The success of each step is uncertain and there is always danger that prior achievements will come unstuck New experiments are often tried only under obvious pressure of events as in debt rescheduling And they are often dependent upon the active leadership of a few individuals or states who feel a serious need for change and who have the greatest resources The essays in this collection show that we are beginning to understand the structural conditions that affect strategic choices leading to co operation or discord These factors are mutuality of interest the shadow of the future and the number of actors Over a wide range of historical cases these three dimensions of situations do help account for the emer gence or nonemergence of cooperation under anarchy But in the course of this collective research we have also found that states are often dissatisfied with the structure of their own environment We have seen that governments have often tried to transform the struc tures within which they operate so as to make it possible for the countries involved to work together productively Some of these experiments have been successful others have been stillborn and still others have collapsed before fully realizing the dreams of their founders We understand the functions performed by international regimes and how they affect strat egies pursued by governments better than we did a number of years ago What we need now are theories that account for I when exper iments to restructure the international environment are tried and 2 whether a particular experiment is likely to succeed Even within a world of independent states that are jealously guarding their sovereignty and protecting their power room exists for new and better arrangements to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes in terms both of economic welfare and military security This does not mean that all endeavors to promote international co operation will yield good results Cooperation can be designed to help a few at the expense of the rest and it can accentuate as well as alleviate injustice in an imperfect world Yet the consequences of failure to co 45 In After Hegemony fn 8 Robert Keohane has sought to show how game theory which is upwardlooking can be combined fruitfully with the downwardlooking theories of public goods and market failure to develop a functional theory of international regimes But he has not formalized his theory and has applied it only to the postWorld War I1 international political economy 254 WORLD POLITICS operatefrom warfare to the intensification of depressionsmake us believe that more cooperation is often better than less If governments are prepared to grope their way toward a bettercoordinated future scholars should be prepared to study the process And in a world where states have often been dissatisfied with international anarchy scholars should be prepared to advance the learning processso that despite the reality of anarchy beneficial forms of international cooperation can be promoted Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations STEFANO GUZZINI Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Fredericiagade 18 1310 Copenhagen Tel 45 33455053 Fax 45 33455060 Email sguzzinicopridk First draft of a paper commissioned for a special issue of the Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia edited by Marco Clementi A revised shortened and translated version is expected to be forthcoming in 2003 Contents Introduction 1 Constructivism as a metatheoretical commitment The interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns Looping effects and the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world 2 Constructivisminspired theories of IR the debate with neorealism and neoinstitutionalism Identity in a critique of rationalist theories of action The constructivist synthesis taking interests more seriously as realists and ideas more seriously as institutionalists 3 The role of institutions in constructivist understandings of world politics The longterm institutions and the rules of the game The short term the postCold War is what we make made of it 1 Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations STEFANO GUZZINI Although Italy in comparison to its Northern neighbours is not a country of constructivists Lucarelli and Menotti 2002 many of the themes crucial to constructivism are common currency in Italian academia For constructivism stands for a series of debates in social theory which made a perhaps late yet virulent intrusion into the discipline of International Relations Its content is probably best understood as the focus which bundles recent discussions on epistemology and the sociology of knowledge on the agentstructure debate and the ontological status of social facts and on the reciprocal relationship between these two A first section will introduce constructivism as a metatheory or as Kratochwil 2000 100f called it a metatheoretical commitment It is on this level that it has become usual to compare it with positivism and now also with rationalist action theories as in the recent stateoftheart book published by former editors of International Organization Katzenstein Keohane et al 1999 As a metatheoretical commitment constructivism does not refer primarily to a theory which could be compared to other established theoretical schools in International Relations such as realism or liberalismpluralism or whatever one wants to call them Yet as a second section will show it still has implications for international theory Indeed a considerable part of the interest in metatheory does not stem from the faddishly abstract curiosities of IR researchers but from their diagnosis that some of the reasons underlying the theoretical blockages in IR is to be found at this level Two blockages have spurred most reaction On the one hand constructivism is a reaction against the narrow individualist conception of international politics underlying game theory and rational choice approaches On the other hand it opposes the naturalist leanings of diverse realist theories of international relations who claim to know 2 STEFANO GUZZINI 1 For the centrality of the assumption of circular history in realism see Bobbio 1981 the world as it really is ultimately unchangeable and historically circular1 leanings which ask for some version of scientific positivism Brown 1992 90 Not being a theory as the others finally implies that there is little sense in giving the constructivist reading of the role of institutions in todays international affairs What can be offered is a presentation of how some constructivisminspired theories think about the role of institutions both within the constitutive rules of international society and as practical fora for socialisation into such a society I will conclude on a way how some constructivists could understand todays world as the renewed social construction of power politics Wendt 1992 trying to put an end to the postCold War era the postCold War is what we make of it 1 Constructivism as a metatheoretical commitment Constructivism emphasises three major inspirations of recent theorising namely the interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns in the social sciences On the basis of this triple inspiration one can propose a definition of the metatheoretical commitment of constructivism and clarify both its social ontology and hermeneutic epistemology The interpretivist sociological and linguistic turns There are different ways for scientists to analyse a red traffic light Natural scientists could for instance be interested in the electric circuit that finally produces something we recognise as light with a certain colour Social scientists would relate the traffic light to the social world One way is a connection of the light to action like a driver stopping the car in front of it A pure behaviouralist understanding of such an action would apprehend it in terms of a stimulusreaction chain similar to Skinners rat experiments in which human choice is a blackbox a throughput Interpretivism but not only would oppose such a behaviouralist and positivist reduction of action It claims that the very action which counts as significant in the social world cannot be apprehended without interpretation that is without understanding the meaning that is given to it Weber 1988 1922 Even if two actors act the same way they might do Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 3 so for different reasons and those reasons are often crucial for understanding that action and for proper reaction It made a huge difference to containment politics during the Cold War if one assumed that the other be it the West or communism followed international rules because it was convinced of it or only because of physical constraint This necessary element of interpretation in human action is not reducible to the actors themselves but must comprise the significance given to it by other actors This point leads to the impact of the sociological turn in the social sciences Taking the sociological turn seriously implies that meaningful action and hence also the knowledge of both agent and observer is a social or intersubjective phenomenon Meaning is not something idiosyncratic to be studied through empathy There is no private language The actors capacity to attach the right meaning to a social event depends on the capacity to share a system of meanings within a group or society Hence interpretation as used here does not necessarily imply an act of conscious or intentional understanding but the sharing of what Searle 1995 127147 calls background abilities or what Bourdieu 1980 calls a habitus It cannot be reduced to cognitive psychology or to choice based on interests Instead as shown later in more detail the sociological turn emphasises the role of the social context within which identities and interests of both actor and acting observer are formed in the first place By the same token the fact of interpretation made by an actor is no different from that of an observer insofar as also this action relies on background abilities Yet when observers want to explain an action by someone else and when they address an audience different from the one in which the initial action has taken place then they will translate the interpretation given by the actor into an interpretation understandable within the background abilities of the other audience Generations of Kremlinologists have tried to explain Soviet actions by translating the assumed interpretation given by Soviet actors into the language of the respective policy environment so as to make them understandable When researchers address their own community with its often arcane codes and concepts they also retranslate from the meaning world at the level of action to the one at the level of observation Sparti 1992 1023 Hence social sciences have to carefully distinguish between the level of action 4 STEFANO GUZZINI proper and the level of observation They differ from naturalist approaches in that they need to reinterpret an already interpreted world Schutz 1962 1953 As this intersubjective or sociological turn shows the whole is finally inscribed in a reflection on the role of language in the social world and in its understanding Kratochwil 1989 Onuf 1989 for a discussion see Zehfuß 1998 Zehfuss 2001 Language works as the model case of intersubjectivity at the epistemological level It provides the paradigm for understanding meaning worlds where meaning is always already socially given to make communication possible in the first place and yet open through the common practice of this very communication Lastly language underlies also the understanding of the practical performative function of interpretation so important for constructivists First if interpretation is central for the social sciences constructivism asks for the effect this meaninggiving in turn has on the social world Constructivists insist that there are a series of institutional facts which exist only because social actors agree whether consciously or not in giving a certain meaning to them Money as distinguished from a sheet of paper for instance is Searles 1995 preferred example Second constructivism carries out the epistemological implications of the aforementioned If knowledge can be considered as an institutional fact since it relies on language and since concepts are the condition for the possibility of knowledge Kant then also knowledge is socially constructed Kuhn 1970 1962 Knowledge is not pregiven data passively registered by an observer Eskimos distinguish with many more words hence see many more things for what others would simply refer to as white This position asks for being sensitive to the effect of truth conventions but does not necessarily imply than anything goes Summarising my reconstruction Guzzini 2000 constructivism is a metatheory which is characterised as 1 Being particularly sensitive to the distinction between the level of action proper the level of observation and the relationship between the two usually theorised in terms of power 2 Having an epistemological position which stresses the social construction of meaning and hence knowledge Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 5 2 This definition has gained a certain consensus since also the latest stateoftheart article invokes it Adler 2002 For earlier discussions see Adler 1997 Checkel 1998 Hopf 1998 3 Having an ontological position which stresses the construction of social reality2 Looping effects and the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world What adds the somewhat constructivist spin to this tradition is related to the relationship between the social construction of meaning and the construction of social reality For again setting the social world apart from the natural our understandings of people and their action can make a real difference to the latter For instance being identified as an opportunist state representative influences options in future negotiations The categories we use so they are shared have an effect on the facts and people Some Foucaultinspired research has been focusing on exactly this as eg when it analyses the way statistical categories produce what counts as significant facts when it analyses the authoritative way of understanding the world Indeed calling something in a particular way might produce the very fact Relying on the idea of a speech act the Copenhagen School of security studies has tried to show that calling an event a threat of national security the securitization of that event is doing something to it in that it allows the use of exceptional measures outside of the regular political process Wæver 1995 Buzan Wæver et al 1998 It becomes a security issue with all the standard operating procedures attached to it by being called one if the call is successfully received Inversely the redefinition of the event can also effect a desecuritisation as exemplified by the German Ostpolitik Ostpolitik offered a status quo on borders at the price of redefining their meaning By the same token it took economics and peoples movement to some extent out of the Soviet definition of national security In this approach the Helsinki process can be seen as a 6 STEFANO GUZZINI desecuritisation strategy which allows politics and diplomacy to work in an increasing number of areas Moreover human beings but not natural phenomena can become reflexively aware of attributions and influence their action in interaction with them This looping effect Hacking 1999 34 is one of the reasons for the importance of identity in constructivist writings theoretically see below and empirically The social process of identification is part of producing the very reality we are supposed to passively react to It made all the difference that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was no longer trying to make the USSR pass for the imperial challenger but wanted it to be perceived as an acceptable member of this international society The Chinese solution at TienanMen was no longer possible The satellites were left free When this identity change happened ie when the Soviet Union was no longer seen by the other as it used to be the Cold War came to an end This brings me to the last point namely the importance of selffulfilling prophecies in constructivist thought If money is money and not just paper because people identify it as such then it ceases to be so the moment this shared attribution goes missing When people stop trusting money money will through this very action become untrustworthy Some constructivism has been much inspired by earlier peace research which has insisted in the way Realpolitik becomes political reality not because of the alleged iron laws of world politics but because of the combined effect of actors believing in its truth Guzzini 2003 forthcom This does not imply that such a practice can be easily undone That practices are socially constructed does not imply anything about their stickiness some good will simply wont do Indeed the Cold War practice was very sticky often for reasons which can be analysed in terms of the dilemmas game theoreticians have come up with But such gametheoretical understanding of collectively sub optimal Nash equilibria is derivative from the very setting of the game For constructivists what is important is what happens before the neo utilitarian model purportedly kicks in Ruggie 1998 19 The potential stickiness and their possibly utilitarian explanation does not change the fundamental idea that these practices are the effect of the interrelationship of the social construction of meaning and the construction of the social world Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 7 3 Although rational choice does not necessarily entail such a behaviouralist theory of action it has become prominent in IR eg Waltz 2 Constructivisminspired theories of IR the debate with neorealism and neoinstitutionalism Given the space constraints I will move to the level of IR theorising by focusing on the agencystructure conception underlying IR theories It is here where constructivism is often compared with rationalism Such a debate immediately biases the discussion insofar as it makes all centre on the level of an action theory on which dialogue with rationalism makes sense rather than on a structural theory With this caveat in mind this section will show how the problematique of identity and identity formation can be seen as a crucial point to exemplify the difference between a constructivist and a rationalisminspired action theory This will also serve to clarify the difference with theories of the neoneo kind see Andreatta in this volume Identity in a critique of rationalist theories of action Identity comes into constructivist IR theorising as an opposition to the limited approach of utilitarian action theories for this opposition to neo utilitarianism see Ruggie 1998 Introduction A behaviouralist rational choice approach3 entails an individualist theory of action It makes two main assumptions about human behaviour First humans are selfinterested utility maximisers and second humans are choosing rationally on the basis of a consistent transitive preference ranking If A is preferred to B and B to C A should be preferred to C A straightforward and parsimonious theory of action derives from this basic depiction of selfinterest and rationality Once we know the desires of individuals their preferences as well as the beliefs about how to realise them we can deduce their rational behaviour Indeed as Keith Dowding has succinctly put it The three go together in a triangle of explanation and given any two of the triumvirate the third may be predicted and explained This is a behaviouralist theory of action since it is studying the behaviour of individuals that allow us to understand their beliefs by making assumptions about their desires or their desires by making assumptions about their beliefs We may understand both by making assumptions about different aspects of each Dowding 1991 23 8 STEFANO GUZZINI It is hence the situation or the set of incentives which suggests behaviour to the individual and besides the two behavioural assumptions carries the major weight in the explanation Structure does affect behaviour The neoneo debate can illustrate this approach for IR Neorealist rational choice can see structure linked to behavioural change only by assuming a different distribution of means which influences desire For this is the only variable component which taking rationality and the logic of interests as valuemaximisation for given influences calculus choice and hence behaviour As in Elsters famous use of the Biblical sour grape analogy where one comes to think oneself satisfied with sour grapes because the sweet ones are too high to reach actors readapt their desires according to their perceived share in the distribution of means Elster 1985 On their side neoinstitutionalist approaches often focus on how over time structure can influence individual beliefs which then independent of any material change can affect behaviour In both cases preferences can change interests do not Constructivists argue instead or better moreover that structure affects through shared beliefs the very definition of identity hence interests and eventually behaviour For such an argument to work constructivists have however first to redefine what is meant by a structure for the following see also Wendt 1995 7374 First structure must be understood as social practice not as objective constraint see the model case of language Second it cannot be materialist only or even mainly For material factors cannot constitute themselves as causes independent of the meaning given to them This meaning in turn is not something subjective again there is no private language but based on a set of shared understandings and knowledge In other words the structural level for the constructivist is ideational in two senses first structure itself includes an ideational component and second matter matters for social action only through shared beliefs Once structure ideationally redefined constructivists can reapprehend the effect such shared meanings can have on actual behaviour This is done mainly through the concept of identity As already mentioned the primary example for putting identity in front of the cart have been explanations of the end of the Cold War see Lebow and RisseKappen 1995 The Cold War itself is analysed as a set of interaction like a game in particular see Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 9 4 I use the concept role advertently since as Wendt 1992 explicitly notes role theory can in many respects be seen as a precursor of these constructivist concerns For the paradigmatic statement of roletheory see Holsti 1987 1970 For a more recent use see also Barnett 1993 5 Responding to earlier critics of realism Kenneth Waltz 1979 argues that neorealism is about security maximisation not power maximisation But by defining security related to relative gains and to power rank it still remains ultimately dependent of power for a similar argument see Grieco 1997 Fierke 1998 defined by a certain set of shared beliefs which define social roles and which have become part of the selfdefinition of agents4 The reproduction of these practices depends however on the roletaking itself not on a whatever nature of anarchy By rejecting the role classically defined for the Soviet Union Gorbachevs New Thinking could so successfully implemented change the very definition of Soviet interests and preferences What was unthinkable earlier like the free on site inspection of nuclear sites became strategy This constructivist move of bringing identity in opens up the Pandora box of the national interest again Finnemore 1996 Weldes 1999 There were precursors It did not go unnoticed that instead of being objectively deductible the notion of selfinterest or national interest as power or security maximisation5 has either a normativeprescriptive or a circular ring According to early realist writers Wolfers 1962 chapters 6 and 10 the maximisation of power has not empirically been nor can it be rationally shown to be the best strategy Aron 1962 chapter 3 argued that the aims of foreign policy cannot be reduced to one All complained that the very concept of power is so loosely used that it can be ex post adjusted whenever the expected powerwielder does not control an outcome for the most forceful critique see the articles collected in Baldwin 1989 Perhaps we should live with the idea that power is basically a tautological concept Barnes 1988 but this is not the way realism or for this matter any neo utilitarian theory in IR wanted to use it In response proponents of rationalism in international relations insisted that the formula valuemaximisation is not as narrow as used by its critics It does not at all exclude altruistic preferences Keohane 1984 74 Although this is strictly speaking not wrong it does strip theories based on rational choice of their predictive power and possibly more For if 10 STEFANO GUZZINI 6 Reducing ideas to causes has been the early charge against regime theory Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 a charge forcefully repeated Laffey and Weldes 1996 against some more recent institutionalist analysis Goldstein and Keohane 1993 behaviour can be either driven by egoism or altruism by one thing and its opposite then the explanation of human action becomes indeterminate SchmalzBruns 1995 354 Indeed rational choice inspired theories then risk becoming mere taxonomies a system of concepts which simply reformulates any behaviour into terms of rational action Then as with Waltzian realism Guzzini 1998 chapter 9 the biggest problem of rational choice inspired approaches would not be that they are wrong but that they can never be wrong Hence this response simply begs the ultimately significant question where these different interests actually come from the classical constructivist charge The present constructivist discussion on identity and interest formation adds a further twist however since it asks for more farreaching adjustments both on the level of the philosophy of science and on the level of social theory According to constructivists identity like ideas cannot be used in a classical causal analysis since structure and agency the shared set of beliefs and identity are coconstitutive6 It is the beliefs which define what can count as an agent property ie as identity and interests In a football game the relations and the embedded practical rules might make the referee to act in a certain way but also by constituting himher as a referee in the first place Applying this constitution of agents by structures to other sociological environment implies that the stronger an institutional environment is rolebound and here games are obviously rather extreme cases the more interests are defined through the attribution and acceptance of certain roles by certain agents But the central role of identity in constructivism exemplifies also a crucial difference on the level of social theorising It includes an element of change and dynamism The Soviet Union accepted a different role one which Ostpolitik had actually prepared for it RisseKappen 1994 Evangelista 1999 And when it did it did not change from midfielder to goal keeper Rather it walked out of the game In this rather particular case its identity was crucial in the very definition of the game both were co Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 11 constitutive Changing identity meant that the Soviet Union unmade the game and joined another one The constructivist synthesis taking interests more seriously as realists and ideas more seriously as institutionalists As the previous discussion already indicates the metatheoretical commitment of constructivism implies a type of theorising which often does not exclude insights from other approaches but redefines them as special cases within its own parameters Materialist utilitarianism is often what actors pursue their action is often rational but only under conditions not specified by rational choice itself Realism might well describe a particular political event yet for the wrong materialist reasons In particular Alexander Wendt 1999 has used such a synthesising and at times assimilating strategy for developing his version of constructivism for a discussion see Guzzini and Leander 2001 This assimilating strategy pushes the usual contenders in IR theorising into uneasy corners If neoutilitarians of a realist brand want to carve out anything particular of theirs it will have to come in a kind of neo Darwinian version For only human nature as an intrinsic material cause escapes the constructivist ontology Albeit with caveats some seem happy to go down that way Thayer 2000 Yet many realists would recoil And indeed even if that road is taken with some sympathy it ends up requiring a constructivist contribution since biological reductionism works no better than others SterlingFolker 2002 But also neoinstitutionalists do not stay unscathed For despite the impression that there is nothing new constructivistinspired theories do not just go on adding ideas and stir The claim is stronger For social action matter matters mainly through shared beliefs through what people make of it Indeed beliefs are not a second parallel cause for action but define how actors come to think of their interests in the first place Regime theory for instance has been going as far as conceptualising regimes as autonomous variables in the sense that regimes are at most parallel to an equally autonomous and deductively given material interest Krasner 1982 Instead constructivists would argue that the very conception of interests independent of shared beliefs ie of the ideational structure is 12 STEFANO GUZZINI erroneous SterlingFolker 2000 has rightly argued that neo institutionalism has de facto included such argument But it has not drawn the consequence which would be a rearrangement of its metatheory As already argued by Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 it would have to abolish the individualist bias in its agencystructure conception and as argued again by Kratochwil 1989 99102 shift to a different understanding of explanation not reducible to classical causality as exemplified by King Keohane et al 1994 It is this particular view of the world a certain understanding of politics which pushes for a metatheoretical grounding not only the other way round Certainly for Wendt it is the case that for being able to propose a coherent liberal theory of IR it requires first a constructivist metatheory Hence bringing identity into established action theories allows constructivism to beat other theories on their ground and make them face these theoretical dilemmas It is for not taking interests and indeed power seriously enough that neorealism is insufficient It is for not taking shared beliefs seriously enough that neoinstitutionalism is Whether or not identity is able to shoulder such a weight is however another issue 3 The role of institutions in constructivist understandings of world politics After having established first the tenets of constructivism as a metatheory and second the implications this has for IR theorising as compared to other established theories this last section will spell out the role institutions play in a constructivist understanding of world politics today It is important to stress that constructivists focus on institutions at a general societyconstituting level ie not necessarily in the sense of material international organisations yet see below They are to use Barry Buzans 2002 distinction mainly interested in primary institutions such as sovereignty not secondary institutions like the UN They share this interest obviously with the English School see Alessandro Colombo in this issue and with regime theory which somewhat ironically once dominated the journal International Organization by downgrading the actual study of Ios The focus on fundamental the international defining institutions implies that constructivisminspired thinking is rather interested in the Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 13 7 It is important to add that although some constructivists like Wendt have a nearly teleological vision of history not unsimilar to earlier functionalists there is nothing in longue durée As with the English School it makes therefore less sense to assume that after 1989 there have been changes Similarly constructivism shows up in the way one needs to analyse international relations the framework of analysis which can inspire many also divergent empirical hypotheses In the following I will not much cover secondary institutions There are two reasons for this On the one hand they are rather reflecting more fundamental changes in terms of international legitimacy such as for instance in the move for an International Criminal Court discussed in the post45 system Wright 1952 but realised only now 1989 is of importance primarily for the way IOs have contributed to the rules of the game in IR and not that much how the end of the Cold War then reduced to an exogenous shock has done to secondary institutions and their role On the other hand their function is pretty constant for constructivists and hence not much under the influence of events like the end of the Cold War In a way reminiscent of earlier studies Claude 1956 Haas 1964 and showing some neofunctionalist roots constructivists have engaged in showing the socialisation function of International Organizations for more detailed accounts of this role see Barnett and Finnemore 1999 Johnston 2001 The longterm institutions and the rules of the game Time frames are long for understanding change in primary institutions Rodney Hall 1999 has argued that ever since the existence of a state system there have been two fundamental historical shifts from the dynastic sovereign via the territorial sovereign to the national sovereign state Reus Smit 1997 1999 has claimed that it is this level of constitutional structures defining legitimate statehood and rightful state action which in turn define the meaning of sovereignty Similarly Alexander Wendt 1999 distinguishes three cultures of anarchyHobbesian Lockian and Kantian which define the rules of the game and he gives examples how historically and theoretically change from one to another can and did happen7 14 STEFANO GUZZINI constructivism which asks for a progressive view of history As fundamental agnostics constructivists would tend to be sceptical against both a progressive and a cyclical vision of history the latter typical of realism The norms that are diffused the culture they define are not necessarily moving for the better leaving for a moment the issue aside how to define the latter Constructivism seems more conform to the concept of historydependent institutionalism as developed by March and Olsen 1998 8 For an analysis of the literature on norm diffusion see Wiener 2003 forthcom This stress of rules of the cultures which define the game and of the central legitimacy norms constituting authorised agency in the society shows the main conduit of constructivist analysis of change the diffusion of norms Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 It is important to stress that constructivists see norms not as simple reflections of power but as better Weberians than realists see power and norms linked in authority through legitimacy As Weber insisted power without legitimacy is under constant potential pressure Many studies have insisted how change can happen not only in longer historical terms like in Halls study but also in individual cases such as in the demise of apartheid Klotz 1995 the diffusion of human rights in a spiral dynamic including the shaming of the pariah state Risse Ropp et al 1999 or the diffusion of norms in and beyond existing security communities Adler and Barnett 19988 If as already mentioned with the change of legitimating principles also the very identity of actors is affected then one of the main questions today would be about the very boundaries of that international society which is said to share such institutions The seem increasingly fuzzy and multifaceted It is perhaps not astounding that the majority of writers tend to simplify things In the English School tradition much is done by reading backwards to apparently easier times when one could talk of the classical European international society which tried to export itself elsewhere Bull 1977 1989 1984 In another simplification early poststructuralist writers tried to pinpoint this society in the community of realists ie in that international community which denies that an international community exists Ashley 1987 1988 an argument which has been differentiated in more recent constructivistEnglish School writings Cronin 1999 In the search of a society also some more recent constructivists end up focusing Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 15 9 The obvious implication for constructivists is that also the war of all against all can exist but only as the product of a social process nothing innate or natural The Hobbesian or also Schmittian description of politics can be correct for some international societies at some times they are no necessity not even in the last resort as all historical determinist theories would put it on the society of states only Wendt 1999 again in a way much reminiscent of the old English School Suganami 20019 This more classical and easier identification of international society appears however at a historical disjuncture For we arguably experience not only 1 a secular decline of the grip of classical European rules and institutions and the old conservative ideology which legitimated them already registered since the early days of IR ie a change of the society of states itself see also Alessandro Colombo in this issue but also 2 the constitution of transnational communities with a distinct language and certain clout be it what Strange 1989 1999 dubbed the business civilisation or the emergence of transnational civil networks Keck and Sikkink 1998 the Davos community and its discontents as it were What is at stake and what is in the focus of constructivist thought but not only is the very identity of this international society The short term the postCold War is what we make made of it So far I have relativised the impact a single event like the end of the Cold War could play in constructivist understandings of world politics For constructivists the way the Cold War ended was a proof to the reasonableness of their assumptions but part of a longer process not itself the cause of a new era This said we have now a series of variables in place with which to understand the postwall system the constitutive relationship between the identityroles and the rules of the game the institutions of international society I will close this piece by concentrating on one particular sensibility of constructivists the clash between international institutions and norm diffusion vs identity politics which cannot in itself however give the entire picture of institutional change as of today After 1989 international relations seemed to be set to be more domesticated Post45 Germany and Japan are the easy cases for the 16 STEFANO GUZZINI constructivist argument that interests derive from roles and identity and not simply from capabilities Berger 1996 1998 Katzenstein 1998a 1998b But also other countries in Europe mainly in the Nordic countries had come to take the changed identity of their security community seriously Similarly Soviet New Thinking tried to rethink Soviet identity South Africa shed off its apartheid identity 1989 came as moment in which those met in which a different vision of legitimate rule made its way Yet whereas some countries saw their identity in resonance with the emerging rules of international society others did not Most remarkably the US was to find it difficult to adapt to a new role Kuwait besides and on top of Berlin became the defining moment For constructivists Kuwait set in motion a remobilising of Cold War biases which threatened to close the window of opportunity opened after 1989 Guzzini 1994 The legitimation of the war was partly done in a language which seemed to herald a new world order but relied extensively on World War II metaphors and containment scripts Luke 1991 Constructivists were alarmed by the possible selffulfilling prophecies of some brands of realism which had undergird much US foreign policy debate and far from receding in 1990 immediately moved onto the stage The wall had hardly come down when John Mearsheimer 1990 already wrote that 1989 meant the return to oldtype European politics where Germany whether it wanted or not will become a more aggressive power again If all European partners had preemptively balanced as Mearsheimer suggested this might indeed have been the outcome Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilisations thesis Huntington 1993 far from being anything new mainly remobilised Cold war clusters He divides the world in different civilizations poles which occupy different cultural areas territories at the borders of which the former iron and bamboo curtain friction are likely to occur In particular the Western world democracy will face the combined onslaught of civilisations which by their nature cannot compromise totalitarianism In other words it was not a new problem which spurred a Western response but Western strategic solutions which were in search of a problem After a decade of heated debates it was as if a constructivist nightmare had come true when the US Presidential candidate George W Bush said during his campaign that we do not know what the enemy is but we know it is there Constructivism and the role of institutions in international relations 17 It is not a pregiven US identity which defines its foreign policy Its identity and foreign policy are constituting each other Campbell 1990 1992 Given the preponderant position these US identity processes play a major role in defining the game however Its remilitarisation and turn towards unilateralism Guzzini 2002 although similar to the first Reagan administration and hence not a purely postwall phenomenon runs now quite openly against the rules and the legitimacy of the international society and does not fit part of its own roleperception To some the US quite legitimately appears as the rogue superpower Huntington 1999 42 These processes in the US are at the heart of a diffusion of norms which undercut the existing institutionalisation of international society This applies not because the nature of anarchy or of US hegemony is like this it is the effect of particular international social practices And it only works if the other participants accept playing the game It is therefore not fortuitous that those countries in which the spirit of Ostpolitik and détente or of a security 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Constructing International Relations The Next Generation Armonk NY ME Sharpe pp 5475 MÉTODOS DE ANÁLISE ANÁLISE DOCUMENTAL Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais Métodos e Técnicas de Pesquisa em RI O QUE É UMA PESQUISA DOCUMENTAL É um procedimento que se utiliza de métodos e técnicas para a apreensão compreensão e análise de documentos dos mais variados tipos PESQUISA DOCUMENTAL VS PESQUISA BIBLIOGRÁFICA Muitas vezes parecem se confundir Ambas possuem o documento e não o sujeito como objeto de investigação Retiram influência do pesquisador sobre os dados Mas não são sinônimos Pesquisa bibliográfica analisa documentos de domínio científico Livros artigos ensaios enciclopédias etc São fontes secundárias Não recorrem diretamente ao fatofenômeno da realidade empírica Pesquisa documental lida com documentos que ainda não receberam tratamento científico Costumam ser fontes primárias Requer análise mais cuidadosa exatamente pois não passaram por tratamento prévio O QUE SÃO DOCUMENTOS Documento tradicionalmente está ligado à ideia de prova inicialmente jurídica depois científica Até século XX ficava restrito a fontes escritas Escola de Annales amplia a ideia de documento para tudo aquilo que foi produzido pelo homem e que portanto contribui para sua compreensão As fontes documentais FONTES NÃO ESCRITAS ESCRITAS Os objectos e os vestígios materiais A iconografia As fontes orais A imagem e o som regis tados Os documentos oficiais arquivos Públicos Privados As fontes não oficiais A imprensa As revistas e publicações periódicas Os livros Os documentos intermediários As fontes estatísticas As estatísticas correntes As análises estatísticas Documento como qualquer suporte que contenha informação registrada formando uma unidade que possa servir para consulta estudo ou prova COLETA DE DOCUMENTOS Devese localizar textos pertinentes e avaliar sua credibilidade e representatividade Sempre tendo em mente a pergunta de investigação Investigador deve buscar compreender a mensagem contida no documento por mais fragmentado que possa parecer Dimensões da avaliação preliminar dos documentos 1 Contexto Contexto histórico de produção do documento Universo sociopolitico do autor e do público Evitar interpretar conteúdo do documento em função de valores modernos 2 Autor es Identidade interesses e motivação de quem produziu o documento Possibilita avaliar melhor a credibilidade do texto Elucida interpretação posicionamento e até deformações presentes no documento 3 Autenticidade e confiabilidade Verificar procedência do documento Identificar relação entre o autor e o que ele produz Testemunhou diretamente o fenômeno Qual a distância temporal entre fenômeno e a produção Possui conhecimento para tratar do fenômeno 4 Natureza do texto Algumas produções são feitas para contextos específicos e só podem ser entendidas dentro deles ou por pessoas já iniciadas neste contexto 5 Conceitoschave e lógica interna Decifrar jargões gírias regionalismos etc Delimitar adequadamente o sentido das palavras tendo em vista o conceito em que são empregadas Examinar lógica interna do documento Se é contraditório em seus próprios termos ANÁLISE DE DOCUMENTOS Documentos não existem isoladamente mas precisam ser situados em uma estrutura teórica para que seu conteúdo seja entendido Objetivo é fornecer interpretação coerente do documento levando em consideração a pergunta de investigação Recorrese geralmente a análise de conteúdo Análise de dados linguísticos frequência etc Investigação do conteúdo simbólico das mensagens Construir categorias de análise e identificálas nos documentos analisados Podem ser construídas a priori ou a partir daquilo que foi lidoobservado no documento Não são fixas Relacionar categorias através de sua frequência importância e conexões ao longo do documento Reler documento a partir das categorias criadas buscando aprofundamento ligação e ampliação Novo julgamento das categorias CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS A análise documental é comumente associada à pesquisa histórica mas marco temporal não é impeditivo Existem vários tipos de documento que podem ser analisados em pesquisas no campo das Relações Internacionais É uma forma de pesquisa portanto deve ser feita com o rigor metodológico adequado Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 janeirojunho 2012 2012 by Unisinos doi 104013rechtd20124101 Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Daniel Farber1 University of California Estados Unidos dfarberlawberkeleyedu Direito dos desastres e questões emergentes no Brasil Abstract Scholars around the world are beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in preparing for such events and responding to them after they occur This article offers an introduction to the field of disaster law with a particular focus on the United States and Brazil The article begins with an overview of disaster law and explains some unifying themes These themes connect risk mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding after disasters The remainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least worsened by failure to regulate risks in advance using land use law or environmental law Disaster law will become even more important in the future due to climate change and other developments such as population growth and expanded populations living near coasts and estuaries Key words Natural disasters nuclear power pollution oil spills climate change risk management Resumo Estudiosos de todo o mundo estão começando a focar no papel do jurídico na preparação para esses eventos e na reação a eles depois de sua ocorrência Este artigo oferece uma introdução ao campo do Direito dos desastres com um foco particular nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil O artigo começa com uma visão geral do Direito dos desastres e explica alguns temas unificadores Estes temas conectam a mitigação de riscos a resposta de emergência a indenização e a reconstrução após catástrofes O restante do artigo foca uma percepção crucial o dano das catástrofes é quase sempre causado ou no mínimo agravado por falta de regulação antecipada de riscos pelo direito fundiário e pelo direito ambiental O Direito dos desastres tornarseá ainda mais importante no futuro devido à mudança climática e outros desdobramentos como o crescimento populacional e o aumento das populações vivendo próximas a costas e estuários Palavraschave catástrofes naturais energia nuclear poluição derramamentos de óleo mudança climática gestão de riscos 1 University of California Berkeley School of Law Boalt Hall 2745 Bancroft Ave University of California Berkeley CA 947 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 3 2 Although this article focuses on the legal literature disasters are also the subject of a robust and growing body of work in economics and policy analysis See eg Kunreuther and Useem 2009 Introduction The last few decades have been punctuated by natural disasters and manmade accidents The disas ters include severe tsunamis cyclones and hurricanes while notable accidents include nuclear meltdowns and massive oil spills Legal scholars around the world are beginning to focus on the role of the legal system in preparing for such events and responding to them after they occur This article offers an overview of the field of disaster law with a particular focus on the United States and Brazil Traditionally Brazil has not been heavily exposed to natural disasters but insurance companies say that this situation is changing Natural disasters will likely become more frequent in Brazil and also more costly in terms of human lives and government expenditures said Fabio Corrias Swiss Res head of corporate solutions for Brazil and the rest of the Southern Cone Brazil has traditionally had a very low exposure to natural disasters but during the last five years the frequency of events such as heavy rains floods and avalanches has increased Corrias told a conference in Sao Paulo hosted by the Swiss reinsurer The latest such events occurred in January this year in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro when floods killed more than 800 people and left some 6000 homeless Corrias noted that due to lack of insurance and rein surance this event cost the public sector US460mn in emergency spending The area most exposed to natural disasters in Brazil is the south east due to high population density Corrias said Rindebro 2011 The Brazilian legal system is still adapting to these new issues arising from disasters One of those issues is risk mitigation For in stance lack of preparation may have contributed to hundreds of deaths from landslides The hillside areas around Rio lacked early warning systems or effective community organizations that might have helped residents to wake one another as the rains intensified last Tuesday night disaster ex perts and residents said Most people are believed to have died early Wednesday morning as they slept when waterloosened earth swept their houses away Kahn 2011 Illustrating the connection between disaster risks and inadequate regulation weak control of urban settle ment was also a contributing factor in the Rio landslides Rio de Janeiro State officials have cited irregular oc cupation of areas at risk of floods and landslides as the main reason that so many have been dying Carlos Minc Rios environment secretary said Thursday that the states civil defense authority urgently needed to relocate residents in highrisk areas Kahn 2011 quot ing Brazilian sources This article attempts to provide a framework for thinking about these emerging issues in Brazil without being so presumptuous as to suggest the correct solu tions for the Brazilian legal system It is tempting to think that disasters are either natural events completely out side of human control or are unavoidable accidents But human beings can plan ahead to reduce the probability of many disasters and reduce their harm as well as estab lishing procedures for rebuilding afterwards Legal schol ars in the United States and elsewhere are beginning to focus on disaster law as a field of study Hopefully some of the lessons may be useful in the Brazilian context Disasters strike unpredictably enough that we are somehow always surprised and never quite pre pared The risks are also diverse and the harms are dis tinctive an earthquake is not a hurricane and a hur ricane is not an oil spill But there is a deep underlying predictability to disasters Nothing is more predictable than the fact that some day again a major hurricane will hit a US or Caribbean city that heat waves will hit cit ies or that poorly regulated but dangerous industries will have devastating accidents It is also predictable that if we do not address climate change coastal cities around the world will be at greater risk and heat waves will be more devastating It is heartening that the legal academy is beginning to pay attention to these risks in a serious way but much more needs to be done2 Part I of this article provides an overview of disaster law and explains some unifying themes These themes connect risk mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding after disasters The re mainder of the article focuses on one crucial insight harm from disasters is almost always caused or at least worsened by failure to regulate risks in advance using land use law or environmental law These regulatory fail ures set the stage for widespread harm but often are not appreciated in advance of the event Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 4 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 Part II illustrates this point with examples from around the world including Brazil Examples include floods and landslides nuclear reactor meltdowns oil spills and heat waves In each case lack of adequate con trol of risksa failure of the regulatory statecontrib uted to the tragic outcome Part III then focuses on a particular regulatory failure the failure of the international community to control climate change This failure will increase many kinds of disaster risks whether in developed countries like the United States or developing countries such as Brazil Disaster law will become even more important in the future due to climate change and other develop ments such as population growth and expanded popula tions living near coasts and estuaries Disasters and the Legal System Hurricane Katrina sparked interest by US legal scholars in disaster law More than any other disaster in American history Hurricane Katrina brought into sharp relief the limitations in the laws capacity to anticipate and respond to catastrophic events With problems ranging from the amplification of alreadyentrenched social injustices and the exhaustion and failure of com pensation systems to the paralysis on the ground result ing from ambiguous divisions of disaster management responsibilities among state and federal governments Katrina and its aftermath made manifest the American legal regimes inability to handle disaster risks effectively see American Bar Association 2007 The legal system plays a central role in disas ter prevention response and management3 For disas ter experts Hurricane Katrina was merely a further confirmation that the law is woefully unprepared to handle disasters A growing community of researchers recognizes this problem and is formulating solutions under the rubric of disaster law This emerging legal academic field encompasses a wideranging interdis ciplinary body of research seeking to inform and im prove disasterrelated decisionmaking as evidenced by recent books4 and a rapidly expanding number of law review articles5 The emergence of disaster law in the US may be compared to the birth of environmental law in the late 1960s and early 1970s when a small group of prac titioners and professors recognized the dire need for a coordinated legal approach to a sprawling and life threatening problem Lazarus 2004 p 47 Their efforts created a new field of legal studies6 the task and the potential of disaster law are no less critical in the cur rent tumultuous era Before plunging into a study of disaster law how ever we need to first identify the distinctive traits of natural and manmade disasters Section A addresses the definitional issue With this clearer definition of the sub ject matter Section B then sets forth a framework for understanding the legal and policy issues about disas ters the circle of disaster management What is a Disaster The common conception of disaster focuses on events that are sudden significant and natural But di saster is in practice a malleable term7 The suddenness criterion emphasizes the emergency period but an im portant consideration in defining the field is whether prevention and development of resilience before the event and compensation and rebuilding after the event are to be included With respect to naturalness it has been argued that there is actually no such thing as a natural disaster8 The second factor significance is to some extent in the eye of the beholder The third factor naturalness turns out to be somewhat misleading Physi cal phenomena are a necessary component of risk but they are only the starting point in addressing safety concernsto be fully effective the work of calculating and planning for disaster risk must account for acts of nature weaknesses of human nature and side effects of technology Farber et al 2010 p 3 2006 p 1085 1090 In this Article we will also consider tech nological disasters accidents that affect ecosystems or 3 These issues are the subject of Farber et al 2010 4 Farber et al 2010 Nolon and Rodriguez 2007 Verchick 2010 Hunter 2008 5 We can get some sense of the expansion from a Westlaw search flood insurance levees oil spill forest fire natural disaster For 20002005 the search produced 23 documents for 20062011 the search produced 105 documents search of JLR database on July 17 2011 A search for Hurricane Katrina in the same database on January 28 2011 produced 3302 documents of which 125 had the term in their titles 6 The conference resulted in the formation of the Environmental Law Institute Lazarus 2004 p 48 7 Dauber 1998 p 967 971 Although the category disaster at first may seem unproblematic I suggest that we should see its definition and boundaries as precisely what is at stake in many contests over the allocation of federal resources 8 Smith 2006 It is generally accepted among environmental geographers that there is no such thing as a natural disaster In every phase and aspect of a disaster causes vulnerability preparedness results and response and reconstructionthe contours of disaster and the difference between who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 5 large populations There are also hybrids where natural events cause technological accidents which in turn in tensify damage from the disaster The issue of suddenness deserves special atten tion Air pollution provides an example of how analysis of risk can be distorted by focusing on the suddenness of an event Although air pollution is often considered a chronic problem acute episodes are also possible Con sider the London pollution incident of 1952 Beginning on December 4 1952 winds over the Thames valley be gan to die down just as a temperature inversion was developing Wise 1968 p 1516 The next morning as emissions from coal fire stations and domestic chimneys entered the atmosphere the morning fog had become massively polluted and by early evening that day the death toll had begun Wise 1968 p 16 The killer smog lasted only four days but in that short time nearly one out of every two thousand residents of London died Wise 1968 p 16 The severity of the 1952 smog is hard to fathom today Even police cars were forced off the streets because of the lack of visibility Wise 1968 p 124 An observer reported that a brides dress had been turned nearly black because she and the groom had been compelled to walk a considerable distance from the church to the Underground station no taxis being available Wise 1968 p 131 Although this was a sudden episode it reflected a chronic problem and we would be led astray if we fo cused only on that episode The Killer Fog of 1952 was the culmination of centuries of serious pollution which as early as 1578 had resulted in a royal proclamation banning the burning of coal while Parliament was in ses sion Wise 1968 p 19 Reformers had struggled in vain for action against air pollution the problem of Britains polluted atmosphere was no nearer a solution than it had been at the turn of the century Wise 1968 p 50 Fortunately no Brazilian city has suffered a simi lar pollution crisis But the health effects of air pollution are still appreciable9 According to one Brazilian study In relation to respiratory mortality in the elderly it is estimated that over 600 deathsyear are attributable to the current mean PM10 corresponding to 49 of the total respiratory mortality observed in these cities For children under five years of age an estimated total of approximately 47 deaths from respiratory causes are attributable to PM10 levels representing 55 of all respiratory deaths recorded during the period It is also estimated that the observed PM10 levels in these Brazilian state capitals are responsible for 52 of hospital admissions from respiratory causes among children and 83 among the elderly totaling 4581 admissions per year in the seven cities Marcilio and Gouveia 2007 p S532 The findings of this Brazilian study also illustrate the complexity of the concept of a disaster If the same number of deaths occurred in one place in a week or two that would undoubtedly be considered a disaster But from the point of view of the victims it makes no difference whether the same number of deaths and ill nesses are found in only one city or in the seven cov ered in the study or whether the ill effects are spread over a year or concentrated in one week Thus we can be led astray in thinking that a disaster as an acute epi sode is fundamentally different than an equally harmful chronic condition Although the field of disaster law does not have sharp boundaries the core cases are fairly clear Hurri canes floods and earthquakes are clearly natural disas ters despite the importance of human factors in deter mining the extent of harm Humans play a more direct role in oil and chemical spills or nuclear accidents but the difference between natural disasters and human accidents is not fundamental Consequently both will be discussed in this article Given a better understanding of the nature of di sasters we next need to map the legal and policy issues and their interrelationships Part B provides a roadmap to disaster issues The Cycle of Disaster Law Presently disasters and their applicable legal re gimes are addressed within broad areas of legal study and practice most notably tort contracts administra tive and constitutional law Issues such as liability and risksharing breach of contract with possible defenses of commercial impracticability or frustration of pur pose and federalism each bear upon disaster response and management Disaster issues span insurance law tort law and administrative law which are normally considered very different fields This section considers the ways in which these disparate issues interconnect in the distinctive context of disasters What most char 9 A comprehensive study in 2011 showed that health effects are significant even when current Brazilian air pollution limits are met See Olmo 2011 p 681 Air pollu tion problems are significant even in smaller cities A 2006 study showed that air pollution episodes resulted in increased hospitalization for pneumonia in São José dos Campos See Nascimento et al 2006 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 6 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 acterizes the field is the cycle of disaster law a set of strategies including mitigation emergency response compensation and rebuilding with rebuilding complet ing the circle by including or failing to include mitigation measures Farber et al 2010 p 3 Figure 1 The Cycle of Disaster Law Risk Mitigation Part II and Part III of this article focus on mitigation It is important to realize that the risk of harm from disasters is not outside of human con trol With proper planning the risk of flooding can be reduced nuclear reactors and offshore oil rigs can be made safer and climate change can be limited Disasters are often caused or exacerbated by failures in environmental protection In a recent book Professor Robert Verchick highlights the importance of what he calls natural infrastructure that is the role of nature as a substructure in human flourishing in providing essential services such as protection against floods carbon sequestration and food supplies like fisheries Verchick 2010 p 22 As Professor Verchick explains an infrastructure perspective helps remind us that natural goods and services come as part of larger interconnected systems Verchick 2010 p 23 Dam aged builtinfrastructure can damage the environment damaged natural infrastructure can lead to or amplify natural disasters Emergency Response Combined with the disaster event itself this is the most dramatic phase of the di saster cycle Here the legal structure can provide clear lines of authority to respond to emergency conditions and can mandate the appropriate planning and training For example it is important to determine the role of the military in responding to disasters versus civilian authorities Compensation Although most of the publics at tention goes to prevention and emergency response victim compensation is a central focus of disaster law The legal system provides a mix of public and private sector methods for compensating victims of natural disasters Each of the methods that have been used to provide compensation for catastrophic risks has its limitations The first method of compensation is private insurance However the unavailability of insurance for catastrophic risks due to expense or underwriting risks exclusion of catastrophic risks by contract and the difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims create significant hurdles Insurance is not commonly considered as a way of dealing with risks in the area of environmental law perhaps because the harm relates to health rather than property But it may not always be feasible to eliminate environmental risks and insurance could provide a useful backup The second method of compensation litigation against responsible private parties also has its limita tions the need for proof of negligence or other basis for liability limits on the financial assets and insurance coverage of potential defendants and other judicial doc trines limiting recovery But in some cases liability can result in extraordinary damage awards Third is the possibility of obtaining compensa tion from the government through various routes tort claims against federal or state government for negli gence subject to immunity defenses claims under special compensation schemes for particular disasters and claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation for the taking or in some states damag ing of property In addition the United States govern ment provides flood insurance10 The US has no similar system of insurance for other hazards Instead the United States has a makeshift assem bly of jerryrigged components In the final analysis the US has what might well be ter med a patchwork system for providing financial com pensation for catastrophic loss Inevitably in such a multifaceted milieu where the tendency has been to develop discrete schemes in response to particulari zed categories of disasters or rely on general welfare schemes that were enacted without disaster relief in mind there will be ongoing finetuning of the system and a continuing dialogue over the efficacy of the me asures in place Rabin and Bratis 2006 p 303 356 10 For a discussion of the system and issues about its functioning see MichelKerjan 2010 p 165 Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 7 Rebuilding and Restoration When buildings are harmed or destroyed by a disaster they must be re built or space must be found for the same activities elsewhere Often rebuilding in the same place may be unwise and land use controls may be warranted When this is not feasible building requirements can be used to increase safety Natural resources damaged by disasters such as oil spills may recover naturally but they may also require cleanup efforts or active restoration to replace damaged plants and animals These phases of the cycle of disaster law are related to each other In the context of disaster law le gal rules interact in unique ways For example the avail ability of insurance coverage and public benefits after a disaster may affect predisaster mitigation measuresit follows that issues in land use disaster response miti gation and compensation cannot be considered in iso lation Individual courses on land use torts insurance administrative law etc cannot adequately treat the in teractions between these areas of law Complex interactions and structures character ize both the cycle of disaster law and also its com ponents Risk involves a network of interconnected strategies while disaster response involves careful in stitutional design and recovery involves the interplay between funding mechanisms some private some state or federal and local government efforts Other fields of law may touch on parts of the puzzle state and local government law insurance law land use law tort law but miss the larger picture Finally disaster law as a whole is unified by the concept of risk management Each stage of the cycle of disaster lawmitigation emergency response insur anceliability compensation government assistance re buildingis part of this risk management portfolio Miti gation efforts attempt to lessen the potential impact of disaster events before the fact while disaster response attempts to do so afterwards Insurance tort and gov ernment disaster assistance provide ways of spreading and shifting risks Rebuilding is in some sense just the mitigation phase for the next disaster down the road Risk management techniques for disasters are interwoven For instance the prospect of generous di saster assistance creates moral hazard which in turn may necessitate government intervention to ensure adequate mitigation In turn adequate mitigation before the fact reduces the need for disaster assistance or in surance after the event Disaster response can have a similar relationship with mitigation but then reduces the need for postdisaster assistance or other forms of risk spreading To complete the cycle postdisaster as sistance insurance and other forms of compensation help shape postdisaster rebuilding and the degree to which future disaster risks are mitigated Thus there is tight linkage between various risk management strate gies providing a conceptual framework for disaster law Part II will focus on the risk mitigation phase of disasters and what happens in the absence of mitigation when regulatory failures create accident risks or amplify risks from natural disasters This is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the circle of disaster management Yet this phase may have the greatest potential for re ducing the human toll from disasters Disaster Risks and Regulatory Failure People tend to think of a disaster as a physical phenomenon stemming from natural events or complex engineering projects such as a nuclear reactor Such physical phenomena are a necessary component of risk but they are only the starting point in addressing safety concerns Whether a risk materializes and the extent of the resulting harm are almost always mediated by human actions Those actions in turn take place inside organizations with their own histories and cultures To understand risk we need to see the human context as well as the physical events that cause harm Only then can we begin to determine the appropriate response to risk Disasters are dramatic events but we need to look past the events themselves to learn more about the sources of risk and their mitigation Doing so re veals that disasters are not simply accidents or Acts of Godthey also involve the failure of the legal system to effectively address risks Thus disaster law dealing with disaster preparation response and recovery is closely linked with regulatory law especially dealing specifically with land use planning and control of environmental risks That link between disaster harms and regulatory failure is the subject of the following four case studies As we will then discuss in Part III climate change will vastly strengthen this linkage between environmental law and disaster law We typically think of regulatory law as address ing longterm problems such as air and water pollution climate change and biodiversity In contrast we think of disasters as being sudden events although as discussed earlier this is a contestable idea But the two are inti mately related disasters are often the result of long term failure of regulations while pollution incidents like the 1952 London Killer Fog can be sudden and dev Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 8 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 astating The connections between chronic regulatory failures are explored below in the context of nuclear accidents oil spills heat waves and floods As discussed earlier although some of these events are often called natural disasters and others are called accidents the fundamental policy issues are similar Nuclear Accidents The story begins with a catastrophic natural event At 246 pm Japan standard time on March 11 2011 946pm PST on March 10 a 90 earthquake struck off the east coast of Honshu Japan 109 miles ENE of Fukushima and 231 miles NE of Tokyo USGS 2011 The earthquake also triggered a large tsunami that overwhelmed seawalls and contributed to massive destruction Onishi 2011 The tsunami waves spanned a great height the maximum height was 127 feet at Aneyoshi Miyako International Atomic Energy Agency 2011 As of July 14 more than fifteen thousand people were known to be dead over five thousand people were still missing More than 227000 buildings have totally or partially collapsed and 3559 roads 77 bridges and 29 railways have been damaged National Police Agency of Japan 2011 As of June 30 116213 people had been evacuated Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011 Economic losses from the earthquake are estimated at 210 billion making it the costliest natural disaster on record the overall economic loss for Hurricane Katrina was 125 billion Munich Re 2011 The earthquake itself was outside of human con trol but the regulatory dimension of the disaster involves nuclear power which turned out to be inadequately regulated for the emergency During the earthquake the Fukushima Daiichi lost outside powerconnection to the electrical grid Backup diesel generators came on at this time The Daini plant did not lose power but did face degraded safety systems International Atomic En ergy Agency 2011 About 46 minutes after the quake the first waves of a large tsunami reached the Fukushima Dai ichi power station The tsunami reached about 14 meters 45 feet at the Daiichi power station overwhelming the 6meter 18foot seawall The IAEA report provides a vivid sense of the posttsunami state at the nuclear plant The tsunami and associated large debris caused wi despread destruction of many buildings doors roads tanks and other site infrastructure at Fukushima Dai ichi including loss of heat sinks The operators were faced with a catastrophic unprecedented emergency scenario with no power reactor control or instru mentation and in addition severely affected commu nications systems both within and external to the site They had to work in darkness with almost no instru mentation and control systems to secure the safety of six reactors six nuclear fuel pools a common fuel pool and dry cask storage facilities International Ato mic Energy Agency 2011 p 1112 Explosions occurred at units 14 the explosions at units 13 were caused by a buildup of hydrogen and the cause for the explosion at unit 4 remains unknown Diesel generators at unit 6 remained functional in the aftermath of the tsunami and workers were able to use it to achieve a cold shutdown11 at units 5 and 6 Units 13 have still not yet achieved cold shutdown Nuclear Emergency Situations have been declared for both the Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini power stations resulting in evacuations and emergency measures12 As the 2011 tsunami and its aftermath illustrate the interdependency of modern societies makes them especially prone to disruption by disasters as damage to basic networks interferes with the delivery of key services But overly optimistic regulators who failed to take into account the need for more rigorous regulation of nuclear plants may have contributed to the disaster It is important to keep in mind the possibility of catastrophic events when designing and siting potentially dangerous facilities such as nuclear reactors Long time periods between such events may give a false sense of security It might seem ridiculous to worry about an event that only occurs once every thousand years But this means that there is one chance in a thousand that the event will happen in any given year If a facility will be in operation for fifty years which is not impossible for many nuclear reactors then there is a 5 chance 50 x 11000 that the event will strike during the lifetime of the facility If the consequences would be sufficiently severe that is a possibility worth considering when planning the facility Oil and Chemical Spills The largest recent oil spill was the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill of 2010 On April 20 2010 while drilling at the Macondo Prospect about 83 kilometers 11 Cold shutdown is achieved after several days once the reactor is no longer critical temperatures below 200 Feven after the cooling rods are inserted and fission stops the radioactive products continue to generate significant heat 12 See the May 17th update of the TEPCO Roadmap towards Restoration here httpwwwtepcocojpenpresscorpcomreleasebetu11eimages110517e3pdf Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 9 southeast of Louisiana an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon caused by a blowout killed 11 of 126 crewmen Associated Press 2010b Two days later despite efforts to put out the blaze on the oil rig the Deepwater Ho rizon sank in 1500 meters of water13 Throughout the end of April May and June estimates of the flow of oil increased from 1000 barrels of crude per day bpd to 5000 bpd to as many as 60000 bpd Gillis 2010 On July 15 BP finally stopped the flow of oil for the first time in nearly three months Gillis 2010 And about three weeks later on August 4 BP executed a successful static kill and a cement plug introduced on September 19 left the well effectively dead and the crisis officially over Gillis 2010 Environmental and economy recov ery however will take much longer It is unclear to what extent oil will continue to wash up on the Gulf coast whether species such as the dwarf seahorse can over come the loss of so much of their habitat and whether dispersants used during cleanup efforts may have un foreseen consequences on the environment14 In terms of the root causes of the blowout the Presidential Commission investigating the accident identified management failures by industry and a dys functional regulatory system National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drill ing 2010 p 122127 The accident resulted from clear mistakes made in the first instance by BP Halliburton and Transocean and by government officials who relying too much on industrys assertions of the safety of their operations failed to create and apply a program of regu latory oversight that would have properly minimized the risks of deepwater drilling National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 127 Thus the oil spill fundamentally stemmed from a failure of environmental regulation as well as negligence by private firms Brazil also suffered a major recent oil spill On November 7 2011 a pressure spike occurred during the drilling of an exploratory well at a depth of 1000 meters about 120 kilometers offshore According to Chevron although the well was immediately sealed leakage began from the seabed nearby and continued for four days15 Chevron was fined 50 million reals and it was reported that authorities were considering indictments against employees who were involved in the leak Carroll and Spinetto 2011 In addition a federal prosecutor filed a lawsuit for 11 billion in damages against Chevron al leging that Chevron and Transocean were not capable of controlling the damages caused by the leakage and that there was evidence of a lack of planning and envi ronmental management by the companies16 Concerns have also been expressed about the risk assessments used for drilling operations offshore of Brazil17 As was also true of the Fukushima accident oil spills may be in some sense accidental but they may also reflect organizational and regulatory failures Harm to the environment stemming from these accidents is not simply a random event but a reflection of failures by society to mitigate the risks appropriately Heat Waves A heat wave may seem like the least manmade of events The summer of 2003 was the hottest in Europe for at least five hundred years Larsen 2006 An anti cyclone high pressure area sat over Western Europe preventing cooler air from the Atlantic from entering UNEP 2003 Temperatures reached extraordinary heights The summer weather in Geneva was similar to the normal summer in Rio de Janeiro UNEP 2003 Temperatures in parts of Italy in August were over eight degrees centigrade warmer than the preceding year in Portugal temperatures were over forty degrees for many days while London had its first recorded tempera tures over thirtyeight degrees in history Larsen 2006 The prolonged heat was catastrophic Estimates of the total number of deaths begin at thirty thousand and run as high as fifty thousand Larsen 2006 In Paris alone there were over twelve hundred deaths Cadot et al 2007 p 466468 The estimate for France as a whole was over fourteen thousand Cadot et al 2007 p 466 468 The biggest risk factors were being a woman 75 13 The Guardian 2010 For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the spill see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 89122 14 Gillis 2010 The difficulties encountered in closing the well are discussed in National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2010 p 129170 15 Chevron Frade ResponseBackground httpchevroncomfraderesponsebackground 16 Reuters 2011 For a discussion of the contrasting roles of environmental criminal law in the United States and Brazil see Blomquist 2011 p 83 8892 and McAllis ter 2008 p 4 17 Vidal 2010 The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of Brazil in 1798 metres 5900 feet of waterdeeper than BPs Deepwater rig that exploded in April and led to the disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico The 14page environment report prepared by the bank financing the drilling operations makes no mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent them Ministers have edited out all ECDGs comments assessing the risks involved in deepsea drilling in the Atlantic Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 10 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 years old and older and living alone at home Cadot et al 2007 p 466468 In addition to its health impacts the heat wave also impacted agriculture and caused nu merous forest fires destroying over 640000 hectares of forest roughly 2500 square miles an area about the size of Delaware UNEP 2003 The heat wave was extreme compared to histor ical temperatures but less abnormal compared to re cent decades because of the longterm increase of very hot days in Europe Rebetez et al 2006 p 569577 Although it is impossible to say whether climate change caused this particular heat wave it is possible to ask whether climate change increased the likelihood of such a heat wave Scientists have concluded that past human influence has more than doubled the risk of European mean summer temperatures as hot as 2003 and that the likelihood of such events is projected to increase 100fold over the next four decades18 Flooding Flooding is a familiar risk but the dangers may be underestimated because of this familiarity Hurri cane Katrina illustrates the seriousness of flood risks and the way that failures of risk management turned a relatively routine event into a catastrophe The impacts were severe killing more than 1500 leaving hundreds of thousands homeless and ravaging one of Americas most storied cities not to mention billions of dollars in property damage United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs 2006 11 to 114 21 to 22 Property damage estimates ap proach 100 billion United States Senate Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs 2006 11 The New Orleans flood represented the tech nological failure of inadequate flood control measures against a predictable risky and potentially lethal event19 After floods in 1927 the US built levees along the Mississippi that have prevented silt from reaching Louisiana wetlands McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 Since the construction of these levees wet lands have been starved of sediment causing them to become waterlogged sink and die McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 The silt ends up uselessly collecting at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico Thus efforts to reduce flooding in the Mississippi River basin have increased the risk of flooding along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico After Hurricane Katrina it became apparent that the disappearance of the wetlands increased di saster risks to the region Wetlands absorb the impact of storms slowing them down once they make landfall Sullivan 2005 For every 12 kilometers of wetlands storm surges are reduced one meter Sullivan 2005 However New Orleans is now increasingly exposed to violent storms because so many of the wetlands have collapsed in part due to the levee system that surrounds the city Sullivan 2005 In addition barrier islands pro vide protection for half a million people from violent storms along with an international commercialindus trial complex worth billions Verchick 2010 p 34 Yet these barrier islands are rapidly disappearing Verchick 2010 p 3435 Although whether climate change contributed to Hurricane Katrina is unclear the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change considers it likely that climate change will lead to future Katrinas According to the IPCC it is likely that future tropical cyclones typhoons and hurricanes will become more intense with larger peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation asso ciated with ongoing increases of tropical SSTs IPCC 2007 p 15 We know with somewhat more confidence that climate change will destroy the wetlands that buffer storm surges Sea level rise is one of the most predict able consequences of climate change20 Apart from the unknown contribution from melting ice sheets in Green land and Antarctica21 the simple change in temperature of the oceans will contribute to thermal expansion just as increased temperature causes the mercury in a ther mometer to rise22 This rise in sea level will result in loss of coastal lands23 increased exposure to flood damage not to mention such other harms as salt water intrusion into estuaries and drinking water supplies24 The Katrina disaster illustrates the close rela tionship between disaster law and land use planning A key method of mitigating disaster risks is to avoid 18 Stott et al 2004 p 610 Fortunately nothing of this severity has struck Brazil although one heat wave in 2010 killed over thirty people See Associated Press 2010a 19 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system see McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 20 See eg Hasselman et al 2003 p 1923 Figure 2 predicting a two meter increase in sea level under a business as usual scenario by 2100 but only 20 centimeters under an optimum regulatory strategy 21 On the potential for catastrophic melting in these areas see Stern 2007 p 16 and IPCC 2007 p 16 22 Changes in ocean temperature will also affect fish stocks See Portner and Knust 2007 p 95 23 Pittock 2005 gives examples including China p 264 India Pakistan Bangladesh p 268 and the United States p 278 24 See Kolbert 2006 p 123124 British governmental study indicating that what are now hundredyear floods could become routine by late in this century See also Pittock 2005 p 118 stating that without adaptive measures annual flood losses would increase from 124 billion in different scenarios Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 11 putting people and key facilities in harms way More over land use controls can help maintain key buffers like coastal wetlands as a form of natural infrastructure Brazil has not suffered a storm of the scale of Ka trina but storms and flooding remain serious problems Torrential rains inundated a heavily populated steep sloped area about 40 miles north of Rio de Janeiro on Tuesday and Wednesday triggering flash floods and mudslides that have claimed at least 511 lives Rainfall amounts of approximately 300 mm 12 inches fell in just a few hours in the hardesthit regions Teresopolis and Nova Friburgo Many more people are missing and the death toll is expected to go much higher once rescuers reach remote villages that have been cut off from communications The death toll makes the Janu ary 2011 floods Brazils worst singleday natural di saster in its history Brazil suffers hundreds of deaths each year due to flooding and mudslides but the past 12 months have been particularly devastating Flooding and landslides near Rio in April last year killed 246 pe ople and did about 13 billion in damage and at least 85 people perished last January during a similar event Romm 2011 As noted earlier these losses are not simply un avoidable acts of nature they also reflect lack of prepara tion As one Brazilian expert explained The important thing is to plan Zoning and urban planning are needed and must take climatic aspects into account Frayssinet 2009 Moreover the victims are likely to be the poor who cannot afford to live in safer areas Frayssinet 2009 Hurricane Katrina also illustrates the link be tween disasters and inequality Equality issues were im possible to miss during the Hurricane Katrina disaster Consider the New Orleans Superdome which offered shelter of last resort The Dome was a brewing pub lic health disaster The number of people inside had doubled in twentyfour hours becoming a virtual city of twentythousand overwhelmingly poor and African American McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 235 For days it was clear to anyone watching television that the majority of people trapped in New Orleans were Afri can Americans most from the low end of the income spectrum McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 300 For much of New Orleans white population had departed before the storm hit while the remainder lived in ar eas closer to dry land and found it easier to escape McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 300 Ultimately the Congressional Research Service found that an estimat ed 272000 black people were displaced by flooding or damage accounting for 73 of the population affected by the storm in the parish Gabe 2005 p 14 1617 The connection of race and poverty with evacu ation rates was not unique to Katrina As the National Research Council found Research has shown that different racial ethnic in come and special needs groups respond in different ways to warning information and evacuation orders Lowerincome groups innercity residents and el derly persons are more likely to have to rely on public transportation rather than personal vehicles in order to evacuate Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences National Research Council Future Challenges and Opportunities 2006 p 129 Both globally and within the United States so cial injustice contributes so heavily to the incidence and intensity of natural disasters that the quest for equality may be regarded as a valuable tool for improving disas ter preparedness response mitigation compensation and rebuilding Farber et al 2010 p 204 In all four of these disaster examplesnuclear risks oil spills heat waves and floodingwe see a close relationship between a sudden catastrophic event and a longterm environmental problem or regulatory fail ure Good environmental law decreases the likelihood and severity of natural disasters Failure to protect the environment has the converse effect The greatest envi ronmental problem of our time is climate change Part III shows how climate change will bring environmental issues and even disaster law closer together Climate Change Planning for A SlowMoving Disaster Environmental law and disaster law encounter each other most fully in the arena of climate change Cli mate change happens over a period of many years but the effects may be as severe as any natural disaster Cli mate change is already underway With rare exceptions recent years rank at the top of the list of the warm est global temperatures Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 43 and depending on future emissions and climate sensitivity the world will end up 27 C warmer than it is today Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 129 Tempera ture change in the arctic will be about twice as large Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 133 Even warming of 2 C which may be the best we can hope for would leave the earth warmer than it has been in millions of years Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 225 Other changes are also foreseeable around the world Snow cover will decrease in most areas Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 147 and oceans will become Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil 12 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 increasingly acidic Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 148 Even moderate climate change will trigger significant extinctions Archer and Rahmstorf 2010 p 162 and extreme events such as fires floods and heat waves will become more widespread25 Adaptation to these im pending changes poses serious challenges26 Extreme events such as floods and drought cause extensive dam age to many parts of society and thus a critical issue for adaptation is the degree to which frequency intensity and persistence of extreme events change Easterling III et al 2004 p 17 The effects of climate change have been mod eled in detail for the United States The US will expe rience significant temperature changes27 Temperatures are expected to rise everywhere but more inland than in coastal or southern areas in the continental United States with the greatest increases in Northern Alaska US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 29 In the Southeast United States even though absolute changes will be smaller the baseline is high resulting in many more very hot days later in this century US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 112 In the Midwest urban life will be burdened by increasing heat waves and decreased air quality US Global Change Re search Program 2010 p 117 Sea level rise due to climate change may cause dramatic losses in wetlands in the United States Laz aroff 2002 Twothirds of all US coastal wetlands would be lost with a onemeter rise in sea level Laz aroff 2002 p 84 This loss would be in addition to extensive past losses of wetlands in Louisiana Laz aroff 2002 p 84 and continued loss of lands The sa linity of remaining wetlands estuaries and tidal rivers would also change Lazaroff 2002 p 114 Hurricanes which may increase in intensity result in further loss of coastal lands Hurricane Katrina for example elimi nated over two hundred square miles roughly 500 km2 of wetlands Lazaroff 2002 p 115 What used to be a one hundredyear flood in New York City is now an eightyyear flood and may be a twentyyear flood by midcentury Cullen 2010 p 238 Correspondingly even more severe floods will become more frequent Changes stemming from sea level rise will not neces sarily be gradual There could be sudden loss of protec tive lands that buffer storm surges or in abrupt intru sions of salt water into aquifers US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 115 Sea level rise will also cause other harms in the United States Because the slope of coastal areas on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts is low a fortycentimeter rise in sea level could result in as much as sixty meters of beach erosion and may cost billions of dollars Gross man 2003 p 1214 Finally as noted earlier sea level rise can result in widespread salt intrusion into aqui fers as well as severe beach erosion wetlands loss and flooding US Global Change Research Program 2010 p 114 Although the predictions are subject to uncer tainty climate change also appears to be a serious issue for Brazil Brazil is vulnerable to climate change not least due to its fragile biologically diverse ecosystems The tropical rain forest in the Amazon and the Pantanal wetland are of particular concern There is also concern that coral reefs along Brazilian coastlines could suffer from the effects of climate change Changing rainfall patterns especially in the drought affected northeastern region of the country will mean poorer water resources and a reduced water supply Floods which are already a serious problem for various regions may increase Coastal areas where the bulk of the population and economic activities are concentrated will be vulnerable to rising sea levels La Rovere and Pereira 2007 According to a report commissioned by the Eu ropean Commission After the long period of drought in 2005 omputeri zed forecasting systems detected that the integrity of the Amazon rainforests could be affected by the pro cesses of savannah expansion Over the past decades increases in temperature and erratic rainfall have led to a massive reversal in carbon absorption Trees are dying out more rapidly where the droughts have been most intense AGRIFOR Consult 2009 p 14 A recent report by the Hadley Centre in Britain reports that sea level rise could have a major impact on Brazil One study places Brazil within the top 15 countries simulated to show an increased exposure from SLR sea level rise relative to present in the 2070s based upon a global assessment of 136 port cities A 10 in tensification of the current 1in100year storm surge 25 These challenges are discussed in Bonyhady et al 2010 US Government Accountability Office 2010 26 For an overview of the failures in planning the levee system see McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 p 7086 27 The most recent information about US climate impacts can be found in US Global Change Research Program 2010 hereinafter US Impacts Farber Disaster law and emerging issues in Brazil Revista de Estudos Constitucionais Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito RECHTD 41 215 13 combined with a 1m SLR could affect around 15 of Brazils coastal land area and 30 of the coastal popu lation Met Office Hadley Center 2011 p 121 Given these risks it is not too soon for major countries such as the United States and Brazil to begin planning to deal with the effects of climate change The US government is just beginning to seriously address adaptation issues following most of a decade in which climate change issues of all kinds were ignored or down played President Obama appointed a task force com posed of key federal agencies to investigate adaptation The Task Forces Report is a solid step forward in prepar ing the US to deal with the challenges of climate change The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 There are three key recommendations relating to domestic adaptation measures at the federal level First according to the Report adaptation needs to become a standard part of agency planning The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 10 2526 The plans should focus on ecosystems rather than either individual species or governmental ju risdictions The White House Council On Environmen tal Quality 2010 p 22 An important recommendation is that adaptation plans should prioritize the most vul nerable people places and infrastructure The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 11 Adaptation plans should prioritize helping people pla ces and infrastructure that are most vulnerable to cli mate impacts They should also be designed and imple mented with meaningful involvement from all parts of society Issues of inequality and environmental justice associated with climate change impacts and adaptation should be addressed The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 21 This recommendation has obvious relevance for disas ter planning as well Second the government needs to ensure that sci entific information about the impacts of climate change is easily accessible The White House Council On En vironmental Quality 2010 p 3033 Without solid sci entific information public and private sector decision makers cannot plan intelligently This effort would build on the US Geologic Survey and its National Climate As sessment The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 23 49 There is a similar need for public information regarding disaster risks Third the government needs to address climate impacts that cut across agency jurisdictions and missions The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 34 Unfortunately this is the case for many of the main impacts such as those that threaten water re sources The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3536 public health The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3738 oceans and coasts The White House Council On Envi ronmental Quality 2010 p 4243 and communities The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 3940 Some important arenas for agency action are to improve wateruse efficiency The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 36 strengthen pub lic health systems The White House Council On Envi ronmental Quality 2010 p 38 integrate climate risks into insurance The White House Council On Environ mental Quality 2010 p 41 and develop an opensource risk assessment model The White House Council On Environmental Quality 2010 p 21 Some of these recommendations are relevant only for the United States but others provide useful guidance in other countries such as Brazil Disaster planning is increasingly connected with adaptation plan ning In the coming era disasters will result from inter linked changes in physical and ecological systems due to climate change Thus disaster planning will need to be part of a broader effort that takes into account climate change natural capital and societal resilience The events discussed in this articlenuclear ac cidents floods oil spills heat waves and severe air pol lutioncan all be classified as environmental disasters We can consider an environmental disaster to be one that destroys important environmental amenities or one in which harm to human interests is mediated by an environmental change The BP oil spill easily fits both criteria it was harmful to natural ecological systems and the harm was mediated by water pollution The 2003 European heat wave also damaged natural systems and it was at least made much more likely by human changes in the Earths atmosphere The tsunami was not caused by human activities but the ensuing nuclear reactor fail ures were as much a failure of effective regulation as they were the effect of the tsunami itself In the era of climate change environmental law will no longer be able to marginalize disaster law as a dis tant cousin Disasters both natural and humaninduced are an increasingly common feature of 21st century life appropriate legal guidance can ensure that disasters are anticipated and contained in a comprehensive and equi table manner Disaster law is a complex multifaceted and rapidly expanding body of thought one that ad dresses the dire need for a systematic thoughtful ap proach to managing the chaos of disasters 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Effects of Air Pollution on Childrens Health in a City in Southeastern Brazil Revista de Saude Publica 4017782 httpdxdoiorg101590S003489102006000100013 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 2010 Deep Water The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Available at httpwww oilspillcommissiongovfinalreport Access on 06082012 NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY OF JAPAN 2011 Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake Available at wwwnpagojparchive keibibikihigaijokyoepdf Access on 06082012 NOLON JR RODRIGUEZ D B 2007 Losing ground a nation on edge Washington DC Environmental Law Institute 491 p OLMO NRS 2011 A Review of LowLevel Air Pollution and Adverse Effects on Human Health Implications for Epidemiological Studies and Public Policy Clinics 664681690 httpdxdoiorg101590S180759322011000400025 ONISHI N 2011 Seawalls Offered Little Protection Against Tsunamis Crushing Waves NY 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Accessed 08092013 0727 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms Conditions of Use available at httpwwwjstororgpageinfoaboutpoliciestermsjsp JSTOR is a notforprofit service that helps scholars researchers and students discover use and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship For more information about JSTOR please contact supportjstororg Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize preserve and extend access to International Studies Review httpwwwjstororg This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions International Studies Review 2007 9 122 REFLECTION EVALUATION INTEGRATION What Are International Institutions1 JOHN DUFFIELD Department of Political Science Georgia State University International institutions are a central focus of international relations scholarship as well as of policymaking efforts around the world Despite their importance our scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted def inition of just what they are Instead scholars have employed a range of largely nonoverlapping conceptions contributing to a fragmentation of the literature and hindering theoretical cumulation This essay seeks to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs It first reviews the principal ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcomings It then develops a definition that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that result from employing the new definition both in improving existing scholarship and by suggest ing valuable new avenues of research There are at least as many definitions of international institutions as there are theoretical perspectives Thomas Risse 2002605 Over the years international institutions of various typestreaties organiza tions regimes conventions and so onhave grown greatly in numbers and im portance Paralleling this growth the scholarly literature on international relations has seen successive waves of efforts to describe and explain institutional phenom ena Indeed international institutions have frequently been at the center of leading theoretical debates in the field Nevertheless this scholarly literature lacks a widely accepted definition of inter national institutions an absence that has had several unfortunate consequences First the term is frequently used to refer to distinctly different empirical phenom ena such as intergovernmental organizations IGOs international regimes and sets of norms Not only does this practice result in much potential for confusion but it means that the findings of most studies of international institutions apply to only limited sets of institutional forms For example John Richards 1999 An earlier version of this essay was presented at Georgia State University Emory University and the annual meeting of the International Studies Association New Orleans 2002 The author wishes to thank the many individuals who have offered helpful comments and suggestions including Chip Carey Jeff Checkel Martha Finnemore Jeff Legro Cecilia Lynch Ron Mitchell Dan Reiter Michael Smith Nina Tannenwald and Al Yee as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers of a number of journals 2007 International Studies Review Publishedby Blackwell Publishing 350 Main Street Malden MA02148 USA and 9600 Garsington Road Oxford OX4 2DQ UK This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 What Are International Institutions positive theory of international institutions in fact concerns only interstate regulatory agreements Second a number of scholarly works may have been unnecessarily flawed because of their failure to recognize the various distinct forms that international institutions can take As a result some studies have defined institutions in one way only to use the term later to refer to other forms For example Barbara Korem enos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001762 define international institu tions as explicit arrangements negotiated among international actors that prescribe proscribe andor authorize behavior yet they proceed to include in their analysis the very different form of international organization that performs various functions as actor or agent More seriously it may be unacknowledged variation in the nature of the institutions themselves rather than other factors that account for the patterns of outcomes that such studies seek to explain Third the international relations literature remains unnecessarily balkanized as adherents of different conceptions talk past one another when they attempt to communicate at all In particular the field is characterized by still largely isolated rationalist and constructivist camps which emphasize more or less formal rules and intersubjective norms respectively Although significant progress is being made within specific research programs the result has been a patchwork understanding of international institutions rather than the development of comprehensive theory As Martha Finnemore 1996b326 has noted incommensurable definitions mean that despite similarities in labeling rationalist and sociological approachesall called institutionalisthave little in common Not only do general claims about the causes or consequences of international institutions possess only limited validity but potentially important phenomena and interesting questions that transcend the conceptions employed by individual research programs may be overlooked In order to remedy this unsatisfactory state of affairs a broad definition of in ternational institutions that incorporates the most important institutional forms is required Certainly such a definition is a prerequisite for the development of any equally comprehensive theories on the subject As Elinor Ostrom 19864 has ar gued no scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of key terms Likewise a comprehensive definition would provide a common framework within which one could locate more specific types of inter national institutions and relate them to one another facilitating a fuller appreciation of their similarities and differences as well as the links between them This essay seeks to address this need It first reviews the principal ways in which international institutions have been conceptualized and identifies their shortcom ings It then develops a definition of international institutions that promises to be inclusive of what are commonly regarded as the most important institutional forms without losing analytical coherence To this end international institutions are de fined here as relatively stable sets of related constitutive regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the international system the actors in the system including states as well as nonstate entities and their activities This definition integrates existing conceptions while expressing two important distinctions one ontological and one functional that are not simultaneously present in any existing definition A final section discusses some of the concrete benefits that may result from employing this new definition It is proposed that this new definition will both improve existing scholarship and suggest new avenues of research Existing Definitions of International Institutions Robert Keohanes 1988382 critical observation that institutions are often dis cussed without being defined at all or after having been defined only casually is hardly less true today than when it was made nearly two decades ago Indeed even This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions parei 1102 JOHN DUFFIELD 3 works that purport to provide general surveys of institutional phenomena often offer only the most cursory discussions of the meaning of the term institution if they provide any at all In his landmark study The Anarchical Society for example Hedley Bull 1977 explores the contributions of the institutions of international society to international order without anywhere defining explicitly the former2 Likewise two otherwise valuable recent overviews of the institutional literature fail to grapple with the fundamental question ofjust what international institutions are At least Steven Weber 1997233 frankly acknowledges that he will sneak by the challenge of defining an institution with the justification that the approaches he discusses are sufficiently different that to develop one definition that will travel across them would be difficult In contrast the contribution by Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons 1998 on theoretical and empirical studies of international insti tutions in the special fiftieth anniversary issue of International Organization does not even raise the question of definitions and the preface by Martin and Simmons 20011 in a subsequent edited volume on international institutions offers only a oneparagraph definitional comment When scholars have paid careful attention to definitional issues they have some times offered conceptions that are excessively broad including elements that are best viewed as distinct from institutions For example K J Holsti 20042023 describes institutions in terms of patterned practices and actions sets of ideas or beliefs and norms and rules Although he is attentive to the causal links between these components many scholars would regard one or more of them as unneces sary or superfluous to a definition of institutions per se No less frustrating for students of international institutions has been the existence of several generally nonoverlapping conceptions that are less than comprehensive As a result wellintentioned efforts to bring clarity to the subject have in some ways only added to the confusion These conceptions can be grouped roughly into four categories institutions as formal organizations practices rules and norms Traditional Conceptions Institutions as Formal Organizations Traditionally scholars and others have frequently used the term international institution to refer to formal international organizations for example the inter national financial institutions of the International Monetary Fund IMF and the World Bank The equation of organizations with institutions may have made a certain amount of sense in the 1950s and 1960s when international organizations were the principal subject of institutional inquiry by scholars As studies of other international institutional forms such as regimes have proliferated in the past three decades however such a restricted construction of the concept has become misleading and as a result inappropriate Nevertheless the practice has remained common even in highly theoretical works For example Arthur Stein 199027 fn 3 implicitly equates international institutions with international organizations In Institutions and Collective Action Wayne Sandholtz 1993 explicitly identifies the Commission of the European Community as an institution In Institutions for the Earth Peter Haas Robert Keohane and Marc Levy 1993397 focus almost exclusively on the activities of international organizations Finally in Credibility Costs and Institutions Lisa Martin 1993423 operationalizes international institutions in terms of interna tional organizations 2See also Barry Buzan 2004169 More generally Buzan 2004167 acknowledges that most English School writers spend little if any time defining what they mean by the institutions of international society This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 What Are International Institutions Early Sociological Conceptions Institutions as Practices The emergence of the literature on international regimes in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to the first conscious efforts by international relations scholars to view international institutions in broader terms and to define them systematically Leading regime theorists such as Oran Young 1980332 1986107 and Robert Keohane 198457 argued that regimes should be conceptualized as social insti tutions which in turn required that institutions be defined Young 198393 himself made the first careful attempt to provide a definition of international institutions Borrowing from sociology he developed an initial def inition of social institutions as recognized patterns of behavior or practice around which expectations converge In the late 1980s Young 1989506 presented a more refined version identifiable practices consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occu pants of these roles Thus for Young international institutions are social insti tutions governing the activities of the members of international society Although pathbreaking Youngs initial attempt to define international institutions never developed a strong following within the community of international relations scholars The precise reasons for this lack of popularity are difficult to ascertain Nevertheless one can identify at least three aspects of Youngs definition that limited its usefulness and attractiveness In one sense this earlier sociological conception was too narrow Young 1986108 also 198932 drew a sharp distinction between social institutions and organizations which he defined as material entities possessing physical locations or seats offices personnel equipment and budgets According to Young 19891213 25 social institutions in general and international institutions in particular may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizations In fact this distinction was probably exaggerated In focusing on the material aspects of organizations Young overlooked the fact that many notably intergovernmental organizations are primarily sets of roles and rules In another sense this sociological conception was too broad at least in the view of many political scientists as revealed by Youngs 198933 statement that even war is a social institution see also Bull 1977 Young 1986107 Certainly the ways in which wars have been practiced at different times and places may have been shaped by social institutions but many would disagree with the assertion that wara state of open armed often prolonged conflict carried on between nations states or parties by one authoritative definition Morris 1975is a social institution given that it is not necessarily rule governed for example Holsti 2004 chapter 9 Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the sociological conceptions from which Young drew inspiration however is the close degree to which they associate in stitutions with behavior Whether the precise term used is behavior or practice the primary emphasis is on the actions and activities of the actors concerned rather than other institutional features Consistent with this interpretation Young 198913 fn 5 explicitly notes the importance of a behavioral approach to the empirical identification of regimes Although this behavioral conception of insti tutions may have some uses it nevertheless requires limiting ones explanatory ambitions accordingly or risking committing the logical fallacy of first identifying institutions on the basis of observed behavior and then using them to explain that same behavior Keohane 199327 Rationalist Conceptions Institutions as Rules Much more common in the literature is the rationalist or rationalistic conception of institutions as sets of more or less formal rules In rationalist analysis agents are assumed to act rationally to maximize their utilities subject to external constraints This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 5 Figuring importantly among these constraints are institutions which in the ra tionalist conception are consciously constructed frameworks established by agents seeking to promote or protect their interests see Scott 199527 Krasner 199960 According to Simmons and Martin 2002194 most scholars have come to regard international institutions as sets of rules meant to govern international be havior such that rules are often conceived of as statements that forbid require or permit particular kinds of actions Somewhat more broadly Keohane 1988343 19893 has defined institutions as persistent and connected sets of rules formal or informal that prescribe behavioral roles constrain activity and shape expect ations3 This definition and variations of it have been widely although not uni versally cited in theoretical studies of international institutions for example Martin 199239 Weber 1997233 Moreover a leading critic of institutional the ories has advanced a very similar definition Mearsheimer 199419958 thereby facilitating a constructive debate between those who find international institutions to be highly consequential and those who do not What have been the attractions of the rationalist conception of international institutions as rules especially in comparison with the sociological conception as expressed by Young Perhaps most importantly it distinguishes sharply between institutions and behavior given that the purpose of much rationalist theorizing is precisely to explain actions and outcomes for example Simmons and Martin 2002194 Thus this conception avoids the danger of tautological reasoning that has so concerned the critics of behavioral conceptions Indeed Young 1996x himself has offered a revised definition of institutions that like Keohanes places primary emphasis on rules and clearly differentiates between them and behavior As a result and in conjunction with rational actor assumptions more generally this conception has proven to be very productive in terms of generating powerful yet parsimonious explanatory theories Rationalist theories view international in stitutions as affecting behavior and outcomes by structuring the incentives and constraints that characterize the strategic environment within which instrumentally motivated utilitymaximizing actors operate More specifically institutional rules can reduce transaction costs establish benchmarks for evaluating the behavior of others provide information promote issue linkage and facilitate enforcement for example Keohane 1988386 Krasner 198869 Martin 19927 39 Despite its popularity and demonstrated usefulness the rationalist conception of international institutions as sets of more or less formal rules also contains features that have limited its acceptanceand will in all probability continue to do so As a practical matter this conception too seems to omit important classes of interna tional institutions It leaves unclear the status of international organizationssome definitions include them for example Keohane 198934 whereas others do not for example Simmons and Martin 2002194and international law And it would appear to have no place for the most fundamental institutions of the in ternational system such as state sovereignty4 These omissions may follow from two more fundamental limitations First the emphasis on rules that are consciously devised by those who would be subject to them necessarily obscures the intersubjective and deontic characteri stics that are often associated with institutions As an analyst of the kindred new 3Keohane did not himself describe this definition as rationalist Indeed he viewed it as being potentially useful for both rationalist and what he termed reflective approaches to the study of international institutions personal communication Nevertheless the equation of institutions with rules is strongly associated with rationalist schol arship not only in political science but in economics and in more recent years sociology as well And even Keohane for example 1990733 has sometimes emphasized the more formal forms 4Keohane 1988385 391 himself has treated sovereign statehood as an institution He has repeatedly described it however as a practice rather than as a set of rules per se in the context of those institutions that consist of general patterns of activity thereby verging on Youngs behavioral conception This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 What Are International Institutions institutionalism in economics has observed actors merely acknowledge the ex istence of the rule systemsrecognizing the validity of the ruleswithout neces sarily believing that the rules are fair or justified Scott 199536 Yet as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie 1986364368 argue in a seminal article on inter national regimes that could apply just as well to the broader concept of interna tional institutions we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior Hence the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity In addition they note what distinguishes international regimes from other international phenomenafrom strategic interaction let us sayis a specifically normative element Second the rationalist conceptions emphasis on the behavioral consequences of rules diverts attention from the ways in which institutions may endow actors with certain powers and capacities and in some cases even create them As Ruggie 1998871 has argued rationalist approaches lack any concept of constitutive rules Instead actors and their interests are typically treated as given and exog enous to the institutions in question see also Krasner 198869 Scott 199529 In contrast Young 19891516 to his credit places equal weight on the roles inherent in international institutions and the rights associated with them Constructivist Sociological Conceptions Institutions as Norms At least partly in response to the limitations of the dominant rationalist conception just discussed yet another sociological conception of international institutions which is commonly called constructivist has emerged in more recent years In the words of Finnemore and Sikkink 2001392 constructivists focus on the role of ideas norms knowledge culture and argument in politics stressing in par ticular the role of collectively held or intersubjective ideas and understandings on social life Accordingly the constructivist conception places primary and often explicit emphasis on the intersubjective aspect of international institutions As such constructivists regard institutions as fundamentally ideational phenomena involving ideas that are shared by members of a collectivity Wendt 199994 96 In contrast to the rationalist conception advocates of this perspective emphasize that institutions are often not created consciously by human beings but emerge slowly through a less deliberative process and that they are frequently taken for granted by the people who are affected by them Keohane 1988389 see also Barnett 1996159 The term that is most often employed to represent these qualities is norm Within this literature social institutions are generally viewed as consisting of norms or sets of norms for example Klotz 199519 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Wendt 199996 Norms in turn are usually defined by constructivists as socially shared expectations understandings or standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity for example Klotz 199514 Finnemore 1996a22 Katzenstein 19965 Legro 199733 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Boekle Rittberger and Wagner 2001106 Constructivists typically go on to distinguish between two main types of norms for example Klotz 19951415 Katzenstein 19965 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Ruggie 1998871 First there are regulative regulatory or prescrip tive norms These are similar to the rules stressed in rationalist conceptions insofar as they order and constrain behavior Unlike more or less formal rules however they have an essentially evaluative or deontic quality As Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 have written it is precisely the prescriptive or evaluative quality of oughtness that sets norms apart from other kinds of rules Second and representing a more fundamental departure from rationalist conceptions there are constitutive norms for example Keohane 1988382 Krasner 198867 Wendt and Duvall 19896063 Klotz 199519 Barnett 1996159 This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 7 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 Ruggie 1998 These components of institutions generate agents endow them with certain capabilities and powers and determine their underlying identities interests and preferences They also define social ac tivities and categories of action Indeed in the words of John Searle 199527 they create the very possibility of certain activities Not only does the constructivist conception in contrast to the rationalist approach highlight the intersubjective and constitutive aspects of international institutions it also distinguishes if not always explicitly between institutions and practices unlike the earlier sociological approach see for example Wendt and Duvall 198962 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 Nevertheless the constructivist conception has not yet had an impact on the international relations literature comparable to that of the rationalist viewpoint In contrast to the sociological and rationalist conceptions considered above it continues to lack a prominent defini tional expression comparable with those provided by Young and Keohane More generally it is the least well developed of the various conceptions in no small part because many of its adherents have not been primarily concerned with exploring the nature determinants or consequences of international institutions per se an important exception is Risse 2002 A more fundamental problem is that in its attempt to correct for the thinness of its rationalist counterpart the constructivist conception may go too far in the other direction In particular it seems to neglect the formal features that are often characteristic of specific international institutions at least as they are popularly conceived Presumably many scholars would disagree with the conten tion that one must necessarily probe beneath the surface for intersubjective norms before one can regard a particular treaty or organization as an international institution A New Definition of International Institutions Even though several useful conceptions of international institutions can be found in the international relations literature each has limitations that prevent it from serv ing as an adequate foundation for the development of comprehensive theories of international institutions Still needed is an analytically coherent yet sufficiently encompassing definition that can facilitate theoretical progress on a broad front The following section aspires to provide such a definition This effort is based on several principles First an adequate definition should be comprehensive enough to accommodate all commonly regarded forms of interna tional institutions At the same time however a definition should not be so ex pansive as to be rendered analytically useless One must guard against blurring the distinction between international institutions and related but arguably distinct phenomena such as ideas in general or international cooperation Second in view of the diversity of international institutions a definition should facilitate the differentiation and comparison among specific forms But such a def inition should not go as far as Elinor Ostrom 19864 who has argued that the multiple referents for the term institution indicates sic that multiple concepts need to be separately identified and treated as separate terms Nevertheless any definition that does not simultaneously lay the groundwork for a taxonomy of international institutions would be inadequate Third and finally the definition should contain a logical basis for this differen tiation It is not sufficient simply to provide a list and description of different types of international institutions Rather it is important to place any taxonomy on a solid analytical footing if it is to have a substantial empirical and theoretical payoff see also Raymond 1997226 In view of these considerations it is proposed that international institutions be defined as relatively stable sets of related constitutive regulative and procedural This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 What Are International Institutions norms and rules that pertain to the international system the actors in the system including states as well as nonstate entities and their activities Any particular international institution need not contain all of these elements Indeed it might consist of only one for instance constitutive norms or procedural rules although most international institutions are unlikely to be so simple It is also important to acknowledge that the terms relatively stable and related are inherently sub jective so some clarification may be helpful By the former is meant that an in stitution will exhibit at least some persistence durability and resilience in the face of changing circumstances By the latter is meant that institutional elements are associated or connected in some meaningful way such as by a functional or formal relationship However where one locates the boundaries of any particular insti tution may not be obvious and may be disputed by others This definition clearly represents an amalgamation and synthesis of existing conceptions of international institutions and thus owes a substantial debt to the conceptual efforts of others especially Keohane and Young As such though it also seeks to express two important distinctionsone ontological and one functionalthat are not simultaneously present in any other definition and that serve as the analytical basis for a comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions These two distinctions are explored in some detail in the remainder of this section5 Ontological Distinctions Intersubjective versus Formal Elements The first distinction is between the intersubjective and formal elements of institu tions as emphasized by the constructivist and rationalist conceptions respectively Although these elements may often be tightly intertwined as a practical matter they can and should be distinguished conceptually In order to express this distinction let us use the word norms as used by constructivists to refer to the intersub jective elements and the word rules as used by rationalists to refer to the formal elements Admittedly this linguistic choice is not unproblematic and some readers may object to it The words norms and rules have been assigned numerous meanings in the international relations literature Typically moreover these mean ings are quite similar and the words are often used interchangeably see for example Keohane 1988383 Kratochwil 1989 Onuf 1989129130 Cortell and Davis 1996 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 Risse 2002604 Holsti 2004 Never theless such a distinction is not inconsistent with their broader usage and for lack of better terms would seem to provide an adequate way of expressing the onto logical difference that is of concern here Although few institutions may be entirely ideational in nature constructivists have made a compelling case for viewing them as intersubjective at least in part Thus to an important extent institutions may exist in the minds of people and need not be written down anywhere As such they may be characterized as shared mental models Denzau and North 1994 Wendt 199996 see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986764765 These features of institutions typically arise spontaneously rather than through a process of negotiation although they may subsequently be codified in writing or formal statements This has been the case for many human rights norms laws of war and diplomatic conventions Likewise given their implicitly consensual nature norms cannot be imposed although they can be 5These are not the only potentially important distinctions one can make among international institutions For example Young 198913 distinguishes between international ordersbroad framework arrangements governing the activities of all or almost all members of international societyand international regimes that are more spe cialized arrangements that pertain to welldefined activities resources or geographical areas and often involve only some subset of the members of international society Similarly the English School literature differentiates between primary institutions which define the basic character and purpose of international society and secondary insti tutions which are more akin to regimes Buzan 2004xviii 167 This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 9 inculcated via such processes as persuasion and socialization see for example the norm life cycle described in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998895905 The other fundamental characteristic of the intersubjective elements of interna tional institutions that bears repeating is their deontic evaluative or normative quality6 They are shared beliefs about the way things should be or how things should be done Norms as the term is used here carry a sense of obligation a sense that they ought to be followed Chayes and Chayes 1995113 emphasis in the original see also Goertz and Diehl 1992638639 Raymond 1997217218 One conse quence of this characteristic of norms is that they are counterfactually valid No single counterfactual occurrence refutes a norm Not even many such occurrences necessarily do Rather whether a violation weakens a norm does not depend on how the community assesses the violation and responds to it Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986767 see also Raymond 1997218 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 For instance the fact that noncombatants are sometimes intentionally targeted in war does not necessarily mean there is no norm of noncombatant immunity Nevertheless norms do vary in strength Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 and as a result they are likely to exert differing degrees of influence The strength of a norm is determined by at least two factors One is the fraction of the members of a social system that share the norm or what has been called concordance Legro 199735 or commonality Boekle Rittberger and Wagner 2001 For example there is near universal agreement that chemical weapons should never be used Price 1995 whereas the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention remains highly contested for example Roberts 2003 Another is the intensity with which the norm is typically held by members of the social system Some norms may involve little sense of obligation whereas others may be so deeply internalized as to be taken for granted Contrast the proscription of the use of force with the antislavery norm How do we know whether such institutions actually exist More specifically how can we assess how widely shared a particular norm is or how strongly it is held No scholarly consensus exists on the measurement of norms Nevertheless nonbehav ioral evidence for the existence of norms can be culled from a number of sources including surveys experiments interviews and participant observation see for example Hechter and Opp 2001 And in the study of international norms in which it is often difficult to interact directly with the actors involved one can and must examine what people say and write using such methods as content discourse and historical analysis see for example Raymond 1997 As Finnemore and Sikkink 1998892 note because norms exist in the mind we can have only indirect evidence of their existence just as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for political action Nevertheless precisely because norms by definition embody a quality of oughtness and shared moral assessment norms prompt justifications for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study Indeed norms must be expressed from time to time verbally or on paper consciously or unconsciously for otherwise they could not be shared by members of a social group What people say and write not only reveals but reaffirms or reinforces their beliefs and in some cases even helps create new norms Thus a number of constructivist international relations scholars have pointed to the need to examine communicative processes or discourse in order to identify norms see for example Klotz 19952933 Finnemore 1996a2324 200315 Indeed as much as two decades ago Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986774 argued for the need for an interpretive approach to the study of regimes in light of their inherently dialogical nature In this sense identifying norms is akin to the process 6Likewise Finnemore and Sikkink 1998891 maintain that both the intersubjective and the evaluative di mensions are inescapable when discussing norms and Goertz and Diehl 1992635 write that the term norm reflects the deontological component that is lacking in the term rule This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10 What Are International Institutions of determining whether a customary international law exists States must perceive that a particular practice is obligatory or required by law How then do we know this is the case According to international legal scholars an important part of the process is an examination of the statements of government leaders and spokes persons Arend 199948 Nevertheless reliance on evidence of this type sometimes poses novel challenges For instance the more strongly held a norm is the less evidence there may be of its existence Finnemore 1996a23 has pointed out that many norms are so intern alized and taken for granted that violations do not occur and the norm is hard to recognize As an illustration she cites the norm of statehood as the only appro priate and legitimate political unit in international politics Indeed so deeply root ed is this norm that most scholarship has treated and continues to treat states as naturally occurring and inevitable rather than as socially constructed and histor ically contingent Finnemore 1996a23 Intersubjective norms do not exhaust the characteristics of institutions however Institutions typically have formal elements as well to which above we assigned the term rules Indeed it is these elements of international institutions that are most familiar Consider as illustrations the United Nations Charter the North Atlantic Treaty the Kyoto Protocol or the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA As these examples suggest moreover the formal elements of interna tional institutions in contrast to norms can have an existence that is entirely separate from the agents that devised them Norms and other intersubjective phenomena require human consciousness to be sustained A related feature of rules as the term is used here is that they need not cor respond to what any affected party actually prefers or thinks should be the case In contrast to the intersubjective elements of international institutions they need not possess any evaluative or deontic content no moral opprobrium is necessarily at tached to their violation Rather rules simply concern what things are and how things are done for instance the membership of the UN Security Council the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization WTO and the voting rules of the IMF Indeed as these examples suggest rules may clash with the normative beliefs of many of the actors to which they apply Thus a rule may be imposed by one actor on others whereas a norm may not and those upon whom the rule is imposed may feel no sense of obligation to adhere to it although they may comply for other reasons Just as norms may vary in strength rules may exhibit differing degrees of for mality or formalization Charles Lipson 1991 has distinguished between more or less formal agreements on the basis of the level at which the agreement is made within the government and the form that it takes Thus a rule may be stated verbally such as through an oral agreement or written down such as in an inter state treaty Aust 2000 For their part treaties may simply be signed as in an executive agreement or be subject to formal ratification by a legislative body Other possibilities lying along this spectrum include memoranda of understanding exchanges of notes and joint communiques Similarly some international legal scholars have sought to make a distinction between hard legalization and various instruments of soft law Chinkin 1989 Abbott and Snidal 2000 Among the latter figure interstate agreements that are explicitly nonlegally binding such as the Helsinki Final Act nonbinding or voluntary resolutions formulated and adopted by international and regional organizations such as those issued by the UN General Assembly formal treaties that lack identifiable rights and obli gations and codes of conduct or guidelines adopted by IGOs The degree of formalization determines the strength of a rule especially when it is made legally binding Intentionally omitted from this definition is any conception of institutions as practices or patterns of behavior As noted above some scholars have defined This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 1 institutions in terms of practices but this approach has found little favor within the field of international relations Indeed the need to distinguish institutional norms and rules from behavior is a leading area of agreement among rationalists and constructivists One reason is that a pattern of behavior such as recurring attempts to maintain a balance of power may not conform to or be influenced by any particular norm or rule More fundamentally the equation of institutions with behavior or practices precludes the use of the former to explain the latter In practice specific institutional elements can assume a wide range of forms Some will be pure rules others will be pure norms and yet othersperhaps mostare best characterized by some combination of rulelike formal and norm like intersubjective characteristics For example a formal rule may be accompan ied by a strong intersubjective belief in its legitimacy Moreover the nature of a particular institutional element can change over time Thus a norm may become formalizedone can point to many illustrations from the laws of war human rights and diplomatic relationswhereas a formal rule may gradually lose moral force over time Nevertheless it should be possible to locate any particular institutional element at a given moment within a twodimensional ontological space Figure 1 attempts to do this using examples from a variety of domains One of the dimensionsin this case the verticalis defined in terms of the strength of the normlike character istics if any The other dimensionthe horizontal hereis determined by the degree of formalization of the rulelike characteristics if any It is important to stress that in this ontology the norm and rulelike characteristics are orthogonal to Strong Peaceful dispute settlement Racial equality Just war theory Anticipatory selfdefense Nuclear taboo pacta sunt servanda Strong norms not formalized USSoviet measures to reduce risk of nuclear war COCOM Wassenaar arrangement SALT II NATO force goals National selfdetermination UNGA resolutions Selfdefense ABM treaty Chemical Weapons Ban Anti slavery convention Partial test ban Formal rule strong norm Norm Strength Spheres of influence Humanitarian intervention Emergent norm not yet formalized USSoviet incidents at sea agreement Universal Declaration of Human Rights GATT rules Climate Change Convention Helsinki Final Act Rio Declaration Torture convention Nonintervention Land Mine Ban Nuclear non proliferation Anticorruption conventions WTO rules Comprehensive Test Ban Formal rule less than universal norm Weak or Nonexistent General disarmament Preventive war Balance of power Weak norm no formal rule USSoviet hotline agreement OPEC quotas Interwar strategic bombing agreement Unratified rule little normative content General proscription of the threat and use of force Protection of Wetlands Convention Territorial waters Navigational rules Postal conventions Formal rule weak or nonexistent norm Rule Low Degree of High formalization FIG 1 Locating Institutional Elements This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12 What Are International Institutions one another rather than lying along a single continuum as is sometimes suggested see for example Steinmo 20017554 Functional Distinctions The second important distinction captured by the definition concerns the functions that different institutional elements perform These functions can be divided into three broad categories the constitutive the regulative and the procedural The distinction between the constitutive and regulative functions is already quite com monly made As explained below it is also useful to distinguish a third the pro cedural function Before proceeding it should be noted that some norms and rules may be both constitutive and regulative at the same time For example the rules regarding the movement of a chess piece simultaneously define what that piece is see also Schauer 19917 Similarly the documents establishing many international bodies also stipulate what those bodies can and cannot do But many norms and rules are not both constitutive and regulative thus it remains important to be able to distinguish analytically among these three functions7 Constitutive Function The constitutive function of international institutions is in a sense the most fundamental given that constitutive rules and norms create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind Schauer 19916 Without the prior constitution of actors for instance there can be no action to regulate Although some rationalist writings on institutions hint at their consti tutive role for example North 1990 this aspect has been developed primarily in the work of constructivists and the closely related English School theory of international relations see Buzan 2004 It is useful to distinguish among several more specific constitutive functions In the first place institutional rules and norms can create social entities actors and determine their very capabilities and other endowments related to action such as rights Indeed this phenomenon is perhaps most obvious in the realm of in ternational relations in which virtually all actors are institutionally constituted to an important extent The most familiar example of such entities is the sovereign state By now it has been well established that the state is a social construct see for example Biersteker and Weber 1996 Hall 1999 As an actor in the inter national system the state is essentially a bundle of roles and related rights as sociated with a given geographical territory that are determined by the basic rules of authority that define international relations Philpott 20013 The in stitution of state sovereignty has become increasingly formalized over the years but it still rests on a strong intersubjective basis The state is not the only institutionally constituted actor of consequence in international affairs however A number of others are associated with interna tional organizations Most common among these are collective intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly the North At lantic Council NAC the Council of Ministers of the European Union EU and the IMF Board of Governors as well as supranational executive bodies such as the UN Secretariat the European Commission and the staff of the World Bank Also possible but still quite rare are supranational judicial and legislative bodies composed of elected or appointed individuals such as the International Court of Justice the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament 7Young 1999 offers a typology of regime or institutional tasks that distinguishes between regulative proced ural programmatic and generative regimes Despite the seeming similarity his typology differs from the one offered here in an important respect Youngs typology refers to the overall task or tasks performed by a regime or institution while the present essay is concerned with the basic range of functions performed by institutional elem ents Thus any programmatic or generative regime for example can in principle be decomposed into some combination of constitutive regulative and procedural elements This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 13 Intergovernmental and supranational actors are typically constituted by formal treaties agreements and conventions among states such as the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty or the decisions of intergovernmental bodies such as the resolution establishing the UN Human Rights Council Yet other noteworthy institutionally constituted actors may involve individual persons Consider for example the UN Secretary General the NATO Supreme Allied Commander the DirectorGeneral of the WTO the President of the World Bank and diplomatic envoys Although the individuals involved already possess a physical existence rules and norms endow them with significant roles and rights Before proceeding it is important to recognize that international organizations are not institutions per se Rather they typically possess the qualities of both institutions as defined here and agents The UN Security Council for example is simultaneously a collective actor and an arena or forum in which member states interact In contrast to truly unitary actors moreover much of the activity of such collective bodies is aimed at setting regulative rules for members and authorizing legitimizing or condemning actions taken by them see Claude 1966 Whether it is more fruitful to regard an international organization as an institution or as an actor will depend upon the precise question that one seeks to answer As a prac tical matter however it may be difficult to distinguish between organizational actors on the one hand and the norms and rules that constitute them regulate their behavior toward other actors and determine their internal processes on the other Analytically distinct from the creation of actors is the role that institutions can play in determining their identities interests goals and preferences which is a prominent theme in the constructivist literature on norms see for example Klotz 1995 Jepperson Wendt and Katzenstein 1996 Katzenstein 1996 In some cases these characteristics may be conferred simultaneously with the very creation of an actor Thus the secretary general of an international organization will generally possess an identity that is distinct from that of any other entity and an interest in promoting the wellbeing of the organization and its membership In other cases however preexisting actors notably states and their leaders may acquire new identities and preferences as a result of their presence participation or embeddedness in an international institution through processes of persuasion and socialization Johnston 2001 In this regard particular attention has been paid to socializing processes within European institutions such as the EU and NATO see for example Checkel 2005 Moreover institutions may constitute activities and categories of action Dessler 1989455 Schauer 19916 Searle 199527 To be sure many forms of behavior especially those of a physical nature can and do take place without the mediation of institutions But institutions often play a role in determining their social meaning such as whether a use of force is to be viewed as an act of aggression or a justifiable intervention or whether a tariff is a violation of international law or a legitimate retaliatory activity They specify what counts as a particular activity And in some cases they may define activities that would not otherwise even exist such as the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council Like sovereignty the actions in which states may or must engage have become increasingly formalized over the years consider the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Law of Consular and Diplomatic Immunities But formalization is not a pre requisite for their existence even though it may affect their impact and influence Regulative Function Perhaps most familiar is the regulative function of insti tutions Many rules and norms seek to regulate the everyday behavior of actors see also Ostrom 199052 In this sense Young 198916 has defined rules as welldefined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that members of an institution are expected to perform or to refrain from performing under This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 14 What Are International Institutions appropriate circumstances Similarly constructivists typically describe norms as shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior Regulative or operational norms and rules can assume three basic forms Dessler 1989457 Schauer 199178 They may be prescriptive requiring or obligating actors to behave in certain ways Examples include the provision of military assistance to allies when attacked the payment of assessed dues to an international organization and intervention to prevent or stop genocide They may proscribe prohibit or forbid various actions Here one might cite the UN Charters broad injunction to refrain from the threat or use of force the ban on torture and restrictions on the application of quotas to traded goods Regulative norms and rules may also be permissive allowing actors to engage in actions that nevertheless remain optional such as selfdefense the imposition of tariffs up to agreed levels and the exploitation of resources on the continental shelf When fully specified such norms and rules indicate the type of action the relevant actors and the circumstances under which they are operative Another useful distinction is between primary norms and rules of behavior and secondary or auxiliary regulative elements intended to increase the likelihood of compliance with the primary ones The secondary category includes transpar ency norms and rules concerning the provision gathering and sharing of in formation about actors policies and actions in order to facilitate determinations of compliance and noncompliance Mitchell 1998 Examples are IMF reporting requirements inspection provisions in arms control agreements and surveillance rights such as those contained in the Open Skies Treaty This category also in cludes rules and norms regarding how actors should respond to instances of noncompliance by others Although such enforcement measures are somewhat rarer one can readily point to prominent examples such as the Covenant of the League of Nations which required members to sever all economic relations with an aggressor and the provisions in the WTO agreements that allow members to impose trade sanctions in certain circumstances Procedural Function The procedural function of international institutions bears a strong resemblance to the regulative function and might well be thought of as a subset of the latter Nevertheless institutional scholars have sometimes taken pains to differentiate between the two see for example Young 1989 Ostrom 1990 and some selfdescribed institutionalist studies have focused entirely on procedures for example Garrett and Tsebelis 1996 How do they differ Regulative rules and norms typically concern behavior that directly affects the physical world Ostrom 199050 whereas procedures typically govern ac tions by actors with respect to one another within the context of institutions or with respect to the institutions themselves In particular procedural arrange ments often provide mechanisms that allow participating actors to arrive at col lective choices regarding problems that arise in the issue areas covered by an institution Young 199928 Obviously a clear line does not always exist between these two functions in part because they are often closely related For example the UN Charter con tains both regulative elements such as the general prohibition on the threat and use of force and procedural elements notably the voting rules of the UN Gen eral Assembly and Security Council as well as important constitutive elements Likewise the institutions concerning international imports both regulate the restrictions that countries can place on trade and provide procedures for the negotiation of lower trade barriers and the resolution of disputes Although the procedural function of institutions is often associated with formal rules especially in the context of IGOs in some contexts it is performed primarily or exclusively by intersubjective norms Moreover even the decisionmaking procedures of IGOs are not always formalized Those of the UN Security Council EU and IMF are spelled out in considerable detail in This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 15 TABLE 1 Typology of International Institutions Ontological Forms Combinations of Norms and Intersubjective Rules Includes But Norms Not Limited to Includes Codified Customary Formal Rules Customary International Includes Imposed International Law Law and Some Regimes and Some Spontaneous Negotiated Negotiated Functions Regimes Regimes Regimes Constitutive Sovereignty Status of diplomats IGO constitutions statehood and for example IMF racial equality diplomatic missions Articles of eg Vienna Agreement ICAO Convention on Convention Diplomatic Relations Regulative Traditional laws of Codified laws of war Interstate includes regime war for example regulatory norms and rules for example Just Geneva agreements for War doctrine Conventions example 200 mile General Assembly limit GATT trade declarations rules postal conventions Open Skies Treaty Procedural Norms of Procedures for Formal IGO includes regime consensus treaty negotiation procedures procedures unanimity and ratification and for example sovereign interpretation Security Council equality one state eg Vienna voting rules WTO one vote Convention on the dispute resolution Law of Treaties procedure the agreements on which those bodies are based In contrast the North Atlantic Treaty is silent on the procedures to be followed by the NAC in which decision making has consequently been guided by the norms of sovereign equality and consensus Potential Contributions of the New Definition It is one thing to argue in the abstract that a particular definition is superior to the alternatives but yet another to demonstrate that its adoption will result in better theoretical and empirical research Accordingly this final section discusses three potential contributions of the new definition Clarifying the Nature of Particular International Institutions In the first place this definition can help scholars make clearer the nature of the particular institutions that are the subject of inquiry and thus the range of phe nomena to which their claims and findings actually apply The ontological and functional distinctions expressed in the definition provide the analytical basis for a This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 16 What Are International Institutions comprehensive taxonomy of international institutions as delineated in Table 1 Here the columns are defined in terms of the ontological nature of the institution ranging from the purely formal to the purely intersubjective or involving some combination of formal and intersubjective elements The rows capture the various functions that institutions can perform Consistent with the objective of providing a comprehensive definition of international institutions it should be possible to situate each of the distinct forms of international institutions within this taxonomy To be sure the task is complicated by the fact that many institutions have multiple elements often making it difficult to assign them to a single category As a result some scholars may object to the specific characterizations suggested here But such objections should not negate the value of attempting to clarify the nature of particular institutional elements Improving Existing Institutional Scholarship The failure to recognize important variations in institutional forms can result in flawed research on the causes and consequences of international institutions The definition proposed here can help illuminate such flaws and suggest how they might be remedied or avoided in the first place One potential problem that the definition may help prevent is the failure to specify the full range of possible out comes when treating international institutions as dependent variables An example can be found in the Rational Design project as presented by Barbara Koremenos Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal 2001 which seeks to explain differences in the forms that international institutions take An important recent contribution to the theoretical literature on international institutions as dependent variables the project defines them as explicit arrangements negotiated among international actors that prescribe proscribe andor authorize behavior Koremenos Lipson and Snidal 2001762 By emphasizing the regulative function however this def inition neglects the important constitutive choices that are often involved in the creation of international institutions Not only must actors decide whether or not to establish formal organizations but they must choose between different types of bodies intergovernmental supranational and so on and determine what func tions authority and capabilities to grant to those bodies As a result of its con stricted focus the Rational Design project may overlook important tradeoffs in the design of international institutions A second potential pitfall that this definition may help with is the failure to specify the full range of relevant institutional causal variables when exploring the effects of international institutions thereby running the risk of omitted variable bias For example the explanatory framework employed in the Rational Design project overlooks the possibility that norms may also be an important determinant of in stitutional design A design that seems optimal on efficiency grounds may never theless be regarded as inappropriate or illegitimate and thus may not be chosen on the basis of normative considerations Indeed one of the case studies executed for the project on prisoners of war treaties shows how a preexisting set of norms were formalized in treaty form Morrow 2001 A similar oversight mars Jeffrey Legros 1997 otherwise valuable effort to com pare the relative impact of international norms and organizational culture Exam ining eight cases involving the use of particular means of warfarechemical weapons strategic bombing and submarine warfareduring World War II he finds that organizational culture provides a more consistent explanation of state preferences than do international norms Legros analysis does not however dis tinguish explicitly between the formal and intersubjective aspects of international institutions In fact some of the international norms that he considers such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol had important formal components Indeed the limited This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 17 data presented by Legro suggest a stronger correlation between state preferences and international institutions than the study found if the latter are measured in terms of formalization Consequently instead of generating a single prediction for each of the three institutions under consideration it might have been advisable to measure norm strength and rule formalization separately Doing so would have made it possible to assess the influence of both intersubjective and formal insti tutional elements as well as that of organizational culture A third potential problem that the definition may help avoid is the failure to identify and differentiate among distinct causal pathways as suggested by Andrew Cortell and James Daviss 1996 pathbreaking study of the ways in which inter national norms and rules affect state behavior through the actions of domestic political actors A key condition or intervening variable in their model of insti tutional influence is the domestic salience of a rule or norm They measure salience in terms of the legitimacy accorded the rule or norm in the domestic political context as well as level of domestic commitment indicated by declarations of support by authoritative actors ratification concrete alterations in policy choices and formal incorporation into domestic processes They then assess the model through an examination of two heuristic case studies of US policy making 1 the US semiconductor industrys efforts to persuade the Reagan Administration to press Japan to comply with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT and 2 congressional efforts to pressure the Bush Administration to pursue a multilateral strategy following Iraqs invasion of Kuwait Because the study explicitly does not differentiate between formal and intersub jective institutional elements however it obscures the possibility that very different causal mechanisms may be at work in different international institutional contexts even if the outcomes are similar In particular the case studies suggest that different types of institutions lend themselves to different forms and degrees of domestic salience More formal institutions such as the GATT rules are more likely to be formally incorporated into domestic laws and procedures whereas the impact of primarily intersubjective phenomena such as the norm of collective security de pends largely on the extent to which they acquire legitimacy in the domestic con text Thus explicit recognition of the ontological distinction proposed here could help produce a richer more differentiated theory of institutional effects A fourth potential problem with which the definition proposed here could help concerns the failure to select institutional cases that are as comparable as possible which is suggested by Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martins 2001 useful effort to explain the effects of international institutions in terms of whether they promote convergence or divergence in state behavior These scholars hypothesize in par ticular that convergence is more likely to occur when states recognize that noncompliance will result in substantial externalities and the relevant institutions possess adequate monitoring mechanisms To establish the plausibility of this hypothesis they explored three cases that exhibit variation in the level of exter nalities 1 development aid cooperation among OECD countries 2 the estab lishment of the Single European Market and 3 international cooperation to limit stratospheric ozone depletion The three cases also however exhibit significant differences in the nature of the regulative rules and norms of state behavior on which the institutions were based Both the Single European Market and international cooperation on ozone involved formally agreed upon legally binding rules that lent themselves to enforcement In contrast the OECD development aid regime was based on a goal 07 of GNP annually that was neither legally binding nor enforceable Indeed this aspirational target did not even command a normative consensus given that many OECD members expressed reservations and two had not accepted it even with reser vations as late as 1985 Lumsdaine 1993247 Arguably these fundamental This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 18 What Are International Institutions differences in the nature of the basic rules and norms could by themselves account for much of the variation in institutional effects that Botcheva and Martin found Consequently future research on this subject might benefit from the careful se lection of cases involving institutions based on highly similar sets of regulative norms and rules Generating New Research Questions A further potential benefit of the definition proposed here is that it can help gen erate useful new research questions that might otherwise be overlooked The types of questions scholars ask are constrained by the assumptions that underlie their models Thus rationalists and constructivists by emphasizing the rule and norm like characteristics of international institutions respectively may have unnecessarily and inappropriately restricted the ambit of institutional research In their otherwise laudable survey of the institutional literature for example Martin and Simmons 1998742757 present a purely rationalist research agenda for the study of in stitutional effectsone which must perforce neglect the ways in which a large number of international institutions matter At least two broad sets of questions suggested by the definition seem worth pursuing One concerns the differing causal relationships between regulative norms and rules as independent variables on the one hand and international behavior and outcomes as dependent variables on the other The reconsideration of the Legro 1997 data above suggests that as a first step it is important to study the relative impact of regulative norms and rules under different circumstances Such work should in turn stimulate and inform efforts to develop a better com parative understanding of the different mechanisms through which formal rules and intersubjective norms operate to shape behavior the value of which is sug gested by the Cortell and Davis 1996 study Throughout this process scholars should be attentive to possible interactions between the intersubjective and formal elements of particular institutions rather than treating them simply as alternative explanatory variables What difference does it make for example whether or not a strong norm is formalized or a highly formalized rule is accompanied by a strong sense of obligation A second broad and potentially valuable area of research concerns the basic formsintersubjective or formalthat international institutions take For instance some otherwise functionally similar institutions such as the prohibitions on the use of chemical and nuclear weapons have assumed very different forms Why is this the case A related question is when and how the basic nature of institutions change Some primarily formal arrangements may acquire a strong intersubjective element of obligation over time whereas others may not and yet others may ex perience a loss of legitimacy Conversely states have formalized some international norms as treaties but not others And what roles might formal rules play in the development of norms and vice versa For example although Finnemore and Sikkink 1998900 do not explicitly differentiate between the two they state that in most cases an emergent norm must become institutionalized in specific sets of presumably formal rules and organizations before it is widely adopted Arguably their pathbreaking analysis of the norm life cycle would have been richer and more accurate if it had been informed by the definition presented here Conclusion This essay began with the premise that the formulation of adequate definitions of key concepts is essential to the process of theory development The scholarly lit erature on international institutions has suffered from the lack of a widely accepted definition that includes all the most important forms The purpose of this essay was This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOHN DUFFIELD 19 to remedy this deficiency by elaborating a comprehensive yet differentiated def inition of international institutions that can serve as a solid foundation for the development of a better understanding of their nature causes and consequences Integral to the definition are two distinctionsone ontological and one function althat in turn serve as the basis for a taxonomy within which all types of international institutions can be located This definition promises to advance the study of international institutions in several ways At a minimum it should promote an appreciation of the full range of possible institutional forms and simultaneously help clarify the extent and limits of existing and future studies of international institutions In addition the definition should help improve work on the subject by making scholars more attentive to potential variations in institutional forms Beyond simply helping remedy or pre vent the repetition of past mistakes it should stimulate the development of both richer and more comprehensive theories of international institutions And no less important the definition should help open potentially valuable avenues of research by generating new questions and inspiring fruitful comparisons Theoretical progress will inevitably occur as scholars seek increasingly to relate different in stitutional forms to one another At the same time by facilitating the differentiation of institutions into their constituent ontological and functional components the definition may help deepen our understanding of specific institutional types 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The International Political Economy and International Institutions Vol I Cheltenham Elgar YOUNG ORAN R 1999 Governance in World Affairs Ithaca Cornell University Press This content downloaded from 1552461535 on Sun 8 Sep 2013 072748 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Cambridge Studies in International Relations From International to World Society English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation Barry Buzan CAMBRIDGE wwwcambridgeorg9780521833486 This page intentionally left blank From International to World Society Barry Buzan offers an extensive and long overdue critique and reap praisal of the English school approach to International Relations Start ing on the neglected concept of world society and bringing together the international society tradition and the Wendtian mode of construc tivism Buzan offers a new theoretical framework that can be used to address globalisation as a complex political interplay among state and nonstate actors This approach forces English school theory to confront neglectedquestionsbothaboutitsbasicconceptsandassumptionsand the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared how and why they are shared and by whom Buzan highlights the idea of pri mary institutions as the central contribution of English school theory and shows how this both differentiates English school theory from realism and neoliberal institutionalism and how it can be used to gen erate distinctive comparative and historical accounts of international society barry buzan is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and a Fellow of the British Academy He is the author coauthor or editor of over fifteen books and has published widely in academic journals No text detected CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 From International to World Society Editorial Board Steve Smith Managing editor Thomas Biersteker Phil Cerny Michael Cox A J R Groom Richard Higgott Kimberley Hutchings Caroline KennedyPipe Steve Lamy Michael Mastanduno Louis Pauly Ngaire Woods Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cam bridge University Press and the British International Studies Associ ation BISA The series will include a wide range of material from undergraduate textbooks and surveys to researchbased monographs and collaborative volumes The aim of the series is to publish the best new scholarship in International Studies from Europe North America and the rest of the world CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 95 Barry Buzan From international to world society English School theory and the social structure of globalisation 94 K J Holsti Taming the sovereigns Institutional change in international politics 93 Bruce Cronin Institutions for the common good International protection regimes in international society 92 Paul Keal European conquest and the rights of indigenous peoples The moral backwardness of international society 91 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver Regions and powers The structure of international security 90 A Claire Cutler Private power and global authority Transnational merchant law in the global political economy 93 Patrick M Morgan Deterrence now 92 Susan Sell Private power public law The globalization of intellectual property rights 87 Nina Tannenwald The nuclear taboo The United States and the nonuse of nuclear weapons since 1945 86 Linda Weiss ed States in the global economy Bringing domestic institutions back in 85 Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J Biersteker eds The emergence of private authority in global governance 84 Heather Rae State identities and the homogenisation of peoples List continues at the end of book From International to World Society English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation Barry Buzan cambridge university press Cambridge New York Melbourne Madrid Cape Town Singapore São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building Cambridge cb2 2ru UK First published in print format isbn13 9780521833486 isbn13 9780521541213 isbn13 9780511186813 Barry Buzan 2004 2004 Information on this title wwwcambridgeorg9780521833486 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press isbn10 0511186819 isbn10 0521833485 isbn10 0521541212 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or thirdparty internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is or will remain accurate or appropriate Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press New York wwwcambridgeorg hardback paperback paperback eBook EBL eBook EBL hardback To Richard Little US ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES SKIN TEST REPORT DSRD NO 026334 SPONSOR XXXXXX COMPANY PO BOX 20274 NEW ORLEANS LA 701300274 Contents List of figures and tables xi Preface xiii List of abbreviations xv Glossary xvii Introduction 1 1 English school theory and its problems an overview 6 English school theory a summary 6 World society and the problems and potentials of English school theory 10 The main areas of weakness in English school theory 15 Is English school theory really theory 24 2 World society in English school theory 27 The intellectual history of world society within English school thinking 30 The pluralistsolidarist debate 45 Conclusions 62 3 Concepts of world society outside English school thinking 63 IR writers with a sociological turn Burton Luard and Shaw 66 Sociological conceptions of world society 70 Global civil society 77 Conclusions 87 4 Reimagining the English schools triad 90 State and nonstate 91 ix Contents Physicalmechanical and social concepts of system 98 Society and community 108 Individual and transnational 118 Conclusions reconstructing the English schools triad 128 5 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate 139 What type of values if shared count as solidarist 143 Does it make any difference to solidarism how and why any given values are shared 152 What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them 154 Conclusions 158 6 The primary institutions of international society 161 Definitional problems 163 The concept of primary institutions in English school literature 167 Hierarchy and functionalism within primary institutions 176 The range of institutions and the types of international society 190 Conclusions 195 7 Bringing geography back in 205 Exclusive globalism is not necessary 207 Unwarranted pessimism 212 Understanding the interplay among the interhuman transnational and interstate domains 217 Conclusions a vanguard theory of international social structures 222 8 Conclusions a portrait of contemporary interstate society 228 A snapshot of contemporary interstate society 231 Looking back what changed what didnt and why 240 Driving forces deeply rooted structures and contradictions 249 Conclusions where to from here 263 List of references 271 Index 284 x Figures and tables Figures 1 The classical Three Traditions model of English school theory page 9 2 The Three Traditions first revision 98 3 The Three Traditions second revision 109 4 The Three Traditions third revision 133 5 The Three Traditions fourth revision 159 Tables 1 Candidates for primary institutions of international society by author 174 2 The nested hierarchy of international institutions 184 3 Contemporary international institutions 187 4 The primary institutions of eighteenthcentury European interstate society 242 xi NA Preface This book started conscious life when I decided in the late 1990s to at tempt a reconvening of the English school Much of its agenda is already visible in a paper I wrote for the public launch of that project at the BISA Conference in 1999 and subsequently published in the Review of Inter national Studies as part of a forum on the English school That paper opens many of the criticisms of the English school classics and some of the suggestions as to how to develop and apply the theory that are fol lowed up here This book has deeper roots both in my earlier attempts to link English school ideas to American IR theory which I extend here and in my world historical writings with Richard Little which point strongly towards the English school as an excellent site for developing grand theory Its particular genesis was a growing feeling that a lot of the problems I saw in English school theory hinged on the concept of world society World society occupied a key place in a triad alongside international society and international system but was the Cinderella of English school theory attracting neither consistent usage nor and in contrast to international society any systematic attempt to explore its meaning The vagueness attending world society seemed to underpin a lot of the problems in English school theory about pluralism and soli darism and how to handle the cosmopolitan and transnational aspects of international life This dissatisfaction led me to apply for ESRC fund ing to look into world society I originally offered an article but as I dug into world society it quickly became obvious that I was writing a book and that it would have to take on the whole body of English school the ory In that sense writing this book has reminded me of the process of writing People States and Fear twenty years ago indeed this book could be titled Peoples States and Transnational Actors Then I was trying to un derstand the concept of security and had to follow the threads wherever xiii Preface they led without knowing what the whole thing would look like Now I have pursued the threads opened by world society and ended up fo cusing on institutions and the general theoretical framework of English school thinking I would like to thank the following for comments on all or parts of earlier versions of this work Mathias Albert William Bain Chris Brown Bruce Cronin Thomas Diez Tim Dunne Ana GonzalezPelaez Stefano Guzzini Lene Hansen Andrew Hurrell Dietrich Jung John Keane Morten Kelstrup Bob Keohane Anna Leander Richard Little Lene Mosegaard Madsen Ian Manners Noel Parker Nick Rengger John Ruggie Brian Schmidt Gerry Simpson Hidemi Suganami Ole Wæver Adam Watson Nick Wheeler Richard Whitman and several anony mous reviewers for the ESRC My special thanks to Richard Little Ole Wæver and the late Gerry Segal Without my extensive collaborations with them I would never have learned half of the things I needed to understand in order to write this book I dedicate it to Richard Little who as well as being a good friend has accompanied me on much of my intellectual journey towards the English school and who has played a big role in the success of its reconvening I am grateful to the ESRC award no R000239415A for funding a twoyear teaching buyout which enabled me to focus on this project and to the University of Westminster and then the London School of Economics for giving me leave I am also grateful to the late and much lamented Copenhagen Peace Research Institute COPRI for funding both my presence there and a regular seminar at which many drafts related to this book received incisive criticism xiv Abbreviations ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BIS Bank for International Settlements BISA British International Studies Association CEO Chief Executive Officer CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species COPRI Copenhagen Peace Research Institute CSD Centre for the Study of Democracy ECPR European Consortium for Political Research ESRC Economic and Social Research Council EU European Union FIDE International Chess Federation FIFA International Federation of Football Associations GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GCS Global Civil Society IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development aka World Bank ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice IGO Intergovernmental Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International NonGovernmental Organisation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPE International Political Economy IPSA International Political Science Association IR International Relations xv List of abbreviations ISA International Studies Association MFN Most Favoured Nation Montreal Protocol 1987 to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer 1987 NAFTA North American Free Trade Association NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference PKO peacekeeping operation QUANGO quasiautonomous nongovernmental organisation TNA transnational actor TNC transnational corporation UN United Nations UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 and Kyoto Protocol 1997 UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States WHO World Health Organisation WSRG World Society Research Group WTO World Trade Organisation xvi Glossary Binding forces coercion calculation belief Interhuman society social structures based on interactions amongst indi vidual human beings and in this book referred to as firstorder societies and mainly manifested as largescale patterns of shared identity International society has two meanings in this book 1 The classical English school usage is about the institutionalisa tion of shared interest and identity amongst states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory I call this interstate society 2 A more specific meaning developed along the way in this book to indicate situations in which the basic political and legal frame of international social structure is set by the statessystem with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within the order defined by interstate society Interstate society see international society definition 1 International system refers generally to the macro side of the interac tions that tie the human race together and more specifically to the interactions among states Its usage in classical English school think ing is close to that in realism being about power politics amongst states within a political structure of international anarchy Montreal Protocol 1987 to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer 1987 Pluralism defines secondorder societies of states with a relatively low de gree of shared norms rules and institutions amongst the states where the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition or possibly also the management of collective prob lems of common fate eg arms control environment xvii Glossary Primary institutions the institutions talked about by the English school as constitutive of both states and international society in that they define both the basic character and purpose of any such society For secondorder societies such institutions define the units that compose the society Secondary institutions the institutions talked about in regime theory are the products of certain types of international society most obviously liberal but possibly other types as well and are for the most part consciously designed by states Secondorder societies those in which the members are not individual human beings but durable collectivities of humans possessed of iden tities and actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts Solidarism can be used as a synonym for cosmopolitanism but in my usage defines international societies with a relatively high degree of shared norms rules and institutions among states where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition but also on coop eration over a wider range of issues whether in pursuit of joint gains eg trade or realisation of shared values eg human rights State any form of postkinship territorially based politically cen tralised selfgoverning entity capable of generating an insideoutside structure The three domains interstate interhuman and transnational society Transnational society social structures composed of nonstate collective actors VanguardtheideacommontobothmilitarystrategyandLeninistthink ingthataleadingelementplaysacrucialroleinhowsocialmovements unfold World society has two meanings in this book 1 the traditional English school usage takes individuals nonstate organisations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts transcendence of the statessystem at the centre of IR theory 2 the usage developed in this book labelling situations in which no one of the three domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two but all are in play together xviii Introduction The most fundamental question you can ask in international theory is What is international society Wight 1987 222 After a long period of neglect the social or societal dimension of the international system is being brought back into fashion within Interna tional Relations IR by the upsurge of interest in constructivism For adherents of the English school this dimension was never out of fash ion with the consequence that English school thinking itself has been somewhat on the margins of the discipline In this book I will argue that English school theory has a lot to offer those interested in developing societal understandings of international systems albeit itself being in need of substantial redevelopment International society is the flagship idea of the English school It carves out a clearly bounded subject focused on the elements of society that states form among themselves This domain has been quite extensively developed conceptually and considerable work has also been done on the histories of international societies particularly the creation of the modern international society in Europe and its expansion to the rest of the planet World society also has a key place in English school theory but is much less well worked out While international society is focused on states world society implies something that reaches well beyond the state towards more cosmopolitan images of how humankind is or should be organised Quite what that something that defines world society is however remains at best contested and at worst simply un clear Since world society can be and is easily cast as a challenger to international society ambiguity about it is a major impediment to clear thinking about the social structure of international systems A key cause of this problem is a widespread failure in English school thinking to 1 From International to World Society distinguish clearly enough between normative theory and theory about norms It is a central focus of this book to address that problem Fortunately several other traditions of thought have grappled with world society sometimes using that label sometimes with variants such as global society or global civil society Latterly its popularity or that of its synonyms perhaps can be understood best as a way of getting to conceptual grips with the phenomenon of globalisation These other bodies of thought provide useful insights applicable to English school theory Consequently although this book is about English school theory gen erally and will have a lot to say about international society much of the argument in the early chapters will focus on trying to clarify world society The concept of world society and especially how world society and international society relate to each other is in my view both the biggest weakness in existing English school theory and the place where the biggest gains are to be found John Vincents 1988 211 observation that the need to work out the relationship between cosmopolitan culture and international order was one of the unfinished legacies of Bulls work remains true today English school theory has great potential to improve how globalisation is conceptualised but cannot do so unless it finds a coherent position on world society I plan to survey the basic ideas and approaches to world society and to attempt a coherent theoretical con struction of the concept My starting position is that there is not much to be gained and quite a lot to be lost analytically from simply using world society as a label for the totality of human interaction in all forms and at all levels Globalisation fills that role already My initial strategy will be to construct world society as a concept to capture the nonstate side of the international system and therefore as the complementopponent to the already welldeveloped idea of international society The book is aimed at two distinct but not mutually exclusive audi ences The narrower audience comprises those already working in the English school tradition plus followers of Wendts mode of construc tivism For the English school people it offers a comprehensive critique of English school theory and an ambitious detailed attempt to address this critique by developing a more purely social structural interpreta tion of the theory to set alongside its existing normative and historical strands For the Wendtians the book offers a friendly critique an exten sion of the logic and an application of the theory I seek to create a synthe sis between the structural elements of the BullVincent side of English school theory about international and world society and Wendts 1999 2 Introduction social theory of international politics I take from both sources a social structural reading of international society and a methodologically plu ralist rejection of the view that paradigms in IR are incommensurable I insert into both two things that they ignore or marginalise the inter national political economy and the subglobal level And I impose on both a more rigorous taxonomical scheme than either has attempted The result is a radical reinterpretation of English school theory from the ground up but one that remains supportive of and in touch with the basic aims of both English school and Wendtian theory to understand and interpret the composition and the dynamics of the social structure of international politics The broader audience is all of those in IR who acknowledge that globalisation represents an important way of labelling a set of sub stantial and significant changes in the international system but who despair about the analytical vacuousness of the G word To them I offer a Wendtinspired social structural interpretation of English school theory as a good solution to the problems of how to think both an alytically and normatively about globalisation English school theory is ideally tailored to address this problematique though it has not so far been much used in this way The English schools triad of concepts exactly captures the simultaneous existence of state and nonstate sys tems operating alongside and through each other without finding this conceptually problematic It keeps the old while bringing in the new and is thus well suited to looking at the transition from Westphalian to postWestphalian international politics whether this be at the level of globalisation or in regional developments such as the EU English school theory can handle the idea of a shift from balance of power and war to market and multilateralism as the dominant institutions of in ternational society and it provides an ideal framework for examining questions of intervention whether on human rights or other grounds Managing this expansion from interstate to world politics is important to IR as a discipline IRs core strengths are in the statessystem and it needs to combine these with other elements of the international system and to avoid ensnaring itself in the trap of unnecessary choices between stateandnonstatealternativesInmyviewEnglishschooltheoryshows how this can be done better than any available alternative This broader audience includes practically everyone engaged in the debates about IR theory Some of them may baulk initially at the idea of wadingthroughasustainedcritiqueofwhattheymayseeasasomewhat marginal and traditional body of IR theory Why they may ask should 3 From International to World Society we bother with something so demonstrably flawed They should take this book in three stages First it can be read as a relatively compact intro duction to a stimulating and useful body of theory with which they may not be very familiar Second it is a sustained attempt to bring together the IR tradition of thinking about international society and Wendtian constructivism and to set both of these against more sociological think ing about society generally and world society in particular Wendtian thinkingisbroadenedouttoincludenonstateactorsandEnglishschool theory is forced to confront neglected questions about the constitution of society in terms of what values are shared how and why they are shared and by whom Third it is about developing out of this conjunc ture a theoretical framework that can be used to address globalisation as a complex social interplay among state and nonstate actors medi ated by a set of primary institutions This interplay can be captured as a finite though not simple set of structural possibilities governed by a relatively small number of key variables Using English school theory to address globalisation does not offer the predictive oversimplifications of neorealism and neoliberalism But by opening the way to a wider historical interpretation it does offer an escape from the Westphalian straitjacket It gives powerful grounds for differentiation and compar ison among types of international society and ways of understanding both what Westphalian international society evolved from and what it might be evolving into In that mode this book also speaks to those grappling with integration theory and how to understand and manage developments in the EU The plan is as follows Chapter 1 provides a quick overview of English school theory in order to set the context and to note some of the problems that a more social structural interpretation might redress Chapter 2 sets out a detailed exegesis of the world society concept in English school thinking establishing the role it plays in the debates about pluralism and solidarism the incoherence of its usage and its importance to the whole structure of English school thinking Chapter 3 surveys how others outside the English school have deployed the idea of world society and looks for ideas there which can be applied to the English school framework Chapter 4 engages four analytical tensions at the heart of English school theory state versus nonstate physical versus social concepts of system society versus community and in dividual versus transnational and develops a revised framework for thinking about international and world society Chapter 5 returns to the pluralistsolidarist debates focusing on the neglected question of what 4 Introduction counts as solidarism and particularly the place of the economic sector It reconstructs this debate as a way of thinking about the spectrum of interstate societies Chapter 6 explores the concept of the institutions of international society in English school theory relating them to usage in regime theory and attempting a comprehensive mapping of them and how they relate to types of international society Chapter 7 introduces geography arguing that the traditional focus on the global level needs to be balanced by an equal focus on international social structures at the subglobal scale Among other things bringing in a geographic variable opens the way into understanding the dynamics and evolution of inter national societies through a type of vanguard theory Chapter 8 uses the analytical lens developed in chapters 46 to sketch a portrait of contem porary international society to look back at the institutional change of the last two centuries that brought us to where we are now and to think about the forces driving it The chapter concludes with a consideration of the likely directions of its development and with proposals for the English school research agenda 5 1 English school theory and its problems an overview We need sharper analytical tools than those provided by Wight and Bull Dunne 2001b 66 This chapter starts with a summary of English school theory as it is conventionally understood The second section looks at the different strands tensions and potentials within the school and locates within them the line to be taken in the rest of this book The third section reviews the main areas of weakness in English school theory that sub sequent chapters will address and hopefully rectify The fourth sec tion tackles the question of whether English school theory is really theory English school theory a summary The English school can be thought of as an established body of both theoretical and empirical work dating back to the late 1950s Dunne 1998 Wæver 1998 Buzan 2001 Robert Jackson 1992 271 nicely sums up the English school conversation by seeing it as a variety of theoretical inquiries which conceive of international rela tions as a world not merely of power or prudence or wealth or capa bility or domination but also one of recognition association member ship equality equity legitimate interests rights reciprocity customs and conventions agreements and disagreements disputes offenses injuries damages reparations and the rest the normative vocabulary of human conduct Two core elements define the distinctiveness of the English school its three key concepts and its theoretically pluralist approach The three key concepts are international system international society and world 6 English school theory and its problems society Little 1995 1516 Within the English school discourse these are sometimes and perhaps misleadingly codified as Hobbes or some times Machiavelli Grotius and Kant Cutler 1991 They line up with Wights 1991 three traditions of IR theory Realism Rationalism and Revolutionism Broadly speaking these terms are now understood as follows r International system HobbesMachiavellirealism is about power politics amongst states and puts the structure and process of inter national anarchy at the centre of IR theory This position is broadly parallel to mainstream realism and neorealism and is thus well de veloped and clearly understood It also appears elsewhere as for ex ample in Tillys 1990 162 definition that states form a system to the extent that they interact with each other regularly and to the degree that their interaction affects the behaviour of each state It is based on an ontology of states and is generally approached with a positivist epistemologymaterialistandrationalistmethodologiesandstructural theories r International society Grotiusrationalism is about the institutionali sation of shared interest and identity amongst states and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory This position has some parallels to regime theory but is much deeper having constitutive rather than merely instrumental implications Hurrell 1991 1216 Dunne 1995 1403 International society has been the main focus of English school think ing and the concept is quite well developed and relatively clear In parallel with international system it is also based on an ontology of states but is generally approached with a constructivist epistemology and historical methods r World society Kantrevolutionism takes individuals nonstate organ isations and ultimately the global population as a whole as the focus of global societal identities and arrangements and puts transcendence of the statessystem at the centre of IR theory Revolutionism is mostly about forms of universalist cosmopolitanism It could include com munism but as Wæver 1992 98 notes these days it is usually taken to mean liberalism This position has some parallels to transnation alism but carries a much more foundational link to normative po litical theory It clearly does not rest on an ontology of states but given the transnational element neither does it rest entirely on one of individuals Critical theory defines some but not all of the approaches 7 From International to World Society to it and in Wightian mode it is more about historically operating al ternative images of the international system as a whole than it is about capturing the nonstate aspects of the system1 Jackson 2000 16978 puts an interesting twist on the three traditions by viewing them as defining the diverse values that statespeople have to juggle in the conduct of foreign policy Realism he sees as giving pri ority to national responsibilities rationalism he sees as giving priority to international responsibilities and revolutionism which he prefers to call cosmopolitanism he sees as giving priority to humanitarian re sponsibilities He adds a fourth more recent value stewardship of the planet in effect giving priority to responsibility for the environment The classical English school framework is summarised in figure 1 below So far the main thrust of the English schools work has been to uncover the nature and function of international societies and to trace their history and development The basic idea of international society is quite simple just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by so also states live in an interna tional society which they shape and are shaped by This social element has to be put alongside realisms raw logic of anarchy if one is to get a meaningful picture of how systems of states operate When units are sentient how they perceive each other is a major determinant of how they interact If the units share a common identity a religion a sys tem of governance a language or even just a common set of rules or norms about how to determine relative status and how to conduct diplomacy then these intersubjective understandings not only condi tion their behaviour but also define the boundaries of a social system Within the idea of international society the principal debate has been that between pluralists and solidarists This hinges on the question of the type and extent of norms rules and institutions that an interna tional society can form without departing from the foundational rules of sovereignty and nonintervention that define it as a system of states Pluraliststhinkthatthesovereigntynoninterventionprinciplesrestrict international society to fairly minimal rules of coexistence Solidarists think that international society can develop quite wideranging norms rules and institutions covering both coexistence issues and coopera tion in pursuit of shared interests including some scope for collective enforcement As indicated on figure 1 pluralism and solidarism define the boundary zones respectively towards realism and revolutionism 1 I am grateful to Ole Wæver for this latter point 8 English school theory and its problems Hobbesianism or Machiavellianism Realism International System Grotianism Rationalism International Society Kantianism Revolutionism World Society PowerMaximising Imperial Messianic Universalist SecuritySeeking efensive Conservative Pluralist Progressive Solidarist volutionary Figure 1 The classical Three Traditions model of English school theory Note Titles in are Wights labels titles in are the analytical focus titles along the border zones are where the traditions blend into each other The main focus of English school work has centred on a synthesis of realism and rationalism This focus is nicely captured by Bull and Watsons 1984 1 classic definition of international society as a group of states or more generally a group of independent politi cal communities which not merely form a system in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements This definition neatly demonstrates the combination of the Hobbesian realist element of international system with the Grotianrationalist el ement of a socially constructed order It interleaves the logic of more material theories of the international system driven by billiard ball metaphors with the view that sentience makes a difference and that social systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones 9 From International to World Society But the pursuit of international society has obliged the English school to engage with the element of liberal revolutionism Once the idea of society was conceded one had to think not just of international society amongst states but also world society the idea of shared norms and values at the individual level transcending the state It is clear from figure 1 that world society is fundamental to the ability of English school theory to focus enquiry along these lines As captured in figure 1 the idea is that these three key concepts form a complete and interlinked picture of the IR universe Although each ele ment is conceptually and methodologically distinct they blur into each other at the boundaries In the English school perspective all three of these elements are in continuous coexistence and interplay the question being how strong they are in relation to each other Bull 1991 xviixviii Dunne 1995 1347 The three key concepts thus generate the second distinctive feature of the English school its theoretical pluralism Little 1998 2000 makes a strong case that the English school should be seen not just as a series of ontological statements about reality but more as a pluralist methodological approach By introducing international society as a third element not only as a via media between realism and liberalismcosmopolitanism but also as the keystone to an interdepen dent set of concepts English school theory transcends the binary op position between them that for long plagued debates about IR theory By assuming not only that all three elements always operate simulta neously but also that each carries its own distinctive ontological and epistemological package English school theory also transcends the as sumption often made in the socalled interparadigm debate that real ist liberal and marxist approaches to IR theory are incommensurable McKinlay and Little 1986 World society and the problems and potentials of English school theory As just noted the foundation of English school theory is the idea that international system international society and world society all exist simultaneously both as objects of discussion and as aspects of inter national reality This theoretically pluralist formulation takes the focus away from the oppositional eitheror approaches of much IR theory interparadigm debate realismidealism rationalistreflectivist etc and moves it towards a holistic synthesising approach that features the patterns of strength and interplay amongst the three pillars But world 10 English school theory and its problems society has been the Cinderella concept of English school theory receiv ing relatively little attention and almost no conceptual development To the extent that it gets discussed at all it is in the context of other concerns usually but not always human rights So long as daytoday world politics was dominated by the interna tional system and international society pillars with world society only a residual element in the background the English school could get away with treating world society as a Cinderella But if as many people think the world society element is rising in significance this neglect becomes untenable There are at least three compelling reasons for giving priority torectifyingthisweaknessFirstisthattheEnglishschoolneedstoclarify the nature of its own claim to the idea in relation to the claims of others using the concept Second is that English school theory itself cannot develop until the weak world society pillar is brought up to strength Third is that there is an opportunity to use English school theory to clarify the perennially unfocused but politically central debate about globalisation This opportunity depends on the English school getting its own theoretical house in order Even if the current assumptions about the rising importance of world society are wrong the English school still needs to sort out the concept partly in order to come to a judgement on the matter and partly to move to completion in the development of its distinctive theoretical approach On this latter point part of the case I want to make is that there is a pressing need for the English school to begin pulling away from its founding fathers Manning Wight Bull Vincent and others deserve much credit for originating an extremely interesting and already quite influential set of ideas Krasner 1999 46 acknowledges the English school as the best known sociological perspective in IR But as I hope to show they also deserve criticism both for not developing some of these ideas and for steering them down a number of narrow channels that while not dead ends and still of interest and importance in themselves have hamstrung the development of the theory Among other things I will show that some of the English schools founding fathers allowed their normative concerns with human rights to distort their theoretical reflections were too much in thrall to universalist principles of order and justice derived from debates in political theory and were too disin terested in international political economy These shortcomings blinded them and most of their successors to much of the actual development in international and world society The emphasis on universalism and also on the high politics issues of human rights and nonintervention 11 From International to World Society has strongly conditioned both the pessimism and the political plural ism that mark much of the schools classical work as has posing the hard test of willingness to support the collective enforcement of inter national law as a measure of solidarism Bull 1966a 52 The potential of English school theory as a basis for grand theory in IR Buzan and Little 2001 will not be realised unless English school theory can be disentan gled from its roots and presented in a more systematically structured way World society is the key to linking English school theory to the debate about globalisation Weller 2000 47 and as well to linking English school theory to the debates about the European Union Diez and Whitman 2000 Scholte 2000 89 5961 argues that globalisation is defined by a deterritorialisation of social life which has created new ac tors and networks alongside the existing territorial ones territoriality and supraterritoriality coexist in complex interrelation The more sen sible globalisation writers all agree that there is no simple zerosum game between globalisation and the statessystem Both Woods 2000 and Held et al 1999 agree with Scholtes idea that the statessystem and the nonstate systems coexist side by side and argue that states especially the stronger states and powers have played a major role in bringing globalisation into being and steering its development Some even think that the word globalisation is really a contemporary eu phemism for American economic dominance Kapstein 1999 468 see also Woods 2000 9 Either way as argued above English school the ory is ideally tailored to address this problematique because of the way in which it takes on board both the territorial and the nonterritorial elements By this point some readers will be shaking their heads in disapproval on the grounds that I am misrepresenting the English school They have a point It is possible to understand what English school theory represents in at least three different though potentially overlapping ways 1 as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of statesmen 2 as a set of ideas to be found in the minds of political theorists 3 as a set of externally imposed concepts that define the material and social structures of the international system Manning 1962 is the classical exponent of the first view For Man ning the idea of international society was just that an idea What was important for him was that this was not just any idea or anyones 12 English school theory and its problems idea It was an idea incorporated in the official thinking of states about their mutual intercourse It formed part of the assumption that was prevalentasorthodoxamong thosewhotalkedandactedinthenamesof states For Manning understanding world politics necessarily involved Verstehen which meant for him that the analyst should understand the thoughts that underlie the actions of the states Thus for Manning the idea of international society was not an analysts idea invented exter nally to the practice Rather the analyst reconstructs the idea of inter national society already contained in the practice2 The central subjects of study in this perspective are diplomats and diplomatic practice see also Osiander 1994 111 The second view is most manifest in Wights 1991 idea of the three traditions but is also strongly present in the work of Bull 1966a b 1977a and Vincent 1986 and many others who participate in the de bates of the English school from the perspective of political theory eg Rengger 1992 1996 1999 Brown 1998 Halliday 1992 Linklater 1998 Jackson 2000 Wights three categories of international thought are ex tracted from writings by international lawyers political philosophers diplomats and statesmen In this version English school theory is a set of ideas which fill the minds of people as they think about andor par ticipate in world politics The three traditions can be seen as a kind of great conversation about international politics setting out the primary positions that are always in some sense in play in discussions about for eign policy and international relations The approaches and concerns of political theory are strong in this perspective They inform not only the influential strand of normative theory in English school thinking but also the disposition to think both in terms of universal principles and in terms of a level of analysis distinction between individuals and the state By universal principles I mean here those principles whose validity requires that they be applied to all the members of a specified group There is some tendency in this political theory understanding to treat English school theory as part of the history of ideas and there fore as essentially a philosophical debate as opposed to a discussion about the condition of the real world The scope for normative posi tioning within this debate is large At one end much of English school writing about pluralist international society could be read from a pro gressive perspective as justifying the history of imperialism At the other end there is a strong and persistent progressive concern to improve the 2 I am grateful to Hidemi Suganami for this formulation 13 From International to World Society condition of world politics by getting practitioners to change their con ceptual maps of world politics towards more enlightened forms This normativeapproachtoEnglishschooltheoryhasbeenthedominantone strongly influenced by the core questions of political theory What is the relationship between citizen and state How do we lead the good life and How is progress possible in international society The third view sees international system international society and world society as a set of analytical concepts designed to capture the ma terial and social structures of the international system Buzan and Little 2000 This is the one that I intend to develop in the chapters that fol low This view is strong in the work of Bull 1977 and even more so of James 1978 1986 1993 and is analogous to the structural approaches taken by nonEnglishschool IR theorists such as Waltz 1979 who is only interested in material structures and Wendt 1999 who sets up a social structural approach This approach does not have any necessary normative content in the sense of promoting preferred values though that is not excluded Norms and ideas play their role here as different forms of social structure not normative theory but theory about norms It is about finding sets of analytical constructs with which to describe and theorise about what goes on in the world and in that sense it is a positivist approach though not a materialist one One illustration of its potential strengths is shown by Littles 2000 4048 discussion of how English school theory leads to a much different understanding of the balance of power than one finds in the purely mechanical idea of it in neorealism As will become clear I am less driven by taking sides on nor mative questions or interpretations of political philosophy and more concerned to put into place the building blocks for a methodologically pluralist grand theory of IR Delineating these different approaches to the English school raises the question of how the normative and structural strands within it and the different goals they represent interact As a rule they have been blended together a practice most clearly visible in the works of Bull and Vincent and one that has come at the cost of a lack of clarity and pre cision in the analytical framework This is not to blame the normative theorists for without them precious little analytical development would have taken place at all But it is to assert the need to develop the social structural strand more in its own right and less as an annex to human rights concerns Whether the resulting conceptual scheme will make it easier or more difficult to pursue the traditional normative concerns of the English school remains to be seen and the outcome either way is 14 English school theory and its problems not a driving concern of this enterprise My concern is to set up a social structural interpretation of English school theory by disentangling this approach from the Wightean one In doing this it is absolutely not my intention to question the validity of the normative approach My aim is to set up the social structural interpretation alongside it as an alterna tive parallel reading of English school theory Some people will prefer one approach some the other though I do hope that clarifying the so cial structural approach will challenge those in the Wightean track to reflect on the conceptual incoherence on which some of their ideas seem to rest In addition I hope to expose the dynamics and driving forces underlying international society more clearly and to break out of the somewhat stultifying opposition between a selfparalysed set of plural ists and a selfconfined set of solidarists Will this still be English school theory Definitely for it remains linked to the classic texts the focus on international social structure and the methodological pluralism But it will not be English school theory as we have known it so far One last point on the theme of social structure is to remind the reader that the term society should not be read as in itself carrying any ne cessarily positive connotation To say that society in the sense of social structure is more fully developed in one place or time than in another is not to say that this is therefore an improvement in some moral sense As Luard 1976 340 reminds us a society may be closely knit yet marked by frequent conflict Many human societies have ritualised and insti tutionalised both intense violence rituals of sacrifice warrior cultures and huge degrees of inequality slavery ethnic religious caste and gen der discrimination The English school has been admirably forthright about this going so far as to classify war as an institution of Westphalian international society in Europe Despite the warnings of history it is nev ertheless easy in a sustained abstract discussion of society to slip into the assumption that society is essentially good and nice and that more of it is therefore better The main areas of weakness in English school theory For all of its many attractions English school theory is neither fully developed nor without problems many of which hinge in one way or another around the weakly developed world society pillar It would not be an exaggeration to say that English school theory is in serious need of a taxonomical overhaul John Vincent 1988 197 see also Richardson 15 From International to World Society 1990 178 said of Bull that his genius for making distinctions that went to the heart of a subjectmatter constituted the essence of his contribu tion to international relations Bulls distinctions have indeed provided much of the analytical leverage that has made the English school an attractive and insightful approach But in this book I want to argue that even Bulls distinctions are neither complete enough nor deeply enough developed to unleash the full potential of English school theory see also Hurrell 2002b xvxxii Bull was heading in the right direction but he did not have time to do more than carve out the opening stages of the path The areas of concern about the existing opus of English school the ory can be organised under five headings levels sectors boundaries normative conflicts and methodology Levels In much of both classical and contemporary English school writing there is a strong assumption that the only relevant level is the sys tem or global one This assumption applies to all three key concepts international system international society world society The general rule is that states are considered mainly as components of international systems andor as members of international society and that both in ternational system and society are assumed to be global phenomena Europe occupies a special place in this scheme because of its role as the original creator of what subsequently became the contemporary global international system and society Since the modern international sys tem is a closed one on a planetary scale assumptions of universalism become assumptions of global scale and vice versa To the extent that this systemlevel assumption is breached it is in the acknowledged his torical process of the international system and international society be coming global during the few hundred years preceding the nineteenth century Discussion of modern international society is almost wholly rooted in the assumption of a single global phenomenon Individuals and therefore world society are also treated as a collective whole in effect humankind There seem to be several reasons for this strong bias towards the systemglobal level In relation to states perhaps the main one is the dominance of a baseline story about the emergence of a distinctive European international system and society its transformation into a global international system and society and the ups and downs of that global international society since then Whatever the past might 16 English school theory and its problems have been the assumption is that for the last two centuries and for the foreseeable future international system and society are global phenom ena and to be studied as such Added to this is a strong normative disposition against subglobal developments of international society seeing these as divisive necessarily corrosive of global international society and prone to generate conflict Bull 1977a 27981 Vincent 1986 101 105 The systemglobal approach to individualshumankind has a different source Concern with individuals in English school literature largely focuses on the tension between human rights on the one hand and the state and the international society that legitimises the state and gives it primacy on the other In that context the approach is predomi nantly normative drawing on the debates from political theory In those debates the source of systemglobal assumptions is the idea whether drawn from natural law or pragmatic reasoning that the principles un derpinning human rights must be universal Vincent 1978 30 Cutler 1991 469 As Vincent 1986 117 argues What is right is something we seek one answer to not several This line of thinking dominates his argumentsdespitehiswarningelsewhere1986125againstthedangers of accepting any purportedly universalist doctrine Because the inter national system and international and world society are global the ref erent group for universal principles must necessarily be humankind as a whole Although Vincent does not spell it out one of those dangers is that both the possibility and the fact of regional level developments of in ternational society get ignored The main exception to this position is Wight who took the view 1991 49 that all known international so cieties have been subsystemic and therefore faced the problem of out siders barbarians in his language But Wight can be dismissed on the grounds that he was mainly interested in looking back into his tory before there was even a global international system let alone society Watson 1992 is also talking mostly about the selfcontained subglobal systems of the past rather than about regional subsystems within a global system Occasional hints can be found elsewhere that seem to admit at least the logical possibility of regional level develop ments in international society Bull 1977a 41 for example when talk ing of the three elements of Hobbesian Kantian and Grotian traditions notes that one of these three elements may predominate over the others in three different contexts in different historical phases of the states sys tem in different geographical theatres of its operation my emphasis 17 From International to World Society and in the policies of different states and statesmen But this opening is not followed up and indeed actively discouraged for the reasons given above To the extent that he thought about the European Community at all Bull 1982 was mainly interested in getting it to play a great power role at the global level It seems to me that this rejection of regional level developments sets a standard for international society so demanding that by itself this factor can explain the pessimism and pluralism that dominate most classical English school writing On the global level it is hardly surprising that international society strikes a fairly minimal lowest common denomina tor It is much more likely that one might find solidarist developments within a civilisational community such as in EUEurope over Bosnia and Kosovo than worldwide The assumption that such developments must be at odds with the development of global international society needs to be questioned Certainly they can be as during the Cold War when the great powers were ideologically divided over the nature of international society But it is neither necessary nor even probable that they must be When the leading edge of international society is amongst a large majority of the leading powers a case can be made with realists from Carr ideas as a form of power to Waltz socialisation and com petition in support that this might well be the key to progress in development at the global level This view is not out of line with the English schools own account of the expansion of international society Bull and Watson 1984a More on this in chapter 7 I will argue that there is a lot of room for differentiating between global internationalworld society on the one hand and subglobal and par ticularly regional internationalworld societies on the other Neither international nor world in this usage necessarily implies global just as Wallersteins worldsystems and world empires do not have to be global The empirical record suggests that different regional interna tional societies can build on common global international society foun dations as they have done in Europe the Islamic world and Southeast Asia and earlier amongst the communist states Given the apparent re gionalising tendencies in the postCold War international system Buzan and Wæver 2003 the scope for subglobal developments and their im plications for global ones needs to be investigated urgently So too does the possibility for nonWestern forms of international society or fusions between Western and nonWestern forms Among other things under standing the subglobal dimension of international society offers big insights into the problem of nonintervention 18 English school theory and its problems Sectors There are some similarities between the English schools problem with levels and its problem in sectors both involve a missing element that plays a crucial role in really existing international and world society Whereas under levels the missing element is subglobal or regional under sectors it is the economy Unlike with regions there seems to be no reason in principle why the economic sector should not feature in discussion of international and world society and this rather glaring omission is often pointed out Miller 1990 704 Richardson 1990 148 184 Hurrell 2002b xvii At various points along the way English school writers have acknowledged the economic sector Wight 1991 78 talks of the rationalist position in terms of diplomacy and commerce Bull in Wight 1977 16 notes trade as one of the four institutions in Wights understanding of a statessystem and mentions it in his theoretical dis cussion of rules about cooperation in society 1977 70 He makes clear that the economy is a major part of contemporary international society Bull 1990 723 and his discussion of justice Bull 1984c rested heavily on the need for a more equitable international political economy Al though Bull 1991 xixxx is critical of Wights disinterest in economics he nevertheless failed to develop this aspect in his own discussions of international society This is all the more surprising given that he made a feature of the economic sector in his critique of those who wanted to take a Hobbesian interpretation of international anarchy Bull 1966b 42 argued that trade symbolic as it is of the existence of overlapping through sic though different interests is the activity most character istic of international relationships as a whole Vincent although critical of Bull for ignoring the economy as a major component of international order Vincent 1988 196 204 also fails to develop the topic even though he does put it on the agenda in a ma jor way His book on human rights Vincent 1986 develops a case for making the right to subsistence the floor of a global human rights pro gramme He is fully aware that this implies a radical reshaping of the international economic order and that such a project might require a radical shift in patterns of political power in order that resources can reach the submerged 40 in developing countries That he understood the political side of the international economy is clear from his state ment that in regard to the failure to provide subsistence rights it is not this or that government whose legitimacy is in question but the whole international system in which we are all implicated Vincent 1986 127 19 From International to World Society 145 But as GonzalezPelaez 2002 points out this opening into inter national political economy IPE was not followed up either by Vincent or by his followers who have focused instead on the more directly vio lent abuses of citizens by their states such as torture and genocide The one exception to this rule was James Mayall 1982 1984 1989 who did begin to think about economic liberalism in international society terms and at one point Mayall 1982 even argued for the existence of a sense of community in the economic sphere despite differences between North and South Given that he was positioned at the LSE alongside Susan Strange he was well placed to bridge between the English school and IPEButheseemedtolosefaithinhisearlierinterpretationMayall1984 His more recent works 1990 2000 have focused largely on national ism and see economic nationalism returning on the back of national security concerns in such a way as to undermine economic solidarism This sidelining of the economic sector in representations of international society is surprising given both the enormous development of norms rules and institutions including ones with some powers of collective enforcement in this sector and the growth of IPE as a major branch of the study of international relations The English schools focus on the state might be one explanation It is clear that the English school formulation explicitly privileges the states system and international society on historical and pragmatic grounds as being the dominant form in the political sector This produces an emphasis on the high politics of collective security diplomacy and human rights which kept most classical English school writers quite close to realism But the state focus is also apparent in IPE so state centrism is not an adequate explanation Perhaps the main explanation is simple disinterest and lack of knowledge about the economy amongst the founding fathers If so there is no excuse for the perpetuation of this tradition Indeed there is an urgent need to reject it Their disinterest in the economic sector may have been reinforced by the ignoring of the regional level and certainly aggravated the drift towards a pessimistic and pluralist outlook in classical English school writing Boundaries As sketched out in figure 1 the theoretical scheme of the English school generates three primary boundaries separating or more loosely delin eating the frontier zones between its three key concepts Two of these do not seem problematic inasmuch as the concepts on either side of them line up clearly defensive realism and pluralism make a good fit as do 20 English school theory and its problems powermaximising imperialism and messianic universalism By con trast the boundary between the solidarist side of international society and the evolutionary side of world society is both unclear and controver sial It is not at all obvious where solidarist international society ends and world society begins This problem relates to that flagged above about the weak development of the world society concept As I will show in chapter 2 world society has functioned as a kind of intellectual dustbin into which all sorts of things have been thrown The world so ciety pillar contains Kantian conceptions of a homogenised system of states transnational ideas about nonstate actors cosmopolitan ideas about identity at the level of individualshumankind and ideas about ideological crusaders wanting to impose their universal truth on all of humanity At a minimum it has to be questioned how these things relate to each other within the world society pillar and the possibility has to be investigated that they cannot in fact all be accommodated within a single concept Normative conflicts There are two linked normative conflicts within the English school One is between advocates of pluralist and solidarist conceptions of interna tional society and the other is between states rights or international society and individual rights or world society The essence of the mat ter is whether individual rightsworld society necessarily conflict with states rightsinternational society or can be in harmony with them an issue with some close connections to the debates in political theory between cosmopolitans and communitarians In practice these largely add up to a single dispute Because of the boundary ambiguities be tween international and world society described above it is not clear whether pluralism and solidarism apply only to international society or whether solidarism somehow spills over into world society Many of the key sources of solidarist thinking such as natural law humanism and cosmopolitanism are deeply rooted in world society This ambigu ity means that it is not immediately clear whether this sometimes quite heated dispute is real or simply a product of unclear classifications and definitions Is international society just a system for preserving the dis tinctiveness and independence of states within a limited framework of shared rules or does it develop as the practice of regimes and regional cooperations seem to suggest into increasing degrees of harmonisation and integration At what point does solidarism become so progressive that it calls into question the existence of a statessystem or is it the case 21 From International to World Society that the understanding and practice of sovereignty evolve along with solidarism continuously solving the contradiction as it arises Methodology There are two problems here first the lack of any sustained attempt to construct a typology of international or world societies and second a lack of clarity in setting out exactly what is entailed in the theoretical pluralism underpinning English school theory Wight 1977 219 made an early start on the classification of types of international society with his differentiation between statessystems based on mutual recognition among sovereign entities and suzerain systems based on more hierarchical relations He added to this the idea of secondary statessystems composed of relations among suzerain sys tems Watson 1990 1026 1992 1318 followed this up with his more elaborate idea of a spectrum of international societies ranging from an archy through hegemony suzerainty and dominion to empire Both Wight and Watson were mainly looking backwards aiming at classifi cations for comparative history Except in the rather inconclusive work of Luard 1976 which was not part of the English school mainstream this start has not been followed up by those more interested in con temporary and future international societies One consequence of this neglect is that the Wight and Watson schemes overplay the coercive and underplay the consensual side of international society There is not much room in Watsons spectrum for something like the EU unless one takes the implausible but in some quarters politically popular view that it is a species of German empire The reasons that the English school has not developed a typology of international societies are not difficult to see Because the schools mainstream writers locked themselves into concern with the single global modern international society chose not to look at the regional level and failed to consider economic develop ments they did not have much reason to be interested in differentiating types Nevertheless from a theorybuilding perspective Wights opening suggests that several obvious questions can and should be asked about international and world societies What is their scale in relation to the overall system in which they sit How loosely or tightly are they bound together Is the nature of what binds them more rational contrac tual and constructed society Gesellschaft or more emotional identity based and historical community Gemeinschaft or some combination of these two Are the organising principles based on the idea of political 22 English school theory and its problems equality amongst the units Westphalian or political inequality amongst the units suzerain or functional differentiation among the units medieval or neomedieval These basic questions suggest not only a means for comparing instances of international society across history but also for monitoring the development and evolution of the layered global and regional international society in which we currently live If the key concepts of English school theory are to be understood as types of social structure then a robust typology is a necessary condition for being able to monitor structural change The second methodological problem concerns the incoherence of ontological and epistemological differentiation within the theoretical pluralism of the English school framework That there is significant ontological and epistemological differentiation amongst international system international society and world society is not in doubt Little 1998 2000 But just what that differentiation is is rather less clear Much hangs on which reading of English school theory one wants to pursue In Wightian 1991 1524 mode the focus is on the three Rs with real ists proceeding on the basis of inductively arrived at laws of human be haviour rationalists proceeding from ontological and teleological views about the nature of social reality and revolutionists proceeding from ethical and prescriptive imperatives If one comes at this with a more structural approach international sys tem and international society are pretty solidly based on an ontology of states World society at least in its cosmopolitan aspect is based on an ontology of individuals but given the confusion about what world society contains one has also to think about nonstate entities and in some versions also states The epistemological and methodological pic ture is even less clear Little 1998 745 sees international system as based on structural methodology and international society as based on agencybased methodology But as well as leaving out world so ciety this does not quite add up International systems can certainly be studied using structural theory but so can international and world so cieties as Little himself shows in later work Buzan and Little 2000 see also Wendt 1999 where constructivist elements are seen as structural More promising is Littles idea 2000 402 following from Linklater that each of the English schools three key concepts is associated with a dif ferent methodological approach international system with positivism international society with hermeneutics and interpretivism and world society with critical theory The linkage of international system and pos itivism seems fairly uncontroversial Less clear is why the interaction 23 From International to World Society aspects of international and world society cannot also be studied using positivist methods Similarly international society can indeed be stud ied using hermeneutic and interpretivist methods but it is not clear why these cannot also be applied to world society Critical theory certainly captures the revolutionist aspect of world society but it is less clear that it covers the cosmopolitan and Kantian aspects Some of this confusion perhaps a lot of it reflects the incoherence of the world society pillar of English school theory One other problem not of English school theory but of this book is of keeping consistency in the use of terms The very nature of the taxonomical overhaul which is central to this book makes such consis tency almost impossible Readers are therefore warned to keep aware as they proceed In the early chapters my usage of terms such as interna tional and world society reflects the usage in the existing literature From chapter 4 onwards I embark on a systematic critique and reworking of most of the basic concepts bringing in some new usages and attach ing more specific meanings to old ones Once this is done my usage of terms will reflect the new meanings though it will sometimes be neces sary such as in quotes from or references to the classical literature to use terms in their older sense I have tried to make my usage as consistent as possible but I cannot avoid some risk of confusion in the presentation Is English school theory really theory One final issue is the standing of English school thinking as theory I have already begun to refer to English school theory and will do so throughout the book but the question of what counts as theory is con troversial so the basis of my assertion needs to be explained In the Social Sciences the answer to the question of whether or not something qualifies as theory often depends on where it is asked Many Europeans use the term theory for anything that organises a field systematically structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of in terrelated concepts and categories Many Americans however often demand that a theory strictly explains and that it contains or is able to generate testable hypotheses of a causal nature English school theory clearly qualifies on the first European account but not on the second In its Wightian normative theory form English school theory cannot and does not want to meet the criteria for positivist theory But if the English school is presented not as normative theory but as theory about norms there is some potential to close the transAtlantic gap In the more 24 English school theory and its problems social structural approach unfolded in this book English school think ing has as much of a claim to theory as Wendts 1999 attempt to pose constructivism as a social theory of international politics In this form it provides social structural benchmarks for the evaluation of significant change in international orders Holsti 2002 sets out a taxonomy that enables comparisons to be made across time and space and provides some predictions and explanations of outcome such as Watsons 1990 1992 macrolevel theory about the inherent instabilities of anarchy and empire The English school also has two other claims to theoretical standing The first and most obvious is its importance as a selfconscious location for the practice of a methodologically pluralist approach to the study of international relations and therefore as a potential site for grand theory The assumption of incommensurability has been one of the main factors generating fragmentation in IR theory Among other things it made the idea of grand theory seem illegitimate or impossible But incommensu rability may have been more a temporary fashion in IR than an absolute epistemological judgement For a time it suited the discipline to think this way both to end pointless polemics amongst realists liberals and radicals and to establish the right to exist of paradigms other than real ism Now however incommensurability seems to be mainly a position of extremists whether ideological or epistemological who insist either that their own story is the only valid one or that their way of telling a story is the only valid one Some positivists and some postmodernists still take this position or are accused by the other side of doing so but doing so seems to be a preference rather than a logical necessity As suggested by the neoneo synthesis the fashion is swinging back to more tolerance of or even enthusiasm for theoretical pluralism though debate will doubtless remain active as to whether a pluralist approach requires giving all the stories equal weight or making some more equal than others Wendt 1999 90 155 is clearly trying to construct a via media between positivist epistemology and postpositivist ontology A more sophisticated set of paths around the incommensurability problem is sketched out by Wæver 1996 esp 16974 Having never surrendered to incommensurability the English school is well placed to capitalise on this turn of intellectual fashion The second claim is equally interesting but much less explored It con cerns an implicit but seemingly unselfconscious move into the novel domain of secondorder societies With this move English school think ing has transcended the conventional boundaries of both sociology and 25 From International to World Society political theory in one important way Its main concept of international society has moved the idea of society out of the state and away from individual human beings as members International society is not based on the crude idea of a domestic analogy Suganami 1989 which simply scales the society within states up to the global level Instead it argues for a new secondorder form of society where the members are not indi vidual human beings but durable collectivities of humans possessed of identities and actor qualities that are more than the sum of their parts This move opens up an aspect of sociology that has not been much if at all explored by sociologists but that should be the natural meeting point between Sociology and Political Theory on the one hand and In ternational Relations on the other In what ways do such secondorder societies and communities differ from the societies and communities composed of individuals and how appropriate or not is theory de rived from firstorder societies to the study of secondorder ones If English school thinking counts as theory in these senses it is never theless for the reasons given above imperfect theory The next task is to address the weak pillar of world society and to see how to repair it 26 2 World society in English school theory As Little 2000 411 notes world society is the most problematic fea ture of the English school framework Yet that world society is crucial to English school theory cannot be in doubt If English school theory is to work as a vehicle for a methodologically pluralist approach to IR then each of its three pillars must have the same clarity and the same standing as the others Yet what world society means in relation to sol idarism is far from clear with a consequent blurring of the boundary between international and world society In figure 1 the conjunction of international system and realismHobbes is wholly conventional and that of international society and rationalismGrotius poses no obvious difficulties notwithstanding that there are substantial debates going on about how to interpret Hobbes Machiavelli and Grotius But the con junction of world society revolutionism and Kant rings several alarm bells Revolutionism seems particularly out of line with most of what is currently discussed under the heading of world society and it is not clear that Kant fits comfortably with either image Transnationalism cosmopolitanism and crusading universalist ideologies are implausibly crammed together in the world society segment To make matters worse the world society segment lacks a world system counterpart interna tional system and international society compose a clear set differen tiating physical systems of interaction from socially constructed ones World society is clearly aimed at socially constructed nonstate systems but what is its physical counterpart Little 2000 41213 thinks that for Bull transnationalism related to world society as international system does to international society but this was never worked out and on the face of it does not look very plausible more on this in chapter 4 Bull 1977a 27681 offers the idea of a world political system to play the physical counterpoint to world society seeing this as the totality of 27 From International to World Society state plus nonstate interactions Bull never worked up much enthusi asm for this idea seeing the statessystem as so dominant within it as to make the additional complication hardly worthwhile Vincent and his followers did pick up some of this idea but bundled it into an expanded concept of world society or latterly in the case of Dunne 2001b 38 an expanded master concept of international society It is hard to escape the conclusion that the concept of world society has served as a residual category for many in the English school Similar to the way in which the unit level served as a dumping ground for neorealist theory Keohane and Nye 1987 746 English school writers have used world society as a place to deposit all the things they did not want to talk about A further problem is the existence of a disagreement about the rela tionship between world society and international society The more his torical side of the school represented by Butterfield Wight and Watson think of world society in the form of shared culture as a prerequisite for international society As Wight 1977 33 puts it We must assume that a statessystem ie an international society will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members Likewise Bull 1977a 16 accepts that a common feature of the main historical cases of international societies is that they were all founded upon a common cul ture or civilisation1 Much of the historical record from classical Greece to early modern Europe supports this view suggesting that a common culture is a necessary condition for an international society As in the expansion of European international society states from other cultures may then join this core Bull and Watson 1984a Gong 1984 Zhang 1998 raising questions about how the norms rules and institutions of in ternational society interact with the domestic life of polities rooted in different civilisations and whether international norms are sustainable under these circumstances Those more concerned with the maintenance and development of international societies rather than their origins come from a different angle though the two concerns meet on the ground where established international societies expand into areas with a different culture as has happened in modern times This second position is quite complicated not least because most English school thinking about world society has taken place around the hotly contested subject of human rights Perhaps the central issue is the possibility of an ontological tension between the 1 According to Adam Watson interview this understanding of common culture as the starting point for international society derived from Heeren and was influential in the thinking of the British Committee 28 World society in English school theory development of world society particularly human rights and the main tenance of international society On one side the argument is that the development of individual rights in international law will undermine state sovereignty The expansion of individual rights threatens exter nal or juridical sovereignty both by facilitating grounds for outside intervention in the domestic life of the state and by weakening the states authority to act internationally It threatens internal or empiri cal sovereignty by restricting the rights of the state against its citizens In other words regardless of whether a measure of common culture is required as a foundation for international society any serious attempt to develop a world society by advancing a universalist human rights law for example will tend to undermine the states that are the foun dation of international society Linklater 1981 2337 1998 celebrates the potential of this assault on the Westphalian order but Bull 1977a 1513 1984 1118 is fearful of destructive dynamics between the two levels of society On the other side the solidarist argument seeks to link the right of recognition of sovereignty to some minimum observance by the state of the rights of its citizens Wæver 1992 1047 argues that the oppositional view of the rela tionship between international society and world society has become rooted in English school thinking and serves to cut off the possibility of positive interaction between them This oppositional view departs from the Wightian historical perspective and tends to construct plu ralist Westphaliantype international society as the defence against the dangers of both hard realism power politics and liberal utopianism universal harmony of interest Wæver agrees with Jones 1981 that this closure prevents the English school from moving into the inter esting ground on which international society is an intermediary vari able between the deeper liberal forces and international politics ie the growth of moral awareness of technological interdependence of inter national learning translated into a gradual maturing of international society which has in turn effects on the working of anarchy Wæver 1992 107 How did this confused view of world society develop and what can be done about it To begin answering this question it helps to look at the intellectual history of world society within English school think ing Doing so makes clear that quite radical shifts of understanding of the basic elements of English school theory have taken place since the ideas were first stated in British Committee work There are notewor thy differences of understanding even among the founding fathers and 29 From International to World Society while there is certainly awareness of some of the key splits no sys tematic attempt has been made either to track these or to sort them out English school theory needs to decide whether international soci ety and world society are mutually exclusive ideas state sovereignty versus cosmopolitanism mutually dependent ideas the need for an element of solidarism to underpin international society the need for a framework of political order to stabilise more liberal visions or some mixture of the two Or is world society simply a manifestation of hege monic dominance currently Americanisation or Westernisation and therefore simply an epiphenomenon of power structure The next section will trace the development of the world society con cept in English school thinking from Manning and Wight through Bull to Vincent in terms of direct discussion about it in the classical literature The second section will take an indirect approach using the pluralist solidarist debate to explore the boundary between international and world society Readers not wishing to engage with a detailed exegesis of the English school classics can simply read the summaries at the end of the next two sections The intellectual history of world society within English school thinking In the classical discussions of world society many of the ideas came out of political theory and international law and were strongly driven by normative agendas None of the founding fathers of the English school with the possible exception of Vincent was particularly interested in world society as such All of them were primarily concerned to develop the idea of international society World society thus only got thought about on the margins as an alternative to international society or in the context of debates about solidarist versus pluralist international societies In thinking about all this it helps to keep in mind how the founders of the English school were trying to position themselves between liber alism and realism in the debates about IR On one side was the liberal tradition summed up in Richard Cobdens famous aphorism that there should be as little intercourse as possible betwixt the Governments as much connection as possible between the nations of the world This remark both established an analytical distinction between the world of states and the world of civil society and staked out a clear posi tion against international society and in favour of world society On the 30 World society in English school theory other side was the cynicism of E H Carr 1946 801 who saw interna tional society as a deception practised by the powerful to legitimate their position and possession On world society Carr was equally damning 1946 162 There is a world community for the reason and no other that people talk and within certain limits behave as if there were a world community Carr saw this as a dangerous illusion given that this community is at best shallow and insubstantial and not capable of sup porting claims of morality because i the principle of equality between members of the community is not applied and is indeed not easily ap plicable in the world community and ii the principle that the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of the part which is a postu late of any fully integrated community is not generally accepted The English schools founding thinkers had also to position themselves in relation to the great clashes between universalist ideologies that marked the twentieth century and that were locked into the confrontation of the Cold War all around them Manning though not a member of the British Committee influenced the early thinking of Wight and Bull His position on world society set the template that was to shape the ideas of Bull and Vincent and through them more recent English school writers Manning 1962 177 wrote that Within beneath alongside behind and transcending the notional society of states there exists and for some purposes fairly effectively the nascent society of all mankind This view is in pretty direct opposition to Carrs It acknowledges some of the Cobdenite view though not setting it in opposition to international society But it does not say much about what the actual form and content of this nascent society of all mankind might be Neither does its rather convoluted spatial metaphor make clear whether Manning thought of international and world society as in any sense analytically separable This approach of talking about international and world society as somehow distinct but not making any systematic attempt to specify them was continued by Wight Perhaps the most widely cited of Wights remarks about world society is his proposition Wight 1977 33 that We must assume that a statessystem will not come into being with out a degree of cultural unity among its members This remark was made in the context of a discussion about the origins of historical states systems in classical Greece and postRoman Europe Although it does not mention world society it clearly sets up the proposition that cultural unity is something distinct from international society and in the con text of Wights analysis prior to it It infers the idea that world society is 31 From International to World Society defined by common culture shared perhaps at the level of individuals and certainly at the level of elites and that the development of interna tional society requires the existence of world society in these terms as a precondition As noted above this position has become the counterpoint to that of Bull and others who worried that world society development would undermine the sovereignty foundation of international society One of the differences between Wights view and that of other English school writers is that he accepted that all known international societies have been subsystemic Wight 1991 49 whereas their focus was on global international societies more on this in chapter 7 But a closer look at Wights writings on world society does not sug gest that he had a clear or coherent view of it and certainly not one that rested on this historical foundation Keene 2002 34 As James 1993 2778 observes Wight uses common culture so loosely that it is un clear whether he has in mind a deep historic sense of culture or the more superficial agreed rules that compose a contractual society Wights 1991 30 definition of international society suggests a conflation of the state and individual levels International society is prima facie a po litical and social fact attested to by the diplomatic system diplomatic society the acceptance of international law and writings of international lawyers and also by a certain instinct of sociability one whose effects are widely diffused among almost all individuals Elsewhere his idea of international society seems more clearly statecentred as when he presents it as a secondorder social contract amongst the several pri mary social contracts represented by states Wight 1991 137 or says that The most essential evidence for the existence of an international society is the existence of international law Wight 1979 107 or iden tifies the institutions of international society as diplomacy balance of power arbitration and war Wight 1991 141 These statements suggest a separation between the levels of states and individuals along with an almost complete ignoring of nonstate entities Another way to try to get at Wights understanding of world society is through its position in his three traditions approach to the study of IR In the early versions of this approach Wight 1987 1960 221 226 seems to hang between seeing the three traditions as component so cial elements of reality and seeing them as patterns of thought about international reality On the one hand he sees a sovereigntyanarchy social structure patterns of habitual intercourse diplomacy law com merce and patterns of moral solidarity On the other he sees modes of thought linked to Hobbes Locke and teleological historicists such 32 World society in English school theory as Kant Toynbee Hegel Marx and Spengler and finds all these three ways of thought within me Wight 1987 227 In the end Wights ap proach through traditions puts the focus very much on the sources of ideas in political theory and much less on the empirical realities of the international system Bull Wight 1991 xi nicely characterises Wights position on the three traditions as realism is about the blood and iron and immorality men rationalism is about the law and order and keep your word men and revolutionism is about the subversion and lib eration and missionary men Wights view of realism is fairly conven tional For him Realists are those who emphasize and concentrate upon the element of international anarchy Wight 1991 7 and who take a pessimistic view of human nature 1991 259 Realist thinking allows civilisations the right to expand according to their power to deny rights to barbarians to exploit them and even to treat them as nonhuman Wight 1991 5066 Realists see no international society because there is no social contract only a state of nature or a system at best there are limited and temporary management agreements amongst the great powers Only states are the subjects of international law Wight 1991 307 Rationalism in Wights view 1991 268 adds a civilising factor to the realist vision Rationalists are those who emphasize and concen trate upon the element of international intercourse Wight 1991 7 by international intercourse here Wight means diplomacy law and com merce Rationalists have a mixed view of human nature with reason as the key to dealing with the contradictions and they see both states and individuals as subjects of international law Wight 1991 259 367 They understand the state of nature as a quasisocial condition cre ated either by natural law or by limited forms of social contract It might be argued cogently that at any given moment the greater part of the totality of international relationships reposes on custom rather than force Wight 1991 39 For rationalists civilisations have paternalistic trusteeshiptype obligations to barbarians and an obligation to civilise them and barbarians should be accorded rights appropriate to a ward or an inferior culture Wight 1991 6682 Wight also notes 1991 134 that rationalism makes a presumption in favour of the existing inter national society and is therefore conservative This view of rationalism does not immediately strike one as very representative of what has be come the mainstream English school view on international society but it is not substantially at odds with it either Passages such as in the last analysis international society is a society of the whole human race 33 From International to World Society Wight 1991 36 again suggest that Wight had not crystallised out the distinction between international and world society Wights view of revolutionism is both interesting and very confusing From the outset initially classifying them as historicists Wights 1987 1960 2236 focus is on those who want to change the world have an idea of how it should be and usually have some mechanism in mind commerce enlightenment revolution war that will bring their visions to reality There is occasional incoherence such as his worrying assertion that Revolutionists are those who emphasise and concentrate upon the element of the society of states or international society Wight 1991 78 This seems almost incomprehensible the definition is a per fect fit with later interpretations of the Grotian or rationalist position But the rest of Wights discussion does not go down this line Instead it unfolds a largely negative view of the subversion and liberation and missionary men Wight 1991 268 acknowledged that revolutionism added a vitalizing factor to international relations but his main con cern was to inveigh against those who wanted to impose ideological uniformity on the international system For Wight revolutionists were cosmopolitan rather than internationalist for them the whole of international society transcends its parts Wight 1991 8 meaning that they assigned a transcendent value to some social vision of humankind other than the existing statessystem They focused on the ought side of politics desiring an international revolution which will renovate and unify the society of states Wight 1991 22 1987 2236 Revolutionists have an optimistic but fearful view of human nature what is right is potentially achievable but always threatened Wight 1991 259 The key point for Wight was that revolutionists wanted to overcome and replace the statessystem They could do so in one of three ways Wight 1991 408 1 by the creation of ideological homogeneity 2 by a successful doctrinal imperialism leading to a world empire or 3 via a cosmopolitan route producing a world society of individuals which overrides nations or states Linklater 2002 323 characterises Wights scheme as dividing revolutionism into three forms civitas maxima or world society of individuals doctrinal uniformity which is the Kantian vision of republican homogeneity and peace and doctrinal imperial ism or Stalinism which is the attempt by one power to impose its ideology onto the system Who the agents are supposed to be in these transformations is left unspecified they could be either or both of state or nonstate actors This view lines up badly with what is now thought of as world society The cosmopolitan scenario is the closest to current 34 World society in English school theory understandings of world society but sits in unreconciled tension with Wights argument that shared cultures have to underpin international societies Ideological homogeneity seems to depict a solidarist version of international society and the Stalinist model seems to belong to the imperialist side of realism What unites these is that all stand as alter native visions to the Westphalian society of states and that all move towards the creation of the global equivalent of domestic politics the question being whether the form is a stateless society a confederation of some sort or an empire Wights rendition of revolutionism is thus not an attempt to define world society as a nonstate parallel to international society in any struc tural sense His concern is much more with the ways in which systems of states as such might be overthrown transcended or replaced In that sense Wights revolutionism is about ideological rejection of the states system It consists of images of the future that can provide the basis for political action in the present aimed at solving the problem of the statessystem whether that problem is seen as the propensity towards war of the statessystem or its dividing up of the unity of humankind or its blocking of the right universal truth So although Wight is the key mover in setting up the three tradi tions approach his actual discussions fail to make any clear distinction between international and world society In his thinking perhaps re flecting its roots in political and legal theory the world is composed of states and individuals and his definitions often blend these two levels together paying little attention to transnational actors As noted in chap ter 1 Wights approach was more about identifying the core elements of a great conversation about world politics than it was about developing concepts aimed at capturing the social structures of the international system As becomes immediately apparent to anyone reading The Anarchical Society Bull had much more inclination towards tidy classifications and structural modes of thinking than did Wight Perhaps Bulls main ac complishment was to single out and clarify the concept of international society In doing so he shaped much subsequent writing and the nature of his contribution is comparable to Waltzs in singling out and clarify ing international system structure though Bull was always careful not to assert the necessary dominance of international society Bulls work provides a much crisper conceptualisation of interna tional society than Wights It therefore helps to delimit world society if only by exclusion particularly by offering a clear sense of international 35 From International to World Society society as being statebased and world society as being to do with transnational actors TNAs and individuals In his thinking about in ternational and world society Bull seemed to link them to two different ontologies in relation to his central concern with political order Inter national society he based on an ontology of states providing order top down in an anarchical society World society he based on an ontology of individuals working towards order from the bottom up This kind of thinking like Wights drew heavily on political theory and international law particularly in its use of a duality between state and individual This dualism creates problems for conceptualising world society by leaving no obvious place for TNAs more on this in chapter 4 One of the central problems for Bull was the persistent and not easily resolved tension between the pragmatic and normative aspects of order His interest in international society was largely pragmatic As he saw it the statebased approach provided both the only immediately avail able pathway to a degree of achievable international order and also a valuable via media between the extremes of realism and liberalism Bull shared Wights view that the statessystem represented a secondorder social construct underneath which lay a wider more fundamental and primordial world order that is a morally prior phenomenon to international order Bull 1977a 22 In Bulls view individuals are the ultimate irreducible unit of analysis and world order is the basic goal for which international order is only instrumental He argues that the law and morality of states have only a subordinate or derivative value compared to the rights and interests of the individual persons of whom humanity is made up Bull 1984 13 The problem is echoing Carr that world society doesnt exist in any substantive form and therefore its moral priority is unattached to any practical capability to deliver much world order The world society of individual human beings entitled to human rights as we understand them exists only as an ideal not as a reality Bull 1984 13 Much of this argument stems from simple com mon sense why do states exist if not in the end to serve the needs of their citizens an idea that later became a key element in the thinking of Vincent and his followers The tension is between on the one hand the many imperfections of states but their actual ability to deliver some measure of world order and on the other the possibility of better more just systems of order that nobody yet knows how to bring into existence ThisdualismrunsinparalleltothetensioninBullbetweennaturallaw the idea that law is inherent in nature and specifically human nature and like knowledge of the physical world can be discovered by reason 36 World society in English school theory out of which the primacy of the individual came and positive law that which is made by political process within and between states which was very much a product of the statessystem Bull leaned strongly in favour of positive law as the foundation and expression of international society but could not abandon the moral primacy of individuals that came out of natural law Wheeler and Dunne 1998 4750 point out that Bulls reason for rejecting the natural law position on world society other than as a fundamental normative referent was that such a society didnt exist in fact Thus the statessystem was de facto what one had to work with in pursuit of world order goals As Wheeler and Dunne argue the flaw in Bulls scheme is that it doesnt confront the potential and actual contradiction between states as the agents for world order and individuals as the moral referent How much can states misbehave towards individuals before forfeiting their moral and legal claims to sovereignty and nonintervention within international society Unlike Wight Bull did make an attempt to deliver a clear conceptu alisation of world society By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built The concept of world society in this sense stands to the totality of global social interaction as our concept of international society stands to the concept of the international system Bull 1977a 279 There are several things to note about this definition First it is consciously parallel to his definition of international society Bull and Watson 1984a 1 in which the physical interaction is taken as given and on top of which states have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements Second it is clearly and explicitly linked to the distinction between the physical and social that underpins his distinction between interna tional system Hobbes and international society Grotius Although confusingly put in the passage just cited Bull does in fact as noted above draw a distinction between world society and the world po litical system with the latter representing physical interaction Indeed Bull 1977a 24854 makes central to his whole analysis a general dis tinction between the physical aspect of systems interaction amongst units more or less in the absence of social structure and the social and 37 From International to World Society normative elements which constitute the social order degree of accep tance of common rules and institutions One can see here Bulls step away from Wights understanding of realism as a cast of mind or an un derstanding of the human condition towards a more structural view of it as the social or rather asocial condition of a system Yet even though he explicitly draws a parallel in these terms between world society and international society both representing the social dimension Bull fails to give much guidance about what the physical counterpart to world society actually is All he says is a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another in which get included both layers of government above and below the state and TNAs His world political system includes firms states and intergovernmental organisa tions IGOs a bundling together which blurs any distinction between international and world system and feels close to what Americans once labelled a world politics paradigm and now goes more under global isation And Bull 1977a 2703 27681 is anyway keen to downplay the idea of adding TNAs to the international system seeing them as being nothing new not necessarily generative of a world society and not yet threatening the historical primacy of the statessystem and in ternational society It remains unclear why the physical dimension gets no separate standing as world system paralleling international sys tems pairing with international society The logic of Bulls distinction between the physical and the social points towards a fourpart scheme with a separate quadrant for world system rather than the traditional English school scheme of three pillars shown in figure 1 Is it that a world system without a world society is inconceivable in a way that a statessystem without an international society is not Bull does not develop this line but I will return to it in chapter 4 Third it remains unclear from his definition exactly how Bull un derstands the connection between his conception of world society and Wights Kantian tradition Sometimes Bull depicts Kantianism in fairly neutral terms as being about the element of transnational solidarity and conflict cutting across the divisions among states Bull 1977a 41 leav ing ambiguous whether this is about people or TNAs But sometimes a more Wightian revolutionist view shows through when Kantianism is said to be about the transnational social bonds that link individ ual human beings and revolutionists look forward to the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan interna tional society 1977a 256 Bull thus makes a considerable advance on Wights development of world society but he also leaves a lot undone 38 World society in English school theory and still carries Wights normative disposition against the subversion and liberation and missionary men Indeed Suganami 2002 10 offers the thought that Bull and most others in the rationalist tradition felt themselves to be distant from revolutionism and that this explains why they did not devote much thought to the world society dimension of English school theory Also noteworthy is that Bull develops in his definitions a strictly globalist view of both international and world society He dismisses regional and other transnational developments as not necessarily con tributing to and possibly obstructing global developments Bull 1977a 27981 With this move Bull takes a quite different path from Wight Bull was concerned mainly with the evolution of the global interna tional society that developed out of European imperialism and his gaze was thus fixed forward Wights view was more historical making the idea of international and world societies as subsystemic phenomena un avoidable The assumption of global scale became a strong element in the English schools thinking about international and world society As will become apparent in the discussion of Vincent the global scale as sumption was also supported by some universal normative imperatives to do with human rights The global scale assumption is I will argue one of the major wrong turnings in the development of English school theory One of the curiosities here is that both the moral primacy of in dividuals and the assumption of universalism come out of the natural law tradition that Bull rejected yet remained strong in his conception of international and world society The work of Watson does not touch much on the world society ques tion Watson was more concerned to apply Bulls ideas about interna tional system and international society to the study of world history In that sense he was furthering Wights project to develop the field of comparative international societies Watsons significance here is that he explicitly sides with Wights view that all known international soci eties originated inside a dominant culture 1990 1001 Watson is keen to add the possibility that regulated crosscultural Gesellschaft interna tional societies might expand from such Gemeinschaft cores By picking up this key idea of Wights Watson not only kept alive but greatly strengthened the idea that shared culture in effect civilisation was a key element in world society To the extent that any of the founding fathers of English school theory took a particular interest in world society it was Vincent His abiding concern with human rights focused his work precisely on the tensions 39 From International to World Society between the individual and the state level and therefore placed him in the boundary zone between international and world society Like Wight and Bull he drew heavily on political theory and international law With his focus on human rights Vincent was trying to advance beyond Bulls rather pluralist understanding of international society towards the more solidarist conception with which Bull seemed to be struggling in his later work In order to see why Vincent talks about both international and world society in the way he does it helps to understand what he was and was not trying to do Vincent was not trying to set out a new clarification or specification of English school concepts His work is essentially a discus sion of human rights where these are seen as a challengers to pluralist international society and therefore a moral and political problem per se and b as representing the cosmopolitanism intrinsic to world soci ety World society gets discussed in this context and Vincent does not make it an object of enquiry in its own right For Vincent 1978 40 it is the standing of individuals in Western thought that gives them the right to make claims against the state international society and in the twentieth century this way of thinking is embodied in the human rights discourse Vincent is searching for a way out of the pluralist frame set by Bull particularly in seeking a way around Bulls concern that the cultivation of human rights law would almost inevitably be subversive of the key principles of international society sovereignty and nonintervention and therefore subversive of world order His angle of attack hangs on the degree to which the rights of states derive from their being man ifestations of the right of selfdetermination of peoples Vincent 1986 11318 This right in his view requires that states have some minimum degree of civil relationship with their citizens If a state is utterly delin quent in this regard by laying waste its own citizens or by bringing on secessionist movements Vincent 1986 115 and by its conduct outrages the conscience of mankind 1986 125 then its entitlement to the protection of the principle of nonintervention should be sus pended He qualifies such suspensions by saying that the circumstances triggering a right of humanitarian intervention must be extraordinary ones not routine Vincent 1986 126 though it is unclear why on moral grounds routine largescale violence by the state against its citizens such as that in Stalins USSR or in Burma under the military junta should be less of an offence against either the principle of a states duty to its citizens or the conscience of humankind than oneoff cases In this 40 World society in English school theory way Vincent offers a possible solution to the tension between a plural ist international society focused on sovereignty and nonintervention and the cosmopolitan or even revolutionist world society implicit in a doctrine of universal human rights His idea is the development of a more solidarist international society in which states become more alike internally and therefore more likely to find common ground in agreeing about when the right of humanitarian intervention overrides the prin ciple of nonintervention Vincent 1986 1502 In this context Vincent notes that the spread of a global culture makes international society work more smoothly 1986 151 and takes hope in the historical record by which the state has made deals with civil society coopting the ideol ogy of individualism by translating human rights into citizens rights With this line of thinking Vincent begins to blend together a statebased solidarist international society with an underlying world society of common culture Within the framework of this discussion Vincent offers various re marks about world society and international society These go in several directions making different readings of his position possible Gonzalez Pelaez 2002 Whereas Wight was more focused on revolutionists seek ing to overthrow international society Vincent leans towards defining world society in terms of those who oppose international society be cause they are excluded from it He offers one definition of world society as the individual and certain actors and institutions in world politics whose concerns have been regarded conventionally as falling outside the domain of diplomacy and international relations Vincent 1978 20 He is keen to make the point that nonstate actors are excluded by a statebased international society from having their justice claims con sidered I use the term world society to describe the framework of morality that encompasses groups of this kind whose claims not being accommodated by the society of states are voiced in a tone which is hos tile to it Vincent 1978 28 World society in this sense could also be a society of ideologically similar states out of step with mainstream inter national society he mentions republican states during the monarchical age and dictatorships of the proletariat amidst a liberal democratic ma jority He suggests that these excluded entities can include individuals claiming human rights tribes and cultural groups multinational corpo rations and exploited classes and shows how each of these has some au dience for the legitimacy of its claims to rights against the state Vincent 1978 29 Vincents theme of world society as oppositional to interna tional society can also be found in ReusSmit 1997 5668 and Barkin 41 From International to World Society 1998 235 Elsewhere Vincent hints at both more cosmopolitan and more Stalinist views Echoing Bull and James he sees world society in the sense of some great society of mankind Vincent 1978 289 or more specifically as some kind of merging of states transnational actors and individuals where all have rights in relation to each other Vincent 1978 37 1992 25361 Elsewhere he links world society specifically to TNAs Vincent 1992 262 Sometimes echoing Wight he sees a world society properly socalled might be one in which all human beings owed allegiance to one sovereign or one in which a universal cultural pattern prevailed such that no part of the society could mount a defence against it Vincent 1978 289 If one had to extract a dominant thread from all of this it would probably be that Vincents view of international and world society was more historical and moral than analytical Vincent was much less con cerned with abstracting a theory of international relations out of English school concepts than he was with identifying and trying to promote an evolution in human political affairs He did not so much see inter national society and world society as separate analytical constructs but rather understood them as two historical forces needing to grope to wards a reconciliation of their contradictions Vincents problematique narrowly taken is the disjuncture represented by human rights prob lems between the establishment of a pluralist international society of states on the one hand and repressed individuals and groups on the other Taken more broadly it is about the general exclusion from inter national society of a periphery composed of individuals groups some TNAs and possibly some types of state His lookedfor solution is to merge the two At times the form of this merger seems to lean towards a solidarist international society of liberal states In his view a fully sol idarist international society would be virtually a world society because all units would be alike in their domestic laws and values on humani tarian intervention Vincent 1986 104 But his dominant image merges international society into world society possibly growing out of Bulls idea of a world political system as mixing state and nonstate actors The difference is that Vincent elevates this mixture from system to so ciety Thus international society might admit institutions other than states as bearers of rights and duties in it recognizing to that extent their equality and welcoming them into what would then have become a world society Vincent 1978 37 Vincents preferred future is one in which a Westphaliantype international society defining itself as an exclusive club of states gives way to a world society that is no longer 42 World society in English school theory defined by opposition to international society Instead the new world society is defined by an inclusive somewhat neomedieval mixture of states groups transnational entities and individuals all sharing some key values and having legal standing in relation to each other Vincent 1986 92104 Since many international nongovernmental organisa tions INGOs have already achieved limited official standing within many IGOs Clark 1995 it might be argued that Vincents vision has moved some way towards practical realisation The normative and predictive force of this vision of merger may be considerable but from a theorybuilding point of view the consequences are huge and not necessarily good Going down Vincents route requires merging two of the pillars of English school theory into one thereby los ing all of the analytical purchase gained by keeping the ontologies of state and individuals distinct Those English school thinkers with pri marily normative concerns do not seem to care much about this cost Vincents approach is still alive and well in the mind of Dunne 2001a 7 Bull is arguably mistaken in interpreting international society as a society of states since many of the rules and institutions of interna tional society predated the emergence of the modern state It is time that the English School jettisoned the ontological primacy it attaches to the state Almeida 2000 International society existed before sovereign states and it will outlive sovereign states He goes further 2001b 378 to argue that world society should be folded back into international soci ety On the other hand Hill 1996 122 keeps the ontologies separate by distinguishing between international and world public opinion along the lines of states versus nonstate actors leading individuals firms NGOs religions and media Buzan and Little 2000 also operate by keeping the state and individual ontologies distinct There is a rift opening up here between those primarily concerned with normative argument and those interested in analytical leverage Thus from a theorybuilding perspective Vincent is more interesting for what he has to say about human rights than for what he contributes to the development of English school theory He does not really ad vance the conceptualisations of international and world society beyond the positions developed by Wight and Bull and in some ways his con ceptual landscape is less clear than Bulls Whether intentionally or not his focus on human rights blocked off any other considerations of what might constitute either solidarist international society or cosmopolitan world society most obviously shared economic norms rules and insti tutions Vincents human rights focus also reinforced Bulls mistake of 43 From International to World Society looking only at global developments Because for Vincent 1986 117 the principle of human rights had to be universal so also was his vi sion of world society The strong linkage between universal principles and global scale is nowhere more obvious than in Vincents thinking Consequently Vincent 1986 101 105 shared Bulls 1977a 27981 re jection of regionallevel developments like Bull seeing them as threats to potential global ones One can sum up key points from this intellectual history of world society in classical English school thinking as follows r The concept of world society generally has a marginal position in the literature It is mostly discussed in the context of other things and not systematically developed in itself It remains distinctly secondary to the development of international society and is somewhat blighted by its association with revolutionism which many rationalists found distasteful r Despite its marginality world society occupies a central position in English school thinking It is crucial to the persistent moral sense animating the search for order that the society of states was only a secondorder phenomenon underneath which lay the morally prior but as yet unrealised society of all humankind The later Bull and much more so Vincent saw it as the ideal to strive for r There nevertheless remains a strong division of political positions on world society with Wight and Bull more or less defending the necessity of international society to the provision of world order and Vincent seeking ways to reduce the bad human rights conse quences of the sovereigntynonintervention principles of interna tional society r World society remains something of an analytical dustbin uncom fortably containing revolutionism cosmopolitanism and transnation alism There is a fairly strong agreement that international society and world society at least for the present rest on an ontological distinc tion between the state level on the one hand and a rather complicated matrix of individuals and nonstate groups and TNAs on the other Vincent and Dunne wants to break down this distinction but Vincent like Bull and Wight starts by accepting its reality A second thread also exists in which world society is partly seen in terms of shared culture Gemeinschaft and partly in terms of more rational bar gained social structures Gesellschaft How or if these two elements of world society fit together is not really addressed Wight 1966 92 44 World society in English school theory perhaps provided the lead for this neglect with his view that since Sociologists have not agreed on a satisfactory distinction in usage between the words society and community he would use them interchangeably Failure to address this distinction led to the curious situation of having one view of world society as a precondition for international society another view of it as the enemy and a third one as the prospective partner in marriage r There has been no followup to Wights idea that commerce was part of the rationalist agenda r There is a strong presumption that international and world society have to be thought about in global terms and that regionalist or subsystemic developments of them must subtract from the whole by creating competing centres More recent works in the English school tradition have not really moved things forward Except as a normative goal world society re mains at the margins and has not been developed conceptually Wæver 1992 104 offers the definition that world society is the cultural ho mogeneity and interlinkage of societies but it is not clear what this contributes and it could also serve as a definition of liberal solidarism in an international society Dunne Wheeler and others whose princi pal concern is the human rights issue eg Knudsen have more or less stuck with Vincents position of wanting to merge international and world society on normative grounds Whether one wants to keep the ontologies of states and individuals separate or merge them the question of what constitutes world society still has to be answered As I have shown above it does not get a very clear answer in such direct discussions of it as exist But another way of approaching the question in the English school literature is through discussion of the boundary between international and world society where does international society stop and world society begin This discussion occurs within the debate about pluralism and solidarism The pluralistsolidarist debate The pluralistsolidarist debate is about the nature and potentiality of in ternational society and particularly about the actual and potential extent of shared norms rules and institutions within systems of states Within the English school this debate hinges mainly on questions of interna tional law as the foundation of international society and especially on 45 From International to World Society whether the international law in question should be or include natural law as it was for Grotius or positive law The main issue at stake in this debate has been human rights and the closely related questions of hu manitarian intervention and the responsibility of the West towards the third world Bull 1966a 1984 Vincent 1986 Dunne and Wheeler 1996 Linklater 1998 Wheeler and Dunne 1998 Knudsen 1999 Wheeler 2000 Mayall 2000 Jackson 2000 Without this focus there would have been much less theoretical development than has in fact taken place The new generation of solidarists in particular deserve credit for picking up the pluralistsolidarist distinction staked out by Bull and carrying it for ward Nevertheless the somewhat relentless focus on human rights by both pluralists and solidarists has kept the whole theory discussion in a much narrower frame than the general logic of the topic would allow The debate has sometimes been unhelpfully emotive Jackson 2000 with pluralism and solidarism cast against each other in almost zero sum terms This section aims both to sketch the English school debate as it has unfolded and to start looking at the pluralismsolidarism ques tion in a wider perspective by divorcing the terms of the debate from the human rights issue a process that will be completed in chapter 5 The basic positions can be summarised as follows Pluralist concep tions lean towards the realist side of rationalism see figure 1 They are strongly statecentric and empirical and consequently assume that international law is positive law ie only made by states They pre suppose that states are de facto the dominant unit of human society and that state sovereignty means practical legal and political primacy More discreetly pluralism like realism is about the preservation andor cultivation of the political and cultural difference and distinctness that are the legacy of human history All of this makes the scope for in ternational society pretty minimal restricted to shared concerns about the degree of international order under anarchy necessary for coexis tence and thus largely confined to agreements about mutual recog nition of sovereignty rules for diplomacy and promotion of the non intervention principle Jackson 2000 Mayall 2000 As Mayall 2000 14 puts it pluralism is the view that states like individuals can and do have differing inter ests and values and consequently that international society is limited to the creation of a framework that will allow them to coexist in rela tive harmony For pluralists one of the features that distinguishes international society from any other form of social organisation is its procedural and hence nondevelopmental character 46 World society in English school theory The assumption of major differences among the states and peoples in a systemissupportedbythinkingofinternationalsocietyonaglobalscale If international society must cover the whole system then the historical evidence is overwhelming that states are culturally and ideologically unlike Since this debate arose during the Cold War the evidence for the depth of cultural and ideological differences among states was all too palpable Bull 1977a 25760 Pluralism stresses the instrumental side of international society as a functional counterweight to the threat of excessive disorder whether that disorder comes from the absence of states a Hobbesian anarchy or from excesses of conflict between states whether driven by simple concerns about survival or by rival universalist ideological visions By contrast solidarist conceptions lean towards the Kantian side of rationalism As Mayall 2000 14 notes solidarists root their thinking in cosmopolitan values the view that humanity is one and that the task of diplomacy is to translate this latent or immanent solidarity of interests and values into reality It is probably fair to say that many sol idarists believe that some cosmopolitanism and concern for the rights of individuals is necessary for international society As Linklater 1998 24 puts it An elementary universalism underpins the society of states and contributes to the survival of international order On this if on not much else the pluralists and solidarists agree Jackson 2000 175 tak ing the view that world society is the domain in which responsibility is defined by ones membership in the human race Solidarists presup pose that the potential scope for international society is much wider than the nondevelopmental character that limits the pluralist vision possibly embracing shared norms rules and institutions about func tional cooperation over such things as limitations on the use of force and acceptable standards of civilisation with regard to the relationship between states and citizens ie human rights In this view sovereignty can in principle embrace many more degrees of political convergence than are conceivable under pluralism as it does for example within the EU Solidarism focuses on the possiblity of shared moral norms under pinning a more expansive and almost inevitably more interventionist understanding of international order The solidarist position is driven both normatively what states should do and what norms should be part of international society and empirically what states do do and what norms are becoming part of international society Because the pluralist position is entirely statebased it is rela tively straightforward and coherent The solidarist position is more 47 From International to World Society problematic Because it ties together state and nonstate actors and draws on cosmopolitan notions of individual rights and a community of humankind it cannot help but blur the boundary between international and world society There is also room for confusion about whether sol idarism requires specific types of ethical commitment such as human rights or whether it is simply about the degree and depth of shared normative agreement in general Consequently although the pluralist solidarist debate is mostly constructed as one about how states should and do behave within international society world society questions are constantly dancing around its edges Two questions about the structure of this debate arise 1 Are pluralism and solidarism positions on a spectrum between which movement is possible or mutually exclusive opposites about which a choice has to be made 2 Is solidarism something that can be discussed within the confines of international society or does it necessarily spill over into the domain of world society On question 1 it has been a matter of debate as to whether pluralism and solidarism are separated by fundamental differences or whether they simply represent different degrees of a fundamentally similar con dition As far as I can see the view that pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive rests on an argument over whether primacy of right is to be allocated to individuals or to states If one takes the reductionist view that individual human beings are the prime referent for rights and that they must be subjects of international law carrying rights of their own then this necessarily falls into conflict with the view that the claim of states to sovereignty the right to selfgovernment trumps all other claims to rights Either individual human beings possess rights of their own subjects of international law or they can only claim and exercise rights through the state objects of international law If pluralism is es sentially underpinned by realist views of state primacy and solidarism is essentially a cosmopolitan position then they do look mutually ex clusive This rift can be reinforced by different views of sovereignty If sovereignty is given an essentialist interpretation seeing it mostly in what Jackson 1990 calls empirical terms in which sovereignty de rives from the power of states to assert the claim to exclusive right to selfgovernment then states cannot surrender very much to shared norms rules and institutions without endangering the very quality that defines them as states The existential threat to sovereignty in this sense 48 World society in English school theory is especially acute in relation to questions about human rights which is one reason why this issue has featured so much in English school debates Human rights as Wheeler 1992 486 observes opens up fun damental issues about the relationship between states and their citizens and poses the conflict between order and justice in its starkest form for the society of states There have been advantages in pursuing the starkest form hard case but one cost has been to force the pluralistsolidarist debate into an excessive polarisation in which non intervention and human rights become mutually exclusive positions The alternative case is that the two concepts comprise the ends of a spectrum and represent degrees of difference rather than contradictory positions This view rests on a more juridical view of sovereignty in which the right to selfgovernment derives from international society Seen in this perspective sovereignty is more of a social contract than an essentialist condition and the terms in which it is understood are always open to negotiation A softer view of sovereignty along these lines poses no real contradiction to solidarist developments though these may well be cast in terms of individuals as the objects of international law rather than as independent subjects carrying their own rights In this case plu ralism simply defines international societies with a relatively low or nar row degree of shared norms rules and institutions amongst the states where the focus of international society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition or possibly also the management of collective problems of common fate eg arms control environment Solidarism defines international societies with a relatively high or wide degree of shared norms rules and institutions among states where the focus is not only on ordering coexistence and competition but also on cooperation over a wider range of issues whether in pursuit of joint gains eg trade or realisation of shared values eg human rights At the pluralist end of the spectrum where international society is thin collective enforcement of rules will be difficult and rare Towards the solidarist end where international society is thicker a degree of collec tive enforcement in some areas might well become generally accepted as has happened already for aspects of trade and somewhat less clearly in relation to arms control In this view so long as one does not insist that individuals have rights apart from and above the state there is no contradiction between development of human rights and sovereignty If they wish states can agree among themselves on extensive guarantees for human rights and doing so is an exercise of their sovereignty not a questioning of it This was Vincents position and along with other 49 From International to World Society solidarists he saw cosmopolitan forces and TNAs as crucial in push ing states towards understanding themselves and their commitments in that way This difference of view matters because if pluralism and solidarism are mutually exclusive then they simply reproduce within the rational ist international society via media a version of the polarisation between realism and liberalism that splits IR theory more generally Placing this polarisation within the linking framework of international society and world society concepts lowers the ideological heat of the debate and opens the possibility of conducting it in a shared institutional and evo lutionarycontextButitfailstoescapetheessentialtensionwhichwould weaken the potential of the English school to offer its methodological pluralism as a foundation for grand theory If they are not mutually ex clusive but more ends of a spectrum then they reinforce the position of international society as the via media between statecentric realism and cosmopolitan world society This line of thinking leads automatically to question 2 and the nature of the boundary between international and world society There are two issues here What is the difference between a solidarist international so ciety on the one hand and a Kantian world society of homogenous states on the other And do increasing degrees of solidarism necessarily bring transnational units and individuals into the picture as in the thinking of the Vincentians so marrying international and world society On the first issue Bull clearly wants to draw a line He rejects the idea that an ideologically homogenous statessystem equates with solidarism Bull 1977a 245 He does so partly on the weak ground that it is unlikely to happen and the process of arriving at it would be highly conflict ual because of inability to agree on universal values and partly on the basis of a distinction between genuinely harmonious Kantian world societies an idea he rejects as utopian and international societies that have learned to regulate conflict and competition but have not elimi nated it In effect Bull tries to eliminate the idea of a Kantian model of ideologically harmonious states altogether Like Carr 1946 he rejects the possibility of ideological homogeneity leading to harmony And be cause he maintains a strong globalscale assumption about international and world society he can plausibly argue against the probability of ide ological harmony ever occurring Because he rejects the Kantian model Bull is able to avoid the boundary question by keeping solidarism firmly within the cast of international society Yet if international society is de fined in terms of a society of states and world society as the nonstate 50 World society in English school theory sector one begins to wonder what Kantianism is doing in the world society pillar of the English school triad in the first place If Kantianism means a society of states marked by a high degree of homogeneity in domestic structures values and laws then it is a type of international society not an element of world society This issue of homogeneity in the domestic structures of states was perhaps Vincents key point of departure from Bull For Vincent 1986 104 1502 a fully solidarist international society would be virtually a world society because all units would be alike in their domestic laws and values on humanitarian intervention Homogeneity would make it more likely that they would find common ground in agreeing about when the right of humanitarian intervention overrides the principle of nonintervention This line of thinking has more recently been explored by Armstrong 1999 in the context of developments in international law Armstrong talks in terms of world society seeing a shift from in ternational law for a society of states to world law for a world society of people His argument hinges on changes in the nature and inter ests of the leading states as they have become more democratic and interdependent and he acknowledges a certain imperial quality to this development as the leading states seek to impose their own standards of governance and commerce on to others Armstrong avoids the term solidarismyethisargumentisexactlyforaVincentstylesolidaristinter national society based on homogeneity in the domestic values of states Neither Bulls rejection nor Vincents advocacy answers the question of just how solidarist a statessystem can become before it can no longer be thought of as an international society The narrow way in which the pluralistsolidarist debate has been conducted within the English school largely focused on the single question of human rights has discouraged investigation of this question The second issue whether increasing degrees of solidarism necessar ily bring transnational units and individuals into the picture also raises questions that have not really been fully explored in English school writing Vincent and his followers assume that it does and want to merge international and world society Arguing from a different start ing point I have elsewhere Buzan 1993 made the case that solidarism can only develop up to a point without there being accompanying developments in world society I did not argue for merging the two concepts but did take the position that a solidarism confined to inter national society can only go so far before further development has to bring in world society elements These questions quickly link back to 51 From International to World Society whether pluralism and solidarism are opposed choices or positions on a spectrum Bull set out the pluralistsolidarist framework and so his conception of society is a good place to tap into this debate Bulls 1977a 537 conception of society comes out of a kind of sociological functionalism in which all human societies must be founded on understandings about security against violence observance of agreements and rules about property rights He sees rules as the key to sharpening up mere common interests into a clear sense of appropriate behaviour 1977a 6771 The making of rules ranges from the customary to the positive but whatever type they are they fall into three levels 1 Constitutional normative principles are the foundation setting out the basic ordering principle eg society of states universal empire state of nature cosmopolitan community etc In Bulls view what is essential for order is that one of these principles dominates because the principles are usually zerosum contestation equals disorder Contestation at this level is what defines Wights revolutionists For an international society the key principle is sovereignty This level is comparable to Waltzs first tier of structure organising principle of thesystemthoughBullsrangeofpossibilitiesiswiderthanWaltzs 2 Rules of coexistence are those which set out the minimum be havioural conditions for society and therefore hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements Here we find Bulls institutions of classical European international society diplomacy international law the balance of power war and the role of great powers 3 Rules to regulate cooperation in politics strategy society and econ omy 1977a 70 About these Bull says 1977a 70 Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elementary or pri mary goals of international life but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objec tives than mere coexistence Here one would find everything from the UN system through arms control treaties to the regimes and institutions for managing trade finance environment and a host of technical issues from postage to allocation of orbital slots and broadcast frequencies Note first that this is a highly rational contractual rulebased con ception of society It has nothing at all to do with shared culture or the 52 World society in English school theory wefeeling of community and is by definition completely distinct from the shared culture civilisational precursors of international society that feature in Wights and Watsons work Note second that Bulls first and second levels mainly define the pluralist position on international society with sovereign states representing the choice of constitutional principle and the rules of coexistence reflecting a mainly Westphalian scheme Solidarism finds its scope mainly in the third tier of more ad vanced but secondary rules about cooperation though international law under rules of coexistence is sufficiently vague to allow in quite a bit of solidarism It is worth keeping this third tier in mind when con sidering Bulls position in the pluralistsolidarist debate Rules about cooperation seem to offer an openended scope for the development of solidarism Yet in his defence of pluralism and his fear of solidarism Bull seems to forget about this third tier Since this is where the big growth has been in contemporary international society especially in the economic sector the placing of this as a kind of shallow third tier comes into question and the odd juxtaposition of the classifications more ad vanced but secondary begins to look contradictory Develop enough down these secondary lines and the more advanced elements begin to bring the constitutive principles themselves into question The devel opment of the EU illustrates this potential and shows that the two are not necessarily contradictory in the disordering way that Bull seemed to think inevitable Why did Bulls underlying concern with order and his pessimism about its prospects drive him to box himself in like this when the underlying logic of his concepts does not seem to require doing so Bull sets out the terms for solidarism and pluralism Bull 1966a see also 1990 and Keene 2002 by exploring the positions represented re spectively by Grotius and Lassa Oppenheim The core of the argument is about whether the international law on which international society rests is to be understood as natural law Grotius solidarist or positive law Oppenheim pluralist According to Bull 1966a 64 it was Grotiuss view deriving from natural law that individual human beings are sub jects of international law and members of international society in their own right Because Grotian solidarism comes out of natural law it is inherently universalist in the sense of having to be applied to all of hu mankind While Bull accepts the universalism he rejects natural law as a basis for international society and particularly dismisses the idea that individuals have standing as subjects of international law and mem bers of international society in their own right He argues 1966a 68 that Grotiuss attachment of solidarism to natural law was rooted in the 53 From International to World Society needs of Grotiuss own times to fill the vacuum left by the declining force of divine or ecclesiastical law and the rudimentary character of ex isting voluntary or positive law and that Grotius stands at the birth of international society and is rightly regarded as one if its midwives 66 Seeing the Grotian position as relevant to a longpast set of historical conditions and fearing that Grotiuss blending of individual rights and state sovereignty was a recipe for conflict Bull plumps for Oppenheims view 1966a 73 it may still be held that the method he Oppenheim employed of gauging the role of law in international society in rela tion to the actual area of agreement between states is superior to one which sets up the law over and against the facts This view seemed to strengthen over time there are no rules that are valid independent of human will that are part of nature Natural law cannot accommodate the fact of moral disagreement so prominent in the domain of interna tional relations Bull 1979 181 For Bull international society is and should be based on positive law Bulls primary concern here is to restrict the idea of international so ciety to states and in that sense he is helping to draw a clear boundary between international society states and world society individuals Adopting the positive law position accomplishes this by putting in ternational law wholly into the hands of states But while identifying pluralism with positive international law Bull 1966a 648 does ex clude individuals as subjects of international law the distinction be tween positive and natural law does not provide an adequate basis for distinguishing between pluralism and solidarism per se in terms of de gree of shared norms rules and institutions It is true that natural law provides one possible foundation for solidarism particularly where the concern is to establish a basis for human rights but as argued above this puts pluralism and solidarism necessarily at odds Remembering Bulls third tier of rules to regulate cooperation it seems clear that adherence to positive law does nothing to prevent states from developing such an extensive range of shared values including in the area of human rights that their relationship would have to be called solidarist This impor tant loophole seems to have escaped Bulls notice not least because his disinterest in both economic and regional developments blinded him to the very significant empirical developments of solidarism going on there Adherence to positive law not only opens the way for as much cooperation among states as they wish to have but since positive law is an expression of sovereignty does so in a way that does not necessarily or even probably bring sovereignty into question As Cutler notes it 54 World society in English school theory also undercuts the assumption of universalism on a global scale that is strong in Bulls thinking about international society Cutler 1991 469 Within a positive law framework states can by definition do what they like including forming solidarist regional or subsystemic international societies Acceptance of positive law draws a straight line between the pluralist and solidarist positions and eliminates the logic of their being opposed Pluralism simply becomes a lower degree of shared norms rules and institutions or a thinner body of positive law solidarism a higher one or a thicker body of positive law Bull never seemed to grasp this implication of his acceptance of posi tive law Instead he goes on to develop what seem like rather arbitrary criteria for solidarism namely that it is defined with respect to the en forcement of the law by states pluralism sees states as capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law 1966a 52 By the device of discussing it only in relation to high politics issues such as collective security and human rights this enforcement criterion is made to seem more demand ing than it often is In this perspective solidarism opposes alliances as sectional and favours collective security on a universalist basis Plural ists argue for the centrality of sovereignty and nonintervention as the key principles of international society and the only purposes for which they could be overridden were that of selfpreservation and that of the maintenance of the balance of power Bull 1966a 63 It is this very demanding concept of solidarism attached to collective security Bull 1977a 23840 that goes forward into The Anarchical Society where Bull 1489 sees solidarism as expressed by the development of consensual international law where norms and rules can achieve the status of inter national law not only if unanimously supported but also if supported by consensus Bull also 1977a 152 continued to identify solidarism with Grotiuss natural law position and this led him to the view that Carried to its logical extreme the doctrine of human rights and du ties under international law is subversive of the whole principle that mankind should be organised as a society of sovereign states For if the rights of each man can be asserted on the world political stage over and against the claims of his state and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as a servant or a citizen of that state then the position of the state as a body sovereign over its citizens and entitled to command their obedience has been subject to challenge and the structure of the society of sovereign states has been placed in jeopardy 55 From International to World Society This position does not change much in his later allegedly more soli darist work Bull 1984 13 The promotion of human rights on a world scale in a context in which there is no consensus as to their meaning and the priorities among them carries the danger that it will be subversive of coexistence among states on which the whole fabric of world order in our times depends The fierceness of Bulls defence of pluralism is understandable when seen as a response to a normatively driven solidarism based in natu ral law pitting a universalist principle of individual rights against the state and so compromising the principle of sovereignty But it does not make sense against the logic of Bulls own positive law position in which likeminded states are perfectly at liberty to agree human rights regimes amongst themselves without compromising the prin ciple of sovereignty Interestingly Manning 1962 1678 was crystal clear on this point What is essentially a system of law for sovereigns being premised on their very sovereignty does not by the fact of being strengthened put in jeopardy the sovereignties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence Not at any rate in logic Bulls globalscale universalist assumptions make the best the enemy of the good by cut ting off acknowledgement of subglobal human rights developments In principle Bull should have no difficulty with individuals as objects of international human rights law so long as that law is made by states If Bulls strong defence of pluralism was a response to the normative cosmopolitanism of human rights solidarists it has reaped its reward in spirited counterattacks The ongoing debate has made some progress but partly because it remains focused on the human rights question it has also carried forward many of the analytical weaknesses and distor tions from the earlier rounds Indeed since interest in collective security has fallen away the more recent pluralistsolidarist debate is almost ex clusively focused on human rights The assumption of universalism and therefore global scale still dominates on both sides as does the blindness or indifference towards all the realworld solidarist develop ments at the regional level and in the economic sector Some of the solidarists such as Knudsen 1999 remain committed to the natural law approach and so take Bull as a particular target Knudsen argues strongly against the polarisation between pluralism and solidarism which he sees as stemming from Bulls work He uses a Grotian position on human rights and international society to argue that human rights can be and in his view already is an institution of international society He brings individuals into international society 56 World society in English school theory through natural law but still holds solidarism to be an empirical feature of statebased international society Wheeler 2000 41 is distinctive for not appealing to natural law and makes it a priority to avoid clashes between international law and human rights Instead he builds his case on empirical grounds and seeks ways to strengthen the moves towards a human rights regime that he sees as already present in positive inter national law Vincent as sketched above does not explicitly enter into the pluralistsolidarist debate But the logic of his argument implic itly equates international society with a pluralist model and solidarism with a move to a world society in which states other groups and indi viduals all have legal standing in relation to each other Vincent 1986 92102 By threatening to merge world society into solidarism Vincent and his followers both lose the extremely central distinction between statebased international and nonstatebased world societies and divert attention from the necessary task of thinking through world so ciety more carefully and relating it to international society as a distinct factor Perhaps the most prominent current exponents of solidarism are Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler They correctly place Bull as rejecting the foundationalistuniversalismsaspectofrevolutionismandalsonatural law Dunne and Wheeler 1998 They recognise that Bulls idea of moral foundations in international society rested on positive law and they also see that this was in principle open ended as regards potential develop ment between pluralism and solidarism Rather than setting Bull up as a target they try to reinterpret him as a kind of protosolidarist perhaps hoping to enlist his status in order to help legitimate those concerned to build up the normative elements in English school theory They them selves seem to be in Vincents tradition seeing solidarism not as a feature or not of international societies but as intimately bound up in the tran sition from international to world society They try 1996 both to push Bull into a more solidarist position and to extend the Grotian line that solidarism crosses the boundary between international and world soci ety They draw attention rightly to the later Bulls concerns for justice as a component of order and to his awareness of the limits of pluralism ex posed by the Cold War ideological polarisation of the great powers They even 1996 92 want to pull out of Bull three paradigms of world poli tics realism pluralism and solidarism centred upon the themes of respectively power order and justice In terms of a structural interpre tation of English school theory this is a potentially huge move though one not yet worked out It would follow Wight in locating on normative 57 From International to World Society ground the entire theoretical foundation of the English school triad tak ing out of the equation the whole question of units states transnational individual and the stateindividual ontology on which the existing structural distinctions are built As I have argued above Bulls commit ment to positive law did provide an opening towards solidarism But it was an opening that Bull himself did not go through Bulls awareness of the pitfalls of pluralism and his sensitivity to justice claims were not sufficient to override his clear commitment to statecentric plural ism In particular they did not override his commitment to an ontology based on keeping states and individuals analytically distinct which is what makes his work a major contribution to developing a more social structural approach to English school theory Trying to coopt Bull into solidarism risks confusing the pluralistsolidarist question with that about the boundary between international and world society on which Bull was clear As I will argue in chapter 5 there are good analytical reasons for keeping the ideas of pluralism and solidarism distinct from the definitions of international and world society What this discussion reveals is that a great deal hinges on the question of what solidarism is understood to be If it is simply cosmopolitanism dressed up in English school jargon then pluralism and solidarism must be mutually exclusive and world society can only be achieved by mer ging international society into a wider cosmopolitan frame Something of this sort is hinted at in Linklaters 1996 78 idea of extending citizen ship both up and down from the state and having the state mediating between the different loyalties and identities present within modern societies If as might be inferred from Bulls discussion of rules and from some of Dunnes and Wheelers writing about positive interna tional law solidarism is better understood as being about the thickness of norms rules and institutions that states choose to create to manage their relations then pluralism and solidarism simply link positions on a spectrum and have no necessary contradiction Given its many costs the only reason to hold the cosmopolitan posi tion is either a dyedinthewool methodological individualism or the hope that doing so gives some political leverage against the many states that have so far proved unwilling to embrace a human rights agenda Against it is the argument made by Williams 2001 that world society contrary to the hopes of some solidarists is more thoroughly and deeply fragmented and diverse and therefore more embeddedly pluralist than international society Whereas states because they are like units and rel atively few in number do have the potential for solidarism underlined 58 World society in English school theory by Kant the diversity and unlikeness of the entities comprising the nonstate world make it a much more problematic site for the develop ment of solidarism The case for taking the less dogmatic line is not just the expedience of avoiding difficulties Sticking with the cosmopolitan view of solidarism confines one to a perilously narrow liberal view in which the issue of human rights dominates what solidarism is under stood to be It leaves one unable to describe as solidarist international societies that make no concession to individuals as subjects of inter national law but which nevertheless display a rich and deep array of shared norms rules and institutions some of which may give individ uals extensive rights as objects of international law On the face of it the inability to label such international societies as solidarist makes a non sense of much of what the pluralistsolidarist debate is about in terms of whether international society is about mere rules of coexistence or is as Mayall 2000 21 puts it about turning international society into an enterprise association that exists to pursue substantive goals of its own In substantive terms pluralism describes thin international soci eties where the shared values are few and the prime focus is on de vising rules for coexistence within a framework of sovereignty and nonintervention Solidarism is about thick international societies in which a wider range of values is shared and where the rules will be not only about coexistence but also about the pursuit of joint gains and the management of collective problems in a range of issueareas Thinking about pluralism and solidarism in terms of thin and thick sets of shared values runs usefully in parallel with Ruggies 1998 33 constructivist understanding of international systems the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material At the level of the international polity the concept of struc ture in social constructivism is suffused with ideational factors There can be no mutually comprehensible conduct of international relations constructivists hold without mutually recognised constitutive rules resting on collective intentionality These rules may be more or less thick or thin Similarly they may be constitutive of conflict or competition If one takes this view then pluralism and solidarism become ends of a spectrum They represent degrees of difference rather than contra dictory positions This position also allows one to keep solidarism as a feature of international society ie a society of states and therefore to 59 From International to World Society keep distinct the idea of international society as being about states and world society as about nonstate actors World society encompasses the individual and transnational domains and it remains a question to be investigated as to whether and how these tie into the development of solidarism Contrary to the Vincentians world society becomes not the necessary absorption of international society into a wider universe of in dividual and transnational rights but a distinct domain of actors whose relationshipwiththestatedomainneedstobeunderstoodAmongother things this perspective requires closer attention to the question of what the shared norms rules and institutions that define solidarism and plu ralism are about and what values they represent Answers to that may well condition the type of relationship between international and world society that develops and whether and how individuals and transna tionals become players in solidarism more on this in chapter 5 For those in the solidarist tradition there is an interesting and as yet not well explored area of linkage to other elements of IR theory to be found in the question of homogeneity of units Bulls pluralism is again a useful foil As noted above Bull rejected as Kantian and therefore world society the idea that solidarism could be produced by states becom ing more internally alike Vincent Armstrong and Dunne and Wheeler seem in many ways to hinge their ideas of solidarism precisely on the possibility of such homogenising developments If homogenisation is a route to solidarist international societies then IR theory offers grounds for optimism Several powerful trends in IR theory note the existence of homogenising forces and this would seem to work in favour of the normative approach to international society at least so long as lib eral states are in the ascendent in the international system as the model around which homogenisation occurs Halliday 1992 focuses on the issue of homogenisation of domestic structures among states as one of the keys to international and by implication world society He impli citlypicksuponthemesfromWightandcarriesthesameblurringofcat egories pluralistrealist transnationalnonstate links and homogeni sation among states in their internal character and structure Halliday notes the normative case for homogenisation Burke and democratic peace the Marxian idea of capitalism as the great homogenising force and the KantianFukuyama idea of science and technology and democracy as homogenising forces Halliday ignores entirely Waltzs 1979 argument about the operation of socialisation and competition as homogenising forces an idea picked up by me and adapted to thinking about international society Buzan 1993 Interestingly the 60 World society in English school theory Stanford school Meyer et al 1997 1448 also ignore the powerful homogenising argument in Waltz Unlike Halliday they acknowledge Waltz but they dismiss him as a microrealist even though they also take the striking isomorphism of the like units of the international sys tem as their key phenomenon for explanation Their explanation for isomorphism could be seen as complementary to that in Waltz more on this in chapter 3 If homogeneity is overdetermined in the interna tional system then the implications of this for solidarism need to be more closely investigated One can sum up key points from the pluralistsolidarist debate as follows r That the debate about solidarism in not primarily or even at all about shared identity or common culture In one sense it is about whether one starts from a cosmopolitan position driven by ethical commit ments or from a statecentric position driven by positive law In an other simpler and less politically charged sense it is about the extent and degree of institutionalisation of shared interests and values in sys tems of agreed rules of conduct Arguably it is also about collective enforcement of rules though whether this is a necessary condition for all rules is unclear r That there is confusion about the relationship between homogeneity of states on the one hand and solidarism on the other Does homo geneitypointtowardsKantianworldsocietyorsolidaristinternational society r That it remains a contested question as to whether solidarism is or should be a quality of interstate international societies or whether it is or should be a quality that necessarily bridges between and merges international and world society Is solidarism the quality that merges international and world society or is it a concept that can be applied to international society states and world society separately If the former then the distinction between international and world society as distinct pillars within English school theory collapses If the latter then the question is how the two relate particularly when and to what extent the development of solidarism in an interstate international society requires corresponding developments in world society r That there does not seem to be any necessary contradiction between acceptance of positive law as the foundation for international society and the development of solidarism 61 From International to World Society r That acceptance of positive law as the foundation for international society would seem to require or at least enable abandoning both the universalistglobalscale assumption inherited from natural law and the blindness to solidarist developments in areas other than human rights and collective security In practice neither has yet happened The pluralistsolidarist debate dances on the border between interna tional and world society But while it opens up some interesting and useful perspectives both on the border and on what lies on either side of it it still does not generate a clear understanding of world society Conclusions On the evidence in this chapter it does not overstate the case to say that as things stand the English schools understanding of world society is both incoherent and underdeveloped Yet this observation is not the basis for a contemptuous dismissal The reasons for it are perfectly un derstandable in the context of what the various writers discussed above were trying to do And the main point is that although the concept is neither well worked out nor clearly defined it is located in an extremely interesting and central position within an overall framework of IR the ory World society bears heavily on the most important debates within the English school so much so that even the relatively welldeveloped concept of international society cannot be properly understood without taking world society into close account For all of its shortcomings the English school approach to world society does show exactly why the concept is important and also shows where if not yet how it fits into a theoretically pluralist approach to IR theory My conclusion then is not that the English schools thinking on world society should be set aside but that it should be taken as the definition of a challenge There is in teresting and important thinking to be done in working out just what world society does mean how it fits into the larger frame of English school theory and what the consequences of a clearer view of it are for that larger frame In order to advance that project it helps now to look at the several bodies of thought outside the English school that also use the concept What other understandings of world society are there and do they offer insights which can be brought to bear on the difficulties that world society raises in the English school 62 3 Concepts of world society outside English school thinking The English school has successfully made the concept of international society its own Because the meaning of international society as the society that states form among themselves is quite specific there are not manyattemptstoimpartothermeaningstothetermThesamecannotbe said of world society As shown in chapter 2 the English schools usage of this term is confused diverse and on the margins of its discourse In addition many others have taken up the term or synonyms for it as a way of questioning the narrowness inherent in the statecentric quality of international society World society is used widely to bring nonstate actors into the social structure of the international system This chapter surveys these alternative conceptions with a view to the lessons they offer for thinking about the meaning of world society and how it should be staged in English school thinking There are in practice two broad ways of using the concept of world society The first typified by Bull is to see it as a specialised idea aimed at capturing the nonstate dimension of humankinds social order Buzan and Little 2000 for example use it as an expression meant to capture either or both of the society Gesellschaft or community Gemeinschaft aspects of the nonstate and individual levels of world politics In this formworldsocietyisdistinctfromandcounterpointedtointernational society The second way exemplified by Vincent and his followers and prevalent in most sociological approaches is to use the concept in an attempt to capture the macrodimension of human social organisation as a whole In this usage world society ultimately incorporates and supersedes international society Yet along the way it is often opposed to international society as a way of conceptualising the world social order 63 From International to World Society In the English schools discussions of international society and also more generally in the discussion about the structure of statessystems the distinction between the system element understood as interaction and the society element understood as socially constructed norms rules and institutions is in general explicit The terms international systemandinternationalsocietyareemployedspecificallyinthestruc tural side of English school theory to represent this distinction It also featuresstronglyinthedebatesbetweenneorealistswhosetheoryhangs on the material aspects of system and constructivists who want to develop more social views of international structure Curiously and regardless of whether or not one thinks the system society distinction tenable or not on which more in chapter 4 no sim ilar separation attends the discussions about world society As noted above Bull 1977 27681 did distinguish between world society and the world political system but this concern to differentiate the me chanical and the social in relation to the nonstate world has not become part of English school practice Outside the English school and indeed outside the mainstream of IR this issue has been addressed not by at tempting to distinguish between the mechanical or physical and the social but by setting up different understandings of what constitutes society Much of the nonEnglish school discussion about world soci ety can be understood as the taking of positions ranging from relatively light to relatively heavy in what definitional benchmarks are set for society On the lighter end world society becomes not much more than a synonym for Bulls world political system or what was referred to in chapter 2 as world system not Wallersteins meaning This view stresses global patterns of interaction and communication and in sym pathy with much of the literature on globalisation uses the term society mainly to distance itself from statecentric models of IR On the heavier end world society approximates Vincents holistic conception and is aimed at capturing the total interplay amongst states nonstate actors and individuals while carrying the sense that all the actors in the sys tem are conscious of their interconnectedness and share some important values This can come in fairly nonspecific forms where the emphasis is on the fact that a great deal of socially structured interaction is going on amongst many different types of actor on a planetary scale It can also come in more focused versions where the whole assemblage is characterised according to some dominant ordering principle such as capitalism or modernity 64 World society outside English school theory Bulls understanding of world society has the attraction of resting on clear assumptions about both world and society In relation to world Bulls position is that it is about the nonstate aspects of international systems and therefore distinct from international society In relation to society Bulls position is in parallel with that on international society that society is about shared values The shared values idea comes in different forms in that it can be arrived at by various routes coercive universalism imposition of shared values by force cosmopolitanism development of shared values at the level of individuals or Kantian development of shared values at the level of states The transnational element in English school world society thinking is not so obviously about shared values though a degree of necessity of shared values can be assumed to underlie it Transnational organisations whether firms or INGOs are by definition functionally differentiated and it can be argued that functionally differentiated organisations presuppose a sys tem of shared values in order to allow for their creation and operation within a division of labour In highly liberalised international systems like that amongst the contemporary Western states transnational or ganisations exist and function because of a framework of agreed rules and institutions Similarly the transnational system of medieval Europe wasstructuredbythesharedvaluesandinstitutionsofChristendomand feudalism Using world society to refer to nonstate elements means that while Bulls concept of world society is generally pitched at the global scale humankind as a whole it is not holistic in the sense of being about everything It represents a particular line of distinction within the frame of the international system overall The idea of shared values means that Bulls concept of society is a relatively strong one with quite demand ing criteria a view shared by Krasner 1999 48 The Vincentians share Bulls strong understanding of society as meaning shared values but not his narrow conception of world society as confined to the nonstate world Compared to Bull and at some risk of oversimplification it can be said that most nonEnglishschool users of the concept want to define world society more loosely along either or both of these lines That is to say like the Vincentians they want world to be used as a holistic umbrella term to include everything in the international system state nonstate and individual Rengger 1992 3669 also argues for incorporating the narrow idea of international society into a cosmopolitan frame But in contrast to almost everyone within the English school the other users 65 From International to World Society of world society want society to mean something less demanding than shared values and closer to what in English school and IR parlance would be thought of as system The most obvious motive behind these moves is consciousness of the shrinkage of time and space in the contem porary global political economy and the consequent need to take into account the multitudinous patterns of interaction and interdependence that knit the world together more tightly and more deeply than ever before Some of these concepts of world society are thus precursors of or analogues for globalisation A second motive probably springs from the direction and character of debates in different disciplines In IR the systemsociety distinction is well embedded In sociology the tradition of debate is more focused around how society is to be defined The rest of this chapter comprises a survey of world society and anal ogous concepts as they have been developed outside the English school The aim is to relate their ways of understanding world society to the problem of conceptualising world society within the English schools theoretical framework The first section looks at three writers located mainly within the IR debate but with a stronger sociological orientation than the IR mainstream John Burton Evan Luard and Martin Shaw The second section examines a range of debates and traditions located mainly in Sociology Luhmann the Stanford school the World Society Research Group and macrosociology The third section turns to a de bate that stems mainly from a mixture of political theory and political activism global civil society IR writers with a sociological turn Burton Luard and Shaw Two IR writers outside the English school who can be read in the same way as the Vincentians and Rengger ie as favouring an all inclusive interpretation of world are Burton and Luard Both men ploughed somewhat lonely furrows in IR and might best be thought of as forerunners of globalisation In that sense neither was responding to the same impulses that inspired the British Committee in particular and the English school more broadly even though they used similar concepts Burton 1972 1922 wanted to differentiate interstate relations which he saw as the dominant IR approach from a holistic approach that focused on the entire network or system or cobweb of human interactions In part he argues that the behaviour of states cannot be 66 World society outside English school theory understood without taking into account the wider context of human interactions In part his ambition was to shift the focus of analysis away from the particularities of states to the dynamics of the interhuman sys tem as a whole His idea of world society meant covering all the levels of analysis at once He wanted maps of human behaviour and the key to his perception of world society is perhaps found in the statement Burton 1972 45 that Communications and not power are the main organising influence in world society Like the English school Burton was reacting against the excesses of mechanistic statecentric realism in IR theory Unlike them he wanted to move much further away from the statessystem as the central frame for thinking about international relations Luard 1976 1990 was much more animated by the task of construct ing a specifically sociological approach to the study of international relations In his earlier work 1976 110 364 he insisted that his sub ject was the society of states but later 1990 he took the whole nexus of states transnational actors and individual networks as the unit of analysis Like Burton he did not differentiate between international and world society and he used the terms interchangeably 1990 2 His concern with consciousness of interrelatedness 1990 3 came close to Burtons focus on communications but he wanted to consider a whole set of variables structure motives means norms institutions elites and most of all ideology and the interplay amongst them as the ba sis for differentiating types of international society Luards approach was consciously sociological and comparative His 1976 book can be grouped with Wights and Watsons as comparative historical sociology approaches to international society His key theme which would res onate with most contemporary contstructivists was that in any given era there exists a common pattern of belief about the nature of interna tional society and the behaviour within it seen as normal 1976 110 This pattern of belief is a social structure that strongly conditions the behaviour of the units in the system no matter what their internal dif ferences He wanted to establish internationalworld society as a type of society with its own distinctive features larger looser with stronger subunits than others but still recognisably similar in structure to some of the larger states He wanted to open the study of society away from the tight smallscale community models of anthropology while keep ing the holistic focus allowed by the concept of society This type of thinking developed mostly in reaction to the statecentric models of international relations promoted by realism but also in some 67 From International to World Society ways by liberalism which has its own version of statecentrism The English school can be attacked also for statecentrism but only if it is interpreted as being about international society and nothing else Some do see it in this way Brown 1999 67 Keane 2001 256 and would be happy to think of it as the international society school With that interpretation the English school can easily be accused of sharing the statecentric ontology of realism and therefore as missing or worse ex cluding from consideration the rising salience of nonstate elements in the international system As has been shown above this is not a tenable interpretation of the English school Although the bulk of the schools work has indeed been in the area of international society its foundation is the theoretical pluralism embedded in the three traditions The three pillars of English school theory do encompass the holistic agenda Its big advantage over other holistic approaches is that it does not surren der ontological and epistemological distinctions and therefore retains a much greater degree of analytical leverage Most other holistic ap proaches dump everything into a single category often labelled world society so presenting an impossibly complicated subject for analysis While the English school can certainly be accused both of neglecting world society and of not making its meaning and content clear enough it cannot fairly be accused of realisms ontological or indeed episte mological narrowness Shaw also leans towards equating the English school with interna tional society but this is not his main point Like Luard Shaw is rightly concerned to raise the sociological consciousness of the IR community But rather than ignoring the English school as Luard largely did Shaw takes it as a target particularly the English schools strong conception of society as shared values Shaw wants a wide definition of world and a weak one of society In terms of world Shaw like Luard and perhaps Burton wants to reintegrate the study of the statessystem the global economy and global culture 1996 56 At some points he seems to take up an antistate position similar to that which Brown 1999 1014 attributes to Burton almost bringing him into line with Bulls view that international society and world society are in important ways opposed concepts He argues that The global society perspective there fore has an ideological significance which is ultimately opposed to that of international society Shaw 1996 60 Yet elsewhere 1996 55 he seems almost close to a three traditions position when he suggests but does not follow up that the key question is how global society and international society relate to each other 68 World society outside English school theory Shaw is on clearer ground when he argues that the definition of so ciety used by Bull and through him the English school is too demand ing In Shaws view the requirement for a substantial degree of social consensus works up to a point to identify international society but is the reason why Bull cannot bring world society into practical focus Shaw sees this strong definition of society as discredited He wants a weaker definition that rejects the distinction between system and society in order to bring the growing reality of a global society more clearly into focus Shaw 1996 54 Here Shaws critique comes close to the holistic line present in Burton and Luard World society exists through the so cial relations involved in global commodity production and exchange through global culture and mass media and through the increasing de velopment of world politics 1996 55 Although this definition is open to interpretation in different ways its thrust suggests a watering down of society to a meaning not much different from Bulls world political system Shaws apparent motive for wanting a weaker definition of society is to enable him to make a stronger empirical claim that a significant world society already exists and needs to be taken into account This is the po sition of some globalists and reflects promotional as much as analytical goals In this sense Shaw and others are quite right to draw attention to the difficulty that the strong definition of society poses for the English school It is pretty clear in Bulls writing that the demanding require ment for society leads directly to the conclusion that not much is to be found by way of really existing world society This in turn forces him to defend pluralist international society in the name of international order The gap between Bulls position and Shaws call for a weaker definition of world society draws attention back to the missing element of world system or in Bulls term world political system in the English school triad noted earlier Recall that in the English schools triad international system represents the physical interaction element at the level of states and international society the socially constructed one based on shared norms rules and institutions Recall also that world society is defined in parallel terms to international society but that there is no place in the triad scheme for a physical interaction analogue world system to international system The position of Shaw and the globalisationists might thus be understood in English school terms as a call to recognise the standing and significance of the world system element which is currently absent from the English schools theoretical scheme Its ab sence in English school thinking is probably explained by the tension 69 From International to World Society between the Wightian mode of thinking from which the three traditions derive and more structural modes In Wightian mode world system does not register because unlike the other three pillars it has not been part of the conversation about international relations The demand for it comes from structural logic Whether it is a good idea to address this problem as Shaw would have us do by conflating world system and world society so weakening what is meant by society is much more open to argument more on this in chapter 4 It is not clear what would be gained analytically from adopting Shaws approach other than a stronger basis for a claim that world society al ready exists In the end his expanded and weakened formulation con tains many of the same ambiguities as are found in the English school and his weaker concept of society pushes towards a mere system view and drains away the distinctiveness of a social as opposed to a merely mechanicalphysical approach Sociological conceptions of world society Sociology is of course the home discipline of society even though some of its leading lights Mann 1986 2 Wallerstein 1984 2 would like to abolish the concept on the grounds that no unit of analysis can be found that corresponds to it Most of Sociology has been concerned with so cieties composed of individual human beings and thus confined itself to entities that are subglobal in scale Some sociologists most notably in the subfield of historical sociology have become concerned with the state and power and developed a perspective on the global level not dissimilar to that of realism Mann 1986 Tilly 1990 Sociologists have not generally been attracted by the idea of secondorder societies such as the society of states with the consequence that this topic was left largely to IR and an intellectual community trained more in politics than sociology But quite a few sociologists have been attracted to macro conceptions of society and it is not surprising that several species of world society are to be found within the debates of sociology Luhmanns concept of world society represents a far more radical de parture from both standard IR and sociological theory than anything else discussed in this chapter Most IR theory has its roots in classical sociological theories which are in one way or another based on the idea that society is about various types of normative cohesion shared norms rules institutions values common identities andor cultures Most in sideoutsideunderstandingsofthestatesharethisapproachasdoesthe 70 World society outside English school theory English schools understanding of international and world society Luhmanns concept is opposed to all of this seeking to replace a nor mative understanding of society with one based on processes and struc tures of communication Albert 1999 According to the World Society ResearchGroupWSRG199589Luhmannwantstomoveawayfrom the old European concept of society based on normative expectations and towards cognitive expectations within networks of social relations based not on universal norms and their enforcement but on functional issues within science and the economy and other areas of organised human life Within these networks individuals have a willingness to learn and to reconsider their own claims As Diez 2000 34 puts it society for Luhmann is the agglomeration of a number of diversi fied functional systems such as law or the economy Each of these systems comes into being through communication and not through some grand normative foundations and operates according to its own codes with one basic code such as legalillegal in the case of law at its heart these systems or most of them are functionally and not territorially differentiated In fact politics and law are the only sys tems still territorially differentiated But if society exists only as and through a conglomerate of systems and if these systems because of their functional definition operate transnationally society is only possible on a world scale it is world society Luhmanns conception is basically hostile to distinctions between state and nonstate or amongst international system international so ciety and world society Its communication perspective does not priv ilege any particular form of organisation though it does have a place for organisations as a social form and it pushes norms identities and shared values well away from the centre of what forms society The only concession in this direction is that the process of communication itself requires the production of secure frameworks of expectation within the functional systems Albert 1999 258 In other words there have to be accepted rules of communication around basic codes such as legalillegal truefalse in order for functional subsystems to exist In one sense and probably only one Luhmanns view is similar to Shaws in that it is a weaker and therefore more really existing con ception of world society than that in the English school Bull might well have understood Luhmann as a rather convoluted statement about the world political system Moving away from the highly demanding cri teria for a society of shared valuesidentities means that more world society can be said to exist already which in turn supports claims that 71 From International to World Society the statessystem is not as dominant as its supporters assert and that the rising replacement system therefore deserves more attention than it is getting This is the standard stuff of academic politics Luhmann however is about much more than that agenda and it is probably a zero sum choice between following the Luhmannian scheme and developing most of the other ideas about world society including English school ones surveyed here Luhmanns emphasis on communication echoes Burtons and in that sense does fit into the general picture that glo balists are trying to sketch But in reconceptualising society in terms of communication Luhmann is going down a path that diverges from the one that the English school has carved out for itself Neither his notion of world nor his understanding of society lines up with English school usage From a Luhmannian position the English school is too similar to the classical sociological conceptions from which Luhmann is try ing to depart From an English school perspective Luhmanns scheme rips away the entire framework within which international society has been understood Consequently there is probably not much scope for complementarity between these two modes of thought It is tempting though probably wrong to link Luhmanns ideas to IR thinking about epistemic communities Haas 1992 In Luhmanns terms epistemic communities are too much about networks of individ uals rather than systems of communication But there is a link in the idea of recognising learning and participating in a structured system of knowledge language andor practice Nevertheless Luhmanns con cept of world society is too alien to help much in thinking about world society in an English school context If there is a lesson it is perhaps the rather oblique one that there is analytical advantage in adopting a normatively neutral view of world society The significance of this will become clear in the discussion of global civil society below Desite Shaws sociological critique of the English schools strong con cept of society there are other sociologists who want to tie the idea of world society to shared norms rules and institutions The Stanford School Thomas et al 1987 Meyer et al 1997 Boli and Thomas 1999 styling themselves macrophenomenological sociological institutionalists put global culture at the centre of their concept of world society They seem to be unaware of the work of Wight Bull and others in the English school who have focused on a society of states and like most other users of world society construct it as a holistic allembracing concept Their disinterest in the English school is unfortunate because a great deal of what they have to say focuses on states and how to explain the 72 World society outside English school theory striking isomorphism of like units in the international system In many ways their concerns are close to those of international society and run alongside the English schools debates on solidarism The core idea in the Stanford school or sometimes world polity approach is that there are powerful worldwide models about how humans should organise themselves These models are carried by academic and professional as sociations and by the network of intergovernmental organisations and are deeply embedded in all the levels of the international system IGOs states TNAs individuals Rather in line with Vincents vision of world society the Stanford school thinks it is already the case that legitimated actorhood operates at several levels Meyer et al 1997 168 and that these levels mutually reinforce and legitimate each other in terms of the shared values embodied in the worldwide models Individuals and states mutually legitimate each other via principles of citizenship while individuals and international organisations do the same via principles of human rights Between individuals and nation states lie any number of interest and functional groups that have stand ing as legitimated actors due to their connections with individuals and states These include religious ethnic occupational industrial class racial and genderbased groups and organisations all of which both depend on and conflict with actors at other levels For example indi vidual actors are entitled to demand equality while collective actors are entitled to promote functionally justified differentiation Meyer et al 1997 171 Conflict is intrinsic to this view of society imparting to it the dynamism that is generated by the rampant inconsistencies and conflicts within world culture itself Meyer et al 1997 172 The Stanford schools approach to world society hangs on the argu ment that this strong world culture has an independent existence and that it is the main cause of isomorphism among states They insist that world culture is a significant causal factor and that it is a systemic phe nomenon not just located in the units What is interesting about this effort from an English school perspective is how much it focuses on the centrality of the state which is acknowledged in world culture as the central institution even though accompanied by other legitimate actors Meyer et al 1997 16971 The Stanford school concede that much of what they identify as world culture is Western and that a good deal of the story is about how the poor and weak and peripheral copy the rich and strong and central Meyer et al 1997 1648 But sadly for the literature they do not explore the obvious link that this line of argument 73 From International to World Society creates both to neorealism and the English school They cite Waltz with out having registered that one of the most central features of his the ory parallels their concern with the phenomenon of isomorphism that under anarchy socialisation and competition imperatives generated by the structural pressures of balance of power result in like units In many ways the Stanford schools ideas are of greater relevance to English school thinking about international society than world so ciety Their idea that the legitimising ideas even for the statessystem are largely carried by nonstate actors Boli and Thomas 1999 gives an interesting twist to thinking about international society but is some what betrayed by the Western origins of most of both the ideas and the carriers It does however set down a marker about the importance of TNAs in world society One key insight is that the values of world society are often inconsistent and conflictual a theme perhaps underde veloped in English school thinking except in relation to human rights and sovereignty but wholly apparent to anyone who has investigated nationalism and sovereignty or the market and sovereignty It is well to be reminded that society is not necessarily either nice or harmonious more on this in chapters 5 and 6 The World Society Research Group WSRG 1995 2000 also stress a holistic multilevel approach to world and put some emphasis on shared culture and values as the essence of society They focus partic ularly on the Weberian differentiation between Gesellschaft society and Gemeinschaft community departing from the original Tonnies 1887 idea that society was a degraded development from community WSRG 2000 67 In this approach society is about rational agreements over mutual adjustments of interest It is based on the sorts of shared values that allow actors to make contracts governing their behaviour and inter action Community is about feelings of belonging together constituting a We that differentiates itself from Others Community is rooted in traditionandoraffectionSocietyisrootedincalculationofselfinterest This is an analytical distinction based on ideal types and the expectation is that all real social relations will be a mixture of the two forms WSRG 2000 7 12 It is almost impossible to imagine communities without contracts and difficult though perhaps not quite impossible to ima gine contracts in the complete absence of any sense of community eg as fellow human beings or at the ultimate stretch as fellow sentient life forms The WSRG approach bears some strong and explicit resemblance to the English schools triad except like Vincent they see international 74 World society outside English school theory system international society and world society as cumulative stages with world society incorporating the other two as the most developed social form WSRG 2000 1113 They think WSRG 1995 1417 that the English school represented curiously by Bull fair enough and Brown and Buzan both decidedly on the margins mistakenly locate society in international society and community in world society They disagree wanting to allow society formation processes amongst non state actors and community formation ones among states Their inter pretation of the English school on this point is I think mistaken though Brown 1995 could be read as they suggest Bull hardly discusses iden tity at all In my earlier work Buzan 1993 33340 I simply build the idea of identity into society both international and world while fail ing to recognise as the WSRG rightly does that the society and com munity conceptions are fundamentally different see also Wæver 1998 108 Nevertheless the WSRG approach raises a lot of interesting and stimulating questions that the English school has so far not confronted squarely The societycommunity distinction has big implications for soli darism and international society as well as for how world society is to be understood The WSRG raise the idea that there is interplay between society formation and community formation with the latter sometimes opposed to the former sometimes supportive of it 1995 245 They also take the view WSRG 2000 1213 along with Brown 1995 1006 that the idea of a universal sense of community ie a universal sense of identity is at the very least seriously problematic and at worst an oxymoron because a sense of being We requires an Other against which to define itself If true this poses major difficulties for some as pects of the world society concept The WSRG are keen to avoid any sense of inevitability about progress up the stages from system to so ciety to community Reverse movement is possible Weller 2000 also builds on the societycommunity distinction establishing society and community as different but interacting types of social relations He too takes the view that the relationship between them is complicated and not subject to simple generalisations about development from one to the other in either direction These questions about society and community are implicit in English schooldiscussionsofculturebuttheapproachestakenbytheWSRGand Weller point the way towards a much clearer formulation The society community question starts from the assumption that the two are dis tinct types of social relationship that are almost always colocated and 75 From International to World Society strongly interactive but with no clear pattern of determination running in either direction about what causes what In this form the question is structured similarly to the English schools triad which also features different social forms existing simultaneously with a strong but inde terminate relationship The last of the sociological approaches to world society might be la belled macrosociology As various writers have noted it is possible to lo cate a substantial amount of Marxian thinking in a world society frame Vincent 1978 2930 44 WSRG 2000 34 and others fit into this group as well The key linking this group together is the idea of a dominant or ganising principle for a macrolevel world society The notion of a central organising principle as the key to structure is familiar in IR through the work of Waltz particularly but also realists generally and the English school and more recently Wendt 1999 But whereas in IR the focus is almost always on the political order macrosociologists take a wider more multisectoral view Marxians have their own version of an already existingworldsocietydefinedbyacapitalistmodeofproductionandthe hierarchy of classes structured in the centreperiphery formation made famous by the world system theory of Wallerstein In its cruder forms the idea of a capitalist world society pits the forces of capital against the state creating a structure of dominance dependency and conflict With the movement to bring the state back in by recognising its relative au tonomy Marxian thinking and also much mainstream IPE took on the appearance of a holistic world society view This was consciously offered as an alternative to and critical view of the statecentric mainstream of IR theory Cox 1986 1994 Strange 1988 and Underhill 2000 all talk about the close interlinkage of states and markets and try to unfold a conceptualisation that expresses the simultaneous interplay of political economic and social forces Perhaps the work of this type that makes the most explicit use of world society is Jung 2001 Jung is amongst the holists who want to use world society to capture the whole human system His key organ ising principle reminiscent of Gellner 1988 is the distinction between tradition and modernity as a fundamental watershed in the organi sation of human society This distinction bears some relationship to that between community tradition and society modernity For Jung the tension between traditional social forms and rational social action is not only a historical divide but an ongoing dynamic in a world which is not yet modern but still an uneasy mix of modern and tra ditional social structures Like Shaw Jung rejects the English schools 76 World society outside English school theory normative integration criteria for society as too demanding wanting instead to understand society as the totality of social reproduction Jung 2001 452 The macrosociological way of thinking is undeniably powerful and attractive Reducing the entirety of the interhuman system to a single organising principle offers not only a seductive simplification but also the possibility of designing deductive theory stemming from the sin gle idea The danger is oversimplification with the consequent need as the Marxians discovered to bring things back in More specialised approaches to world society like that of the English school cannot com pete with the sweep of the single encompassing idea But by embedding some key differentiations early on they avoid the danger of oversim plification and retain a more detailed analytical toolkit Global civil society Eventhoughitdoesnotdeploythetermworldsocietyoneotherschool of thought requires close consideration here the discourse about global civil society Both world society and global civil society GCS highlight the political dimension of the nonstate universe and both also carry a liberal programme aimed at constraining andor reforming state power Both therefore share two problems how to define the content of the nonstate universe and how to handle the tensions between the needs of activists pursuing a normative agenda on the one hand and those of analysts needing a concept with which to capture the nonstate deter ritorialised elements in world politics on the other These problems are linked and examining the betterdeveloped GCS debate throws use ful light on how to develop the world society concept Activists are constrained not only by their campaigning needs but also by a dual meaning inherent in civil to define GCS in ways that construct it as nice Doing so raises two questions 1 how to handle the dark side of the nonstate world represented by various kinds of organised ex tremists and criminals and 2 how to handle the global economy and its nonstate actors whether as part of GCS or as one of its targets Analysts need a concept that captures the nonstate political universe whether nice or nasty The argument is that the needs of activists and analysts may well be irreconcilable The debates around these concepts have roots in classical ideological divisions Until recently they opened a divide between economic and social liberals but with the rise of con cern about terrorism they may return to a much older and deeper clash 77 From International to World Society between liberal and conservative views of the relationship between state and society The two concepts share a common foundation in the tradition of lib eral thinking about civil society which stretches back to the eighteenth centuryTheEnglishschoolsconceptofworldsocietycanbeunderstood asperhapsthefirstsystematicattempttolifttheliberalconceptualisation of civil society based on individualism and the right of association out of the state and place it alongside international society as part of a toolkit for understanding the international system It was in this sense more ambitious than the Kantian idea of an eventual convergence amongst republican states from which it mistakenly took its label It was also distinct from both early liberal versions of civil society and Marxian re actions to them that linked civil society closely to the social structures of capitalism the liberals positively the Marxians negatively Alexander 1998 If world society shared anything with the Marxians it was the attempt to question and possibly transcend the dominant frame work of states and nations as the defining entities at the international level The liberal idea of civil society always carried some cosmopolitan as sumptions about civilised communities separate from and transcend ing the framework of states and having distinct social andor legal codes Lipschutz 1996 1069 But the main thrust of civil society was at the domestic level counterpointing the state though at the same time being deeply entangled with it Depending on ones view of human nature the state might be seen in Hobbesian terms as a necessary con dition for civil society because civil society is dependent for its own functioning on the defended civil space created by the state or as irrel evant or even obstructive to civil society because human beings are perfectly capable of forming societies without an oppressive Leviathan Hobbes was pretty radical for his day and is claimed as a founder both by conservatives for the necessity of the state and liberals for his emphasis on individualism and a disarmed civil society For him the Leviathan state was necessary to contain the anarchic and violent qualities of an ungoverned and uncivil society the war of each against all The assumption was that unless constrained by a superior power human society lacks the ability to regulate itself and falls into thuggery and warlordism Later eighteenthcentury and onward liberal think ing starts both from a more positive view of human nature giving better prospects for uncoerced cooperation and from a sharp historical con sciousness that Leviathan has often been a profoundly flawed saviour 78 World society outside English school theory itself generating unacceptable amounts of violence and repression In this view if humans were properly educated and left more to them selves both a more efficient political economy and a more civil soci ety would be the probable outcome The civil society tradition reflects not only an analytical distinction between state and nonstate modes of social organisation but a deep and longstanding ideological battle be tween conservative and liberal understandings of the human condition and views about how best to achieve the good life Civil society thus has descriptive functions that which is not the state where civil takes its meaning from civilian and normative ones still nonstatebutwhereciviltakesitsmeaningmorefromcivilisedrepre senting a particular preferred form of social order In descriptive mode civil society is neutral about whether what composes it is good or bad or some mixture Those with a conservative view of human nature will tend to see civil society as the problem because the powerseeking ruthless and selfinterested nature of human beings generates conflict criminality injustice inequality and the state as the solution by impos ing disarmament and enforced laws Those with a more liberal view of human nature see the state as the problem because nothing constrains its monopoly of force which is therefore too frequently abused and civil society as the solution because of the natural sociability of humans and their rational tendency to seek joint gains in the less radical version as an organised democratic counterweight that can constrain the state and keep it minimal in the more radical version as an alternative to the state This normative side of civil society is both a great strength and a main weakness It is a strength because it opens up powerful opportunities for political mobilisations both within the state aimed at redefining the relationship between citizens and government and outside it possibly with the same aim of reforming the state possibly aimed at bypassing and superseding the state In this mode civil society had its most recent airing in the last decades of the Cold War when both state and nonstate actors in the West cultivated the emergence of civil society within the Soviet bloc as a way of undermining the totalitarian control and so cial atomisation that was the key to the power of communist parties Lipschutz 1996 103 Both state and nonstate actors in the West and nonstate actors in the East aimed at reforming the communist states by changing the balance within them between civil society and govern ment Some of the nonstate actors in the West also aimed at reforming the Western states which they saw as at least equally responsible for 79 From International to World Society generating the Cold War and the threat of nuclear obliteration of hu mankind Burke forthcoming The problem with defining civil society in this normative politically activist way is that it almost inevitably opens up a gap between what is incorporated in the wider descriptive meaning and what is incorpo rated in the narrower normative one In descriptive mode civil society equates with nonstate and therefore includes mafias pornography merchants and a host of other darkside entities as well as the nicer side of civil society There is of course plenty of room for disagreement about what counts as nice and what nasty religious organisations or terrorists or drug dealers might be placed in either camp according to individual taste There is a substantial grey zone occupied for example by those prepared to use nasty means violence against the property and staff of abortion clinics and research facilities that use live animals for good ends But regardless of either disagreements or grey zones it remains the case that a normative understanding of civil society will almost inevitably represent only a partial selection of what exists in the nonstate world Therefore if the term civil society is used in this nar rower way it cannot avoid both casting civil society as nice and leaving a vacuum about what term is to be used analytically to label the whole of the nonstate social world The shift to global civil society as a primary focus occurred during the 1990s and in one sense can be seen as a result of the stunning intellectual and political victory of liberalism represented by the end of the Cold War and the ideological collapse of communism Fukuyama 1992 With the communist Leviathan routed and democracy spreading two changes became apparent First and demonstrated in part by the role played by transnational civil society forces in the victory against communism it was clear that both the power of GCS and its scope for operation had increased A more liberaldemocratic system of states wound down the significance of national borders as barriers to many not all types of interaction and in doing so opened up substantial transnational eco nomic societal legal and political space in which nonstate actors could operate This development was already under way during the Cold War with many firms and some INGOs moving into transnational space But the ending of the Cold War gave neoliberal ideology more scope to blow away geopolitical barriers both opening up new areas for nonstate actors and giving them more leeway in areas already open The second change resulting from the ending of the Cold War was that with the spread of democratic states the domestic agenda of civil 80 World society outside English school theory society versus Leviathan became less relevant at least within core areas of Western civilisation It remained relevant in parts of the third world but there the problem was as much the failure of states as it was the impositions of overbearing Leviathans Failed states provided a new arena for the transnational vanguard of GCS in the form of aid and development INGOs Where there were still repressive Leviathans posing political andor cultural barriers to civil society the issue was no longer largely one between particular states and their citizens but between such states and coalitions of transnational and domestic civil society forces The ending of the Cold War thus strengthened both the descriptive and the normative aspects of what was now referred to as global civil society In the descriptive sense GCS was a kind of synonym for glob alisation It captured the general understanding that nonstate actors entities and structures of all sorts were a more influential part of inter national relations than they had been during the Cold War TNAs of all stripes were now out there some of them enabled by the liberal charac ter of the leading states some of them enabled by the political vacuums opening up where failed states were tearing holes in the fabric of in ternational society Not everyone agreed that this added up to global civil society Peterson 1992 388 for example seeing instead strongly connected national civil societies living in a system of many states But most analysts whether or not they advocated the continued primacy of the state were happy to concede that the transnational domain was uncommonly lively and there was little doubt that GCS in this sense was making a difference to international norms and rules through suc cessful campaigns on issues ranging from landmines and famine relief through debt and terms of trade to human rights and the environment But in the normative sense and in an ironic twist a substantial part of the newly confident political forces of GCS constructed globalisation mainly seen as the operation of neoliberal global capitalism as their principal target The most prominent public manifestation of GCS in the decade after the implosion of the Soviet Union was an antiglobalisation movement that bundled together a diverse transnational coalition ran ging from environmentalists and humanitarians through various kinds of cultural nationalists and socialists to outright anarchists Rather than pitching liberals against conservatives this move opened up the split always present in liberalism between economic liberals who put the market first and see it as the key to delivering the other goods on the lib eral agenda and social ones who start from individualism and human 81 From International to World Society rights and are much less tolerant of the inequalities generated by un constrained operation of markets McKinlay and Little 1986 The development of an antiglobalisation global civil society is rich with contradictions and highly instructive for any attempt to under stand the English schools concept of world society Among other things many of the transnational actors that compose GCS are in alliance with employed by funded by and sometimes even created by states andor state dominated IGOs Risse 2002 If globalisation is understood su perficially to be a neoliberal alliance of state and corporate elites then the opposition to it of GCS makes sense Globalisation is posed either as a conspiracy or as a set of impersonal structural forces In the hope of maintaining the engine of growth state elites rejig legal and polit ical frameworks to facilitate the operation of capital Corporate elites promise economic efficiency and growth and fatten themselves at the expense of workers the environment and civil society at large In this reading GCS is an activist manifesto picking up the Marxian tradition As Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 15 note GCS has increasingly occupied the emancipatory space left by the demise of socialism and national liberation This means that it often comes in the clothes of an aspirational left oppositional project aimed at creating a third force to resist both the statessystem and global capitalism Partly because it is a carrier of this ideological energy the definition of GCS remains hotly contested and not just in the details but in the basic conceptualisation The narrower more political understanding is rooted in the Gramscian understanding of civil society as a social force standing between state and market and attempting to call their power to account Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 17 define it as the sphere of ideas values institutions organisations networks and indi viduals located between the family the state and the market and oper ating beyond the confines of national societies polities and economies Tacked onto this is the idea that GCS is nice because it rests on ideas of trust and nonviolence and carries a commitment to common human values that go beyond ethnic religious or national boundaries Anheier Glasius and Kaldor 2001 15 This definition feels close to what must have been in the minds of Bull 1977 and up to a point Vincent 1986 and his followers when they talked of world society It rests on the same idea of individuals and nonstate organisations as carriers of values in opposition to the impositions of a statecreated Westphalian interna tional society This view of GCS however is more clearly formulated than the English schools concept of world society particularly so in 82 World society outside English school theory relationtotheeconomicsectorEnglishschoolthinkershavebeenlargely silent about the economic sector and it could be inferred from that si lence that they agree with the political proponents of GCS in differenti ating the two in order to exclude the economic from the civil But on a deeper reading of globalisation GCS is itself part of the process Capitalism is a principal mover in the process of globalisation but not the only one and not necessarily the principal definition of what globalisation is about In this reading interestingly prefigured by Rosenau 1990 the key is the development of powerful people and a consequent acrosstheboard shift in the nature of authority structures and political relationships Starting from the industrial revolution it has served the interests of both state and capital to have bettereducated healthier and wealthier citizens and workers Only by improving the capacities of their citizensworkers could the state increase its power and capital increase its returns But as more and more individuals have become more capable they have become less subservient to authority more willing to define their own agendas and more able to create their own nodes and networks in pursuit of those agendas This development underpinned the flowering of Western democracy during the twentieth century and has a certain teleological force The question is not only the happy liberal one of what happens if democratising and decentralising forces begin seriously to transcend the state but also post 11 September the darker Hobbesian one of what happens if powerful people express themselves by organising crime and pursuing extremist agendas Rosenaus scheme 1990 40 generates an international system di vided between sovereigntybound and sovereigntyfree actors whose fate depends on both the balance of power between the two worlds and with echoes of the Stanford schools approach on whether or not they agree or differ on what the prevailing norms of the system should be This comes very close to the English schools division between interna tional and world society and reflects the same dilemma about whether the two are in tension or in harmony It reflects a complex interplay among political economic and social structures in which a strong histor ical line of development is changing the capabilities and requirements of all kinds of actors simultaneously Since capitalism is immensely effec tive at stimulating and spreading technological innovation this whole packageispushedandpulledbyopportunitiesanddangersarisingfrom new technological capabilities Powers of destruction become so great that total war becomes absurd and the planetary environment moves from being a background constant to a foreground variable Powers of 83 From International to World Society communication become so widespread and so cheap that geography no longer determines the shape of community and the world becomes a single information space Powers of transportation become so efficient and so dense that the world becomes a single market and interdepen dence effects ripple easily from one end of the planet to the other In this wider view of globalisation GCS cannot be separated from capi talism and can only be understood as part of it GCS exists through between and around states rather than just within them Rather than being counterpointed against a global state as civil society sometimes was against the territorial state it is itself part of and entangled with a loose and rather hazy structure of global governance This structure has been generated mostly by the leading capitalist states but now has a quasiautonomous standing A recent reflection on this wider more analytical understanding of global civil society is offered by John Keane 2001 He rejects the Gram scian separation of civil society from the economic sector on the grounds that this generates a major misunderstanding of what GCS is and how it works Like Rosenau he sees the global economy as part of GCS with turbocapitalism as one of the driving forces underpinning it the contemporary thickening and stretching of networks of socio economic institutions across borders to all four corners of the earth such that peaceful or civil effects of these nongovernmental net works are felt everywhere It comprises organisations civic and business initiatives coalitions social movement linguistic com munities and cultural identities All of them deliberately organise themselves and conduct their crossborder social activities business and politics outside the boundaries of governmental structures with a minimum of violence and a maximum of respect for the principle of civilised powersharing among different ways of life Keane 2001 234 Keanes more comprehensive definition fleshes out an understanding of GCS that goes much further towards filling the nonstate side of a statenonstate distinction He correctly points out that there is no sharp line between state and nonstate Keane 2001 35 Within demo cratic states there are numerous quasiautonomous nongovernmental organisations QUANGOs that blur the boundary and during the Cold War communist states were notorious for constructing shortleash ver sions of QUANGOs such as the various official peace councils Similarly at the global level many INGOs receive support and funding from gov ernments whether they be humanitarian aid organisations or various 84 World society outside English school theory forms of ideological fifth column The Red Cross for example is closely integrated into the statessystem as a key supporter for some aspects of international law Keane seems absolutely right in insisting that the nonstate dimension cannot be understood without incorporating the economic sector even though doing so necessarily wrecks some of the emancipatory political agenda that the activists want to pin on to the concept But although Keanes definition is more analytical he does not wholly abandon the political project Keane is also committed to the idea that GCS is nice in the sense of committed to nonviolence civility and tolerance His incorporation of the economic sector however makes it difficult for him to maintain coherence on this issue Although he rightly points out that the corporate world by and large supports the value of nonviolence in the interests of business efficiency he also concedes that Inequalities of power bullying and fanatical violent attempts to de globalise are chronic features of global civil society Keane 2001 33 39 This hints strongly though it does not explore that there is a dark side to global civil society Keane 2001 40 is also rightly aware that GCS does not stand above the grimy issues of force and coercion Because it is vulnerable to ruthless uncivil elements whether statebased or not GCS needs protection and can most easily acquire it from states On the grounds that civil carries two meanings nonstate and civilised both Keane although he comes closer to acknowledging it and Anheier Glasius and Kaldor marginalise the dark side of the nonstate world from their definitions of GCS If the narrower andor nicer view of GCS is accepted then for analytical purposes one would need a parallel concept of global uncivil society to cover what has been left out of the nonstate picture This would be true whether or not ones purpose was primarily analytical or primarily political The existence of such uncivil society and the need to contain it is of course the prime Hobbesian justification for the existence of the state and by extension also for the existence of an international society created and maintained by states Nothing could illustrate this more clearly than the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 The dark side of the nonstate world is a problem for the advocates of both global civil society and world society The GCS school espe cially its activist wing is stuck with the nice meaning of civil which pushes it towards regarding the nonstate as inherently a good thing It does not take a vast amount of empirical research to demonstrate that both the benign and the malign views of civil society are incorrect as 85 From International to World Society characterisations of the whole nonstate world In reality there is always a mixture of the two The nice nonviolent side of civil society both do mestic and global is to be found everywhere in voluntary associations NGOs INGOs and firms But the nasty side is everywhere too in the form of crime hoodlum anarchism and selfrighteous extremists of all stripes The antiglobalisation movement has run up against this in the form of its anarchist wing which is useful at generating media attention but destructive to its political image The neoliberaldriven globalisation of the last decade also has to come to terms with the consequence that opening borders for commerce is a boon to organised criminals and ex tremists Indeed after the events of 11 September there is firm ground for expecting that the politics of global civil societyworld society will shift away from economic versus social liberal and back more into the frame of liberal versus conservative AlQaeda has highlighted the dark side of global uncivil society and in doing so has strengthened the Hobbesian case for the state andor international society as a necessary defence against the disorders of an underregulated human condition Because GCS rests on the same distinction between state and nonstate as does world society there are many useful lessons here for English school thinking The GCS literature has a better developed view of the economic sector than can be found in English school thinking Its nor mative commitments run in parallel to the solidarist wing of the English school but in principle the English school is better placed to take into account the dark side of the nonstate world First its concept of world society is not restricted to civil and therefore has an easier time in in corporating the whole of the nonstate world Second it is less focused on transnational actors and therefore better placed to deal with the nonstate identity components of world politics such as Islam Islam is an excellent example of a world society element that is not in itself a transnational actor It is a nonstate identity that does not have ac tor quality itself but which carries a mobilising power that enables a range of nonstate and state actors When it mobilises terrorism it is a much stronger challenge to international society than human rights because it privatises the use of force thus undermining the foundations of the Westphalian political order Third world society is better adapted to thinking about the global level having originally been designed for that purpose GCS is still hung about with many of the political trap pings carried over from its roots in the debates about civil society These make it an effective idea for activists but a problematic one for analysts Whatever their flaws concepts such as GCS and world society are an 86 World society outside English school theory essential part of the toolkit that we need to develop if we are to equip ourselves to think meaningfully about globalisation If this discussion highlights anything it is the necessity to encompass the whole of the nonstate political universe when trying to conceptualise the politics of globalisation Conclusions Setting this review of concepts of world society from outside the English school against the English schools discussion of world society reviewed in chapter 2 the lessons for any attempt to rethink world society can be summed up as follows r There is a need to take a position on whether world means all types of social relations or just the nonstate universe and whether it has to mean global in extent or can apply to subglobal levels There are two contrary pressures on this decision first the advantages of coining a single concept to encompass a whole sphere of activity and second the dangers of creating an overburdened idea into which too many things get thrown and which loses the analytical power of drawing distinctions r There is a need to take a position on how society is understood whetherinaweakersenseclosetowhatisgenerallymeantbysystem in IR or whether in the stronger sense of shared values and identities from classical sociology r In conjunction with the previous point there is a need to take seriously the distinction between society and community and the interrelation ships between them and to investigate the implication of thinking in this way for international and world society both separately and in how they relate to each other In this context there is also a need to think about whether there can be a global community given the need for an Other against which to define a We r There is a need to be aware of the tensions between the analytical and activist uses of concepts both in terms of the inevitable normative implications of any analytical construct of society or world and the inevitable costs to descriptive accuracy of any activist application of these concepts r There is a need to take into account the dark side as well as the nice aspects of the nonstate world and to understand that society is just as easily a site for conflict as it is a site for peace and harmony 87 From International to World Society My own response to these points is twofold First I take the message that we need to look closely at all of the key terms in English school the ory with a view to clarifying meanings This is especially so for the three concepts that make up the English schools triad and for pluralism and solidarism Second I want to move away from any attempt to lump too much together under a single heading The rather sorry condition of the globalisation debate stands as a warning against creating undifferenti ated concepts and in my view the English schools rendition of world society is running the same risk I have no problem with holism but I want the whole to be composed of analytically distinct parts whose operation and interaction become the subject of study Wholes that sub sume everything within them have the same attractions and the same drawbacks as the idea of god they explain everything and nothing Even if one rejects the move of the Vincentians and Luard Burton Shaw many Marxians and the WSRG of aggregating states into world society there is probably still too much in the world society box As currently constructed in both English school and some other formula tions it contains both the physical interaction and socially constructed sides without these being clearly distinguished along international sys teminternational society lines Within the socially constructed side it contains both the Gesellschaft society and Gemeinschaft community elements which seem deserving of analytical distinction though also tied together in complicated ways And it also contains the individual cosmopolitancommunitarian element of identities on one side and the world of transnational actors on the other My inclinations lean towards the strategy of Rosenau and Bull which is to find the point of interest in the balance between the state and the nonstate worlds In the distant future the state may well have become obsolete and humankind may find itself organised in some deterritori alised neomedieval form In the meantime we seem to be in the presence of a shift away from a pure Westphalian mode of international relations in which the key tension is among rival states For now and for some decades to come the interesting question is about how the state and the nonstate worlds do and will interact with each other What makes this question interesting is more than just shifts in the distribution of power or immediate relevance to real world events On top of these is the deep and excruciating tension between the state and nonstate worlds In some ways they are deeply antagonistic both in concept and in practice In other ways they are deeply interdependent again both in concept and in practice This tension it seems to me is the big 88 World society outside English school theory political question of our time and in order to get at it analytically it is vital to keep the two worlds conceptually distinct The next stage of this enquiry is to take the lessons learned in this chapter and use them to unpack and remake the contents not just of world society but also of international society and indeed the English schools whole classical triad as set out in figure 1 89 4 Reimagining the English schools triad The survey in chapter 3 exposed four underlying conceptual dyads on which much of the discussion and the confusion about international and world society hang r state and nonstate levels and whether or not the distinction between them is what defines the difference between international and world society r physical or mechanical and social concepts of system and whether the distinction along these lines between international system and international society should be retained andor carried over into one between world system and world society r society and community and whether or not these two conceptions of social relations need to play a larger role in thinking about both international and world society and what the implications of their doing so are for understanding pluralism and solidarism r individuals and transnational actors as the units of analysis that define world society and whether or not they can comfortably be considered together or whether more analytical leverage is acquired by keeping them distinct The choices posed by these dyads need to be made explicit and to be resolved in some way before any clear sense can be made of English school theory as a social structural project For the reasons given above my starting position will be to reject the inclinations of the Vincentians and many of the nonEnglish school users of world society to construct world society in holistic terms that combine the state and nonstate into a kind of higher or better developed social form Instead I will pro ceed from the position that state and nonstate represent distinct social domains that are simultaneously mutually supporting and in tension 90 Reimagining the English schools triad with each other This is the chapter in which I begin to redefine some established terms and to introduce new vocabulary State and nonstate I have already committed myself to defending this distinction so what has to be done here is to deepen the explanation for this move and to support it against alternative interpretations English school theory is based on the idea that there is something special and unique about the state or more generally about any sort of independent political community that justifies giving it a prominent and distinctive role in the conceptualisation of international relations In English school theory both international system and international society are concepts built around the state as the defining unit So the first and in some ways most important step in bringing the concept of world society into focus is to establish the desirability and in terms of a structural presentation of English school theory the necessity of making a sharp separation between state and international society on the one hand and nonstate and world society on the other On this point I intend to defend a position close to that of Bull and up to a point James and Jackson Any conflation of state and nonstate will ef fectively destroy the analytical leverage of the English schools triad and create an unmanageable object of analysis in the name of holism There is nothing unusual in privileging the state in this way It remains special because of its central role in the processes of law organised vio lence taxation political legitimacy territoriality and in some ways social identity This view is of course central to all forms of political realism There are many other routes including the English school to the same conclusion Marxians historical sociologists and IPE have all brought the state back in the Stanford school reaches the same conclusion from a more legal and normative perspective as does Brown 1995 1056 discussing world community from the perspective of political theory Controversy rightly attends this privileging of the state if it is taken as some realists do to the extreme of excluding all other types of ac tors from the definition of the international system or world politics or world system or globality That is not my intention Rather I want to preserve the distinctive idea of a society of states in order to acknowledge the special role of the state in the overall picture of human social relations while at the same time acknowledging the signifi cance of other elements cosmopolitanism TNAs in that picture In the 91 From International to World Society English school triad international system and international society cap ture the distinctiveness of the state while world society is the vehicle for bringing the nonstate elements into the picture In other words while there is no doubt that significant deterritorialisation has taken place in human affairs territory remains a crucial factor for many key aspects of humankinds social economic and especially political structures If I am right in accepting Rosenaus 1990 argument that the central political question of our time is the working out of a new balance between the territorial and the nonterritorial modes of human organisation then it is vital to keep the territorial element in clear focus Differentiating between state and nonstate places an immediate bur den on definitions What counts as a state On this issue I intend to stick with the traditions in most realism historical sociology and the English school note the latters phrase states or independent political com munitiesoftakingabroadviewRealistsunderstandthestatethrough the idea that conflict groups are the building blocks and ultimate units of social and political life Gilpin 1986 305 and that interpretation en ables them to see states of one sort or another stretching back at least 5000 years The definition used in Buzan and Little 2000 442 puts less emphasis on conflict and will serve as my benchmark here any form of postkinship territoriallybased politically centralized selfgoverning entity capable of generating an insideoutside structure This notion of state takes in citystates and empires kingdoms republics various forms of national state and the late modern or in some view postmod ern states emerging in the twentyfirst century Its emphasis is on the political and the territorial though it does not require either sovereignty Paul 1999 or hard boundaries both of which are quite recent inven tions Using a broad definition like this means that one should expect to find much variation in the character and institutions of international society depending on what sort of state is dominant more on this in chapter 6 One tricky part in this approach comes in setting values for indepen dent and politically centralised and insideoutside On a generous reading the EU or the later Holy Roman Empire might count as states under this definition raising the awkward problem of having two sorts of entity in the same territory and therefore at least two layers of insideoutside In the case of the EU its political centralisation is weak but it is definitely independent territorial and capable of generating an insideoutside structure Similar problems arise for various types of dominion or commonwealth or protectorate where independence is 92 Reimagining the English schools triad not total but sufficient Other sorts of mixed entities combining political with other elements such as the chartered companies of the seventeenth century or the Roman church in some periods also pose boundary prob lemsraisinganothertrickyquestionabouthowtodrawthelinebetween what counts as part of the state and what counts as nonstate In most postmodern states there are substantial numbers of QUANGOs sitting on the boundary between the two There are also IGOs on which I take the position set out in Buzan and Little 2000 2667 that these are cre ations of the statessystem and for the most part best seen as part of social interaction capacity Different analysts might well want to reach different conclusions about exactly where to draw the line in such cases But these are familiar problems of classification in the social sciences With this definition the general location of the line is clear enough and the contents of the inevitable grey zone between state and nonstate relatively tightly constrained A firm analytical separation between state and nonstate however drawn has some substantial consequences for the English school triad In terms of Bull and Wight it means two things First Kantianism al most certainly has to move out of the world society section and into the solidarist end of international society Bulls case against doing this reviewed in chapter 2 is unconvincing As Jackson 2000 180 notes Kantianism is based on increasing homogeneity in the domestic struc tures of states with a liberal international society becoming the support ing framework for cosmopolitan values Its key idea important also to the Vincentians is that a convergence in the dominant domestic social values of states will generate a solidarist international society amongst them Since this is about a form of solidarist as opposed to Westphalian pluralist statessystem it has to count as a species of thick international society and not a type of world society Second a pretty strong case emerges for moving the coercive universalism element of revolution ism ie unifying the world by force into the imperial end of the realist spectrum Unipolarity is after all the extreme position on the realist spectrum Hansen 2000 Statebased seekers after imperial power or world domination will if they are efficient almost always carry a uni versalist ideology to justify their claims and in social structural terms this seems to belong in the realist domain more than to world society These moves mark a sharp departure from the Wightian understand ing of world society Moving Kantianism and coercive universalism out of the world society pillar might be thought to do violence to the Wightian conception of revolutionism as historically operating ideas 93 From International to World Society that work to challenge the statessystem In one sense such a move does reflect the priorities of a structural approach as opposed to a political theory one and the normative drive of Wights scheme is sacrificed But on second look the contradiction is perhaps more apparent than real The baseline for Wights discussion was not the statessystem per se but the particular pluralist Westphalian form of it that dominated modern history Because his view of a statessystem was quite narrowly cast the scope for revolutionism was large A less realist view of the state makes more room for evolutions of statessystems into different types Wights ideas remain in play but they are located and understood differently At this stage of the argument the separation between state and non state has two consequences for those working in Vincents tradition First for now it requires rejecting their move to use world society as a term to cover the merger of state and nonstate This rejection is not done on descriptive or normative grounds and it does not mean that the human rights issues they want to examine cannot or should not be a prominent feature of English school work The rejection is done on analytical grounds and simply means that their agenda needs to be looked at in terms of the interplay between international and world so ciety on human rights more on this below Second a more analytical approach to the concept of the state creates a tension with those in the solidarist tradition who want to insert into the definition of states that they only exist to promote the welfare and security of their citizens Dunne 2001b 7 With the quite broad definition of state given above most states in history would not comply with this highly liberal view yet would be perfectly capable of being members of international soci ety As discussed in chapter 3 society is not necessarily nice in a moral sense and neither is the state Dunnes move is part of a normative ar gument aimed at shifting the contemporary foundations on which the juridical side of sovereignty is based It is an aspirational ought seeking to become an actual is and aimed at promoting the development of a particular type of state liberal democratic within a particular type of liberal solidarist international society But states can and do have many other purposes and they can be members of some types of international society even when their concerns for the welfare and security of their citizens are low I do not want to lose sight of all of these other possibil ities in international society by taking on an excessively liberal or even modern view of what gets defined as a state If the state sector is to be treated as distinctive and as embodied in the concepts of international system and international society then it 94 Reimagining the English schools triad follows that English school theory has to take a keen interest in the evolv ing character of both the state and sovereignty as the defining concept of the state In this sense Dunne and the Vincentians are quite right to focus on these issues Unlike neorealism which largely confines itself to the international system pillar takes an essentialist view of sovereignty and makes system structure dominant over the units English school theory is much more insideout than outsidein International society is constructed by the units and particularly by the dominant units in the system and consequently reflects their domestic character Hollis and Smith 1991 95 In this sense Wendts 1992 view that anarchy is what states make of it is a restatement of the English schools general position English school theory especially in the pluralist versions of Bull and Jackson accepts as true for international society the neorealist injunction that international systems are largely defined by the domi nant units within them but it does not follow neorealism in presetting the character of states This being so the English school needs to be par ticularly interested in the evolution of the leading modern states from absolutist to nationalist to democratic to postmodern charting the im pact on international society of these domestic transformations Buzan and Little 2000 24375 It must also be interested in the question of sovereignty not as a static concept but as an evolving institution of mod ern international society Any solidaristprogressive view of interna tional society requires sharp moves away from essentialist conceptions of what sovereignty is and how it works As the case of the EU illustrates thick international societies have to unpack and redistribute elements of sovereignty English school theory needs to understand all of this better than it now does Bull saw solidarism as problematic because of its incompatibility with the Westphalian state A more flexible approach sees it as part and parcel of how the postmodern state is itself evolving It does not go too far to say that both postmodern states and premod ern weak ones may only be sustainable within strong international societies In defending a statenonstate approach to international and world society I have claimed to be building on Bulls thinking But it is pos sible to read Bull to support a different and more Vincentian interpre tation than mine of the internationalworld society distinction1 In this argument Bull derives the international versus world society distinc tion from his inquiry into world order Bull saw the state as the main 1 I am grateful to Stefano Guzzini and Ole Wæver for this insight 95 From International to World Society present and future supplier of such world order as was obtainable and world society as a potential threat to this through its questioning of sovereignty in pursuit of human rights objectives Vincents jumble of ideas about world society also contained a formulation that set world society as the excluded and oppositional voices to the Westphalian or der and this view links back to Wights understanding of revolutionism as ideas opposed to the existing interstate order Staying within Bulls focus on international order but adding to it some of the globalist views about the roles of nonstate actors it is possible to construct a Bullian and in some ways a Vincentian argument that the providers of world order are now not just states but states plus the whole array of IGOs and INGOs that provide and support global governance Boli and Thomas 1999 148 Keck and Sikkink 1998 199217 RisseKappen 1995b Held et al 1999 In this view the Red Cross and Amnesty International and the WHO the WTO and the IAEA are as much providers of world or der as are states This way of thinking supposes rightly that history has moved on and that the sources of international order have evolved substantially since Bull was observing the international system Hurrell 2002 xvxxii It also supposes perhaps more arguably that Bulls com mitment to the order problematique would have opened his eyes to this if he were looking at the twentyfirstcentury world In this perspective international society is represented not just by states but by Davos cul ture comprising both the dominant structure of ordering ideas and all of the providers of order within that framework whether states IGOs or INGOs World society then becomes more Wightian comprising the set of political ideas that can be used to mobilise opposition to this hege monic consensus and the set of actors whether states IGOs or INGOs that promote such opposition The nub of the tension between this interpretation and mine is whether the focus of the differentiation between international and world society rests on the type of actor state vs nonstate or on attitude to wards the dominant ideas and institutions of internationalworld order supportive or opposed Wight would almost certainly opt for the lat ter view though as shown in chapter 2 his three traditions thinking never led him to any very clear conceptualisation of international and world society Bull clearly leaned towards the distinction based on type of actor being driven to do so by his rather narrow Westphalian in terpretation of sovereignty Whether he would change his mind now is a moot point but a defensible hypothesis Vincent was torn leaning sometimes towards Wight sometimes towards Bull But in the end both 96 Reimagining the English schools triad Vincent and his followers have opted for a solidarist vision in which they hope via a kind of extended Kantian homogenisation based on liberal values to reduce or eliminate the differences in attitude so cre ating a world society in which states and nonstate actors share a set of norms rules and institutions It seems to me that trying to define the difference between interna tional and world society on the basis of support for or opposition to the dominant order while certainly viable is a less interesting and less useful approach than the focus on types of unit On technical grounds the difficulties of trying to draw a line between state and nonstate pale into insignificance compared to those posed by finding the boundary between opposition and support On which side does one put reformers and those who question and pressure from within How does one deal with the large mass of indifference that is nearly always the third posi tion in any political polarisation Opposition to a dominant order is no doubt a deep and durable feature of human society though its particular forms and intensities vary hugely across times and places On analytical grounds I would argue that the distinction between territorial and non territorial modes of organisation is just as deep and durable Nonstate actors represent an enduring feature of human social organisation that would exist even in a solidarist world And as I hope to show below keeping the state and the nonstate distinct opens up analytical opportu nities not available through the alternative approach for thinking about nonliberal types of international society As I argued in chapter 1 this is not a zerosum game English school theory can support a number of different interpretations and my hope is that setting out a structural interpretation will not only generate interesting insights in itself but also stimulate and challenge the other interpretations to improve their act The consequences for the standard view of English school theory set out in figure 1 of defining international and world society in terms of type of actor are sketched in figure 2 This first step towards an explicitly structural interpretation of English school theory more or less leaves in place the international system and international society pillars of the triad It moves Kantianism out of the world society pillar and into the international society one and coercive universalism out of the world society pillar and into the international system one Those two moves leave unclear what then defines the boundary zones between what remains in the world society pillar nonstate actors and the other two pillars That problem is confronted in the next section 97 From International to World Society International System of states International Society of states World Society of transnational actors and individuals PowerMaximising Imperial Coercive Universalism SecuritySeeking efensive Conservative Pluralist Progressive Solidarist antian Figure 2 The Three Traditions first revision with the three pillars seen in structural terms and reserving world society to nonstate units Physicalmechanical and social concepts of system Underpinning the idea of system in English school theory and clearly evidentinBullandWatsons1984b1definitionofinternationalsociety aretwodifferentmodesofinteractionphysicalandsocialIhavealready made some play with this distinction pointing out the inconsistency of having it for the domain of states but not for the domain of world society Bull and Watsons definition is widely cited within the English school and as far as I am aware has not been contested Its distinction between international system and international society seems to rest on a separation of the physical system from the social one a group of states or more generally a group of independent politi cal communities which not merely form a system in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements 98 Reimagining the English schools triad System here represents the physical mode of interaction typical of the mechanistic realiststyle analyses of the balance of power as an auto matic process rooted in the relative material capabilities of states The social side is minimally present through the element of calculation though as will become clear further on in this chapter calculation could also underpin the common rules and institutions The main social ele ment is represented by the establishment and maintenance of common rules and institutions for the conduct of interstate relations This dis tinction is deeply embedded in quite a bit of IR theory other than the English school drawing the lines for example between the materialist theories of neorealism and various institutionalist and constructivist approaches to understanding international order Despite its embeddedness in IR theory it might nevertheless be ar gued that the distinction between physical and social is not nearly as interesting as it first appears There is no doubt that taking a physical mechanical view of international systems is one way of theorising about them as the endless debates about polarity amongst both IR theorists and the policy community attest As some readers will know I have been and remain a participant in those debates myself The point to be made here is that one can cover much of the ground claimed by phys ical theories such as neorealism from within a social structural theory whereas the reverse move is not possible The key to such an interpreta tion is the high degree of overlap between physical and social systems All human social interaction presupposes the existence of physical inter action of some sort and physical interaction without social content is if not quite impossible at least rather rare and marginal in human affairs Almeida 2001 Alan James 1993 demonstrates in some detail that Bulls distinction between the two is shot through with ambiguities and difficulties leading him to the conclusion that international system is a meaningless idea and international society is the key concept Taking a different tack Jackson 2000 11316 interprets Bulls system as not representing a physical but a social ie Hobbesian interpretation to cover the domain of realism Adam Watson 1987 1990 though accept ing Bulls distinction is one of the few within the English school to have thought hard and empirically about the boundary between interna tional system and international society that the distinction necessitates His detailed agonisings over the difficulties of drawing it reinforce the idea that few physical interactions in international relations are without significant social content He concludes definitively that no interna tional ie in the terms used here physical system as defined by Bull 99 From International to World Society has operated without some regulatory rules and institutions Watson 1987 1512 Beyond the English school most of the physical interactions which excite globalists and those promoting holistic conceptions of world so ciety require significant social content Everything from the internet to epistemic communities depends on some shared social background in order for communication to occur The most primitive physical inter actions such as trading practices which go back a very long way in human history require some basic social understanding about both the nature of the act and the relative values of different goods Even war often reflects social agreements about honour terms of surrender treat ment of the dead and suchlike If all human interaction is in some sense social and rulebound then what results is not a distinction between international systems and international societies but a spectrum of in ternational societies ranging from weak or thin or poorly developed or conflictual to strong or thick or well developed or cooperative The one obvious direct exception to this rule where asocial purely physical systems of interaction can occur is wars of extermination Humans by and large do not negotiate with ants and termites they simply try to destroy them just as ants and termites sometimes try to destroy each other Such asocial systems of interaction are mostly of interest to historians andor science fiction fans Looking backwards the initial thirteenthcentury encounters between the Mongols and the agrarian civilisations in China and the Middle East come about as close to being asocial as one can get Instances of exterminism where invaders treated the local inhabitants as vermin can also be found in the records of European imperial expansion Asocial systems and battles of exter mination are much more common in the Manichaean structure of much popular science fiction from H G Wells War of the Worlds to Alien Independence Day Starship Troopers and the Borg episodes of Star Trek The Borg greeting of Resistance is futile you will be assimilated hardly counts as social interaction Where contact is direct the assump tion that asocial systems will necessarily be conflictual seems sound War is the only interaction that can be carried on without any social de velopment and complete indifference seems unlikely in the presence of sustained contact Direct asocial systems will therefore almost certainly be built around conflict groups Although rare they do represent a pos sible form of physical international system What is seen through some neorealist eyes as the mechanistic operation of the balance of power can also be interpreted as the behavioural characteristics of a particular 100 Reimagining the English schools triad type of social structure If states understand themselves and their rela tions in what Wendt 1999 calls Hobbesian enemy or Lockean rival terms then that type of social structure will broadly conform to realist expectations Treating international systems as social does not rule out the options of materialist theory It then becomes a hypothesis to ex plore whether material factors such as polarity shape the social world so strongly that they can act as reliable predictors for behaviour There is one other case where asocial systems are possible but here the lack of sociality rests not on unwillingness to allow the existence of the other but on limited interaction capacity The defining case here is the Eurasian trading system that connected Han China and classical Rome Significant quantities of goods moved between Rome and China enough to make a noticeable impact on their economies notably the drainage of specie from Rome But this was relay trade There was no direct contact between Rome and China The goods moved along a series of trading stages each one of which represented a social structure but which did not provide any social connection between Rome and China In this sense Rome and China were part of a physical economic system even though each link in the chain was social Buzan and Little 2000 916 If one treats these cases of pure wars of extermination and relay trad ing systems as marginal to the general pattern of modern international relationsthentheargumentfordissolvingthedistinctionbetweenphys ical and social systems as a major distinction within English school the ory and adopting Jamess reading of Bull runs as follows social inter action cannot occur without physical interaction so for most practical purposes the two are bundled together The key question is therefore not about the distinction between physical and social systems but about howanyphysicalsocialsystemisstructuredWhatisthedominanttype of interaction What are the dominant units What is the distribution of capability What is the interaction capacity of the system What type of social structure is it and how is it maintained Dissolving the distinction between physical and social systems or at least downgrading it to what Wendt 1999 10938 calls rump mate rialism helpfully removes the question discussed in earlier chapters about why there is no world system as a counterpart to world soci ety Instead it turns the spotlight on to whether English school theory needs to retain the distinction between international system and inter national society It is important to reiterate that this move does not take the physical out of the analysis altogether Physical elements such as 101 From International to World Society the distribution of power and the nature of interaction capacity remain central to the analysis of all social systems What changes is that the physical aspect ceases to provide the principal basis for distinguish ing one type of international system from another Instead of thinking in a frame of two basic forms international systems and international societies this move pushes one inexorably down the path of seeking a classification scheme for a spectrum of types of international soci ety an idea already inherent in Wendts 1992 famous proposition that anarchy is what states make of it English school theory contains some elements for such a scheme but no systematic attempt Wight 1977 explored the difference between statessystems and suzerain systems and Watson 1990 1992 Wæver 1996 continued that line with his pen dulum theory about the spectrum from anarchy to empire of centred to decentred international societies In addition the whole debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about types of international society with the Westphalian model at the pluralist end and something else not very clearly specified at the solidarist one more on this in chapter 5 There is a sustained but not all that systematic attempt at a typology in Luard 1976 which runs parallel to English school thinking at many points Wendt 1999 has taken up his own challenge with a scheme for classi fying what kind of socialisation a system has and how it is maintained Usefully Wendts scheme runs in quite close parallel to the structural interpretation of English school theory that I am presenting here see Suganami 2001 Indeed some of Wendts conceptualisation most no tably his classification of three types of international social structure as Hobbesian Lockean and Kantian are derived from the English schools three traditions though Wendts scheme is limited by being wholly statebased no world society component His social structures rest on the nature of the dominant roles in the system or subsystem respectively enemy rival and friend However from an English school perspective it may well be the case that Wendts most interesting con tribution is his taking up of the issue of how norms and values the building blocks of any sort of society are internalised by the actors involved In other words Wendt shifts the focus from what the shared norms rules and institutions are and who shares them to the means by which these norms are held in place as a form of social practice As far as I am aware this core issue of theory has not been raised specif ically either in the English school or any other of the debates about world society though it is often present implicitly Wendt himself does 102 Reimagining the English schools triad not develop the idea very far There is perhaps the beginning of an ap proach to it in Bulls concerns about what it is that creates compliance to international law whether mere utilitarian calculus or some more constitutive sense of legimacy about rules or shared identity as part of a moral community Alderson and Hurrell 2000 31 But this lead has not been systematically followed up Wendt 1999 24750 offers three possibilities which he sees as both degrees and modes of internalisation coercion calculation and be lief Something close to this formulation is also present in Kratochwils 1989 97 much more complicated account which talks of institutional sanctions Hobbes ruleutilitarianism Hume and emotional at tachment Durkheim in Hurds 1999 set of coercion selfinterest and legitimacy as the determinants of social behaviour and with co ercion excluded in March and Olsens 1998 94854 discussion of the bases of social action in terms of either a logic of expected consequences calculation or a logic of appropriateness belief In all of these schemes the shallowest and least stable is coercion when the social structure is essentially imposed by an outside power A social structure built on this foundation is hardly internalised at all and is unlikely to survive the removal of its outside supporter The underlying fragility of a social system of coercively imposed norms is amply illustrated by the rapid collapse of the Soviet empire and then the Soviet Union itself and many similar cases can be found in the history of empires In the middle is calculation when the social structure rests on rational assessments of selfinterest Such a structure is only superficially internalised and remains stable only so long as the ratios of costs and benefits remain favourable to it A concert of powers for example will collapse if one power comes to believe that it can and should seek hegemony and a liberal trading system will collapse if enough of its members begin to think that the costs of exposing their societies and economies to global trade and finance outweigh the benefits As Hurd 1999 387 puts it a social system that relies primarily on selfinterest will necessarily be thin and tenuously held together and subject to drastic changes in response to shifts in the structure of payoffs The deepest and most stable mode is belief where actors support the social structure because they accept it as legitimate and in so doing incorporate it into their own conception of their identity Deep internalisation of this sort can survive quite ma jor changes of circumstance as shown by many cases of the persistence of religion long after its sponsoring imperial power has faded away Christianity after Rome Islam after the Abbasid dynasty Buddhism 103 From International to World Society after the Mauryan Empire Wendt offers the penetrating twist that in principle each of these modes of socialisation can apply to any of his three social structures Thus a seemingly Kantian social structure of friendship might be based on coercion and thus unstable the Soviet Union and its socialist fraternity while a Hobbesian social structure might well be based on the deeply internalised values of a warrior cul ture and thus held as legitimate eg Klingons for Star Trek fans or a long history of nomadic barbarian warrior cultures for others most visible these days in places like Somalia and Afghanistan A Lockean social structure mixing limited rivalry and limited cooperation might be supported only by instrumental calculation as some fear about the current global economy or it might be quite deeply internalised on the basis of Enlightenment beliefs about human nature or about the best way to achieve economic progress Wendts scheme is attractively neat and simple and at first glance seems to cover the main possibilities On reflection however one could question it in several ways For one thing it is based on an analogy with individual behaviour that misses out some important differences that affect the way states or other collective actors internalise shared val ues Hurrell 2002 1456 for example points out the incorporation of norms into bureaucratic structures and procedures and into legal codes domestic and international as forms of internalisation that would be distinctive to collective entities Perhaps more troubling is that Wendts three categories all require conscious awareness of the mechanism on the part of the actors concerned Is there a case for considering a fourth cat egory to cover behaviour that is driven by unconscious internalisation of norms whether as traditions or as doxa the unquestioned norms embedded in the social background of any society Guzzini 1993 466 There is also room for debate about whether a value is held if what holds it in place is coercion If contracts signed under duress are not legal do values held under duress actually count as values Some might think not Wendts and Hurds schemes force one to rely on sus tained behaviour as the indicator that a value is held This rather be havioural view of values will not convince everyone and will be particu larlyproblematicforthosenormativetheoristsforwhomtheholdingofa value equates with belief in it more on this below These issues deserve more thought than I have space to indulge in here In what follows I am simply going to try to apply Wendts scheme as given on the grounds that it opens up vital and inadequately explored ground within English schooltheoryIleaveopenthepossibilitythatothersmightwanttorefine 104 Reimagining the English schools triad the ideas if this first rough cut turns out to be interesting It seems to me that the issue of how norms are held in place is a crucial one in any un derstanding of how international or world societies develop and how stable or unstable they might be I will make extensive use of Wendts formulation in both the later sections of this chapter and in subsequent chapters of this book Inter alia Wendts scheme offers insight into Watsons 1990 1992 pendulum theory that international societies swing back and forth on a spectrum from extreme independence anarchy through hegemony suzerainty and dominion to empire Empire is too crude a term for the hierarchical end of the spectrum The social structure of empire is held together by a mixture of coercion calculation and belief in which coercion is generally the largest element and belief the smallest Rome was created and maintained by its army but it had enough legitimacy to fuel a millennium of nostalgia after its fall More purely brutal empires such as the Mongol and the Assyrian left much less nostalgia amongst theirformersubjectsAnalternativeformofhierarchyisconfederation where belief is generally the largest element and coercion the smallest These two types of construction are different enough so that using the label empire for both misleads more than it clarifies Wendts separation of modedepth of socialisation is helpful here It allows one to think of a single form of social structure eg hierarchy at the extreme end of Watsons spectrum while leaving open the question of whether this is achieved and maintained more by coercion Wights Stalinism more by calculation as some fear and some hope about the EU or more by belief a deeply rooted federation such as the US Thinking along these Wendtian lines poses some probing questions for how the history of international society is told The question of what holds norms in place is implicit in the English schools accounts of the spread of Western international society which involved a good deal of coercive imposition of a standard of civilisation as well as some cal culated and some principled acceptance Gong 1984 Bull and Watson 1984 This stillexpanding literature could usefully incorporate Wendts ideas Similar though less militarised coercive practices continue today Armstrong 1999 55861 and can most clearly be seen in action in the operation of conditionality imposed on periphery states by the core whether in relation to applications for NATO EU or WTO member ship or bids for loans from the IMF and World Bank But perhaps the real challenge opened up here is to those following in Vincents tradi tion of promoting human rights objectives in pursuit of a more solidarist 105 From International to World Society international society It is perfectly clear that Western individualist ver sions of human rights are held as legitimate and deeply internalised by a substantial community of states and people It is just as clear that any attempt to impose these values on a universalist global basis will re quire the use of coercive and calculative modes of socialisation against those who do not share them Is this a desirable and durable way to pursue the creation of a more solidarist international society More on this in chapters 5 and 8 Abandoning the physicalsocial distinction as a primary organising device for theory effectively collapses one pillar of the English school triad reducing the scheme to a dyad between international and world society In so doing it heightens the need to think systematically about the range of structural possibilities within international and world so cieties This task has so far only been picked away at and not addressed systematically by the English school and not much addressed by other versions of world society either many of which tend towards even more homogenous interpretations Going down this route means following Wendt and other construc tivists in privileging the social over the physical According to this way of thinking it will matter both what the shared norms rules and in stitutions are and how they are held in place Wendts scheme adds a new dimension to the solidarismpluralism debate It asks not only how many and what type of values are shared and whether they are about just survival or about more ambitious pursuit of joint gains but also about the mode of socialisation in play Privileging the social also raises questions about what happens to the neorealist types of structural analysis that would previously have fitted into the international system pillar of the English schools triad The first thing to note is that Waltzs 1979 first two tiers are social rather than material anyway organis ing principle and structural and functional differentiation are about the social structures created by political ideas not material capabilities These two ideas can stay in play without contradiction in the scheme set out in figure 2 Distribution of capabilities is more obviously physical and like interaction capacity has to be treated as an essential question that one asks of any social system Neorealists assume that the inter national system is composed of enemies and rivals and that polarity therefore matters primarily in relation to military and political security But as thinking about hegemonic stability in IPE suggests polarity can also matter and in a very different way in a system or a subsystem 106 Reimagining the English schools triad composed of rivals and friends In a social structural perspective polar ity does not determine the nature of the game or the players but it does affect how the game will be played whether it be a Hobbesian Grotian or Kantian one The consequences of the argument in this section for the first revi sion view of English school theory set out in figure 2 are sketched in the second revision in figure 3 and are quite radical Dropping system as representing a distinctive physical asocial form of interstate relations means eliminating or rather relocating in a redefined form one of the three main pillars in the classic English school triad of concepts In return for this the problem of the missing system side complementing world society also disappears This revision when combined with the one in figure 2 solves the boundary problem created there by changing the na ture of the boundary between international and world society Instead of being a frontier where one classification blends into another it becomes a clear separation based on type of actor In addition and following from the incorporation of Wendts ideas one can begin to see the spectrum of types of international society set out in the plan view Pluralism and solidarism no longer as in the classical English school triad of figure 1 define the outer boundaries of international society Instead they oc cupy the middle part of the spectrum Cronin 1999 817 conducts a similar exercise in defining types of international community His spec trum has international state of nature at the asocial end of the spectrum and universal collective security at my confederative end In between are balance of power great power concert pluralist security community common security system and amalgamated security community He ac companies this with a second spectrum of degrees of identity starting from hostility Other as antiself and proceeding through rivalry in difference cohesion some sense of common good and group identity altruism willingness to sacrifice for others to symbiosis shared core identity dissolves selfOther distinction Beyond solidarism one finds the Kantian model where the states composing international society become very alike domestically and confederalism where the de gree of political integration is on the border of transforming a system of states into a single hierarchical political entity Beyond pluralism which more or less stands for Wendts Lockean social structure one finds more Hobbesian social structures based on enemy relationships At the extreme end of this side of the spectrum one finds the asocial scenario sketched above where enemies are locked into a permanent 107 From International to World Society war of extermination In this view international society incorporates the whole spectrum of social structures possible between states from virtually nothing therefore absolutely conflictual to the brink of com plete political integration If one stays true to Wendts scheme then it is necessary to add a di mension of thickness to the plan view set out in the elevation view to take into account not just the type of social structure but also its modedepth of internalisation For every position on this spectrum one has to ask on what mixture of coercion calculation and belief the ob served social structure rests On the pluralistHobbesian side the ob served social structure could be deeply internalised as an expression of a warrior culture or it could be a shallower instrumental calculation based on the existence of some bad apples in the basket and fear of them amongst the other states or it could be coerced by the existence of one very powerful warrior state that threatens all the others Similarly on the solidaristKantian side the observed social structure could be deeply internalised as a result of shared belief in liberal principles or it could be the result of more instrumental calculations of advantage or it could be a result of a coercive hegemonic or imperial power able and willing to impose its values on others The English school has implicitly rested its understanding of society on belief and has therefore not asked this question with anything like the necessary clarity and consistency But as its accounts of the expansion of European international society to global scale show coercion and calculation matter Much of the non European world was simply forced into international society through the process of colonisation and decolonisation The few that escaped such as the Ottoman Empire China and Japan were much motivated by the prospect of coercion and calculated the need to adapt in order to survive Society even when defined in strong terms as shared values can rest on other foundations than belief Following Wendt figure 3 re quires this question to be asked of all types of international and world society Society and community If one is going to deploy the concept of society then the question of def inition and meaning cannot be avoided Both humility and caution are called for here Sociologists have been debating the meaning of society for generations without coming to any very clear resolution Mayhew 1968 It is unlikely that IR theorists are going to solve this problem but 108 Reimagining the English schools triad International Society of states World Society of transnational actors and individuals Asocial Con Federative antian Solidarist Pluralist o esian Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION BELIEF CALCULATION DEEP Figure 3 The Three Traditions second revision dropping the physical element of international system extending the spectrum of types of international society and adding Wendts modedepth of internalisation if they are going to deploy the concept then they must at least take a position especially so if like the English school they want to defend the strong version of society based on shared values highlighted in chapter 3 In general the concept of society aims to identify what it is that constitutes individuals into durable groups in such a way as to give the group ontological status societies can reproduce them selves and outlive the particular individuals that compose them at any given point Defining societies as bounded units has proved particu larly difficult So has deciding what kind of binding forces constitute the 109 From International to World Society essential ingredient that makes a collection of individuals into a soci ety must it be deep internalisation in the form of shared belief about identity or can society be calculated or even in some sense coerced in which case shared behaviour is sufficient to identify it The liter ature about society is almost totally based on the idea that however they might be structured societies are composed of individual human beings The English schools core idea that the units of international society are states secondorder societies composed of collective units rather than individuals is a striking departure recently picked up by some constructivists This departure deserves more attention than it has received Societies can and have been defined in political economic historical identity cultural and communication terms These can perhaps with the exception of Luhmann and his followers be simplified down to two main lines of approach One focuses on patterns of interaction struc tured by shared norms and rules while the other focuses on identity and wefeeling as the key to society These two lines are captured by the distinction first drawn by Tonnies 1887 between society Gesellschaft and community Gemeinschaft There is a long history of debate around these terms much of it bound up in the distinction between the tradi tional and the modern and analysis of the process of modernisation Much of this debate is freighted with German historical baggage not relevant to the IR debate about secondorder societies To oversimplify this history Gemeinschaft community broadly represents the organic premodern smallscale way exemplified by clans and tribes that hu mans grouped themselves together in before the onset of modernity In this sense community is a deep concept implying not only membership of an identity group but also a degree of responsibility towards the other members of the group It would be almost impossible to apply the con cept in this form to a loose secondorder construct such as international society and difficult if not quite impossible to imagine applying it to world society As Luard 1976 vii observes there is reason to doubt whether the aggregation of states possesses the common values and assumptions which are by definition the essential conditions of com munity Gesellschaftsociety broadly represents the rational contractual largescale way of organising humankind that has become dominant since the onset of modernity In principle and in practice Gesellschaft fits comfortably with the international domain Luard 1976 viii sees inter national society as possessing some common customs and traditions common expectations concerning the relationships and behaviour to be 110 Reimagining the English schools triad expected among its members even in many cases common institutions for discussing common problems There is plenty of room in this longstanding sociological formulation for casting the two as opposed forces and for mounting polemics in support of or opposition to one or the other progressive versus con servative views As shown in chapter 3 the world society approach of Dietrich Jung seeks to build a macrohistorical sociology understand ing of the contemporary international system directly on the basis of the interplay between tradition and modernity set up in the Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft formulation of the German debate But as pointed out by the WSRG there is another way of building on this tradition Instead of taking it as a macrohistorical sociological approach one can instead extract the essential distinction embedded in GemeinschaftGesellschaft and use it to identify different types of social relations in any histori cal context This second more abstract approach is the one I intend to pursue Jungs approach is more or less an alternative to the existing IR traditions and is interesting for that reason The approach of distin guishingbetweensocietyandcommunityastypesofsocialrelationships is powerful because it offers insight into the existing IR debates about international and world society From here on in I will signal this move away from the traditional GemeinschaftGesellschaft conception and all of the political and intellectual battles associated with it by abandoning the German terminology and sticking to the English terms community and society The principal cost of the abstraction away from history is that one dilutes the traditional organic deep sense of community by adding in the idea that communities can also be consciously constructed In the formulation proposed here society becomes essentially about agreed arrangements concerning expected behaviour norms rules in stitutions and community becomes essentially about shared identity wefeeling In this sense community can be quite shallow as for ex ample amongst the worldwide fandom of Manchester United or Elvis Presley The main advantage of the move is that it divorces society and community from a particular interpretation of history and makes them available as concepts for analysing the rather different world of second order societies whether international or world at the levels above the state The distinction between society and community features quite strongly in some of the schools of thought about world society sur veyed in chapter 3 It is not unknown in English school thinking but neither is it much explored and what is said leans in contradictory 111 From International to World Society directions2 Wights 1977 33 muchcited idea that We must assume that a statessystem ie an international society will not come into be ing without a degree of cultural unity among its members seems to lean towards community as a key element in international society though culture can be read in both society and community senses Adam Watson personal conversation says that community was what the British Committee had in mind when it talked about common culture Bull by contrast seems to lean firmly towards a society interpretation His idea of society 1977 45 as noted in chapter 2 rests on the presence of rules of coexistence regarding limits on the use of force provisions for the sanctity of contracts and arrangements for the assignment of prop erty rights The key question is whether society and community rep resent fundamentally different forms of social relationship or are just different elements within what can be considered a single phenomenon If they are fundamentally different forms then the question has to be put as to whether they can be conflated within concepts such as inter national and world society If they are aspects of a single phenomenon a wider sense of society then such bundling together is both more eas ily justified and less analytically suspect In some of my earlier writing Buzan 1993 33340 I simply added the element of identity into the concept of society without adequately recognising the need to ask this question In trying to formulate a position on whether society and community are fundamentally different or aspects of a single phenomenon Chris Browns 1995a attempt to draw a distinction among system society and community is instructive not least because it addresses the prob lemmoreorlessinthetermsoftheEnglishschoolsclassicalthreepillars He defines a system as existing when whatever rules and regularities exist in the world are the product solely of an interplay of forces and devoid of any kind of normative content Brown 1995a 185 That def inition would also satisfy most neorealists and some readings of Bull Community he places as the polar opposite of system seeing it as a heavily contested concept at the centre of which is the idea that whatever order exists in a community is normatively groundedbasedonrelationshipswhichconstituteanetworkofmutual claims rights duties and obligations that pull people together in ways that are qualitatively different from the impersonal forces which create 2 I am grateful to Ana GonzalezPelaez for pointing out to me the potential significance of community in English school thinking 112 Reimagining the English schools triad a system Community implies the idea of common interests and at least an emerging common identity The notion of community on a world scale implies a cosmopolitan belief in the oneness of humanity What is central is the idea of unity based on notions of fellow feeling 1995a 185 This understanding of community is echoed by Cronin 1999 4 com munities require some degree of group cohesion and a shared sense of self Between these two Brown positions society which lacks the affective unity of community Society is a normgoverned form of association but the norms in ques tion emerge out of the requirements for social cooperation and do not necessarily require commitment to any common projects common interest or common identity beyond what is required for social coex istence the norms that constitute society are different from those that would constitute a world community They are essentially the norms that are required for successful pursuit of peaceful coexistence by states whereas the norms involved in world community are nei ther limited to those of coexistence nor restricted in their application to interstate relations Brown 1995a 186 italics in the original Although Brown ignores the link his formulation runs in close parallel withthedistinctionbetweenpluralismasabouttherulesofcoexistence and solidarism as about common projects collective responsibility and shared identity in English school thinking Browns formulation provides a useful path into the society community question not least because it is troubling in a number of ways Most obviously the complexity and vagueness of his definition of community squeezes the space left for defining society This is per haps explained by his concerns as a political theorist to put norms or the absence of them at the centre of his definitions One consequence of his squeezed definition is his attempt to limit society to states and therefore in my understanding to international society whereas com munity is by implication allowed to apply to states and other entities including individuals This raises but does not really answer the ques tion of just what sorts of units the concepts of society and community can or cannot be applied to a crucial issue if one is to develop the idea of secondorder societies Browns approach to community runs close to Vincents idea of world society as states plus transnational actors plus individuals and again his position is echoed by Cronin 2002a 66 who defines international communities as 113 From International to World Society historicallysituated collectivities of regional political actors who main tain formal ongoing relations with each other in international affairs on the basis of an integrated set of procedural and political norms Such actors include government officials diplomats and representa tives from international and transnational organisations and social movements These definitions contain elements of the societycommunity distinc tion particularly in allocating affective and shared identity elements to community But the main drift is to see community as a thicker form incorporating the thinner form of mere society and adding to it ele ments of shared values and identities Brown denies 1995a 186 that he is posing system society and community as a spectrum But he doesnt develop the reasons for his denial and his overall presentation strongly suggests exactly such a developmental sequence with system being the simplest and most basic construction where interaction generates some mechanical rules society adding a layer of conscious rulemaking among states onto that and community being the most fully developed form bringing in elements of identity and more elaborate forms of nor mative kinship This developmental spectrum model is also strong in the thinking of Vincent and the WSRG This question of development is vital because as noted in the dis cussion of the WSRG in chapter 3 determining what the relationship is between society and community remains one of the unresolved con troversies at the core of the sociological debate That there is a strong relationship of some sort is not in doubt for the two are frequently co located and nearly always interactive But what that relationship might be is hotly contested with no clear pattern of determination running in either direction about what causes what In the sociological tradition of Tonnies WSRG 2000 6 community is an organic historical idea that comes before and is in some ways superior to the rational but hol low society relationships typical of modernity Gellner 1988 61 is also in this tradition arguing for a rough law of the intellectual history of mankind logical and social coherence are inversely related In other words Gellner thinks that primitive human societies perform better in terms of community and identity and more advanced ones perform better in terms of society and rationality and that the two characteris tics being contradictory are inversely related to each other This same opposition can also be seen in debates that pose religion a strong form of community against science the ultimate in modernist rationality Wight 1977 seems to think that community in the sense of shared 114 Reimagining the English schools triad culture precedes the development of international society though his view of the relationship is more positive than Gellners Yet if one re calls the work of Vincent and probably most of those in the solidarist tradition of the English school the view is like that of Chris Brown the other way around Their hope seems to be that a sense of community a normative kinship will grow out of the thinner practice of society Bull seems to fear that society and community will prove to be contra dictory with community undermining society Whatever else might be true it seems clear that an inadequate distinction between society and community lies at the heart of some of the central confusions in English school theory Is it that the world society pillar in English school theory is actually about community so representing a semantic wrong turn Or is the problem more serious than that with the society and commu nity elements simply not having been given adequate recognition in the whole theoretical construction of both international and world society Resolving this question in some way becomes even more important if one accepts the argument made in the previous section for priv ileging the social over the physical in conceptualising international system structure If the social is in fact made up of two distinct in tertwined types of relationship the connections between which are complex and indeterminate then making the social central carries an obligation to be clear about what is understood to compose it In this regard it is of more than passing interest that Wendts understand ing of social structure is strongly linked to identity and therefore in the terms set out here to community When states engage in egoistic foreign policies more is going on than simply an attempt to realize given selfish ends They are also instantiating and reproducing a particular conception of who they are Wendt 1999 3401 Structural change is a problem of collective identity formation it occurs when actors re define who they are and what they want We are or become what we do Wendt 1999 338 336 342 Wendt links his constructivist approach to the idea that social interaction is not just about the adjust ment of behaviour to price as the rationalist would see it but also about the reproduction of the agents involved of their identities and interests Wendt 1999 316 The strong implication of these remarks is that for Wendt the types of social structure represented by Hobbes Locke and Kant are all rooted in identity and are therefore species of community In Wendts scheme the distinction between society and commu nity seems to emerge most clearly in his discussion about modes and depths of socialisation outlined in the previous section The rational 115 From International to World Society contractual calculated instrumental definition of society fits closely with Wendts middle mode of internalisation calculation of self interest whereas the internalisation of identity that defines community seems close to the internalisation of belief that forms Wendts third and deepest mode of internalisation But as explained above Wendt specif ically does not tie together the modedepth of internalisation and the type of social structure and keeping this relationship open is one of the powerful and innovative elements in his scheme How to fit Wendts thinking with the societycommunity discussion is something of a puzzle In Wendts scheme it is not immediately obvious whether societycommunity is a distinction between two different types of social relations or a statement about how any society in the general sense is internalised His Kantian structure of friendship is indeterminate as regards society or community and could be read either way Wendt 1999 297308 The simplest way through this minefield and also the one best suited to dealing with the secondorder societies of interest to IR is to accept the arguments offered by Weller 2000 and the WSRG 2000 Their for mulation treats as distinct forms of social relationship on the one hand contractual social relations based on agreements about rational self interest ie society and on the other hand social relations of shared identity based on affection or tradition ie community This Weberian formulation is open about the units to which the concepts might apply individuals nonstate actors nations states civilisations and takes society and community as ideal types seldom if ever found in pure form It postulates the near certainty that the two will always come en tangled with each other in some way but argues that the relationship is both complex and indeterminate as to which precedes or causes which and whether they will be harmonious or conflictual Indirect support for this move can be found in the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas 2001 whose use of two variables integration and regulation to characterise any human collectivity runs in quite close parallel to the communitysociety scheme proposed here From an English school perspective this move has the attraction of providing some leverage on the strong version of society as shared values that Shaw and others criticise it for Perhaps the main cost other of course than the inconvenience of having to think again about things previously taken for granted is that one more or less has to abandon hopes for both predictive theory not a great loss to most English school types and linear developmental models perhaps of concern to some 116 Reimagining the English schools triad solidarists Given the apparent absence of any clear lines of general causality between society and community in either direction students of the subject will largely be confined to situational and comparative analysis This loss is balanced by the gain that the indeterminacy of the societycommunity relationship takes the heat out of the worry that world society and international society must in some way be necessarily at odds with each other They can be but they can also be mutually supportive Some epistemic communities for example might well be opposed to the statebased international society some human rights and environmentalist groups but others may well be deeply entwined with it international law for example or big science research projects in astronomy space exploration and physics Another benefit is to enable the English school to take up Wellers 2000 648 idea that one key variable affecting what the relationship between society and community will be is whether their geographical boundaries are the same or different Bringing the geography of society and community into line has of course been one driving rationale behind the nationstate which if nothing else underlines the political salience of Wellers question Wellers question is a neat way of formulating the many agonisings of the English school about the expansion of European international society into areas not sharing the history of European civil isation It is also a way of addressing the English schools reluctance to talk about regional international societies as anything other than a threat to global international society more on this in chapter 7 It is also worth noting that there is an opportunity here for the English school and indeed others of like mind in IR to make a distinctive con tribution to the wider debate about society The relationship between society and community has not yet been sorted out in any definitive manner by either political theorists or sociologists Common to their en deavours has been the assumption that both society and community are composed of individual human beings There is scope for IR theorists to play here in that the consequences of social structure are almost cer tainly quite different when the units concerned are not individuals but collectivities with ontological status of their own If such secondorder societies are indeed fundamentally different from societies composed of individual human beings then there will be limits to both the lessons and the problems that can be carried over to the international level from discussions about primary human societies Some even within IR reject the idea of secondorder societies al together Jones 1981 5 on the grounds presumably deriving from a 117 From International to World Society strongly held methodological individualism that societies can only be composed of individual human beings Anyone taking that view has to reject any concept of international society altogether and confine themselves at most to a reductionist idea of world society Doing so it seems to me throws away a hugely important concept for understand ing international relations The main insights so far developed in IR on secondorder societies come in reflections about international anarchy and suggest that such societies do differ significantly from primary ones The question has been to what extent if any the Hobbesian war of each against all image of primary anarchy carries over to international ie secondary anarchies Bull 1977 4651 Buzan 1991 21 378 148ff The lesson from those discussions is that the secondorder structures are indeed different from the primary ones because the nature of the constituent social units individual human beings versus states is pro foundly different on issues ranging from physical vulnerability through processes of reproduction to death If what is true for international an archy is true for international society as seems likely then IR theorists have a responsibility to develop distinctive models of society to cover this secondorder domain If secondorder societies are different from primary ones then study of them may open up new perspectives on how society and community interrelate Such a question is compatible with the central project of the English school and could also be taken up by constructivists such as Cronin 1999 and Wendt 1999 who are already working with the idea of secondorder societies If one takes the bold step of treating society and community as distinct forms of social relationship between which lines of causality are indeter minate what are the consequences for thinking about international and world society How in other words is the distinction between society and community to be worked into a revision of figure 4 Before turning to that task it helps first to deal with the last of the dyads defining this chapter individuals and transnational actors TNAs Individual and transnational I suggested in chapter 1 that world society had become something of an intellectual dustbin in English school theory and this could still be a problem even if one confined its content to nonstate entities If world society is about a mixture of nongovernmental organisations and indi viduals then the question is whether or not the logic of transnational ism and the logic of cosmopolitanism can comfortably be composed as a 118 Reimagining the English schools triad single coherent phenomenon or whether more analytical leverage is ac quired by keeping them distinct In order to get to grips with this issue it helps to go back to basics The exegesis of English school and other world society theories conducted in chapters 2 and 3 revealed considerable consistency in the analytical construction of what the relevant units are Three types of unit are in constant play states transnational actors and individuals Taxonomic logic suggests that this trilogy could and should be abstracted into two general types individuals on the one hand and various kinds of collective units ie substantially autonomous social collectivities sufficiently well structured both to reproduce themselves and to have decisionmaking processes which enable them to behave in a selfconscious fashion on the other Collective units in this sense would be problematic or even nonsensical for methodological indi vidualists Because such units are understood to have sufficient actor quality to constitute them as distinctive agents in a social world they have to be understood in methodologically collective terms In practice however taxonomic neatness surrenders to the primacy of the state and the collective units category remains divided into state and nonstate The English school and realism International Law Historical Sociology and much neoliberalism privilege the state as still central to international order providing the essential political framework for much else On this basis a strong distinction is made between states and TNAs eg firms INGOs mafias etc Alan James 1993 288 for exam ple argues that nonstate actors are not members of international society because they do not possess the attributes that would give them the right of admission But they can be seen as participants in the international society that is created and maintained by sovereign states This view is widely reflected in the literature on TNAs Vincent 1992 261 Keck and Sikkink 1998 217 RisseKappen 1995b 280300 Krasner 1995 258 Noortmann Arts and Reinalda 2001 299301 for example argue that while nonstate actors have become part of the institutional structure of international politics and policymaking their influence in comparison with states should not be exaggerated The position in international law is complicated Noortmann 2001 5976 argues that the positivist tradition in international law automatically privileges the state as the sole subject of international law while other traditions make more room for nonstate actors He argues 2001 64 6974 that no intrinsic rule of international law that excludes nonstate actors from acquiring a degree of legal personality exists and that de facto transnational corporations TNCs are so heavily bound up in international legal rights and duties 119 From International to World Society and can make and be held to legal claims to such an extent that they must have standing as effective subjects of international law INGOs have a much less clear position but even though they are usually de nied standing as subjects of international law they often have formal standing with IGOs So at this point I run into the argument made and accepted in the previous section for setting the state apart as a distinct focus for anal ysis using the concept of international society Acknowledging the risk of perpetuating a historical privileging of the state that justifies itself mainly by looking backwards I nevertheless have to accept the divi sion of collective units into state and nonstate The grounds for doing this are that the state remains central to the political structuring of hu mankind with no obvious successor in sight and no obvious way of doing without political structure of some sort I exclude IGOs as actors on the grounds set out in Buzan and Little 2000 2667 that because of their generally low actor quality IGOs are more generally part of social interaction capacity than units in their own right So while it would make more strictly taxonomical sense to bundle states and TNAs together TNAs nevertheless get pushed down into world society along with their unnatural partner individuals Can this pairing be sustained To answer this question it helps to conduct a thought experiment around the three basic types of unit in play and the sorts of systems they might form Given that we are looking at three types of autonomous actor what kinds of social systems can they form If one accepts the trilogy of unit types then it follows that there can be three types of pure basic international social systems interstate state tostate interaction transnational TNAtoTNA interaction and in terhuman individualtoindividual interaction Nothing forbids these from coexisting and indeed overlapping eg statetoTNA etc In the ory and in practice all sorts of mixtures are possible Such mixing often without thinking too hard about it has been part of English school thinking eg Vincents idea of world society as states TNAs indi viduals The same tendency can be found in Cronins 1999 338 2002b idea of transnational political community among elites both state and nonstate as a kind of Davosculture counterweight to the realist logic of anarchy and his understanding of the UN Cronin 2002a 54 as an institutional embodiment of an international community that inte grates both state and transnational actors But it is nevertheless a useful foundational exercise to start by thinking through each of these types of social system in pure form In doing this and with a view to the goal of 120 Reimagining the English schools triad revising figure 3 in the light of the discussion in this section and the pre vious one it is helpful to try to bring the societycommunity distinction into play in relation to the three pure forms In the case of states the ideas of international society and with some what less coherence international community are pretty well estab lished in IR theory International society has been the primary focus of English school writing and is about the instrumental norms rules and institutions created and maintained by states or independent political communities whether consciously or not to bring a degree of order into their system of relationships As shown in figure 3 such societies can range from being quite thin or minimalist to quite thick covering a wide range of issues in considerable depth Warrior societies might generate a Hobbesian international society where the main rules are about conflict and honour Pluralist international societies might well take Westphalian form with the states wishing to preserve maximum autonomy and distinctiveness and therefore agreeing mainly on the principles necessary for coexistence sovereignty nonintervention and rules for diplomacy More solidarist international societies will want to do more than that moving beyond coexistence to pursuit of com mon interests defined in terms of joint gains The will to move towards solidarist arrangements arises most easily if states become more inter nally alike and therefore share a wider array of ideas and values about human rights or market economies or property rights for example In principle solidarist international societies could generate a very wide array of shared norms rules and institutions covering economy law politics environment education and so on The EU is a living example of this potentiality International community has not been systematically discussed by the English school but in the meaning of community set out in the pre vious section would hinge on shared identity and wefeeling among states Shared identity like instrumental cooperation can range from low to high intensity and can come in either exclusive one overriding identity or multiple forms The identity that many individuals feel as members of the human race for example is generally of fairly low inten sity and is seldom if ever exclusive By contrast many individuals have high intensity and sometimes exclusive identity with family clan reli gion nation or some ideologically motivated party or movement This is the basis of the realists emphasis on conflict groups noted above How does this work with states In the contemporary international so ciety the bottom line of shared identity that could define international 121 From International to World Society community is mutual recognition of sovereignty All states that share such mutual recognition acknowledge each other as being the same type of entity and this is nearly universal But that is a fairly low intensity wefeeling and certainly does not stand in the way of stronger generally subglobal forms of interstate community such as the late communist community the club of Western liberal democracies the community of Islamic states or going back a bit in Western history Christendom Other types of more instrumental identity groupings can arise such as landlocked states great powers and the third world Most of the more intense forms of international community are not universal and none of them is very intense in an absolute sense International community might well thus exist to some degree on a global scale but is unlikely to be as strong there as on subglobal scales How is one to read this depiction of international community in re lation to the question much agonised about in political theory about whether the very nature of shared identity requires an Other there fore ruling out the possibility of a universal identity Can there be an Us without a Them Both the WSRG 2000 13 17 and Brown 1995b 1006 note that this question raises contradictions in the idea of uni versal community that could make it impossible to achieve in practice Browns solution is to pose international society seen as a secondorder society of collective units each of which comprises a primary commu nity of individuals as the via media between the reality of particularist communitarianism and the probably hopeless aspiration to universal ist cosmopolitanism In his scheme secondorder society is called in to rescue primary society from the impossibility of achieving unity in the absence of an Other If these arguments are taken seriously they rule out the possibility of universal international andor world communi ties One possibility is that what may be true for primary communities of individuals may not necessarily hold for second order communities of states Perhaps states do not require an Other in order to create a universal community In support of that would be the weak but still extant global community of states based on mutual acceptance as like units on the basis of sovereignty This community pretty much incorpo rates all the members of the class of states Another possibility is that states do require an Other but they find it in the form of individuals or ganised in forms other than itself eg primary anarchy or transnational neomedievalism Ole Wæver also raises the possibility exemplified in the history of the EU that states could find their collective Other in a fear of returning to their own violenceridden past Buzan and Wæver 122 Reimagining the English schools triad 2003 ch 11 There will of course be attempts to finesse this problem by linking a subglobal identity to the good of the whole Carr 1946 801 The practice of the Western states of representing themselves as the international community generally hinges on an appeal to Western values that are understood to be universal even if they are contested by some outside the West Trying to visualise pure transnational and interhuman societies and communities set apart from an accompanying statessystem takes one away from much of history and onto unfamiliar ground It raises ques tions about whether the concept of world society can be thought of inde pendently from statessystems therefore having the same ontological standing or whether it is somehow dependent on an accompanying international society therefore only an epiphenomenon Starting with individuals as the unit underlines the case for taking a social view of international systems made in the previous section It is scarcely possible to imagine purely asocial interhuman systems in any realistic sense Hobbess image of the war of each against all captures one possibility but has no basis in what we know about human social life be fore the coming of Leviathan Buzan and Little 2000 part II Humans acting as individuals in a system very quickly find powerful reasons to form cooperative groups especially if fighting is in prospect It is almost impossible to imagine a largescale interhuman society or com munity coming into being without first going through many stages of development focused on collective units of one sort or another Without going through the intermediary stages of collective units how would the whole population of humans ever establish communication with each other or learn how to align their identities or coordinate their ac tions on a large scale Given a numerous and geographically dispersed population the processes by which humans interact seem inevitably fated to form collective entities each of which encompasses only a small part of the total human population These entities might be collective units of some kind possessing actor quality andor they might be pat terns of shared identity religious ethnic etc with network types of association amongst individuals poised somewhere in between Iftheentitiesareclearlyunitswithactorqualitythenwemovestraight into the realm of transnational or state units This makes it difficult to imagine world society in terms of individuals because a secondorder transnational or interstate society would form before any fullscale in terhuman system could arise An interhuman world society unmediated by collective units can just about be imagined in a world vastly more 123 From International to World Society technologically and socially developed than our own when evolutions of the internet have become both universal and deeply embedded in hu man society and probably physiology as well But such a development would only come about as a result of long evolution through interunit societies of some sort It is thus difficult to think about world societies of individuals without immediately conjuring up collective units of one sort or another and thus departing from the individualasunit scenario It is much easier to see individuals in the community terms of shared identity without encountering this problem The idea of shared identity among individuals is well covered in the extensive literature on com munitarianism and cosmopolitanism which is one of the major stocks in trade of political theory Humans seem to fall naturally into identity groups based on such things as kinship ethnicity language religion andor political allegiance The entities thus formed do not necessar ily or even usually have actor quality The problem in relation to any idea of world community is as noted above that such associations form more easily on small scales than on larger ones and that universal com munity amongst individuals is on some readings impossible because of the lack of an Other against which to define shared identity Commu nity certainly operates but when does it become justified to use the term world In a strict usage world would have to mean global and in that case world community in terms of individuals would only occur after a very long period of development and aggregation of shared identities on a smaller scale With this meaning it could just about be argued that humankind is beginning to develop a world community because of the widespread acceptance of the principle that all humans are equal and possessed of some basic shared human rights But a looser meaning of world along the lines of Wallersteins world systems and world em pires can also be justified and offers more scope Here world means occurring on a large scale relative to other aspects of human organisa tion and having substantially selfcontained qualities With this usage a variety of religious and civilisational foundations for claims about world communities can come into play In either case the necessity of development through successive aggregations from smaller to more en compassing groups means that the idea of world community amongst individuals would have to be part of a set of multiple identities some thing that moderated the effects of more sectional parochial types of wefeeling rather than replacing them It is hard to imagine an overrid ing identity of humankind without a large range of lessthanuniversal identities being embedded in it 124 Reimagining the English schools triad Turning to TNAs as the unit reinforces the case for taking a social view of international systems Imagining a purely physical transnational sys tem is almost as problematic as for the interhuman case TNAs represent a division of labour and a differentiation of function and such develop ments can hardly be contemplated outside the context of some sort of societycommunity Amongst transnational actors society is easier to imagine and com munity more difficult Pure transnational world societies are easier to imagine because they are analogous to that other system of collective units formed by states But envisaging pure transnational societies re quires that one eliminate states or more generally types of collec tive unit claiming exclusive powers of government and rights to use force over defined territories and peoples Eliminating states leaves be hind an almost infinite array of functionally specific entities that ranges from hobbyist clubs and sporting associations through mafias and re ligious institutions to firms and interest lobbies and professional as sociations RisseKappen 1995a Boli and Thomas 1999 Noortmann Arts and Reinalda 2001 303 Risse 2002 Only one historical exam ple comes even close to this model in medieval Europe both property rights and political rights or more to the point duties were divided up across a range of entities from guilds crusading orders and monasteries through bishops barons and princes to cities Holy Roman emperors and popes Ruggie 1983 1993 Fischer 1992 Buzan and Little 1996 This medievalmodelisnotpurelytransnationalsincesomeofitscomponents citystatessomekingswouldcountasstatesunderthedefinitiongiven above and the same is true of Hedley Bulls muchcited idea of neo medievalism which captured the possibility that the future might de velop a similar mix The Westphalian statessystem eventually replaced the medieval one and gave it a bad press as the dark ages But me dieval Europe nonetheless stands as an exemplar of the possibility of a predominantly transnational world society It is perfectly possible to imagine firms and indeed clubs mafias and various other types of association agreeing pluralist type rules of recognition and conventions of communication amongst others of a similar type and working out practical measures of coexistence Cartel agreements amongst firms or mafias not to compete with one another in certain markets or territories are parallel to rules of non intervention among states It is harder to imagine why different types of transnational organisation would behave in this way Because states or firms are the same type of entity they may well fall into zerosum 125 From International to World Society rivalry and therefore have need of rules of coexistence But chess clubs and steel manufacturers hardly compete for the same social terrain and can as well remain indifferent to each other as seek structured social relations Similarly it is not difficult to imagine elements of solidarism in transnational societies Chess or sports clubs may want to cooperate in setting up systemwide standards and tournaments Firms may want to agree on common standards for everything from screws to software systems Stock exchanges might want to make their buying and selling practices interoperable As with states therefore other types of collec tive units have choices about how they relate to each other and these choices can range from zerosum rivalry through pluralist modes of coexistence to more solidarist modes of cooperation in pursuit of joint gains and interoperability There is perhaps some echo in this image of Luhmanns idea of world society as consisting of distinct functional systems of communication each structured by its own basic code into selfreferential communities It is more difficult to think about a purely transnational world com munity the problem being that unlike states and individuals the units of the transnational world are similar only in the sense that they are not states Little else about them is similar and therefore the founda tions for shared identity are hard to imagine Partly for this reason Williams 2001 rightly points out that world society contrary to the hopes of some solidarists is perhaps more embeddedly pluralist and more problematic as a site for the development of solidarism than in ternational society World communities of transnational actors might develop among similar types all chess clubs all mining companies all terrorist groups but this would be so narrow as to make the term world seem inappropriate Perhaps the only plausible route to a widely based transnational world community would be if the shared iden tity as nonstate became strong For that to happen not only would a core political rivalry between the state and nonstate worlds have to develop but also a sophisticated consciousness of division of labour among the different types of nonstate units such that they could con struct a shared identity as part of a grand idea about the human social world Such a scenario probably exists only in the minds of the more ex treme proponents of globalisation global civil society andor classical anarchism In principle a transnational world society could exist in the ab sence of states notwithstanding the nonsense that would make of the term transnational itself and is therefore a possible alternative to 126 Reimagining the English schools triad international society It can also exist in conjunction with states as now when transnational and international society overlap and interweave Taking all this into account the answer to the opening question of this section Can the logic of transnationalism and the logic of cos mopolitanism be composed as a single coherent phenomenon labelled world societycommunity would seem to be no The ontological dif ference between individuals and transnational actors is profound and it leads to quite different logics and potentialities in the way in which each of these types of units can or cannot form societies and communities Thinking about the individual level is very largely focused on ques tions of identity and community This is reflected in the debates within political theory about cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism As demonstrated it is actually quite difficult to think about a pure interhu man society because the dynamics of society almost immediately jump to the transnational andor state levels By contrast thinking about the transnational level is mostly focused on questions of society While it is not impossible to think about community at the transnational level the huge diversity of actor types among TNAs tends to impose pretty strict limits on how far shared identity can go Following the argument made on pp 918 about favouring type of unit as the key to distinguishing between international and world society I cannot avoid the conclusion that individuals and transnational actors should not be bundled together In terms of revising figure 3 this move has two consequences First it would seem to destroy the concept of world society as used in figures 13 This rather alarming development is balanced by the fact that in doing so the separation of the individual and transnational worlds opens up ways around some of the dilemmas for English school theory posed by world society and exposed most clearly in the examination of Vincents work Second it creates strong reasons to divide the nonstate into two and thereby restore a triadic structure but now with each of the three pillars defined by a distinct type of unit individuals TNAs states Buried in all of this argument has been a major departure from the role that individual human beings play in the normative verson of English school theory3 In that tradition individuals are of primary interest as the carriers of moral rights It is the individual that matters whether singly as him or herself or collectively as humankind In the structural version of English school theory emerging here the focus is not on the 3 I am grateful to Lene Mosegaard Madsen for pointing this out 127 From International to World Society individual as such but on the patterns of shared identity that group human beings into various forms of community A structural approach does not do well at dealing with individual units It necessarily seeks patterns on a larger scale At this point everything is in place to undertake the revision of figure 3 and to reconsider the meaning of both international and world society Conclusions reconstructing the English schools triad To sum up the argument above has defended the following proposi tions r That there are strong reasons for keeping a distinction between state and nonstate as a feature of the analysis figure 2 r That the physicalsocial distinction should be largely set aside in English school theory Given the heavy overlap between them the two should be considered together within the context of a range of types of social system figure 3 r That society and community need to be considered as distinct forms of social relationship nearly always linked but with little or no deter minate causality in either direction r That the individual and the transnational have such different ontolo gical foundations that bundling them together as a collective non state or world society category is not sustainable The task in this section is to work out the consequences of the last two of these conclusions for reconstructing the English schools triad and to apply these to revising figure 3 Recallthatinconstructingfigure3IfollowedWendtJamesandothers in abandoning the idea of a purely physical mechanistic international system The consequence of that move was extending the range of in ternational society to cover a wider spectrum than pluralist to solidarist This spectrum went from asocial very rare and Hobbesian at one ex treme through pluralist and solidarist to Kantian with confederative forming the borderline with hierarchical modes of political order at the other extreme In line with Wendt I accepted that enemy and rival were as much forms of social relationship as friend I also ac cepted the Wendtian move of separating out the type of international 128 Reimagining the English schools triad society from the modedepth of its internalisation coercion calculation or belief I noted that Wendts formulation left quite a bit of ambiguity as to where and how the societycommunity distinction as discussed above pp 10818 fitted into his scheme and that thread is one of the keys to designing figure 4 Wendts scheme rests on a distinction between the type of society ie what values are shared and the modedepth of internalisation of the values ie how and why they are shared I can see no reason why this distinction should not apply to any kind of society whether a primary one composed of individuals or a secondorder one composed of states or TNAs If one accepts the distinction between what and howwhy as is done in figure 3 then the societycommunity distinction clearly belongs in the howwhy dimension The what dimension identifies the form or type of social structure as determined by the character of the norms rules and institutions that make it up The societycommunity distinc tion does not address the range of values that define the differences between the various positions along the spectrum of international so cial structures shown in figure 4 Following Wendts logic society and community are about the binding forces which hold any type of social structure together The first step in revising figure 3 is therefore to locate the societycommunity distinction within Wendts howwhy dimension Note that this move has the result of colocating society and com munity with coercion This is a radical departure from those tradi tions which have tended to see coercion and violence as the absence of societycommunity as the problem that societycommunity should in some way address Yet coercion is never far from the surface of discus sions about society Think of Hobbess Leviathan or of Marxian under standings of capitalism It is also the case that if one follows the construc tivist logic of treating all human interactions as social then violence and coercion have to be counted as forms of society and investigated as such Wendt 1999 254 thus rightly puts coercion into the howwhy dimension alongside society and community and forming a spectrum with them of degrees of cultural internalization This move also occurs as a conse quence of extending the domain of international society to cover what was seen previously as physical and mechanistic conflict dynamics at the Hobbesian end of the spectrum Enmity is also social and coercion is one of the ways in which collective behaviour can be shaped Follow ing this logic society becomes synonymous with Wendts calculation which as noted above is a very comfortable fit Wendts presentation of calculation is closely parallel to the rationalist instrumental modernist 129 From International to World Society understandings of what society means in the sociological debates Community then has to become synonymous with Wendts belief At first glance this is not such an immediately comfortable fit though nei ther is it all that jarring If community is understood as shared identity it might be thought to represent something similar to but narrower than shared belief Shared identity is of course a form of shared belief viz Andersons 1983 famous imagined communities But does shared belief necessarily generate shared identity On reflection and with the caveat that good communication is also required in order to establish as common knowledge that belief is shared it is difficult to imagine that it doesnt In discussing their logic of appropriateness March and Olsen 1998 951 also make this link noting that for this type of mo tive the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities more than with interests I conclude that calculation and society and belief and com munity are substantively close enough to confirm that the distinction between society and community does belong in the howwhy dimension of Wendts scheme and not in the what dimension Society and community and coercion thus represent the binding forces by which social structures of any sort can be created and sus tained They do not determine the values defining the social structure and in principle each can apply to any type of social structure Wendt is clear that he wants to see his types of social structure in mutually exclusive terms either Hobbesian or Lockean or Kantian but not mix tures He goes in a similar direction about the disposition of the three components of the howwhy dimension That each can apply to any so cial structure is a powerful insight set up in a 3 3 matrix of coercion calculation and belief with his Hobbesian Lockean and Kantian types of social structure Wendt 1999 254 Wendts assumption that the types of social structure in the what dimension will always have a sufficiently clear pattern of enemy rival or friend to give them clear and mutu ally exclusive designations is already bordering on heroic simplification Buzan and Wæver 2003 though it might just about be sustainable for analytical purposes But to assume the same about the three elements of the howwhy dimension is not sustainable Almost any social structure one can think of will be held together by some mixture of coercion calculation and belief The necessity of mix ture and how to deal with it is what defines politics Empires might mainlybeheldtogetherbycoercionbutonecouldnotunderstandeither the Roman or British empire without adding in substantial elements of calculation the economic advantages of being in the empire and belief 130 Reimagining the English schools triad local elites sharing some of the values of the empire Similarly liberal democracies might be held together mainly by belief but the substantial role of calculation is indicated by fears about whether democracy can be sustained without economic growth No democracies have been able to do without some coercive institutions that have primarily domestic functions Much of Westphalian pluralist international society rests not just on the societycalculation element of agreed norms rules and insti tutions but also on the communitybelief acknowledgement amongst the states that they are the same type of sovereign entity and thus share an identity The issue of communitybelief emerges even more strongly for solidarist international societies where an everextending range of cooperative norms rules and institutions is likely both to reflect and encourage a move towards increasing similarity in the domestic struc tures and values of the states concerned Thecasefortreatingcoercioncalculationandbeliefassimultaneously present in all but a few extreme cases of theoretically possible types of social structure is reinforced by the nature of the sociological and po litical theory debates about society and community Recall that in these debates society and community are generally held to represent distinct forms of social relationship that are nevertheless nearly always found chained together in some degree They are distinct as ideal types but in practice they are found mixed together in complex and fundamentally indeterminate ways sometimes in tension with each other sometimes complementaryThenatureoftherelationshipbetweensocietyandcom munity is much disputed but the fact that there always is a relationship is generally accepted There is a recurrent disposition in the literature to see this link in terms of layering or hierarchy Those of a more historical disposition much of the sociological debate reviewed in chapter 3 put community as the earlier primitive form and society as the later more sophisticated though not necessarily better development By contrast those of a more structural inclination Browns formulation discussed in pp 11214 also the WSRGs approach and Wendt tend to see society as the simpler more basic less demanding form and community as the more difficult and usually desirable thing to develop as the deep form of social integration Understanding society and community as elements of the howwhy dimension helpfully keeps in focus that neither society nor community is necessarily nice That they are part of the means that hold any set of shared values together and do not determine what those values are untangles some of the problems revealed in the discussion of global 131 From International to World Society civil society in chapter 3 Social structures that can be characterised as societies or communities in the traditional usage of those terms can just as easily be sites of conflict as well as zones of cooperation and harmony as any reflection on the experience of family clan nation or religion quickly reveals and any study of civil war underlines Putting society and community into the howwhy dimension makes it less easy to lose sight of that dual character In the formulation adopted here I am therefore following Wendt in adding coercion into the societycommunity mix but not following him in treating coercion calculation and belief as mutually exclusive features In dealing with the howwhy dimension the English schools three traditions approach of assuming that all elements are always in play seems much more appropriate complementing the conclusion reached above pp 11828 that the three types of unit that compose society are likewise always in play to some degree With these qualifications figure 4 can thus build on the strength of Wendts insight that the issue of modedepth of internalisation applies across the whole range of types of international society Sticking with Wendts scheme as begun in figure 3 offers an interesting way of taking on board the societycommunity distinction It also has the advantage of separating out and bringing into clearer focus the question of what the shared values are that compose international and world societies This issue has major implications for the English schools pluralistsolidarist debate which has not investigated sufficiently the question of what the values are that can constitute solidarism and not really investigated at all how the issue of modedepth of internalisation bears on the under standing of solidarism More on this in chapter 5 Given the cumulative shifts and refinements of definition what do the traditional concepts of international and world society now represent The necessary revisions to figure 3 can be summarised and explained as follows 1 TheelevationviewrepresentingWendtsmodedepthofinternalisa tion remains the same and I stay with Wendts language for labelling the howwhy dimension As noted applying the howwhy classifica tions of coercion calculation and belief to interhuman and transna tional societies does not seem to pose any problems 2 The top half of the pie in plan view representing the what spectrum of types of international society remains the same subject to a change of label set out in point 4 below 132 Reimagining the English schools triad Interstate Societies Asocial Con Federative antian Solidarist Pluralist o esian Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION DEEP CALCULATION Interhuman Societies Transnational Societies Fragmented Pure Mediaevalism No TNAs Universal Identities Largescale Imagined Communities Coalitions of Like TNAs TNA Coalitions Across Type Competing TNAs BELIEF Figure 4 The Three Traditions third revision a social structural reinterpretation of the English schools triad 3 The bottom half of the pie previously representing world society gets cut into two quarters representing the distinct domains within the scheme occupied by individuals and TNAs This returns to an approximation of the original English school triad but now based on type of unit and linked by the common substrate of the howwhy dimension The three domains are now separated by the hard bound aries resulting from defining them in terms of different types of constitutive unit They are not a spectrum as the three traditions of the classical English school model were generally taken to be Mayall 2000 13 Consequently interest shifts from what defines 133 From International to World Society these borders now clear to how the three domains as so consti tuted interact with each other Because the boundaries are hard no significance now attaches to the placement of the interhuman and transnational segments of the pie they could be reversed or perhaps even better given as three separate selfcontained circles The key English school idea that the three traditions are understood to be simultaneously in play is preserved but now on the grounds that social formations involving the three types of unit are always ex pected to be present in international systems to some degree At a minimum each domain in the triad constitutes part of the operating environment for the other two At a maximum conditions in one do main may determine what options are possible in the others more on this below Although the triadic structure is restored the do mains no longer represent equal proportions of the pie as they did in figures 1 and 2 This might be thought to privilege the state over the other two and if so that would be consistent with the arguments on pp 918 for doing so It might also be thought to diminish the place of the state because in figures 1 and 2 the statebased elements oc cupied twothirds of the pie international system and international society and that thought is also justified In the background of the relationship amongst these three domains is Vincents 1988 210 sharp observation that authority must reside somewhere if order is to obtain anywhere 4 In figure 4 the three domains represent pure or ideal type forms of society based on different constitutive units as discussed on pp 11828 To reflect this and also to underline the shift to defin ing the domains more clearly in terms of their constitutive units they are labelled interstate societies transnational societies and inter human societies Societies is given in the plural to reflect the point made in chapter 1 and followed up in chapter 7 below that in ternational and world societies are not just phenomena found on a global scale but also ones found simultaneously in regional and other subglobal forms Somewhat irritatingly society is used here in its general sense incorporating all types of social cohesion There is no obvious escape from the confusion caused by society carrying both this general meaning and the more specific one discussed at length above A key part of the argument in this book is that the elements that make up international society are not found only at the global level but also and simultaneously at a range of subglobal scales 134 Reimagining the English schools triad 5 As noted in point 2 the spectrum of interstate societies from figure 3 remains unchanged but there is a need to consider the detailed con tents of the what dimension for both transnational and interhuman societies As argued on pp 11828 the differentiation between in terhuman and transnational societies hinges on the distinction be tween primary and secondorder societies ie societies composed of groups of humans on the one hand and of groups of TNAs on the other The difficult bit in this distinction is that if interhuman soci eties achieve actor quality they become TNAs Interhuman societies are thus largely constructed in terms of shared identities with net works posing the main ambiguity about classification On this basis the what dimension of the interhuman pillar runs across a spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated In thinking about this one needs to start with the range of scales on which human identity groups occur The minimum interhuman society is the basic family clan unit necessary for reproduction In the middle of the range one finds large imagined communities such as nations religions and various kinds of functional networks These may be defined in such a way as to always or necessarily exclude some section of the human race such as Gemeinschaft concepts of nationalism or supporters of a particular football club or may be failed universalisms which in principle could include the whole human race but in practice act as dividers all universal religions and political ideologies At the maximum end of the spectrum would be universally shared identi ties which could vary from the minimum recognition by all humans of each other as likeunits paralleling pluralism among states to the advent of a world civilisation linking all of humankind together in a complex web of shared values and elaborated identities In sim ple terms the spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated would represent the exclusive dominance of smallscale groups on one end and the exclusive dominance of a universal identity on the other But since humans in more complex societies generally hold multiple identities this spectrum cannot in the real world represent a spectrum of staged mutually exclusive positions All or at least many will exist simultaneously The minimum position will always exist The maximum universalist one may or may not exist but if it does it will not eliminate the ones in the rest of the spectrum Therefore the spectrum from highly fragmented to highly integrated will almost always represent a complex mixture the most interest ing question being whether anything at all exists towards the highly 135 From International to World Society integrated end of the spectrum and if it does how strong it is and how deeply rooted Again to reiterate because the boundaries are now hard no significance attaches to the placing of Fragmented next to Asocial or Universal Identities next to No TNAs The question of how to characterise the what dimension for a pure transnational society is a more consciously artificial exercise because as argued above pure transnational societies are rather difficult to imagine Easiest is to start thinking in terms of a weaktostrong spec trum of global civil society defined in terms of TNAs At one end of the spectrum it is perfectly easy to imagine an international sys tem in which no TNAs existed though historical examples of this might be difficult to find The requirement would be a domineer ing interstate society in which the states either suppressed nonstate actors altogether or contained them tightly each within its own bor ders Next would come fragmented transnational societies in which similar types of TNAs build up shared norms rules institutions and identities among themselves In the middle of the spectrum one wouldfindcoalitionsinvolvinglinksamongdifferenttypesofTNAs such as one often finds in peace movements that tie together pure peace groups with religious political and trade union organisations At the strong end would be a kind of pure transnational neome dievalism in which many different types of TNAs recognised each other on the basis of principles of functional differentiation amongst the different types of units and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of unit in relation to each other As already argued in this scheme each domain is at a minimum part of the operating environment of the other two but is there any more systematic relationship among the three domains Notwithstanding the widespread tendency to privilege the state the three are ontologically distinct Both TNAs and states can reproduce themselves in the absence or presence of the other and being collective units they are distinct from individuals But it does not require much hard thinking to show that the societies formed by each type of unit quite quickly begin to play into each other Although it is true that patterns of shared identity among human beings can and do occur on large scales the historical record shows pretty clearly that the creation of the larger imagined com munities such as nations and religions depended heavily on states and TNAs to promote them the Christian churches the later Roman Empire the Abassid Caliphate etc And while it is possible to imagine states 136 Reimagining the English schools triad and TNAs being composed of entirely atomised human individuals the historical record again makes abundantly clear that the developmental potential of both states and TNAs is closely linked to their ability to in tegrate themselves with the shared identity of the people who compose them As Ahrne 1998 89 notes How to make people participate with a moral enthusiasm and at the same time follow orders and rules is in fact a common problem in much organisation theory Obsession with nationalism as the key to linking the three domains is very evident in the attempt common to both IR and political theory and very much alive in the mythology of modernist realworld politics to tie the human sense of shared identitycommunity into the state But as many postmod ernists and globalists of various stripes celebrate and as increasingly acknowledged even in realpolitik circles postCold War there is a new world disorder defined by the degree to which interhuman identities whether kinship ethnonational religious politicalideological cultural or epistemic have spilled out of state containers often with the encour agement of the state though frequently also against its will World his tory with its migrations of peoples and its comings and goings of states and empires has bequeathed humankind a thoroughly mixed condition in which there are both strong overlaps and strong disjunctures between the interhuman and interstate social structures If one blends TNAs into this picture it is clear that the interesting question is less about idealtype transnational societies and mostly about how TNAs relate to the society of states The main development at present is the trend for TNAs to form functional networks among them selves the Bank for International Settlements BIS the International Political Science Association IPSA the International Chess Federation FIDE the European Roundtable business CEOs and innumerable others representing everything from football clubs to trade unions But this trend is less interesting as a study of pure transnational societies than it is as a study of the interplay between the transnational domain and the interstate one The least imaginitive and most politicised way of formulating this relationship is in zerosum terms where gains for one equal losses for the other and the outcome has to be the elimina tion or subordination of one by the other RisseKappen 1995a 313 Much more relevant is to ask how these two domains of human soci ety are redefining each other and what problems and potentialities this development opens up That enquiry takes us away from the mostly static definitional con ceptualisings of society that have occupied this chapter and towards the 137 From International to World Society question of social dynamics and the forces that drive change and evo lution in international social structures I will have more to say about these driving forces in the chapters that follow These questions take us beyond the limits of this chapter To address them one needs to look more closely both at what difference is made by variations in the howwhy dimension across the different types of society and at how the institutions of international society relate to each other To get at this one needs first to look more closely at the questions encompassed in the pluralistsolidarist debate Just what are the kinds of shared values and identities that qualify for movement across the spectrum of types of interstate society This will be done in chapters 5 and 6 Second one needs to look at the geographical dimension If the assumption that international and world society have to be global is abandoned and subglobal levels of society are brought into the picture then there can be no single answer to how interhuman transnational and interstate societies interact with each other at any given point in time and re gional differentiation emerges as a key driving force for change This will be the subject of chapter 7 Astute readers will also have noticed that the terms international society and world society are not present in figure 4 Do these key terms of classical English school usage disappear in a more structural interpretation or if not how are they to be de ployed This question too is best left until we have looked more closely at the pluralistsolidarist debate In the meantime I will use the three terms developed in this chapter interhuman transnational interstate when I want to confine the meaning to a specific domain and the two traditional terms when referring to usage within the existing English school debates 138 5 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate On the basis of the arguments in chapter 4 and the progressive revisions to the English schools three pillars I can now return to the pluralist solidarist debate In chapter 2 I argued that pluralism and solidarism should be understood not as mutually exclusive positions but as positions on a spectrum representing respectively thin and thick sets of shared norms rules and institutions The basic differentiation between thin and thick was qualified by some discussion about the nature of the values shared with pluralism associated with rules about coexis tence and solidarism potentially extending much beyond that I used Bulls ideas about rules of cooperation and the centrality of positive in ternational law to question the reasons behind his pluralism arguing that these can be seen also as a powerful key to an understanding of solidarism wider than the one Bull himself employed I argued against basing solidarism on cosmopolitanism because that approach confines its meaning to a narrow band largely occupied by human rights and therefore excludes much that is of great empirical and theoretical sig nificance to the concept I also argued for allowing solidarism to be a feature of interstate societies and not using it as a vehicle to imply some necessary conflation between international and world society In this chapter I want to pick up these arguments and examine them in more detail Since pluralism already has a fairly welldeveloped image I will concentrate particularly on solidarism the content of which has not been explored in anything like the same depth The debate about pluralism and solidarism is absolutely central to English school theory andhowthedebateisconstructedmakesabigdifferencetowhatcanand cannot be done with the theory In this chapter the initial focus will be on pluralism and solidarism as the key to defining types of interstate society This approach opens the way not only to the economic sector but also 139 From International to World Society brings in other features of solidarism for which substantial empirical referents can be found It also turns ones attention to the question of the institutionsofinternationalsocietywhichwillbethesubjectofchapter6 Classical English school writing discusses a set of pluralist institutions without offering much either in the way of criteria for distinguishing what does and what does not count as an institution in this sense or thoughts about how the institutions of international society change One way of cutting through the complexities of the pluralist solidarist debate is to say that pluralism is what happens when pes simistsrealistsconservatives think about international society and solidarism is what happens when optimistsidealistsliberals do so There is an element of truth in this view but it is problematic for one big reason pessimistic and optimistic evaluations do not arise only as a result of the predispositions of certain charactertypes They can arise also as a result of how the things being evaluated are themselves de fined and interpreted As I hope to show in what follows thinking more carefully about what pluralism and solidarism mean changes the basis on which they are evaluated The detailed discussions of pluralism and solidarism in chapter 2 and in this chapter are thus necessary It matters how things are defined If one accepts the thinthick characterisation of pluralism solidarism developed in chapter 2 then the way forward in this enquiry is to first focus on developing an understanding of solidarism in inter state society and then ask how this might relate to the interhuman and transnational domains Recall that if one accepts the argument that all of international relations is social that enemies is just as much a social structure as rivals or friends then the term interstate society covers a wide spectrum of phenomena ranging from Hobbesian social structures on one end to Kantian at the other In this perspective the debate about pluralism and solidarism can be seen largely as a debate about types of interstate society with pluralism representing a Westphalian model and solidarism covering a swath of the spectrum from pluralismplus through Kantianism homogenous state domestic structures on liberal lines to the fringes of federation at which point the international dissolves into a single polity Thinking along these lines might be con strued as picking up Mannings 1962 165 idea of international society as a game of letsplaystates What are the constitutive rules of the game of states at the very least sovereignty territoriality diplomacy and how many basic variations within the pluralistsolidarist spec trum do these rules allow of the way in which the game can be played 140 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Where are the boundaries beyond which one is playing a game other than states Does the pursuit of solidarism eventually depart from the game of states and become some other game empire cosmopolitanism federation In the discussion of solidarism in chapter 2 some quite different interpretations were in play Some perhaps most notably Linklater understand solidarism as a specifically liberal linkage between state sovereignty and individual rights The link to human rights has played particularly strongly in English school thinking about solidarism In Vincent Bull Mayall Jackson and others one finds cosmopolitanism as the key to solidarism and for Bull also one finds the question of provi sions for enforcement Suganami 2002 13 sees the pluralistsolidarist debate as differing judgments about the extent of solidarity or potential solidarity in international society and I want to make explicit the cri teria for differentiating judgements At the risk of stating the obvious solidarism rests on the idea of solidarity which implies not only that a unity of interests and sympathies exists amongst a set of actors but that this unity is of a type sufficient to generate capability for collective ac tion Two ideas are the key to unlocking the full meaning of solidarism shared values and the use of these to support collective action In chapter 2 I argued that solidarism was crudely about the number of shared values with many possible candidates for what those values might be But there was already a hint in that argument that the type of values coexistence or cooperation was also a factor in the pluralist solidarist distinction In order to tease out this argument further it helps to investigate three questions about solidarism 1 What type of values if shared count as solidarist 2 Does it make any difference to the question of solidarism how and why any given values are shared 3 What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them These questions have so far only been addressed indirectly if at all in the pluralistsolidarist debate They need to be examined in their own right In one sense they can be seen as asking where the border is between pluralism and solidarism At what point and by what criteria does an interstate society move from being pluralist to solidarist Pluralist in terstate societies are easy to visualise Pluralism generally stands for the familiar Westphalian model based on mutual recognition of sovereignty 141 From International to World Society and nonintervention This model is widely used in both realist and En glish school writing and has easy referents in much modern European and world history Science fiction also registers here One of the things that lifts the universe of Star Trek above its asocial compatriots in the genre from War of the Worlds to Independence Day and Starship Troopers is its development of a pluralist galactic interstate society with diplomacy alliances rules of nonintervention the prime directive and suchlike Neumann 2001 Contemplating solidarist interstate societies puts one on less familiar ground The classic English school thinkers have not much developed this image except in terms of human rights and those who have tried most notably Vincent quickly cross the border into world society by bringing in TNAs and individuals Yet it is a useful discipline to start by confining the exploration of solidarism to interstate societies The most obvious example of a solidarist interstate society that we have albeit only as a subsystem is the EU and the English school has only just be gun to engage with this regional development Diez and Whitman 2000 Manners 2002 If one accepts the argument from chapter 2 that positive international law is the key to interstate society then there is scope for a progressive development of interstate society in which the states work out agreed norms rules and institutions covering various functional areassuchastradefinancepropertyrightshumanrightspollutionand health and safety standards standards of calibration and measurement and suchlike The EU example suggests that progressive solidarism of this sort must necessarily involve major parallel developments in the transnational and interhuman domains and that the liberal version of interstate society as international society is certainly one possibility But it is not the only possibility One could imagine for example an in terstate society that is solidarist in the sense of being based on a high degree of ideological uniformity but where the shared values are na tionalist rather than liberal In such circumstances governments might well develop a quite solidarist interstate society based on their shared view of the political ideal while still also agreeing that each had the right and the duty to develop and foster its own distinctive national culture insulated from the others Intimations of a benign nationalist scenario along these lines can be found in Herz 1950 For theory purposes it is important to keep open the idea of solidarism as something that can happen purely within state systems interstate societies without ne cessarily requiring the spillovers into the interhuman and transnational domains that inevitably at some point become a feature of the liberal 142 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate vision of solidarism As I will show later starting out with the focus on interstate societies is crucial to the subsequent move of asking how developments in the interstate domain relate to those in the interhuman and transnational domains What type of values if shared count as solidarist Since the image of pluralism is relatively clear and since pluralism is the foundation on which solidarism has to be built it makes a good place to start thinking about the criteria that distinguish solidarism from plu ralism Much of the writing about pluralism stresses the centrality of rules of coexistence as the essence of what pluralist international so cieties are about with Jackson 2000 providing perhaps the strongest statement Because it privileges tolerance of difference coexistence is a relatively undemanding social goal One of its enduring attractions is that almost however understood it does not threaten the constitutive rules of the game of states Pluralism does not require moving much beyond the raw selfcentredness and selfinterest of egoistic sovereign actors only that they recognise that their own survival and selfinterest can be enhanced by agreeing some basic rules with the other actors in the system Pluralist international societies thus encompass the first two of Bulls three types of rules discussed in chapter 2 constitutive prin ciples agreed as a society of states rather than a universal empire or a cosmopolitan community or and rules of coexistence which hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements Taken together these provide the basis for Bulls conception of the institutions of classical European international society diplomacy international law the bal ance of power war and the role of great powers to which should cer tainly be added sovereigntynonintervention Sovereignty is the des ignator of property rights and the basis for rules of recognition and its corollary nonintervention sets the basic frame for political relations As James 1999 468 puts it sovereignty is the constitutive principle of interstate relations The balance of power war and the role of the great powers are about how the system is managed to put some limits on violence Diplomacy and international law are about communica tion negotiation and the sanctity of agreements These institutions all play into each other and as Mayall 2000 94 notes international law is the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or falls This classical view of the institutions of international 143 From International to World Society society pretty much sums up the modern European historical expe rience of a pluralist interstate society seeking order through rules of coexistence I will return to the question of the institutions of international soci ety in chapter 6 but at this point one has to ask whether the classical portrait of pluralism just given represents the maximum that pluralism can encompass without spilling over into solidarism In other words how far does the logic of coexistence stretch Bulls 1977a 6771 for mulation wants to draw a line between constitutive rules and rules of coexistence on the one hand and rules of cooperation on the other defining the latter 1977a 70 as prescribing behaviour that is appro priate not to the elementary or primary goals of international life but rather to those more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence As noted in chapter 2 Bulls rules of cooperation suggest one way of defining solidarism by drawing the line between it and pluralisms limitation to rules of coex istence Alas even a brief reflection on the modern history of pluralist interstate society suggests that Bulls distinction between rules of coex istence and rules of cooperation is too problematic to serve as the way of distinguishing between pluralist and solidarist interstate societies The unquestionably pluralist and mainly European interstate society ofthelaternineteenthcenturyforexamplewasdistinctiveforsettingup the first wave of intergovernmental organisations IGOs These aimed mostly at smoothing technical interoperability between states and peo ples the Universal Postal Union the International Telecommunications Union the International Bureau of Weights and Measures and suchlike These would certainly have to count as rules of cooperation fitting with the idea of more advanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society in which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence Yet they also seem in essence to be about coexistence Like diplomacy they are about redu cing unnecessary frictions and inefficiencies in the intercourse of states and peoples They do not threaten sovereignty and they do not repre sent any substantial collective project at odds with a pluralist structure One can see the presentday equivalent of these more advanced arrange ments of coexistence in the bodies that allocate radio frequencies and orbital slots for geostationary satellites Such arrangements like their nineteenthcentury precursors reflect the pursuit of coexistence in a more technically advanced environment 144 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Examples of state behaviour from the Cold War suggest that the principle of coexistence might even be pushed into rules about deal ing with shared dangers and common fates Given the lamenting in English school classics about the deterioration of international society resulting from the Cold War rivalry of the superpowers there can be little doubt that the interstate society of that time at least at the global level counted as pluralist or even subpluralist Hobbesian Yet the US and the Soviet Union were able to sustain a dialogue and establish a significant array of norms rules and institutions in areas where their fates were linked and they saw common dangers The whole process of detente between them rested on a dialogue about arms control and the need to avoid unstable military configurations and unwanted cri sis escalations A limited amount of inspection was eventually allowed though this issue was always deeply controversial So even between en emies fear of nuclear war made it possible to establish quite extensive cooperation around a shared interest in survival adding its own nuance to the meaning of coexistence It is not difficult to imagine other such grounds for cooperation for example in response to a clear and present global environmental danger for which countermeasures were within reach The measures taken to preserve the ozone layer fall comfortably within a logic of coexistence where the emphasis is on measures ne cessary to maintain the conditions of existence for the members of the society All such developments would be compatible with a pluralist in ternational society committed to preserving its differences and taking a hard view of sovereignty and nonintervention So perhaps would the array of cooperations observed by those neoliberal institutionalists who work with rational choice theory and seek to derive the logic of inter national cooperation from the calculations of egoistic actors in pursuit of their own selfinterest Milner 1997 Snidal 1993 Under pluralism coexistence is rooted in the selfinterest of the states composing interstate society Selfinterest certainly stretches to cooper ation in pursuit of a livable international order but it keeps the focus on differences among the states and does not require that they agree on anything beyond the basics or that they hold any common values other than an interest in survival and the avoidance of unwanted disorder It nevertheless needs to be noted that pluralism does not exclude the mem bers of interstate society from sharing a degree of common identity The institution of sovereignty serves as a kind of bottom line for shared iden tity inasmuch as the states are required to recognise each other as being the same type of entity with the same legal standing Buzan 1993 But 145 From International to World Society classical European interstate society also shared a conception of itself as Christendom or la grande republique and the idea that a shared culture of some sort was if not necessary then extremely helpful in underpinning interstate society is a commonplace in the WightWatson historical side of English school thinking Pluralism therefore does not rule out an element of community States in a pluralist society may share a weak common identity as the Europeans shared Christendom and as the Atlantic states currently share the idea of being Western They may well use this primarily to differentiate themselves from nonmembers as when nineteenthcentury Europeans defined themselves as civilised and others as barbarian or savage and now when the West defines itself as the first world in distinction from various second third and fourth worlds But this useful differentiation between us and them does not stop the members of a pluralist interstate society from construct ing strong differentiations among themselves In Europe this was done first in terms of rival monarchs and raison detat and later and more notoriously in terms of a social Darwinist reading of nationalism If neither shared identity nor Bulls rules of cooperation provide the key to differentiating pluralism from solidarism what does Obviously one cannot go on stretching the meaning of coexistence forever Just as obviously solidarism almost certainly builds on the foundations laid down by pluralism or at least must do so in its early and middle stages whatever it might evolve into in its more advanced forms At least some of Bulls essentially Westphalian institutions can easily be envisaged as operating in and contributing to a solidarist interstate society most obviously diplomacy and international law but also great power man agement and war The portrait of pluralism painted above suggests two principles on which a departure into solidarism might be constructed Both could be added to coexistence yet both also move away from the key defining qualities of pluralism 1 States might abandon the pursuit of difference and exclusivity as their main raison dˆetre and cultivate becoming more alike as a con scious goal One might expect that there would be a correlation on the one hand between solidarism and a substantial degree of homogeneity amongst the domestic constitutions of the members and on the other between diversity in the domestic constitutions of members and pluralism 2 States might acknowledge common values among them that go be yond survival and coexistence and which they agree to pursue by 146 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate coordinating their policies undertaking collective action creating appropriate norms rules and organisations and revising the insti tutions of interstate society The first of these principles reflects a Kantian logic of convergence The second is suggested by Mayalls 2000 21 idea of an enterprise association that exists to pursue substantive goals of its own Mayall clearly thinks that pursuing substantive goals of its own transcends an understanding of pluralism as based on coexistence and I imagine most pluralists would agree He links this idea to cosmopolitanism but that link is not necessary to the idea and in what follows I will take it as being only one among several possibilities underpinning solidarism In practice convergence and pursuit of a joint project will often overlap sometimes substantially but this overlap is not a necessary one for all possible scenarios For convergence among states to move into the realm of solidarism it would have to grow beyond the basic acknowledgement among them that they are all the same type of sovereign entity which is the base line of pluralism This additional commonality might be thought of as a conscious move towards greater homogeneity in domestic structures and values among a set of states It might be a Kantian community of liberaldemocracies as most existing discussions of solidarism pre suppose Or it might equally be a community of communist peoples republics or Islamic states or monarchies or any other form of ideolog ical standardisation It is essential for a sound theoretical development of solidarism to keep these nonliberal options open The human rights focus of most solidarist writing has obscured them from view and gen erated a too narrow and too controversial understanding of what sol idarism is about I do not include here the cultivation of instrumental commonalities such as all landlocked states or all developing countries Those can occur under pluralism as a matter of forming alliances on particular issues Convergence in the sense necessary for solidarism has to involve a deeper sort of wefeeling It has to involve a package of values that is associated not just with belonging to the same civilisation which was true for the states of classical pluralist Europe but also with a substantial degree of convergence in the norms rules institutions and goals of the states concerned Pluralism is abandoned when states not only recognise that they are alike in this sense but see that a significant degree of similarity is valuable and seek to reinforce the security and legitimacy of their own values by consciously linking with others who 147 From International to World Society are likeminded building a shared identity with them Convergence in this sense begins to look like a form of community and in its stronger forms will involve acceptance of some responsibility for other mem bers of the community The literature on pluralist security communities Deutsch et al 1957 Adler and Barnett 1998 explores exactly this type of development Although convergence is still hard to find on a global scale on a sub global scale it shows up rather strongly The EU is a pretty advanced case of conscious convergence among states and many of its stresses and strains result from the continuous necessity of adjusting to this pro cess The socalled Atlantic community or in slightly wider form the West or the liberal democracies represent weaker but still significant instances of convergence around liberal democracy Outside the West one might see such bodies as the Arab League the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference as representing at least aspirations in this direction though mostly not backed up by much substance Even globally the picture is not entirely bleak Recall the argument made in chapter 2 about the apparent overdetermination of homogeneity of units in the international system If the many theories that point in this direction are right then the underpinnings of conver gence are built into the operation of interstate society in several different ways They may not yet have manifested their strength sufficiently to underpin any global solidarism but they might be given some credit for pushing things along to where the logic of likeunits is strong enough at least to support Coexistence forms of pluralism Indeed if homogenisa tion is overdetermined in the international system then it should work in favour both of solidarist society and international and world com munity But homogenisation is a tricky element in human affairs While it may serve as a necessary condition for the development of both so ciety and community it is not therefore a sufficient one Wendt 1999 3537 Groups of similar entities are prone to the notorious narcissism of small differences that afflicts everything from religious communities to academic associations and can lead to extreme social polarisations and violence Wendt tried to tackle the question of homogeneity by dis tinguishing two types isomorphic which he sees as similar to Waltzs idea of like units structural and functional similarity see Buzan and Little 1996 and ideological difference or not in the constitutive princi ples of political legitimacy But it is not clear why there are only these two since one could easily head the way of Rosenaus 1966 pretheory and the failed 1960s project of comparative foreign policy to construct 148 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate typologies of states This approach tends to be defeated by the huge number of significant variables on which states may or may not be alike Homogeneity emerges as a subject in need of much more thinking It could well be that increasing homogeneity amongst the dominant social units in the international system rather than the processes of globali sation is actually the main key to developments in international and world society But what kinds of likeness are crucial and how intense do they have to be The second principle on which an advance into solidarism can be constructed is that states might cooperate in one or more joint projects in pursuit of one or more common values Such projects can of course come in as many different forms as there are common values that might be taken up in this way And joint projects also raise the issue of enforce ment At the pluralist end of the spectrum where international society is thin collective enforcement of rules will be difficult and rare Towards the solidarist end where international society is thicker a degree of col lective enforcement in some areas might well become generally accepted and common Bulls original idea of seeing collective security as a form of solidarism certainly seems right But collective security usually comes attached to a universalist condition anything less than universal par ticipation is not true collective security but mere alliancemaking This definition sets an impossibly high standard and therefore contributed to pluralist pessimism and rejection of solidarism as utopian A softer understanding of collective security which allowed subglobal devel opments such as NATO opens up a more positive view Surely NATOs development of joint command structures and extensive interoperabil ity of forces not to mention its agreement that an attack on one shall be treated as an attack on all has a solidarist ring about it Jackson 2000 3515 The joint pursuit of human rights is by far the bestdeveloped theme in the solidarist literature From Vincents 1986 146 call quoting Henry Kissinger that all governments should accept the removal of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition as the objective of the inter national community as a whole to Wheelers 2000 Knudsens 1999 and others calls for greater protection of human beings against violent abuse by their governments solidarists have campaigned both to pro mote the development of a human rights project by interstate society and to increase awareness that a legal basis for this is already emergent Weller 2002 700 Because it is heavily aspirational and promotional much of this literature depends on linking solidarism to supposedly 149 From International to World Society universalist cosmopolitan values As noted above pursuit of a human rights agenda raises difficult questions about ends and means that have not been adequately explored If observance of human rights has to be imposed on those who do not share belief in the value andor do not calculate observance of it as being to their advantage then one faces the problem that this project can in the short term only be expanded by coercive means Here as elsewhere solidarists cannot escape the dilemma apparent in the whole story of the expansion of international society that rules about a standard of civilisation are generally spread from a subglobal core by a mixture of means in which coercion is often prominent This problem is what animates the more extreme defenders of tolerant noninterventionist pluralism such as Jackson 2000 The universalist requirement also means that too little attention has been given to substantial solidarist developments on a subglobal scale for example in the EU As Jackson 2000 1767 points out environmentalism is another dis tinctive area for solidarist development The idea that states andor citizens should have trusteeship or stewardship of the planet itself is a value quite distinct from human rights As I have argued above ele ments of environmentalism can develop and have done so within the pluralist logic of coexistence But this agenda readily spills over into a much more ambitious collective project encompassing everything from the preservation of particular species and their environments to man agement of the planetary climate It could easily be argued that as with human rights the environmentalist agenda represents a leading aspir ational element of solidarism but also one in which not insignificant practical measures have already been accomplished eg restraints on trade in endangered species or products derived from them restraints on various types of pollution Collective security human rights and environmentalism still repre sent the aspirational more than the empirical side of solidarism a cam paign for collective selfimprovement of the human condition There have been some practical developments but these are small in relation to what most solidarists would like to see What strikes me as pecu liar is the way in which the focus on human rights has resulted in the almost complete ignoring of two other areas in which real solidarist de velopments have been most spectacular the pursuit of joint gain and the pursuit of knowledge It is long past time to begin repairing the English schools neglect of the economic sector The most obvious exemplar of solidarism in the 150 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate pursuit of joint gains lies in liberal understandings of how to organise the economic sector In order to realise joint gains a liberal interna tional economy has to be organised around a host of rules about trade property rights legal process investment banking corporate law and suchlike Unless states can cooperate to liberalise trade and finance so liberal theory goes they will remain stuck with lower levels of growth and innovation higher costs and lower efficiencies than would other wise be the case In order to realise these gains states have both to open their borders and coordinate their behaviours in selected but systematic ways In other words they have to agree to homogenise their domestic structures in a number of quite central respects Over the past half century this has in fact been done to a quite remarkable degree though still short of what the more strident neoliberals continue to demand Al though initially subglobal this development of solidarism is now nearly global in extent What is more it is held in place by an elaborate mix ture of belief calculation and coercion and displays all the complexities of thickness surveyed below see pp 1547 These qualities make it an ideal case study for both the what and the howwhy of solidarism in action and provide excellent leverage on the question of instability in solidarist arrangements The liberal economic project even includes some significant enforcement measures thus meeting the hard test of willingness to support the collective enforcement of international law that was one of Bulls 1966a 52 benchmarks for solidarism There is a pressing need for the English school to bring its perspective to bear on the work in IPE Also neglected is the collective pursuit of knowledge again an area in which the actual record of solidarist achievement is quite impressive International cooperation in big science projects such as physics as tronomy and space exploration now has a substantial record from the multinational projects to pursue highenergy physics through global coordination of astronomical observations to innumerable joint space probes and the international space station Some of this lies in the transnational domain but a great deal is interstate In contrast to the eco nomic sector coercion plays almost no role Belief not only in the pur suit of knowledge for its own sake but also in the means by which such knowledge can be pursued is sufficiently widespread in the world to underpin cooperation motivated by belief and the calculation of joint gain It is worth noting that this kind of joint project is highly constrained under pluralism where it might cut too closely to concerns about tech nologies with military applications 151 From International to World Society All of these joint projects threaten sovereignty if it is defined in strict pluralist terms As the solidarists have long recognised in relation to hu man rights such projects require states to redefine how their sovereignty and their boundaries operate and this is what differentiates solidarist societies from pluralist ones Does it make any difference to solidarism how and why any given values are shared Since pluralism is rooted in the survival instincts and selfinterests of states it does not raise serious questions about either what values are shared or how and why they are shared If there are shared values they will either be instrumental technical ones such as those to do with com munication and common standards or ones closely related to survival questions such as those associated with arms control or environmental management Solidarism by contrast rests on the idea that states share values that are beyond concerns about survival and coexistence and sig nificant enough to underpin the pursuit of joint projects andor conver gence For solidarism therefore the twin questions of what values are shared and how and why they are shared become central Because the pluralistsolidarist debate got hung up on the particular issue of human rights the English school has not investigated sufficiently the question of what the range of values is that can constitute solidarism and not confronted directly the difficult questions about the binding forces that underpin shared values Given both the background of English school work on the expansion of international society and the particular na ture of the human rights issue this neglect is surprising The general history about how a European interstate society became a global one is a story in which persuasion and conversion played some role but coercion was the main engine by which a standard of civilisation was imposed Gong 1984 Bull and Watson 1984a As noted in chapter 4 see pp 98108 similar though usually less militarised coercive practices continue today and the war against Iraq in 2003 could easily be read as old style coercive imposition of a standard of civilisation The human rights issue likewise features coercion Solidarists would prefer it if all states came around to accepting the values of human rights But they do not shy away from advocating military intervention on hu manitarian grounds and they advocate making recognition of sovereign rights conditional on observance of a human rights standard of civilisa tion rooted in cosmopolitan values Wheeler 2000 288310 Solidarists 152 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate therefore cannot avoid confronting the double normative implication inherent in their stance of human rights advocacy Moral questions arise not only in relation to what values are shared but also in relation to how and why they are shared In its bluntest form the moral issue here is whether it is right to use bad means coercion to impose observance of good values human rights In principle this moral dualism applies to any shared values that might define the what dimension of solidarism explored above pp 14352 As Hurrell 2002a 149 argues the decline of consentbased adherence to international society gives rise to tensions between sets of rules that seek to moderate amongst different values and those that seek to promote and enforce a single set of universal values Recall the discussion from chapter 4 of Wendts degrees and modes of internalisation coercion calculation and belief and how these were incorporated as the howwhy dimension in figure 4 Wendts insight is that the different means by which social structures of any sort can be created and sustained do not determine the values defining the social structure In principle any type of social structure can be supported by any type of means The upshot of this argument is that one has to ask of any type of solidarist international society whether the shared values on display rest mainly on coercion calculation or belief SolidaristKantian social structures could be deeply internalised as a result of shared be lief in liberal principles andor they could be a result of instrumental calculations of advantage andor they could be a result of a coercive suzerain able and willing to impose its values on others If understood in terms of sustained patterns of behaviour solidarism is not necessarily about belief Hurrell 2002a 1434 opens the way to this interpretation with his argument that norms encompass both regularities of behaviour among actors and a prescriptive sense of what ought to be done But note the ambiguity of ought It seems to imply beliefs that differen tiate right from wrong in an ethical sense but could also be read in a more rational consequentialist mode of the need to respond to the imperatives of calculation or coercion you ought to behave properly or you will be punished In this view people share the value of human rights or economic liberalism or so long as they behave appropriately to the value and regardless of why they do so The key to solidarism is what values are shared not howwhy they are shared which will always be a mix of coercion calculation and belief Belief is the preferable form of solidarism but not the necessary one especially where solidarism is based on pursuit of joint gain The pursuit of joint 153 From International to World Society gains in the economic sector might be based in part on shared belief in the tenets of economic liberalism but its mainstay is more likely to be calculations of advantage and some weaker players will simply be coerced into going along The projection of a standard of civilisation will also rest on some mixture of coercion calculation and belief As the solidarist literature on human rights makes clear coercion is not ruled out in the pursuit of solidarist international society that the right values are observed is more important than howwhy they are observed Thus Wendts question about depth of internalisation is highly relevant for understanding solidarism Where solidarism is based mainly on belief it will be most durable Where based on calculation or coercion it will be much more vulnerable to changes of circumstance These variations in binding forces matter but they do not define what solidarism is What does thickness mean in terms of type and number of values shared and type and number of people andor states sharing them I have argued that pluralism and solidarism should be seen as a spec trum ranging from thin to thick in terms of the values shared amongst the states composing interstate society The implication in figure 4 was that relative thinness and thickness along these lines could be used to set benchmarks for demarcating progression from pluralist through soli darist to Kantian internationalsocieties As noted above this approach is in harmony with the several writers Almeida 2001 James 1993 Watson 1987 1512 who observe that even the most primitive international systems have some elements of international society in terms of shared norms rules institutions I share Almeidas 2002 understanding that pluralism and solidarism are not necessary opposites but can coexist The argument above pp 14352 suggested that qualitative factors to do with the type of shared value should be one criterion for judging the thinness or thickness of interstate societies Values relating to the survival and selfinterest of the states and to coexistence defined plu ralism and therefore thinness Values to do with convergence and the pursuit of joint projects defined solidarism and therefore thickness But if one accepts the general idea of a spectrum from thin to thick definedintermsofthetypeofvaluessharedthisstillleavessomeques tionsaboutwhatthinandthickmeanTheargumentabovepp1524 154 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate reinforced the primacy of what values are shared by making the case that the howwhy of shared values coercion calculation belief applies to all the types of values across the spectrum So the type of values shared does matter Since solidarism builds on pluralism it is also pretty easy to make the case that the number of shared values also matters Moving into the solidarist part of the spectrum will mean adding new values to those already accumulated under pluralism which could as explained above on the logic of coexistence encompass quite a wide range of coop eration It is not difficult to envisage that international societies pursuing convergence will pursue extensions in the number and type of values shared This still leaves the tricky questions of who holds the values and how strongly they do so When one says that a state shares a given value with other states what does this mean At a minimum it means that the present leadership of that state holds that value At a maximum it means that the value is widely diffused throughout the elites and the mass of ordinary citizens In between lie innumerable configurations of contestation and indiffer ence The value may be strongly supported by one political party and its followers and strongly opposed by another and its supporters Or it may be widely supported among the elites but regarded with suspicion or hostility by a substantial part of the population the Davos culture versus the antiglobalisation movement If this pattern extends across state borders such that a set of ruling elites support a value but their citizens mostly oppose it one finds the grounds for tension between international and world society that so worries some English school writers As with the howwhy dimension discussed above variations of this kind will make a difference to the stability of international society opening up the possibility that even quite advanced seemingly soli darist international societies may in fact be quite fragile and vulnerable to sudden reversals because of domestic political changes in key coun tries Thus a value such as human rights or economic liberalism might be quite widely held if viewed simply as a matter of current government policy across a set of states but be fragile because of the way it is held within some or all of those states On top of who holds the value there is the additional question of how strongly those who hold it do so Any person can hold any value with a degree of commitment ranging from passionate and overrid ing to a rather mild and marginal acceptance One may hold oneself to be a Christian or a Japanese or a Manchester United supporter or 155 From International to World Society whatever with a strength positioned anywhere on this spectrum Some values most notably fundamentalist religion and hypernationalism are associated with attempts to cultivate a single overriding commit ment Others will usually be found in an array of overlapping beliefs the famous layers of postmodern identity ranging from member of the human race to supporter of local football team This question is not the same as Wendts one about modedepth of internalisation though the two may interact with each other Belief may range from overriding to mild It is easy to find for example fanatical Christians or Muslims or whose whole lives revolve almost entirely around their religious beliefs and Muslims or for whom their faith is still belief but of a very background sort It is also the case that coercion might in duce a high degree of conforming behaviour in some individuals and only very superficial conforming in others a spectrum that could be ob served in relation to communist ideology in what during the Cold War were called the Eastern European states Although not the same as the howwhy dimension this variable also affects the stability of a solidarist international society One useful perspective on this question of how strongly values are held can be found in the special issue of International Organization on legalisation 2000 543 see also Ratner 1998 The argument there is that legalisation of international agreements among states varies on a spectrum from soft to hard How soft or hard any particular arrange ment is depends on a combination of how binding its terms are on the participants how precise the terms of the agreement are in terms of prescriptions and proscriptions on behaviour and how much power is delegated by the signatories to institutions or third parties to mon itor manage and enforce the terms Goldstein et al 2000 Abbott et al 2000 The argument is that soft and hard legalisations do not neces sarily correlate with soft badweak and hard goodstrong Soft legalisation is better for some kinds of circumstances hard for others Abbott and Snidal 2000 This approach gives a nice insight into the thickness or thinness of institutionalisation Another useful perspective is Krasners 1999 44 spectrum of hightolow conformity with princi ples and norms Adding in the variables of how many shared values held by who and how strongly held and how legalised makes the question of thinthick quite complicated It is easy to imagine many combinations and permu tations that could present themselves as solidarist in terms of the type and number of values shared amongst states These would vary not 156 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate only as regards the particular character and number of values shared but also in terms of how widely and deeply they were shared within and therefore between the states concerned A solidarist interstate society might hinge mainly on shared values to do with economics or mainly on human rights These values might be held widely or narrowly andor strongly or weakly What this scope for variation suggests is that degree of thinness or thickness of interstate society does not offer the type of simplification necessary for it to be theorised and used as a benchmark to define either causes or effects in formal theory The possible vari ance within any given position on the spectrum requires that cases be looked at individually and analyses made according to the particular balance of these factors within them There is scope here for comparative method What this discussion of thinness and thickness most usefully reveals is that analysts of interstate society need to focus as much on the stability of sets of shared values among states as on what the shared values are Krasner199944comesclosetothiswithhisdiscussionofthedurability of institutions the degree to which they change with change of circum stance Recall that what values are held is not affected by the howwhy dimension Wendts modedepth of internalisation Especially when one is dealing with societies of states this variable has to be considered separately It is entirely possible to envisage interstate societies that in a daytoday operational sense share a sufficient number and type of val ues additional to coexistence to count as solidarist but that are largely held together by coercion and calculation The former Soviet bloc gives the flavour as do some of the great empires of history Adding to this howwhy argument the thinthick issues raised here make the stability of interstate societies a separate question from their degree of advance ment in terms of a pluralistsolidarist spectrum Any given interstate society will be more stable to the extent that its shared values are inter nalised more by belief than by calculation or coercion are held broadly rather than narrowly within states do not inspire widespread andor substantial opposition within the state and are held strongly rather than weakly by those who do hold them It will be less stable to the extent that its shared values are internalised more by coercion than by calculation or belief are held narrowly within the states attract widespread andor substantial opposition within the state and are held weakly by those who do hold them Crucial to the stability or not of any interstate society as a whole will be whether these things are true within and between the leading powers 157 From International to World Society Conclusions Whether or not people agree with the interpretation I have put on the pluralistsolidarist debate in this chapter I hope it at least challenges them to make their own positions clearer and provides a benchmark against which to do so I hope I have demonstrated that although sol idarism may be linked to cosmopolitanism the link is not a necessary one and pretending that it is has large costs in terms of how solidarism is understood I hope also to have made a strong case that pluralism and solidarism can be used to think about societies of states and that they are best cast as defining the basis for a typology of interstate societies All I have done here is to establish that solidarism does not necessarily have to be seen as a mixture of international and world society This move opens up analytical space for a range of nonliberal solidarisms Certain mainly liberal forms of solidarism will automatically involve extensions of rights responsibilities and recognitions to individuals and TNAs and thus tie together interstate interhuman and transnational so ciety in important ways But some will not Those campaigning in the name of solidarism need to be aware that they are advocating a partic ular type of solidarist international society and not solidarism per se They also need to add to their concerns about what values are shared an equal concern with those variables that affect the stability of solidarist international societies how and why are values shared by whom how strongly and with what degree of opposition Taking all this into consideration figure 4 requires some further re vision First pluralism and solidarism need to be repositioned so that they define the spectrum of types of interstate society rather than being positions within it as they are in figures 14 This move reflects the con clusion that solidarism is determined largely by the type of value shared and within that the number of values shared It allows for the idea that solidarism at least initially builds on pluralism to become pluralism plus but can then develop into a variety of thicker versions Second having withdrawn pluralism and solidarism from the role of identify ing only two types of international society I relabel the spectrum with a set of benchmark positions identifying types of interstate society At this point it seems appropriate to abandon the English schools and Wendts tradition of linking types of interstate society to iconic political theo rists Tying types of interstate society to Hobbes Locke Grotius and Kant has some appeal but it is fundamentally Westerncentric and for nonWestern cases easily gets in the way Instead I will adopt a set of 158 Reconstructing the pluralistsolidarist debate Interstate Societies Asocial Confederative Plan View What Dimension Elevation View HowWhy Dimension ModeDepth of Internalisation SHALLOW COERCION DEEP CALCULATION Interhuman Societies Transnational Societies Fragmented Pure Mediaevalism No TNAs Universal Identities Largescale Imagined Communities Coalitions of Like TNAs TNA Coalitions Across Type Competing TNAs Convergence Cooperative Coexistence Power Political Pl ur ali st S ol id ar is t BELIEF Figure 5 The Three Traditions fourth revision repositioning the pluralist and solidarist spectrum more neutral functionally based labels These changes are set out in figure 5 The new set of positions along the spectrum of interstate societies can be summarised as follows r Asocial is confined to the rather rare condition found mostly in science fiction where the only contact between states is wars of extermination unaccompanied by diplomacy or any other form of social contact r Power political represents here much the same as Hobbesian does for Wendt and the traditional English schools international system pil lar namely an international society based largely on enmity and the 159 From International to World Society possibility of war but where there is also some diplomacy alliance making and trade Survival is the main motive for the states and no values are necessarily shared Institutions will be minimal mostly confined to rules of recognition and diplomacy r Coexistence occupies some of the zone taken by Wendts 1999 27997 uncomfortably broad Lockean category focusing on the exemplar of modern Europe and meaning by it the kind of Westphalian system in which the core institutions of international society are the balance of power sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power manage ment war and international law In the English school literature this form is labelled pluralist and incorporates the realist side of Grotian r Cooperative requires developments that go significantly beyond coexis tence but short of extensive domestic convergence It incorporates the more solidarist side of what the English school calls Grotian but might come in many guises depending on what type of values are shared and howwhy they are shared Probably war gets downgraded as an institution and other institutions might arise to reflect the solidarist joint projects more on this in chapter 6 r Convergence means the development of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar po litical legal and economic forms The range of shared values has to be wide enough and substantial enough to generate similar forms of government liberal democracies Islamic theocracies communist to talitarianisms and legal systems based on similar values in respect of such basic issues as property rights human rights and the rela tionship between government and citizens One would expect quite radical changes in the pattern of institutions of international society This definition makes clear the divorce of solidarism from cosmopoli tanism In a society of states the Kantian form of solidarism around liberal values identified by the English school and Wendt is one option but not the only one r Confederative defines the border zone between a solidarist interstate so ciety and the creation of a single political entity between anarchy and hierarchy in Waltzs terminology It is a convergence international so ciety with the addition of significant intergovernmental organisations EU model The idea that each of these types with the probable exception of asocial can be held in place by any mixture of coercion calculation and belief remains unchanged 160 6 The primary institutions of international society The debate about pluralism and solidarism leads into the question of the institutions of international society It seems safe to say that there will be a close relationship between where an international society is located on the pluralistsolidarist spectrum and either what type of in stitutions it has or how it interprets any given institution A number of authors have for example tracked the evolution of sovereignty re lating it inter alia to changes in the internal character of the dominant states Keohane 1995 ReusSmit 1997 Barkin 1998 Sørensen 1999 The concept of institutions is central to English school thinking for three reasons first because it fleshes out the substantive content of interna tional society second because it underpins what English school writers mean by order in international relations and third because the partic ular understanding of institutions in English school thinking is one of the main things that differentiates it from the mainstream rationalist neoliberal institutionalist study of international regimes Quite a bit has been written about the similarities and differences between the English school approach to institutions and that of regime theory Keohane 1988 Hurrell 1991 Evans and Wilson 1992 Buzan 1993 Wæver 1998 10912 Alderson and Hurrell 2000 There is general agreement that these two bodies of literature overlap at several points and that there is significant complementarity between them The essential differences are 1 regime theory is more focused on contemporary events while the English school has a mainly historical perspective 2 regime theory is primarily concerned with particular human constructed arrangements formally or informally organised Keo hane 1988 383 whereas the English school is primarily concerned with historically constructed normative structures Alderson and 161 From International to World Society Hurrell 2000 27 the shared culture elements that precede rational cooperation or what Keohane 1988 385 calls enduring fundamen tal practices which shape and constrain the formation evolution and demise of the more specific institutions Onuf 2002 labels this distinction as evolved versus designed institutions 3 CloselytiedtothepreviouspointisthattheEnglishschoolhasplaced a lot of emphasis on the way in which the institutions of interna tional society and its members are mutually constitutive To pick up Mannings metaphor of the game of states for the English school institutions define what the pieces are and how the game is played Regime theory tends to take both actors and their preferences as given and to define the game as cooperation under anarchy This difference is complemented and reinforced by one of method with regime theory largely wedded to rationalist method Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 and the English school resting on history normative political theory and international legal theory 4 regime theory has applied itself intensively to institutionalisation around economic and technological issues both of which have been neglected by the English school which has concentrated mainly on the politicomilitary sector 5 regime theory has pursued its analysis mainly in terms of actors pursuing selfinterest using the mechanisms of rational cooperation while the English school has focused mainly on common interests andsharedvaluesandthemechanismsofinternationalorderEvans and Wilson 1992 3379 6 de facto but not in principle regime theory has mainly studied sub global phenomena Its stockintrade is studies of specific regimes which usually embody a subset of states negotiating rules about some specific issue fishing pollution shipping arms control trade etc The English school has subordinated the subglobal to the sys temic level talking mainly about the character and operation of international society as a whole The fact that there are two schools of thought within mainstream IR not to mention others outside IR both claiming the concept of insti tutions is in itself a recipe for confusion Wæver 1998 10912 This situation is not helped by a pervasive ambiguity in what differentiates many of the associated concepts such as norms rules and principles The first section takes a brief look at the definitional problems with these concepts The second reviews how the concept of institutions is 162 The primary institutions of international society handled in the English school literature The third examines the con cept of institutions through the lenses of hierarchy and functionalism with a particular look at the distinction between constitutive and reg ulatory rules The fourth surveys the relationship between the range of institutions and the types of international society The fifth section concludes by reflecting on three questions the relationship if any be tween institutions in the English school sense and more materialist structuralinterpretationsofthesamephenomenaandthetwoquestions left hanging in chapter 4 one about how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other and the other about the fate of the concepts international and world society in my structural scheme Definitional problems The terms norms rules values and principles are scattered throughout the literature of both regime theory and the English school yet it is seldom clear what if anything differentiates them and in many usagestheyseeminterchangeableAllarelinkedbytheideathattheirex istence should shape expectations about the behaviour of the members of a social group But what are the differences among shared norms and shared values and shared principles Are norms and rules just shaded variations of the same thing Perhaps the bestknown attempt to con front this is Krasners 1983 2 see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 76971 definition of regimes as implicit or explicit principles norms rules and decisionmaking pro cedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations Principles are beliefs of fact causation and rectitude Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for ac tions Decisionmaking procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice This is quite helpful but does not really produce clear mutually exclu sive concepts There does not for example seem to be much difference between a principle understood as a belief of rectitude and a norm understood as behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations Principles might serve as general propositions from which rules can be deduced but inductive reasoning might also lead from rules to prin ciples Krasners distinction between norms and rules seems to hinge on the degree of formality Both aim to regulate behaviour and both 163 From International to World Society carry the sense that they are authoritative though neither can be seen as causal Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 767 In Krasners scheme norms feel more like the customs of a society with rules occupying the more for mal written possibly legal end of the spectrum Yet norms could also be written down and the general understanding of rules includes custom ary practices It is fundamentally unclear how or whether these two concepts can be disentangled The task is not made easier by Krasners opening move of declaring that all of these concepts can be implicit or explicit which weakens the basis for a distinction between norms and rules on grounds of degree of informality It is also unclear what the standing of decisionmaking procedures is in this scheme Identifying them as prevailing practices simply disguises the fact that they could be principles or norms or rules They do not seem to be something that falls outside the first three concepts Krasner does not mention values and this term is much more important in the English school literature than in the regime theory one A conventional understanding of val ues in the social sense is the moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social group Moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards easily embraces principles norms and rules The unavoidable entanglements among Krasners concepts perhaps explainwhythesetermsaresooftengroupedtogethernormsrulesand principles or norms rules and institutions Even Kratochwil 1989 10 uses rules norms and principles as synonyms and though he promises to distinguish them later in the book it is far from clear that he ever does so Despite the difficulties Krasners formulation does suggest some helpful distinctions that are worth keeping in mind The idea that norms represent the customary implicit end of the authoritative social regulation of behaviour and rules the more specific explicit end can often be useful and I will try to retain that sense when I use the terms separately The concept of institutions shares some of the ambiguities that attend rules In common usage institution can be understood either in quite specific terms as an organisation or establishment founded for a spe cific purpose or in more general ones as an established custom law or relationship in a society or community Hanks 1986 As noted above these different meanings play strongly into what distinguishes English school theory from regime theory Regime theory is mostly concerned with the first sense though as noted regimes go beyond the idea of intergovernmental organisation Keohane 1988 3835 is keen to draw a distinction between specific institutions understood as things that 164 The primary institutions of international society can be identified as related complexes of rules and norms identifiable in space and time and more fundamental practices providing insti tutionalized constraints at a more enduring level a distinction also pursued by Wæver 1998 10912 Keohane puts particular emphasis on rules arguing that specific institutions exist where there is a per sistent set of rules that must constrain activity shape expectation and prescribe roles This confines his meaning of institution either to for mal organisations with capacity for purposive action or international regimes comprising complexes of rules and organisations a distinc tion also made by Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986 This comes close to making the meaning of institution synonymous with intergovernmen tal organisations and legal frameworks Some IR definitions of institution act to blur these two meanings Krasner 1999 43 for example sees institutions as formal or informal structures of norms and rules that are created by actors to increase their utility This formulation seems to lean towards designed rather than evolved institutions but since created is unmodified could be read either way A more elaborate blurring is offered by March and Olson 1998 948 institution can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations Such practices and rules are embedded in structures of meaning and schemes of interpretation that explain and legitimize particular identities and the practices and rules associated with them Here the first sentence seems to speak to Keohanes specific institutions the second to his more fundamental practices From the Stanford school Meyer et al 1987 13 we get a definition that leans quite definitelytowardsthefundamentalpracticessideWeseeinstitutionsas cultural rules giving collective meaning and value to particular entities andactivitiesintegratingthemintolargerschemesWeseebothpatterns of activity and the units involved in them individuals and other social entities as constructed by such wider rules Although Wæver 1998 112 thinks that the English school operates across these meanings and is confused about its position a case can be made that in fact it largely takes the second more general sense of institution as its starting point Bull 1977a 40 74 goes out of his way to make clear that when he talks of institutions he does not mean in tergovernmental organisations or administrative machinery Bull wants to get at Keohanes fundamental practices Keohane mainly discusses only one member of this category sovereignty which he also picks up in later work Keohane 1995 though he acknowledges that there are 165 From International to World Society others including Bulls set 1988 383 The English school has explored a range of candidates within this deeper sense of institution and it is on this basis that much of its claim to distinctiveness rests Standing back from the IR debates the English schools understand ing of institutions feels close to that developed by Searle 1995 Searle argues that institutions are created when a social function and status are allocated to something but which do not reflect its intrinsic physical properties A wall keeps people out physically whereas markers can do so socially if accepted by those concerned Money is the easiest example where an exchange commodity evolved into paper money which has no intrinsic value other than its status of recognition as money Money and much else in the social world is kept in place by collective agree ment or acceptance Searles idea is that human societies contain large numbers of institutions in this sense and consequently large numbers of what he calls institutional facts resulting from them eg husbands and wives resulting from the institution of marriage For Searle 1995 2 26 institutional facts are a subset of social facts which arise out of collective intentionality Social facts are distinct from brute facts which exist without human thought affecting them He notes 57 that each use of the institution is a renewed expression of the commitment of the users to the institution which underlines the concern with practices in the IR literature on this subject Both the specific designed and the deeper evolved understandings represent legitimate interpretations of institutions and there is no good reason for trying to exclude one or the other from its meaning Neither meaning is contested and since the essential difference between them is clear the issue is simply to find a way of clarifying which meaning is in play Given the influence of international lawyers on Bull it is perhaps worth pointing out that the distinction between primary and secondary institutions does not derive from Harts 1961 7999 well known formulation about primary and secondary rules Harts concern was to distinguish between primary rules defining illegitimate activ ity in any society and secondary rules which are about transforming custom into a formal framework of law and justice The institutions talked about in regime theory are the products of a certain type of in ternational society most obviously liberal but possibly other types as well and are for the most part consciously designed by states The insti tutions talked about by the English school are constitutive of both states and international society in that they define the basic character and pur pose of any such society For secondorder societies where the members 166 The primary institutions of international society are themselves collective actors such institutions define the units that compose the society Searle 1995 35 argues that social facts in gen eral and institutional facts especially are hierarchically structured On this basis and given that there is no disagreement about the English schools institutions reflecting something more fundamental it does not seem unreasonable to call what the English school and the Stanford school wants to get at primary institutions and those referred to by regime theory as secondary institutions The concept of primary institutions in English school literature If the English schools focus is primary institutions how are these de fined and what range of possibilities is encompassed Regime theorists dealing with secondary institutions can make do with general defini tions such as those provided by Krasner and Keohane Within such definitions there are nearly infinite possibilities for types of formal or ganisation and regime An indication of the type and range of diversity can be found in the discussion about hard and soft law referred to in chapter 5 and the three independent variables obligation precision delegation that produce degrees of hardness and softness in legalisa tion Goldstein et al 2000 Abbott et al 2000 Dealing with primary institutions is a rather different proposition Most English school writ ers spend little if any time defining what they mean by the institutions of international society concentrating instead on listing and discussing a relatively small number that they take to define the essence of what ever international society they are examining Since the idea of primary institutions is not controversial even for those who wish to focus on sec ondary institutions the English schools neglect of definitions though a shortcoming in its literature does not weaken its general position Usage of the term institutions within the English school literature fits pretty well with the key features of primary institutions identified by others viz r that they are relatively fundamental and durable practices that are evolved more than designed and r that they are constitutive of actors and their patterns of legitimate activity in relation to each other With this understanding in mind and given that the English school lit erature is the main one making a sustained effort to develop the idea 167 From International to World Society of primary institutions for international society it is worth surveying its candidates for the primary institutions as a starting point for an in vestigation into what this universe might contain It seems immediately clear for example that secondorder societies being simpler and hav ing many fewer members than Searles firstorder human societies will contain a relatively small number of primary institutions Wight 1979 111 says that the institutions of international society are according to its nature which implies that institutions will be dif ferent from one type of international society to another This is consis tent with his more historical work Wight 1977 2933 479 in which he identifies various institutions of premodern international societies including messengers conferences and congresses a diplomatic lan guage trade religious sites and festivals Wight does not attempt any distinction between primary and secondary institutions and his list could be boiled down to diplomacy trade and religious sites and fes tivals Also looking backward ReusSmit 1997 notes arbitration as a distinctive feature of classical Greek international society and Cohen 1998 could easily be read as a study of diplomacy as an institution in ancient and classical times In a study of premodern China Zhang 2001 looks at sovereignty diplomacy balance of power and a form of ritual analogous to international law during Chinas anarchic phase 770221 BC and adds the idea that the tribute system was an insti tution of the classical Sinocentric international society in East Asia Warner 2001 6976 shows just how different from Westphalian mod els the institutions of classical Islamic international society were in the process illustrating both the contradictions when the West imposed it self and the range of possibilities within the idea of primary institu tions These ideas about premodern institutions suggest an evolution from the simpler arrangements of tribes citystates and empires in the ancient and classical period into the more sophisticated Westphalian criteria of the modern states system with some overlap in the role of dynastic principles Wight 1979 11112 goes on to enumerate those of what from the context is the international society of the first half of the twentieth century as diplomacy alliances guarantees war and neutrality Somewhat inconsistently he then says that Diplomacy is the institution for negotiating Alliances are the institution for effect ing a common interest Arbitration is an institution for the settlement of minor differences between states War is the institution for the final settlement of differences Elsewhere Wight 1977 11052 puts a lot of emphasis on diplomacy sovereignty international law and balance of 168 The primary institutions of international society power as distinctive to European international society but he does not anywhere draw together his various comments on institutions into a coherent discussion Bull puts institutions on the map for the English school and his set of five institutions of international interstate society diplomacy international law the balance of power war and the role of great pow ers occupies the whole central third of his 1977 book Yet Bull never gives a full definition of what constitutes an institution nor does he set out criteria for inclusion into or exclusion from this category Neither does he attempt to explain the difference between his set and Wights Both by noting Wights institutions for premodern international soci eties and by himself setting out a variety of alternative possibilities for future international society Bull appears to accept the idea that primary institutions can and do change but he offers little guidance about how institutions arise and disappear His core statement on institutions is firmly within the Westphalian straitjacket 1977 74 States collaborate with one another in varying degrees in what may be called the institutions of international society the balance of power international law the diplomatic mechanism the managerial system of the great powers and war By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society or serve as a surro gate central authority in the international system They are rather an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration The location of this set in the overall structure of Bulls argument is that they derive from the second of his three types of rules rules of coexist ence which are those setting out the minimum behavioural conditions for society see chapter 2 In Bulls scheme rules of coexistence hinge on the basic elements of society limits to violence establishment of prop erty rights and sanctity of agreements This placing explains both the pluralist character of these institutions which occurs by definition as rules of coexistence and the curious absence of sovereignty which falls under Bulls first set of rules about the constitutive normative prin ciple of world politics Indeed Bull 1977a 71 does say that it is states themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states but he does not develop this idea whereas the other five get a chapter each 169 From International to World Society Bulls presentation of institutions can be read in two ways either it reflects his pluralist predisposition or it reflects his understanding of the history and present condition of interstate society As argued in chapter 2 there is scope in Bulls institutions for solidarist develop ment But he makes little attempt to explore this or to develop a general definition of primary institutions or to explore the range of possibili ties that might be covered by institutions of international society One possible lead for such an exploration is suggested by the link between Bulls choice of institutions and the explicitly functional quality of his understanding of society Do his ideas about society being constituted by limits to violence establishment of property rights and sanctity of agreements open a functional path into thinking about primary institu tions More on this below Bulls failure both to give a clear definition of primary institutions and to relate to earlier work continues into and in some ways worsens within the more contemporary English school literature For example Mayall 2000 14950 says The framework that I have adopted describes the context of interna tional relations in terms of a set of institutions law diplomacy the balance of power etc and principles Some of these sovereignty territorial integrity and nonintervention have been around since the beginning of the modern statessystem Others selfdetermination nondiscrimination respect for fundamental human rights etc have been added more recently do all these institutions and principles have equal weight or are they arranged in a hierarchy And if so is it fixed Curiously he does not mention nationalism which might be thought to be his major contribution to the English school literature Mayall 1990 2000 and which clearly meets the criteria for primary institutions given above Mayall 2000 94 identifies international law as a kind of master institution the bedrock institution on which the idea of international society stands or falls This view is supported by Kratochwils 1989 251 argument that the international legal order exists simply by virtue of its role in defining the game of international relations and Nardins 1998 20 see contra Nardin Whelan 1998 501 that international so ciety is not merely regulated by international law but constituted by it The arguments made in chapter 2 about the centrality of positive international law to international society might also be taken as rea son to privilege international law in this way Aside from Mayalls 170 The primary institutions of international society exasperating etceteras which leave one wondering what the full sets might look like we are offered a distinction between institutions and principles with no explanation as to what the difference might be or any clear setting out of which items belong in which category His good questions about weight and change seem to apply to both together and therefore to suggest that perhaps there is no difference and Mayall in any case does not attempt to answer them Perhaps picking up on Bulls undeveloped point and in contrast to Mayalls and Kratochwils elevation of international law James 1999 468 says that sovereignty is the constitutive principle of interstate rela tions though in earlier work James 1978 he identifies diplomacy in ternational law and sovereignty as the key phenomena indicating the presence of international society Interestingly James 1978 3 also hints at a functional understanding of institutions by talking of sovereignty in terms of rules about who can be a member of international society The emphasis on sovereignty is also shared by Jackson 2000 10212 who although he does not mount a direct discussion of institutions also talks about diplomacy colonialism international law and war in terms compatible with an institutional view ReusSmit 1997 focuses on inter national law and multilateralism as the key contemporary institutions of interstate society and Keohane 1995 also seems to lean towards multilateralism To add to the mixture some solidarists Knudsen 1999 39ff want to push human rights almost to the status of an institution while others Wheeler 2000 talk about it more ambiguously in terms of a norm of international society As with Mayalls distinction between institutions and principles it is not clear what if anything draws the line between institutions and norms of international society Both carry a sense of being durable features and in that sense social structures of a society and both are about constituting roles and actors and shaping expectations of behaviour If the concept of primary institutions is to play a coherent role in English school theory then we need to improve our understanding of what it does and does not represent The existing discussion suggests several points needing further thought r that there is an urgent need to acknowledge the centrality of primary institutions in English school theory to generate consistency in the use and understanding of the concept and to make clear what does and does not count as a primary institution 171 From International to World Society r thatBullsclassicsetoffiveinstitutionsismuchmoreastatementabout historical pluralist international societies than any kind of universal foralltime set and that consequently there is a need to flesh out the wider range of primary institutions r that institutions can change and that processes of creation and decay need to be part of the picture r that perhaps not all primary institutions are equal and that some sort of hierarchy may need to be introduced r that a functional understanding of primary institutions is worth investigating A timely paper by Holsti 2002 has begun a systematic and stimulat ing attempt to take the taxonomy of primary international institutions in hand Holstis starting point is a concern to develop primary institu tions as benchmarks for monitoring significant change in international systems Holsti 2002 6 sees institutions in this sense as embodying three essential elements practices ideas and normsrules in varying mixtures He adds Holsti 2002 910 a key distinction between foun dational and procedural institutions Foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors They also define the funda mental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based Procedural institutions are repetitive practices ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors including the conduct of both conflict and normal intercourse Although Holsti divides institutions into two types it is clear that he is not repeating the division between primary and sec ondary institutions his procedural institutions are still primary in con cept not regimes or IGOs Like Mayall Holsti shies away from giving definitive lists but he includes as foundational institutions sovereignty states territoriality and the fundamental principles of international law Among procedural institutions he includes diplomacy war trade and colonialism A similar move is made by ReusSmit 1997 55666 when he identifies three layers in modern international society The deepest layer he calls constitutional structures which are similar to Holstis foundational institutions Constitutional structures reflect a hierarchy of deep constitutive values a shared belief about the moral purpose of centalized political organisation an organising principle of sovereignty and a norm of pure procedural justice Picking up the functional theme he says that these structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs principles and norms that perform two functions in ordering 172 The primary institutions of international society international societies they define what constitutes a legitimate actor entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood and they define the basic parameters of rightful state action The middle layer ReusSmit calls fundamental institutions which he sees as basic rules of practice such as bilateralism multilateralism and international law This does not feel quite the same as Holstis procedural institutions but the concept is not elaborated enough to tease out the difference either in principle or practice and the difference is perhaps not large ReusSmits third layer is issuespecific regimes which brings us back to the distinc tion between primary and secondary institutions Although they con tain some embellishments both Holstis and ReusSmits definitions of primary institutions are broadly in line with the definitions discussed above Holstis approach tackles the question of change and evolution in in ternational institutions and thereby allows both entry into and exit from BullspluralistmodelInthisaspecthisworkrunsinparallelwithothers who have not only focused on institutions but also on the process of institutionalisation Krasner 1999 44 raises the question of durability which he defines as whether principles and norms endure or change with change of circumstances The Stanford school Meyer et al 1987 13 define institutionalisation as the process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come to be normatively and cognitively held in place and practically taken for granted as lawful whether as a matter of formal law custom or knowledge March and Olsen 1998 95969 draw attention to the way in which the development of inter action and competence tends to lead to institutionalisation and to the need to study how political history evolves in terms of institutions I will look more closely at the process of institutionalisation in chapter 8 Holsti shows how new institutions arise trade and some old ones drop out of use altogether colonialism see also Keene 2002 60144 and it is apparent that any study of institutional dynamics must incor porate both the rise and consolidation of institutions and their decay and demise He argues that war has decayed as an institution of con temporary international society taking a similar view to Mayalls 2000 19 remark that in the twentieth century war became regarded more as the breakdown of international society than as a sign of its operation Other institutions have become much more elaborate and complicated international law dipomacy In general Holsti sets up a scheme that invites observers to look not just for the existence or not of institutions but whether the trend is for those that do exist to strengthen weaken 173 Table 1 Candidates for primary institutions of international society by authorc Wight Bull Mayalla Holstib James Jackson Religious sites and festivals Dynastic principles Trade Trade P Diplomacy Diplomacy Diplomacy I DiplomacyP Diplomacy Diplomacy Alliances Guarantees War War War P War Neutrality Arbitration Balance of Power Balance of Power Balance of Power I Great power management International Law International Law International Law I International Law F International Law International Law The State The State F Sovereignty Sovereignty P Sovereignty F Sovereignty Sovereignty Territorial Integrity P Territoriality F Political boundaries Nonintervention P SelfDetermination P NonDiscrimination P Human Rights P Colonialism P Colonialism Notes a for Mayall I institution and P principle b for Holsti F foundational institution and P procedural institution c words underlined are where the author identifies an institution as principal or master or bedrock The primary institutions of international society or evolve internally Holstis scheme and ReusSmits also address explicitly the question of hierarchy among primary institutions and not just between primary and secondary ones though more think ing is needed about this Holstis statement 2002 13 that sovereignty is the bedrock for all other international institutions reinforces the discord between on the one hand the seemingly similar positions of Alan James and Robert Jackson cited above and on the other Mayalls Kratochwils and Nardins virtually identical statements about interna tional law The whole idea of bedrock institutions seems to suggest a special status for some even within the foundational category It is also unclear in these discussions whether the claims for bedrock status are general to any interstate society or specific to the Westphalian one and its contemporary derivative In addition Holstis inclusion of the state as a foundational institution alongside sovereignty and territoriality looks problematic It is not clear that anything of consequence is left if one subtracts sovereignty and territoriality from the state Neither is it clear that the state fits within Holstis definition If as he says foundational institutions define and give privileged status to certain actors and the fundamental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based then actors cannot be primary institutions This ar gument also undercuts Bulls unexplored classification of the state as the principal institution of international society Primary institutions have to reflect some shared principle norm or value In this instance states would be the actors constituted by the combination of sovereignty and territoriality Although not identifying all of the writers who have had something to say about primary institutions the current state of play on primary institutions in English school literature is roughly summarised in table 1 One might want to add to it ReusSmits and Keohanes idea that multilateralism is an institution if not of interstate society globally at least amongst the Western states and their circle This summary is inspiring because it is clearly getting at something basic and important about international social structure that is not cov ered either by secondary institutions or by Wendts broad classification of basic types of social order It is also both instructive and a bit de pressing It is depressing because it reveals something approaching in difference towards both conceptual clarity and cumulative debate The English schools interest in primary institutions might be a candidate for the coherent research program that Keohane 1988 392 accuses the re flectivists of lacking but to qualify will require much more systematic 175 From International to World Society thinking than it has received so far The summary is instructive on two grounds First because it suggests that there is a lot more to primary institutions than sovereignty As Onuf 2002 228 astutely observes it is a feature of realist thinking that sovereignty is the only rule that matters for the constitution of anarchy A systematic approach through primary institutions would thus settle once and for all what it is that differentiates English school theory from realism Second primary in stitutions do have some kind of lifecycle in which they rise evolve and decline and this dynamic itself needs to be a focus of study more on this in chapter 8 The summary also suggests a recurrent desire to differentiate primary institutions into some sort of hierarchy between the deeper and more constitutive and the less deep and more procedu ral Alongside this and not clearly connected to it are the hints about a functional understanding of primary institutions How can one be gin to transform the English schools lists into a coherent taxonomy I will begin with ideas about hierarchy and then turn to the functional question Hierarchy and functionalism within primary institutions What lies behind the persistent tendency in writings about primary in stitutionseithertofingersomeoneinstitutionasprimaryormasteror to make some more general distinction Mayalls institutions and prin ciples Holstis procedural and foundational institutions ReusSmits constitutional structures and fundamental institutions The idea of a primary or master institution implies that one deep practice essen tially generates or shapes all of the others The idea of two layers of primary institutions implies that some are deeper than others Looking first at the notion of layers Holstis and ReusSmits dis tinctions are based on the idea that some proceduralfoundational institutions are about repetitive practices and interactions while others foundationalconstitutional structures are about how the actors and the basic rules of the game among them are constituted A distinction along these lines is similar to the one used by Ruggie 1998 and others eg Kratochwil 1989 26 Searle 1995 278 Sørensen 1999 between reg ulative and constitutive rules Since as argued above pp 1637 norms rules principles and values all overlap and since institutions embody all of them it seems reasonable to transpose the logic developed around constitutive and regulatory rules to the discussion about different types 176 The primary institutions of international society of primary institutions Regulative rules are intended to have causal effects on a preexisting activity while constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any particular consciously organised social activity they specify what counts as that activity Ruggie 1998 22 Searle 1995 114 argues that institutions always consist in constitutive rules practices procedures that have the form X counts as Y in context C It seems that the strange status of the state in Bulls scheme and his silence about sovereignty reflect the positioning of his institutions within his rules of coexistence category which leaves out the institu tions to be found under his constitutive rules Bull thus comes close to falling foul of the criticism made by Ruggie 1998 25 of neorealists and neoliberals that they exclude constitutive rules and that the scope of their theories is confined to regulative rules that coordinate be haviour in a preconstituted world Yet that would not be quite fair since several of Bulls institutions do seem to fit under Holstis foun dational category and Ruggies constitutive one At first glance it is not exactly clear how one would interpret Bulls three types of rules in the light of Holstis and Ruggies dyadic classifications Bulls consti tutive rules probably fit within Holstis foundational institutions and Ruggies constitutive rules His rules of cooperation probably fit within Holstis procedural institutions and Ruggies regulative rules and may also overlap with secondary institutions But quite where Bulls rules of coexistence and hence his five institutions fit is not immediately obvious We are in the murky waters signposted by Hurrell 2002a 145 when he noted the absence of any clear answer as to what ac tually are the most important constitutive rules in international rela tions One thing that is clear is that this debate is about a different concern from Harts 1961 distinction between primary and secondary rules which is more narrowly aimed at how custom is transformed into law Just what does count as constitutive in relation to interstate societies Since the English school has in part justified its distinctiveness from mainly American regime theory by pointing to the constitutive quality of what it means by institutions getting some sort of coherent answer to this question is essential to the standing of English school theory As already noted Bulls idea of constitutive rules is the social struc tural analogue to Waltzs first tier of structure comprising the ordering principle of the system that defines whether it is a society of states a universal empire a cosmopolitan society or whatever Bulls rules of coexistence are heavily shaped by the prior choice of sovereign 177 From International to World Society territorial states within this first tier of constitutive rules The rules of coexistence then set out the minimum behavioural conditions for society in other words a kind of bottom line necessary for some sort of interstate society to exist Holstis and ReusSmits deepest layers define both the key actors and the fundamental principles rules and norms upon which their mutual relations are based Ruggies idea is that constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up any par ticular consciously organised social activity with the example of a game eg chess Searle 1995 278 giving clear guidance As in chess the rules define the pieces the environment in which the pieces act and the ways in which they relate to each other and that environment Tak ing all these ideas together and staying with a game metaphor chess or Mannings game of states it becomes apparent that there are two core elements in the idea of constitutive institutions one is that such institutions define the main piecesplayers in the game the other that they define the basic rules by which the piecesplayers relate to each other This sounds relatively simple but is not One problem concerns the separability of piecesplayers on the one hand and the rules of en gagement on the other These might be separate as in chess but they might also be linked as in the mutual constitution resolution to the agentstructure problem Sovereignty as the defining quality of states piecesplayers cannot be disentangled from anarchy as the defin ing quality of system structure and therefore the rules of the game This link is dynamic and as the several accounts of the evolution of sovereignty noted above make clear both states and the game they play change over time Sovereignty may stay constant as the key constitu tive institution but the practices that it legitimises are under continuous renegotiation This changeability within a constant is less of a contrast to chess than might be imagined the rules of chess have changed quite fre quently without the identity of the game coming into question Hassner 2003 A second problem lies in the conflation of pieces and players In chess the pieces are constituted by the rules but the pieces are not the players and although the activity of chess may be constituted by its rules the people who play it are not except in the very limited sense of being temporarily constituted as chess players In the game of states this distinction is much less clear The pieces and the players are still separable pieces states players political leaders and diplomats but they are closely interlinked as captured in the distinction between roleandidiosyncraticvariablesinthestudyofforeignpolicymaking 178 The primary institutions of international society Where the pieces states are composed of sentient social actors then what the pieces are and how they relate to each other will inevitably be connected On this basis Holsti and ReusSmit would seem to be correct in proposing that for the game of states constitutive institutions must define both the main actors and the basic rules by which they relate to each other What does such a conclusion mean in practical terms The clearest candidates for the status of constitutive institutions will be those that bear directly on the definition of the principal actorsplayers in the game Taking the cue from Bulls discussion of constitutive principles for the game of states in Westphalian form the key constitutive institu tions would be sovereignty and territoriality for the game of empires it would be suzerainty for a cosmopolitian community it would be human rights and for a neomedieval system it would be the set of principles that differentiated the main types of actors and set out their rights and responsibilities in relation to each other For something like the EU the constitutive institution remains sovereignty but accompanied by in tegration and subsidiarity the investment of authority at the lowest possible level of an institutional hierarchy McLean 1996 482 It is not impossible for some of these rules to coexist During the colonial era for example the European states system was constituted by sovereignty but the European powers related to the rest of the world on the basis of suzerainty which defined a range of imperial entities from dominions through protectorates to colonies Holsti and Keene 2000 2002 are thus quite right to identify colonialism as a key institution of pre1945 European international society Thinking just about what constitutes the actorsplayers pushes one towards the idea of master or princi pal primary institutions where perhaps one or two key foundational practices do seem to set up the rest of the game Moving to constitutive institutions focused on the basic rules of en gagement is more difficult Where is the boundary between what counts as basic or fundamental rules coexistence for Bull rules that de fine the game for Ruggie fundamental principles defining relations for Holsti and ReusSmit and cooperationregulativeprocedural rules Bulls idea of rules of cooperation being about secondary issues those more advanced rules agreed by states beyond mere coexistence looks immediately problematic Such rules can include trade and human rights both of which might well count as constitutive in the sense that they impact quickly and deeply on what practices are legitimised or not by sovereignty and therefore how the key players are defined 179 From International to World Society Both Holstis and ReusSmits procedural rules and Ruggies regula tive ones are trying to define a level that is relatively superficial in the sense that it downplays or eliminates the constitutive element Holstis procedural institutions are repetitive practices ideas and norms that underlie and regulate interactions and transactions between the separate actors Ruggies regulative rules are intended to have causal effects on a preexisting activity The idea here is to capture as it were the regular practices that sentient players engage in once the actors are established the basic rules are in place and the game of states is under way But this seemingly clear distinction is hard to sustain Even at the level of secondary institutions there are plausible claims that the buildup of networks of regimes eventually entangles states to such an extent as to change quite fundamentally the nature of relations among them more legal and institutionalised less war and thus to call into question the neorealist understanding of what anarchy means Such claims are intrinsic to much of the discussion of globalisation and world society and are not difficult to find in other literatures Keohane and Nye 1977 Wendt 1999 Milner 1991 In effect such claims connect even secondary institutions at least in their cumulative effect as expressions of the primary institution of multilateralism to constitutive status Holsti counts both trade and war as procedural institutions yet there are compelling arguments that both have major effects on the constitution and behaviour of states eg Keohane and Nye 1977 Tilly 1990 One key element in the difficulty of drawing a boundary between constitutive institutions and regulatory rules is the breakdown of the analogy between games such as chess where the pieces are not the play ers and games such as states where the pieces and the players are more closely intertwined In the game of states the players can reinter pret existing institutions as they go along Ashleys 1987 411 seem ingly convoluted definition of international community is close to the sense of primary institutions and captures this idea of essential fluidity well international community can only be seen as a never completed prod uct of multiple historical practices a stillcontested product of struggle to impose interpretation upon interpretation In its form it can only be understood as a network of historically fabricated practical under standings precedents skills and procedures that define competent international subjectivity and that occupy a precariously held social space pried open amidst contending historical forces multiple inter pretations and plural practices 180 The primary institutions of international society As Holstis discussion makes clear within the game of states even quite basic institutions colonialism in his set which does define actors in the system can disappear as the game evolves or at least atrophy to the point where the label is no longer an acceptable way of charac terising practices Holsti tracks substantial changes of interpretation in other primary institutions as well such as sovereignty see also Keohane 1995 Barkin 1998 Sørensen 1999 war and international law The shared norms or principles represented by primary institutions can endure in a general sense while the particular rules and institutional facts that they legitimise undergo substantial change The problem is how to dis tinguish between those institutions that change the nature of the game and the character of the key players and those that dont Drawing any such distinction in a definitive way is certain to be both difficult and controversial There is endless scope for dispute as to what extent new institutions the market or human rights change either the game or the players and over what time periods they do so In terms of the discus sion in chapter 5 the question is does solidarism change the game of states and at what point do those changes add up to a new game for which the name game of states is no longer appropriate A suggestive answer to this question is provided by the tendency of EU studies to drift away from both IR and Politics implying that at least in the minds of many of those who study it the EU cannot be adequately understood either as a state or as a game of states Taking all of this into consideration one can make the follow ing general characterisation of the primary institutions of interstate society r Primary institutions are durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies amd embodying a mix of norms rules and principles In some cases these shared practices and values may be extended to and accepted by nonstate actors r In order to count as a primary institution such practices must play a constitutive role in relation to both the piecesplayers and the rules of the game There is probably not a useful distinction to be made between constitutive and regulatory or fundamental and procedural primary institutions r Although durable primary institutions are neither permanent nor fixed They will typically undergo a historical pattern of rise evo lution and decline that is long by the standards of a human lifetime 181 From International to World Society Changes in the practices within an institution may be a sign of vigour and adaptation as those in sovereignty over the last couple of cen turies or of decline as in the narrowing legitimacy of war over the last halfcentury One needs to distinguish between changes in and changes of primary institutions Although I have argued that a constitutiveregulatory distinction cannot be used as the basis for a hierarchy within primary institutions the sense in the literature that there needs to be a hierarchy is strong It is also uncontestable that there needs to be a better taxonomy of primary institutions The simplest solution to the hierarchy problem is to treat it as an issue of nesting Some primary institutions can be understood as containing or generating others International law for example can be seen as a general institution a set of fundamental principles and also as the container of the potentially endless particular laws about a wide variety of specific issues that can be built up within it and which mostly fall under what I have labelled here as secondary institutions The trick is to find primary institutions that stand alone Looking again at table 1 it is clear that some of the candidates do stand alone whereas others are derivative Sovereignty is a good candidate for a master institution of West phalian international society Within it one could bundle up May alls principles of nonintervention selfdetermination and non discrimination A good case could be made for seeing international law as derivative from sovereignty Although there could in principle be international law without sovereignty as Mosler 1980 1 argues before sovereignty in ancient and classical times there was no conception of a universal community of rules or laws on this question see Onuma 2000 Zhang 2001 Without international law it is difficult to imag ine much international relations among sovereign entities other than war Territoriality or territorial integrity is distinct from sovereignty and not necessary to it Sovereignty can in principle exist without being territorial even though in practice that might be difficult to implement Territoriality is therefore a distinct master institution of Westphalian interstate societies Ruggie 1993 It might be argued that boundaries are a derivative institution from territoriality though it could also be argued that territoriality and boundaries are opposite sides of the same coin As argued above sovereignty and territoriality together constitute 182 The primary institutions of international society the essence of the Westphalian state and so eliminate Bulls and Holstis attempt to see the state itself as a primary institution Diplomacy is another good candidate for a master institution In his torical terms it predates sovereignty and it easily bundles up Wights messengers conferences and congresses diplomatic language and arbitration and ReusSmits multilateralism Balance of power is a clear fourth Westphalian master institution When understood as a recognised social practice and shared value rather than as a mechanical consequence of anarchy balance of power contains alliances guarantees neutrality and great power management It also contains war again when understood as a social practice Searle 1995 8990 which as Wight noted is the institution for the final settlement of differences Of the list in table 1 that leaves religious sites and festivals dynastic principles trade human rights and colonialism as not clearly deriva tive or subordinate to any other master institution Religious sites and festivals have dropped away as a feature of modern European interna tional society but clearly played a central role in ancient and classical times and retain unquestionable importance in subglobal international societies notably those of the Islamic Jewish and Hindu worlds Dy nastic principles have also faded out of European international society but they were crucial in its early phases and were prominent also in ancient and classical times Trade is another very old practice in hu man affairs and does not depend on any of the four master institutions listed above Buzan and Little 2000 Whether trade as such is the in stitution or particular principles applying to it such as protectionism or the market is an interesting question needing more thought A good case can be made that over the past century and a half there has been a battle between these two principles of how to govern trade and that since the end of the Cold War the market has emerged clearly as one of the major primary institutions of contemporary interstate society Even with that resolution however there remains a vigorous battle between economic and embedded liberals for the soul of the market As noted above human rights is a cosmopolitan institution but it can also be picked up as a shared value in an interstate society Probably it is not a master institution in itself but derivative from the principle of equality of people established as part of decolonisation Conversely colonialism was a derivative primary institution of international society up to 1945 resting on the general principle of inequality of peoples 183 From International to World Society Table 2 The nested hierarchy of international institutions Primary Institutions Master Derivative Sovereignty Nonintervention International law Territoriality Boundaries Diplomacy Messengersdiplomats ConferencesCongresses Multilateralism Diplomatic language Arbitration Balance of power Antihegemonism Alliances Guarantees Neutrality War Great power management Equality of people Human Rights Humanitarian intervention Inequality of people Colonialism Dynasticism Trade Market Protectionism Hegemonic stability Nationalism Selfdetermination Popular sovereignty Democracy On the basis of this discussion and setting aside religious sites and festivals and dynastic principles on the grounds that they are mostly of historical interest a simple logic of nesting generates a preliminary pattern of master and derivative primary institutions applying to mod ern interstate societies as set out in table 2 I am aware that some will find the dispositions in table 2 controversial and I offer them more as a way of opening than of closing a debate about nesting as one way of dealing with the problem of hierarchy within primary institutions that is not resolved by the distinction between constitutive and regulatory rules Of course tables 1 and 2 do not contain all of the possible primary institutions and neither do they tell us what the contemporary pat tern looks like Given the pluralist dispositions of the authors involved these lists have not only an interstate but also a specific Westphalian 184 The primary institutions of international society bias and even there are not complete One thing that is noticeable about trade human rights and colonialism in relation to sovereignty territori ality diplomacy and balance of power is that they dont fit comfortably together Sovereignty territoriality diplomacy and balance of power are a harmonious set They do not guarantee peace but they complement each other comfortably and contain no necessary contradictions The market human rights and colonialism raise contradictions The contra diction between human rights on the one hand and sovereigntynon intervention on the other is well developed in the English school liter ature Bull 1977a Mayall 2000 Jackson 2000 Colonialism contradicts sovereignty by creating a society of unequals a mix of Westphalian and imperial forms Keene 2002 The market principle creates tensions with sovereignty and territoriality not to mention balance of power in ways that have been well explored in the literatures of IPE and globalisation Given the problem of contradictions it is not without significance that nationalism which given its importance as the political legitimiser for sovereignty might well be thought a quite longstanding master institu tion of interstate society is not part of table 1 Like trade human rights and colonialism nationalism and its corollaries popular sovereignty and the right of selfdetermination create contradictions with some of the other master institutions sovereignty territoriality trade even at times diplomacy a story well told by Mayall 1990 Nationalism as Mayall 2000 84 notes sacralises territory by making sovereignty pop ular It can also underpin the solidarist call derided by Jackson 2000 366 to make democracy a universal institution of interstate society It is perhaps no accident that the English school classics avoided talk of trade and nationalism for fear of disrupting the harmony of their core Westphalian set of institutions Bull and more recently Jackson put the pursuit of order as their first priority A consequent disinclination to take on board disruptive institutions would be of a piece with their often fierce resistance to human rights which creates similar tensions Although the potential for contradictions among primary institutions is real it is also sometimes overdone The fear that the WTO regime degrades sovereignty by imposing rules and restrictions on states for example is a common part of the debate about globalisation In defence the OECD 1998 1314 7790 argues that since states agree to the rules in pursuit of what they define as their own national interests the trade regime is an exercise of sovereignty not a surrender of it This line is close to Mannings cited in chapter 2 that What is essentially a system 185 From International to World Society of law for sovereigns being premised on their very sovereignty does not by the fact of being strengthened put in jeopardy the sovereign ties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence Not at any rate in logic Those classics of the English school that subordinate the exploration of tensions among primary institutions to the concern for order block one of the most interesting insights to be gained from the study of primary institutions that tensions among them are a key driv ing force in the evolution of interstate society More on this in chapters 7 and 8 Another missing primary institution is environmentalism discussed by Jackson 2000 1758 as a fourth area of responsibility after national international and humanitarian involving stewardship or trusteeship of the planet This was little if at all discussed by earlier English school writers in part because the issue was not then as prominent as it later became As discussed in chapter 5 environmental stewardship can up to a point be fitted into a pluralist logic of coexistence but it can also become a solidarist project It might be argued that environmentalism as a master institution is generating derivative institutions such as the right to survival for all species Taking these additions into account and focusing in on the particular pattern of contemporary international institutions is the task of table 3 Here it is also possible to begin seeing roughly how primary and sec ondary institutions relate to each other though I have not tried to trace all of the crosslinkages where secondary institutions might well link to or express more than one primary institution eg the UNGA linking to sovereignty diplomacy selfdetermination Note also how in this more specific focus the market and great power management move to the sta tus of primary institutions with their own derivatives Again as with table 2 I offer this interpretation as a way of opening a discussion that the English school and others interested in international institutions need to have I will look in more detail at the institutions of contemporary inter national society and the dynamics that drive them in chapter 8 There remains the question of exploring the path opened by Bull James and ReusSmit towards a functional understanding of primary institutions Onecouldalsoderivefunctionalleaningsfromthediscussionaboutcon stitutive rules being what define the players and the rules of the game Heading in that direction requires abandoning the empirical inductive approach with which I started and turning towards a more deductive 186 The primary institutions of international society Table 3 Contemporary international institutions Primary Institutions Secondary Institutions Master Derivative examples of Sovereignty Nonintervention UN General Assembly International law Most regimes ICJ ICC Territoriality Boundaries Some PKOs Diplomacy Bilateralism Embassies Multilateralism United Nations Conferences Most IGOs regimes Great power management Alliances NATO War UN Security Council Balance of power Equality of people Human rights UNHCR Humanitarian intervention Market Trade liberalisation GATTWTO MFN agreements Financial liberalisation Hegemonic stability IBRD IMF BIS Nationalism Selfdetermination Some PKOs Popular sovereignty Democracy Environmental stewardship Species survival Climate stability CITES UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol IPCC Montreal Protocol etc approach Jack Donnelly 2002 213 has made a preliminary start down this path choosing a functional logic as a way both of building on Bulls understanding of society and of addressing the manifest shortcomings of the English schools simple lists Without giving much explanation as to why he offers five types of political functions as likely to be per formed in any international society and begins to allocate institutions to them communicating and interacting diplomacy heralds and messen gers the ancient Greek practice of proxeny making and applying rules international law regulating the use of force war just war rules vari ous practices specifying the right to bear arms aggregating interests and power alliances spheres of influence IGOs feudal obligations religious solidarity and allocating jurisdiction and establishing status sovereignty suzerainty universal empire Donnellys paper is his first cut at a large 187 From International to World Society project and while understandably unsatisfactory in some respects at this early stage is nevertheless usefully suggestive not least in starting from the requirements of secondorder international societies rather than assuming as Bull does that one can start from the requirements of any form of society Unlike firstorder societies secondorder societies do not have to deal with some basic human functions such as sex birth and death But be cause unlike the individual humans who compose firstorder societies their entities are both collective and socially constructed they do have distinctive problems about communication and recognition As James and ReusSmit emphasise secondorder societies have a particular need to specify what kinds of collective actors are allowed membership and what not Since the entities are collective they also need rules about how communication is to be conducted and which voice from within is to be treated as authoritative Beyond that the obvious historic core concerns of secondorder societies are with war and commerce which are captured by Bulls emphasis respectively on constraints on the use of force and allocation of property rights To pursue either commerce or restraints on the resort to war necessitates bringing in Bulls third element of society which is understandings about the sanctity of agree ments One could therefore start a functional analysis of the primary institutions of international society with these five In terms of the in stitutions discussed earlier in this chapter the allocations might go as follows Membership the importance of defining the membership of a second order society was apparent in the discussion above about constitutive rules and who the playersactors are Membership partly overlaps with Donnellys category of allocating jurisdiction and establishing status but also goes beyond it potentially taking in such identity issues as feudal obligations and religious solidarity which Donnelly places under aggregating interests and power It is thus not just about Bulls constitutive rules but also contains equalityinequality of peo ple or not and their derivatives human rightscolonialism and dy nasticism nationalism and its derivatives selfdetermination popular sovereignty and democracy and other variations on the question of identity that would bear on the standard of civilisation that deter mines whether entities are admitted to or excluded from international society Authoritative communication this is close to Donnellys classification and is mainly about diplomacy and its antecedents 188 The primary institutions of international society Limits to the use of force it is difficult to make a tight distinction be tween this function and membership It would obviously include many of the classic Westphalian institutions emphasised by English school pluralists great power management war alliances neutrality and bal ance of power But at least for Westphaliantype interstate societies it would be difficult to exclude from this function some of the institu tions that also determine membership for example colonialism dy nasticism and human rights As I have argued elsewhere Buzan 1996 membership of international society has security implications in and of itself not necessarily guaranteeing survival but giving some protection against being treated asa terra nullius whose inhabitantscanbe treated as nonhuman Allocation of property rights curiously Donnelly does not pick up this aspect of Bulls functional approach to society thereby perpetuating the English schools neglect of the economic sector Allocation of prop erty rights has both political and economic aspects respectively about who governs where and who owns what Whether these aspects can be treated as distinct as in Tillys 1990 counterpointing of coercion and capital or whether they are intertwined as in Ruggies 1983 argument that private property and sovereignty emerged together remains con troversial On the political side the obvious Westphalian institutions are territoriality and boundaries though as the feudal model indicates this kind of hard territoriality is not the only way of allocating prop erty rights On the economic side property rights points towards the institutions associated with trade and finance In societies where the environment has become an issue institutions associated with steward ship would also come under this heading Sanctity of agreements this is close to Donnellys making and apply ing rules and is mainly about international law and its antecedents This discussion does no more than open the door on the question of how to understand the primary institutions of international society in functional terms I do not have the space here to develop this line of thinking further but the desirability of doing so is apparent for at least two reasons First a functional framing is one way of giving theoretical grounding to the English schools so far rather ad hoc and empirical approach to institutions and moreover doing so in terms that can be linked into Bulls work Second Donnelly is no doubt correct in thinking that a functional approach would greatly facilitate the WightWatson project of comparing international societies across space and time In the meantime it is useful to try to get a somewhat more systematic sense 189 From International to World Society of the possible range of primary institutions beyond the Westphalian model To do this one needs to look at different types of interstate society through the crude functional lens just established The range of institutions and the types of international society Firstorder interhuman societies are typically complicated and may well have large numbers of defining institutions Searle 1995 Second ordersocietieswilltypicallyhavefewermembersandfewerinstitutions but they can take many forms and shapes and therefore even though the number of primary institutions within any given international soci ety may be fairly small the overall possibilities for such institutions are if not infinite at least very numerous I am therefore unable to escape the etcetera problem for which I earlier pilloried Mayall and others although at least now one can see why On the basis of the thinthick argument in chapter 5 one would expect fewer institutions at the plural ist end of the spectrum and more at the solidarist end Exactly what the primary institutions of any given international society are is a matter for close empirical enquiry conducted within functional guidelines Holsti is quite right to link the question of how to benchmark change in inter national systems to the study of the institutions that define what the so ciety is and what the rules of its game are Especially in games where the pieces are the players institutions are open to change whether change of meaning and practice eg sovereignty war or risedecline of the institution as such eg market colonialism Even with a functional frame one cannot set out a definitive list of primary institutions for all times and places yet it is nevertheless inter esting and instructive to try to think through the question of primary institutions in relation to the four types of interstate social order set out in figure 5 In particular such an exercise enables one to revisit the issue of change in the context of the idea from the discussion of pluralism and solidarism above that solidarist forms of interstate society at least initially build on pluralist foundations One has to keep in mind that each model can in principle be held together by any mix of coercion calculation and belief A Power Political interstate society was defined as based largely on enmity and the possibility of war and therefore as thin in terms of primary institutions Survival is the main motive for the states and no values are necessarily shared Secondary institutions are unlikely to 190 The primary institutions of international society exist at all At a minimum a Power Political society will require means of authoritative communication even if only for alliance making and therefore some form of diplomacy By historical experience there is also likely to be some institutionalisation around property rights Trade becomes an institution when there is shared practice for granting par ticular rights to merchants which was common even in ancient and classical times Buzan and Little 2000 It is easy to find historical cases where diplomacy and trade existed without there being any shared political principle It also seems likely that some sort of territoriality would be important because of its intrinsic relationship to the pro cesses of war and conquest though this might well not take the form of hard boundaries Empires and tribes usually have fuzzy frontiers rather than fixed lines In such a thin society there may well not be much elaboration around the rules of membership Sovereignty might or might not be an institution in a Hobbesian society which could just as easily rest on suzerainty or even on the simple pragmatic test of whatever kind of entity is able to field significant military force In most of ancient and classical times for example international systems were composed of a mix of citystates empires nomadic barbarians and huntergatherer bands This does not rule out that Power Political interstate societies could also feature shared political institutions such as dynasticism or suzerainty as they did for much of classical history and also early modern European history By definition Power Political interstate societies are unlikely to feature major constraints on the use of force though war may well be a strong candidate for an institution in the sense of a general acceptance of conquest as a legitimate way to establish political claims Any society will require some method of establishing the sanctity of agreements even if only the value placed on word of honour but the ruthless survivalism of a Power Political one is unlikely to feature much in the way of developed international law A Coexistence interstate society was defined as based on the model of a Westphalian balance of power system in which the balance of power is accepted as an organising principle by the great powers and sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power management war and international law are the core institutions of international society This is Bulls pluralist international society close to the experience of modern European history up to 1945 In functional terms these clas sic institutions already cover a quite welldeveloped means of author itative communication diplomacy membership sovereignty limits 191 From International to World Society to the use of force war balance of power great power management property rights territoriality and sanctity of agreements international law Yet the classical pluralist presentation of institutions in the En glish school literature does not exhaust the possibilities In terms of membership colonialism is an option for such a society provided that it has room to expand outside its core Holsti 2002 Keene 2000 2002 and so also is dynasticism as it was in Europe well into the nine teenth century A standard of civilisation embodying other cultural andor religious identity markers might well also be applied to mem bership as it was by the Europeans before 1945 In terms of property rights Coexistence interstate societies can also generate economic in stitutions more sophisticated than the basic trading practices that can be found even in Power Political interstate societies Coexistence interstate societies might well keep the mercantilist practices and principles inherited from Power Political forebears but they might also seek to improve on them In the case of nineteenthcentury Europe the Gold Standard could be seen as one such development as perhaps could the attempts to move towards liberal trading prac tices such as agreed tariff reductions and mostfavourednation agree ments As Coexistence societies move towards the Cooperative model they may well begin to generate secondary institutions in the form of regimes and IGOs as began to happen during the late nineteenth century The most important institution missing from the English schools es sentially Coexistence set is nationalism which bears on both member ship and the political side of property rights Mayall 1990 2000 has long been the champion of giving full recognition to this as a constitu tive institution arguing that during the nineteenth century it melded with the institution of sovereignty and transformed it in a number of quitefundamentalwaysNationalselfdeterminationnotonlydisplaced dynasticism as the key to political legitimacy it also sacralised terri tory Mayall 2000 84 and imposed limits on the legitimate uses of war Hurrell 2002a 145 reinforces Mayalls position with his suggestion that national selfdetermination is the most important constitutive norm of the modern era Nationalism like sovereignty has spread well beyond its European origins It has been instrumental in the demise of colo nialism as an institution of Western interstate society It is part of the explanation for the decline of war as an institution and through its link to popular sovereignty is also implicated in the rise of the solidarist agendas of human rights and democracy 192 The primary institutions of international society A Cooperative interstate society was defined as based on developments that go significantly beyond coexistence but short of extensive domes tic convergence This definition implies a considerable carryover of institutions from the Coexistence model and it would be surprising if a Cooperative interstate society did not possess a fairly rich collection of secondary institutions It is not difficult to imagine that sovereignty territoriality nationalism diplomacy and international law remain in place albeit with some elaboration and reinterpretation Judging by the UN Charter the practices within the EU and the still vigorous and interesting debate about unipolarity and multipolarity great power management can also remain in place It seems highly likely however that Cooperative interstate societies will have more elaborate criteria for membership more stringent institutions concerning the sanctity of agreements and greater restraints on the use of force Indeed such soci eties may well downgrade or even eliminate war as an institution Recall Mayalls 2000 19 remark that in the twentieth century war became re garded more as the breakdown of international society than as a sign of its operation If interstate society is engaged in solidarist cooperative projects then allowing free scope for war as a legitimate way of chang ing political control becomes problematic Neither the liberal economic project nor the big science one can be pursued at least not universally in an interstate society where war remains one of the core institutions War may not be eliminated but its legitimate use gets squeezed into a relatively narrow range closely centred on the right to selfdefence and not in violation of the right of national selfdetermination The squeez ing of war in this way seems likely to downgrade the balance of power as an institution at least in the robust sense of its meaning in a Coex istence interstate society In the contemporary international system this whole nexus of questions is under test by the apparent desire of the US to reassert a right to war for the purposes of combating terrorism and containing rogue states Whether and how downgrading of balance of power happens may well depend on what kind of solidarist projects a Cooperative inter state society pursues and the question of what other primary institu tions such a society might have also hangs on this question It will make a difference whether the joint project is big science human rights col lective security the pursuit of joint economic gain environmentalism universal religion or some combination of these or others If contempo rary Western interstate society is taken as a model for the possibilities then the most obvious candidate for elevation to the status of primary 193 From International to World Society institution would be the market The market means more than just trade It is a principle of organisation and legitimation that affects both how states define and constitute themselves what kind of other actors they give standing to and how they interpret sovereignty and territorial ity The market does not necessarily eliminate balance of power as an institution but it does make its operation much more complicated and contradictory than it would be under mercantilist rules I have elsewhere Buzan and Wæver 2003 labelled this the liberalrealist dilemma and it is most visible in contemporary Western Japanese and Taiwanese rela tions with China Realist or balancing logic suggests that it is unwise to trade with and invest in and thus empower states one may later have to fight Liberal or market logic suggests that one can reduce the prob ability of having to fight by allowing the operation of a market economy to democratise and entangle potential enemies A Convergence interstate society was defined as based on the devel opment of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar political legal and economic forms This implies not only a thick development of institutions across all the functions but also extremely exacting conditions for membership Ex actly what this type of society would look like depends hugely on what model of political economy its member states were converging around liberal democracy Islamic theocracy absolutist hereditary monarchy hierarchical empire communist totalitarianism etc This choice would largely determine the practices and legal systems that would define the institutions Some pluralist institutions might well still be in play though it seems unlikely that war and balance of power would play much of a role In a liberal Kantian version of Convergence interstate society the market property rights human rights and democratic rela tions between government and citizens might well feature as primary institutions But if the convergence model was Islamic communist or some other then the institutions would be radically different All three of these forms would probably bring sovereignty and territoriality se riously into question not necessarily in Holstis 2002 89 scheme by makingthemobsoletebuteitherbyincreasingtheircomplexityortrans formingtheirmainfunctionsConvergencewouldalmostcertainlypush nonintervention as a corollary of sovereignty towards obsolescence for many purposes As Convergence developments moved towards Con federalism and the border between international systems and unified ones one would expect a change in the character of its secondary insti tutions There would not just be significant IGOs of the forum kind like 194 The primary institutions of international society the UN but also secondary institutions of a more integrative sort like those in the EU By this stage restraints on the use of force would have to be nearly total diplomacy largely transformed into something more like the process of domestic politics and international law transformed into something more like domestic law with institutions of enforce ment to back it up One can draw from this discussion the following conclusions r That it is possible using a functional frame to go some way towards identifying the institutions that would go along with different forms of macro secondorder societies but that the possible range of such societies is large and all of their particularities impossible to predict r That norms and therefore institutions can change This change may be driven by changes in the domestic societies of the member states or as Hurrell 2002a 1467 argues about contemporary international society by promotion by TNAs by the discursive tendency of norms to expand by filling in gaps by analogy by responses to new problems andor by debate in IGOs r That there are master institutions in the sense that some primary institutions nest inside others but not in the sense that some are con stitutive and others regulatory r That while solidarist evolution does build on pluralist foundations initially it does so not just by direct accumulation but as solidarism thickens by dropping or downgrading or transforming some key pluralist institutions r That as Hurrell 2002a 1434 observes the set of institutions constituting any given interstate society may well contain contra dictionstensions among themselves These contradictionstensions may well be a key dynamic in the evolution or decay of any given interstate society More on this in chapter 8 r Thatoneneedstobewareofthelimitationsofapurelypoliticomilitary approach to conceptualising institutions Economic societal and envi ronmental institutions can be just as constitutive of players and rules of the game in interstate societies as can the narrow set of strictly politicomilitary ones Conclusions Three issues remain to be discussed 1 the relationship if any between institutions in the English school sense and more materialist structural 195 From International to World Society interpretations of the same phenomena 2 the question left hanging in chapter 4 of how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other and 3 the vocabulary question also left hanging in chapter 4 about the fate of the concepts international and world society In the discussion of primary institutions above it was noted that war as an institution became more problematic as interstate society moved away from pluralist constructions and towards solidarist ones This problematisation was not to do with technical issues such as the ad vent of weapons of mass destruction which might well bring war into question even within Hobbesian or Lockean interstate societies Rather it concerned the contradiction between war as an institution and the other institutions that might be cultivated by more solidarist interstate societies War become increasingly incompatible with solidarist projects such as big science or the institutionalisation of the market How is one to link this perspective to the more materialist one made famous by Tillys phrase that war makes the state and the state makes war which implicitly underpins much realist theorising about international rela tions From this perspective war is constitutive of states not in the form of a constitutive rule but as a mechanical Darwinian structure which favours the survival of units that are more like modern states and drives into extinction or subordination other older types of unit that are less clearly organised around strict sovereignty and hard bound aries If war itself gets driven towards extinction what then becomes of the state Although the logics driving this type of structural thinking are different from those underpinning primary institutions in the English school sense the two do cross paths when one comes to consider the impact of the market Like war the market can be seen both as a me chanical structure and as an institution of interstate and interhuman and transnational society In both perspectives there are some areas of overlap and complementarity between the two but also an underly ing contradiction that becomes more powerful as the market approaches globalscaleWarmightuptoapointsupportthemarketwhenthegame is to grab control of subglobal shares But when the market becomes global war becomes a costly disruption to trade production and finan cial markets As institutions war and the market become increasingly incompatible in solidarist interstate societies As mechanical structures they seem also to fall into a zerosum game for what makes the state and what the state makes It could well be argued that in contemporary interstate societies it is the market that makes the state and the state that 196 The primary institutions of international society makes markets To the extent that this is true the shift in balance between these two constitutes not just a shift in the institutions of interstate so ciety but also a transformation in the Darwinian structures that shape the principal units in the international system Buzan and Little 2000 3627 The second issue is how the interhuman transnational and interstate domains relate to each other The main point I want to underline here is the need to remain aware that liberal models of solidarism are not the only option for thinking about this question From a contemporary Westernperspectiveinsideliberalismitisalltooeasytolosesightofthis fact The liberal model of solidarism offers a very particular and quite compelling answer to how the interhuman transnational and interstate will relate to each other as solidarism develops Liberal arguments con tain a strong logic that although the three units of individuals TNAs and states are ontologically distinct the interhuman transnational and interstate societies that they form will be closely interrelated in a quite particular way As I have argued elsewhere Buzan 1993 there are grounds for think ing that interstate societies aspiring to solidarism especially if their constitutent states are democratic will have to be accompanied by matching elements of cosmopolitan world society among their citizens if the solidarist international society is to be sustainable In other words the twentieth centurys obsession with nationalism as the link between the interhuman and the interstate domains has to be broadened out to incorporate the wider forms of interhuman society necessary to support a solidarist interstate agenda whether in human rights democracy or economic interdependenceglobalisation In addition pursuit of the lib eral economic project necessitates the creation and support of a host of transnational economic actors In parallel with these developments in identity and economy liberal interstate societies will need to promote andor allow the development of a corresponding transnational civil society sufficient to carry the political burden created by moves into wider identities and more global markets And while liberal solidarist interstate societies will need to encourage transnational civil society the states composing them will need to adapt themselves by creating IGOs to deal with the forces of transnational uncivil society to which the pro cesses of integration also give space Amongst other things dealing with transnational uncivil society can lead to reformulations of the institu tion of war as visible in the post2001 war on terrorism Buzan 2003 Liberal solidarism will be unable to develop far unless the interstate 197 From International to World Society domain can carry with it degrees and types of interhuman and transna tional society appropriate to the degree and type of norms rules insti tutions and identities that they want to share amongst their members A liberal interstate society will require parallel developments of cos mopolitanism in the interhuman domain and of economic and civil so ciety actors in the transnational domain Without such developments the pursuit of the interstate project will be impossible beyond a rather basic level In a liberal perspective more interstate solidarism requires more cosmopolitanism in the interhuman domain and more TNAs and coop eration amongst TNAs to support it Conversely the desired cosmopoli tan developments in the interhuman and transnational domains cannot take place without the provision of law order and security from the in terstate domain Liberal solidarism develops as a close nexus amongst the three domains The EU provides an instructive case for investigating this liberal nexus Its ongoing debate about the tension between further integration oftheEUiedeepeningofitsinternationalandtransnationalsocietyon the one hand and the absence of any strong European identity amongst its citizens ie lagging development in the interhuman domain on the other Smith 1992 and the endless debates about the EUs sec ondary institutions from police to parliament all provide an advanced case study for looking at the development of liberal solidarism Among other things the EU case raises the question of where the driving forces for the development of international society are located The EU has been primarily stateled which explains why the interhuman domain is the laggard In other cases one might find the driving forces within the interhuman or transnational domains Through liberal lenses it looks to be the case that as one moves to wards the confederative end of the interstate society spectrum ever more room is created for interhuman and transnational society It also appears that the interstate development depends on progress in the other two and at least in the minds of the more extreme sorts of global ists that the processprogress mightshould if it has not already eventually topple the state as the dominant unit in the international sys tem That the three domains have historically interacted with each other is beyond question For example the present scale of interhuman soci eties was heavily shaped by the influence of earlier TNAs the Catholic and Orthodox churches and statesempires Rome China Abbasid In turn these collective actors depended in their time on being able to tie their own organisation and legitimacy to the structures of interhuman 198 The primary institutions of international society society In a realist world of competitive states national states those that make their subjects into citizens and define themselves in terms of pop ular sovereignty will outperform absolutist states both economically and militarily The dynamics of the interstate society will thus work to make interhuman society conform to its political geography both in terms of nationalism and wider interstate society developments such as the EU the West the Communist bloc etc But how the three do mains interact with each other depends on what sort of values are in play and where they are located Liberal values encourage a broadly complementary relationship amongst the three making developments in each dependent on matching developments in the other two But even within liberalism more contradictory readings are possible It can be argued that empowering transnational capitalist actors unleashes forces that not only assault patterns of identity in the interhuman do main but also tend to atomise the interhuman world into individuals consumers Capitalist transnationals can also be seen as contradic tory to the state tending to hollow it out and shrink its domains of legitimate action The liberal model in sum can raise a highly political agenda in which developments in one domain force quite extreme pat terns on the other two and the nature of these questions may well vary depending on the stage of development that liberalism is in whether national as in the nineteenth century or globalist as in the twenty first Similar sorts of thought exercises could be conducted for nonliberal international societies Islamic values for example could also be read as weakening the state domain by placing individual loyalty to the umma above the loyalty of citizens to states The ofttold story of how a West phalian statessystem emerged out of European medievalism displays similar tensions between the demands of a universal religion on the one hand and the demands of state sovereignty on the other In the political sphere there was a zerosum game between the emergent states and the Catholic church between the interstate and transnational domains of society It seems clear that in a communist interstate society there would be little or no room for TNAs and strong assaults on religious and na tional identities in the interhuman domain From the historical record classical empires tended to constrain the development of transnational economic actors and often did not care too much about patterns of iden tity in the interhuman domain being more concerned with obedience than identity In sum the liberal model is not the only template on which one can and should think about the relationship among the three 199 From International to World Society domains Even within the liberal model different interpretations of the relationship are possible according to which ideological perspective one takes on capitalism This brief look at alternatives also underlines the question about where the driving forces for the social structure of international sys tems are located Physical interaction capacity obviously matters for the technical ability to move goods people and information around the system conditions the opportunities of actors in all the domains and across all of history The work of tracing this factor across history has been done by Buzan and Little 2000 Beyond that the question of driv ing forces turns to which if any of the domains dominates the other two Is it that developments in the state pillar push and pull developments in the transnational and interhuman domains Or is it that autonomous developments in the interhuman domain the rise of a consciousness of being a member of humankind and the transnational one the rise of powerful TNAs of various kinds force the state domain to adapt Even within the liberal model this chickenegg problem presents itself Most realists will take the view that states are the drivers many glo balists that the interhuman and transnational domains are taking over Campaigners for solidarist developments will try to mobilise the in terhuman domain to influence the transnational one and use both to influence states Or depending on issues and circumstances they may try to mobilise the state to influence the transnational and interhuman domains Both the realist and globalist positions contain elements of the truth but the argument between them is more interesting as a political phenomenon than as an analytical question What is interesting analytically are the constraints and opportunities that developments in any one of these domains pose for the other two Embedded patterns in the interhuman domain might act as a brake on or a facilitator for developments towards deeper forms of interstate society the difference depending on the geographical overlap or not of the relevant patterns in the two domains A good example of this is the classical English school question about the relationship between interstate society and underlying cultural patterns The assumption was that an underlying civilisational pattern would facilitate the develop ment of an interstate society classical Greece earlymodern Europe whereas the lack thereof would be a problem the expansion of West ern interstate society to global scale Similarly the character of inter state society very much conditions the possibilities for TNAs but once they are established and powerful TNAs also condition and restrain the 200 The primary institutions of international society possibilities for interstate society The units in each domain have to op erate in the conditions created by the units in the other two domains but the units in each domain can up to a point and given time also shape the nature of the other two domains This is a highly dynamic universe in which agents and structure are engaged in a continuous game of mutual tensions and mutual constitutions Both complementarities and contradictions are possible Liberal solidarism must have supporting cosmopolitan and transnational developments A communist interstate society is hard to envisage in a world in which transnational actors are strong but a communist world society in which the communist party is the primary institution and the state has atrophied is just about possible to imagine In this sense it is difficult to imagine developments in any one domain getting too far out of line with developments in the other two and easy to see that some primary institutions necessarily extend beyond the strictly interstate domain The range of possibilities is large Some types of solidarist societies will require big developments in the transnational domain others not Although I have argued that there is a lot of room for interplay among the three domains it remains true in the contemporary world that states are still the most powerful and focused unit states can shove and shape the others more easily than they can be shoved and shaped by them But this is far from saying that states can shape the other two domains as they wish Change is at best slow and powers of resistance can be great Politics leadership imagination and a host of other factors affect the way in which the three domains play into each other and whether opportunities for change get taken up or whether possibilities for re sistance are effective or not It is probably not possible to postulate a mechanical set of relationships among the three domains What is pos sible is to set a mechanism of analysis that ensures that this relation ship and the changes in it become a central focus of any examina tion of international social structures I will have a first crack at this in chapter 8 The other question left over from chapter 4 was the fate of the terms international and world society World society disappeared in chapter 4 p 138 because of the decision to separate the interhuman and the transnational into two distinct analytical domains International so ciety has disappeared because the triad in figures 4 and 5 is now based on types of unit making the term interstate a necessary tightening up of usage and reflecting more traditional English school formulations such as society of states or statessystems The term international 201 From International to World Society though often used to mean interstate has always carried a certain ambi guity Buzan and Little 2000 323 which makes it awkward to use as a label for the strictly statebased domain But given that there does seem to be considerable institutional linkage among the three domains the ambiguity of international becomes useful There is a need for terms to encompass the complex patterns that result when one looks at the interhuman transnational and interstate domains all together Myproposalistouseinternationalsocietytoindicatesomethinglikethe arrangement that emerged during the twentieth century Mayall 2000 1725 where the basic political and legal frame is set by the states system with individuals and TNAs being given rights by states within the order defined by interstate society This would roughly accord with Jamess view cited above that individuals and TNAs are participants in international society rather than members of it or with the arguments in chapter 2 about individuals being dependent objects of international law rather than independent subjects of it with standing in their own right It also feels close to the alternative interpretation of Bull given on pp 956 where following his imperative about international order in the conditions prevailing in the early twentyfirst century could lead one to a Davosculture view of who it is that now provides it This usage takes advantage of both the ambiguity and the statecentrism built into the term international Defining international society in this way means that the term cannot be applied to the classical Westphalian period of European history The resolute pluralism of that period the relative ab sence of TNAs and political nationalism and the widespread disregard for the interhuman sector displayed by slavery imperial expropriation and on occasions genocide mark the Westphalian system as an inter state society well towards the Power Political side of the Coexistence model There may well have been some institutions in the interhuman and transnational domains but these would not have been closely tied into those in the interstate domain Following this reasoning world society then becomes a vehicle for dropping the assumption that states are the dominant units and inter state society the dominant domain In world societies no one of the three domains or types of unit is dominant over the other two but all are in play together This feels close to Bulls neomedieval idea and to that one of Vincents versions of world society that hinged on a rightsbased community among states individuals and TNAs see chapter 2 and GonzalezPelaez 2002 3841 2469 Buzan and Little 2000 3657 414 202 The primary institutions of international society discuss something close to it under the label postmodern international society Given my criticisms of Vincent for his lack of clarity about the boundary between international and world society this move will strike some readers as sweetly ironic But Vincent used world society in sev eral senses perhaps the main one taking off from the Wightian idea of opposition to international society The usage proposed here does maintain the same blurring of boundaries between international and world society in traditional English school usage but it proceeds from a position in which the traditional meanings of international and world society have been abandoned Neither does it carry any of Vincents and Wights sense of opposition to andor exclusion from interstate society A world society in my sense would be based on principles of functional differentiation amongst the various types of entities in play and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of unit in relation both to each other and to different types States and firms for example would have to accept the historical evidence that neither performs efficiently when it tries to do the others job and that their respective legal rights and obligations need to be clearly demar cated Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as hold ing legal and political status independently not as a gift from either of the others Individuals and firms would thus become subjects of inter national law in their own right Humankind has not yet seen a world society in this sense though the EU may be heading in that direction Such a development is certainly within the range of imagination and it presents a far more plausible and engaging goal than the oversimplifica tions of anarchists hyperliberals hyperglobalists and dyedinthewool realists who can only see the future in terms of the victory of one domain over the others Using these definitions international and world society come back into play carrying specific clearly defined meanings and representing an important distinction of relevance to contemporary world politics That said one might still complain rightly that my definitions leave gaps in the labelling scheme Logically one would also have to have la bels for situations in which either of the nonstate domains dominated over the other two It might also be possible to imagine situations in which one would simply need to discuss the three domains separately without bundling them together in some linking classification For the reasons already argued in chapter 4 scenarios of nonstate dominance are hard to imagine and seem unlikely Unbundled scenarios probably 203 From International to World Society require introduction of the geographic variable which is the subject of chapter 7 On reflection therefore it seems to me that interstate inter national and world society plus the option to discuss interstate inter human and transnational separately cover almost all of the interesting cases whether historical contemporary or foreseeable within the next few decades 204 7 Bringing geography back in Throughout the previous chapters I have registered a steady drumbeat of dissatisfaction with the combination of neglect and resistance that marks the attitude of most classical English school writers towards the subglobalregional level Subglobal and regional manifestations of in ternational social structure have either been marginalised by a focus on global scale and universal principles or resisted because seen as threats to the development of global scale international society Wights and Watsons explorations of historical statessystems do not count because most of those systems were substantially selfcontained and not part of a global scale interstatesystem I am not the only dissatisfied customer of the classical English school tradition in this regard Zhang 2002 6 notes that A cursory survey of the existing literature reveals a strange silence on the part of International Society scholars on regionalism Deliberations by scholars of the English School on regional levels of international society in the twentieth century are until very recently muted if not entirely invisible Such silence is best reflected in an important essay on regionalism in 1995 by Andrew Hurrell The comprehensive survey of Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective conducted by Hurrell contains no specific mentioning of either the English school or International Society perspective It is remarkable that Hedley Bull is mentioned only once towards the end of his book as that archregional sceptic Fawcett and Hurrell 1995 327 Even critical International Society as summarized nicely by Dunne 1995 does not seem to have made much dent on the studies of regionalism Zhangs point is underlined by the fact that Hurrell is a leading figure among contemporary English school writers Zhang 2002 7 goes on to note that the main concern of English school writers has been to study 205 From International to World Society how a group of states come to form a society when they develop distinc tive norms common rules and institutions and when they perceive themselves to have common purpose in international life and to share the workings of common institutions for the conduct of their relations Since there is nothing in this definition that excludes the regional he puzzles quite rightly as to why interest has not been applied at the regional level when there are many interesting and distinctive cases to be found there It is certainly fair to point the finger at Bull as mainly responsible for this state of affairs But it is worth noting that his oftencited 1982 article on Civilian Power Europe should not be taken as exemplary for that attitude either generally or in relation to the English schools neglect of the EU Bulls argument was not about regional international society at all It was about global Cold War power politics His aim was to reject the idea of civilian power Europe as a significant actor on the global stage and to call for more development of the EU particularly in foreign and defence policy in order to give it the wherewithal to distance itself from the US Despite its importance the question of subglobal manifestations of social structure in the international system has had to be left until near the end of this book because it was necessary first to develop the ana lytical tools that I propose should be used to examine such structures at any level global or regional Now it is time to bring geography back in At this point it will come as no surprise to readers that I plan to make a strong case for reversing the neglect of subglobal develop ments in interstate and interhuman society that has marked English school analyses of the contemporary international system In the next section I make the case that exclusion of the subglobal is simply not necessary within the terms of English school theory and that taking the regional level on board opens up a rich set of cases both for com parative purposes and to help in thinking about theory In the second section I argue that confining the debate about secondorder society to the global level has fed pessimistic pluralist interpretations of interstate society and starved optimistic solidarist ones In the third I show how this confinement has sealed off the possibility of exploring how differ ences in territoriality affect the classical literatures concerns about the interplay of international and world society In the fourth I develop the idea that the subglobal level is essential for revealing what might be called a vanguard theory about how international society spreads and grows Such a theory is implicit in the English schools account of the 206 Bringing geography back in expansion of contemporary international society but with the excep tion of an oblique presence in Watsons concern with hegemony absent from its main theoretical works A reluctance to confront coercion as a mechanism explains some of this disjuncture but much is also explained by failure to give the subglobal its proper place in the theory Exclusive globalism is not necessary The question of whether international and world society must be con sidered only as universal global scale phenomena has already been given a quite thorough airing in the section on levels in chapter 1 pp 1618 The underlying issue is the scale or scales on which it is appropriate to think about interstate interhuman and transnational so cieties In English school thinking the assumption of global scale arose from a combination of the history of the expansion of European interna tional society the influence of universal normative principles in political theory a fear amplified by the Cold War that subglobal developments would necessarily undermine global ones and a blindness to empirical developments of international society in the world economy In their defence it might be argued that for most of the classical English school writers decolonisation was a central event defining the context of their writing and at least initially decolonisation seemed more a globallevel event than a regional one Among nonEnglish school thinkers about world society enthusiasm for global scale seems to stem mainly from a desire to generate a holistic conception of the international system broadly compatible with a globalisation perspective The first thing to note is that an attack on the global scale requirement is not an attack on holism per se The goal remains that of building up a complete picture of the social structure of the international system and the global level is a key component of that picture But to restrict the concepts of macrosocial structure to the global level is to crush the re quirements of empirical and theoretical enquiry under the demands of a normative agenda The classic English school definition of international society has as its referent a group of states or more generally a group of independent political communities which leaves entirely open the question of scale Other traditions of theoretical enquiry within and around IR from balance of power and polarity through regime theory to Wallersteins world systems and world empires all apply their key concepts to either the systemic or the subsystemic level Interestingly Bullsinfrequentlyciteddefinitionofworldsocietyunlikehisfrequently 207 From International to World Society cited one of international society does make the global requirement ex plicit no doubt reflecting its origins in cosmopolitan thinking about the totality of humankind By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built The concept of world society in this sense stands to the totality of global social interaction as our concept of international society stands to the concept of the international system Bull 1977a 279 my italics Whatever the reasons for it this strong bias towards globalist universalist requirements for international and world society and against the subglobal level has to be discarded if English school theory is to develop its full potential It is perhaps not going too far to say that blindness towards the subglobal level whether in interstate terms or in interhuman andor transnational ones is the most damaging legacy that the classical English school writers left to their successors Looking first at the interstate domain it is perfectly clear that a global scalepluralistinterstatesocietyexistsonthebasisofeffectivelyuniversal acceptance of basic Westphalian institutions such as sovereignty terri toriality diplomacy and international law But it is just as clear that this global society is unevenly developed to a very marked degree Moving on from Vincents famous eggbox metaphor of international society in which states were the eggs and international society the box one might see this unevenness as a pan of fried eggs Although nearly all the states in the system belong to a thin pluralist interstate society the layer of eggwhite there are subglobal andor regional clusters sitting on that common substrate that are both much more thickly developed than the global common and up to a point developed separately and in different ways from each other the yolks The EU East Asia and North America for example all stand out as subglobal interstate societies that are more thickly developed within themselves Yet even though a great deal of their extra thickness arises from similar concerns to facilitate economic exchange these three are quite sharply differentiated from each other in the modes and values that bind them Helleiner 1994 The EU is heavily institutionalised and pursuing both social market and single market ob jectives Its attempt to move beyond Westphalian international politics has produced perhaps the only example of a convergence interstate so ciety ever seen and the only one that even begins to approach a world 208 Bringing geography back in society as I have defined that term NAFTA is less ambitious organ ised mainly around a set of neoliberal rules and has no commitment to equalisationorfactormovementEastAsiahasfewinstitutionsorformal rules and is largely organised by statesanctioned private capital and a tiered system of development Lesser attempts to create thicker liberal regional interstateinternational societies by cultivating joint economic development can be found in Mercosur and various other regional eco nomic cooperations Above some of these regional efforts one can find larger looser thinner versions of the same thing labelled the West or the Atlantic Community or the AsiaPacific A quite different form of relative thickness compared to the global common reflecting concern with more political andor cultural values could no doubt be found by looking at the arrangements of ASEAN or among the community of Islamic states or the Arab League Subglobal developments that are just different rather than thicker are perhaps exemplified by the con tested versions of human rights rooted in the West Islam and various Asian cultures There is thus strong empirical evidence particularly but not only in the economic sector that distinctive development of interstate societies is flourishing at the subglobal level What is more this evidence sug gests a rather balanced assessment of how subglobal developments might impact on global interstate society As the fried eggs metaphor emphasises there is no simple eitheror choice about global and sub global developments In the contemporary international system the thinner global interstate society is shared by all and the subglobal developments build on top of that A secondorder pluralism is pos sible when subglobal interstate societies seek rules of coexistence with each other at the global level There are clearly no grounds for any au tomatic assumption that subglobal developments must fall into rivalry with each other and so weaken global social developments This can happen as the Cold War showed all too clearly especially when rival ideologies are in play Fear of conflict across levels can certainly be found in that body of mostly liberal concerns that regional economic blocs will undermine the liberal international economic order at the global level creating some kind of replay of the 1930s But against this is the argument that regional economic groupings are mainly responses to the global economic order and that their existence may well serve to stabilise that order against the periodic instabilities that affect the trad ing and financial arrangements of all liberal economic orders Short of that such blocs offer options to strengthen the position of participating 209 From International to World Society states within the global economy so creating synergies rather than con tradictions between the two levels The need to look at the subglobal level is just as obvious if one turns to world society or what I recast in chapter 4 and figure 5 as interhu man and transnational society Recall that interhuman society is largely about collective identity Looking at the interhuman domain through this lens what one sees in a very broad brush picture is an inverse correlation between scale on the one hand and the intensity of shared identity on the other Families clans tribes and nations mostly shine strongly whereas humankind or members of the planetary ecosystem are still little more than background glow albeit up from nothing in the quite recent past There are exceptions to this pattern Some na tional identities embrace huge numbers of people and large territories A handful of religions most notably Christianity and Islam have suc ceeded in creating vast subsystemic communities Some civilisations Western Confucian hold a similarly sized scale but less intensely In matters of identity parochialism still rules Despite some breakthroughs to larger scale universal scale identity remains strikingly weak In mat ters of identity the subglobal yolks rest only on the very thin substrate of white provided by the general acceptance that all human beings are equal Transnational society is almost by definition less amenable to geo graphicalclassificationthaneitherinterhumanorinterstatesocietyNev ertheless and again in very broad brush the view is one in which higher intensities of norms rules and institutions are found on the smaller scales than on the larger ones Clubs firms lobbies associations and suchlike are all more intensely organised locally than globally But in the transnational realm of society it is possible to achieve large even global scale in an extremely thin way Some firms and INGOs do this and be hind them and expanding fast through the internet is a huge array of interest groups of many kinds now able to organise in real time on a global scale even for relatively tiny numbers of people The network of scholars interested in the English school for example amounts to several hundred people at best yet having members on all continents can plausibly claim to be global In the transnational domain however these numerous globalisms tend to be separate rather than coordinated In terms of the classifications in figure 5 the bulk of what one would find would be located in competing TNAs eg firms and coalitions of like TNAs eg global umbrella bodies for all political science associations 210 Bringing geography back in or all banks with some development of TNA coalitions across type eg the antiglobalisation movement There are thus many globalisms in the transnational domain but the global level as such is interesting more for how these many TNAs interplay with interstate society than how they interplay with each other In sum the subglobal level is thickly occupied regardless of whether one looks at the interstate interhuman or transnational domain Inter estingly echoing the insight of Williams 2001 the global level is rea sonably well developed only in the interstate domain The diplomatic and political structure of global international society and the regimes and institutions of the global economy are altogether more substantial than either the faint glow of shared identity as humankind or the distant prospect of either a pure transnational society or a world society All of this suggests a serious need to take the subglobal level of inter state and international society on board in English school thinking The combination of antiregionalism and antieconomic predispositions in classical English school writing has meant that a rich array of empirical developments has been neglected This is bad enough in itself but it also represents three more serious losses First it means that a whole set of opportunities for the comparative study of contemporary international society has been ignored Diez and Whitman 2000 2002 Zhang 2002 Second it means that the interplay between empirical studies and the development of theory has been substantially impoverished As Ratner 1998 71 767 notes for example the regional level often generates much more robust mechanisms for enforcement the key test of soli darism in the English school classics than can be found on the global level This impoverishment is most obvious in the neglect of the EU If the EU is not the thickest most ambitious and most highly developed interstate society ever seen then it is difficult to imagine what it is As such study of it should be playing a leading role in thinking about how solidaristinterstatesocietiesparticularlyliberalonescandevelopwhat problems arise as they get thicker and where the boundary is between a convergence interstate society on the one hand and the creation of a new actor at the global level on the other The EU not only raises many of the classical questions of English school theory about pluralism versus solidarism and international versus world society but also provides a mine of empirical cases and evidence against which the debates about theory can be sharpened Better theory might then allow the English school to play a constructive role in the debates about the EU 211 From International to World Society The third and perhaps most serious loss from the neglect of sub global developments is that it has sustained an emaciated conceptual isation of what the whole idea of internationalworld society is about Secondorder society at the global level is almost inevitably thin but subglobal developments may well be much thicker The whole frame work of interstate interhuman and transnational societies needs to be understood as the interplay between subglobal and global levels As I will show in the next three sections bringing the regional level back in changes both the structural and the normative frameworks of debate about contemporary international society Unwarranted pessimism I argued in chapter 1 that in several ways the pluralists within the English school have virtually determined a pessimistic evaluation of international society from the way they have set up the problem Their ignoring of the economic sector and other areas of solidarist devel opment was discussed in chapter 5 Given the predisposition of most English school writers to focus on the global level and given that for much of the nineteenth century and again increasingly so since the later twentieth century the economic sector has functioned strongly at the global level this omission is to say the least odd It was perhaps understandable during the Cold War when the principles of global eco nomic organisation were a central part of what was under dispute but this does not forgive its general neglect In this section I want to draw attention to two other sources of pluralist pessimism both of which relate to an excessive focus on the global level though going in quite different directions The first is relatively simple involving a privileging of the global level by either neglect of or hostility to subglobal societal developments The problem generated by this move is that it makes the test for solidarist international society so hard that pessimismpluralism becomes the obvious conclusion especially so in the absence of the economic sector Current examples of this mode of thinking are recent books by Jackson 2000 and Mayall 2000 Solidarism is firmly located in the idea that humanity is one Mayall 2000 14 and then rejected on the grounds that there is too much diversity and too little democracy in the human condition to sustain solidarist goals The second is more complicated involving what seems to me to be a gross misreading of nineteenthcentury interstate society as being thicker and stronger than it actually was The consequence of this 212 Bringing geography back in move is unwarranted pessimism in evaluations of how interstate and international society have evolved both globally and regionally since then MostEnglishschoolwritershaveeitherignoredtheregionallevelorif theyhavepaidattentiontoithaveseenitinnegativeoppositionalterms in relation to the development of global international society Neglect seemstoderivemostlyfromtransposingaconcernwithuniversalvalues into an assumption that the relevant domain must be the global one This screens out places where major solidarist developments have in fact occurred most obviously within the EU and NAFTA but also within the wider Western community and not insignificantly in South America Mercosur South East Asia ASEAN and to a lesser exent among the Islamic states As a result it sets an extremely high standard for any sense of progress towards solidarism by demanding that it occur on a global scale Following Zhangs reasoning I can think of no good reason why this practice should be sustained Easier to understand is the fear that subsystem developments would necessarily or even just probably be subversive of international order This fear was one of the themes that came out of the discussion of Bull and Vincent in chapter 2 and it can also be found in Brown 1995a 1956 Such fears perhaps made sense to those responding to the con ditions of the Cold War when interstate society was polarised into com peting camps It is certainly true that having two or more different sub global interstate societies in play at the same time entails a risk that they will fall into conflict But if it is posed as a general principle that sub global developments in the social structure of the international system must necessarily or probably be in contradiction to globallevel ones then this idea needs to be questioned As a general principle it commits the same error as realist assumptions that powers must necessarily be in conflict There are two other possibilities One is that different subglobal interstate societies will find ways to coexist a kind of secondorder version of pluralism This possibility is enhanced by the fact that sub global interstate societies may well share a common substrate building differences on top of certain shared norms rules and institutions Even the Cold War particularly its detente phases can be understood in this way Neither side abandoned key shared primary institutions such as sovereignty diplomacy international law or the primacy of great pow ers and together they pursued some significant measures of coexistence most notably in arms control The third possibility that could overlap with either of the other two is that subglobal developments of interstate 213 From International to World Society society serve as the basis for a process of vanguardled strengthening of interstate society at the global level A very plausible case can be made that social developments are most easily nurtured subsystemically and spread from there to the global level Indeed the surprise here is that the English schools whole account of the expansion of interstate soci ety over the last two centuries is quite hard to read in any other way and the same goes for the Stanford school Everything from antislavery to Westphalian modes of diplomacy and recognition followed a van guardist pattern It cannot be denied that such uneven development raises the possibility of conflict But it also raises the opportunity for the mechanisms of socialisation and competition with or without elements of coercion to spread a variety of norms rules and institutions up to the global level Seen in this perspective there is as much reason for op timism as pessimism in subglobal developments of interstate society More on vanguardism in the last section of this chapter The second source of pessimism arises from an idealised reading of nineteenthcentury interstate society and a consequently bleak view of its twentiethcentury successor Miller 1990 747 Bull and others see the nineteenth century as the high point of interstate society be cause the relatively coherent and welldeveloped interstate society of the European subsystem held sway over the entire planet During the nineteenth century there was a quite strong commitment by the great powers to a set of shared values and this was reinforced by a com mon EuropeanChristian culture On this basis Bull and others take a rather depressed view of subsequent developments They see decoloni sation as not only bringing a host of weak states into interstate society but also as undermining its civilisational coherence by the inevitable introduction of a multicultural social background In this perspective decolonisation at best diluted and at worst corroded the stock of shared values on which interstate society rests The descent of Europe into its civil war of 191445 and the fragmentation of the West into ideological factions representing opposed views about the future of industrial soci ety liberal democracy communism fascism compounded the problem of weakened shared values and shrank the area of consensus amongst the great powers This process culminated in the Cold War in which a zerosum ideological confrontation between two superpowers drove global interstate society to the margins by unleashing and legitimising a host of mutually exclusive and competitive social values Bull 1977 3840 25760 31517 Kedourie 1984 Bozeman 1984 Bull and Watson 1984b 42535 214 Bringing geography back in In my view this perspective is not only ethnocentrically narrow and misleadingly gloomy but also fundamentally mistaken about what in terstate society is and how it develops It is certainly true that the Euro pean ascendency created a global imperium and thus an exceptionally high level of societal homogeneity amongst the dominant powers It is also true that this imperium set the conditions for a global interstate so ciety both by intensifying the density of the system and by making all parts of it deeply aware that they were locked into a pattern of interac tion powerful enough to shape the major conditions of their societal and political survival But this imperium can only itself be called a global international or even interstate society at risk of ignoring the huge in equalities of political and legal status between the colonisers and the colonised To assume that imposed values represent a strong society in the same sense that shared values do is to ignore Wendts insight that it matters whether shared values are put and kept in place by coercion calculation or belief It is also to ignore the idea essential not just to any progressive view of interstate society but also to the more conservative Westphalian model of such societies that some substantial perception of equalstatusmustexistamongstitsmembersKeenes20002002ideaof colonial international society and Holstis 2002 idea that colonialism was up to the Second World War an institution of interstate society both suggest a need to consider more of a disjuncture than is acknowledged in The Expansion of International Society between the interstate society that emerged after 1945 and the one that preceded it At the very least as noted in chapter 6 there was a major change in the core institutions of interstate society before and after the Second World War as colonialism became obsolete and sovereign equality became universal The lack of sovereign equality on a global scale until decolonisation occurred meant that there was no truly global Westphalian interstate society before 1945 The nineteenth century represented not a global interstate society but a mostly imperial global extension of a largely regional European inter state society On this basis comparing late twentiethcentury interstate society with its nineteenthcentury predecessor assumes a false conti nuity at the global level and is not comparing like with like Seen from this perspective many of the reasons for pessimism about the condition of contemporary interstate society disappear There has been no great decline of coherence and homogeneity during the twen tieth century because there was no real peak of these things at the end of the nineteenth Colonial interstate society might have been more ho mogenous among the Western states but half the world was coerced 215 From International to World Society into a subordinate position What we have witnessed during the twen tieth century is a huge process of transformation A narrowly based coercive global imperium collapsed and was replaced by a thin global interstate society resting largely on voluntary acceptance of Westphalian primary institutions Keene 2002 The sources of global interaction are now located all through the system rather than being located primarily in one part of it and most of the units in the system relate to each other voluntarily as legal equals rather than as a coerced hierarchy of states mandates protectorates dependencies and colonies It might be ob jected that the formal position of legal equality still allows huge amounts of practical inequality between core and periphery While this is true there is nevertheless a profound difference between secondorder soci eties in which the formal position is one of legal equality and those in which it is not Indeed the shift from colonial interstate society to global Westphalian norms might be counted as a gigantic progessive step in twentiethcentury international history This new global interstate soci ety was born out of the collapse of the old one and in many important ways was created by it The European imperium generated the need for a global interstate society and provided much of the political form within which it took shape The question is therefore not how much ground has been lost since the heyday of European power but what legacy was left by the old interstate society for the new How much of European interstate society did the nonEuropean states accept and how much did they reject The main reason for thinking that interstate society is in relatively good shape by historical standards is the near universal acceptance of the sovereign territorial state as the fundamental unit of political le gitimacy This expansion can be seen as the great though unintended political legacy of the European imperium So successful was the Euro pean state in unleashing human potential that it overwhelmed all other forms of political organisation in the system To escape from European domination it was necessary to adopt European political forms Some achieved this by copying others had it imposed on them by the process of decolonisation As even Bull and Watson 1984b 4345 acknowl edge much of European interstate society was accepted by the rest of the world when they achieved independence The key primary insti tutions of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy international law and nationalism became accepted worldwide And this argument can be ex tended to tackle at least some of the concerns about multiculturalism 216 Bringing geography back in weakening the cultural foundations of interstate society Certainly there is less cultural cohesion underpinning contemporary global interstate society than there was behind the European colonial interstate society of the nineteenth century But the European imperium left behind more than just a global acceptance of the sovereign state and pluralist inter state society It also embedded nationalism science the idea of progress and more recently the market as more or less universally accepted ideas about human social organisation Without adopting this wider set al most no state can either compete effectively in power terms or establish a genuine legitimacy with its own population Buzan and Segal 1998a The existence of this Westernistic culture does not eliminate the prob lems of multiculturalism But it does represent a substantial transforma tion in the cultural underpinnings of interstate society that should not be ignored in assessments of progress Understanding the interplay among the interhuman transnational and interstate domains The argument for bringing geography back in is essential if one is to pursue the layered understanding of international social structure de veloped in this book The key point emerged in chapter 4 in the context of the discussion about differentiating society and community Weller 2000 648 noted that the relationship between society and community depends significantly on whether their geographical boundaries are the same or different Bringing the geography of society and community into line has of course been the driving rationale behind the nationstate Where community and society occupy the same space as in a classical nationstate the element of identity eg nationalism may well play a crucial role in balancing some of the divisive effects of society and pol itics eg the class antagonism generated by capitalist economies the need for political parties to play the role of loyal opposition when out of power But where identity and society are not in the same space as in the contemporary problematique of globalisation they might well be antagonistic forces eg nationalist reactions against economic liber alism Similarly in Wightian mode the community element of civili sations represented by shared culture and identity may well facilitate the development of interstate and transnational society It is less clear why the community elements of cosmopolitanism feared by Bull should 217 From International to World Society contradict the society elements of interstate society unless values such as human rights are imposed by coercion on those not accepting them The case that community facilitates the formation of a secondorder society looks relatively easy to make Whether or not secondorder so ciety necessarily or even usually leads towards the formation of com munity is a much more open question Wellers question is a neat way of formulating the many agonisings of the English school about the expansion of European interstate society into areas not sharing the history of European civilisation It is also a way of addressing the English schools reluctance to talk about regional interstate societies as anything other than a threat to global interstate society His insight it seems to me should be one of the starting points for enquiry about the contemporary condition of and prospects for the social structure of the international system To understand the social structure of the international system at the global level requires that one also understand what is going on at the levels beneath Translating Wellers question into the framework developed in this book requires not only looking at how geography operates within each of the three domains interhuman transnational interstate but also picking up his core concern about how it operates across the three domains Within the interstate domain geography plays in two primary ways first in the relationship between the global and subglobal levels and second in the relationship between different subglobal interstate so cieties Both of these types of relationship can range along the spec trum from antagonistic at one end through indifferent in the middle to complementary at the other end Where the relationships are on the indifferenttocomplementary side then geography will mostly be of descriptive use in identifying distributional patterns For example the subglobal Islamic interhuman society and the interstate society in East Asia are for the most part indifferent to each other and both are broadly complementary to the global international society But where the re lationships are on the indifferenttoantagonistic side then geography becomes central to understanding the dynamics of the international so cial structure as a whole One example of tension between the subglobal and global levels is the interplay between the economic and social lib eral agendas of Western interstate society on the one hand and the more Westphalian pluralist norms of global interstate society on the other Western liberalism threatens the sovereignty territoriality and borders of those who do not agree with its values Examples of antagonism be tween different subglobal interstate societies can be found in the story 218 Bringing geography back in of how European interstate society ran up against and eventually over whelmed the imperial suzerainvassal societies of Asia and also in the competition between East and West during the Cold War The interplay between subglobal and global interstate societies also allows a much more nuanced and useful view of the heated debate about intervention The question of intervention blends elements of norma tive and legal debate and connects both to current affairs Is interven tion a right or a duty and for what ends and with what effects Given the arguments around the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 the subject is as important possibly more important now than in the past and is likely to remain a key focus of the English school agenda If it is pos sible to build distinctive subglobalregional international societies on the common foundations provided by global international society then this arrangement frames the issue of intervention in the form of three questions 1 How legitimatelegal is intervention within the global rules and norms ie the lowest common denominator of interstate society 2 How legitimatelegal is intervention within the rules and norms of a given subglobalregional interstate society such as EUEurope or the Arab League 3 How legitimatelegal is intervention across the boundary between distinctive subglobalregional interstate societies eg from the West into Africa Asia or the Middle East Questions about the legitimacy and legality of intervention relate so intimately to the issue of sovereignty that it is impossible to separate them But sovereignty means different things at the pluralist and soli darist ends of interstate society In a pure Westphalian interstate society virtually all intervention is both illegal and illegitimate except against forces aiming to disrupt or overthrow the interstate order In a thick solidarist international society such as that represented by the EU the agreed unpacking of sovereignty and the establishment of agreements about elements of justice and the rights of individuals and nonstate ac tors makes many more kinds of intervention both legal and legitimate There may be many inbetween cases where legality and legitimacy part company as in aspects of the recent Western interventions in Iraq and the Balkans Wheeler 2000 Since interstate society is de facto dif ferentiated quite radically at the regional level it is absurd to confine a discussion of the de jure aspects of intervention by imposing an as sumption that interstate society is a single globalscale phenomenon 219 From International to World Society Each intervention has to be considered in relation to the specific charac teristics of its location and whether it is within a subregional society or crosses boundaries between such societies If NATOs intervention in former Yugoslavia had been presented and understood as an affair of EuropeanWestern interstate society it would have triggered much less resistance from China and others who feared it might be setting a global precedent In the interhuman domain geography also plays quite strongly be cause patterns of collective identity often cluster Most national identi ties are geographically clustered to a substantial degree as to a lesser extent are most religious and civilisational identities Since individual humans often hold more than one identity simultaneously the question is how the patterns of distribution overlap and which takes priority as a mobiliser or legitimator of political action Some identities will fit inside others like Russian dolls eg Danish within Scandinavian within Eu ropean within Western whereas others may be relatively diffuse and have complicated patterns of overlap eg religious identities in relation to ethnonational ones The transnational domain does not easily lend itself to geographical thinking The key questions for TNAs is not about their geographical distribution but about the thinnessthickness of their relationship to geography As already noted TNAs of various kinds might all be able to claim global or regional standing the English school network FIFA Ford yet with huge variation in the actual substantive content of that claim quite large for Ford and FIFA pretty thin for the English school network For the transnational domain the question of geography be comes more interesting in the relationship among the three domains It is when one turns to the interplay among the three domains that Wellers concern about how patterns of identity interact with patterns shaped mainly by contractual bargains comes mainly into focus In the classical English school literature this concern took the form of three questions r was it a necessary precondition for the formation of an interstate soci ety that it be underpinned by a preexisting common culture as had been the case for ancient Greece and modern Europe r did the expansion of an interstate society beyond the area of its original common culture necessarily mean that expansion came at the expense of cohesion as the pluralists think about decolonisation and 220 Bringing geography back in r did the rise of cosmopolitan values necessarily threaten the founda tions of interstate society most particularly with respect to human rights These questions remain valid and it is not difficult to fit plenty of other contemporary questions about both policy and theory into this heading The problem of how to press on with European integration when the interstate mechanisms have outrun the rather weak sense of European identity amongst the peoples of the EU is one of the most obvious Another the globalisation problematique is how to sustain the economic liberalisation being driven by the core states and firms when its culturally homogenising consequences trigger nationalist re actions Huntingtons 1996 worrying clash of civilisations thesis fits here made all the more alarming by the escalation of securitisation be tween the Islamic world and the West that followed on from 11 Septem ber the breakdown of the peace process between Israel and the Pales tinians and the US invasion of Iraq So too do his incisive observations Huntington 1996 13554 about torn states such as Russia Turkey Mexico and Australia unsure of which civilisation they belong to and cleft states such as Israel Sudan and Sri Lanka divided by starkly different identities in the interhuman domain Also under this heading are things such as Asian values and the ASEAN way panArabism panIslamism and panAfricanism and any other attempts to ascribe a political quality to a cultural zone In a general sense all of this can be understood as being about how political economic and cultural geography play into each other At the macrolevel interest focuses on the relationship between the larger pat terns in the interhuman domain and the subglobal and global social structures in the interstate domain Do subglobal interstate develop ments follow the cultural patterns in the interhuman domain as they appear to do for example with the West and if so how closely tied are these two factors How does the existence of only a very weak identity at the level of humankind constrain the possibilities for in terstate and transnational society at the global level Conversely how does the operation of interstate and transnational society affect the rise and demise of identities in the interhuman domain Does the existence of global TNAs and of a global interstate society cultivate the growth of universal human identity or stimulate localist reactions and identity differentiations or both 221 From International to World Society Wellers implicit hypothesis is that identity on the one hand and the machineries of rational contractual relations on the other more easily reinforce each other when they occupy the same territorial space and provide grounds for conflict when they do not This idea and its ac companying assumption that the three domains are generally present in any largescale social structure seems an excellent starting point for almost any enquiry into the social structure of the international system More on this in chapter 8 Conclusions a vanguard theory of international social structures A crucial reason for bringing the subglobal level into English school theory is to open up space for a vanguard explanation of the dynam ics of international social structure By vanguard I mean the idea com mon to both military strategy and Leninist thinking that a leading ele ment plays a crucial role in how a social movement unfolds As noted above a vanguard theory of how interstate society expands is implicit in the way the English school has presented the story of the expansion of EuropeanWestern interstate society to global scale In historical terms the development of a global interstate society has been a function of the expansion of the West From the fifteenth century onwards the rise of European power first eroded and then crushed the longstanding configuration of four substantially selfcontained civilisational areas in Europe the Middle East South Asia and East Asia Buzan and Little 2000 241345 By the end of the nineteenth century virtually the whole of the international system was either created in the image of Europe as in the Americas and Australia or directly subordinated to Europe as in the African and Asian colonies or hellbent on catching up with Europe as in Japan Russia and more slowly China The triumph of European power meant not only that a sharp and apparently permanent rise in the level of interaction and thus density and interdependence took place but also that Western norms and values and institutions dominated the whole system This mixture of coercion and copying and persuasion as already noted runs in very close parallel to Waltzs idea that anarchy generates like units through processes of socialisation and competi tion Although the story of the expansion of interstate society is part of the English schools stockintrade no attempt seems to have been made to develop a vanguard explanation about the development of 222 Bringing geography back in interstateinternational society as such Suganami 2002 14 hints at the subglobal possibilities with his talk of a solidarist core or pockets and the idea that pluralism might evolve into solidarism but does not attempt to link these two arguments Yet looking back on this history it is difficult to come to any conclusion other than that Europe played the vanguard role for the development of contemporary interstate society Vanguard explanations not only fit well with the history of interstate society they also create grounds for opposing the assumption that subglobal developments of interstate society must necessarily be contradictory to globallevel ones regional developments might not be mainly problematic for global ones but possibly essential to them In addition such explanations give open examination to the role of coercion in interstate society The danger of accepting vanguard explanations is well known from the Marxist experience namely that claims to be the wave of the future and the justification of violent means on that basis can be made by extremists of all sorts In this application there is also a risk that vanguardism privileges the influence of the powerful eg the West and obscures the contribution of oppositional forces eg anticolonial movements Used in historical perspective a vanguard explanation for the devel opmentofcontemporaryinterstatesocietybringsintofocusasetofprob lematic normative issues surrounding the role of coercion In so doing it picks up the questions raised by Wendt and discussed in chapters 4 and 5 about the binding forces that hold the shared values and practices of any society in place Quite explicit in the vanguard story of global in terstate society is the role of violence and coercion in spreading to global scale norms rules and institutions developed in Europe Also explicit in that story despite the misgivings of many English school writers about the consequences of decolonisation for interstate society is that several of the values that were carried outward by the force of West ern military superiority have over time become internalised by those peoples on whom they were originally imposed Nationalism territorial sovereignty international law diplomacy and science are the most obvi ous examples joined more recently and perhaps still controversially by the market However morally distasteful it may be to acknowledge the efficacy of coercion in shaping values it nonetheless remains true that most of these values are unquestionably now universally held values in interstate society They are no longer held in place mainly if at all by force but in many places have become internalised as widespread be liefs especially diplomacy science nationalism international law and 223 From International to World Society sovereignty The market is still held in place coercively in some parts of the system and by calculation in others but it too has a substantial worldwide constituency of believers more numerous and more influen tial in some places than in others What starts out as imperial imposition canbecomeinternalisedandacceptedbythoseonwhomitwasimposed though there is nothing inevitable about this and imposition can just as easily breed rejection as the demise of the Soviet Union demonstrated Where the values imposed by coercion bring improvement to the lives of peoples whether in terms of wealth or power or social cohesion then they have a chance of enduring beyond the coercion that originally carried them In addition to the obvious moral reservations it might also be objected that this vanguard interpretation is of only historical interest Can it be dismissed as a kind of oneoff experience no longer really relevant in an age in which imperial conquest has become not just unfashionable but also substantially illegal Any such opinion would in my view be mistaken While it may be true that vanguardism will no longer be driven primarily by military conquest the US occupation of Iraq in 2003 with its aim of promoting democracy in the Arab world certainly fits in the vanguardist mould and will be a very interesting test of whether coercion can change values Yet unless there is a major breakdown of the present interstate order the extension of interstate society by mili tary means will be confined to relatively marginal cases such as Serbia Afghanistan Iraq and possibly North Korea Vanguardism can work in other ways especially so when the distribution of power in the in ternational system remains markedly uneven The neoimperial qualities inherent in the present condition of interstate society are noticed by Nye 19901667whenhearguesthattheUSneedstoestablishinternational norms consistent with its society and get other countries to want what it wants A more coercive interpretation of this view has emerged in the Bush administration post 11 September A lopsided distribution of power enables the strong to impose themselves on the weak through all kinds of softer forms of coercion usually labelled conditionality and applied in relation to access to diplomatic recognition aid loans markets weapons and memberships of various IGOs most obviously NATO EU WTO This type of coercion is especially effective if the strong are not ideologically divided among themselves as they were for much of the twentieth century but all more or less on board in their own subglobal interstateinternational society If the social structure of the international system has a strong coreperiphery form where the 224 Bringing geography back in core is relatively homogenous then imposition of a standard of civili sation is much facilitated After the end of the Cold War there was some prospect that a fairly homogenous core would become a durable feature but with the diplo matic disarray surrounding the war against Iraq in 2003 this looks at the time of writing April 2003 to be less likely If the US persists in pur suing a project of neoimperial vanguardism it may have to rely more on the lopsided distribution of power than on a consensus backed by a concert of the great powers The vanguard whether composed of a con cert of great powers or a single superpower can try to impose its values by coercion conquest or fear of takeover but it can also operate more socially Others might emulate the core adopting its values for several reasons They might simply be overawed and copy in order to conform and to obtain the same results They might be persuaded by normative argument They might emulate for competitive reasons fearing loss of wealth or power if they fail to adapt and hoping to outdo the vanguard at its own game Whatever the mechanisms and whatever the rationales the effect is one of a subglobal vanguard leading a global development In the first classical imperial round of this process the main effect was to expand Westphalian interstate society from European to global scale In the second phase now in its early stages the main attempt will be to increase the number and depth of shared values both by elaborating the logic of coexistence within pluralism and by inviting participation in solidarist joint projects such as liberal economics big science and the pursuit of human rights If this succeeds it will push global interstate society towards a more solidarist formation from Power Political to Coexistence to Cooperative perhaps in places even to Kantian Conver gence If it fails badly by seriously dividing the core or by pushing too hard on contested values most obviously democracy human rights or by failing to deliver promised effects eg economic development and better distributed wealth or by delivering damaging sideeffects envi ronmental disaster economic meltdown political instability it could give rise once again to oppositional subglobal interstateinternational societies Between these two options lies a mixture of some movement towards solidarism at the global level combined with some development of dif ferentiated regional or subglobal interstateinternational societies The model for this is already apparent in the international political economy where it is broadly accepted that regional economic groupings are both alternatives to a global economic order and ways of operating more 225 From International to World Society effectively within such a global order Buzan Wæver and de Wilde 1998 11215 Subglobal structures play a delicate game both with each other competitors in some senses codependent in others and with the global level too much subglobalism will destroy the global level to the potential disadvantage of all A vanguard interpretation of how international social structures de velop and decay draws attention to the domestic character of the leading powers as a key factor in understanding the dynamics of the interna tional social structure Recall the argument in chapter 4 pp 917 on the English school needing to make the internal evolution of the leading states and the impact of their projection of their domestic values out ward a focus of historical and empirical work see also Buzan and Little 2000 3747 Imperialism may or may not work as a way of expanding international social structures in space and depth but whether it does or not will depend on the type of values projected the methods by which they are projected how they are evaluated morally by the recipients and how well or badly they fit with other social values in play in the cultures either that are exposed to them or on which they are imposed All of this in turn will depend on the nature of the states and societies that lie at the core of the international system Those with a taste for counterfactual history can explore this question by thinking through the likely consequences if Germany had won the First World War or Germany and Japan the Second World War or the Soviet Union and China the Third Cold World War If fascist or communist powers now formed the core what would interstate society look like What would the main institutions be Certainly it would not look at all like what we have today and the degree of difference shows how much the question of the domestic character of the dominant power matters to what sort of international social structures do and do not get put in place The process and outcomes of these wars can be seen also as aspects of the vanguard process in operation This line of reasoning ties up to the argument unfolded in chapter 5 pp 1489 about homogeneity I made the case there that one needed to be open minded about what sort of ideology underpinned interstate so ciety Much of the English school account tells only a liberal story either because it is looking at European history becoming global history or be causeitisspecificallyconcernedwithpromotingliberalvaluesButother stories are perfectly possible and some of them have real as opposed to counterfactual histories The interstate societies of the ancient and clas sical world were driven almost entirely by the values of imperial ruling 226 Bringing geography back in elites The international social structures of the classical Islamic world however one might best describe their mix of interhuman transnational and interstate were certainly not liberal The absolutist phase of Euro pean interstate society was dominated by mercantilist and aristocratic values not liberal ones Fascism and communism had only rather brief historical runs but a close look at how Germany Japan and the Soviet Union operated within the spheres they did control would give some hints as to what would have happened had they come to dominate the whole of the international system One could look also perhaps at Chinas long history as the core of an imperial system and glean some insights as to what the world would be like if an undemocratic China rather than the US was the sole superpower From a theoretical perspec tive and also a historical one it is important not to lose sight of the fact that forms of international social structure other than liberal ones are possible and that these too can be understood within the frame of English school theory Yet the historical legacy we have is that the three world wars of the twentieth century were about what form of political economy was going to shape the future of industrial society and liberalism emerged victori ous in all three rounds It is thus not at all unreasonable to look closely at the particular character of the interstate and international societies generated by a liberal core But one has to keep in mind that liberal values are not universally dominant Other sorts of values are still in play worldwide and at the subglobal level for example in the Islamic world and much of East Asia liberal values are not dominant within the local interstate societies If one is going to bring the regional and the subglobal levels back into the study of international social structures as I have argued should be done then these nonliberal alternatives are of more than historical and theoretical interest Some of them are still strongly in play at the subglobal level How this mixture of the global and subglobal works in the contemporary world is the subject of chapter 8 227 8 Conclusions a portrait of contemporary interstate society In chapter 1 I set out both my dissatisfactions with English school the ory and the reasons why I nevertheless thought it well worth pursu ing I committed myself to trying to shine some light on the important but murky relationship between international and world society and to developing a structural interpretation of English school ideas con structing them as a theory about norms rather than a normative theory I also committed myself to using the methodological pluralism of English school theory and its ability to look at several things at once as a way of unpacking the problem of globalisation and gaining more leverage on it This agenda took me much deeper than I had originally intended and with some help from various thinkers both inside and outside the English school I have ended up with a rather radical revi sion of the classical three traditions I hope I have also ended up with a plausible way of looking at the complex package of things that constitute the globalisation problematique Since misunderstandings seem to occur with frightening ease in academic debates let me state very clearly for the record that I do not intend that this structural rewriting of English school theory should replace or override the normative version of English school thinking which I labelled Wightian in chapter 1 Wights three traditions of de bate about international relations and the ongoing tensions between a prevailing orthodoxy and the various visions that challenge it remains a valid and necessary understanding of English school theory What I hope I have accomplished is to set up a structural interpretation alongside that normative one as an alternative but complementary way of understanding English school theory I hope of course that some people will see merit in this alternative and take it up I also hope that the more rigorous approach to taxonomy in the structural 228 Conclusions version will challenge various aspects of the debate in the normative version and stimulate those pursuing that line to reconsider some of their assumptions Perhaps the main theme throughout the preceding chapters has been that English school theory has not clearly enough distinguished between the structural and normative strands that weave through it and that this practice has compromised the presentation of both elements The structural element has never been clearly developed and the normative element often flounders in conceptual confusion as indicated by the nearly total incoherence about the central concept of world society We need both the normative and the structural interpretations of English school theory standing side by side complementing and questioning each other Over the preceding seven chapters I have constructed what I hope is a clearer and more internally consistent English school lens through which to look at the questions posed by globalisation This lens has several filters which select for the following r from chapter 4 the three domains interhuman transnational and in terstate and from Wendt the howwhy dimension of shared values in terms of coercion calculation and belief r from chapter 5 pluralismsolidarism and the spectrum of types of interstate society plus the interplay among the three domains Soli darism here includes a wider range of shared values particularly economic ones than are normally found in English school analyses r from chapter 6 primary institutions and the way these play into types of interstate society both as defining features and as benchmarks for change r from chapter 7 the distinction between global and subglobal espe cially regional levels and the consequent question of how they inter act particularly the idea of vanguardism as a basic mechanism for the development of international social structure These filters are I propose the minimum toolkit that one needs in order to approach the issue of globalisation They do not offer clean and simple hypotheses like those available from neorealism but they do offer an escape from the severe loss of analytical leverage that results from bundling huge complexities into a single concept whether it be god or globalisation English school theory holds on to the obligation to think in holistic terms and it is prepared to look straight into the eyes of the complexity that necessarily results Although I have borrowed ideas from Wendt and in some ways recast English school theory in Wendtian 229 From International to World Society terms although substantially modified ones I have not followed him into the confines of statecentrism If this book is read as a critique of Wendt then the main point of departure is keeping the nonstate domains in play alongside the interstate one The social structure of the international system is very complicated and I do not think that one can understand globalisation without taking into account both the state and the nonstate domains While I share Wendts view that states are still the dominant type of actor in the international system and likely to remain so for some time I have aimed for a theory that in principle allows for this not to be the case Doing that it seems to me is a crucial move if one is not to block off the ability to see fundamental changes of social structure Buzan and Little 2001 If Wendt was aiming at the possibility of a social structural theory in parallel to neorealism then I think this will eventually mislead more than enlighten Any given international social structure will represent a complicated mixture of domains and levels not to mention mixtures of coercion calculation and belief and much about its particular workings will depend crucially on how the mixture is composed This opens the way to interpretive and comparative theory but probably not to the hard causeeffect theory beloved of positivists In this last chapter it seems fitting to give this new lens a trial run by turning it towards the contemporary international system and seeing what kind of view it reveals In one chapter it will not be possible to sketch more than a general portrait One function of this portrait relates to the English school and is to demonstrate the difference of view us ing this social structural lens as opposed to the constricted pluralist one that still dominates most English school writing including the writing of the solidarists My aim is both to fill in the gaps that have been the focus of criticism in preceding chapters and to give a hint at what an English school take on globalisation looks like The second function is to offer a contrast between an English school account of what the interna tional system now looks like how it got to where it is and what driving forces it sees as the main movers of history and the familiar accounts available from other mainstream IR theories Here the emphasis will be on primary institutions as the main comparative advantage of an English school approach combined with a commitment to always ask ing what mixture of coercion calculation and belief holds these insti tutions in place Neorealism cannot ask this kind of question and by moving towards it neoliberalism largely follows suit Constructivists canasksuchquestionsbutsofarlackaholisticandhistoricalframework comparable to that developed by the English school 230 Conclusions In the next section I will set out a static portrait of contemporary in terstate society looking at both the global and subglobal levels Since I will be focusing on an interstate society whose core is mainly liberal but some of whose periphery and semiperiphery is not this view will contribute to investigating the features of the liberal form of a Co operative interstate society with a strong interplay among the three domains and developments in the interstate sector being interdepen dent with those in the interhuman and transnational ones The second section looks back briefly to the interstate societies before the Second World War The purpose is to get some sense of how institutions have changed and to take advantage of the powers of hindsight to look at the possible dynamics driving both the changes and the continuities The third section focuses on the stability of contemporary interstate society What are its internal contradictions How do the interplays between global and subglobal levels and among the interstate transnational and interhuman domains affect the stability of interstate society How much do external developments in for example technology and envi ronment influence its stability and development Are there changes in the binding forces that hold it together and is the global level stable in itself or dependent on a vanguard The fourth section concludes with a speculation on what the pattern of dynamics at play in contemporary interstate society suggests about its possible futures and some thoughts on where to from here in the English school research programme A snapshot of contemporary interstate society How would one set about characterising contemporary interstate soci ety in terms of the ideas unfolded in the preceding chapters Perhaps the most obvious point to begin at is the one underlined by literatures as diverse as Huntingtons clash of civilisations and the many inter pretations of the postCold War international system as two worlds or core and periphery These literatures suggests that contemporary in terstate society is a layered diverse phenomenon It certainly has sig nificant standing at the system level where there is a globalscale so cial structure but this is accompanied by more diverse and in places much deeper subglobal structures These levels need to be examined separately At the global level the dominant view in the English school litera ture is that interstate society is firmly towards the pluralist end of the spectrum with not even the solidarists claiming much beyond that 231 From International to World Society I have argued that this view is too pessimistic both because it ignores subglobal developments not strictly relevant here since I am consid ering only the global level at this point and because it does not count developments in the economic sector as part of interstate society which is relevant In terms of the general spectrum of types of interstate so ciety set out in figure 5 and elaborated in chapter 6 pp 1905 above it would be unreasonable to characterise contemporary interstate so ciety as either Power Political or Convergence Institutions are much too well developed and war much too constrained to see the world as Power Political and the degree of structural and ideological diversity amongst states much too high and resistance to the idea of homoge nization much too strong to see it as Convergence The middle of the spectrum comprises the Coexistence model which emphasises the pri macy of states and the limitation of interstate society to pluralist rules and the Cooperation one where many institutions will at least initially be carried over from the Coexistence model significant downgrading of war and balance of power is likely and some joint projects become a feature of shared values If the economic sector is allowed in as a shared value of contemporary interstate society then it is difficult to argue that it fits with the Coexistence model For sure much remains that fits a logic of coexistence including some quite elaborate arrangements for arms control and environmental management But the widespread ac ceptance of liberal rules for the world economy cannot reasonably be characterised as coexistence and neither can more tentative acceptance of some elements of human rights These represent a clear move into the Cooperative logic of collective pursuit of shared values economic growth and development human rights So one can start this exer cise by positioning contemporary global interstate society towards the pluralist side of the Cooperative model Picking up from table 3 and looking at the primary institutions of this global society sovereignty and territoriality and therefore the state still feature strongly as master institutions Of the derivatives from these nonintervention is still quite robust though no longer as absolute as it once was being under pressure both from human rights and US claims to a broad right of preventive action in pursuit of its national security Bush 2002 International law has become hugely elaborate support ing many secondary institutions Diplomacy remains a master institu tion with multilateralism the most significant derivative though under threat from US unilateralism and again a host of secondary institu tions Great power management remains robust as a general principle 232 Conclusions but under stress from differences between unipolar and multipolar in terpretations Of its derivatives alliances are no longer the most salient feature of the political landscape and war is much hedged about with restrictions and largely ruled out amongst the major powers Balance of power is somewhat harder to characterise Certainly it does not op erate in the same vigorous way that characterised it up to the end of the Cold War The increasing adoption of liberal economic values has severelymoderatedantihegemonismasexemplifiedinteraliabyaquite widespread willingness among the powers to collaborate in big science projects Nationalism and its derivatives selfdetermination and pop ular sovereignty remain strong but democracy is not a globally shared value Equality of people is strong as a master institution but despite significant advances its derivatives human rights and humanitarian intervention remain contested It it still controversial whether to count themasgloballevelinstitutionsornotThemarkethasfinallytriumphed as a master institution strongly tied into multilateralism and with trade and financial liberalisation as its major derivatives Environmental stew ardship probably now registers as a master institution but more with a logic of coexistence than with the force of a joint project Because this modestly Cooperative interstate society is dominantly liberal in character one would expect and one finds a lot of interplay between the three domains interstate interhuman transnational With equality of people and the market as strong primary institutions both individuals and even more so TNAs of various kinds are given sub stantial rights and standings within the secondary institutions of inter state society Firms political lobbying groups and interest groups are allowed and often encouraged to operate transnationally and can ac quire legal rights and responsibilities within the framework of interstate society TNAs and individuals are allowed to accumulate and use huge amounts of capital and organisational resources and to play openly and covertly in the political processes of bilateral diplomacy conferencing and multilateralism Powerful TNAs and individuals have a big enough role to justify labelling the global level an international society They have been important movers of interstate society on human rights environ ment and some arms control issues Their position makes it reasonable to ask whether or not they are the dominant driving force behind the rise of the market to such a strong position among the institutions of contemporary international society If we live in a modestly Cooperative and ideologically liberal global international society what are the binding forces coercion calculation 233 From International to World Society belief that hold it together and how stable is it Given the size and the complexity of this society the number and variety of both its members and its institutions it would almost certainly distort the truth too much to attempt a Wendtstyle single overall characterisation As I argued in chapter 4 coercion calculation and belief will almost always come in mixtures Without a much deeper investigation it is not possible to give more than an impressionistic account of this aspect of contemporary international society but common sense will perhaps save this from be ing too controversial If one focuses on the interstate society then many of the institutions appear to be held in place by belief At the level of states sovereignty territoriality nonintervention diplomacy interna tional law great power management nationalism selfdetermination not all versions popular sovereignty and equality of peoples are all pretty deeply internalised and not contested as principles Particular in stances or applications may excite controversy for example resentments of great power management or opposition to some selfdetermination bids based on cultural nationalism But the basic institutions of plu ralist interstate society have wide support among states and pretty wide support amongst peoples and TNAs Most liberation movements seek sovereignty Most TNAs want and need a stable legal framework Although these institutions were originally imposed coercively by the West it is far from clear that they are now held in place primarily by Western power and influence Even if Western power declined it does not seem unreasonable to think that most of these pluralist institutions would remain in place as too might the modest level of commitment to environmental stewardship The same cannot yet be said for the more solidarist elements of con temporary international society Should the backing for human rights and humanitarian intervention by the West weaken for any reason it does not seem likely that they would retain much standing as global institutions even though they would retain strong constituencies of in terstate support regionally and more widely in the transnational and interhuman domains But at the global interstate level they are held in place more by calculation and coercion than by belief Whether the same is true of the market and its derivatives is an interesting important and difficult question Until the end of the Cold War the market was one of the core contested issues among the great powers the rival principle being centrally planned economics But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of central planning by China the market has become a global institution in the sense that most states conform to 234 Conclusions market rules and powerful secondary institutions exist to support this IMF WTO World Bank While many states support this out of belief it could be argued that many others adhere to it because of calculation or soft forms of coercion One does not see much of gunboats being sent in to open markets as was done during colonial times but for most periphery states access to aid loans and markets is frequently made conditional on compliance with market rules Many calculate that their wellbeing or even survival depend on such compliance and thus go along voluntarily Others are subject to more direct forms of arm twisting such as sanctions Because compliance is nearly universal the market is a major institution of contemporary international society Amongst many adherence is rooted in belief but for a significant number this in stitution is held in place by and serves the interests of Western power If that power were to decline weakening coercion and changing the balance of calculation it is not clear that the market would survive as a global institution In sum although this is a modestly Cooperative international society its Coexistence elements are quite deeprooted and stable whereas its Cooperative ones as yet have shallower roots and could more easily which is not to say easily be swept away by changes in the distribution of power An argument can be made that the interstate domain at the global level is increasingly supported by a global scale Westernistic civilisation or Mondo culture which influences not just state elites but also TNAs and popular culture Buzan and Segal 1998a b Up to a century ago relatively few people thought of themselves as members of the human race in any meaningful way Empire was common outright slavery only recently pushed to the margins unequal treatment routine and the idea of a common humanity very marginal except within some religious traditions Few people knew much or cared much about what was happening on other parts of the planet Now many more people do know at least something about what goes on elsewhere and up to a point care about it even if very unevenly and in ways heavily shaped by patterns of media attention For the past halfcentury there has been a general acceptance that all humans are equal even if this is still violated in practice in many ways and places These things matter in that they contribute to the stability of a global interstate society by embeddingitsideasnotjustinstateelitesbutinthemindsofthepeoples as well The picture at the subglobalregional level is as one might expect much more mixed The fried egg metaphor I floated earlier suggests that 235 From International to World Society subglobal societies seen as the yolks would rest on and share the common white representing the global level just described This metaphor carries the important implication that there is a substantial degree of compatibility between the societal developments at the sub global level and those at the global level and for those attuned to racism the idea of the substrate being white will also carry some resonance If no such compatibility exists then the global level itself does not exist To say compatibility must exist is not to imply that harmony must exist amongstthesubglobalsocietiesonlythattheymustagreetosharesome institutions In principle the nature of the relationships both among the subglobal societies and between them and the global level remains open and historically contingent It is possible for subglobal interstate societies to be strong rivals as they were during the Cold War and yet still share adherence to some globallevel institutions sovereignty territoriality diplomacy I referred to this earlier as secondorder plu ralism Such pluralism could encompass intersocietal relations ranging from friendship through indifference to hostility Subglobal interna tional societies lose their point if there are no significant differences among them and if the differences become too great then the global level disappears I can see no reason to agree with the hypothesis assumed in some English school writings that subglobal societal developments must necessarily be rivals or necessarily degrade the global level They might do so Or they might not In the contemporary international system one can identify quite a few subglobal mostly regional interstate andor international societies Even a brief survey reveals that what is striking about them is that most are quite well in tune with the institutions at the global level and that there are no fierce hostilities among them of the kind that defined the Cold War There are in other words no competing universalisms of the type that so worried Bull and Wight It can certainly be argued that the West and particularly the US sees itself as a universalism but unlike during the Cold War the other subglobal interstate societies are broadly concerned with maintaining their distinctiveness at the subglobal level not trying to remake the global level in their own image Perhaps the most obvious candidate for a subglobal international so ciety is the West Because the West serves as the core for global level international society there is no puzzle about its compatibility with the global level The West is a clear case of the fried eggs metaphor where the yolk is thicker than the white because it represents a wider set of shared institutions Within the circle of Western states some of 236 Conclusions the things that are either hotly contested at the global level or held in place by calculation or coercion are deeply internalised and sta ble at this subglobal level Within Western international society the market is broadly accepted democracy even more so and there is agreement on a substantial array of human rights Individuals and nonstate actors have wellestablished rights and responsibilities and the whole subsystem is laced together with a dense network of sec ondary institutions and transnational networks The West as a whole has achieved fullyfledged Cooperative status and is often referred to as the international community GonzalezPelaez 2002 4759 though at the time of writing this development is coming under severe pressure from the unilateralist and in some ways imperial policies of the Bush administration The West is not monolithic Some parts of it have distinctive Coop erative projects of their own most obviously NAFTA and more on the edges of the West Mercosur Although these largely embrace the same sorts of institutions as the West as a whole the market democracy elements of human rights they generate distinctive secondary institu tions for the pursuit of those shared goals Other parts of the West most notably the EU are progressing well into the Kantian version of the Con vergencemodelbyembracingbothsubstantialelementsofhomogeneity in their state structures and by constructing strong secondary institu tions including some IGOs with a quasigovernmental character the European Commission the European Parliament the European Court of Justice The contrast between the Convergence goals of the EU and the robust rejection of convergence by the US has become much more visible under the Bush administration even generating its own litera ture Kagan 2002 Because the West is the core of the global interstate society it cannot just be considered as a more thickly developed sub system It is also the centre of power that supports the global interstate society and the repository of the more contested institutions which that core projects into global interstate society and to some extent supports coercively the market human rights democracyInthissensetheWest generally is still playing the role of vanguard to global interstate society pressing its own values and institutions onto societies that in varying degrees want to resist them and which use the earlier round of pluralist institutions especially sovereignty territoriality diplomacy to do so Although it is too early to judge at the time of writing the 2003 war against Iraq by the US seems to suggest that the Bush administration has in mind a much more aggressive and imperial style of vanguardism 237 From International to World Society though whether this can be sustained or will work remains to be seen as does the extent to which pursuit of it will undermine the cohesion of the West as the core of global international society There is a subglobal interstate society in East Asia which is mostly Coexistence in character Unlike the West and talk of Asian values notwithstanding East Asia enjoys little or no overall shared culture beyond that provided by the global level and its interstate society is defined by strong adherence to sovereignty territoriality and nation alism The region as a whole is far from being a security community even though within it the ASEAN states have built up quite a successful security regime If it were not restrained by the ringholder presence of the US East Asia would probably have war as a more prominent in stitution Yet East Asia also has some Cooperative qualities Mostly it resists the Western pressure on human rights and democracy but many of its states have accepted a limited version of the market as necessary to their own power and stability Economic nationalism remains strong but with the understanding that the national economic development of each depends on a degree of openness to trade and investment and acceptance of some market rules Until the late 1990s there was also acceptance of the distinctive Japanese model of capitalism There is a common understanding among most of the leaderships that pursuit of economic interdependence both requires and supports restraints on the operation of the balance of power and war East Asia has some still rather weak secondary institutions and it is far from clear that as China grows strong this regional interstate society will be able to sustain a commitment to absolute gains in the face of relative ones that might change the distribution of power among the member states Buzan and Wæver 2003 14280 Turning to areas more clearly within the global periphery one finds a variety of other yolks embedded in the global white Russia is busy try ing to adapt to the global institutions having previously been the failed side in the Cold Wars struggle of competing universalisms South Asia strangely manages to be less on the regional level than the global norm not so much a yolk sitting on the white as a thin area of the white Althoughit does havesome very weak regionalsecondaryinstitutions South Asia is basically on the Power Political side of the Coexistence model War is an everpresent possibility India and Pakistan have trou ble sustaining diplomatic relations there is relatively little trade and investment within the region and no parallel to the East Asian joint development idea 238 Conclusions Something of the same might initially be thought about the Islamic international society centred on the Middle East and West Asia There too war remains a vigorous institution and there is little commitment within the region to joint economic development There is also fierce resistance to Western impositions of human rights and democracy Yet while in the interstate domain this might also look like being on the Power Political side of the Coexistence model there are other things going on As in South Asia the statessystem and basic Westphalian institutions are robust There are some mostly weak secondary insti tutions most notably the Arab League and the Organization of the Is lamic Conference OIC as well as a variety of subregional IGOs Arab Maghreb Union Gulf Cooperation Council And although the states system has proved surprisingly robust both Arab nationalism and Islam constitute powerful and where they overlap intertwined elements of collective identity within the interhuman domain These strong inter human components of this subglobal society are concentrated in the same area as the interstate component but also reach out to a thinner global constituency Among other things they are powerful drivers of hostility to Israel and Iran Although Islam is not organised as a hierar chical church these patterns of identity support a substantial element of TNAs ranging from philosophical Sufi sects to alQaeda While the interstate side of this subglobal international society is largely in con formity with the Westphalian elements of global interstate society a case might be made that the interhuman and transnational elements are at least potentially and up to a point in practice in tension with it Although most of the states in this society have succeeded at least par tially in coopting Islamic legitimacy into their own structures there re mains a tension between the universalist claims and pulls of the umma and the secular and sectional claims of the state In some senses the idea of an Islamic state is a contradiction in terms So long as those senses retain the capacity to mobilise people as demonstrated by alQaeda the Islamic international society will remain in tension both with itself and as demonstrated most recently by the invasion of Iraq with the global international society Buzan and Wæver 2003 185216 Africa is perhaps the most difficult of the periphery areas to charac terise in these terms On the one hand so many of its states are weak or even failed that it is hard put to meet Westphalian criteria in prac tice Civil war of one sort or another is common the dominant form of indigenous TNA is the armed insurgency group and borders in many places are more notional than functional On the other hand Africa 239 From International to World Society possesses a modestly impressive set of regional and subregional sec ondary institutions Interstate wars are relatively uncommon Its states are strong defenders of the principles of sovereignty nonintervention and diplomacy and there is at least rhetorical commitment to joint de velopment Because of the weakness of its local political economic and social structures Africa is heavily penetrated by both external powers and outside TNAs It is the most peripheral part of the periphery and the place where many of the local state structures would not survive if they were not held in place and supported by the institutions of global interstate society Jackson 1990 Buzan and Wæver 2003 21751 In sum there is quite a lot of variation at the subglobal level Some parts are more developed or at least thicker in the sense of more sol idarist than the global level and act in part as a vanguard using their power to project contested values on a global scale Other parts are less developed or thinner more pluralist most notably in retaining war as an active institution less hedged about with restraints than the global level Some parts are seeking to pursue their own variations within the broad framework of global level institutions others seek to defend ele ments of cultural distinctiveness At present and with the possible ex ception of the US there are no clashing universalisms where subglobal interstatesocietiesseektoimposetheirnormsonthewholeplanetThere are certainly tensions most obviously around the war on terrorism but more generally between the human rights and democracy vanguardism of the West and the mostly African Middle Eastern and Asian societies in which those values clash with indigenous cultural traditions These tensions look enduring and their outcome uncertain But against them stand the really quite impressive and quite stable set of interstate in stitutions that are common both to the global level and to most of the subglobal ones While there is a lot going on in terms of globalisation in all three domains there is also a lot going on in all three domains of a much more localist or regional character Looking back what changed what didnt and why I do not have the space here to conduct a detailed stepbystep analysis of how the international social structure has evolved and changed over the last two centuries It is nonetheless possible and quite useful to exploit the powers of hindsight by taking a quick look back As set out in chapter 7 pp 21417 above there already exists a classical English 240 Conclusions school account of this period told as the expansion of European inter state society to the rest of the world I have argued that this account rests on an idealised view of the nineteenth century leading to an unduly pes simistic view of developments in the twentieth This classical account therefore serves as one benchmark against which to develop an alter native interpretation based on the theoretical framework developed in chapters 47 Picking up on Holstis idea of using primary institutions as a benchmark for change provides another analytical tool On these lines and in contrast to liberals such as Ikenberry 2001 who use sec ondary institutions to structure a historical account it is also possible to build on the work of Mayall and Keene Mayalls studies on nation alism trace out and up to a point explain some of the most important changes in primary institutions during this period Keenes 2002 dis cussion of colonialism provides a similar service One can ask whether these are changes within or between the main models that occupy the pluralistsolidarist spectrum One can also look for significant changes andor continuities in other elements of international social structure the three domains the question of binding forces and geographical scope and subdivision In the previous section I argued that contemporary global level in terstate society was modestly Cooperative I gave its master primary institutions as sovereignty territoriality diplomacy great power man agement nationalism the market equality of people and environmen tal stewardship and its derivative institutions as nonintervention international law multilateralism balance of power war though now extremely hedged about with restrictions selfdetermination popu lar sovereignty and trade and financial liberalisation Embedded in this global level I identified a number of subglobal interstate societies some much thicker than the global substrate some a bit thinner but most more or less in harmony with the pluralist end of the global level structure A significant feature of this whole ensemble was its coreperiphery structure in which the West played the role of past and present vanguard in creating supporting and in some respects pushing for extension of the institutions at the global level If this is a fair characterisation of what we have now where did we come from and what changed and what remained the same to bring us to this point ItisIthinkfairtoaccepttheEnglishschoolsclassicalassumptionthat the contemporary global international society evolved primarily out of developments in Europe Since a global interstate society of any sort is difficult to trace much before the middle of the nineteenth century it is 241 From International to World Society thus reasonable to use European interstate society as the starting bench mark against which to track the changes that bring us to the present If we take eighteenthcentury Europe as representative of a classical Westphaliansocietyofstatesitsprimaryinstitutionscanbesummarised as follows Table 4 The primary institutions of eighteenthcentury European interstate society Primary Institutions Master Derivative Sovereignty Nonintervention International law Territoriality Borders Diplomacy Messengersdiplomats Treaties Diplomatic language Balance of power Antihegemonism Alliances Guarantees Neutrality War Great power management Inequality of peoples Colonialism Trade Mercantilism Dynasticism Elite genealogy and marriage Starting from this characterisation of eighteenthcentury Europe one can attempt to fill in the gap between then and now Overall we seem to be tracking a shift from a European interstate society located close to the Power Political side of the Coexistence model and not global in scale to the global scale modestly Cooperative international society of the present day Obviously quite a lot of eighteenthcentury institutions have survived and the question is whether and how these have changed intermsoftheunderstandingofwhattheyrepresentandthepracticesle gitimised by them Earlier discussion already suggests that sovereignty war and international law have undergone substantial internal changes Just as obviously some eighteenthcentury institutions have dropped away inequality of peoples colonialism mercantilism dynasticism elite genealogy and marriage and more arguably alliances and several additional institutions have been taken on board nationalism equality of people selfdetermination popular sovereignty the market multilat eralism environmental stewardship Many of these exits and entrances are linked pairs occupying the same functional space eg mercantilism and market inequality of peoples and equality of peoples colonial ism and selfdetermination dynasticism and popular sovereignty For 242 Conclusions both the exits and entrances the question is when and why this hap pened Table 4 also makes clear that the whole universe of secondary institutions came into being after the eighteenth century and again the questions are when and why It was probably the case that the institu tions and operations of this eighteenthcentury interstate society were largely detached from the interhuman domain except for the idea of Christendom In the transnational domain the Roman church remained a player and some banking and trading networks were also important but apart from these the transnational domain was thinly populated in comparison with the present day Since eighteenthcentury Europe had mainly colonial relations with the rest of the world and an international system was not yet fully global in extent and very thin in many places it is hard to think in terms of global and subglobal levels of interstate society Because there has been no attempt within the English school to think systematically about primary institutions there is almost no work that attempts to analyse the expansion and evolution of international so ciety in this way Holstis 2002 paper has already been discussed in chapter 6 Watson 1992 152250 contains some hints but since he is more concerned to highlight the role of hegemony within the anarchy hierarchy spectrum he does not deal systematically with institutions He is nevertheless good at tracking the development of diplomacy war and the balance of power as institutions and touches on dynasticism international law and nationalism Mayalls 1990 2000 work on na tionalism brings in many other primary institutions and provides not only a starting point but also something of a model for how to approach the interplay and tensions among primary institutions as a key dynamic shaping how interstate societies evolve Mayall focuses his main effort on identifying the impact of nation alism on the interstate society into which it was introduced For the purposes of this analysis I will accept the general understanding that nationalism came into vogue in Europe during the nineteenth century having intellectual roots developed during the eighteenth It can be ex plained multiply as a product of romantic thinking as a political tool for peoples seeking to free themselves from empires primarily Ottoman and AustroHungarian and as a response by state elites both to military pressures the use of the levee en masse by revolutionary France and to the class tensions identified by Marx as arising from the practices of in dustrial capitalism Whatever its source during the nineteenth century nationalism was increasingly taken on board as a primary institution 243 From International to World Society both by European interstate society and by the global interstate society that Europe was unintentionally making through colonialism This pro cess did much more than simply add another primary institution into the mix As Mayall traces with some care it played a key role in both the reinterpretation of some Westphalian institutions and the demise of others Mayalls 1990 2000 main observations are as follows r Nationalism underlay the shift from dynastic to popular sovereignty and was also a strand leading into the development of human rights in the West 1990 2 Nationalism supported selfdetermination but introduced a tension about who constitutes any given nation ethno nationalism or political nationalism This in turn confused the prin ciple of selfdetermination adopted after the First World War though also becoming one of the tensions that undermined colonialism 1990 3849 2000 3966 r Diplomacy survived the coming of nationalism but nationalism modified the Westphalian primary institutions of sovereignty non intervention war territoriality and balance of power without elimi nating them Even postmodern states still retain sovereignty and terri toriality though they use them differently 2000 6778 Nationalism weakened the principle of mutual recognition by setting the nation state ideal against the much more mixed reality but strengthened commitment to sovereign equality It created tensions between liberal inclinations to restrain the use of force and interpretations of national ism that elevated war to be the mechanism of social Darwinism And it hugely deepened the relationship between governments and peo ples role of the state in society 1990 2537 Nationalism challenged territoriality not as such but by hanging its legitimacy on national cri teria and generating problems of irredentism and secessionism 1990 5063 r Dynasticism political aggression and imperialismcolonialism were all delegitimised by nationalism 1990 35 r In some ways nationalism was entangled with liberalism and thus developed as an institution alongside the market Yet despite this shared parentage nationalism and the market are often in ten sion with nationalism challenging the market in ways ranging from cultural and political autarky projects through imperatives of de fence selfreliance to labour mobility and migration 1990 70110 Economic nationalism was also a feature of both communist and many third world states 1990 11144 This general tension does not mean 244 Conclusions that the nationstate idea is not also complementary to the liberal project in many ways including defence democracy law and cur rency 1990 1501 r Because international law is made by states there are tensions be tween international law and democracy except where all states are democracies Mayall 2000 94 Using Mayalls insights as a starting point and adding in the exits and entrances already noted between eighteenthcentury and contemporary interstate society one can compile the following sketch about how why and when the primary institutions of interstate society changed over the last two centuries During the nineteenth century nationalism consolidated as an insti tution of European interstate society with resultant tensions between its derivatives selfdetermination and popular sovereignty and the stability of local not overseas empires Ottoman AustroHungarian Russian There was sustained tension between mercantilism and the market as to which would be the dominant derivative of trade Later in the century came the first development of secondary institutions in response to growing trade and communication and the rapid shrinking of the world by technologies of transportation and communication In terstate society became global in scale as European and later US and Japanese empires filled up the international system This was a largely colonial interstate society with a European core A Western hemisphere semiperiphery and later East Asian developments centred on the rise of Japan began to introduce a significant independent subglobal level while most of Africa Asia and the Pacific had subordinate political and social status During this period sovereignty diplomacy international law territoriality borders the balance of power antihegemonism al liances and war did not alter much though the concert of Europe de veloped as an early form of multilateral great power management After the First World War and in no small measure in reaction to its horrors interstate war began to be downgraded as an acceptable general instrument amongst the members of interstate society mostly because of fear that technologically driven powers of destruction threat ened to wreck European civilisation Diplomacy came under chal lenge in some European countries and the US because of its removal from popular sovereignty and public opinion but it largely survived this turbulence unaltered The mandate system began to question the legitimacy of colonialism and its derivatives Mayall 2000 1725 and 245 From International to World Society a major consolidation of selfdetermination and popular sovereignty within European international society Wilsonianism began the corro sive seepage of these ideas into the colonies Dynasticism and its deriva tives were largely eliminated as institutions of interstate society under the pressure of nationalism and popular sovereignty though some dy nastic practices remained as features of domestic politics in some states There was a major development of secondary institutions especially global forum organisations and along with that the beginning of a ma jor expansion of positive international law foreshadowed by the two Hague Conferences on the laws of war late in the nineteenth century During this period nationalism changed the understanding of territori ality and borders and also completed the shifting of the legitimation of sovereignty from dynastic rights to peoples The competition between mercantilism and market continued as did central roles for alliances balance of power and antihegemonism The Second World War and the understanding of the processes lead ing up to it likewise generated further changes in the institutions of interstate society These reactions consolidated the market as an insti tution of Western international society and linked this strongly to the shrinking legitimacy of war which under pressure from fear of nu clear weapons was increasingly confined to an ultimate right of self defence validated by sovereignty and nationalism At the same time the long tension between the market and the communist version of mercantilism entered what now looks like the last phase of the strug gle for dominance and democracy was consolidating as a primary in stitution of Western international society After 1945 and outside the Soviet sphere there was a rapid demise of inequality of peoples and its derivatives colonialism and the right of conquest This took place under pressure from the spread of nationalism selfdetermination and pop ular sovereignty from European to global interstate society Alongside this was a concomitant rise of equality of peoples as an institution of global interstate society The winding down of colonialism meant that an interstate society based on sovereign equality became global in scale This expansion opened up the way for a variety of subglobalregional developments previously overlaid by colonialism and it was during this period that the differentiation between global and subglobal inter national social structures spread to the whole system At least within the Western sphere multilateral diplomacy flourished as an institution and many issues that might previously have led to war were handled in a variety of conferences and IGOs This rise of multilateralism was 246 Conclusions accompanied by a rapid expansion of both secondary institutions and TNAs linked into Western interstate society The rise of secondary in stitutions was linked to two things first the impact of decolonisation which released dozens of weak states into the system many not ca pable of fulfilling independently either their internal management or their diplomatic roles and second the rise of the market within the Western sphere and the need for management of what was becoming a global economy Within this context international law continued to become more extensive and elaborate not only among states but also between them and TNAs and to a lesser extent individuals Within the West and particularly so within the developing EU sovereignty terri toriality and borders were adapted to meet the conditions created by a more extensive embracing of the market In the wider global soci ety sovereignty and nonintervention remained robust as did balance of power antihegemonism and alliances Environmental stewardship began to emerge as a new institution and one substantially driven from the interhuman and transnational domains up into the interstate one After the ending of the Cold War the market became a strong insti tution at the global level and interstate war was pushed even further to the margins The implosion of the Soviet Union created perhaps the last major round of decolonisation One consequence of all this was a reduction in the importance of alliances which while still present no longer functioned within interstate society in the same central way that they had done traditionally Another consequence was the weakening of antihegemonism as exemplified inter alia by a quite widespread will ingness among the powers both to open their economies and accept the risks of interdependence and to collaborate in various big science projects Asking whether the balance of power as a master institution was in decay was at least not an unreasonable question though great power management remained strong Nau 2001 585 for example argues that when national identities converge as they have recently among the democratic great powers they may temper and even elim inate the struggle for power There was room for thinking that in many ways the market multilateralism and the host of secondary in stitutions associated with them had taken over from war balance of power and their derivatives as the institutions that now shaped how sovereignty and territoriality were to be understood Yet with the US left as the sole superpower multilateralism came under some hard questioning as Washington adopted more unilateralist attitudes and 247 From International to World Society practices and turned against many of the secondary institutions it had been the prime mover in creating So also after 11 September and more so after the invasion of Iraq did the place of war with the US claiming and exercising rights of preventive attack With the West as a whole in a dominant position the projection globally of its concerns about human rights and democracy raised tensions not only with non intervention but also with the problem that the social conditions ne cessary to sustain democracy and human rights as a standard of civil isation simply did not exist in many parts of the world Mayall 2000 8893 10620 Environmental stewardship continued to grow as an institution which like human rights had strong roots in the nonstate domains This rough sketch of the development of interstate society over the past two centuries reveals both substantial continuity and a good deal of change Perhaps diplomacy and nonintervention have been the most stable institutions in the sense both of remaining in place and not being fundamentally reinterpreted The practice of diplomacy has of course changed with better communications and more multilateralism but its essential principles remain pretty much the same Nonintervention has recently come under challenge both by human rights campaigners and by the new claims of the US for rights of preemption yet this institution also has so far kept its basic shape rather well By contrast sovereignty territoriality and borders though remaining central have been substan tially reinterpreted to accommodate nationalism and the market Both interstate war and the balance of power have been pushed towards the margins as institutions not least by the rise of the market as a dominant institution Overall this brief sketch presents a very different picture from the classical rather pessimistic account of the English school outlined in chapter 7 pp 21217 It also provides a much fuller portrait than ei ther neorealism which tells the story in terms of changes in polarity or neoliberalism with its emphasis on secondary institutions These theo reticalapproachessimplycannotgeneratethequestionsthatanimatethe English schools approach The development of global interstate society is of course susceptible to a variety of normative assessments depending on the values used But it is difficult to see it as a story of retreat from some nineteenthcentury pinnacle and quite possible to interpret it as in many ways a progressive story albeit one with ups and downs Perhaps the really central change over the last 200 years has been the shift from 248 Conclusions a coreperiphery mediated by imperial power and war to one based on universalised Westphalian principles and multilateralism Within that shift a greater scope for geographical differentiation has opened up as the process of decolonisation not only allowed the periphery to join a global interstate society on much more equal political terms but also allowed subglobal interstate societies to form and develop in distinc tive ways If interstate society is understood only at the global level and primarily as a phenomenon of great powers then it is indeed possible to see the Cold War as a rather depressing time But if one builds into the picture decolonisation as well as superpower rivalry and looks not just at the global level but also the subglobal one then even the Cold War has quite a bit to be cheerful about The costs of losing a degree of cultural homogeneity underpinning interstate society are a legitimate source of concern but need to be balanced both by the gains of losing colonialism and dynasticism and by the development of elements of a global culture not just at the level of elites but also and increasingly in the interhuman and transnational domains In the West and increas ingly beyond it we have an international and not just an interstate society Also clear from this story is that the changes in interstate society have many sources War has been one of the key movers on both global and subglobal levels though its central role now seems to be giving way to the market Deeper developments in society economy and technology in the form both of revolutions and steadier incremental transforma tions also motivate institutional change So too does the interplay be tween different institutions and the tensions and contradictions among them which lead to both reinterpretions of institutions that remain sta ble and the atrophy of some old institutions and the entry of some new ones And there is the interplay amongst the three domains already discussed in chapter 6 These driving forces are the subject of the next section Driving forces deeply rooted structures and contradictions Having looked at how things are in contemporary international society and then at what changed to make them that way the next step is to focus on the driving forces that kept some institutions stable drove some from the field and inspired or pressed for the development of new ones The 249 From International to World Society focus on continuity and change of primary institutions provides a single frame of reference within which to capture the daunting array of vari ables that constitute the problematique of globalisation The enormous complexity of globalisation means that any single dominant cause is unlikely Both the dynamics and the statics of international society re flect interplays among a variety of factors some material some social In this section I will look briefly at the five main explanatory factors that arise out of the framework and analysis developed above tensions and contradictions among primary institutions the dynamics of societal geography and the distribution of power the nature of binding forces and the character of leading powers the interplay among the three domains and the pressures of material conditions Tensions and contradictions among primary institutions There was quite a bit of discussion of this in the previous section build ing on Mayalls contribution and also in chapter 6 where I pointed out that while some primary institutions composed a relatively coher ent mutually supportive set notably the classical pluralist package of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy balance of power and inter national law others were both practically and intrinsically in tension both with some of these and sometimes with each other nationalism human rights the market The basic point here is that there should be no expectation that the primary institutions composing any inter state or international society should necessarily or even probably all be in harmony with each other Harmony should not be excluded as a possibility and might have interesting implications for stability if it happened But it is probably the exception rather than the rule This should not be surprising Contradictions within a set of values all held to be central are the everyday stuff of both individual morality and the practice of domestic politics in most states If some of the primary in stitutions of any society are in tension with each other then one must expect that tension to be a pressure for change both of and in institu tions That said however one should not underestimate the capability of powerful and generally successful societies to sustain and even profit from a degree of tension among their primary institutions The merit of Mayalls analysis was precisely that he showed how the introduction of nationalism as a primary institution created tensions and consequently changed the understanding of some other primary institutions ter ritoriality sovereignty market and undermined others colonialism 250 Conclusions dynasticism At the same time these other institutions affected how nationalism was interpreted for example in relation to self determination In contemporary international society there is a central tension between the market on the one hand and sovereignty national ism and war on the other The attempt by the Western core to promote human rights and democracy on a global scale produces tensions of a different sort but should human rights and democracy be accepted as primary institutions of global international society that would not en tirely remove their tension with sovereignty and nonintervention not to mention war so creating pressure for adaptation and reinterpreta tion in both directions Building on Vincents idea of a basic right to subsistence GonzalezPelaez 2002 explores the tensions among hu man rights sovereignty and the market The point here is that such tensions are likely to be a common feature of interstateinternational societies and that in and of themselves they constitute an important dynamic of change If one is curious as to why the pluralist package of sovereignty territoriality diplomacy balance of power and interna tional law has proved so durable both in practice and in its intellectual appeal then the answer lies at least in part in the harmony amongst them In practice this harmony produces a degree of mutual support allowing a degree of flexibility and reinterpretation which has enabled this package to adapt to the rise of new institutions Intellectually the harmony is naturally attractive to those whose main concern is order The dynamics of societal geography and the distribution of power The relevance of societal geography and the distribution of power is ob vious from three points already made above First the classical English schools story of the expansion of international society rests on a con centration of power in a specific geographical area and the use of that power to expand control into weaker areas in the process expanding international society That whole process depends on strong differences in societal geography Second in the previous section it was possible to use the three world wars of the twentieth century as plausible bench marks for significant turning points in the evolution of the institutions of interstate society Since the outcomes of these wars both reflected and generated new distributions of power there is a strong suggestion that this matters in the development of interstate society Third the idea that 251 From International to World Society the distribution of power matters is an area of common understanding between realists and English school pluralists Both emphasise the lead ing role of the major powers in defining the character of the international system Waltzs poles of power taken up by neorealists and Bulls great responsibles Thedifficultyhereisthatwehavetwosensesofdistributionofpower in play the neorealist and pluralist sense of polarity as number of great powers and a more general sense of the overall distribution of power within the international system What matters for the dynamics of in terstateinternational society is probably not the distribution of power in the sense of great powers and polarity as such European interstate society expanded even though or even to a degree because the Euro pean great powers were fighting amongst themselves on a regular basis More important for the dynamics of international society is the lineup between the distribution of power and the character of the leading pow ers are the great powers strongly divided ideologically as during the interwar years and the Cold War or relatively tolerant of each others domestic arrangements as now And of course it matters a lot what ideology is dominant among the great powers It makes a difference that the liberal democracies and not the totalitarians won the wars of the twentieth century More on this below pp 3617 The distribution of power within the international system more gen erally points toward the distinction between the global and subglobal levels explored in chapter 7 It also points towards the idea that at least in terms of the historical record a vanguard model is a prominent feature of how interstate and international societies develop From Watsons 1992 many empires of ancient and classical times to the expansion of European interstate society it has been historically common for a cen tre of power to grow up in one part of the system and then to expand and in varying degrees impose its own social political and economic order onto a wider realm This centre of power might be a single politi cal entity Rome the Han Empire or it might be a subsystem of states Sumeria classical Greece modern Europe and Watson 1992 31617 notes the tension that this creates in contemporary international society between the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention and the reality of hegemonic practice by great powers This vanguard element explains the coreperiphery structure of contemporary interstate society which in turn opens the question of whether the global or any systemic level is stable in itself or whether that stability depends on a vanguard to uphold it 252 Conclusions The nature of binding forces and the character of leading powers I have argued strongly in earlier chapters in favour of Wendts approach of separating the forces that bind societies together coercion calcula tion belief from the shared values that define whether and how a society is pluralist or solidarist One major consequence of this move is to open up the possibility of both coercive Convergence societies and Power Political warrior cultures held together by belief Another is to challenge the advocates of solidarist norms to come clean about what methods they will and will not accept in pursuit of their goals The same challenge applies to historical and normative evaluations of how con temporary interstate society was made I argued in chapter 5 pp 1547 that among other things the particular composition of binding forces playscentrallyintotheissueofwhetheranygivensocietyisstableornot withforcestowardsthebeliefendfavouringstabilityandforcestowards the coercion end suggesting instability or at least stability contingent on an ability to maintain a large difference in power at a manageable cost This approach means that the pattern of binding forces is itself part of the social structure of interstate society In a crude way it suggests the hypothesis that other things being equal interstate and international societies based on coercion will be less stable than those based on calcu lation which will be less stable than those based on beliefidentity This is a slightly more systematic way of formulating the fairly common place insight Watson 1992 127 that legitimacy is crucial to the stability of any political order More agonisingly on the normative side Wendts approach raises the question of whether coercion is an effective or ac ceptable means for holding a value in place until it becomes accepted by calculation andor belief The historical record makes it perfectly clear that coercion has played a huge role in the making and breaking of interstate and international societies from Sumeria onwards Empires that were ruthlessly coercive Assyrian Mongol Soviet collapsed to tally even though their trade benefits would also have created some bonds of calculation Those that offered more whether through cul ture religion or citizenship Rome China were either more durable in themselves or left behind durable residues that fed into subsequent interstate or international societies The fact that Swedish kings were carving statues of Roman emperors onto the bowsprits of their war ships a thousand years after the fall of Rome is testimony to the power of such legacies Antislavery was initially imposed by the European 253 From International to World Society powers Watson 1992 273 but eventually became a universal norm largely sustained by belief Indeed the whole edifice of European inter state society was initially imposed by coercion but has become univer sally accepted at least by calculation and in many places as belief Buzan and Segal 1998a Watson 1992 2589 argues that by the nineteeth century many coun tries were eager to join European international society Although some of this eagerness can be attributed to fear of coercion calculation also played a part along the lines of Waltzs mechanism of socialisation It was clear that the pluralist package of primary institutions generated power both material and social more effectively than any rival Tilly 1990 Thus a combination of coercion extinction and copying calcula tion brought more and more states into the Western interstate society and over time belief in sovereign equality in nationalism in territori alty in diplomacy kept them there Much the same might be said about the market initially imposed by coercion now held in place by a broad mixture of belief calculation and coercion Sometimes coercion works as a way of transplanting values and sometimes the Soviet experiment it doesnt The central political weakness of the fascist experiment during the interwar years was that its narrow ethnicracist legitimising idea pretty much meant that beyond a fairly small sphere it could only be held in place by coercion and had little prospect for translation into support by calculation andor belief From a liberal perspective the central threat of communism was precisely that like liberalism it had real potential to be accepted as a universal belief Onecanconcludefromthisdiscussionthatboththenatureofthebind ing forces in the sense of their distribution at any given point in time and the interplay among them in relation to any given value or set of values in the sense of the actual or potential shifting either up or down the coercioncalculationbelief spectrum are a key part of the dynamics of stability and change in the structure of interstateinternational soci eties As suggested above this argument links the nature of the binding forces to the character of the leading powers There are two elements in play in this linkage The first is to do with the particular nature of the values espoused by the leading powers and the way in which those values favour or moderate the use of coercion in promoting them The second assuming that there is more than one great power in the system is about the degree of ideological homogeneity versus ideological dif ferencehostility among the powers the Convergence model versus the divergence assumption that underpins pluralism 254 Conclusions The nature of the values espoused by the leading powers and how these relate to the dynamics of binding force is an extremely complicated question At one end of the spectrum one finds the fascist example al ready mentioned where the nature of the values espoused virtually guarantees a strong emphasis on coercion because of the lack of much basis for calculation and belief beyond a narrow ethnicracial circle In the middle of the spectrum one might place the case of the communist powers Unlike fascism communist values could be and were con structed as universal In terms of the values themselves it was an open question as to how they should be promoted and in practice there was for a time a successful mixture of belief the use of propaganda and example and coercion the imposition of communist governments by conquest or revolution At the other end of the spectrum one might find at least some liberals whose espousal of democracy and human rights would carry the conviction that these values cannot and should not be imposed by force But here too there is much room for ambiguity Other liberal values such as the market have quite frequently been imposed by force the openings of Japan and China in the midnineteenth cen tury Even democracy and human rights were successfully imposed on the Axis powers by conquest after the Second World War and as I write an attempt to do the same thing is underway in Iraq Liberal values are certainly not intrinsically immune from the lure of coercion though they can be constructed in that way more easily than many other values The question of how values link to binding forces cannot be answered only with reference to the nature of the values themselves Equally or possibly more relevant is the social context into which any value is projected Fascist values will almost always have to be carried by force beyond the ethnic group that promotes them Dynastic values might well carry fairly easily across quite different cultures as demonstrated by many empires throughout history Communist values might well carry more easily into societies with their own traditions of collectivism as they did in parts of Asia than into societies with more individualist traditions And vice versa for liberal values which might well carry more easily into cultures with individualist traditions than cultures with collectivist ones This kind of positional analysis suggests something about how values will be evaluated morally at the receiving end and therefore whether more or less coercion will be necessary to insert them An easy or difficult fit of values will probably play a big role in how binding forces work or dont work Regardless of this there is also an efficacy factor which is whether given values are seen to produce 255 From International to World Society an advantage for one or more sectors of society This element points towards calculation and perhaps in the longer run belief and wasis a key part of the promotion of both communist and liberal values Liberals assume that people will come their way because they will first see the advantages of doing so and having entered into the practice come to accept the values as a matter of belief If adherence to some values does indeed make some wealthier more knowledgeable more powerful or more interesting than adherence to others then this facilitates the move away from coercion towards belief It was part of the crisis of the communist world in the later stages of the Cold War that its values visibly lagged in many of these practical respects compared with those of the West At present one could apply this way of thinking to the concern about the US that it is moving sharply away from the practice of projecting its values by a logic of persuasion and towards the coercive end of the spectrum The US has been spectacularly successful over the last halfcentury not only in promoting the market international law and multilateralism but also in building a host of secondary institutions to reinforce the binding mechanisms of calculation beloved of the ratio nal choice approach and belief beloved of the normative theorists Yet now the combination of unipolarity a massive and for the time being quite easily sustained military superiority 11 September a national le gitimising cause for unilateralism and extreme modes of securitisation and the deeper strands of American exceptionalism American values seen as universal truths seem to be driving away from that tradition The US vigorously attacks much of what it has created the UN and many of its agencies claims exceptional rights over international law and asserts the right to use force preemptively against targets of its own choosing Iraq If this trend continues we may soon be concerned less about relative versus absolute gains than about relative versus absolute losses On the impact of convergence versus divergence in the ideological character of the leading powers it is tempting but almost certainly wrong to propose that convergence equates with less coercion and di vergence with more The model case of convergence is the argument about democracy and peace The twentieth century with its three ideo logical world wars is a model case of divergence But it is not clear that ideological convergence of any kind breeds harmony Among fas cist powers it almost certainly would not Amongst communist pow ers it certainly did not and neither did it amongst dynastic powers or 256 Conclusions Christian or Islamic or Confucian ones Although ideological divergence easily can lead to conflict it does not necessarily do so Pluralism as sumes that some common interests and values can be found amongst divergent ideologies on the basis of a logic of coexistence but it is also the case that difference could breed indifference or tolerance The current debate about whether or not Islam is or must be hostile to liberal val ues and vice versa or whether there are acceptable interpretations that make them more compatible is an example of the room for manoeuvre available in secondorder pluralism in this respect The interplay among the three domains I opened this discussion in chapter 6 p 195 focusing particularly on the liberal model and its expectations and requirements of high inter play among the three domains In terms of seeing this interplay as one of the driving forces affecting the international social structure there are two ways historical and ideological of approaching the question The historical route reflects the concerns of the WightWatson wing of the English school about the interplay between preexisting cultures and the formation of interstate societies This question generates the hypothesis that a shared culture is either a necessary or at least a very advantageous condition for the development of an interstate society as in classical Greece and early modern Europe The historical ap proach awards a certain primacy to the interhuman domain It sets up the largerscale patterns of individual identity expressed in civilisations and the universal religions as foundational for secondorder societies Doing this risks essentialising the social structures in the interhuman domain without asking where they came from In the case of Europe the civilisational substrate of Christendom on which the Westphalian interstate society was constructed was itself a leftover of the Roman empire Without the influence of Rome it is far from clear that the Euro pean peoples would have become Christian This creates a chickenegg problem about whether interhuman social structures have to precede interstate ones or vice versa In the longer run it seems clear that there is a process of mutual constitution between the social structures in the interhuman domain and those in the interstate domain Each feeds into the other through a series of cycles Perhaps the key dynamic identified by this approach hinges on the question of what happens when an interstate or international society expands beyond its cultural home base Must such expansion necessar ily weaken the interstate society Many English school writers thought 257 From International to World Society that decolonisation had done so to Western international society and Huntingtons 1996 clash of civilisations thesis can be read as a more polemical version of the same argument The underlying idea here is that when the social structures within the interstate and interhuman do mains line up then this reinforces their stability and when they dont line up the disjuncture undermines stability This is close to Wellers 2000 discussion cited at several points in earlier chapters underlin ing the importance of social geography Weller draws attention to the potential stabilities available where patterns of identity and patterns of rational contractual relations occupy the same territorial space and the potential instabilities when they do not This is a hypothesis worth exploring through detailed case studies Although it identifies a potentially important dynamic arising from the interplay between domains it also carries a danger While interstate so ciety is regarded as being relatively fluid and capable of expanding or contracting quite easily the social structures in the interhuman domain are regarded as relatively static and fixed If this is true then expansions of interstate society will inescapably be challenged by disjunctures in the interhuman domain Thinking in this way marginalises the possibil ity that expansions within the interstate domain are in themselves part of the mechanism by which social structures in the interhuman domain are created Here the argument loops back to that made in the previ ous paragraph It also connects to the discussions in chapter 4 about how society and community link together in a strong but indeter minate way Putting this idea in play casts the problem of expansion of interstateinternational society into a different light The question then becomes one not of an inevitable existential contradiction between the two domains but a much more dynamic one about how quickly and how effectively the interstate society can remake the social structure of the interhuman domain on which it rests Must there be a clash of civil isations as Huntington and some hard realists think or do we already see elements of an emergent Mondo culture as some globalists and world society advocates discern and many antiglobalisationists target as McDonaldisation The greatest and most successful empires such as Rome China and in different form the West flourish by spreading their culture and changing how those within them think about their identity They do this both by coopting elements of the local cultures in classical times by absorbing their gods and festivals now by commodi fying local culture and by offering attractive new practices Patterns of identity may be slower moving than patterns of power but they are not 258 Conclusions static How this question is answered obviously connects quickly and strongly to the discussion of binding forces above If developments in the interhuman domain lag behind those in the interstate one is coer cion an effective and legitimate means of holding things in place until the interhuman domain comes around in terms of calculation andor belief The historical record suggests that sometimes this works and sometimes not The ethical questions are altogether more complicated By contrast the approach through ideology tends to give primacy to the interstate domain This approach focuses on how any particular type of interstate international or world society incorporates the three domains into its governing ideas As I argued in chapter 5 there are good reasons to think that states will generally be the dominant actors as they have been within the frame of human history to date and seem likely to be at least for some decades to come Although it is possible to imagine world societies in which states are not dominant it remains true in the contemporary world that states are still the most powerful and focused unit and can shove and shape the others more easily than individuals and TNAs can shove and shape them not least because of their dominant command of the instruments of coercion It is neverthe less important as argued in chapter 6 not to drift unthinkingly into the assumption that the only relevant model of interstate society whether pluralist or solidarist is a liberal one There are many other models and what the relationship among the three domains will be depends heavily on the type of interstate society in play Liberal interstate societies will be ideologically disposed to give political and legal space to individu als and TNAs Other types of interstate society most obviously those based on totalitarian ideologies such as communism and fascism will be ideologically disposed to give little or no political and legal space to individuals and TNAs Yet other types of interstate or international or world society eg Islamic Sumerian Mayan might well have different mixtures The liberal model is of course of huge interest because it is the one we are living in and by whose truth claims we are surrounded Liberal international societies certainly open up enormous scope for interplay among the three domains by recognising and empowering individuals and TNAs Yet liberalism can also be accused of feeding off the inter human domain while at the same time undermining its structures of identity Liberalism focuses on the individual both as the fundamental bearer of rights and responsibilities and as the consumer encouraged to cultivate individualism by differentiating him or herself through 259 From International to World Society the acquisition of a unique portfolio of goods and services It sets this focus on the individual into the context of universal values human rights and practices the market which easily cast as parochial and backwardlooking many of the social structures in the interhuman do main whether national civilisational or religious Looking at liberalism in this way links back to the argument just made about the interplay of the interhuman and interstate domains posing two alternative views Does liberalisms elevation of the individual serve well for the expan sion of interstate society by offering attractive universal foundations for wider social structures in the interhuman domain Or does it just atomise threatening the older patterns of identity in the interhuman domain The former view is supported by the success of Westernisa tionAmericanisation in spreading its own fashions of dress music film and news reporting around the world The latter view is exempli fied by nationalist or religious fundamentalist reactions to globalisation in many parts of the international system Liberal interstate societies should thus be expected to excite strong dynamics between the inter state and interhuman domains by mounting a fundamental assault on traditional cultural practices and identities These dynamics will nor mally be played out by a mixture of coercion calculation and belief But perhaps even more important is the way in which liberal inter state societies empower the transnational domain In principle liberal ism favours a minimal state and the maximum liberty for individuals consistent with maintaining social order In practice this means the em powerment of civil society and the right of people to establish organ isations for a wide range of purposes Translated to the international sphere this means that state borders have to be permeable to trade travel ideas capital and a wide range of INGOs including multina tional firms interest groups and lobbies A liberal international society is likely to open up a substantial transnational space in which TNAs of various kinds have legal rights and considerable autonomy to act across state borders This feature creates a strong pressure on states to harmonise their domestic arrangements on a wide range of issues from property rights and border controls to accounting practices and prod uct standards This pressure in turn underlies a tendency towards a Kantian Convergence model of interstate society The logic of a liberal interstate society thus points towards international and eventually even world society as I defined them in chapter 6 pp 2014 In a liberal international society TNAs can and have become very powerful actors Huge global corporations command wealth resources 260 Conclusions and knowledge that surpass those of many of the poorer weaker states in the system and pressure even the more powerful states to compete for their investment Transnational interest groups and lobbies can harass states directly over issues such as human rights and pollution and a host of quieter TNAs can slowly leach away the authority and character of the state by providing alternative points of reference for its citizens Because liberalism ties its political legitimacy and fortune to sustained economic growth the rise of the transnational domain as a crucial element in the global economy itself becomes a crucial element in the wealth power and legitimacy of the core capitalist political economies All of this is of course the stuff that drives the idea of globalisation In the context of this discussion however the point of interest is that liberal interstate societies perhaps more than any other create a powerful dynamic be tween the interstate and the transnational domains At a minimum the transnational sector becomes a driving force in favour of reinterpreting primary institutions such as sovereignty and nonintervention and pro moting new ones such as the market and human rights At a maximum as thought by some globalisation enthusiasts the transnational domain becomes the location of the vanguard driving the social structure of humankind towards some form of world society By this point in the discussion any readers who had doubts about what happened in chapter 4 when I overthrew the classic English school triad and replaced it with the three domains should be able to make up their minds I hope I have shown how the three domains work as an analytical tool and why they give a much clearer structural picture than would be possible by sticking with the traditional understandings of international system international society and world society The pressures of material conditions interaction capacity human powers of destruction and the planetary environment In thinking about the driving forces behind international social struc tures one cannot neglect a range of material factors that define the con ditions in which the game of states is played Changes in these condi tions can be critical drivers of changes in the primary and secondary institutions of interstate society One obvious example of this is the rise of awareness starting in the 1960s but visible further back in Malthu sian thinking that the planetary environment is a finite resource and that rising human numbers and capabilities have moved it from being an independent variable running on its own logic to an increasingly 261 From International to World Society dependent one affected by an increasing range of human activities As the physical vulnerability of the planetary environment to human ac tivity increased so environmental stewardship rose in prominence as a primary institution of interstate and international society Without that physical change of circumstance it is hard to imagine that the institu tional change would have occurred though it is possible to imagine that the institutional change would not have occurred despite the phys ical change had international society been differently constituted than it was A similar logic attends the rise in human powers of destruction which fed a fear of war and thus helped to weaken war and the balance of power as central primary institutions of interstate society By fear of war here I do not just mean exhaustion from a particular war as after the Thirty Years War and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars but existential fear of war as such arising from concern that the destruction involved would lead to the collapse or even extinction of the societies engaged in it This fear was benchmarked by the First World War which gave the first full experience of industrialised war and re inforced later by the arrival of nuclear weapons A more general case can be made that the rapid complex and univer sal growth of interaction capacity from the nineteenth century onwards is a key driver in the shaping of international relations By interaction capacity I mean the physical and social technologies that determine the possibilities for transportation and communication within any social system This case has been set out at length elsewhere Buzan Jones and Little 1993 Buzan and Little 2000 The physical technologies determine the size and degree of integration not only of the international system as a whole but also of the units and subsystems within it The social technologies that affect interaction capacity include some primary insti tutions diplomacy international law and many secondary ones forum organisations such as the UN Once rising interaction capacity had cre ated a fully global international system during the nineteenth century its continued increase shaped both the speed and intensity of interac tion within the system and the number and type of people who had access to those capabilities What started with the telegraph and the steamship as tools for government and business elites evolved into the internet with its rapidly widening access to communication and in formation resources for all sorts of people These social and physical technologies both make possible and in some ways express a liberal international society They underpin the rise of the market as a pri mary institution and it is hard to imagine that without them either 262 Conclusions equality of peoples or the beginnings of a global culture would have developed The social structures of humankind are substantially driven by inter nal logics and contradictions but they are also shaped by the physical environment within which they operate Mostly that pressure comes from human impacts as with interaction capacity the capacity for de struction in war and the alteration of the ecosystem both by various kinds of pollution and by direct destruction of lifeforms and change of landscape Sometimes it can come from nature as would be the case with the return of the ice age or the prospect of a large asteroid colliding with the planet Conclusions where to from here There are two senses of where to from here that I need to address in this final section first in terms of saying something about where the presentday international society might be heading and second in terms of indicating the direction of the research programme implied by this book To gaze into the future means that one has to take the analytical frame work set out above and ask whether in terms of the various elements it identifies there is a momentum or discernible direction to the evolu tion of contemporary international society Do the dynamics explored in the previous section seem to line up in some coherent way or do they pull against each other making outcomes uncertain This is not the type of theory that enables one to quantify the variables and seek statistical inferences But it is the type of theory that enables one to combine a structural approach with a historical account and so generate an anal ysis that is sufficiently simplified to make big questions about direction and momentum reasonably clear and approachable One can look at the stability or not of the pattern of primary institutions and explore its implications for movement along the pluralistsolidarist spectrum Alongside that one also has to look at the interplay among the three domains at the stability or not of the geographical patterns of interna tional social structure between the global and subglobal levels and at the balance among the binding forces I argued in the first section of this chapter that the contemporary global interstate society was modestly Cooperative and ideologically liberal with its pluralist elements widely embedded by belief but its solidarist elements presenting a much more mixed picture of coercion calculation and belief It could be classified 263 From International to World Society as an international society dominated by states but giving rights to non state actors I also argued that the cultivation of difference in subglobal interstate and international societies was largely compatible with the global level Barring catastrophic interruptions a case can be made that there is a lot of inertia in this general pattern Much that has remained sta ble is likely to continue to do so and much that has been changing will continue to move in the same directions The general structure of a secondorder pluralism in which subglobal interstateinternational societiescultivatedifferenceswithouteitherdepartingfromglobalinter state society or trying to dominate it might well be robust as might the overall coreperiphery structure with the West as the dominant core It is a more open question whether the incremental drift of the West into further Cooperative developments will continue both generally and in the more Kantian case of the EU It could be that this process has for the time being reached its limits and will either stay relatively static or even fall back as a result of transatlantic political divergence or within the EU resistance to further integration At the global level the pluralist institutions look pretty stable as does the continuance of con troversy about human rights and democracy The big question is about the stability of the market Because the international politics surround ing the market are always fractious and turbulent it is particularly hard to see whether the battles over trade and finance are essentially within a stable institution or whether they are about the fate of the institution itself Given that the global market delivers so much in terms of wealth and power and given the huge costs of dismantling it now that most economies are structured towards it the odds have to favour its contin uance almost certainly with no diminution of the associated disputes and probably with a similar mix of coercion calculation and belief The market is sustained inter alia by the widespread belief that it is a major factor in the downgrading of war and by its central role in fulfilling the liberal vision of international society It is also sustained by its strong interlinkage with multilateralism and the many secondary institutions they have jointly spawned The principal material forces that play on international social structure fear of war concern about environment increase of interaction capacity all have strong momentum and are unlikely to change Other than catastrophic disruptions of some sort there are two de velopments afoot in contemporary international society that have the potential to derail this inertia and produce some significant changes 264 Conclusions of direction the war on terrorism and the unipolar distribution of powerresultingfromtheUSbeingthelastsuperpowerThesetwodevel opments are quite strongly linked US superpowerdom does not depend on terrorism as such but the exercise of it could be significantly shaped by the war on terrorism Terrorism at least in its alQaeda form is significantly dependent on US superpowerdom because that defines its main target This link means that they have the potential to reinforce each other September 11 and the subsequent war on terrorism can be seen as a serious turning in the interplay between the interstate and transna tional domains As argued above liberal interstate societies encourage and empower the transnational domain seeing the development of a global economy and a global civil society as good and desirable in and of themselves In many ways the market is the main expression of the liberal cultivation of the transnational domain Extreme terrorism pre pared to resort to suicide attacks and seeming to have no moral con straint about attacks on civilians or the use of weapons of mass destruc tion exposes the darkest possible side of the transnational domain The availability of communications money and technologies of destruction to such groups exposes the contradictions of liberalism at their most extreme Hatefilled fanatics wielding weapons of mass destruction not only threaten to change the balance of power between the state and transnational domains but also threaten the practical sustainability of the liberal model itself If uncivil society becomes seen as the main source of threat then as discussed in the third section of chapter 3 lib eral logic gets pushed in a Power Political direction in which Leviathan is necessary to impose order and a civil sphere Because the openness of a liberalised economy provides opportunities for transnational extremists of all sorts to operate on a global scale the traditional Hobbesian domes tic security agenda gets pushed up to the international level becoming a problem for international society against global uncivil society If the understanding of war as an institution of interstate society shifts in this direction away from the statetostate assumptions of the Westphalian model then much more imperial approaches to world order easily fol low This logic is one of the most worrying aspects of the USBritish invasion of Iraq Any such development of course depends on the practical serious ness of the threat 11 September exposed the potential seriousness of this threat but if the war on terrorism proves effective at preventing repetitions on that scale then probably not much will change on this 265 From International to World Society account As anyone who lives in Britain or Spain can testify modern societies can tolerate a certain level of terrorism without undergoing major structural changes But if terrorists use weapons of mass destruc tion then the scenario is quite different That would cast 11 September as the opening round of a new clash of civilisations or perhaps not a new one but a taking up of the cudgels for a second round of the clash of civilisations that began several hundred years ago with the expansion of the West at the expense of other civilisations As clashing expressions of the transnational domain terrorism and the market become crucial factors in the fate of liberal international society The effects of sustained terrorism could shrink and degrade the market as a primary institution and maintaining the market could become the legitimising cause for the war on terrorism The question of the US is at the time of writing the more worrying be cause it is a concrete development whereas terrorism despite Septem ber 11 is still a hypothetical one in terms of its ability to change the development of global international society In a nutshell the question is whether or not the US is turning its back on the pursuit of a multi lateralist liberal international order and restyling itself in more impe rial mode As one observer puts it There is hardly a single international institution that has not been questioned undermined or outright aban doned by the United States in the name of its need to protect its sovereign interests Barber 2001 xxii The empirical evidence for such a turn is mixed and vulnerable to the success or failure of the USs attempt to reconstruct Iraq as a liberal democracy It is also unclear whether present developments represent the peculiarities of the second Bush adminis tration or some deeper turn in US politics which has been reinforced by 11 September Also unclear is whether this turn is driven primarily by the logic of a unipolar structure the US being effectively unbalanced in a military sense by the other great powers or whether it arises from the domestic character of American exceptionalism with to oversimplify somewhat its extreme demands for national security its claim to own the future and its uncritical belief in the essential goodness and right ness of American society The causes for concern are visible in several directions the Manichaean with us or against us rhetoric associated with the war on terrorism the attack on the framework of secondary institutions that the US was instrumental in building up over the last halfcentury the claim to a unilateral right to preemptive war and its exercise against Iraq and the general undermining of multilateralism by its preference for unilateral action and ad hoc coalitions 266 Conclusions A serious and sustained move by the leading power along these lines could if sustained alter the present shape and direction of the interna tional social structure It could reverse the decay of war as an institution and halt or reverse the rise of multilateralism and international law In extremis it could put a huge strain on sovereignty and nonintervention by asserting a right to change regimes on grounds either of support for terrorism or attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction that might be used against the US or US allies such as Israel It could revive the institution of antihegemonism by casting the US more in the role of a threat rather than as a carrier of acceptable universal values If Europe and Japan begin to fear or oppose the US some extremely hard choices would follow Should they begin to distance themselves from the US rethinking their bandwagoning posture and weakening the West as a coherent core Or should they accept a more naked less Gramscian form of hegemony with implications of suzerainty in the requirement to acknowledge that American exceptionalism here defined in terms of the requirement of the single superpower role legitimates the US stand ing outside and above the secondary institutions and international laws that form the framework of multilateralism for the rest of interstate soci ety Could the EU survive if its close association with and dependence on the US became a central point of controversy Perhaps not as sug gested by the splits over the Iraq war Reactions against a more imperial US could also change the balance between the global and the subglobal levels of social structure with the former weakening back to a more barebones pluralism and the latter becoming more differentiated and more selfcontained a scenario close to that of a world of blocs The interplay amongst primary institutions provides a useful way of thinking about this scenario It could be argued that the rise of multilat eralism and the market as primary institutions are closely linked OECD 1998 801 It could be argued further that their associated network of secondary institutions has been a critical factor in the downgrading of the role of balance of power alliances antihegemonism and to a lesser extent war If multilateralism is itself downgraded by sustained US at tacks on it then a resurgence of these older institutions is a likely result In this sense the accumulation of empirical evidence by neoliberal insti tutionalists that secondary institutions do facilitate cooperation under anarchy is highly relevant Those secondary institutions have been the front line of a deeper primary institution of multilateralism that has defined what constitutes normal practice in managing international so ciety It is not clear that the Bush administration recognises this fact 267 From International to World Society and therefore understands the probable cumulative consequences of its actions Nor is it clear how far the US can go in downgrading multi lateralism without beginning to jeopardise the market and whether US interests in sustaining the market therefore act as a brake on its unilat eralism Needless to say the adoption of a more imperial posture by the US would necessarily change the balance among the binding forces of interstateinternational society One of the remarkable features of US hegemony over the past halfcentury was its ability to build a consen sual international order that was increasingly held together by calcula tion and belief rather than coercion and which operated multilaterally throughahostofmediatingsecondaryinstitutionsEmpiresdonotwork that way Coercion is their first tool and loyalty their first demand If the US turns strongly and durably in this direction then the consequences for interstate and international society will be large The second sense of where to from here concerns the direction of the research project implied in this book and its implications for those who work in or listen to the English school tradition What should be the research priorities of those who want to pursue a more social structural approach to English school theory and what are the implications for those within the more Wightian and Vincentian normative traditions Totheextentthatthisbookisanopeningratherthanaclosingaprovo cation rather than a definitive rendering more probably much more needs to be said about the framework set out here I know that I have not fully mastered the subject of primary institutions and since this is the key to the English schools claims more work needs to be done on both the conceptualisation of primary institutions and on linking this con ceptualisation more systematically to the neoliberal institutionalist and regime theory studies of secondary institutions One question that may be central to exploring this linkage is where are the limits of constitu tive effects in international society Is the boundary between primary and secondary institutions understandable in terms of the difference between constitutive effects and regulatory practices defined and cre ated by preconstituted actors within a preconstituted game I rather suspect not but this question needs to be addressed A more coherent understanding of institutions also needs to be read into the historical account As implied in this chapter I think that the concept of primary institutions offers considerable scope for revising the English schools accounts of the expansion and evolution of international society The same could be said of pluralism and solidarism I have set out what I think is a clearer rendition of the pluralistsolidarist spectrum but it is 268 Conclusions not one with which I expect everyone to agree I hope that those who disagree will take it as a challenge to revisit their own conceptions and see how they stand up to the points raised Among other things those interested in solidarism need to face up to the issue of convergence and the question posed by Vincent as to whether the only way of making solidarist development compatible with sovereignty and its derivatives is for states to become more alike internally What are the implications for this way of thinking of the wider arguments about homogenising forces that can be found in the IR literature In particular I hope those in the solidarist tradition will think hard about why they have excluded the economic sector and what the implications are of bringing it on board It seems to me that there are interesting opportunities to bring English school thinking and International Political Economy work into closer contact not least in thinking about the interplay of the market and multilateralism with other institutions In thinking about all of this it is important to recognise that solidarism like society is not necessar ily nice Solidarity is about shared interests and sympathies and can encompass a wide range of values Also to those in the solidarist wing and as well the historical WightWatson one there is the challenge to make more explicit the role of binding forces both in evaluating the historical record and in advocacy of solidarist developments in human rights and other areas If vanguardism is to be accepted as a key mechanism for advancing international society both historically and in the present then the ques tion about the role of coercion in the pursuit of the market and human rights cannot be evaded How are we to deal with the tension between moral doubts about means versus historical evidence that coercion can work as a way of implanting primary institutions on the global level and the moral imperative to do something now How do advocates of solidarism deal with the reality and the legitimacy of secondorder pluralism versus the push towards global homogenization implied in the pursuit of universal values I have given the concept of world society an empirically marginal role describing an extreme form of liberal development and replaced its present main functions with the idea of the interplay amongst the interstate interhuman and transnational domains Wighteans may not want to give up the idea of world society as that which is in opposition to interstate society or based on political programmes with an alternative foundation to the sovereign state and I have no problem with that us age continuing in the normative discourse But present usage of world 269 From International to World Society society covers so many meanings as to sow more confusion than clarity and this weakens the structural potential of English school theory If my solution is not liked perhaps it will stimulate other suggestions about how to deal with this problem More straightforwardly the framework in this book invites much more study of subglobal international social structures and the way in which they interact with the global level Some ideas here might be gleaned from work I have done with Ole Wæver Buzan and Wæver 2003 which confronts the globalsubglobal problem in the context of regional security complexes and global polarity Bringing in the sub global also requires retelling the story of the expansion and evolution of international society It opens up prospects for linking English school thinkingtoregionalistworkparticularlythestudyoftheEUMorework needs to be done on the particular characteristics of liberal international societies and this would be helped if it could be contrasted with more specifically theoretical understandings of the nonliberal possibilities for interstate international and world societies In sum there is scope for an English school research programme that takes the particular qualities and characteristics of secondorder soci eties as its subject the pluralistsolidarist spectrum as its basic bench mark and primary institutions as its principal object of investigation Such a programme would focus on mapping and explaining the evolu tion of primary institutions in secondorder societies Its investigations would take systematically into account the role of sociopolitical geogra phy the interplay among the interstate interhuman and transnational domains and the effect of binding forces This programme offers re search opportunities of both a macro and a 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2001 System Empire and State in Chinese International Relations in Michael Cox Tim Dunne and Ken Booth eds Empires Systems and States Great Transformations in International Politics Cambridge University Press 4363 2002 Towards a Regional International Society Making Sense of Regional isms in Asia paper at ISA Convention New Orleans March 15 pp 283 Index Abbasid Dynasty 103 136 198 Abbott Kenneth 156 167 Adler Emanuel 148 Afghanistan 224 Africa 222 239240 245 Albert Mathias 71 Alderson Kai 103 161 Alexander Jeffrey 78 alliances 168 233 Almeida Joao de 43 99 154 AlQaeda 86 239 265 altruism 107 Americas 222 Amnesty International 96 anarchy 22 95 105 118 222 Ancient Greece 28 31 168 200 220 252 257 Ancient Rome 101 105 130 198 252 253 257 258 Anderson Benedict 130 Anheier Helmut 82 85 antihegemonism 233 247 267 Arab League 148 209 239 Arab Maghreb Union 239 arbitration 168 Armstrong David 51 60 105 Arts Bas 119 125 ASEAN 209 213 221 238 Ashley Richard 180 Asia 209 222 245 255 East Asia 208 209 218 222 227 238 South Asia 222 238 Southeast Asia 18 213 West Asia 239 asocial societies 159 Assyrians 105 253 Atlantic community 148 209 Australia 221 222 AustroHungarian empire 243 245 balance of power 143144 168 169 183 194 233 Balkans invervention in 219 banking 151 barbarians 33 104 146 191 Barber Benjamin 266 Barkin Samuel 41 161 181 Barnett Michael 148 belief binding force 103104 108 129131 communities 116 130 contemporary society 234 empires 105 social structures 130131 132 153154 and stability 157 binding forces contemporary society 233235 future research 269 meaning xvii nature 109 and primary institutions 253257 shared values 153154 157 215 223224 social systems 103106 108 129 132 and US imperialism 268 Boli John 72 74 96 125 Bozeman Adda 214 Britain 130 266 Brown Chris 13 68 75 91 112 113114 115 122 131 213 Buddhism 103 Bull Hedley 2 6 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 2728 29 30 31 32 33 3539 40 42 4344 46 47 5051 5256 5758 60 63 64 65 69 75 82 88 91 93 284 Index 9597 98 99100 101 103 105 112113 118 125 139 141 143 144 149 152 165 166 169171 172 174 175 177178 179 183 185 186 191 202 205 206 207208 213 214 216 217 236 Burke Edmund 60 61 Burke Patrick 80 Burma 40 Burton John 6667 68 69 88 Bush administration 232 237 267 Butterfield Herbert 28 calculation 103 105 108 116 129131 132 153154 157 capitalism 8384 129 199 238 Carr E H 18 31 36 50 123 cartels 125 Catholic Church 93 198 199 chartered companies 93 chess 178 180 China central planning 234 Cold War 226 and East Asia 238 empire 101 198 227 253 258 and Europe 222 and Kosovo intervention 220 liberalrealist dilemma 194 Mongols 100 nineteenth century 255 noncolonisation 108 primary institutions 168 Christendom 122 146 198 243 257 Christianity 65 103 136 210 214 257 citystates 191 civil society concept 7880 empowerment 260261 global civil society 7787 civilisations clash of civilisations 221 231 258 266 standards 225 248 clans 121 Clark Ann Marie 43 clash of civilisations 221 231 258 266 cleft states 221 clubs 125126 135 137 210 Cobden Richard 30 31 coercion binding force 103 105 108 129131 132 contemporary society 152154 empires 105 130131 future research 269 omnipresence 129 Soviet Union 40 104 157 253 254 and stability 157 253254 United States 224225 coexistence 143 144146 160 169 177 179 coexistence interstate societies 160 191192 232 235 Cohen Raymond 168 cohesion 107 Cold War 18 31 47 57 7981 145 209 213 214 226 236 249 256 collective enforcement 149 151 collective security 20 55 56 149 150 colonialism decolonisation 207 214 220 223 247 258 demise 192 expropriation 202 and global interstate society 215216 internationalisation effect 108 postWorld War I 245 postWorld War II 246 primary institution 171 172 173 179 181 183 241 common cultures 220 257 common humanity 235 communications 67 71 188 191 communism 7 214 227 254 255 communist community 122 communist interstate societies 199 201 communist states 18 244 256 communist values 256 communist world society 201 communitysociety distinction 7476 87 108118 128 217218 companies 119 125126 210 company law 151 confederations 105 107 160 conflict groups 121 Confucian civilisations 210 257 constructivism 1 2 4 7 59 64 106 230 convergence interstate societies 160 194195 232 237 256257 cooperation 144 177 cooperative interstate societies 160 193194 231 232235 237 238 241 cosmopolitanism xviii 7 8 21 27 47 217 221 counterfactual history 226 Cox Robert 76 critical theory 2324 Cronin Bruce 107 113 118 120 crusading orders 125 cultural patterns 200 285 Index cultures shared cultures 220 257 Cutler Claire 7 17 54 Darwinism 146 196 197 Davos culture 96 120 155 202 de Wilde Jaap 226 decolonisation 207 214 220 223 247 258 democracies 122 214 democracy 185 233 255 demography 261 Deutsch Karl 148 Diez Thomas 12 71 142 211 diplomacy English school 20 32 33 143 146 function 188 practice 13 primary institution 168 169 171 172 183 232 survival 248 discrimination 15 distribution of power 251252 265 domains of international relations contemporary society 233 driving forces 200 249263 English school key concepts 6 10 13 16 20 23 32 228229 interactions 197201 217222 257261 meaning xviii models 9 98 109 133 reconstructing English School concepts 128138 261 terminology 201204 dominion 22 105 Donnelly Jack 187189 Douglas Mary 116 doxa 104 driving forces 200 249263 Dunne Tim 6 7 10 28 37 43 44 45 46 5758 60 9495 205 Durkheim Emile 103 dynastic principles 183 191 255 East Asia 208 209 218 222 227 238 economic sector and English school 11 1920 212 and global civil society 85 market as primary institution 194 196197 233 234235 246 266 267 neglect 150151 212 269 regional groupings 209210 225 stability of market 264 empires coercion 130 253254 268 and English school 22 105 institutions 191 and nationalism 243 245 world empires 207 enforcement collective enforcement 149 151 English school boundaries 2021 contribution 1 34 and economy 1920 212 future directions 268270 global network 210 220 levels 1618 liberal story 226227 methodology 2224 normative conflicts 2122 normative theories 12 11 13 1415 pluralism 10 primary institutions concept 23 32 167176 and regime theory 161162 sectors 1920 strands 1214 and subglobal developments 1718 213 summary 610 theory 2426 triad models 9 98 109 133 triad of key concepts 6 10 13 16 20 23 32 128138 228229 261 unwarranted pessimism 212217 weaknesses 1524 and world society 1015 21 2762 8687 enmity 129 140 environment 8 145 150 186 233 261263 equality 215 235 246 Europe eighteenthcentury primary institutions 243 nineteenth century 144 146 214216 absolutist phase 227 against US 267 and Asian societies 219 binding forces 253 Christianity 257 coexistence interstate society 191192 colonialism 100 179 218 222224 241 245 252 common culture 220 and development of global society 1617 241243 early modern period 191 200 257 Greek heritage 28 31 and Kosovo 18 Middle Ages 23 65 125 nationalism 243246 286 Index primary institutions 242 use of war 15 Westphalian period 202 European Union binding forces 105 convergence society 195 208 237 debates 12 development 53 English school neglect 206 211 213 global role 18 IGOs 237 integration 4 105 221 liberal solidarism 198 membership conditions 224 motivation 122 nature 22 92 121 160 181 power management 193 solidarist interstate society 142 148 and sovereignty 95 subglobal unit 208209 survival 267 world society 203 Evans Tony 161 162 extermination wars 100101 108 families 121 fascism 214 227 254 255 256 Fawcett L L E 205 federations 105 107 feudalism 65 firstorder societies meaning xvii Fischer Markus 125 France 262 friendship 116 Fukuyama Francis 60 80 Gellner Ernest 76 114 Gemeinschaft 22 39 44 63 74 110111 genocide 20 202 geography social geography 117 251252 258 Germany 22 226 227 Gesellschaft 22 39 44 63 74 110111 Gilpin Robert 92 Glasius Marlies 82 85 global civil society 2 7782 8586 87 global society terminology 2 globalisation antiglobalisation 82 86 155 debate 11 definition 12 phenomenon 4 terminology 2 3 and TNAs 261 or world society 38 66 globalism exclusive globalism 207212 tension with subglobal levels 218219 Gold Standard 192 Goldstein Judith 156 167 Gong Gerritt 28 105 152 GonzalezPelaez Ana 20 41 202 237 251 Gramsci Antonio 82 84 great power management 232 234 Greece See Ancient Greece Grotius Hugo 7 9 17 27 34 37 46 5354 55 158 guarantees 168 guilds 125 Gulf Cooperation Council 148 239 Guzzini Stefano 104 Haas Peter 72 Hague Conferences 246 Halliday Fred 13 Han Empire 101 252 Hanks Patrick 164 Hansen Birthe 93 Hart H L A 166 177 Hassner Ron 178 Heeren Arnold 28 Hegel Friedrich 33 hegemony 22 30 105 Held David 12 96 Helleiner Eric 208 hermeneutics 23 Herz John 142 Hill Chris 43 historical overview 240249 Hobbes Thomas 7 9 17 19 27 32 37 47 78 83 85 86 101 102 103 107 115 118 123 129 158 Hollis Martin 95 Holsti Kalevi 25 172175 176 177 178 179180 181 183 190 192 194 215 241 243 Holy Roman Empire 92 125 homogeneity 148149 215 226 human rights coercion 152153 255 controversy 233 debate 2829 46 and English school 1112 focus of solidarist debate 147 149150 primacy 179 183 right to subsistence 19 and state sovereignty 17 20 2829 4849 5556 universalism 17 44 150 287 Index human rights cont western version 105106 and world society 4041 humanism 21 humanitarian intervention 4041 46 233 Hume David 103 huntergatherers 191 Huntington Samuel 221 231 258 Hurd Ian 103 104 Hurrell Andrew 7 16 19 96 103 104 153 161 177 192 195 205 IAEA 96 IGOs 93 96 120 246 Ikenberry John 241 imagined communities 130 136 IMF 105 235 imperialism 237 Independence Day 142 indifference 107 individuals objects of international law 56 202 participants in international society 202 subjects of international law 53 54 and transnationals 118128 INGOs 43 84 96 119 120 210 260 institutions driving forces 249263 institutional sanctions 103 list 187 meaning 161163 164167 pressure of material conditions 261263 primary See primary institutions primary and secondary 167 secondary See secondary institutions stability 264 interhuman domain 258259 interhuman societies xvii 127 207212 International Atomic Energy Agency 96 International Bureau of Weights and Measures 144 international community 121123 180 international law compliance to 103 increase 232 and international society 32 natural or positive law 45 46 objects 56 and pluralism 143144 primary institution 168 169 170 171 172 175 182 sanctity of agreements 189 and solidarism 146 subjects 33 48 53 54 US attacks on 267268 international relations key concepts See domains of international relations unwarranted pessimism 212217 international society definition 9 32 English school 1 8 121 evidence 32 exclusive globalism 207212 historical changes 240249 institutions See primary institutions and international system 98108 meaning xvii 1 7 63 64 nonWestern forms 18 physical and social modes 98 postmodern 203 and range of institutions 190195 and states 121 terminology 24 201 202 types 2223 190195 unwarranted pessimism 212217 vanguard theory 222227 and world societies 2 28 202204 international systems homogeneity of units 148149 215 and international society 98108 meaning xvii 7 64 physical and social concepts 98108 128 International Telecommunications Union 144 interpretivism 23 interstate societies nineteenth century 214216 coexistence societies 160 191192 232 235 convergence societies 160 194195 232 237 256257 cooperative 160 193194 231 232235 237 238 241 exclusive globalism 207212 historical changes 240249 interstate domain 258259 meaning xvii postWorld War II history 246248 power political 159160 190191 232 238 239 preWorld War II history 243246 regional vanguard role 222227 snapshot of contemporary society 231 spectrum 159160 190195 232235 and underlying cultural patterns 200 intervention 219220 investment 151 Iran 239 288 Index Iraq imposition of democracy 255 266 Iraq invasion 2003 152 219 221 224 225 237 239 248 256 265 267 Islam 103 199 209 210 221 257 259 Islamic world 18 122 209 213 218 221 227 239 Israel 221 239 267 Jackson Robert 6 8 13 46 47 48 91 93 95 99 141 143 149 150 171 174 175 185 186 212 240 James Alan 14 32 42 91 99 101 119 143 154 171 174 175 186 188 202 Japan 108 222 226 227 238 245 255 267 Jones Roy 29 117 262 Jung Dietrich 7677 111 Kagan Robert 237 Kaldor Mary 82 85 Kant Immanuel 7 17 21 27 33 34 38 47 5051 59 60 65 78 9394 102 107 115 158 Kapstein Ethan 12 Keane John 8485 Keck Margaret 96 119 Kedourie Elie 214 Keene Edward 32 53 173 179 185 192 215 216 241 Keohane Robert 28 161 162 164166 167 171 175 180 181 Kissinger Henry 149 Knudsen Tonny Brems 45 46 5657 149 171 Kosovo 18 Krasner Stephen 11 65 119 156 157 163164 165 167 173 Kratochwil Friedrich 103 162 163 164 165 170 175 176 Leninism xviii 222 liberalism adoption of values 256 and coercion 255 concept of civil society 7880 democracies 214 English school 226227 international societies 259261 liberal solidarist model 197200 revolutionism 7 10 tradition 3031 utopianism 29 victory 80 Linklater Andrew 13 23 29 34 46 47 58 141 Lipschutz Ronnie 78 79 Little Richard 7 10 12 14 23 27 43 63 82 92 93 95 101 120 123 125 148 183 191 200 202 222 226 230 262 lobbies 210 Locke John 32 101 102 107 115 158 Luard Evan 15 22 66 67 69 88 102 110 Luhmann Niklas 7072 110 126 Machiavelli Niccolo 7 27 macrosociology 7677 mafias 119 125126 Malthus Thomas 261 Manchester United 111 Mann Michael 70 Manners Ian 151 Manning C A W 11 1213 30 31 56 140 162 178 185 March James 103 130 165 173 market 194 196197 233 234235 246 264 266 267 Marx Karl 33 60 243 Marxism 76 78 91 129 223 material conditions 261263 Mauryan Empire 104 Mayall James 20 46 47 59 133 141 143 147 170171 173 174 175 176 182 185 190 192 193 202 212 241 243246 248 250 Mayans 259 Mayhew Leon 108 McDonaldisation 258 McKinlay R D 10 82 McLean Iain 179 Mercosur 209 213 237 Mexico 221 Meyer John 61 72 73 165 173 Middle Ages 23 65 125 Middle East 100 222 239 Miller J D B 19 214 Milner Helen 145 180 monasteries 125 Mondo culture 235 258 money 166 Mongols 100 105 253 Mosler Hermann 182 multiculturalism 217 multilateralism 171 183 232 246 247 266 267268 NAFTA 209 213 237 Nardin Terry 170 175 national security 265 266 289 Index nationalism nineteenthcentury Europe 146 twentiethcentury obsession 197 coexistence societies 192 communities 135 contemporary society 233 economic 20 postWorld War II 246 preWorld War II 243246 primary institution 185 241 250 and shared identity 137 NATO 105 149 220 224 natural law 21 36 46 5356 Nau Henry 247 neoimperialism 224 225 neoliberalism 4 7 230 248 neomedievalism 43 122 125 179 202 neorealism 4 28 64 95 106 230 248 Neumann Iver 142 neutrality 168 nomads 191 nonintervention principle 46 55 143 232 248 nonstate actors and states 9197 and world society 63 74 Noortmann Math 119 125 norms 12 11 13 1415 2122 163164 North America 208 North Korea 224 Nye Joseph 28 180 224 OECD 185 267 Olsen Johan 103 130 165 173 Onuf Nicholas 162 176 Onuma Yasuaki 182 Oppenheim Lassa 5354 Organisation of the Islamic Conferences 148 239 Orthodox Church 198 Oslander Andreas 13 Other 75 107 122123 124 Ottoman Empire 108 243 245 ozone layer 145 Pacific 245 Palestinians 221 panAfricanism 221 panArabism 221 panIslamism 221 parochialism 210 Paul Darel 92 pendulum theory 105 Peterson M J 81 pluralism concepts 4647 143146 contemporary interstate society 231 English school 10 future research 268269 institutions 143144 251 meaning xvii 141142 pessimism of pluralists 212217 pluralistsolidarist debate 8 4562 102 107108 139143 268269 second order pluralism 236 popular sovereignty 233 244 246 see nationalism positivism 7 23 24 37 46 5356 119 power political societies 159160 190191 232 238 239 Presley Elvis 111 primary institutions benchmark for change 241 and binding forces 253257 change 181 195 242 characterisation 181182 coexistence interstate societies 191192 constitutional structures 172 contemporary society 234235 contradictions 250251 and distribution of power 251252 driving forces 249263 dynamics 176 195 251252 English school 32 52 167176 Europe 242 243 foundational institutions 172 functions 186190 195 fundamental institutions 173 future research 268 hierarchy 175 176184 186 195 historical overview 240249 issuespecific regimes 173 list 174 187 and material conditions 261263 meaning xviii 167 power political interstate societies 190191 procedural institutions 172 180 process of institutionalisation 173 and societal geography 251252 stability 264 tensions 250251 and types of international society 190195 universal acceptance 216217 principles meaning 163164 property rights 143 151 189 191 192 290 Index QUANGOs 84 93 radio frequencies 144 rationalism 7 8 9 3334 Ratner Stephen 156 211 realism 7 8 9 33 Red Cross 85 96 regime theory 78 161162 regimes meaning 163 regionalism See subglobal societies Reinalda Bob 119 125 religions 121 136 183 210 Rengger Nicholas 13 65 republicanism 146 ReusSmit Christian 41 161 168 171 172173 175 176 178 179180 183 186 188 revolutionism 7 8 10 27 3435 Richardson James 15 19 right to subsistence 251 Risse Thomas 82 125 RisseKappen Thomas 96 119 125 137 rivalry 107 Rome See Ancient Rome Rosenau James 83 88 92 148 Ruggie John 59 125 162 163 164 165 176177 178 179180 182 189 rules meaning 163164 Russia 221 222 238 sacrifice 15 107 satellites 144 Scholte Jan Aart 12 science 114 117 151 233 Searle John 166 167 168 176 177 178 183 190 secondorder societies allocation of property rights 189 communications 188 and English school 25 26 functional problems 188190 limits to use of force 188189 meaning xvii xviii membership 188 rejection of idea 117118 sanctity of agreements 189 and sociologists 70 states 110 secondary institutions coexistence societies 192 Europe 243 list 187 meaning xviii 167 rise 247 US attack on 266 267268 Segal Gerald 217 235 254 selfdetermination 40 185 192 233 244 246 September 11 attacks 83 85 86 197 221 224 248 256 265266 Serbia 224 shared cultures 257 shared identity 130 137138 145146 220 shared values Asian values 238 binding forces 102 103106 153154 157 215 223224 253257 English school 68 quality 131132 reasons for 152154 social structures 70 74 solidarist values 143 stability 157 thickthin 139 140 154157 transnational organisations 65 world society 72 Shaw Martin 6870 71 88 116 Sikkink Kathryn 96 119 slavery 15 202 253 Smith Anthony 198 Smith Steve 95 Snidal Duncan 145 156 social Darwinism 146 244 social systems binding forces 103106 108 129 132 and physical systems 98108 128 vanguard theory 222227 society communitysociety distinction 7476 87 108118 128 217218 concept 71 87 connotation 15 definition 69 108110 sociological approaches 63 6677 sociology 70 solidarism concepts 21 47 212 examples 148 future research 268269 and international society 8 liberal models 197200 meaning xviii 141 nonliberal models 199200 pluralistsolidarist debate 8 4562 102 107108 139143 268269 shared values 143 and world society 27 Sørensen Georg 161 176 181 South America 213 South Asia 222 238 291 Index Southeast Asia 18 213 sovereign equality 215 sovereignty See state sovereignty Soviet Union coercion 40 104 157 253 254 Cold War 145 226 collapse 103 104 224 234 247 empire 227 Spain 266 Spengler Oswald 33 Sri Lanka 221 Stalinism 34 35 40 42 105 standard of civilisation 225 248 Stanford School 61 7274 83 91 165 173 214 Star Trek 100 104 142 Starship Troopers 142 state sovereignty bedrock institution 175 176 182 centrality 55 continuation 232 evolution 161 and human rights 17 2829 40 4849 5556 nonintervention 143 219220 power political interstate societies 191 primary institution 168 171 172 and sovereign equality 215 universal acceptance 216217 and world society 32 states centrality 8 20 46 6768 119120 201 230 classification of systems 22 cleft states 221 definition 9293 94 elimination 125127 and geography 117 meaning xviii and nonstate actors 9197 primary institution 172 183 selfinterest 145 torn states 221 uniqueness 9192 units of international society 110 Westphalian See Westphalian model stock exchanges 126 Strange Susan 20 76 subglobal societies antagonism and neglect 1718 39 44 45 187 213 collective security 149 contemporary society 235240 economic blocs 209210 225 and exclusive globalism 207212 future research 270 and interaction of IR domains 217222 interventions 219220 pluralist pessimism 212217 subversion of international order 213214 tensions with global levels 218219 vanguard movements 214 222227 237238 252 West 236238 subsistence right to 251 Sudan 221 Sufis 239 Suganami Hidemi 26 39 102 141 223 suicide attacks 265 Sumeria 252 259 suzerainty 22 23 105 179 191 Sweden 253 symbiosis 107 systems physical and social 98108 technology 262263 telecommunications 144 terra nullius 189 territoriality 97 172 182183 191 232 terrorism 86 240 265268 theory nature 2426 Third World 46 81 122 244 Thomas George 72 74 96 125 Tilly Charles 7 70 180 189 196 254 Tonnies F 74 110 114 torn states 221 torture 20 Toynbee Arnold 33 trade coexistence interstate societies 192 Eurasian system 101 liberal economies 151 market as primary institution 194 196197 233 234235 246 266 267 power political interstate societies 191 practices 100 primary institution 19 33 45 172 180 183 185186 trade unions 137 traditions 104 111 transnational actors capitalism 199 contemporary society 233 260261 corporations 119 125126 210 dark side 86 265 functional networks 137 historical 198 and individuals 118128 organisations nature of 65 292 Index participants in international society 202 and regional developments 220 role 38 transnational societies xviii 207212 transnationalism and world society 7 27 tribes 191 Turkey 221 uncivil society 8586 87 197 265 Underhill Geoffrey 76 unilateralism 232 256 266 United Nations 193 256 262 United States coercion 256 Cold War 145 and East Asia 238 economic dominance 12 and EU 206 federation 105 hegemony 30 247 imperialism 224 225 237 245 268 invasion of Iraq 219 221 224 237 248 256 265 267 national security 232 preemptive war 248 266 rejection of convergence 237 superpower 265268 unilateralism 232 256 266 universalist delusion 236 240 256 266 use of war 193 war on terrorism 240 265268 Universal Postal Union 144 universalism assumptions 1618 39 56 269 English school 11 human rights 44 150 and liberalism 260 meaning 1314 65 United States 236 240 256 266 and world society 27 utopianism 29 values meaning 163164 shared See shared values vanguard meaning xviii 222 subglobal societies 214 237238 252 theory of international social structures 222227 Vincent John 2 11 13 14 15 17 1920 28 30 31 36 3944 46 49 51 57 60 63 64 65 76 82 88 90 93 9597 113 114 115 119 120 127 134 141 142 149 202203 208 213 251 269 Wæver Ole 6 7 18 25 26 29 45 75 102 122 130 161 162 165 194 238 239 240 270 Wallerstein Immanuel 18 64 70 76 124 207 Waltz Kenneth 14 18 35 52 60 61 76 106 148 160 177 222 254 war elimination 193 196197 fear of war 262 First World War 262 limits 188189 191 233 post 911 use 197 preemptive war 248 266 primary institution 143144 168 169 171 172 180 265268 war on terrorism 240 265268 wars of extermination 100101 108 War of the Worlds 142 Warner Caroline M 168 warrior societies 121 Watson Adam 9 17 18 2223 25 28 37 39 67 98 99 102 105 112 152 154 205 214 216 243 252 253 254 257 weapons of mass destruction 265 266 Weber Max 74 116 Weller Christopher 2000 12 75 116 117 149 217 218 220 221 258 Wells H G 100 142 Wendt Alexander 2 4 14 23 25 76 95 101 102108 115116 118 128129 148 153154 156 157 158 159 160 175 215 223 229230 253 West clash with Islamic world 221 contemporary society 235 empire 258 globalism and subglobalism 210 218 shared values 237 subglobal society 236238 universalism 123 values 83 105106 108 146 209 West Asia 239 Westphalian model alternatives 35 binding forces 131 European history 202 and human rights 29 and interventions 219 nature 23 origins 125 199 pluralism 141 primary institutions 169 principles 182 and solidarism 146 293 Index Westphalian model cont straitjacket 4 transition 3 42 88 and war 15 Wheeler Nicholas 37 45 46 49 5758 60 149 152 171 219 Whelan Frederick 170 Whitman Richard 12 142 211 Wight Martin 1 6 7 8 11 1314 17 19 2223 28 29 30 3135 44 57 67 9394 96 102 105 112 114 168169 174 183 203 205 228 236 257 269 Williams John 58 126 211 Wilson Peter 161 162 Wilson Woodrow 246 Woods Ngaire 12 World Bank 105 235 World Health Organisation 96 world political system 64 69 world polity 73 world society alternative views 6366 analytical dustbin 28 44 88 118 definitions 37 41 45 207208 English school 12 1015 21 2762 and exclusive globalism 207212 global civil society 7787 or globalisation 66 intellectual history 30 45 and international society 2 28 202204 meaning xviii 78 nonstate actors 63 redefining 269270 rise 11 sociological approaches 63 6677 and solidarism 27 terminology 24 201 202204 units 119121 World Society Research Group 71 7476 88 111 114 116 122 131 world systems 207 WTO 96 105 185 224 235 Yugoslavia 220 Zhang Yongjin 28 168 182 205206 211 294 CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 83 Maja Zehfuss Constructivism in international relations The politics of reality 82 Paul K Huth and Todd Allee The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the twentieth century 81 Neta C Crawford Argument and change in world politics Ethics decolonization and humanitarian intervention 80 Douglas Lemke Regions of war and peace 79 Richard Shapcott Justice community and dialogue in international relations 78 Phil Steinberg The social construction of the ocean 77 Christine Sylvester Feminist international relations An unfinished journey 76 Kenneth A Schultz Democracy and coercive diplomacy 75 David Houghton US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis 74 Cecilia Albin Justice and fairness in international negotiation 73 Martin Shaw Theory of the global state Globality as an unfinished revolution 72 Frank C Zagare and D Marc Kilgour Perfect deterrence 71 Robert OBrien Anne Marie Goetz Jan Aart Scholte and Marc Williams Contesting global governance Multilateral economic institutions and global social movements 70 Roland Bleiker Popular dissent human agency and global politics 69 Bill McSweeney Security identity and interests A sociology of international relations 68 Molly Cochran Normative theory in international relations A pragmatic approach 67 Alexander Wendt Social theory of international politics 66 Thomas Risse Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink eds The power of human rights International norms and domestic change 65 Daniel W Drezner The sanctions paradox Economic statecraft and international relations 64 Viva Ona Bartkus The dynamic of secession 63 John A Vasquez The power of power politics From classical realism to neotraditionalism 62 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett eds Security communities 61 Charles Jones E H Carr and international relations A duty to lie 60 Jeffrey W Knopf Domestic society and international cooperation The impact of protest on US arms control policy 59 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf The republican legacy in international thought 58 Daniel S Geller and J David Singer Nations at war A scientific study of international conflict 57 Randall D Germain The international organization of credit States and global finance in the world economy 56 N Piers Ludlow Dealing with Britain The six and the first UK application to the EEC 55 Andreas Hasenclever Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger Theories of international regimes 54 Miranda A Schreurs and Elizabeth C Economy eds The internationalization of environmental protection 53 James N Rosenau Along the domesticforeign frontier Exploring governance in a turbulent world 52 John M Hobson The wealth of states A comparative sociology of international economic and political change 51 Kalevi J Holsti The state war and the state of war 50 Christopher Clapham Africa and the international system The politics of state survival 49 Susan Strange The retreat of the state The diffusion of power in the world economy 48 William I Robinson Promoting polyarchy Globalization US intervention and hegemony 47 Roger Spegele Political realism in international theory 46 Thomas J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds State sovereignty as social construct 45 Mervyn Frost Ethics in international relations A constitutive theory 44 Mark W Zacher with Brent A Sutton Governing global networks International regimes for transportation and communications 43 Mark Neufeld The restructuring of international relations theory 42 Thomas RisseKappen ed Bringing transnational relations back in Nonstate actors domestic structures and international institutions 41 Hayward R Alker Rediscoveries and reformulations Humanistic methodologies for international studies 40 Robert W Cox with Timothy J Sinclair Approaches to world order 39 Jens Bartelson A genealogy of sovereignty 38 Mark Rupert Producing hegemony The politics of mass production and American global power 37 Cynthia Weber Simulating sovereignty Intervention the state and symbolic exchange 36 Gary Goertz Contexts of international politics 35 James L Richardson Crisis diplomacy The great powers since the midnineteenth century 34 Bradley S Klein Strategic studies and world order The global politics of deterrence 33 T V Paul Asymmetric conflicts war initiation by weaker powers 32 Christine Sylvester Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era 31 Peter J Schraeder US foreign policy toward Africa Incrementalism crisis and change 30 Graham Spinardi From polaris to trident the development of US fleet ballistic missile technology 29 David A Welch Justice and the genesis of war 28 Russell J Leng Interstate crisis behavior 18161980 realism versus reciprocity 27 John A Vasquez The war puzzle 26 Stephen Gill ed Gramsci historical materialism and international relations 25 Mike Bowker and Robin Brown eds From cold war to collapse theory and world politics in the 1980s 24 R B J Walker Insideoutside international relations as political theory 23 Edward Reiss The strategic defense initiative 22 Keith Krause 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international society 9 William Bloom Personal identity national identity and international relations 8 Zeev Maoz National choices and international processes 7 Ian Clark The hierarchy of states Reform and resistance in the international order 6 Hidemi Suganami The domestic analogy and world order proposals 5 Stephen Gill American hegemony and the trilateral commission 4 Michael C Pugh The ANZUS crisis nuclear visiting and deterrence 3 Michael Nicholson Formal theories in international relations 2 Friedrich V Kratochwil Rules norms and decisions On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 1 Myles L C Robertson Soviet policy towards Japan An analysis of trends in the 1970s and 1980s 182 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Aperfeiçoamentos reativos de políticas ambientais lições dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Michelle Cristina dos Reis Bragaa Alberto de Freitas Castro Fonsecab a Master in Environmental Engineering Researcher Programa de PósGraduação em Engenharia Ambiental Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto Ouro Preto Brazil Email michellebragaalunoufopedubr b PhD in Sustainable Development Researcher Programa de PósGraduação em Engenharia Ambiental Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto Ouro Preto Brazil Email albertoufopedubr doi1018472SustDebv12n1202139412 Received 19082021 Accepted 25112021 ARTICLE VARIA ABSTRACT The State is not always able to proactively improve environmental policies Eventually policy improvements are a result of disasters that expose preexisting problems This situation is reflected in the state of Minas Gerais Brazil where after the failures of the Fundão and B1 tailings dam in Mariana and Brumadinho several problems in dam safety and emergency policies were exposed This study had a twofold objective 1 to identify the mechanisms used by the government of Minas Gerais to improve environmental policies and 2 to understand how the Mariana and Brumadinhos disasters affected dam safety and emergency policies Based on semistructured interviews and regulatory analysis the study revealed that the state government of Minas Gerais has been predominantly reactive in controlling environmental policies Additionally it was observed that the disasters catalysed a learning process that culminated in potentially better dam safety policies Keywords Environmental Policy Assessment Environmental Disasters Tailings Dams Regulatory Learning RESUMO O Estado nem sempre é capaz de aperfeiçoar políticas ambientais de maneira proativa Eventualmente melhorias políticas se dão em reação a desastres que expõem contundentemente problemas preexistentes Essa situação está refletida no estado de Minas Gerais Brasil onde após as rupturas das barragens de rejeito de Fundão em Mariana e B1 em Brumadinho ficaram expostas lacunas nas políticas de segurança e emergência de barragens Este estudo teve dois objetivos 1 identificar os mecanismos utilizados pelo governo de Minas Gerais para aperfeiçoar políticas ambientais e 2 183 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 entender como os desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho afetaram as políticas de segurança e emergência de barragens Baseado em entrevistas semiestruturadas e análises regulatórias o estudo revelou que o Estado tem sido predominantemente reativo no controle de políticas ambientais Adicionalmente foi observado que os desastres ocorridos catalisaram um processo de aprendizagem que culminou em políticas de barragens potencialmente melhores Palavraschave Avaliação de Políticas Ambientais Desastres Ambientais Barragens de Rejeito Aprendizagem regulatória 1 INTRODUCTION DISASTERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Environmental policies are imperfect and need constant monitoring and performance evaluation to support learning processes ASSIS et al 2012 BELLONI SOUZA MAGALHÃES 2003 The improvement of environmental policies however does not always happen proactively While suddenly and forcefully exposing preexisting problems catastrophic events often function as catalysts for change EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Many environmental disasters have driven the creation and improvement of environmental public policies HOGAN 2007 POTT ESTRELA 2017 In London four years after the Great Smog of 1952 the Clean Air Act was created thus establishing measures to control pollution caused by burning coal WALLER 1971 In 1956 in Japan there was a significant episode of mercury contamination in the Minamata Bay that stimulated discussions on the use of chemical compounds and their effects on flora and fauna thus leading to the ban of DDT and to an environmental movement that would gain strength in the following decade HOGAN 2007 In 1977 toxic substances including dioxin were released due to an explosion in the chemical industry in Seveso Italy HOGAN 2007 Years after this disaster the Seveso Directive was regulated to prevent accidents involving dangerous substances and limit their adverse effects on the environment and society POTT ESTRELA 2017 Still in the late 1970s hazardous waste disposal and human occupation in the Love Canal USA unfolded into reproductive problems among women and into high levels of chemical contaminants in the soil and air This led to the approval of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act Superfund which gave the Environmental Protection Agency EPA the authority to respond to releases of hazardous substances that could endanger public health or the environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 2018 HOGAN 2007 An accident in the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania USA in 1979 triggered debates around the use of atomic energy Years later in 1986 the explosion of a nuclear reactor in Chernobyl Ukraine increased environmental awareness in Europe and promoted favourable conditions for the implementation of environmental policies FREY 2000 In the 1980s there was also a leak of toxic gases from a pesticide industry in Bhopal India which resulted in the approval of the Convention 174 of the International Labor Organization ILO aimed at preventing industrial accidents and reducing their risks and consequences POTT ESTRELA 2017 A similar phenomenon of reactive improvement of environmental policies recently occurred in Minas Gerais Brazil after the failures of the Fundão tailings dam failures in Mariana in 2015 and of the B1 tailings dam Brumadinho in 2019 These disasters in addition to killing hundreds of people caused severe biophysical and socioeconomic damage The magnitude of these damages shed light on the many flaws and limitations of existing dam safety and emergency policies MILANEZ et al 2019 At the state and federal levels various legal and regulatory changes were triggered by the failures of these dams However the political and institutional learning of these failures remains fragmented and marginally explored in the literature This article sought to answer the following questions How does the Minas Gerais state government monitor and improve its environmental policies How did the dam failures affect the States institutional 184 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 regulatory learning More specifically the study had a twofold objective 1 to identify the mechanisms used by the government of Minas Gerais to improve environmental policies and 2 to understand how the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters affected dam safety and emergency policies 2 POSTDISASTER POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNINGS Catastrophic events can reveal organisational dysfunctions and stimulate reflections regarding the analysis diagnosis and prevention capacity of the actors involved in policymaking thus opening up opportunities for dialogue and collaborative learning between groups and organisations EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 LLORY MONTMAYEUL 2014 Disasters in particular have a considerable level of leverage to trigger change as they attract the attention of managers regulators and other stakeholders generating significant pressure to investigate understand and implement improvements including in the regulatory system EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 However the postdisaster learning process is not trivial several technical organisational or cultural obstacles must be overcome EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Learning involves identifying deficiencies and implementing changes at various levels of the system where different actors are involved Through the establishment of laws governments make priorities explicit and define limits guiding or restricting the behaviour of public agencies and entrepreneurs Subsequently these laws are interpreted and regulated To be operational these regulations have to adapt to the particular contexts of each project taking into account the existing resources and procedures Finally at the technicaloperational level legal requirements are put into practice RASMUSSEN 1997 In addition to these interactions the different actors are influenced by external pressure during the learning process whether political economic or technological as illustrated in Figure 1 22 WHEAT AND DERIVATIVES SECTOR The wheat and derivatives segment comprises the manufacture of wheat flour wheat milling the manufacture of semolina and wheat bran the manufacture of other wheat derivatives and the manufacture of flour and mixed pasta powder and prepared for the manufacture of bread cakes cookies etc ECONODATA 2020 According to this database this segment consists of 798 companies distributed between 26 Brazilian states as shown in Figure 1 Figure 1 Interactions between actors in the process of creating and improving policies laws and regulations Source Adapted from RASMUSSEN 1997 185 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Postdisaster learning encompasses the steps of reporting analysing planning implementing and monitoring effectiveness EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Some organisational or cultural issues however may impair learning such as the absence or poor quality of information and records the absence of statistical and trend analysis to support decisions on future investments or organisational changes unfamiliarity of root causes restriction of human and financial resources among others EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 In many cases politicalinstitutional lessons learned in the postdisaster context are translated into laws and regulations Which by itself does not guarantee the effectiveness of the requirements For Barros et al 2012 legal requirements are only efficient if they are well applied fulfilled and assimilated by social agents These authors further state that Having good laws is the first and most crucial step but its not enough The standard is just a starting point For its effectiveness it is necessary to establish conditions that make its application feasible such as the hiring of specialised technicians adequate infrastructure and financial resources to carry out the work in addition to an educated public aware of environmental issues BARROS et al 2012 p173 Furthermore understanding the causes of a disaster by itself does not contribute to political institutional learning The behavioural change of organisations whether they are private enterprises or public bodies the constant search for technical knowledge and the critical sense of the interested parties are some of the preponderant factors for learning from disasters Effective actions are therefore crucial for learning EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 Finally it should be noted that limited learning leads to the recurrence of disasters The failure of the Fundão dam in 2015 exemplifies this issue Despite the several changes in the instruments for managing the safety and emergency plans of dams after the event there was the second disaster in Brumadinho and an even more catastrophic one in terms of loss of human lives This situation indicates that the analyses of the disasters were superficial being limited to the identification of direct causes such as technical and human flaws Root causes which are generally organisational were not adequately remedied EUROPEAN SAFETY RELIABILITY DATA ASSOCIATION 2015 A technical study was written by Poemas 2015 published shortly after the Mariana disaster indicated limitations in the institutional learning of the environmental agencies and dam inspectors at the state and federal levels Such institutions were going through institutional capacity problems such as lack of personnel equipment and resources to promote more effective and efficient inspections Even after the disasters the National Mining Agency ANM continues to face budget restrictions and delays in the availability of resources which hinder the proper development of planned actions AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2020 The failures of the tailings dams in Minas Gerais offer therefore a fertile ground for evaluating reactive improvements in environmental policies 3 EVOLUTION OF TAILINGS DAMS SAFETY AND EMERGENCY POLICIES AT THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS The first dams designed to contain tailings from mining activities were built at the beginning of the 20th century Previously tailings were directly discarded into the environment as their impacts were considered insignificant or acceptable by governments and society ÁVILA 2012 Tailings dams are complex structures that demand strict regulations and adequate management to reduce their many risks In addition to the inherent hazards to the construction methods tailings properties may change over time and project changes may jeopardise initial safety assumptions INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON LARGE DAMS 2001 186 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 After the 1960s guidelines for dam safety management were established in Brazil by creating an institution currently known as the Brazilian Dam Committee whose acronym in Portuguese is CBDB In the 1980s and 1990s CBDB published books on Brazilian dams safety procedures and guidelines for inspection auscultation and instrumentation MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 The Federal Ministry of Mines and Energy in the late 1980s created a workgroup to standardise preventive and maintenance procedures aimed at dam safety This group prepared a report dealing with monitoring and instrumentation the frequency of inspection general guidelines to be followed in accidents and the definition of responsibilities for carrying out the actions MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 In 1996 CBDB drafted an Ordinance containing guidelines for assessing the safety of dams and proposing the creation of the National Dam Safety Council However this proposal was not pursued by the government In 1999 CBDB prepared the Basic Guide for Dam Safety MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 In 2002 the Dam Management Program started in Minas Gerais indicating criteria for dam classification minimum requirements to be included in the management system and considered in environmental studies related to the main stages of dams licensing procedures MINAS GERAIS 2002 The pioneering role of the government of Minas Gerais is primarily a result of disruptive events that occurred previously in 1986 and 2001 During the 2000s guidelines were therefore established in Minas Gerais to support technical security audits and the mandatory submission of the Declaration of Stability Condition DCE of the dams to the environmental agency More vital legislation on dam safety came with the sanction of Law nº 123342010 which established the National Policy for Dam Safety PNSB The bill that culminated in this law was drafted reactively after dam failures in 2001 and 2003 in Minas Gerais reinforcing the need to approve specific legislation on this subject ESTANISLAU BELLEZZIA 2017 MELLO PIASENTIN 2011 Furthermore many problems were recognised including latent vulnerabilities in projects and issues in the construction and operation of existing structures AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2018 Before the PNSB there were voluntary isolated initiatives by some entrepreneurs who were trying to implement in their Brazilian facilities the same operational and safety standards adopted internationally in their dams AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2018 There was a general lack of articulation between competent authorities in the public sphere which dealt separately with the many issues related to dams ZONTA TROCATE 2016 In this sense the PNSB was an attempt to expand government control over dams based on inspections and compilation of information thus allowing for improved dam safety management BRASIL 2010 One of PNSBs principles is that developers are legally responsible for the dams safety thus being required to implement actions to guarantee it including effective management systems and compliance with the regulations In the case of mining tailings dams government safety inspections are the responsibility of the National Mining Agency ANM However environmental agencies can carry other inspections that make up Brazils National System of Environmental Institutions whose acronym in Portuguese is Sisnama ANM the national mining agency established regulations for managing the safety and emergency of mining dams in 2012 and 2013 But after the Fundão dam failure these regulations were unified and further enhanced to incorporate the learning outcomes of this disaster BRASIL 2012 2013 2017 After the Brumadinho disaster a proposed bill culminated in Law 140662020 which changed the previous PNSB incorporating new requirements There were intense regulatory changes at the state and federal levels leading to various new regulations BRASIL 2020 187 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 In Minas Gerais after the collapse of the B1 dam the State Policy for Dam Safety Pesb was established through Law nº 232912019 being applied to dams designed to contain andor dispose of mining tailings residues water or other liquids that are associated with industrial or mining activities being more restrictive than the PNSB MINAS GERAIS 2019 The Pesb established some principles such as the prevalence of the most protective norm for the environment and communities as well as the prioritisation of actions of prevention inspection and monitoring by state environmental agencies and entities Furthermore it determined that they should articulate with the bodies and entities responsible for the PNSB in information sharing and inspections The requirements of the Pesb were regulated in specific normative acts as shown in Figure 2 Figure 2 State Dam Safety Policy and its Main Regulations Source Authors 2021 Given the context mentioned above this article will discuss the roles of Mariana and Brumadinho in promoting regulatory learning 4 METHODS This study addressed the particular context of Minas Gerais which is a leading Brazilian state in mineral production with decades of experience in implementing different types of environmental policies including policies aimed at the safety and emergency management of dams Two qualitative data collection and analysis approaches were adopted in this research semistructured interviews and content analysis In semistructured interviews the researcher asks predetermined but open questions to obtain greater depth in answers Thus there is more control over the topics investigated than in unstructured interviews and there is no fixed interval of responses for each question AYRES 2008 We opted for this methodological approach to capture deeper and contextual elements in respondents answers The interviews were carried out with eight professionals who work in different departments of the State Government Environmental System whose Portuguese acronym is Sisema The respondents were intentionally chosen because of their knowledge and experience with other environmental policy instruments The interviews were all telephonebased and lasted an average of 45 minutes between 30 and 60 minutes They were recorded using a smartphone application and later transcribed and analysed All respondents were aware of the purpose of the study and signed an Informed Consent Form previously approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Federal University of Ouro Preto The participants were coded to preserve their identities P1 to P8 Table 1 presents the details of the methodology used in the interviews 188 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Table 1 Methodology used in semistructured interviews Number of respondents Eight identified as P1 to P8 Date of the interviews January2019 February2019 and March2020 Respondents profile Managers and analysts from the State Secretary for the Environment and Sustainable Development Semad State Forest Institute IEF Institute for Water Management Igam and State Environment Foundation Feam responsible for the implementation and control of environmental policy instruments Main interview content Respondents profile and experience performance controls administrative and territorial challenges and priorities in improving environmental policy instruments Types of questions Open Questionnaire type Semistructured Communication media Phone calls recorded through smartphone app Data analysis Transcription coding and analysis of patterns and relevant content Source Authors 2021 Through interviews we sought to investigate the studys first objective namely how the state government monitors and evaluates the performance of environmental policies More specifically the following themes were explored which technologies tools or indicators are used the main challenges faced and the perception of professionals about the effectiveness of environmental policies in the state In the context of this research effectiveness is understood as the achievement of the objective proposed by a policy be it the change or maintenance of specific environmental conditions The primary purpose of the interviews was to obtain a general overview of policy learning and control at the state government Specificities of one or another environmental policy instrument were not further explored The content analysis of policies laws and regulations related to dam safety and emergency management required careful evaluations of textual material KRIPPENDORFF 2004 This method included categorising qualitative textual data into groups of similar entities to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or themes JULIEN 2008 This method proved to be suitable for analysing the temporal evolution of legal instruments aimed at tailings dams This study evaluated the primary laws and regulations enacted until 31 May 2021 at the state level in Minas Gerais and at the federal level A matrix was used to organise the legal and regulatory changes that took place after the failures Based on the identified changes we discuss the learning process triggered by the disasters 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 51 EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN MINAS GERAIS The interviewees pointed out a series of issues that hinder or prevent the control of the performance of environmental policies in Minas Gerais the lack of systematic monitoring of the improvement of environmental quality the absence of constant monitoring of environmental data incompatible systems which are restricted to administrative controls and even the inexistence of methods among others were reported 189 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 Participant P1 who held several managerial positions related to protected areas and conservation policies stated that there are some tools that we use that bring some indicators but they are of little significance there is no such systematic monitoring in connection with the environmental quality of the territory Participant P2 who has extensive managerial experience in inspection and administrative sanctions reported that he uses a basic system that cannot verify the instruments effectiveness in terms of environmental quality outcomes Respondents cited the importance of using systems to manage environmental policy instruments and control their performance However several problems were reported in the existing systems such as low reliability modernisation and customisation Interviewee P6 who worked in the management of water resources and sustainable development policies stated today our database is very inconsistent because the old system did not have control over the consistency of the data released by the analysts The inspection mentioned above and sanctions manager P2 reported that the system does have some condition to generate some reports but we do not use it daily And he added we need a better system thats for sure theres even a reliability problem in it too The precarious systematisation and availability of data reported by the research participants is not a recent issue in environmental agencies in Minas Gerais Ribeiro 2005 detected in his study that in many cases data were available in these institutions Still they were not presented in an organised and systematic way demanding further collection and reporting This situation was also observed by Assis et al 2012 in an analysis of Brazilian environmental policies The scarcity of information about the performance of environmental policies coordinated by the state government makes it difficult for public agencies to implement and improve policies as well as prioritise efforts leading to institutional disparities while some instruments have staff and resources for its execution others receive little attention and are underutilised Regarding the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments there were different perceptions among interviewees This was already expected since other devices have different characteristics effects levels of regulation and institutional maturity It was reported by participant P4 who has extensive experience in forest and vegetation removal approvals and management that when there is a tangle of norms related to a particular environmental policy instrument it adds complexity making it impractical to manage effectiveness Participants P2 P3 P5 and P7 were of the general opinion that the state environmental policies are effective arguing that they contribute to the control of pollution and environmental degradation act as barriers to the irregular occupation of natural areas or promote environmental awareness using penalties and sanctions In other words they see effectiveness in the mere existence of environmental policies This perception that the absence of policies would aggravate environmental quality corroborates the view of Moura 2016 who stated there is a perception that many environmental problems have been worsening in the country while the instruments devised for environmental policy have not advanced at a sufficient pace and intensity in the changes necessary for better management of the environment Even so there is no doubt that the deterioration of environmental quality in this period would have been more serious if these regulatory economic voluntary or informational tools had not been used to address environmental problems MOURA 2016 p 139 140 However it is noteworthy that contributing to a goal and achieving a goal are different issues as assumed in the concept of effectiveness The limitation of human resources low investments in the technical qualification of the teams insufficiency or poor distribution of financial resources decisions distorted by political influences lack of articulation between environmental agencies lack of clear priorities and a focus on document analysis to the detriment of inspection were pointed out by the 190 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 several interviewees as the main bottlenecks for the effectiveness of environmental policy instruments For example participants P1 P2 and P3 externalised during the interviews that it is not effective due to lack of resources and resources include people and financial resources as well So there is a lack of money and we waste a lot of time trying to resolve things and in the end we always come up against some government decision lack of resources a new year a state bureaucracy P1 the environment demands many different focuses there is licensing there is inspection so we stay in a pot sic waiting for many other priorities to be met P2 the money is used for many other things except for its core activity for its effective purpose the money that is collected is not applied as it should be P3 For Moura 2016 institutional structures and participation processes involving social and economic agents determine the quality of environmental policies For this author the populations involvement in the elaboration execution and evaluation of policies is one of the pillars of success In this regard the interviewees mentioned that public participation in environmental policies occurs through consultations meetings hearings technical chambers and councils Participatory management was mentioned in the interviews as an essential step towards the effectiveness of the instruments which corroborates Assis et al 2012 p18 who stated It is essential that different actors who may have conflicting visions and objectives be incorporated into the assessment Despite the recognition of the importance of civil society participation in the formulation of effective environmental public policies there are structural issues in Minas Gerais that lead to the pseudo social involvement in public hearings and State Council for Environmental Policy Copam chambers CARNEIRO 2005 MOURA 2016 SALHEB et al 2009 The interviews demonstrated weak preparation and articulation among state environmental agencies when evaluating the performance of policies thus reinforcing the obscure causeandeffect relationship between policies and environmental quality on the ground The lack of priorities and evidence of effectiveness hinders the improvement of policies as several relevant aspects such as the management capacity of environmental agencies and entities are not considered in decisionmaking Difficulties and challenges in evaluating the performance of environmental policies pointed out by the interviewees were also identified in the literature It was observed that in Minas Gerais difficulties in measuring progress in environmental policies result from a lack of structured assessment mechanisms For Moura 2016 without these mechanisms notions of effectiveness will remain imprecise or partial The existence of a continuous learning system was not evidenced in the interviews This situation hinders the preventive action of the State The occurrence of disasters in Minas Gerais is likely a symptom of the inefficiency of the policy control Unwanted events become catalysts for a learning process that reactively seeks improvements based on the causes and consequences of what happened However the difficulties presented by the interviewees cannot represent an impediment to the performance evaluation of environmental policies They must reinforce the search for knowledge and investments so that the evaluation is helpful to direct policies promoting improvements and the efficient allocation of public resources based on participatory and democratic mechanisms 191 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 52 POSTDISASTER LEARNING IN MINAS GERAIS ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON DAM SAFETY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT The second part of this study focused more specifically on policy changes aimed at dam safety and emergency management which reflect a reaction to the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters This part sought to understand the details of the changes and the bulk of the lessons learned This part however was not based on interviews but as previously explained in the methods section on content analysis of laws and regulations As shown in Table 2 an intense legislative and regulatory activity was identified after the Mariana disaster and above all after the Brumadinho disaster Table 2 Laws and regulations aimed at the safety and emergency management of tailings dams STATE LEGISLATION Marianas predisaster Resolution Semad nº 992002 January 29 2002 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 622002 December 17 2002 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 742004 September 9 2004 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 872005 June 17 2005 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 1242008 October 9 2008 State Decree nº 448442008 June 25 2008 Marianas postdisaster State Decree n 468922015 November 20 2015 State Law nº 219722016 January 21 2016 State Decree n 469932016 May 2 2016 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2102016 September 21 2016 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2172017 December 06 2017 Normative Deliberation Copam nº 2282018 November 28 2018 Brumadinhos postdisaster Resolution Semad nº 27622019 January 29 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 27652019 January 30 2019 State Law nº 232912019 February 25 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 27842019 March 21 2019 Official Notice GMGCedec nº 022019 June 25 2019 Resolution SemadFeam nº 28332019 August 26 2019 State Decree nº 477392019 October 18 2019 State Decree nº 480782020 November 5 2020 State Decree nº 481402021 February 25 2021 Resolution SemadFeamIEFIgam nº 30492021 March 2 2021 Ordinance IMA nº 20472021 March 31 2021 Ordinance IephaMG nº 72021 April 9 2021 Ordinance Feam nº 6782021 May 6 2021 Ordinance Feam nº 6792021 May 6 2021 Technical Instruction GMGCedec nº 012021 May 21 2021 192 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 FEDERAL LEGISLATION Marianas predisaster Federal Law nº 123342010 September 20 2010 Ordinance DNPM nº 4162012 September 03 2012 Ordinance DNPM nº 5262013 December 09 2013 Marianas postdisaster Ordinance DNPM nº 142016 January 15 2016 Ordinance Secretaria Nacional de Proteção e Defesa Civil nº 1872016 October 26 2016 Ordinance DNPM nº 703892017 May 17 2017 Brumadinhos postdisaster Resolution of the Ministerial Council for the Oversight of Disaster Responses nº 12019 January 28 2019 Resolution of the Ministerial Council for the Oversight of Disaster Responses nº 22019 January 28 2019 Resolution ANM n 42019 February 15 2019 Resolution ANM n 132019 August 8 2019 Resolution ANM n 322020 May 11 2020 Resolution ANM n 402020 July 6 2020 Federal Law nº 140662020 September 30 2020 Resolution ANM nº 512020 December 24 2020 Resolution ANM nº 562021 January 28 2021 Source Authors 2021 The study identified that there was particularly in Minas Gerais an incremental learning process Years before the publication of the PNSB the State already had a dam classification system and required documents and data on the dam structures during the environmental licensing process The state government was the precursor of several changes later implemented at the federal level for mining dams and other dams Table 3 exemplifies the pioneering role of Minas Gerais Table 3 Examples of pioneering dam safety regulations in Minas Gerais Description State Level Federal Level Mining dams andor other types Dam Registration Resolution Semad nº 992002 Federal Law nº 123342010 Determines the registration of professionals who attest to the stability of dams State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Determines measures to rescue people animals and cultural heritage mitigate environmental impacts and ensure water supply State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Determines upstream dam decharacterization decommissioning Resolution SemadFeam n 27652019 Resolution ANM nº 42019 Determines the analysis and approval of Emergency Action Plana State Decree nº 480782020 Resolution ANM nº 512020 Establishes guidelines for the elaboration of flood studies Official Notice GMG Cedec nº 022019 Resolution ANM nº 322020 Determines public hearings to present the Emergency Action Plan State Law nº 232912019 Federal Law nº 140662020 Source Authors 2021 193 Braga Fonseca Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 It was found that some learnings catalysed by the failure of the Fundão dam were materialised only after the collapse of the B1 dam An example is the implementation of the State Policy for Dam Safety Pesb which resulted from the Popular Initiative Law Project called Sea of Mud Never Again proposed in July 2016 After the collapse of the B1 dam the urgency and relevance of the law mentioned above was more clearly perceived thus leading to its sanction one month after the dam break Therefore it was necessary the occurrence of two disasters for the implementation of some determinations at the state level such as detailing of flood studies methodology mandatory three phase environmental licensing for dam construction and change the requirement of a guarantee to ensure socioenvironmental recovery public hearings to discuss the conceptual design of dams environmental licenses conditioned to the approval of Emergency Action Plans by various sector entities requirement for the prioritisation of disposal alternatives that minimise social and environmental risks and promote the dewatering of tailings and residues creation of Dam Management Information System Sigibar and compatibility of the state and federal dam classification systems At the federal level the ANM mainly after the failure of the B1 dam established new requirements related to dam safety and emergency management Furthermore a cooperation agreement was signed with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD to review the regulation and governance of the mineral sector The ANM aims to identify regulatory barriers that may hinder the implementation of public policies and correct inefficiencies in the mineral sector based on the best global practices from countries such as Canada Australia and the United States AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2020 In its preliminary report the OECD highlighted the need to optimise inspection activities to reduce the risks of accidents AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE MINERAÇÃO 2021 A large part of the effort of public and private institutions has been focused on improving emergency management by dealing with procedures that can avoid failures or minimise damage resulting from them especially loss of life It is worth mentioning that in response to the Brumadinho disaster the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management was established which based on the lessons learned from recent failures and existing good practices set out global guidelines for the safe management of dams UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 2020 While the mining industrys interests prevailed in its preparation this Standard defined auditable principles and requirements that emphasise the relevance of engagement and communication with stakeholders throughout the entire life cycle of dams HOPKINS KEMP 2021 The analysis carried out here suggests that changes in legal requirements are not enough to prevent new disasters It is necessary that developers comply with legal requirements and that the supervisory and regulatory bodies have sufficient financial and human resources to monitor compliance with their determinations If laws and regulations disregard the capacity of supervisory bodies or licensing entities the effectiveness of existing policies is compromised Regulatory changes in the context of developing economies like Brazil must be accompanied by capacitybuilding and intuitional strengthening 6 FINAL REMARKS The proactive performance assessment of environmental policies enables a better understanding of policies actual implications and opportunities for improvement thus legitimising political changes and helping governments to make more scientific and evidencebased decisions which can ultimately contribute to the enhanced distribution and use of resources ASSIS et al 2012 BELLONI SOUZA MAGALHÃES 2003 CRABBE LEROY 2008 MICKWITZ 2006 In Brazil however the socioenvironmental effects of policies are not constantly monitored making their assessment and consequently politicalinstitutional learning difficult Specifically in Minas Gerais 194 Reactive improvement of environmental policies lessons from the Mariana and Brumadinho disasters Sustainability in Debate Brasília v 12 n3 p 182196 dec2021 ISSNe 21799067 interviewees suggested that state environmental agencies still have weak control and articulation in assessing policies Environmental disasters become a natural catalyst of policy improvement in this context as reflected in tailings dams recent legislative and regulatory changes The failures of the Fundão and B1 dams stimulated discussions about the effectiveness of dam safety and emergency policies and therefore accelerated a learning process Regrettably however the Fundão disaster was not enough It was necessary for the second disaster of Brumadinho to simulate more meaningful learning MILANEZ 2021 This article identified several institutional challenges faced by the government of Minas Gerais that hinder or prevent the control of environmental policies and consequently the prioritisation of correction and preventive measures In the present study empirical evidence was obtained about the capacity of public institutions and it was found that the perception of professionals working in state environmental agencies corroborates previous studies When it comes to dam safety and emergency management the assessment carried out revealed that the changes that took place were not mere coincidences the vast majority of if not all regulatory changes are directly related to the causes or consequences of both disasters Advances in dam safety could occur due to studies methodologies and good practices disseminated among professionals but not in the speed and intensity observed here The identified challenges of policy effectiveness evaluations are mainly related to mismatches between laws intended objectives and their actual implementation budget cuts lack of personnel and technical resources and lack of knowledge or disregard for the benefits of policies at different levels of management It is therefore necessary among other aspects to strengthen the institutional capacity of government agencies Mariana and Brumadinho demonstrated no zero risk for tailings dams no matter how good the engineering projects and legal requirements safeguard these structures Developers must comply with legal requirements and the supervisory and regulatory bodies need sufficient human and financial resources to monitor compliance with their determinations ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel Capes for the Masters scholarship and the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development CNPq for the research scholarship 132558 20181 as well as for the financial support to the project 311201 20180 REFERENCES 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Paraopeba Versos Textos para Discussão PoEMAS 2019 MILANEZ B Mapping industrial disaster recovery lessons from mining dam failures in Brazil The Extractive Industries and Society v 8 Issue 2 June 2021 MINAS GERAIS Deliberação Normativa Copam no 62 de 17 de dezembro de 2002 Dispõe sobre critérios de classificação de barragens de contenção de rejeitos de resíduos e de reservatório de água em empreendimentos industriais e de mineração no Estado de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte 2002 MINAS GERAIS Lei 23291 de 25 de fevereiro de 2019 Institui a política estadual de segurança de barragens Belo Horizonte 2019 MOURA A M M DE Governança Ambiental no Brasil instituições atores e políticas públicas Brasília Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 2016 POEMAS Antes fosse mais leve a carga avaliação dos aspectos econômicos políticos e sociais do desastre da SamarcoValeBHP em Mariana MG Mimeo 2015 POTT C M ESTRELA C C Histórico ambiental desastres ambientais e o despertar de um novo pensamento Estudos Avançados v 31 n 89 p 271283 2017 RASMUSSEN J Risk Management in a dynamic society a modelling problem Safety Science v 27 n 2 p 183 213 1997 RIBEIRO J C J Desenvolvimento de modelo para avaliação de desempenho de política pública de meio ambiente estudo de caso Estado de Minas Gerais 2005 Tese Doutorado em Saneamento Meio Ambiente e Recursos Hídricos Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte SALHEB G J M et al Políticas públicas e meio ambiente reflexões preliminares Revista Internacional de Direito Ambiental e Políticas Públicas v 1 n 1 p 527 2009 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME International Council on Mining and Metals Principles for Responsible Investment Padrão Global da Indústria para Gestão de Rejeitos 2020 Available at httpsibram orgbrwpcontentuploads202008globaltailingsstandardPTpdf Accessed in 1 maio 2021 WALLER R E Air Pollution and Community Health London 1971 ZONTA M TROCATE C A questão mineral no Brasil Antes fosse mais leve a carga reflexões sobre o desastre da SamarcoValeBHP Billiton Marabá Editorial iGuana 2016 v 2 PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE MINAS GERAIS INSTITUTO DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS DEPARTAMENTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS AMANDA AGUIAR COSTA DO DESASTRE À MUDANÇA UMA ANÁLISE DOS IMPACTOS DAS MOVIMENTAÇÕES DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NAS MUDANÇAS DAS NORMAS DE REGULAMENTAÇÃO DA ATIVIDADE MINERADORA APÓS OS ROMPIMENTOS DAS BARRAGENS DE MARIANA E BRUMADINHO Belo Horizonte 2024 Estou estudando as mobilizações da sociedade civil brasileira oriundas dos grandes desastres ambientais ocorridos em 2015 e 2019 em Minas Gerais os rompimentos de barragens ocorridos nas cidades de Mariana e Brumadinho A magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais desses desastres tecnológicos levou a uma mobilização não apenas pelas consequências diretas em curto e longo prazo dos desastres em si mas também pela possibilidade de outros acontecerem da mesma maneira dada a falha na segurança desse modelo de alocação de rejeitos na construção na supervisão da estabilidade e consequentemente nas normas de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Ao redor do país existem centenas dessas barragens e uma quantidade impossível de ignorar é considerada de alto risco de rompimento Porque quero descobrir a influência da sociedade civil brasileira sobre a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e seu impacto nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação das atividades predatórias extrativistas Para explicar que a sociedade civil ao redirecionar a diplomacia ambiental brasileira foi capaz de gerar uma mudança das normas internacionais de regulamentação das atividades mineradoras aumentando a restrição de ação por meio da participação em fóruns e congressos e de criações de padrões de processos em parceria com organizações extremamente relevantes internacionalmente lutando não somente na busca pela responsabilização dos responsáveis pelo desastre mas também pela prevenção de outras catástrofes nos mesmos moldes Pergunta de Pesquisa Em que medida as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira pós desastres de Brumadinho e Mariana levaram à uma mudança na diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e consequentemente nas diretrizes internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora Hipótese de Investigação A sociedade civil brasileira frente a magnitude dos impactos gerados com os rompimentos das barragens pressionou o Estado Brasileiro para um redirecionamento de seu posicionamento internacionalmente para um ativismo ambiental significativamente mais presente de modo a reforçar a importância de regulamentar a atividade mineradora atuação que levou a uma maior restrição nos padrões globais Objetivos de Pesquisa o Objetivo Geral Analisar o impacto da busca da sociedade civil brasileira por melhores regulamentações das atividades extrativistas de grandes corporações em nível internacional o Objetivos Específicos a Mapear os processos e movimentos mais significativos da sociedade civil brasileira relacionados aos desastres ambientais ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho b Analisar a efetividade das estratégias de mobilização utilizadas pela sociedade civil brasileira c Identificar a relação entre os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira com um aumento no ativismo do Estado Brasileiro d Identificar a relação entre o aumento do ativismo do Estado Brasileiro e a mudança na regulamentação internacional para atuação de empresas mineradoras d Analisar as normas internacionais de regulamentação da atividade mineradora antes e depois dos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho Justificativa Os desastres tecnológicos ocorridos em Mariana e Brumadinho ambos no estado de Minas Gerais Brasil constituem eventos de notável gravidade cujas consequências se estendem para além das fronteiras temporais e geográficas Em primeiro lugar é essencial destacar que tais desastres desencadearam uma profunda comoção na sociedade brasileira e internacional dada a magnitude dos impactos ambientais e sociais observados os quais se revelam tanto no curto quanto no longo prazo O Brasil até aquele momento não havia registrado precedentes de desastres ambientais com tais características e dimensões As falhas estruturais evidenciadas no modelo de alocação dos rejeitos nas barragens conjugadas com deficiências nos laudos de segurança suscitaram graves questionamentos sobre a veracidade e a integridade das situações descritas nesses documentos Tais falhas revelaramse cruciais na compreensão dos riscos envolvidos e na subsequente materialização dos desastres Esses eventos explicitam de forma contundente a necessidade imperativa de uma revisão crítica das práticas permitidas às grandes corporações que operam no setor extrativista Essas corporações que desempenham um papel substancial na movimentação da economia nacional devem operar sob regulamentações que minimizem os riscos de tragédias ambientais visto que as consequências dessas operações são sentidas sobretudo pela população brasileira frequentemente de modo irreparável e para além do que qualquer compensação financeira possa cobrir Ao experienciar diretamente os efeitos devastadores desses desastres em Mariana como nativo desta localidade pude observar de perto o impacto profundo e duradouro sobre a vida das pessoas diretamente afetadas As perdas de familiares amigos locais queridos e até mesmo memórias representam danos inestimáveis que moldam permanentemente a identidade e a memória coletiva da comunidade A dor das perdas a devastação de locais com valor sentimental inigualável e a desintegração de redes sociais e culturais refletemse em traumas que em muitos casos persistem por gerações O deslocamento de famílias forçadas a habitar em acomodações temporárias como hotéis transformou espaços de vida diária incluindo minha própria escola em refúgios para aqueles que perderam tudo O contato constante com essas realidades e a ocupação da casa de meu avô por uma das famílias desalojadas destacam a intensidade com que a comunidade local foi e continua a ser afetada Este sofrimento cotidiano ressalta a necessidade urgente de justiça reparação e sobretudo medidas preventivas robustas para evitar a recorrência de tais catástrofes A relevância desta pesquisa se insere no contexto mais amplo da emergência climática global um fenômeno cada vez mais perceptível e preocupante As atividades predatórias das mineradoras ao contribuírem significativamente para o agravamento das crises ambientais exigem um escrutínio rigoroso e uma reformulação das normas que regem suas operações Esta pesquisa se propõe a identificar como surgem e se desenvolvem os movimentos na sociedade internacional que impulsionam a mudança nas normas regulatórias das atividades empresariais A busca por aprimorar os processos de governança corporativa e normativa visa não apenas mitigar os impactos ambientais mas também promover um desenvolvimento que seja verdadeiramente sustentável garantindo às futuras gerações condições ambientais e sociais melhores do que as que se experimentam atualmente Assim este estudo busca contribuir substancialmente para o campo das Relações Internacionais ao fornecer uma análise detalhada de como crises ambientais de grande escala influenciam a evolução das normas e práticas internacionais A expectativa é que ao explorar os processos de emergência e adaptação das normas esta pesquisa ofereça insights valiosos para a formulação de políticas mais eficazes e preventivas que não só respondam às crises ambientais mas também as previnam promovendo um ambiente global mais seguro e sustentável para todos Marco teórico Partindo da perspectiva teórica construtivista a concepção de realidade nas Relações Internacionais é essencialmente construída e mantida por meio de processos contínuos de interação social onde a linguagem desempenha um papel fundamental De acordo com essa abordagem os processos de socialização são centrais na construção da realidade uma vez que eles moldam as identidades dos atores e simultaneamente contribuem para a formação dos significados que esses atores atribuem ao mundo ao seu redor Em outras palavras a realidade é um constructo dinâmico que emerge da interação entre identidades e significados que se reforçam e se reconstroem mutuamente No contexto das Relações Internacionais as normas e regras que regem o comportamento dos Estados e outros atores do Sistema Internacional são criadas difundidas e eventualmente internalizadas através de processos complexos de interação social e política Os Estados considerados como atores racionais e dotados de identidades próprias desempenham um papel central na construção de significados compartilhados que se manifestam na forma de normas e regras internacionais A formação e emergência de normas e regras no Sistema Internacional seguem um ciclo que pode ser dividido em três fases principais externalização objetivação e internalização Cada uma dessas fases é caracterizada por distintos mecanismos de legitimação justificação coação e a utilização de canais de comunicação variados para a disseminação e aceitação dessas normas 1 Externalização Na fase de externalização os atores começam a articular novas ideias e normas geralmente em resposta a mudanças contextuais ou a problemas emergentes que demandam novos marcos regulatórios ou comportamentais Esse processo envolve a projeção de ideias e expectativas para além das fronteiras domésticas buscando influenciar outros atores no sistema internacional A linguagem e a retórica desempenham um papel crucial nesta fase pois são utilizadas para comunicar argumentar e convencer outros atores da validade e necessidade das novas normas propostas 2 Objetivação A fase de objetivação referese ao momento em que as normas começam a ser institucionalizadas e ganham um status mais concreto dentro do sistema internacional Durante esta fase as normas deixam de ser meras propostas para se tornarem elementos reconhecidos e incorporados nas práticas e instituições internacionais Este processo de institucionalização pode envolver a codificação das normas em tratados resoluções ou outros instrumentos de governança bem como a criação de mecanismos de monitoramento e implementação 3 Internalização Por fim a fase de internalização ocorre quando as normas se tornam amplamente aceitas e integradas nas práticas cotidianas dos atores internacionais Nesta fase as normas deixam de ser contestadas e passam a ser vistas como parte integrante do comportamento esperado dos Estados e outros atores globais A internalização implica que as normas foram aceitas não apenas formalmente mas também normativamente influenciando as identidades e comportamentos dos atores de forma profunda e duradoura Aplicação na Pesquisa Neste estudo a análise se concentrará em como os movimentos da sociedade civil brasileira ao externalizar suas demandas e preocupações através de processos comunicativos e linguísticos foram capazes de influenciar significativamente a diplomacia ambiental do Brasil e promover mudanças na regulamentação internacional relativa à ação das empresas mineradoras A mobilização e articulação de demandas da sociedade civil podem ser vistas como exemplos claros de externalização onde novas normas são propostas em resposta aos impactos devastadores dos desastres ambientais de Mariana e Brumadinho Esses movimentos demonstram como atores nãoestatais podem desempenhar um papel crucial na formação de normas ao influenciar os processos de legitimação e justificação que conduzem à objetivação e eventualmente à internalização dessas normas no sistema internacional O estudo investigará portanto a dinâmica através da qual a sociedade civil consegue moldar a diplomacia ambiental e contribuir para a emergência de novas normas internacionais que visem um maior controle e regulamentação das atividades mineradoras promovendo assim um modelo de desenvolvimento mais sustentável e eticamente responsável METODOLOGIA Abordagem Metodológica A presente pesquisa adota uma abordagem qualitativa para explorar como as movimentações da sociedade civil brasileira em resposta aos desastres ambientais de Mariana e Brumadinho influenciaram as mudanças nas normas internacionais e a reorientação da diplomacia ambiental brasileira Essa escolha metodológica se fundamenta na necessidade de compreender os processos subjacentes e as dinâmicas sociais complexas que moldam a formação e a transformação de normas e políticas no Sistema Internacional Métodos de Coleta de Dados A coleta de dados será realizada através de uma análise abrangente de documentos entrevistas reportagens e manifestações em redes sociais A seguir detalhamse os principais métodos de coleta 1 Análise Documental A análise documental será empregada para examinar uma vasta gama de documentos relacionados aos desastres de Mariana e Brumadinho incluindo relatórios técnicos acordos institucionais e regulatórios e publicações acadêmicas Este método permitirá a identificação e a análise das normas e práticas emergentes que moldaram as respostas institucionais e a diplomacia ambiental brasileira Conforme aponta o documento Métodos de Análise Análise Documental a avaliação de documentos deve considerar a autenticidade a credibilidade e o contexto de produção dos mesmos com o objetivo de interpretar de forma adequada as mensagens contidas 2 Entrevistas Serão realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas com representantes de organizações nãogovernamentais autoridades governamentais e especialistas em direito ambiental e relações internacionais As entrevistas têm como objetivo captar perspectivas diversificadas sobre os impactos dos desastres e a resposta normativa subsequente De acordo com Ayres 2008 as entrevistas semiestruturadas são adequadas para obter um entendimento mais profundo e contextualizado das percepções dos participantes uma vez que permitem maior flexibilidade nas respostas e a exploração de tópicos relevantes 3 Reportagens e Mídia Social Serão analisadas reportagens e manifestações em redes sociais para compreender como os desastres foram retratados e discutidos publicamente e como esses discursos podem ter influenciado a formulação de normas e políticas A análise dessas fontes permitirá avaliar a mobilização social e a influência da opinião pública na agenda política e na diplomacia ambiental Métodos de Análise de Dados A análise dos dados coletados será conduzida através de uma combinação de análises documental de redes de conteúdo e de discurso conforme descrito a seguir 1 Análise Documental A análise documental envolverá a identificação e categorização de temas emergentes nos documentos revisados como padrões normativos diretrizes regulatórias e respostas políticas Este método permitirá mapear a evolução das normas e avaliar como os documentos refletem e influenciam as mudanças nas práticas internacionais 2 Análise de Redes A análise de redes será aplicada para mapear as interações entre os diversos atores envolvidos nos desdobramentos dos desastres Isso inclui a análise das conexões entre organizações da sociedade civil agências governamentais e corporações mineradoras Conforme o documento Análise de Redes sugere este método é eficaz para analisar dados das relações sociais e identificar variáveischave e comportamentos dos agentes que influenciam a estrutura de relações 3 Análise de Conteúdo A análise de conteúdo será utilizada para examinar as narrativas presentes em entrevistas reportagens e redes sociais identificando a frequência e a importância de categorias temáticas Este método permitirá uma interpretação coerente das mensagens e a identificação de padrões e significados atribuídos aos desastres e suas consequências 4 Análise de Discurso A análise de discurso focará na forma como os discursos sobre os desastres e suas repercussões são construídos e legitimados Guzzini 2003 ressalta a importância da análise de discurso para entender como as instituições e as normas são moldadas e sustentadas por meio de processos discursivos Procedimentos de Legitimidade e Validação Para garantir a validade e a confiabilidade dos dados será adotada uma abordagem rigorosa para a seleção e avaliação das fontes documentais e informativas A análise se pautará nos princípios estabelecidos por Duffield 2007 sobre a natureza e o papel das instituições internacionais garantindo que os documentos e dados coletados sejam representativos e relevantes para a pesquisa A triangulação de dados será utilizada para corroborar os achados das diferentes fontes e métodos de coleta assegurando uma compreensão robusta e bem fundamentada dos processos analisados Considerações Éticas A condução das entrevistas seguirá estritamente os protocolos éticos incluindo o consentimento informado e a proteção da privacidade dos participantes As análises de mídias sociais e reportagens serão realizadas com atenção à representatividade e ao respeito pela diversidade de opiniões e expressões conforme estabelecido pelas diretrizes éticas em pesquisas qualitativas REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS 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