National Defense Strategy EUA 2022 - Revisao Nuclear e Defesa de Misseis

US Department of Defense 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review 2022 National Defense Strategy 2022 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review I I 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y This page left intentionally blank I I I 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y October 27 2022 President Biden has stated that we are living in a decisive decade one stamped by dramatic changes in geopolitics technology economics and our environment The defense strategy that the United States pursues will set the Departments course for decades to come The Department of Defense owes it to our AllVolunteer Force and the American people to provide a clear picture of the challenges we expect to face in the crucial years aheadand we owe them a clear and rigorous strategy for advancing our defense and security goals The 2022 National Defense Strategy NDS details the Departments path forward into that decisive decadefrom helping to protect the American people to promoting global security to seizing new strategic opportunities and to realizing and defending our democratic values For the first time the Department conducted its strategic reviewsthe NDS the Nuclear Posture Review NPR and Missile Defense Review MDRin an integrated way ensuring tight linkages between our strategy and our resources The NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen US deterrence with the Peoples Republic of China PRC as the pacing challenge for the Department The NDS further explains how we will collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of Russian aggression while mitigating and protecting against threats from North Korea Iran violent extremist organizations and transboundary challenges such as climate change The PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades I have reached this conclusion based on the PRCs increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences alongside a keen awareness of the PRCs clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernization and expansion of its military As President Bidens National Security Strategy notes the PRC is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and increasingly the economic diplomatic military and technological power to do so Meanwhile Russias unprovoked unjust and reckless invasion of Ukraine underscores its irresponsible behavior Efforts to respond to Russias assault on Ukraine also dramatically highlight the importance of a strategy that leverages the power of our values and our military might with that of our Allies and partners Together we have marshalled a strong unified response to Russias attack and proven the strength of NATO unity In these times business as usual at the Department is not acceptable The 2022 NDS lays out our vision for focusing the Defense Department around our pacing challenge even as we manage the other threats of our swiftly changing world It builds on my 2021 Message to the Force which stressed as core values defending the nation taking care of our people and succeeding through teamwork I V 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y Our central charge is to develop combine and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect This is the core of integrated deterrence a centerpiece of the 2022 NDS Integrated deterrence means using every tool at the Departments disposal in close collaboration with our counterparts across the US Government and with Allies and partners to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression The Department will align policies investments and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrencetailored to specific competitors and challenges and coordinated and synchronized inside and outside the Department The Department will also campaign daytoday to gain and sustain military advantages counter acute forms of our competitors coercion and complicate our competitors military preparations Campaigning is not business as usualit is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Departments activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor Through campaigning the Department will focus on the most consequential competitor activities that if left unaddressed would endanger our military advantages now and in the future Even as we take these steps we will act with urgency to build enduring advantages for the future Joint Force undertaking reforms to accelerate force development getting the technology we need more quickly and making investments in the extraordinary people of the Department who remain our most valuable resource America has never been afraid of competition and we do not shy away from tough challenges especially when it comes to securing our national interests and defending our national values To meet this moment we will tap into our core strengths our dynamic diverse and innovative society our unmatched network of Allies and partners and the tremendous men and women of our armed forces We live in turbulent times Yet I am confident that the Department along with our counterparts throughout the US Government and our Allies and partners around the world is well positioned to meet the challenges of this decisive decade V 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y I INTRODUCTION 1 II SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 4 III DEFENSE PRIORITIES 7 IV INTEGRATED DETERRENCE 8 V CAMPAIGNING 12 VI ANCHORING OUR STRATEGY IN ALLIES AND PARTNERS AND ADVANCING REGIONAL GOALS 14 VII FORCE PLANNING 17 VIII BUILDING ENDURING ADVANTAGES 19 IX RISK MANAGEMENT 22 X CONCLUSION 23 2022 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 1 2022 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS V I 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y This page left intentionally blank 1 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y I INTRODUCTION For more than seven decades the vision and leadership of the United States have undergirded international peace and prosperity A strong principled and adaptive US military is a central pillar for US leadership particularly in the face of challenges arising from dramatic geopolitical technological economic and environmental change The Department of Defense stands ready to meet these challenges and seize opportunities with the confidence creativity and commitment that have long characterized our military and the democracy that it serves The Department will focus on safeguarding and advancing vital US national interests We will work alongside other agencies and departments to Protect the security of the American people Expand economic prosperity and opportunity and Realize and defend the values at the heart of American way of life The 2022 National Defense Strategy NDS sets forth how the US military will meet growing threats to vital US national security interests and to a stable and open international system It directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen US deterrence with the Peoples Republic of China PRC as the Departments pacing challenge The strategy identifies four toplevel defense priorities that the Department must pursue to strengthen deterrence First we will defend the homeland Second we will deter strategic attacks against the United States our Allies and our partners Third we will deter aggression and be prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary Fourth to ensure our future military advantage we will build a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem The Department will advance our priorities through integrated deterrence campaigning and actions that build enduring advantages Integrated deterrence entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains theaters the spectrum of conflict all instruments of US national power and our network of Alliances and partnerships Tailored to specific circumstances it applies a coordinated multifaceted approach to reducing competitors perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint Integrated deterrence is enabled by combatcredible forces prepared to fight and win as needed and backstopped by a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent Day after day the Department will strengthen deterrence and gain advantage against competitors most consequential coercive measures by campaigning the conduct and sequencing of logically linked military initiatives aimed at advancing welldefined strategyaligned priorities over time The United States will operate forces synchronize broader Departmental efforts and align Departmental activities with other instruments of national power to counter forms of competitor coercion complicate competitors military preparations and develop our own warfighting capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners 2 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y To shore up the foundations for integrated deterrence and campaigning we will act urgently to build enduring advantages across the defense ecosystem the Department of Defense the defense industrial base and the array of private sector and academic enterprises that create and sharpen the Joint Forces technological edge We will modernize the systems that design and build the Joint Force with a focus on innovation and rapid adjustment to new strategic demands We will make our supporting systems more resilient and agile in the face of threats that range from competitors to the effects of climate change And we will cultivate our talents recruiting and training a workforce with the skills abilities and diversity we need to creatively solve national security challenges in a complex global environment The 2022 NDS advances a strategy focused on the PRC and on collaboration with our growing network of Allies and partners on common objectives It seeks to prevent the PRCs dominance of key regions while protecting the US homeland and reinforcing a stable and open international system Consistent with the 2022 National Security Strategy NSS a key objective of the NDS is to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of advancing goals that threaten vital US national interests Conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable The Departments priorities support broader wholeofgovernment efforts to develop terms of interaction with the PRC that are favorable to our interests and values while managing strategic competition and enabling the pursuit of cooperation on common challenges Even as we focus on the PRC as our pacing challenge the NDS also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia demonstrated most recently by Russias unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine The Department will support robust deterrence of Russian aggression against vital US national interests including our treaty Allies We will work closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO and our partners to provide US leadership develop key enabling capabilities and deepen interoperability In service of our strategic priorities we will accept measured risk but remain vigilant in the face of other persistent threats including those posed by North Korea Iran and violent extremist organizations VEOs We will also build resilience in the face of destabilizing and potentially catastrophic transboundary challenges such as climate change and pandemics which increasingly strain the Joint Force We cannot meet these complex and interconnected challenges alone Mutuallybeneficial Alliances and partnerships are our greatest global strategic advantage and they are a center of gravity for this strategy We will strengthen major regional security architectures with our Allies and partners based on complementary contributions combined collaborative operations and force planning increased intelligence and information sharing new operational concepts and our ability to draw on the Joint Force worldwide We cannot delay The NSS describes the United States agenda for renewal in the coming decisive decade a tenyear window for leadership to tackle our eras defining challenges In full accord with the urgency conveyed by the NSS and in support of its broader goals the Department will move immediately to implement the changes detailed in this NDS the Secretary of Defenses preeminent guidance document 3 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y The challenges we face are formidable but the United States possesses strengths that our competitors cannot match Our democratic values our open society our diversity our base of innovation our culture of ingenuity our combat experience our globespanning network of Alliances and partnerships and above all our extraordinary All Volunteer Force these together provide firm foundations for a defense strategy that will keep America secure prosperous and free 4 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y II SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Now and over the next two decades we face strategic challenges stemming from complex interactions between a rapidly changing global balance of military capabilities emerging technologies competitor doctrines that pose new threats to the US homeland and to strategic stability an escalation of competitors coercive and malign activities in the gray zone and transboundary challenges that impose new demands on the Joint Force and the defense enterprise These developments and the threats they present are interconnected in part because our competitors deliberately link them to erode deterrence exert economic coercion and endanger the political autonomy of states Competitor strategies seek to exploit perceived vulnerabilities in the American way of war including by creating antiaccessareadenial environments developing conventional capabilities to undertake rapid interventions posing alldomain threats to the US homeland in an effort to jeopardize the US militarys ability to project power and counter regional aggression and using the cyber and space domains to gain operational logistical and information advantages At the same time our competitors are building larger and more diverse nuclear arsenals and working to distract and divide the United States and our Allies and partners Strategic Competition with the Peoples Republic of China PRC The most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security is the PRCs coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the IndoPacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences The PRC seeks to undermine US alliances and security partnerships in the IndoPacific region and leverage its growing capabilities including its economic influence and the Peoples Liberation Armys PLA growing strength and military footprint to coerce its neighbors and threaten their interests The PRCs increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing risk miscalculation and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea the South China Sea and along the Line of Actual Control The PRC has expanded and modernized nearly every aspect of the PLA with a focus on offsetting US military advantages The PRC is therefore the pacing challenge for the Department In addition to expanding its conventional forces the PLA is rapidly advancing and integrating its space counterspace cyber electronic and informational warfare capabilities to support its holistic approach to joint warfare The PLA seeks to target the ability of the Joint Force to project power to defend vital US interests and aid our Allies in a crisis or conflict The PRC is also expanding the PLAs global footprint and working to establish a more robust overseas and basing infrastructure to allow it to project military power at greater distances In parallel the PRC is accelerating the modernization and expansion of its nuclear capabilities The United States and its Allies and partners will increasingly face the challenge of deterring two major powers with modern and diverse nuclear capabilities the PRC and Russia creating new stresses on strategic stability 5 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y Russia as an Acute Threat Even as the PRC poses the Departments pacing challenge recent events underscore the acute threat posed by Russia Contemptuous of its neighbors independence Russias government seeks to use force to impose border changes and to reimpose an imperial sphere of influence Its extensive track record of territorial aggression includes the escalation of its brutal unprovoked war against Ukraine Although its leaders political and military actions intended to fracture NATO have backfired dramatically the goal remains Russia presents serious continuing risks in key areas These include nuclear threats to the homeland and US Allies and partners longrange cruise missile threats cyber and information operations counterspace threats chemical and biological weapons CBW undersea warfare and extensive gray zone campaigns targeted against democracies in particular Russia has incorporated these capabilities and methods into an overall strategy that like the PRCs seeks to exploit advantages in geography and time backed by a mix of threats to the US homeland and to our Allies and partners Although diverging interests and historical mistrust may limit the depth of their political and military cooperation the PRC and Russia relationship continues to increase in breadth Either state could seek to create dilemmas globally for the Joint Force in the event of US engagement in a crisis or a conflict with the other Threats to the US Homeland The scope and scale of threats to the homeland have fundamentally changed The PRC and Russia now pose more dangerous challenges to safety and security at home even as terrorist threats persist Both states are already using nonkinetic means against our defense industrial base and mobilization systems as well as deploying counterspace capabilities that can target our Global Positioning System and other spacebased capabilities that support military power and daily civilian life The PRC or Russia could use a wide array of tools in an attempt to hinder US military preparation and response in a conflict including actions aimed at undermining the will of the US public and to target our critical infrastructure and other systems These threats along with the toll taken by climate change pandemics and other transborder challenges will increase demands on Department resources federal civil authorities and the public and private sectors Other Persistent Threats North Korea Iran and VEOs North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile capability to threaten the US homeland deployed US forces and the Republic of Korea ROK and Japan while seeking to drive wedges between the United States ROK and United StatesJapan Alliances Iran is taking actions that would improve its ability to produce a nuclear weapon should it make the decision to do so even as it builds and exports extensive missile forces uncrewed aircraft systems and advanced maritime capabilities that threaten chokepoints for the free flow of energy resources and international commerce Iran further undermines Middle East stability by supporting terrorist groups and military proxies employing its own paramilitary forces engaging in military provocations and conducting malicious cyber and information operations Global terrorist groups including alQaida Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIS and their affiliates have had their capabilities degraded but some may be able to 6 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y reconstitute them in short order which will require monitoring indications and warning against the VEO threat Complex Escalation Dynamics Rapidly Evolving Domains and Technologies A wide range of new or fastevolving technologies and applications are complicating escalation dynamics and creating new challenges for strategic stability These include counterspace weapons hypersonic weapons advanced CBW and new and emerging payload and delivery systems for both conventional and nonstrategic nuclear weapons In the cyber and space domains the risk of inadvertent escalation is particularly high due to unclear norms of behavior and escalation thresholds complex domain interactions and new capabilities New applications of artificial intelligence quantum science autonomy biotechnology and space technologies have the potential not just to change kinetic conflict but also to disrupt daytoday US supply chain and logistics operations Competitors Gray Zone Activities Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for US military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US Government The PRC employs statecontrolled forces cyber and space operations and economic coercion against the United States and its Allies and partners Russia employs disinformation cyber and space operations against the United States and our Allies and partners and irregular proxy forces in multiple countries Other state actors particularly North Korea and Iran use similar if currently more limited means The proliferation of advanced missiles uncrewed aircraft systems and cyber tools to military proxies allows competitors to threaten US forces Allies and partners in indirect and deniable ways Climate Change and other Transboundary Challenges Beyond state and nonstate actors changes in global climate and other dangerous transboundary threats are already transforming the context in which the Department operates Increasing temperatures changing precipitation patterns rising sea levels and more frequent extreme weather conditions will affect basing and access while degrading readiness installations and capabilities Climate change is creating new corridors of strategic interaction particularly in the Arctic region It will increase demands including on the Joint Force for disaster response and defense support of civil authorities and affect security relationships with some Allies and partners Insecurity and instability related to climate change may tax governance capacity in some countries while heightening tensions between others risking new armed conflicts and increasing demands for stabilization activities The COVID19 pandemic continues to impact societies global supply chains and the US defense industrial base It has required substantial commitment of Department resources for support of civil authorities and support to international partners COVID19 also spotlights the costs and risks of future biological threats whether natural or humanmade for the Department and the Joint Force 7 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y III DEFENSE PRIORITIES Together these rapidly evolving features of the security environment threaten to erode the United States ability to deter aggression and to help maintain favorable balances of power in critical regions The PRC presents the most consequential and systemic challenge while Russia poses acute threats both to vital US national interests abroad and to the homeland Other features of the security environment including climate change and other transboundary threats will increasingly place pressure on the Joint Force and the systems that support it In this context and in support of a stable and open international system and our defense commitments the Departments priorities are Defending the homeland paced to the growing multidomain threat posed by the PRC Deterring strategic attacks against the United States Allies and partners Deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary prioritizing the PRC challenge in the IndoPacific region then the Russia challenge in Europe and Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem 8 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y IV INTEGRATED DETERRENCE Our competitors particularly the PRC are pursuing holistic strategies that employ varied forms of coercion malign behavior and aggression to achieve their objectives and weaken the foundations of a stable and open international system Meeting the challenge requires a holistic response integrated deterrence In the past the Departments approach to deterrence has too often been hindered by competing priorities lack of clarity regarding the specific competitor actions we seek to deter an emphasis on deterring behaviors in instances where Department authorities and tools are illsuited and stovepiping Integrated deterrence is how we will align the Departments policies investments and activities to sustain and strengthen deterrence tailored to specific competitors and coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department How We Will Deter Deterrence is strengthened by actions that reduce a competitors perception of the benefits of aggression relative to restraint Effective deterrence requires the Department to consider how competitors perceive US Ally and partner stakes commitment and combat credibility their perception of their own ability to control escalation risks and their view of how the status quo will evolve in part as a result of US Ally and partner actions if they do not use force Actions aimed at strengthening deterrence work by different logics denial resilience and cost imposition Optimal combinations need to be tailored to specific settings and deterrence objectives in an integrated deterrence approach Deterrence by Denial To deter aggression especially where potential adversaries could act to rapidly seize territory the Department will develop asymmetric approaches and optimize our posture for denial In the nearterm we will continue to develop innovative operational concepts and supplement current capabilities and posture through investments in mature highvalue assets Over the mid to longterm we will develop new capabilities including in longrange strike undersea hypersonic and autonomous systems and improve information sharing and the integration of nonkinetic tools Deterrence by Resilience Denying the benefits of aggression also requires resilience the ability to withstand fight through and recover quickly from disruption The Department will improve its ability to operate in the face of multidomain attacks on a growing surface of vital networks and critical infrastructure both in the homeland and in collaboration with Allies and partners at risk Because the cyber and space domains empower the entire Joint Force we will prioritize building resilience in these areas Cyber resilience will be enhanced by for example modern encryption and a zerotrust architecture In the space domain the Department will reduce adversary incentives for early attack by fielding diverse resilient and redundant satellite constellations We will bolster our ability to fight through disruption by improving defensive capabilities and increasing options for reconstitution We will assist Allies and partners in doing the same 9 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y Deterrence by Direct and Collective Cost Imposition Denial and resilience strategies are necessary but not always sufficient Effective deterrence may also hinge on our ability to impose costs in excess to the perceived benefits of aggression The Department will continue to modernize our nuclear forces the ultimate backstop to deter attacks on the homeland and our Allies and partners who rely on US extended deterrence Direct cost imposition approaches also include a broad range of other means including conventional longrange fires offensive cyber irregular warfare support for foreign internal defense and interagency instruments such as economic sanctions export controls and diplomatic measures Collective cost imposition approaches increase the expectation that aggression will be met with a collective response Through close collaboration with US Government departments and agencies and with our Allies and partners we will diversify our posture and broaden the scope of cooperation adding complexity to competitors military planning and execution US leadership in shaping norms for appropriate conduct in the cyber space and other emerging technology domains will reinforce deterrence by increasing international consensus on what constitutes malign and aggressive behavior thereby increasing the prospect of collective attribution and response when these norms are violated Role of Information in Deterrence Deterrence depends in part on competitors understanding of US intent and capabilities The Department must seek to avoid unknowingly driving competition to aggression To strengthen deterrence while managing escalation risks the Department will enhance its ability to operate in the information domain for example by working to ensure that messages are conveyed effectively We will work in collaboration with other US Federal departments and agencies along with Allies and partners Tailored Deterrence Approaches Coordinating and applying deterrence logics to maximum effect requires tailoring for specific problems competitors and settings Deterring Attacks against the Homeland The Department will take steps to raise potential attackers direct and indirect costs while reducing their expected benefits for aggressive action against the homeland particularly by increasing resilience We will ensure that hostile operations including those conducted early in a crisis or conflict will not advance adversary objectives or severely limit US response options Our work will prioritize closer coordination with US interagency state local tribal and territorial partners as well as with the private sector starting with the defense industrial base Deterring Strategic Attacks Any adversary use of nuclear weapons regardless of location or yield would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict create the potential for uncontrolled escalation and have strategic effects To maintain credible and effective deterrence of both largescale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries the Department will modernize nuclear forces nuclear command control and communications and the nuclear weapon production enterprise and strengthen extended deterrence We will bolster regional nuclear deterrence by enhanced consultations with Allies and partners and by better synchronizing conventional and nuclear 1 0 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y aspects of planning including by improving conventional forces ability to operate in the face of limited nuclear chemical and biological attacks so as to deny adversaries benefit from possessing and employing such weapons The Department will employ an integrated deterrence approach that draws on tailored combinations of conventional cyber space and information capabilities together with the unique deterrent effects of nuclear weapons Deterring PRC Attacks The Department will bolster deterrence by leveraging existing and emergent force capabilities posture and activities to enhance denial and by enhancing the resilience of US systems the PRC may seek to target We will develop new operational concepts and enhanced future warfighting capabilities against potential PRC aggression Collaboration with Allies and partners will cement joint capability with the aid of multilateral exercises co development of technologies greater intelligence and information sharing and combined planning for shared deterrence challenges We will also build enduring advantages undertaking foundational improvements and enhancements to ensure our technological edge and Joint Force combat credibility Deterring Russian Attacks The Department will focus on deterring Russian attacks on the United States NATO members and other Allies reinforcing our ironclad treaty commitments to include conventional aggression that has the potential to escalate to nuclear employment of any scale We will work together with our Allies and partners to modernize denial capabilities increase interoperability improve resilience against attack and coercion share intelligence and strengthen extended nuclear deterrence Over time the Department will focus on enhancing denial capabilities and key enablers in NATOs force planning while NATO Allies seek to bolster their conventional warfighting capabilities For Ally and partner countries that border Russia the Department will support efforts to build out response options that enable cost imposition Deterring North Korean Attacks The Department will continue to deter attacks through forward posture integrated air and missile defense close coordination and interoperability with our ROK Ally nuclear deterrence resilience initiatives and the potential for direct cost imposition approaches that come from globally deployable Joint Forces Deterring Iranian Attacks To deter largescale Iranian attacks on vital national security interests and partners in the region the Department will work to increase partner capability and resilience particularly in air and missile defense while collaborating with partners to expose Iranian gray zone operations The Department will continue to support US interagency and international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon Escalation Management Changes in the security environment particularly in the space and cyber domains are likely to increase opacity during a crisis or conflict threatening strategic stability The Department will develop tailored approaches to assess and manage escalation risk in both crises and conflicts including conducting analysis of escalation pathways and thresholds and planning for situations with decreased domain awareness and impaired communications We will strengthen strategic stability through dialogue with competitors unilateral measures that make command control and communications more robust and by developing defenses and architectural 1 1 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y resilience to maintain operational capabilities in cyberspace and space during conflict Establishing and practicing crisis communications with Allies and partners as well as with competitors is an essential tool to reduce mutual misperceptions and to help manage escalation 1 2 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y V CAMPAIGNING The Department strengthens deterrence and gains military advantages not only by building Joint Force capabilities but also by campaigning the conduct and sequencing of logicallylinked military activities to achieve strategyaligned objectives over time Campaigning initiatives change the environment to the benefit of the United States and our Allies and partners while limiting frustrating and disrupting competitor activities that seriously impinge on our interests especially those carried out in the gray zone Campaigning requires discipline It targets the most consequential competitor activities those that if left unaddressed would endanger our military advantages and vital national interests now and in the future Successful campaigning begins with focused planning that specifies how an initiative supports our defense priorities establishes clear connections with the Departments ways and means and incorporates feedback loops In service of strategic prioritization we will focus daytoday force employment on a more narrow set of tasks than we do currently Campaigning to Gain Military Advantage Enhance Deterrence and Address Gray Zone Challenges The Department will actively campaign across domains and the spectrum of conflict Campaigning initiatives will improve our baseline understanding of the operating environment and seek to shape perceptions including by sowing doubt in our competitors that they can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions They will disrupt competitor warfighting advantages while reinforcing our own and enhance interoperability and access Working with Allies and partners we will build and exercise force elements needed in crisis or conflict such as infrastructure logistics command and control dispersal and relocation and mobilization Competitors increasingly engage in gray zone operations at odds with international norms and below the threshold of a credible military response Emerging technologies and applications are making these activities more effective at building competitors military and nonmilitary advantages which if left unaddressed could endanger US military effectiveness now and in the future The Department will be judicious in its use of defense resources and efforts to counter competitors coercive behaviors in gray zone operations as traditional military tools may not always be the most appropriate response In many cases intelligence sharing economic measures diplomatic actions and activities in the information domain conducted by other US departments and agencies may prove more effective Nevertheless there can be an important role for campaigning to disrupt competitors attempts to advance their objectives through gray zone tactics especially when integrated for maximum impact with the actions of Allies partners and other US departments and agencies Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors We will conduct cyberspace operations to degrade competitors malicious cyber activity and to prepare cyber capabilities to be used in crisis 1 3 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y or conflict Tailored information operations can be used to support and in some instances lead the Departments response In campaigning the Department will carefully evaluate and manage escalation risks Campaigning and Our Global Posture Our force posture will focus on the access and warfighting requirements that enable our efforts to deter potential PRC and Russian aggression against vital US national interests and to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails The Department will conduct campaigning activities from this posture against a clear set of objectives to include deterring adversary attacks supporting rapid crisis response with survivable forces and conducting operations to reinforce internationallyagreedupon norms In the IndoPacific we will continue key infrastructure investments and coordinate with the Department of State to expand access in the region In Europe our posture will focus on command and control fires and key enablers that complement our NATO Allies capabilities and strengthen deterrence by increasing combat credibility For other major threats we will leverage security cooperation and capacity building with partners backed by a monitorandrespond approach that takes advantage of the deterrent value of the Departments ability to deploy forces globally at the time and place of our choosing Robust intelligence collection in concert with the work of other departments and agencies will seek to provide early indication and warning to help manage risk 1 4 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y VI ANCHORING OUR STRATEGY IN ALLIES AND PARTNERS AND ADVANCING REGIONAL GOALS Countries around the world have a vital interest in a free and open international system Close collaboration with Allies and partners is foundational for US national security interests and for our collective ability to address the challenges that the PRC and Russia present while responsibly managing the array of other threats we face We strive to be a trusted defense partner We respect the sovereignty of all states and we know that the decisions that our Allies and partners face are rarely binary We recognize that when it comes to our security relationships the Department cannot rely on rhetoric Early and continuous consideration engagement and where possible collaboration with Allies and partners in planning is essential for advancing our shared interests The 2022 National Defense Strategy is a call to action for the defense enterprise to incorporate Allies and partners at every stage of defense planning To strengthen and sustain deterrence the Department will prioritize interoperability and enable coalitions with enhanced capabilities new operating concepts and combined collaborative force planning We will consult and coordinate with Allies and partners as we modernize our nuclear forces reinforcing our extended deterrence commitments The Department will seek to improve denial capability including resilience particularly for those most exposed to military coercion And we will support regional partners ability to respond to regional contingencies provide strategic indicators and warning and reduce competitors ability to hold key geographic and logistical chokepoints at risk By joining with Allies and partners in efforts to enhance resilience to climate change we will both strengthen defense relationships and reduce the need for the force to respond to instability and humanitarian emergencies Overall the Department will work across the interagency system and in concert with Allies and partners to advance regional security goals that implement the higherlevel aims of integrated deterrence while accounting for the cross regional and global dimensions of potential conflict To succeed in these objectives the Department will reduce institutional barriers including those that inhibit collective research and development planning interoperability intelligence and information sharing and export of key capabilities We will work across the US Government to upgrade technology and information release processes expand release authorizations and redefine dissemination controls to facilitate information exchange for mutual benefit The IndoPacific Region The Department will reinforce and build out a resilient security architecture in the IndoPacific region in order to sustain a free and open regional order and deter attempts to resolve disputes by force We will modernize our Alliance with Japan and strengthen combined capabilities by aligning strategic planning and priorities in a more integrated manner deepen our Alliance with Australia through investments in posture interoperability and expansion of multilateral cooperation and foster advantage through advanced technology cooperation with 1 5 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y partnerships like AUKUS and the IndoPacific Quad The Department will advance our Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression and ensure free and open access to the Indian Ocean region The Department will support Taiwans asymmetric self defense commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy We will work with the ROK to continue to improve its defense capability to lead the Alliance combined defense with US forces augmenting those of the ROK We will invigorate multilateral approaches to security challenges in the region to include by promoting the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in addressing regional security issues The Department will work with Allies and partners to ensure power projection in a contested environment The Department will also support Ally and partner efforts in accordance with US policy and international law to address acute forms of gray zone coercion from the PRCs campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea Taiwan Strait South China Sea and disputed land borders such as with India At the same time the Department will continue to prioritize maintaining open lines of communication with the PLA and managing competition responsibly Europe The Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security working alongside Allies and partners to deter defend and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion As we continue contributing to NATO capabilities and readiness including through improvements to our posture in Europe and our extended nuclear deterrence commitments the Department will work with Allies bilaterally and through NATOs established processes to better focus NATO capability development and military modernization to address Russias military threat The approach will emphasize ready interoperable combat power in contested environments across NATO forces particularly air forces and other joint precision strike capabilities and critical enablers such as intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR and electronic warfare platforms The Department will collaborate with Allies and partners to build capacity along Europes eastern flank strengthening defensive anti areaaccessdenial capabilities and indications and warning expanding readiness training and exercises and promoting resilience including against hybrid and cyber actions The Middle East As the Department continues to rightsize its forward military presence in the Middle East following the mission transition in Afghanistan and continuing our by with and through approach in Iraq and Syria we will address major security challenges in the region in effective and sustainable ways The Joint Force will retain the ability to deny Iran a nuclear weapon to identify and support action against Iranian and Iranianbacked threats and to disrupt toptier VEO threats that endanger the homeland and vital US national interests The Department will prioritize cooperation with our regional and global partners that results in their increased ability to deter and defend against potential aggression from Iran for example by working to advance integrated air and missile defense maritime security and irregular warfare capabilities Working in concert with global and interagency partners the Department will redouble efforts to support regional security coalitions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and among states in the region to ensure maritime security and improve collective intelligence and warning 1 6 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y Western Hemisphere The United States derives immense benefit from a stable peaceful and democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland To prevent distant threats from becoming a challenge at home the Department will continue to partner with countries in the region to build capability and promote security and stability We will maintain the ability to respond to crises and seek to strengthen regional roles and capabilities for humanitarian assistance climate resilience and disaster response efforts As in all regions the Department will work collaboratively seeking to understand our partners security needs and areas of mutual concern Africa In Africa the Department will prioritize disrupting VEO threats against the US homeland and vital US national interests working by with and through our African partners to build states capability to degrade terrorist organizations and contribute broadly to regional security and stability We will orient our approach on the continent towards security cooperation increase coordination with Allies multilateral organizations and regional bodies that share these objectives and support US interagency initiatives in the region including efforts to disrupt malign PRC and Russian activities on the continent The Arctic The United States seeks a stable Arctic region characterized by adherence to internationallyagreed upon rules and norms The Department will deter threats to the US homeland from and through the Arctic region by improving early warning and ISR capabilities partnering with Canada to enhance North American Aerospace Defense Command capabilities and working with Allies and partners to increase shared maritime domain awareness US activities and posture in the Arctic should be calibrated as the Department preserves its focus on the IndoPacific region 1 7 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y VII FORCE PLANNING Sustaining and strengthening deterrence requires that the Department design develop and manage a combatcredible US military fit for advancing our highest defense priorities Building on the 2018 NDS the 2022 NDS Force Planning Construct sizes and shapes the Joint Force to simultaneously defend the homeland maintain strategic deterrence and deter and if necessary prevail in conflict To deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere while the United States is involved in an alldomain conflict the Department will employ a range of risk mitigation efforts rooted in integrated deterrence These include coordination with and contributions of Allies and partners deterrent effects of US nuclear posture and leveraging posture and capabilities not solely engaged in the primary warfight for example cyber and space Additionally the Joint Force will be shaped to ensure the ability to respond to smallscale shortduration crises without substantially impairing highend warfighting readiness and to conduct campaigning activities that improve our position and reinforce deterrence while limiting or disrupting competitor activities that seriously affect US interests Our approach to force planning aims to build strength and capability in key operational areas To maintain information advantage the Department will improve our ability to integrate defend and reconstitute our surveillance and decision systems to achieve warfighting objectives particularly in the space domain and despite adversaries means of interference or deception To preserve command control and communications in a fastpaced battlefield we will make our network architectures more resilient against systemlevel exploitation and disruption so as to ensure effective coordination of distributed forces To enhance our ability to deny aggression we will improve the speed and accuracy of detection and targeting To mitigate adversary antiaccessarea denial capability the Department will develop concepts and capabilities that improve our ability to reliably hold at risk those military forces and assets that are essential to adversary operational success while managing escalation For logistics and sustainment we will reinforce our capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain highintensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and nonkinetic attack and disruption Achieving success in these operational areas requires tightly linking our concepts and capabilities for operating forces The Department will continue to develop operational concepts that realistically expand US options and constrain those of potential adversaries The Department will explore force employment concepts and capabilities that degrade adversary power projection while weighing crisis stability and escalation risk integrate new technologies experiment with creative applications of existing capabilities and selectively share the most effective asymmetric capabilities with threatened Allies and partners 1 8 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y The Departments force development and design program will integrate new operational concepts with the force attributes required to strengthen and sustain deterrence and to prevail in conflict if necessary The Department will prioritize a future force that is Lethal Possesses antiaccessareadenialinsensitive strike capabilities that can penetrate adversary defenses at range Sustainable Securely and effectively provides logistics and sustainment to continue operations in a contested and degraded environment despite adversary disruption Resilient Maintains information and decision advantage preserves command control and communications systems and ensures critical detection and targeting operations Survivable Continues generating combat power to support strike capabilities and enablers for logistics and sustainment despite adversary attacks Agile and Responsive Rapidly mobilizes forces generates combat power and provides logistics and sustainment even given adversary regional advantages and climate change impacts The Joint Force will remain prepared to employ combatready forces on short notice to address aggression or crisis an ability critical to strengthening deterrence At the same time the Department will make sure that daytoday requirements to deploy and operate forces do not erode readiness for future missions or bias investments towards extant but increasingly less effective capabilities at the expense of building capability and proficiency for advanced threats The Department is establishing a new framework for strategic readiness enabling a more comprehensive datadriven assessment and reporting of readiness to ensure greater alignment with NDS priorities To give the future Joint Force effective advocates today current availability benchmarks and demands will be assessed against longterm force readiness sustainability recapitalization and modernization objectives in addition to priority threats and missions Strategic readiness planning will take climate change impacts into account 1 9 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y VIII BUILDING ENDURING ADVANTAGES Building the future Joint Force that we need to advance the goals of this strategy requires broad and deep change in how we produce and manage military capability US competitors increasingly hold at risk our defense ecosystem the Department the defense industrial base and the landscape of private sector and academic enterprises that innovate and support the systems on which the Joint Force depends To construct an enduring foundation for our future military advantage the Department working in concert with other US Federal departments and agencies Congress the private sector and Allies and partners will take swift action to affect change in five ways On each dimension the Department can and will leverage asymmetric American advantages our entrepreneurial spirit our diversity and pluralistic system of ideas and technology generation that drive unparalleled creativity innovation and adaptation and our militarys combinedarms ethos and years of combattested operational and coalition experience Transform the Foundation of the Future Force Building the Joint Force called for by this strategy requires overhauling the Departments force development design and business management practices Our current system is too slow and too focused on acquiring systems not designed to address the most critical challenges we now face This orientation leaves little incentive to design open systems that can rapidly incorporate cuttingedge technologies creating longerterm challenges with obsolescence interoperability and cost effectiveness The Department will instead reward rapid experimentation acquisition and fielding We will better align requirements resourcing and acquisition and undertake a campaign of learning to identify the most promising concepts incorporating emerging technologies in the commercial and military sectors for solving our key operational challenges We will design transition pathways to divest from systems that are less relevant to advancing the force planning guidance and partner to equip the defense industrial base to support more relevant modernization efforts Make the Right Technology Investments The United States technological edge has long been a foundation of our military advantage The Department will support the innovation ecosystem both at home and in expanded partnerships with our Allies and partners We will fuel research and development for advanced capabilities including in directed energy hypersonics integrated sensing and cyber We will seed opportunities in biotechnology quantum science advanced materials and cleanenergy technology We will be a fastfollower where market forces are driving commercialization of militarilyrelevant capabilities in trusted artificial intelligence and autonomy integrated network systemofsystems microelectronics space renewable energy generation and storage and humanmachine interfaces Because Joint Force operations increasingly rely on datadriven technologies and integration of diverse data sources the Department will implement institutional reforms that integrate our data software and artificial intelligence efforts and speed their delivery to the warfighter 2 0 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y Adapt and Fortify Our Defense Ecosystem The Department will strengthen our defense industrial base to ensure that we produce and sustain the full range of capabilities needed to give US allied and partners forces a competitive advantage We will bolster support for our unparalleled network of research institutions both universityaffiliated and federallyfunded research and development centers as well as small businesses and innovative technology firms The Department will act urgently to better support advanced manufacturing processes eg aircraft and ship building preferred munition production to increase our ability to reconstitute the Joint Force in a major conflict We will work closely with Congress on reforms needed to accelerate these transitions We will increase collaboration with the private sector in priority areas especially with the commercial space industry leveraging its technological advancements and entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities We will prioritize joint efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base our logistical systems and relevant global supply chains against subversion compromise and theft Strengthen Resilience and Adaptability Building enduring advantages also means having the elasticity and readiness in the defense ecosystem to adapt to emerging threats such as climate change We will strengthen the Departments ability to withstand and recover quickly from climate events We will continue to analyze climate change impacts on the Joint Force and will integrate climate change into threat assessments We will increase resilience of military installations and at affected access and basing locations vital for deterrence and warfighting objectives We will take climate extremes into account in decisions related to training and equipping the force We will make reducing energy demand a priority and seek to adopt more efficient and cleanenergy technologies that reduce logistics requirements in contested or austere environments Cultivate the Workforce We Need People execute the strategy To recruit and retain the most talented Americans we must change our institutional culture and reform how we do business The Department will attract train and promote a workforce with the skills and abilities we need to creatively solve national security challenges in a complex global environment We will streamline and simplify hiring practices for both applicants and managers We will offer competitive incentives flexible work environments and rotational assignments to better compete with the private sector We will aggressively seek to fill specific technology gaps including in cyber data and artificial intelligence specializations and work with colleges and universities to help build our future workforce The Department will encourage personnel to gain deep expertise not only about key technologies but also about our competitors and the future of warfare In part by refocusing the curricula of Professional Military Education institutions we will foster critical thinking and analytical skills fluency in critical languages and integration of insights from the social and behavioral sciences We will increase the availability of fellowships internships and rotational assignments including in the private sector to grow the skills of our workforce provide a broad range of experiences create collaboration opportunities and carry best practices back to the Department 2 1 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y We will lead with our values We will broaden our recruitment pool to reflect all of the United States including traditionally marginalized communities and promoting a diversity of backgrounds and experiences to drive innovative solutions across the enterprise And we will take care of our people never sparing support for the health safety and welfare of service members and their families as well as our civilian employees Our efforts will ultimately fail if we allow problems in our own ranks to undermine our cohesion performance and ability to advance our mission The Department will continue to take tangible steps to counter sexual assault and harassment across our Armed Forces We will continue to work with Congress as critical changes are made informed by the recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military to increase accountability ensure we have a culture of zero tolerance for harassment and assault enable active prevention and support those who come forward Finally the Department will seek to eradicate all forms of extremism in our ranks 2 2 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y IX RISK MANAGEMENT No strategy will perfectly anticipate the threats we may face and we will doubtless confront challenges in execution This strategy shifts focus and resources toward the Departments highest priorities which will inevitably affect risk profiles in other areas An NDS that is cleareyed about this reality will help ensure that the Department effectively implements the strategy and assesses its impact over time Foresight Risks In developing this strategy the Department considered the risks stemming from inaccurate predictions including unforeseen shocks in the security environment Chief among these The rate at which a competitor modernizes its military and the conditions under which competitor aggression manifests could be different than anticipated Our threat assessments may prove to be either over or underestimated We might fail to anticipate which technologies and capabilities may be employed and change our relative military advantage A new pandemic or the impacts of climate change could impair operations or readiness Foresight risks can be hedged and of course must be managed when they arise Hedging options include continuing to exercise the Joint Force against multiple contingencies and developing new more resourceefficient concepts of operation in light of continuously updated intelligence and security assessments Implementation Risks This strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategys level of ambition if we do not effectively incorporate new technologies and identify recruit and leverage new talent and if we are unsuccessful in reducing the barriers that limit collaboration with Allies and partners We aim to mitigate these and other risks through ruthless prioritization For example we must not overexert reallocate or redesign our forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to preparedness for our highest strategic priorities Implementation risks will be forestalled by leadership focus and discipline as well as consistent attention to monitoring implementation in line with clear metrics to enable assessment and course correction 2 3 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y X CONCLUSION The United States is endowed with remarkable qualities that confer great advantages including in the realm of national security We are a free people devoted to democracy and the rule of law Our combination of diversity free minds and free enterprise drives extraordinary innovation and adaptability We are a member of an unparalleled and unprecedented network of alliances and partnerships Together we share many common values and a common interest in defending the stable and open international system the basis for the most peaceful and prosperous epoch in modern history We must not lose sight of these qualities and advantages Our generational challenge is to combine and integrate them developing our capabilities together with those of our Allies and partners to sustain and strengthen an international system under threat This NDS has outlined the courses of action the Department of Defense will take to help meet this challenge We are confident in success Our country has faced and prevailed in multiyear competitions with major powers threatening or using force to subjugate others on more than one occasion in the past Working in service of the American people and in collaboration with our partners around the world the men and women of our superbly capable Joint Force stand ready to do so again 2 4 2 0 2 2 N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y This page left intentionally blank 2022 Nuclear Posture Review New fossil discovery shows that early humans walked upright far earlier than we thought I 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W TABLE OF CONTENTS I A COMPREHENSIVE BALANCED APPROACH TO DEFENDING VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND REDUCING NUCLEAR RISKS 1 II THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND DETERRENCE CHALLENGES 4 III THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN US STRATEGY 7 IV TAILORED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGIES 11 V STRENGTHENING REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 14 VI ARMS CONTROL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM 16 VII US NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 20 VIII A RESILIENT AND ADAPTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE 23 IX CONCLUSION 25 I I 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W This page left intentionally blank 1 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W I A COMPREHENSIVE BALANCED APPROACH TO DEFENDING VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND REDUCING NUCLEAR RISKS This Nuclear Posture Review NPR describes United States nuclear strategy policy posture and forces in support of the National Security Strategy NSS and National Defense Strategy NDS It reaffirms a continuing commitment to a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence Strategic deterrence remains a top priority mission for the Department of Defense DoD and the Nation For the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of US military power can replace To deter aggression and preserve our security in the current security environment we will maintain nuclear forces that are responsive to the threats we face US nuclear weapons deter aggression assure allies and partners and allow us to achieve Presidential objectives if deterrence fails In a dynamic security environment a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent is foundational to broader US defense strategy and the extended deterrence commitments we have made to allies and partners Security architectures in the Euro Atlantic and IndoPacific regions are a critical US strategic advantage over those governments that challenge the rulesbased international order These regional security architectures are a key pillar of the NDS this NPR underscores the linkage between the conventional and nuclear elements of collective deterrence and defense Deterrence alone will not reduce nuclear dangers The United States will pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach that places a renewed emphasis on arms control nonproliferation and risk reduction to strengthen stability head off costly arms races and signal our desire to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons globally Mutual verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective durable and responsible path to achieving a key goal reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy Despite the challenges in the current security environment the United States will continue to pursue engagement with other nucleararmed states where possible to reduce nuclear risks We will do so with realistic expectations understanding that progress requires reliable partners prepared to engage responsibly and on the basis of reciprocity and with whom we can establish a degree of trust Russias invasion of Ukraine underscores that nuclear dangers persist and could grow in an increasingly competitive and volatile geopolitical landscape The Russian Federations unprovoked and unlawful invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a stark reminder of nuclear risk in contemporary conflict Russia has conducted its aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saberrattling out of cycle nuclear exercises and false narratives concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction WMD In brandishing Russias nuclear arsenal in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Russias leaders have made clear that they view these weapons as a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against their neighbors Irresponsible Russian 2 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W statements and actions raise the risk of deliberate or unintended escalation Russias leadership should have no doubt regarding the resolve of the United States to both resist nuclear coercion and act as a responsible nuclear power As long as nuclear weapons exist the United States and other nuclear weapon states have a special charge to be responsible custodians of these nuclear capabilities and work with a sense of urgency to create a security environment that would ultimately allow for their elimination Nuclear weapons have not been employed in more than 75 years While ensuring our security our goal is to extend this record of nonuse and reduce the risk of a nuclear war that could have catastrophic effects for the United States and the world Mindful of this imperative in 2022 the leaders of the five declared Nuclear Weapon States France Peoples Republic of China Russian Federation United Kingdom United States P5 affirmed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought and that nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes deter aggression and prevent war The P5 leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to their disarmamentrelated obligations under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT and their intent to strengthen stability and prevent an arms race Russias rhetoric and actions in Ukraine are inconsistent with and undermine this P5 statement China also has a responsibility as an NPT nuclear weapons state and a member of the P5 to engage in talks that will reduce the risks of miscalculation and address destabilizing military dynamics The United States is committed to the modernization of its nuclear forces nuclear command control and communications NC3 system and production and support infrastructure and to sustaining fielded systems through the transition to their replacements Our principal competitors continue to expand and diversify their nuclear capabilities to include novel and destabilizing systems as well as nonnuclear capabilities that could be used to conduct strategic attacks They have demonstrated little interest in reducing their reliance on nuclear weapons By contrast the United States is focused on the timely replacement of legacy fielded systems that are rapidly approaching their end of service life The NPR identifies current or planned nuclear capabilities that are no longer required to meet our deterrence needs Additionally consistent with its concept for integrated deterrence DoD will seek to identify and assess the ability of nonnuclear capabilities to contribute to deterrence and will integrate these capabilities into operational plans as appropriate While we are taking steps to advance the goal of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons more farreaching opportunities to move in this direction will require enduring improvement in the security environment a commitment to verifiable arms control among the major nuclear powers further progress in developing nonnuclear capabilities and an assessment of how nucleararmed competitors and adversaries may react The United States is committed to making progress toward this goal as security political and technology conditions evolve in ways that allow us to do so Meeting our nuclear policy goals would not be possible without a capable motivated workforce The military and civilian personnel who work every day in the nuclear enterprise are a national 3 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W asset whose accomplishments are rarely seen but vitally important Preparing the next generation of deterrence and arms control leaders across the government and among Allies and partners is a critical task We will sustain and strengthen activities to recruit retain and support the professional development of Service members and civilians working in and supporting the nuclear field The 2022 NPR has made the following decisions to ensure a safe secure and effective deterrent while taking responsible steps to advance the goal of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy This approach offers a sound path toward sustained security and stable deterrence Adopt a strategy and declaratory policy that maintain a very high bar for nuclear employment while assuring Allies and partners and complicating adversary decision calculus Adopt an integrated deterrence approach that works to leverage nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities to tailor deterrence under specific circumstances Eliminate hedge against an uncertain future as a formal role of nuclear weapons Take steps to strengthen extended deterrence and Allied assurance Pursue enhanced security through arms control strategic stability nonproliferation and reducing the risks of miscalculation Affirm fullscope Triad replacement and other nuclear modernization programs including NC3 Retire the B831 gravity bomb Cancel the nucleararmed SeaLaunched Cruise Missile SLCMN program Deliver a modern adaptive nuclear security enterprise based on an integrated strategy for risk management productionbased resilience science and technology innovation and workforce initiatives 4 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W II THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND DETERRENCE CHALLENGES The NPR contributes to a broader strategic framework that recognizes the growing risk of military confrontation with or among nuclear powers and the urgent need to sustain and strengthen deterrence In large part due to the actions of our strategic competitors the international security environment has deteriorated in recent years The Peoples Republic of China PRC is the overall pacing challenge for US defense planning and a growing factor in evaluating our nuclear deterrent The PRC has embarked on an ambitious expansion modernization and diversification of its nuclear forces and established a nascent nuclear triad The PRC likely intends to possess at least 1000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade While the end state resulting from the PRCs specific choices with respect to its nuclear forces and strategy is uncertain the trajectory of these efforts points to a large diverse nuclear arsenal with a high degree of survivability reliability and effectiveness This could provide the PRC with new options before and during a crisis or conflict to leverage nuclear weapons for coercive purposes including military provocations against US Allies and partners in the region Russia continues to emphasize nuclear weapons in its strategy modernize and expand its nuclear forces and brandish its nuclear weapons in support of its revisionist security policy Its modern nuclear arsenal which is expected to grow further presents an enduring existential threat to the United States and our Allies and partners For more than twenty years Russia has pursued a wide ranging military modernization program that includes replacing legacy strategic nuclear systems and steadily expanding and diversifying nuclear systems that pose a direct threat to NATO and neighboring countries This includes up to 1550 accountable deployed warheads on strategic delivery vehicles that are limited by the New START Treaty as well as nuclear forces that are not numerically constrained by any arms control treaty For example Russia has an active stockpile of up to 2000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads that is not treatylimited Similarly Russia is pursuing several novel nuclearcapable systems designed to hold the US homeland or Allies and partners at risk some of which are also not accountable under New START By the 2030s the United States will for the first time in its history face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence assurance arms control and risk reduction The PRC and Russia are also working to augment their growing nuclear forces with a broader set of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities including cyber space information and advanced conventional strike Each seeks to integrate these multidomain capabilities to support coercive strategies and enable military campaigns intended to present the Joint Force with operational dilemmas The PRC and Russia also likely possess capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to US Allied and partner forces military operations and civilian populations 5 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W The Democratic Peoples Republic of North Korea North Korea while not a rival on the same scale as the PRC and Russia nonetheless also presents deterrence dilemmas for the United States and its Allies and partners It poses a persistent threat and growing danger to the US homeland and the IndoPacific region as it expands diversifies and improves its nuclear ballistic missile and nonnuclear capabilities including its chemical weapon stockpile A crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula could involve a number of nucleararmed actors raising the risk of broader conflict Iran does not today possess a nuclear weapon and we currently believe it is not pursuing one However recent Iranian activities previously constrained by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA are of great concern as they are applicable to a nuclear weapons program US policy is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon The acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states could lead to new challenges for deterrence Developments in the security environment including actions taken by Iran and North Korea and Russias aggression against Ukraine could create or deepen proliferation incentives Additionally nuclear terrorism continues to pose a threat to the United States and our Allies and partners Terrorists remain interested in using WMD in attacks against US interests and possibly the US homeland Dualuse knowledge goods and technology applicable to WMD continue to proliferate The security environment poses a number of critical challenges for deterrence The current and growing salience of nuclear weapons in the strategies and forces of our competitors heightens the risks associated with strategic competition and the stakes of crisis and military confrontation As the NDS notes we must be able to deter conventional aggression that has the potential to escalate to nuclear employment of any scale Russia presents the most acute example of this problem today given its significantly larger stockpile of regional nuclear systems and the possibility it would use these forces to try to win a war on its periphery or avoid defeat if it was in danger of losing a conventional war Deterring Russian limited nuclear use in a regional conflict is a high US and NATO priority The PRCs nuclear expansion and the changes this could bring to its strategy present new complexities In the nearterm we must factor this into our arms control and risk reduction approaches with Russia We also recognize that as the security environment evolves it may be necessary to consider nuclear strategy and force adjustments to assure our ability to achieve deterrence and other objectives for the PRC even as we continue to do so for Russia Our plans and capabilities must also account for the fact that the PRC increasingly will be able to execute a range of nuclear strategies to advance its goals 6 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Opportunistic aggression could create deterrence challenges Should we find ourselves in a largescale military confrontation with a major power or regional adversary the Joint Force will need to be postured with military capabilities including nuclear weapons that can deter and defeat other actors who may seek to take advantage of this scenario to engage in opportunistic aggression In such circumstances we will also need to be prepared to fully leverage other instruments of national power and the capabilities our Allies and partners can bring to bear Multidomain stability challenges will grow As all major powers develop multi domain approaches the United States and our Allies and partners will face new dilemmas for deterrence and managing escalation risk One challenge arises from advances in nonnuclear capabilities including in the cyber space air and undersea domains that likely will create complex and unpredictable pathways for conflict escalation especially where collective experience common understandings and established norms of behavior such as cyber and space are lacking A related challenge is the lack of collective experience and potential limited understanding of the interplay between nuclear and nonnuclear strategic capabilities in shaping a crisis or conflict 7 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W III THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN US STRATEGY Since the end of the Cold War the United States has substantially reduced the size and diversity of its nuclear forces narrowed the circumstances under which it would consider employing these forces actively sought reciprocal force reductions with Russia and made progress in global nonproliferation and risk reduction Unlike some of its competitors the United States will not use nuclear weapons to intimidate others or as part of an expansionist security policy This policy of restraint continues to shape the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy The United States is committed to taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy as well as the risks of nuclear war while also ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe secure and effective and our extended deterrence commitments remain strong and credible The Role of Nuclear Weapons The NPR affirms the following roles for nuclear weapons Deter strategic attacks Assure Allies and partners and Achieve US objectives if deterrence fails These roles are interrelated and complementary and provide the basis for developing and assessing our nuclear strategies policies and capabilities Hedging against an uncertain future is no longer a stated role for nuclear weapons The United States will continue to carry out robust risk management strategies within the nuclear enterprise so that it is capable of delivering credible deterrence even in the face of significant uncertainties and unanticipated challenges This requires sustaining a set of initiatives and actions in the nuclear enterprise that over time builds enduring advantage and resilience in our stockpile production complex and science and technology efforts Our approach to mitigating programmatic geopolitical technological and operational risk through a resilient and adaptive nuclear enterprise is discussed below Deter Strategic Attacks The United States affirms that its nuclear forces deter all forms of strategic attack They serve to deter nuclear employment of any scale directed against the US homeland or the territory of Allies and partners whether on the ground in the air at sea or in space Any adversary use of nuclear weapons regardless of location or yield would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict create the potential for uncontrolled escalation and have strategic effects We must therefore be able to deter both largescale and limited nuclear attacks from a range of adversaries The capability to deter limited nuclear attacks is critical given that some competitors have developed strategies for warfare that may rely on the threat of nuclear escalation in order to terminate a conflict on advantageous terms The ability to deter limited nuclear use is thus key to deterring nonnuclear aggression If we are not confident we can deter escalation it will be more difficult for our leaders to make the decision to project conventional military power to protect vital national security interests and far more dangerous to do so should that decision be made 8 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Consistent with prior reviews our nuclear strategy accounts for existing and emerging nonnuclear threats with potential strategic effect for which nuclear weapons are necessary to deter We concluded that nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack but also a narrow range of other high consequence strategiclevel attacks This is a prudent approach given the current security environment and how it could further evolve Assure Allies and Partners The NSS and NDS require strengthening security architectures in key regions in order to fully leverage the capabilities of Allies and partners to deter and if necessary defeat adversary aggression The US global alliance and partnership network is a military center of gravity US extended nuclear deterrence is foundational to this network Thus assuring Allies and partners that these commitments are credible is central to US national security and defense strategy Allies must be confident that the United States is willing and able to deter the range of strategic threats they face and mitigate the risks they will assume in a crisis or conflict Modernizing US nuclear forces is key to assuring Allies that the United States is committed and capable of deterring the range of threats US nuclear strategy addresses Extended nuclear deterrence contributes to US nonproliferation goals by giving Allies and partners confidence that they can resist strategic threats and remain secure without acquiring nuclear weapons of their own Part of our assurance to Allies and partners is a continued and strengthened commitment to arms control nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear risk reduction to improve collective security by reducing or constraining adversary capabilities Achieve US Objectives if Deterrence Fails We will maintain a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent and flexible nuclear capabilities to achieve our objectives should the President conclude that the employment of nuclear weapons is necessary In such a circumstance the United States would seek to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its Allies and partners As part of NPR implementation the United States will update nuclear weapons employment guidance in accordance with the policy and strategy established by the President following publication of this report United States nuclear weapons employment guidance is approved by the President and all nuclear plans are reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense These plans are prepared with advice from the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff among other senior officials Legal advice is integral to the preparation of these documents and includes review of their consistency with the Law of Armed Conflict LOAC which is authoritatively stated for DoD personnel in the DoD Law of War Manual Longstanding DoD policy is to comply with LOAC in all armed conflicts however characterized and the DoD Law of War Manual recognizes that the law of war governs the use of nuclear weapons just as it governs the use of conventional weapons In addition longstanding US policy is to not purposely threaten civilian populations or objects and the United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or objects in violation of LOAC 9 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Declaratory Policy United States declaratory policy reflects a sensible and stabilizing approach to deterring a range of attacks in a dynamic security environment This balanced policy maintains a very high bar for nuclear employment while also complicating adversary decision calculus and assuring Allies and partners As long as nuclear weapons exist the fundamental role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States our Allies and partners The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations For all other states there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which US nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring attacks that have strategic effect against the United States or its Allies and partners Declaratory policy is informed by the threat assessed adversary perceptions Ally and partner perspectives and our strategic risk reduction objectives We conducted a thorough review of a broad range of options for nuclear declaratory policy including both No First Use and Sole Purpose policies and concluded that those approaches would result in an unacceptable level of risk in light of the range of nonnuclear capabilities being developed and fielded by competitors that could inflict strategiclevel damage to the United States and its Allies and partners Some Allies and partners are particularly vulnerable to attacks with nonnuclear means that could produce devastating effects We retain the goal of moving toward a sole purpose declaration and we will work with our Allies and partners to identify concrete steps that would allow us to do so Nuclear Weapons in US Defense Strategy While the United States maintains a very high bar for the employment of nuclear weapons our nuclear posture is intended to complicate an adversarys entire decision calculus including whether to instigate a crisis initiate armed conflict conduct strategic attacks using nonnuclear capabilities or escalate to the use of nuclear weapons on any scale Our nuclear deterrent thus undergirds all our national defense priorities including defending the US homeland deterring strategic attacks against the United States our Allies and partners and deterring regional aggression with emphasis on the PRC and Russia Additionally DoDs goal to build a resilient defense ecosystem and Joint Force bears directly on our nuclear posture Making the overall defense enterprise more resilient requires investing in the nuclear enterprise to ensure it is capable of responding in a timely way to changes in the security environment or challenges that arise in our nuclear force We will deter through safe secure and effective nuclear forces that enable countryspecific strategies and plans extended deterrence commitments and an integrated deterrence approach that incorporates suitable nonnuclear capabilities tailored to specific threat scenarios This approach requires modernizing our nuclear forces NC3 production infrastructure and science and technology and industrial base strengthening extended deterrence relationships and reinforcing our nuclear forces with defenses against adversaries conventional cyber space information chemical biological radiological and nuclear capabilities 1 0 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W A key goal of integrated deterrence is to develop tailored options that shape adversary perceptions of benefits and costs The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans Nonnuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multidomain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent Developing the needed operational and organizational concepts will take time and require additional research evaluation and experience This will be a focus of NPR and NDS implementation Another important element of integrated deterrence is better synchronizing nuclear and non nuclear planning exercises and operations Our goal is to strengthen deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold of our potential adversaries in regional conflict by undermining adversary confidence in strategies for limited war that rely on the threat of nuclear escalation When engaged in conventional operations against a nucleararmed adversary the Joint Force must be able to survive maintain cohesion and continue to operate in the face of limited nuclear attacks This form of resilience sends a distinct deterrence message to an adversary that limited nuclear escalation will not render US Allied and partner forces incapable of achieving our warfighting aims It is also critically important that the Joint Force can fight and win in a chemical biological radiological and nuclear CBRNcontaminated environment Further development of plans and force requirements to enable military operations in a nuclear environment will be a focus of NPR implementation including requirements to ensure the resilience of conventional systems to limited nuclear use effects and enhanced mission assurance of space assets critical to conventional force operations DoD also seeks to integrate its activities operations and strategies more widely and deeply with Allies and partners to signal to adversaries that aggression will be met with a collective response Greater engagement with Ally and partner forces adds uncertainty and complexity to adversary planning An adversary may choose restraint if it believes it is challenging not just the United States but a unified alliance or coalition prepared to share risks confront aggression and impose prohibitive costs Extended nuclear deterrence relationships play an important role here by operationalizing collective defense that couples US and Allied security and gives Allies and partners the confidence to resist coercion and vigorously defend shared interests Even as adversaries seek to decouple the United States and its Allies the strength of these extended deterrence relationships conveys to them the risk that local aggression could widen with potentially catastrophic consequences 1 1 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W IV TAILORED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGIES CountrySpecific Approaches Central to US deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most Effectively deterring and restoring deterrence if necessary requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decisionmaking and perceptions The PRC is increasing its capability to threaten the United States and our Allies and partners with nuclear weapons The range of nuclear options available to the PRC leadership will expand in the years ahead allowing it potentially to adopt a broader range of strategies to achieve its objectives to include nuclear coercion and limited nuclear first use We will maintain a flexible deterrence strategy and force posture that continues to clearly convey to the PRC that the United States will not be deterred from defending our Allies and partners or coerced into terminating a conflict on unacceptable terms Forces that provide this flexibility include the W762 low yield submarine launched ballistic missile warhead globallydeployable bombers dualcapable fighter aircraft and airlaunched cruise missiles Our intent is to prevent the PRC from mistakenly concluding that it could gain advantage through any employment of nuclear weapons however limited The NPR recognizes that as the security environment evolves changes in US strategy and force posture may be required to sustain the ability to achieve deterrence assurance and employment objectives for both Russia and the PRC Russia remains the US rival with the most capable and diverse nuclear forces Today it is unique in the combination of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces it fields that enables nuclear employment ranging from largescale attacks on the homeland to limited strikes in support of a regional military campaign To deter largescale attacks we will field a modern resilient nuclear Triad To deter theater attacks and nuclear coercion of Allies and partners we will bolster the Triad with capabilities that further strengthen regional deterrence such as F35A dualcapable fighter aircraft DCA equipped with the B6112 bomb the W762 warhead and the LongRange Standoff LRSO weapon These flexible tailorable capabilities are key to ensuring that Russias leadership does not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear use on any scale thereby reducing their confidence in both initiating conventional war against NATO and considering the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in such a conflict The PRC and Russia are at different stages in their nuclear weapons development but each poses a major and growing nuclear threat to the United States and its Allies and partners There is some opportunity to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategies for the PRC and Russia in circumstances where the threat of a nuclear response may not be credible and where suitable non nuclear options may exist or may be developed At the same time we believe that major changes in the role of nuclear weapons in our strategies for the PRC and Russia will require verifiable reductions or constraints on their nuclear forces otherwise the United States would assume unacceptable deterrence and assurance risks 1 2 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W In a potential conflict with a competitor the United States would need to be able to deter opportunistic aggression by another competitor We will rely in part on nuclear weapons to help mitigate this risk recognizing that a nearsimultaneous conflict with two nucleararmed states would constitute an extreme circumstance Our strategy for North Korea recognizes the threat posed by its nuclear chemical missile and conventional capabilities and in particular the need to make clear to the Kim regime the dire consequences should it use nuclear weapons Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive Short of nuclear use North Korea can also conduct rapid strategic attacks in East Asia United States nuclear weapons continue to play a role in deterring such attacks Further we will hold the regime responsible for any transfers it makes of nuclear weapons technology material or expertise to any state or nonstate actor Iran does not currently pose a nuclear threat but continues to develop capabilities that would enable it to produce a nuclear weapon should it make the decision to do so The United States relies on nonnuclear overmatch to deter regional aggression by Iran as long as Iran does not possess nuclear weapons It is US policy that Iran will not be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon This policy has been consistent across successive administrations since the public disclosure of a clandestine Iranian nuclear program Managing the Risks of Escalation and Miscalculation Changes in the security environment and new capabilities particularly in the cyber and space domains will contribute in crisis or conflict to an increasingly complex operating environment In this type of environment deterring aggression and managing escalation will be more challenging Accordingly in developing and executing tailored deterrence strategies we will follow guidelines for managing escalation risk These guidelines will reflect general principles and approaches that favor crisis stability such as architectural resilience and defenses that reduce first mover advantages in cyber and space operational concepts and capabilities that provide options intended to limit escalation risk and resilient stresstested weapon systems and command and control networks Additionally in crisis or conflict we will seek to manage escalation risk by addressing adversary misperceptions that may exist regarding US resolve capabilities strategic intentions or war aims that could lead to miscalculation This can be accomplished through the way we posture our nuclear and nonnuclear forces public and private messaging and crisis communication and management mechanisms It is equally important in building operational plans and making decisions regarding nuclear posture and readiness to reduce the risk that the United States will misinterpret adversary intentions or capabilities or unknowingly cross a misunderstood or ambiguous threshold for adversary nuclear use Intelligence analysis simulations and wargames red teaming and other means offer actionable insights to US leaders that help mitigate this risk 1 3 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Peacetime dialogue with potential adversaries can facilitate efforts in a crisis or war to reduce risks of misperception that could lead to escalation Our goals in discussions on strategic stability include improving transparency and mutual understanding of threat perceptions policies doctrine and capabilities as well as establishing or enhancing crisis management processes that can help avoid or limit conflict escalation The United States has substantial experience in strategic dialogue and crisis management with Russia but has made little progress with the PRC despite consistent US efforts The world expects nuclear powers to act responsibly including on risk reduction and crisis communications and the United States will continue to pursue these efforts with China We also recognize the risk of unintended nuclear escalation which can result from accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon The United States has extensive protections in place to mitigate this risk As an example US intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs are not on hair trigger alert These forces are on daytoday alert a posture that contributes to strategic stability Forces on daytoday alert are subject to multiple layers of control and the United States maintains rigorous procedural and technical safeguards to prevent misinformed accidental or unauthorized launch Survivable and redundant sensors provide high confidence that potential attacks will be detected and characterized enabling policies and procedures that ensure a deliberative process allowing the President sufficient time to gather information and consider courses of action In the most plausible scenarios that concern policy leaders today there would be time for full deliberation For these reasons while the United States maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack it does not rely on a launchunderattack policy to ensure a credible response Rather US nuclear forces are postured to withstand an initial attack In all cases the United States will maintain a human in the loop for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the President to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment As confidence and securitybuilding measures the United States has taken steps over time to modify its nuclear posture to enhance stability We continue to maintain our longstanding practice of openocean targeting of strategic nuclear forces daytoday Additionally while we retain the capability to upload a portion of the ICBM force we continue to configure these missiles with only one warhead daytoday thereby reducing adversary incentive to launch a first strike Further dealerting ICBMs or other steps to reduce alert levels could undermine crisis stability by heightening adversary incentives to attack or to increase nuclear readiness as a coercive measure DoD will continue working to gain a deeper understanding of potential risks to crisis stability In addition as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 DoD will commission an independent review of the safety security and reliability of US nuclear weapons NC3 and integrated tactical warningattack assessment systems 1 4 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W V STRENGTHENING REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE As long as Allies and partners face nuclear threats extended nuclear deterrence will remain a pillar of regional security architectures Effective assurance of Allies and partners is built on a shared view of the security environment and deterrence challenges a commitment to risk and burden sharing modern and effective nuclear forces robust consultation processes and Ally and partner confidence that the United States has the will and capability to meet its security commitments Based on these principles we will collaborate with Allies and partners to tailor extended deterrence and assurance policies that are responsive to the security environment and that integrate our collective capabilities across all tools of national power Assurance also rests on a commitment to advance shared goals for arms control nonproliferation and other forms of risk reduction consistent with collective security interests This includes identifying steps to reduce the risk of miscalculation that could lead to deliberate or inadvertent nuclear escalation Strong and Credible Nuclear Deterrence in the EuroAtlantic Region As long as nuclear weapons exist NATO will remain a nuclear alliance A strong cohesive Alliance with a clear nuclear mission remains essential to deter aggression and promote peace and stability in the EuroAtlantic area especially in light of Russias aggression against its neighbors and the central role nuclear weapons and other strategic capabilities play in Russian doctrine United States strategic nuclear forces and forwarddeployed nuclear weapons provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America Combined with the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom and NATOs nuclear burdensharing arrangements US nuclear forces remain essential to the Alliances deterrence and defense posture Since Russias invasion of Ukraine and occupation of Crimea in 2014 NATO has taken steps to ensure a modern ready and credible NATO nuclear deterrent This includes modernizing US nuclear weapons forwarddeployed in Europe and with participating NATO Allies transitioning to a new generation of fighter aircraft including the US F35A Joint Strike Fighter The United States will work with Allies concerned to ensure that the transition to modern DCA and the B6112 bomb is executed efficiently and with minimal disruption to readiness Further steps are needed to fully adapt these forces to current and emerging security conditions We will work with Allies and partners to monitor Russian capabilities and doctrine and other aspects of the threat environment enhance the readiness survivability and effectiveness of the DCA mission across the conflict spectrum including through enhanced exercises strengthen the coherence of NATOs nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities and concepts to ensure they are mutually supportive and achieve the broadest possible participation in NATOs nuclear burden sharing mission consistent with treaty commitments Any changes in NATOs nuclear posture will be taken only after a thorough review within and decision by the Alliance 1 5 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Strong and Credible Nuclear Deterrence in the IndoPacific Region Our security commitments to Allies and partners in the IndoPacific region are steadfast We recognize growing concerns about nuclear and missile developments in the PRC North Korea and Russia and are committed to strengthening deterrence in ways that are responsive to changes in the regional security environment Toward that end we will work with Allies and partners to ensure an effective mix of capabilities concepts deployments exercises and tailored options to deter and if necessary respond to coercion and aggression Foundational to this approach is stronger extended deterrence consultation emphasizing a cooperative approach between the United States and Allies in decisionmaking related to nuclear deterrence policy strategic messaging and activities that reinforce collective regional security Building on the extended deterrence dialogues established over the last decade with the Republic of Korea ROK Japan and Australia and other forums we will identify pragmatic steps to enhance consultation This could include periodically meeting at higher levels of seniority and examining options to improve crisis management consultation An important goal is to identify opportunities for trilateral United States Japan ROK or quadrilateral plus Australia information sharing and dialogue Relevant lessonslearned from dialogues and consultations should be directly factored into the development of tailored deterrence strategies and operational plans The United States will continue to field flexible nuclear forces suited to deterring regional nuclear conflict including the capability to forward deploy strategic bombers dualcapable fighter aircraft and nuclear weapons to the region and globally We will work with Allies and partners to identify opportunities to increase the visibility of US strategic assets to the region as a demonstration of US resolve and commitment including ballistic missile submarine port visits and strategic bomber missions Greater capability integration is an important goal as well to better synchronize the nuclear and nonnuclear elements of deterrence and to leverage Ally and partner nonnuclear capabilities that can support the nuclear deterrence mission In advancing these goals we view the expertise capabilities and resources of our Allies and partners as force multipliers for strengthening deterrence 1 6 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W VI ARMS CONTROL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM Beyond the critical role played by deterrence arms control risk reduction and nuclear non proliferation play indispensable roles in further reducing nuclear dangers Together these are mutually reinforcing tools for preserving stability deterring aggression and escalation and avoiding arms racing and nuclear war We are placing renewed emphasis on arms control nuclear nonproliferation and risk reduction These policies complement US nuclear policy and force structure decisions and enable us to pursue opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons globally enhance strategic stability with the PRC and Russia and reduce the risks of war or escalation during war In particular limitations on and greater transparency into adversary nuclear and possibly nonnuclear strategic capabilities through arms control is central to any approach to reduce the role of nuclear weapons Mutual verifiable nuclear arms control offers the most effective durable and responsible path to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our strategy and prevent their use Consistent with our commitment to put diplomacy first the United States will pursue new arms control arrangements that address the full range of nuclear threats and advance our global nonproliferation interests PRC and Russian actions to expand their nuclear arsenals make mutual and verifiable arms control challenging but the United States will prepare for engagement and realistic outcomes in dialogues with both governments as this remains in our national security interest We will seek opportunities to pursue practical steps to advance the goals of greater transparency and predictability enhanced stability reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and ultimately a world without nuclear weapons Russia will remain a focus of US efforts given the size diversity and continuing modernization of its nuclear arsenal However we will need to account for the PRCs nuclear expansion in future USRussia arms control discussions Nuclear Arms Control and Risk Reduction Upon taking office in January 2021 the President immediately extended the New START Treaty for the full fiveyears provided in the Treaty Extending verifiable limits on Russian intercontinentalrange nuclear forces contributes to strategic stability and advances our defense priorities We will continue to implement the Treaty and verify Russian compliance Expiration of the Treaty without a followon agreement would leave Russia free to expand strategic nuclear forces that are now constrained as well as novel intercontinentalrange and regional systems that are not currently limited by the Treaty The United States is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026 although negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith Our priorities include fostering transparency and mutual risk reduction pursuing initiatives that limit destabilizing systems or postures and reducing the chance of miscalculation Although the United States and Russia have expressed support for extending nuclear arms control beyond the New START Treaty our priorities are not identical underscoring the importance of 1 7 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W dialogue when conditions permit to address each sides differing goals and perceptions of military systems that affect strategic stability The scope and pace of the PRCs nuclear expansion as well as its lack of transparency and growing military assertiveness raise questions regarding its intentions nuclear strategy and doctrine and perceptions of strategic stability This underscores the need for discussions on practical steps to reduce strategic risks including steps that could lay the groundwork for additional discussion of mutual restraints in capabilities and behavior Although the PRC has been reluctant to discuss these items the United States remains ready to engage the PRC on a full range of strategic issues with a focus on military deconfliction crisis communications information sharing mutual restraint risk reduction emerging technologies and approaches to nuclear arms control among other issues The United States remains prepared to meet with the PRC in bilateral and multilateral fora while pressing for these discussions to include both sides military and diplomatic authorities Engagement with the PRC should address its plans for expanding fissile material production to support its growing nuclear arsenal The PRC should adopt a moratorium on fissile material production or at a minimum provide increased transparency to assure the international community that fissile material produced for civilian purposes is fully accounted for and not diverted to military uses We will make clear to the international community our concerns regarding the PRCs growing nuclear arsenal and ensure outreach to the PRC is consistent with our security commitments to allies and partners Successfully enforcing future arms control agreements will require new technical capabilities for verification and monitoring VM The United States is already investing in some of the needed technologies but additional resource prioritization may be required to ensure they will be available when needed Our participation in several international collaborations eg International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification advances the technical basis for innovation in VM To support our longterm arms control nonproliferation and disarmament goals we are committed to developing the next generation of policy and technical experts needed to negotiate and implement future agreements Nuclear NonProliferation The United States remains dedicated to preserving and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and reaffirms its commitment to the NPT The NPT has made the world safer and more prosperous and all Parties including the United States and its Allies and partners continue to benefit from the Treaty The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and its nuclear safeguards system including the Additional Protocol as well as effective international export controls impede nuclear proliferation and should be strengthened US actions to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament advance US national security in their own right but also build international confidence in the broader benefits of the nuclear nonproliferation regime The United States will continue to pursue political and technological barriers to nuclear proliferation including through strengthened strategic trade controls and support for the adoption of nuclear weaponfree zones 1 8 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W We will also continue to support efforts that enable all NPT States Parties to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology US policy is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and is pursuing principled diplomacy in coordination with Allies and partners to constrain Irans nuclear activities Further we support measures to limit Iranian nuclear activities applicable to a nuclear weapons program and to provide the greatest possible level of international transparency and verification Our policy toward North Korea calls for a calibrated diplomatic approach to secure practical progress that increases the security of the United States our Allies and partners and deployed forces At the same time we will continue to press North Korea to comply with its obligations under various United Nations Security Council resolutions and return to negotiations to verifiably eliminate its nuclear program With respect to reducing or eliminating the threat from North Korea our goal remains the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament The P5 Process promotes dialogue on nuclear issues that could build confidence and understanding enhance transparency and create a forum for highlevel engagement Future efforts could be tailored to deepen engagement on nuclear doctrines concepts for strategic risk reduction and nuclear arms control verification The United States supports the Comprehensive NuclearTestBan Treaty CTBT and is committed to working to achieve its entry into force recognizing the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal In the near term we continue to support the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization the completion and provisional operation of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre and development of the onsite inspection regime so that it will be capable of carrying out its compliance verification mission once the Treaty enters into force Once in force the CTBT would ban nuclear explosive tests of any yield Under the CTBT there is no threshold of nuclear yield below which nuclear explosive tests are permissible If the CTBT were to enter into force Russia and the PRC would have an obligation to comply with the Treatys zeroyield standard The United States will engage with Russia and the PRC as appropriate in order to address nuclear test site activities of concern relative to the Treaty as outlined in the Department of States Compliance Report Those concerns do not outweigh the security benefits of the Treaty indeed the Treatys benefits would include a legally binding basis and tools for challenging that behavior Consistent with the goals of the CTBT the United States continues to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain such a moratorium The Department of Energys National Nuclear Security Administration NNSA stockpile stewardship program enables the United States to ensure a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent without requiring a return to nuclear explosive testing This helps advance US nonproliferation objectives and sets a responsible example for all nuclear weapons states 1 9 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty FMCT would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and remains a key element of the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda The United States continues to support the commencement of FMCT negotiations provided they are governed by consensus and all key states participate In the interim we remain committed to maintaining our unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons which has been in place since the early 1990s We continue to encourage all states that have not yet done so including the PRC to declare and maintain such a moratorium immediately While the United States actively pursues the goal of a world without nuclear weapons it does not consider the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons TPNW to be an effective means to reach that goal The United States does not share the underlying assumption of the TPNW that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be achieved irrespective of the prevailing international security environment Nor do we consider the TPNW to be an effective tool to resolve the underlying security conflicts that lead states to retain or seek nuclear weapons Nuclear Counterterrorism Preventing an act of nuclear terrorism is an enduring national security requirement We will continue to work through diplomacy and partnerships to advance the core elements of our nuclear counterterrorism strategy denying nonstate actors access to nuclear materials and related technology improving forensic capabilities to identify the origin of nuclear material outside of regulatory control or used in a nuclear device monitoring and disrupting terrorist attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities and maintaining an incident response posture to detect interdict and defeat nuclear threats or minimize the consequence of nuclear events This strategy contributes to the deterrence of both nonstate actors and hostile states that might contemplate providing nuclear material or other assistance to wouldbe nuclear terrorists and provides for response options should deterrence fail Deterring states from facilitating acts of nuclear terrorism by others is enabled in part by nuclear forensic capabilities that provide the scientific basis to hold such states accountable Greater investment in these technical nuclear forensic tools is required to ensure they remain responsive to the threat and thus scientifically credible and internationally accepted 2 0 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W VII US NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES The United States will field and maintain strategic nuclear delivery systems and deployed weapons in compliance with New START Treaty central limits as long as the Treaty remains in force We will continue to deploy a nuclear triad and are fully committed to the programs that will begin to field modernized systems later this decade Programs are also being executed to modernize US DCA the nuclear weapons stockpile the NC3 architecture and the weapons production infrastructure The three legs of the nuclear Triad are complementary with each component offering unique attributes Maintaining a modern triad possessing these attributes effectiveness responsiveness survivability flexibility and visibility ensures that the United States can withstand and respond to any strategic attack tailor its deterrence strategies as needed and assure Allies in support of our extended deterrence commitments While the US nuclear arsenal remains safe secure and effective most nuclear deterrent systems are operating beyond their original design life Replacement programs are on track at this time but there is little or no margin between the end of effective life of existing systems and the fielding of their replacements These replacement programs are planned to deliver modernized capabilities to avoid any gaps in our ability to field a credible and effective deterrent The B831 gravity bomb will be retired due to increasing limitations on its capabilities and rising maintenance costs In the nearterm we will leverage existing capabilities to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets DoD working with its interagency partners and informed by existing concepts will develop an enduring capability for improved defeat of such targets In addition we are cancelling the nucleararmed SeaLaunched Cruise Missile SLCMN program The 2018 NPR introduced SLCMN and the W762 to supplement the existing nuclear program of record in order to strengthen deterrence of limited nuclear use in a regional conflict We reassessed the rationale for these capabilities and concluded that the W762 currently provides an important means to deter limited nuclear use Its deterrence value will be reevaluated as the F 35A and LRSO are fielded and in light of the security environment and plausible deterrence scenarios we could face in the future We concluded SLCMN was no longer necessary given the deterrence contribution of the W762 uncertainty regarding whether SLCMN on its own would provide leverage to negotiate arms control limits on Russias NSNW and the estimated cost of SLCMN in light of other nuclear modernization programs and defense priorities 2 1 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W 2 2 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W Strengthening Nuclear Command Control and Communications NC3 Our NC3 system must provide command and control of US nuclear forces at all times and under all circumstances including during and following a nuclear or nonnuclear attack by any adversary Resilient NC3 capabilities are a critical enabler of mission assurance for nuclear operations The five essential functions for nuclear command and control are detection warning and attack characterization adaptive nuclear planning decisionmaking conferencing receiving and executing Presidential orders and enabling the management and direction of forces We will employ an optimized mix of resilience approaches to protect the nextgeneration NC3 architecture from threats posed by competitor capabilities This includes but is not limited to enhanced protection from cyber spacebased and electromagnetic pulse threats enhanced integrated tactical warning and attack assessment improved command post and communication links advanced decision support technology and integrated planning and operations Technology Innovation for the Nuclear Enterprise A stronger and more systematic approach to technology innovation is key to building enduring advantage in the nuclear enterprise This requires investing in new research prototyping and engineering efforts that can be leveraged as needed to ensure a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent into the future The nuclear enterprise will increase focus on research development test and evaluation efforts government purpose data rights and faster development of technologies and system concepts through digital engineering and open architecture designs for example Development activities will emphasize a robust experimental approach to the use of emerging technologies and innovative design practices to promote competition of concepts accelerate technology readiness bolster the critical workforce and help leadership understand technology opportunities This multifaceted approach will promote technologybased resilience and will reduce the risks associated with developing or adapting future nuclear deterrent capabilities Stockpile Certification Since 1992 the United States has maintained a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and remains committed to assuring the safety security and reliability of our arsenal through a rigorous sciencebased stockpile stewardship program For more than twenty years the Secretaries of Defense and Energy the directors of the national security laboratories and the Commanders of US Strategic Command USSTRATCOM have annually assessed that our nuclear stockpile is safe reliable and effective and that there is no current need to conduct nuclear explosive tests to ensure stockpile reliability As nuclear warhead system lifetimes are extended the NNSA and USSTRATCOM required assessments and certifications of warhead systems are increasingly challenged by limited surveillance hardware and testing opportunities Additionally if any issues are observed through surveillance activities and tests the capacity of the production infrastructure to make necessary changes can interrupt other planned modernization programs Therefore the United States maintains a nuclear explosive test readiness program in the event it is required to resolve technical uncertainties The United States does not envision or desire a return to nuclear explosive testing Any resumption of nuclear testing would occur only at the Presidents explicit direction 2 3 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W VIII A RESILIENT AND ADAPTIVE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE For most of the postCold War period the focus of our nuclear security enterprise has been to sustain existing nuclear weapons and improve our ability to assess their safety security reliability and effectiveness without nuclear explosive testing When aging issues were identified in the stockpile weapons were partially refurbished without changing their military characteristics and safety and security systems were sometimes upgraded Elements of the production infrastructure were dismantled and other elements were not sustained Today much of the stockpile has aged without comprehensive refurbishment At a time of rising nuclear risks a partial refurbishment strategy no longer serves our interests A safe secure and effective deterrent requires modern weapons and a modern infrastructure enabled by a worldclass workforce equipped with modern tools We must develop and field a balanced flexible stockpile capable of pacing threats responding to uncertainty and maintaining effectiveness To accomplish this we must reestablish repair and modernize our production infrastructure and ensure it has appropriate capabilities and sufficient capacity to build and maintain modern nuclear weapons in a timely manner The nuclear security enterprise must be able to respond in a timely way to threat developments and technology opportunities maintain effectiveness over time and at all times ensure that Presidential guidance can be achieved This plan has three pillars First given the complexity and interconnected nature of ongoing nuclear modernization and sustainment programs DoD and NNSA will improve coordination and integration DoD and NNSA will develop and implement a Nuclear Deterrent Risk Management Strategy to identify prioritize and recommend actions across the portfolio of nuclear programs and monitor the overall health of the nuclear deterrent as we sustain current capabilities and transition to modernized systems This strategy will be informed by ongoing assessment of the security environment and early identification of potential risks with the goal of enhancing senior leader visibility and framing options for risk mitigation Second NNSA will institute a Productionbased Resilience Program PRP to complement the sciencebased stewardship program and ensure that the nuclear security enterprise is capable of fullscope production The PRP will establish the capabilities and infrastructure that can efficiently produce weapons required in the nearterm and beyond and that are sufficiently resilient to adapt to additional or new requirements should geopolitical or technology developments warrant Key attributes are flexibility supply chain security and resilience production capacity margin and elimination of single point failures The PRP will enable more regular and timely incorporation of advanced technologies to improve safety security and reliability accommodate arms control considerations as design features as weapons and infrastructure are modernized and enable improved stockpile management and risk mitigation without overreliance on single warhead types a large reserve stockpile or increases to the size of the stockpile 2 4 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W The PRP will address all elements of the enterprise including production of primaries secondaries tritium and nonnuclear components domestic uranium enrichment and system assembly and disassembly For primary production the highest priority for the next ten years is pit production a capability lost when the Rocky Flats facility was closed in 1992 Restoring the ability to produce plutonium pits for primaries will guard against the uncertainties of plutonium aging in todays stockpile and will also allow new pit designs to be manufactured if necessary for future weapons The twosite strategy at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Savannah River Site will eliminate single point failure and provide flexible capacity options Priorities for secondary production are completion and full operation of the Uranium Processing Facility as well as depleted uranium and lithium facilities modernization Modernizing tritium production will assure a reliable and resilient domestic source and options for longer stockpile life tritium components Modernizing development and production capabilities of high explosives and energetic materials will eliminate single points of failure Modernizing production capacity for nonnuclear components encompasses items such as strategic radiationhardened microelectronics component test capabilities and sufficient manufacturing floor space Third NNSA will establish a Science and Technology Innovation Initiative to accelerate the integration of science and technology ST throughout its activities This initiative will add to the existing science portfolio an increased focus on leveraging ST to support the weapon design and production phases and modernize the production complex The goal is to more rapidly assimilate findings from academic commercial and internal research and thereby reduce the time and cost required to design and produce weapons with the most modern technologies that are most responsive to potential threats This initiative will include new and replacement science facilities Additionally NNSA will partner closely with DoDs ST community as both pursue activities to foster and exercise the national technology base The health of the enterprise depends critically on recruiting and retaining a skilled and diverse workforce We will place priority on programs and policies to ensure the nuclear security enterprise can attract and retain talent and conduct effective knowledge transfer Building a resilient and adaptive enterprise will take time There is no quick fix but with sustained national commitment a sound strategy and a 21st century workforce we will maintain a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as necessary 2 5 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W IX CONCLUSION In an increasingly complex security environment we are committed to ensuring a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent and strong and credible extended deterrence a posture that contributes to stability and supports the broader objectives of our National Defense Strategy This includes a commitment to responsible stewardship of our nuclear weapons constructive collaboration with our Allies and partners pragmatic approaches to arms control and nonproliferation and responsible technology innovation that enhances stability We fully recognize the enduring importance of a nuclear policy that balances the evolving demands of deterrence with our goal of taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and thereby reducing the salience of nuclear weapons globally We will work with a sense of urgency to reduce the danger of nuclear war which would have catastrophic consequences for the United States and the world Developments in the security environment make these goals both more challenging and more pressing to pursue However we can only make progress in these respects if we are confident in the ability of our nuclear posture to deter aggression and protect our Allies and partners Thus for the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of US military power can replace To deter aggression and preserve our security in the current security environment we will maintain a nuclear posture that is responsive to the threats we face 2 6 2 0 2 2 N U C L E A R P O S T U R E R E V I E W This page left intentionally blank 2022 Missile Defense Review Fossil teeth reveal new chapter of human evolution in East Asia I 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W TABLE OF CONTENTS I INTRODUCTION 1 II EVOLVING AIR AND MISSILE THREAT ENVIRONMENT 2 III STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 5 IV STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS 10 V CONCLUSION 12 I I 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W This page left intentionally blank 1 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W I INTRODUCTION The 2022 Missile Defense Review MDR provides direction to the Department of Defense DoD and guidance to its interagency partners on US missile defense strategy and policy in support of the National Defense Strategy NDS The MDR provides a framework for US missile defenses that is informed by defense priorities and deterrence objectives as indicated in the NDS the framework of integrated deterrence and the multifaceted elements of US missile defenses The MDR also identifies how the United States is integrating missile defense with its Allies and partners to strengthen international cooperation against shared threats Since the release of the last MDR in 2019 missilerelated threats have rapidly expanded in quantity diversity and sophistication US national security interests are increasingly at risk from wideranging missile arsenals that include offensive ballistic cruise and hypersonic weapons as well as lowertier threats such as Uncrewed Aircraft Systems UAS The United States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence underwritten by a safe secure and effective nuclear arsenal and reinforced by a resilient sensor and Nuclear Command Control and Communications NC3 architecture to address and deter large intercontinentalrange nuclear missile threats to the homeland from the Peoples Republic of China PRC and the Russian Federation Russia As the scale and complexity of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea North Korea missile capabilities increase the United States will also continue to stay ahead of North Korean missile threats to the homeland through a comprehensive missile defeat approach complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and non nuclear means Missile defeat encompasses the range of activities to counter the development acquisition proliferation potential and actual use of adversary offensive missiles of all types and to limit damage from such use In support of the homeland missile defense mission continued modernization and expansion of the Groundbased Midcourse Defense GMD system will remain an essential element of our comprehensive missile defeat approach In addition as part of this comprehensive approach the United States will also continue to improve defensive capabilities to address the threat of evolving cruise missile strikes by any adversary against the homeland To strengthen regional defense and deterrence close cooperation with Allies and partners on Integrated Air and Missile Defense IAMD will remain an important priority As such the United States will continue to pursue Joint Allied and partner IAMD capabilities needed to maintain a credible level of regional defensive capability for joint maneuver forces and critical infrastructure against all missile threats from any adversary in order to protect US forces abroad maintain freedom of maneuver and strengthen security commitments to our Allies and partners 2 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W II EVOLVING AIR AND MISSILE THREAT ENVIRONMENT Adversaries are developing fielding and integrating more advanced air and missile capabilities into their strategies in order to favorably shape the course of a potential crisis or conflict These air and missile capabilities pose an expanding and accelerating risk to the US homeland US forces abroad and our Allies and partners Current and emerging ballistic cruise and hypersonic missile capabilities as well as new threats such as small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems sUAS are complicating the traditional roles of air and missile defense Potential adversaries are acquiring longerrange and more complex missiles and are seeking meaningful military advantage with advanced conventional missiles enabled by sophisticated information systems and sensors Threat actors are developing and deploying mobile missile systems to reduce the ability of the United States Allies and partners to detect identify and respond to launch preparations Hypersonic weapons designed to evade US sensors and defensive systems pose an increasing and complex threat due to their dual nuclearconventional capable nature challenging flight profile and maneuverability PRC As outlined in the NDS PRC efforts and activities to contest the rulesbased international order make it the pacing challenge for the Department Over the past two decades the PRC has dramatically advanced its development of conventional and nucleararmed ballistic and hypersonic missile technologies and capabilities through intense and focused investment development testing and deployments The PRC currently utilizes Russiandeveloped air and missile defense systems while also pursuing indigenous capabilities that are growing in sophistication In many areas such as conventional ballistic and hypersonic missile technologies the PRC continues to close the gap with the United States and will likely continue to develop and expand its missile capabilities Increasingly sophisticated and proliferated spacebased Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISR networks and improved Command and Control C2 systems have greatly improved the precision and accuracy of missile systems the PRC would employ to deter and counter US forward presence and operations especially in the Western Pacific region Russia The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine clearly signals the reemergence of a more militaristic Russia that seeks to overturn the postCold War European security system and challenge the broader rulesbased international order Through its hostile actions Russia seeks to expand its control over portions of the former Soviet empire in order to reclaim what it regards as its rightful position on the world stage In Ukraine Russia has used thousands of air land and sealaunched cruise and ballistic missiles including hypersonic missiles Current battlefield losses threaten to reduce Russias modernized weapons arsenal and coordinated and wideranging economic sanctions and export controls may hinder its future ability to effectively produce modern precisionguided munitions 3 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W As noted in the NDS Russia also seeks to advance its interests by directly challenging US national interests Over the last 10 years Russia has prioritized modernization of its intercontinental range missile systems and is developing testing and deploying new diversified capabilities that pose new challenges to missile warning and defense of the US homeland Russia is developing and fielding a suite of advanced precisionstrike missiles that can be launched from multiple air sea and groundbased platforms and feature many capabilities designed to defeat missile defenses Russia has retained and upgraded its own missile defense system designed to protect Moscow against a US strike and has developed several lowertier air defense systems for its own use and export as a foreign policy instrument North Korea North Korea continues to improve expand and diversify its conventional and nuclear missile capabilities posing an increasing risk to the US homeland and US forces in theater as well as regional Allies and partners In 2017 North Korea flighttested two different types of domesticallyproduced roadmobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ICBM both of which can reach the US homeland In 2020 North Korea displayed a new larger ICBM during a military parade Additionally North Korea has a range of domesticallyproduced missile systems including short medium and IntermediateRange Ballistic Missiles IRBM that can hold deployed US forces Allies and partners at risk Most of North Koreas ballistic missiles have an assessed capability to carry nuclear payloads North Korea has publicly stated its intent to continue advancing the size and complexity of its ballistic missile program regardless of future US regional or homeland missile defense capabilities or postures Additionally since September 2021 North Korea has conducted multiple flight tests of what it claims are hypersonic missiles In January 2022 North Korea conducted another series of tests of a variety of missile systems including an IRBM its first such test since 2017 Iran The Islamic Republic of Iran Iran maintains a large and growing regional missile and UAS capability which it leverages often through proxies to conduct attacks in the region ensure regime survival deter attacks against its territory and respond if attacked Iran continues to maintain the largest missile force in the Middle East augmented with a growing UAS capability Its missiles pose a risk to US forces Allies and partners in the Middle East and beyond but cannot currently reach the US homeland Iran also continues to pursue a space program which could shorten the pathway to a future longrange missile capability NonState Actors Nonstate actors pose an increasing threat to US regional interests including Allies and partners particularly in the Middle East and Africa On todays battlefields nonstate actors are employing increasingly complex offensive sUAS rocket and missile capabilities and continue to benefit from technology transfer by US adversaries UAS UAS are an inexpensive accessible flexible expendable and plausibly deniable way to carry out armed attacks and project outsized power over a variety of domains Accelerating technology trends continue to transform applications of UAS making them increasingly capable platforms in the hands of both state and nonstate actors UAS can have similar lethality to cruise 4 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W missiles and can launch from a wide array of locations virtually undetected UAS are generally not perceived by adversaries as having the same destabilizing geostrategic implications as larger missile forces making them an increasingly preferred method to carry out tacticallevel strikes Adversaries also are utilizing multiple types of missile salvos such as oneway attack UAS in combination with rockets in an effort to defeat missile defense systems UAS usage will likely expand and continue to pose a threat to US personnel overseas Allies and partners and potentially to the US homeland 5 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W III STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK As outlined in the NDS integrated deterrence is a framework weaving together all instruments of national power with diplomacy at the forefront to work seamlessly across warfighting domains theaters the spectrum of conflict and our network of alliances and partnerships Tailored to specific circumstances integrated deterrence applies a coordinated multifaceted approach to reducing competitors perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint Integrated deterrence is enabled by combatcredible forces and backstopped by a safe secure and effective nuclear deterrent Missile defenses as one component of this integrated multilayered framework are critical to the top priority of defending the homeland and deterring attacks against the United States Whether protecting the homeland deployed US forces or our Allies and partners missile defenses deny the benefits of an attack by adversaries and limits damage should deterrence fail The continued evolution and progress of missiles as a principal means by which adversaries seek to project conventional or nuclear military power makes missile defense a core deterrenceby denial component of an integrated deterrence strategy Missile defense capabilities add resilience and undermine adversary confidence in missile use by introducing doubt and uncertainty into strike planning and execution reducing the incentive to conduct smallscale coercive attacks decreasing the probability of attack success and raising the threshold for conflict Missile defenses also reinforce US diplomatic and security posture to reassure Allies and partners that the United States will not be deterred from fulfilling its global security commitments In the event of crisis or conflict missile defenses offer military options that help counter the expanding presence of missile threats and may be less escalatory than employing offensive systems Damage limitation offered by missile defenses expands decision making space for senior leaders at all levels of conflict and preserves capability and freedom of maneuver for US forces Within the framework of integrated deterrence missile defense and nuclear capabilities are complementary US nuclear weapons present a credible threat of a robust response and overwhelming cost imposition while missile defenses contribute to deterrence by denial If deterrence fails missile defenses can potentially mitigate some effects from an attack Missile defense contributes directly to tailored US deterrence strategies to dissuade attacks on the United States from states like North Korea and contributes to extended deterrence for US Allies and partners and our respective forces abroad To address intercontinentalrange nuclear threats from Russia and the PRC the United States will continue to rely on strategic deterrence underwritten by safe secure and effective nuclear forces to deter such threats as outlined in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review NPR Ensuring the continued credibility of this deterrent will require investments in missile warning missile tracking and resilient NC3 to keep pace with the evolving PRC and Russian threats and avoid the possibility of evading US sensor networks in a surprise attack For states like North Korea 6 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W missile defenses and the US nuclear arsenal are complementary and mutually reinforcing as both capabilities contribute to deterring an attack against the United States and our Allies and partners Homeland Missile Defense The Departments top priority is to defend the homeland and deter attacks against the United States For the purposes of this review homeland missile defense refers to the defense of the 50 states all US territories and the District of Columbia against missile attacks Missile defenses can raise the threshold for initiating nuclear conflict by denying an aggressor the ability to execute smallscale coercive nuclear attacks or demonstrations Further the presence of missile defense complicates adversary decisionmaking by injecting doubt and uncertainty about the likelihood of a successful offensive missile attack Missile defense systems such as the GMD offer a visible measure of protection for the US population while reassuring Allies and partners that the United States will not be coerced by threats to the homeland from states like North Korea and potentially Iran In the event of crisis globally integrated domain awareness capabilities increase warning and allow for flexible decisionmaking to respond as necessary and appropriate with escalatory options such as kinetic strike Should deterrence fail missile defenses can help mitigate damage to the homeland and help protect the US population The US homeland ballistic missile defense architecture centers on the GMD system consisting of interceptors emplaced in Alaska and California a network of spacebased and terrestrialbased sensors and an integrated C2 system Together these US homeland defense capabilities provide the means to address ballistic missile threats from states like North Korea and Iran Though the United States maintains the right to defend itself against attacks from any source GMD is neither intended for nor capable of defeating the large and sophisticated ICBM air or sea launched ballistic missile threats from Russia and the PRC The United States relies on strategic deterrence to address those threats As part of an integrated approach to deterrence the United States recognizes the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive systems Strengthening mutual transparency and predictability with regard to these systems could help reduce the risk of conflict As North Korean ballistic missile threats to the US homeland continue to evolve the United States is committed to improving the capability and reliability of the GMD system This includes development of the Next Generation Interceptor NGI to augment and potentially replace the existing GroundBased Interceptors GBI In addition to the GMD system the United States will leverage and improve its full spectrum of missile defeat capabilities complemented by the credible threat of direct cost imposition through nuclear and nonnuclear means to continue to counter North Korean missile threats to the homeland To deter attempts by adversaries to stay under the nuclear threshold and achieve strategic results with conventional capabilities the United States will examine active and passive defense measures to decrease the risk from any cruise missile strike against critical assets regardless of origin 7 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W Within the context of homeland defense an attack on Guam or any other US territory by any adversary will be considered a direct attack on the United States and will be met with an appropriate response Additionally Guam is home to key regional power projection platforms and logistical nodes and is an essential operating base for US efforts to maintain a free and open IndoPacific region The architecture for defense of the territory against missile attacks will therefore be commensurate with its unique status as both an unequivocal part of the United States as well as a vital regional location Guams defense which will include various active and passive missile defense capabilities will contribute to the overall integrity of integrated deterrence and bolster US operational strategy in the IndoPacific region Regional Missile Defense The United States will continue to strengthen defenses for US forces and with Allies and partners against all regional missile threats from any source As part of an integrated interoperable and multilayered approach to deterrence IAMD capabilities need to keep pace with expanding regional missile threats while protecting and enabling US Allied and partner maneuver forces to conduct operations Regional missile threats continue to expand in capability capacity and complexity challenging existing US Allied and partner regional IAMD capabilities and placing all at risk Likely designed for employment below the US nuclear threshold adversaries are pursuing and demonstrating advanced longrange space and missile systems capable of traversing entire Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility AORs Attacks from these systems could increasingly blur the line between regional and homeland defense and challenge existing IAMD architectures In addition to missile threats US forces Allies and partners also face the proliferation of lowertier threats eg rockets armed UAS etc as adversaries seek to take advantage of these relatively inexpensive flexible and expendable systems while exploiting inherent difficulties with attribution and its implications for deterrence Cooperation with likeminded nations is crucial The United States will continue to seek ways to integrate and interoperate with Allies and partners as well as encouraging greater integration among Allies and partners to fill gaps against the increasing spectrum of regional threats Additionally as the ability to share sensor information and data is critical to regional defense the United States will continue to streamline processes for information and data sharing while encouraging Allies and partners to enhance their information protection posture and cyber security The United States will also continue to develop active and passive defenses against regional hypersonic missile threats and pursue a persistent and resilient sensor network to characterize and track all hypersonic threats improve attribution and enable engagement Acquisition strategies for new sensors interceptors and C2 systems must be fully aligned with sensors as the priority As appropriate the United States will pursue joint research and development on hypersonic defense programs with key Allies and partners 8 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W IAMD Nested within our broader missile defeat approach IAMD is the integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the homeland Allies and partners protect the Joint and combined forces and enable freedom of action by negating an adversarys ability to create adverse effects with air and missile capabilities IAMD represents an effort to move beyond platformspecific missile defense toward a broader approach melding all missile defeat capabilities defensive passive offensive kinetic non kinetic into a comprehensive joint and combined construct Developing and fielding IAMD systems is a complex problem set To address the rapidly evolving threat the acquisition community must continue to exploit adaptive acquisition approaches to ensure the timely and costeffective development procurement sustainment and improvement of IAMD systems while providing a clear investment strategy over the near medium and long terms The Department must develop design acquire and maintain Joint IAMD systems that are integrated interoperable and sufficiently mobile flexible and affordable to protect the homeland and dispersed joint and combined maneuver forces from the full spectrum of air and missile threats Interoperability breeds efficiency and economy of resources To enhance this effect in IAMD the Department must develop and exercise innovative combinations of Service national and Allied and partner capabilities to meet mission needs One area of importance related to IAMD is the increasing challenge of counterUAS CUAS UAS are an inexpensive flexible and plausibly deniable way for adversaries endeavoring to carry out tacticallevel attacks below the threshold for major response making them an increasingly preferred capability for state and nonstate actors alike UAS capabilities are also growing in variety quality and quantity The homeland and regionally forward deployed forces require the fielding of technical and integrated CUAS solutions with crossDoD and interagency synchronization to ensure they can meet the range of threats and appropriately hedge against future advancements Within the homeland protecting the population from UAS threats is a combined interagency mission Future Technologies The United States requires responsive persistent resilient and cost effective joint IAMD sensor capabilities to detect characterize track and engage current and emerging advanced air and missile threats regionally and to improve early warning identification tracking discrimination and attribution for missile threats to the homeland Sensors must be integrated into a cohesive architecture with increasingly capable C2 in order to provide leaders with a maximized decision space for informed actions Sensors should be able to seamlessly transition from theaterlevel threats to homeland defense to global threats by sharing and transmitting data with C2 as threats move in and out of the atmosphere Because of their global nature persistence and greater access to denied regions resilient spacebased infrared radar and associated data transport systems will be critical to any 9 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W future integrated sensor network Likewise modern overthehorizon radar capabilities are essential to improving warning and tracking against cruise missile and other threats to the homeland Advanced sensor capabilities need to facilitate different mission areas simultaneously These include strategic and theater missile warning and tracking to alert national leadership and cue missile defenses in the event of a missile launch offer space domain awareness to provide indications and warning of threats support mission assurance of the space architecture and prompt ISR to provide persistent and often unwarned global information essential to the whole of government Therefore the ability to operate these sensors through common joint and combined alldomain integrated and survivable C2 networks and architectures is paramount The United States will continue to leverage industry academia government and allied and partner solutions to augment existing Department of Defense capabilities and foster rapid future capability employment Advanced and innovative technologies and more effective battle management will be crucial to moving the United States towards a costeffective and integrated set of offensive and defensive capabilities To cope with rapidly increasing adversary development of missilecentric Anti AccessAreaDenial A2AD threats the Department must seek new technologies and hedge against continuing adversary missile developments and emerging capabilities such as hypersonic weapons multiple and maneuvering warheads and missile defense countermeasures Future air and missile defense capabilities must also be more mobile flexible survivable and affordable and emphasize disaggregation dispersal and maneuver to mitigate the threat from adversary missiles Finally these technologies and platforms including those enabling NC3 must be inherently cybersecure joined by resilient redundant and hardened networks and monitored by an agile defensive cyber force operating under a clear unified C2 construct 1 0 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W IV STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS Americas alliances and close partnerships around the world are one of its greatest assets Working closely with select countries in North America the IndoPacific Europe and the Middle East to enhance our collective IAMD efforts continues to be an important priority for the United States From a strategic standpoint cooperation in this area strengthens common protection enhances extended deterrence and provides assurances essential to the cohesion of our alliances and partnerships in the face of growing regional missile threats coercion and attacks Operationally IAMDrelated coordination including in the crucial areas of sensing and tracking threats plays an important role in improving interoperability while mitigating the effectiveness of adversary A2AD capabilities To pursue these objectives and goals the Department of Defense engages Allies and partners in extensive bilateral and multilateral IAMDfocused security cooperation activities that coordinate policy development and operational planning conduct missile defense experimentation share information on regional and global missile threats exchange operational IAMD visions strengthen and align information protection efforts support modernization and future capability development and advance new opportunities for joint research training and collaborative development and production North America The United States and Canada have worked together in the defense of North America for decades Over the years our shared homeland defense concerns have grown more acute as adversaries have developed increasingly sophisticated conventional missile capabilities that are able to target critical infrastructure in North America Through the binational North American Aerospace Defense NORAD Command the United States and Canada will continue to work together to improve early warning surveillance for potential incursions or attacks originating from any direction into North America IndoPacific The pacing challenge posed by the PRC as well as the growing North Korean missile threat have magnified the importance of collaborative regional air and missile defense efforts in the IndoPacific region To counter these threats the US conducts missile defense cooperation with Allies and partners throughout the region which is strongest with Japan Australia and the Republic of Korea ROK Our cooperation with these countries strengthens collective regional deterrence and defense efforts while offering assurances critical to the unity of our alliances Japan Australia and the ROK practice and signal their respective defensive military capabilities through sustained investment in air and missile defense systems as well as participation in regular exercises and training with the United States We will continue to work closely with these Allies and partners encouraging them to pursue ground and spacebased sensor systems for warning and tracking and exploring joint opportunities to invest in the cooperative development of complementary IAMD technologies and capabilities such as hypersonic defenses to address advanced and increasingly diverse air and missile threats 1 1 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W Europe The United States works multilaterally within NATO and also cooperates bilaterally with specific NATO and nonNATO countries in Europe to counter air and missile threats from potential adversaries NATO IAMD addresses cruise and ballistic missile threats in a 360degree defense encompassing a mixture of lowertier air and missile defenses eg PATRIOT National Advanced Surfaceto Air Missile System NASAMS SurfacetoAir Missile PlatformTerrain SAMPT NATO IAMD is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime crisis and times of conflict which contributes to deterrence and defense and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance including NATOs capability to reinforce and to provide a strategic response NATO has enhanced its IAMD mission and taken steps to improve NATO IAMD forces readiness and responsiveness in peacetime crisis and times of conflict strengthening our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are implemented for the security of the Alliance The NATO Ballistic Missile Defense NATO BMD system defends European NATO territory from ballistic missiles originating from outside the EuroAtlantic region These efforts include a voluntary US national contribution to the NATO BMD system the European Phased Adaptive Approach EPAA EPAA includes an ANTPY2 radar based in Turkey one Aegis Ashore site in Romania one Aegis Ashore site under construction in Poland plus Aegis BMD capable ships homeported in Spain The United States will continue to work closely with its NATO Allies and other European partners to strengthen both NATO IAMD and NATO BMD through improved readiness and preparedness greater integration and coherence multilateral and bilateral exercises Foreign Military Sales and international armaments cooperation initiatives where applicable Middle East The United States has a long history of working with Israel and other partners in the Middle East to counter air and missile threats With Israel we have a longstanding relationship of robust cooperation on missile defense The United States also has strong bilateral air and missile defense cooperation with many Gulf Cooperation Council GCC states including the United Arab Emirates UAE and Saudi Arabia as well as collectively with GCC itself that includes regular engagements with air and missile defense forces in support of operational activities An ongoing longerterm goal with the GCC and other regional states is to establish a network of air and missile defense capabilities across the Middle East to facilitate greater cooperation while bolstering defense through a layered approach Ongoing normalization efforts between Israel and key Arab states provide additional opportunities to strengthen regional air defenses given shared missile and UAS threats 1 2 2 0 2 2 M I S S I L E D E F E N S E R E V I E W V CONCLUSION The evolution of offensive air and missile threats has accelerated greatly since the United States began developing its first ballistic missile defense systems over fifty years ago This trend represents a growing national security challenge expected to multiply in scope and complexity over the coming decade To meet these challenges US IAMD posture must be comprehensive layered mobile and ready to degrade disrupt and defeat adversary missiles at every opportunity and in all phases of flight and include evolving warfighting concepts that emphasize dispersal and maneuver to ensure resilience in contested environments To be most effective it must also be integrated and interoperable with Allies and partners and underpinned with increasingly robust domain awareness capabilities within a pliable missile defense network As a proven capability within an integrated deterrence approach active and passive missile defenses remain essential elements in the suite of solutions against advanced and changing threats to the United States and its Allies and partners It is a strategic imperative for the United States to continue investments and innovation in the development of full spectrum missile defeat capabilities in order to maintain deterrence and offer protection while hedging against uncertainty An ancient jawbone suggests that humans left Africa earlier and spread much more widely than previously believed DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA