The Dynamics of the Conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the Threat Posed by Homegrown Terrorists

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all front matter Jump to Page 16 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis This electronic document was made available from wwwrandorg as a public service of the RAND Corporation CHILDREN AND FAMILIES EDUCATION AND THE ARTS ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Testimony The Dynamics of the Conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the Threat Posed by Homegrown Terrorists and Returning Western Fighters Brian Michael Jenkins RAND Office of External Affairs CT443 November 2015 Testimony submitted before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Homeland Security Committee on November 18 2015 This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal state or local legislative committees governmentappointed commissions and panels and private review and oversight bodies The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors R is a registered trademark C O R P O R A T I O N Published 2015 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street PO Box 2138 Santa Monica CA 904072138 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington VA 222025050 4570 Fifth Avenue Suite 600 Pittsburgh PA 152132665 RAND URL httpwwwrandorg To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information contact Distribution Services Telephone 310 4517002 Email orderrandorg 1 Brian Michael Jenkins1 The RAND Corporation The Dynamics of the Conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the Threat Posed by Homegrown Terrorists and Returning Western Fighters2 Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives November 18 2015 Chairman Royce Chairman McCaul Ranking Member Engel Ranking Member Thompson and distinguished members of the Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security Committees I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address this important subject This statement describes the underlying dynamics of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and how these are likely to shape the future of the region and events beyond It also assesses the threat posed by homegrown terrorists and by the return of Americans and other Western foreign fighters who have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIL or other jihadist groups in Syria These are complex and intertwined issues3 Recognizing that Russias intervention in the Syrian conflict has further complicated the situation the statement offers a range of US options These options raise a fundamental question To what extent do we see security of the homeland dependent on continued and continuous US engagement against terrorist foes in the Middle East and Southwest Asia My statement today builds on my own previous testimonies and those of my RAND colleagues4 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the authors alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal state or local legislative committees governmentappointed commissions and panels and private review and oversight bodies The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors 2 This testimony is available for free download at httpwwwrandorgpubstestimoniesCT443html 3 I would like to thank Laura Baldwin David Cohen Richard Daddario Karen Greenberg and Andrew Liepman for their helpful reviews and comments 4 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this statement are the authors alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research 2 The Current Situation ISIL suffered heavy casualties and lost some territory in the past year particularly to the Kurds in northern Syria and Iraq but it has survived and been able to advance in other areas capturing more cities in Iraq and Syria Al Qaedas affiliate in Syria Jabhat alNusra and its growing list of Salafist allies remain one of the strongest forces in Syria and prior to Russias intervention were pushing into the Syrian governments sectarian stronghold in western Syria Russian bombing has begun to stanch the regimes losses bolstering regime morale The more secular rebel formations favored by the West have not yet emerged as a significant determining factor in the contest The continued fighting has seriously weakened Syrian government forces The regime now depends on direct external assistance from Iran Russia and Hezbollah to survive Russias intervention changes the situation but it does not change the underlying dynamics of the conflict Russian bombing can relieve immediate pressure on Syrian forces but Russian assistance will not enable them to recover vast tracts of lost territory The insurgency will continue Russian intervention however has prompted a needed reassessment of US strategy The Dynamics of the Conflicts in Syria and Iraq The military situation is at a stalemate By stalemate I mean that the insurgents arrayed against the Syrian government and ISIL in Iraq cannot overthrow governments in Damascus or Baghdad but for the foreseeable future neither government will be able to restore its authority throughout national territory This is particularly true in Syria National armies have failed and power has shifted to militias which are good at defending their own sectarian and ethnic enclaves but have less success conducting operations beyond their home ground Iran is testing that proposition by moving Iranianbacked Iraqi Shiite militias into Syria USsupported Kurdish forces have moved toward ISILs bastion in Raqqa but their continued advance southward will put them deeper into Arab territory and beyond their comfort zone The fighting in both countries is likely to continuesectarian and ethnic divisions now drive the conflicts which have become an existential contest for all of the local partiesit is a fight to the death or at least exhaustion 3 The failure of Syrias and Iraqs national armies and increased dependence on militias beholden to other domestic and foreign powers also point to a permanent loss of the monopoly of force Central authority will be weaker Syria and Iraq are now effectively partitionedIraq into relatively homogenous Shia Sunni and Kurdish zones and Syria into a messier mosaic This partition is likely to persist The mainly Shia part of Iraq under government control the Kurdish enclaves in the north of Syria and Iraq and Assads sectarian stronghold in western Syria with much help from its friends are viable entities with government institutions and sources of revenue The future of Sunnis in Syria and Iraq is more uncertain Will ISIL become their primary political expression or will we see emergence of a Sunni badlands where warfare between armed rivals continues indefinitely Foreign powers have significant stakes in the conflicts but competing interests Absent major military investments outsiders cannot guarantee the victory of local allies Despite the coalitions bombing campaign which has continued for more than a year foreign fighters continue to join ISIL and other jihadist groups The volume of persons believed to be planning to go and of individuals returning are overwhelming European authorities The number of Americans going or wanting to go to Syria also has increased but it remains a fraction of those departing from Europe The conflicts have produced millions of refugees12 million have fled the country or are internally displaced in Syria plus nearly 4 million have fled the country or are internally displaced in Iraq Those who have fled abroad cannot return while the fighting continues and cannot be absorbed by their neighbors They will continue to be a source of regional instability while adding to immigration pressures on Europe The difficulties of dealing with the deluge of refugees pouring out of the region are shaking the European Union to its core Many fear that the Syrian refugees now streaming into Europe will increase the terrorist threat to their host nations As of this writing there is no concrete evidence that ISIL or al Nusra operatives including those that attacked Paris have infiltrated the refugee flow but they could However the refugee population includes large numbers of young males from violent environments who have little or no education They will not easily find jobs Idle and frustrated some may turn to crime or be receptive to extremist recruiting 4 This is hardly a controversial assessment but it is antithetical to the premises of US policy There is always some space between announced objectives and reality on the ground Here that distance seems very great5 Options for the United States Critics of current US policy view Russias intervention as evidence of American failure something must be done Without getting too distracted by speculation about Putins psychology or longrange strategy it is clear that Russia wants to ensure the survival of the Assad regime a longtime ally and its only partner in the Middle East or at the very least a proRussian successor that will guarantee Russias continued possession of its only naval base on the Mediterranean at Tartus Russia also views the Assad regime as the best option to target groups that threaten Russia particularly in the Caucasus That means defending Damascus and protecting the Syrian governments remaining enclave in the western part of the country which in turn means going after the adjacent rebel forces These include al Nusra and what remains of the moresecular forces backed by the West This goal explains the immediate focus of Russias air strikes ISIL is concentrated in eastern Syria and thus represents a more distant threat although the presence of a reported contingent of 2500 Russian Sunni Muslims from Chechnya and the Caucasus in the ranks of ISIL worries Moscow6 In October Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that 7000 jihadi fighters from Russia and the former Soviet east are fighting for the Islamic State7 Some Russians may welcome new military engagements abroad as validation of Russian power but putting Russian soldierseven as volunteerson the ground in Syria runs risks Although Russias involvement in Syria is being portrayed domestically as an expression of Deus vult God wills it which was the battle cry of the First Crusade in the 11th century Russia probably would want to avoid the consequences of what could be portrayed as a Russian religious war against the Sunni population The Russian military campaign may galvanize jihadist sympathizers in Russias restive Caucasus republics while the possible sabotage of a Russian airliner by ISIL operatives or affiliates in Egypt underscores the possibility of terrorist retaliation The ability of 5 These observations are drawn from a more detailed report Brian Michael Jenkins How the Current Conflicts Are Shaping the Future of Syria and Iraq Santa Monica Calif RAND Corporation PE163RC 2015 See also Brian Michael Jenkins The Dynamics of Syrias Civil War Santa Monica Calif RAND Corporation PE115RC 2014 6 Olga Khrustaleva Russias burgeoning ISIL problem Al Jazeera December 10 2014 7 Tom Batchelor Vladimir Putin Warns Thousands of Russian Jihadis Now Fighting for Islamic State in Syria Sunday Express October 17 2015 5 ISIL affiliates to carry out this kind of terrorist attack is also worrisome to the United States and European countries It is not clear whether the event will increase domestic support for Putin or erode enthusiasm for what Russians may fear will become another Afghanistan The United States has two increasingly contradictory objectives To destroy ISIL and to remove the Assad regime Most US allies share these broad objectives but all of them have varying priorities and different objectives of their own The Iraqi government wants to crush ISIL and regain lost territory but for Baghdad removing the regime in Damascus is not an objective For the Saudis and the Gulf monarchies getting rid of Assad is paramount although they also certainly wanteventuallyto deal with ISIL Turkey wants to rid Syria of the Assad regime and to degrade ISIL but for the Turks Kurdish issues may hold the most strategic urgency Russia and Iran simply want to bolster the Syrian government although Iran certainly has different reasons for doing so Both see the threat of ISIL but not as the burning issue the United States does The downing of a Russian airliner may alter Moscows priorities There has been no shortage of competing suggestions about how the United States must respond to Russias intervention in Syrias civil war These suggestions range from reducing the United States involvement in the ongoing conflict to escalating US military efforts in response to Russias provocation Many of these proposals sound muscular but remain vague It is not clear for example what the pronouncement that the United States must reestablish its presence means operationally Adding details often dilutes the toughsounding talk Countering Putin in the Middle East comes down to trying to prevent Russian overflights or sanctioning Russian defense companieswhich the United States has been doing anyway since Russias intervention in Ukraine Some of the suggested actionssuch as establishing and maintaining nofly zones where Syrian rebels and refugees may find sanctuaryare complicated missions There is no suitable replacement for Assad Indeed the strongest parties in Syria seem increasingly to be Islamist extremistsal Nusra and its allies and ISIL Their rise has blunted but not entirely removed Western hostility toward the Assad regime The United States and some of its allies want to prevent the Syrian regime from completely destroying all resistance arrayed against it which is why they support Syrias rebels Even though these forces include undesirable extremist elements they keep pressure on the Assad regime Assads departure now risks ushering in the kind of chaos that has continued long after Moammar Gadhafis removal from power in Libya Nor would we want to see jihadists slaughter Assads 6 Alawite Christian Druze and Sunni supporters These conflicting concernsdefeating the jihadists replacing Assad but avoiding the massacres that might follow his departuredemand an exquisitely modulated application of violence an inherently blunt instrument All coalitions come with constraints There is little international support for expanding the USled campaign beyond attacking ISIL Some coalition participants will not carry out operations in Syria Broadening the mission or escalating the conflict by introducing combat forces on the ground might reassure some in the region of US resolve but it could make some coalition partners drop out Some have already dropped back The United States could still go it alone or with a handful of allies but doing so jeopardizes legitimacy and could erode already tenuous domestic support Todays politicians and tomorrows historians will debate whether as some allege the United States timidity and inaction allowed the current mess and created the vacuum that Russia has now entered However that does not tell us what the United States should do now So what is to be done Here are six options They are not mutually exclusive Confrontation In the eyes of many a forceful US response is required to destroy ISIL ensure Assads departure and prevent Russia from expanding its influence in the region To many this will require boots on the ground Combining some of the more ambitious proposals would see the deployment of up to 25000 US troops to Iraq assuming Iraq allows this and sending another US ground contingent to Syria to lead a larger allied regional army aimed at destroying ISIL US military commanders warn that American combat troops while effective in battle would still face a longterm pacification problem as they did a decade earlier in Afghanistan and Iraq Other US actions could include declaring nofly zones that are offlimits to the Syrian government or Russian air strikesan idea considered before Russias direct interventionand manning them with US forces to discourage Russia from testing American resolve Others have proposed the deployment of more Special Operations forces to assist Iraqs army as well as secular rebels in Syria instead of US combat units as the US administration has recently decided to do in supporting the Kurds But despite some progress it is still not certain that independent viable and effective secular rebel formations can be built up Thus far US efforts to create and arm an independent and secular Syrian rebel force have failed The units of the Free Syrian Army favored by the West did not prove to be an effective fighting 7 force Efforts by the United States to create and train its own rebel force have been hampered by understandable concerns that UStrained fighters might join al Nusra or ISIL taking their equipment with them Careful vetting was seen as necessary to ensure that this would not occur My own view is that the risk of betrayals was real given the fluid loyalties among Syrias rebels but that consequences of these betrayals were not that great given that the United States would be supplying its Syrian force with ordinary light infantry weapons and pickup trucks none of which are in short supply in the region Risks in such enterprises are inevitable The United States approach was extraordinarily riskaverse probably as much a result of wanting to avoid political embarrassment at home as of concern about whether ISIL might end up with more weapons The second problem was the fact that the United States sought to create and train a rebel force and put it directly into combat on its own That is very hard to do It would have been more realistic to create defensive formations and back them up on their own turf with additional support Backing the Kurds is different They have an existing organization and have demonstrated themselves to be tough fighters For now they operate primarily on their own turf This is something the United States can build on At the same time that it expands its role on the ground in Syria and Iraq the United States could exploit Europes unhappiness with Russian intervention to further increase targeted economic sanctions already imposed in response to Russias moves in Ukraine Thus far these have not altered Russian behavior although they may weaken Russia in the long run by further undermining its economy which is already hemorrhaging due to the collapse of global oil prices An International Peace Conference Despite the required optimism of diplomats reflected in the announced areas of agreement coming out of the recent meeting in Vienna this was not a new Vienna Congress or Paris Peace Conference where delegates sorted out the world after years of conflict This is not the end of a warthis is an ongoing war Even if all of the external actors were to back off and suspend their support for both regimes and all rebelsan unlikely eventthey cannot prevent Syrians and Iraqis from continuing their armed struggle At issue is not just the survival of the Assad regime but a deeper sectarian struggle that reflects a historical divide across the region Although the United States wants Assad out immediately it might be persuaded to accept an overall settlement resulting in his eventual departure and replacement by a new government that is able to reconcile with the rebels and restore its authority throughout Syrian national territory In 8 July at the Aspen Security Conference a citadel of the US security establishment organizers tabled the questions of whether the prerevolutionary Assad regime in Syria was more in line with American interests and whether as a consequence the best outcome now is as close to the status quo ante as possible However Aspen is not Aleppo For Syrians the conflict has gone beyond regime change Even if Assad departs the regimes Alawite and Christian stalwarts are unlikely to lay down their arms It is equally difficult to imagine al Nusra and other Islamist rebels abandoning their struggle against those they see as infidels No agreement will accept ISILs control of an Islamic State An Incremental Ceasefire Through Local Accommodation Instead of a grand warending agreement the United States could push for a series of local ceasefires on humanitarian grounds Putting pre2011 Syria back together is next to impossible for now Instead this option would mean accepting the de facto partition of Syria into a series of armed cantons Assad would get to stay and rule a miniature state in the western part of the country and Damascushis Republika Syrianska The rebels including al Nusra would hold the territory they currently command with the choice of keeping their little emirates or remaining the target of Russian and coalition bombing Local withdrawals and exchanges of territory would be negotiated individually As agreements are reached international forces which might include both Russian and US observers would help to keep peace on the perimeters Participating zones would receive generous aid Military action against ISIL by both coalition and Russian aircraft would continue There should be no illusions The fighting will continue in many areas and there will be continued terrorist attacks But local accommodations that allow reconstruction and commerce and that slow the flow of refugees might emerge in other localities Afghanistan Redux ISIL has survived coalition bombing for more than a yearmore than 12000 air strikes It may be weakened but it has not been defeated AntiAssad rebels now facing Russian bombing will suffer some setbacks but also may be able to adapt and remain effective Even were Russia able to scatter the rebels pressing on the remaining Syrian governmentcontrolled territory it will face a continuing insurgency always the more difficult challenge Like Syria Russia is willing to use its military power indiscriminately but that comes with a cost and does not always work After nearly four years of ruthless bombing by the Syrian regime and assistance on the ground from 9 Hezbollah Iranianbacked militias and Iranian advisors Assad was not able to defeat the insurgents While it cannot halt Russias bombing the United States could increase its support for rebel forces other than ISIL by lowering its strict vetting standards which thus far have limited US support The Gulf monarchies that now support the rebels are likely to do even more This option differs from the confrontation option in that it avoids the creation of nofly zones and the commitment of US ground forces The aim would be simply to put more weapons and more ammunition into rebel hands accepting that some of these supplies may end up in the hands of jihadist extremistshopefully not ISIL which in this option would remain the exclusive target of the coalitions bombing campaign Containment This option starts with the premise that the United States has limited objectives in Syria and Iraq and limited ability to shape events in these two countries without making a substantial military commitmentone that could turn out to be far greater than proponents of moreambitious efforts admit For now there is no disagreementUS investment increases or US objectives are scaled back The question is whether the American public which now supports the bombing campaign as long as there are no US casualties will support and continue to support going to war and all that entails That does not appear to be the case a fact that critics of Washingtons current caution ignore Under this option the United States would continue its bombing campaign since ISIL and al Nusra are viewed as a direct threat to US interests and it would continue to support Kurdish fighters defending their territory against ISIL However the United States would not deploy ground forces set up safe havens or nofly zones significantly increase its support for the other Syrian rebels or make major investments in other military efforts to bring down Assad Instead the United States would pursue what can be described as a prudent course of action limiting its involvement in another countrys civil war that it cannot resolve but may only make worse The United States primary mission would be to assist neighboring alliesespecially Jordan and Saudi Arabiain containing the conflict and defending themselves ISILs black flag flying over Mecca would guarantee a longlasting clash of civilizations Helping the neighbors would also mean devoting more resources to refugees The United States can help buttress border security and provide other kinds of aid This option appears close to current US policy 10 Disengagement An earlier essay of mine outlining these courses of action published in The Hill prompted the criticism that I had left out an important optionwithdrawal8 Proponents of US disengagement argue that the United States has few vital interests in Syria or Iraq and that it faces more serious challenges to its national security in other parts of the world and even morepressing priorities at home ISIL and al Nusra pose a terrorist threat but not one that warrants imperial missions and perpetual war overseas If continued US bombing of terrorist targets in Syria and Iraq is deemed essential according to this option further involvement with Syrias fractious rebels is not Thus far the US government has portrayed its involvement as taking prudent and limited steps which are sensible under the circumstances but they run the risk of incrementally drawing the United States into another costly Middle East war At the very least the United States should delay increasing its military investment and instead adopt a waitandsee attitude These are all options on the continuum between disengaging and forceful military action There are an unlimited number of options along this continuum gradually ratcheting up the pressure as US interests dictate Delineating options helps to clarify thinkingit forces proponents of specific courses of action to articulate their assumptions The dominant factor in picking an option has to be how it contributes to achieving US objectives That of course requires us to specify reasonable and reachable objectives not the seemingly contradictory ones we have now One of the principal problems with the United States current posture is that it is reflexive We react to ISIL military advances with a bombing campaign and we react to Russian military intervention by deploying 50 Special Operations personnel to increase the effectiveness of Kurdish fighters and intensify the bombing campaign But we dont really say how these moves make US objectives more achievable Again the options are not mutually exclusivethe United States can simultaneously increase its support for Syrias rebels and pursue diplomatic solutions as it is doing now In all of the options the bombing campaign against ISIL continues The purpose of laying the options out is to encourage rational thinking based on realistic presumptions not media or campaigndriven hype It is fair to ask about my own view of what a realistic and wise pursuit of US interests might include For now the United States should continue to exert pressure on ISIL with airpower and 8 Brian Michael Jenkins Five Options for the US in Syria The Hill October 21 2015 11 special operations continue to support for Kurdish fighters provide added security assistance to the surrounding countries and seek opportunities to bring about incremental ceasefires That means for now accepting Russias presence which means for now tolerating Assad I would avoid the commitment of US combat forces and attempts to create nofly zones The emphasis on for now is deliberate Right now the situation in Syria presents a grim picture Syria must be seen as a longterm problem that will resist any shortterm solution but circumstances will change The United States can then exploit opportunities that allow more promising interventions The Current Terrorist Threat to Homeland Security Current US actions in Syria and Iraq are a continuation of the military campaign to destroy the terrorist enterprise responsible for 911 and other terrorist attacks on the US targets The paramount objective remains the protection of the homeland from further largescale terrorist attacks So far the United States has been fortunate at least in terms of terrorist attacks in the homeland The years since 911 have been the most tranquil in terms of domestic terrorist violence since the 1960s Many people do not recall that in the 1970s the United States saw 50 to 60 terrorist bombings a year Since 911 there have been only five or six successful attacks by jihadist terrorists including the recent shootings in Tennessee and Texas which together left 23 dead US military action alone does not account for the reduction in the number of terrorist attacks here although military operations have shattered al Qaedas core Al Qaeda affiliates are for now preoccupied with local conflicts in Yemen and North Africa International cooperation has made the terrorists operating environment a lot more hostile Domestic intelligence though still not optimal has significantly improved as has law enforcement Of equal importance is the fact that al Qaedas exhortations to homegrown terrorists to take up arms have gained little traction in the United States Americas Muslims overwhelmingly reject terrorism ISILs declaration of an Islamic State and its moreeffective use of social media have created excitement and attracted more followers but the number of those who have responded remains small Fear of what terrorists may dorather than what terrorists have done since 911drives our assessment of the threat The United States has become a securityobsessed society that views 12 every vulnerability as an imminent threat Ample catastrophic scenarios are on offer from dirty bombs to electromagnetic pulses caused by powerful highaltitude nuclear explosions to cyber Armageddons Future Terrorist Scenarios of Concern Most of these doomsday plots would require capabilities that are far beyond what terrorists including the 911 hijackers have demonstrated There are however lesser but still significant scenarios within reach of their current range of capabilities The most serious threat would be a major terrorist operation in which foreign volunteers are recruited trained equipped and infiltrated into the United States to carry out a major terrorist strike not necessarily an attack of the style or scale of 911 This appears less likely now but ISIL al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP and al Nusra are theoretically capable of mounting a major terrorist attack Authorities also worry about a smallerscale Mumbai or Nairobi scenario in which two or more heavily armed shooters enter a public building to kill at random and seize hostages Such an attack could be carried out entirely by homegrown terrorists Since 911 US authorities have interrupted several plots involving two or more shooters Another scenario is an airliner sabotage scenario in which a foreign volunteer is recruited and equipped for a suicide mission or in which an explosive device is smuggled onto a commercial airliner AQAP has made previous attempts and there has been concern about possible plots by al Nusras Khorasan cell The possible sabotage of a Russian airliner in Egypt underscores this threat A scenario like the July 7 2005 London subway attack in which foreign fighters return with a terrorist mission and specialized skills to carry it out must be included This was the plan in the 2009 plot by Najibullah Zazi to carry out suicide bombings on New Yorks subways There have been several similar plots Most likely are individual attacks involving single shooters individual assaults on uniformed personnel or military families stabbings or ramming vehicles into crowds These have occurred already and we have to accept that such attacks will continue A concern for 2016 Although some jihadist assassination plots have been uncovered terrorists in the United States have not yet adopted assassination of political officials as their primary tactic butgiven events abroad and the extraordinarily charged political environment at homethe likelihood of assassination attempts could increase during next years elections 13 The Threat Posed by Returning Foreign Fighters Syrias civil war reportedly has attracted between 20000 and 30000 foreign fighters Most of them have joined ISIL which offers the attractions of living in what is portrayed as an authentic Islamic state opportunities to engage in unlimited violence and being present at the endoftime battle between believers and infidels Most of the foreign fighters come from surrounding Arab countries but as many as 5000 come from Western countries primarily Western Europe It is not clear that the coalitions bombing campaign of ISIL has slowed the flow of volunteers More than 250 Americans reportedly have traveled to Syria and Iraq This number includes those who went earlier and are not necessarily jihadists those who have tried to go and were arrested on the way those who went and were killed while abroad those who are believed to be currently serving in ISILs ranks and those who have returned as well as others under investigation Authorities in Europe and the United States fear that returning foreign fighters will significantly increase the likelihood of homegrown terrorist attacks and the skill level of the terrorists involved Returning fighters have already carried out several attacks in Europe The numbers of those traveling to Syria those suspected of preparing to go and those returning are overwhelming European authorities Many of these foreign fighters will die on the battlefield ISIL may execute some of them itself Some will move on to the next jihadist front wherever that may be Some will lose their jihadist fervor and will return disillusioned by what they have witnessed suffering from shock and unlikely to engage in terrorist attacks But some inevitably will seek to return and continue their violent campaign in the name of ISILs or al Qaedas ideology as hardened combat veterans with skills in handling weapons and building explosive devices The threat from these returning fighters is real but needs to be put into perspective ISIL assigns many of its foreign volunteers to purely support functions that will confer no combat skills Some returning fighters will learn how to handle weapons but this does not represent a significant increase in danger as violent criminals mass shooters and homegrown terrorists without any combat experience also have carried out deadly attacks Experience in making improvised explosive devices will count more but it is not clear how many ISIL fighters are gaining this type of experience Other kinds of combat experience such as small unit tactics will have little relevance to domestic terrorist attacks In sum returning fighters may not significantly increase terrorist capabilities 14 The biggest difference may lie in their propensity toward violence Those who made it to Syria represent the most determined Their time with ISIL will have further radicalized them while the extreme violence they have witnessed will have changed them psychologically Accustomed to gore unconstrained in their willingness to kill and ready to die they may return bent on revenge Fortunately they are likely to be relatively few in number I base this statement on what we know thus far about Americans who have left or have attempted to leave the country to seek terrorist training or join jihadist fronts abroad The totals are small Since 911 US authorities have identified 105 Americans who have traveled or tried to travel to connect with jihadist groups in Afghanistan Pakistan Somalia Yemen or countries other than Syria The identities of only 60 of the 250 individuals who have gone attempted to go or may be preparing to go to Syria have been made public The report prepared by the Congressional Task Force on Foreign Fighters assumes that the other 190 made it to Syria9 It could be that authorities suspect they are there but are unable to confirm their identity or do not want them to know that they are on an intelligence watchlist It could be that some are currently under surveillance However the 60 names we do know offer some insights about the larger cohort Of the 60 who sought to go to Syria 30 50 percent were arrested before departure and four never made it to Syria but returned to the United States where they were arrested one more was arrested in Jordan Three teenage girls were intercepted in Europe and were brought back to the United States without arrest Of the 22 who made it to Syria 11 50 percent were killed six remain at large and five 8 percent were arrested after their return to the United States None of those returning from Syria were involved in terrorist plots after their return These figures are not far off from those of the previous cohort except that more were killed abroad 50 percent versus 28 percent and thus far fewer have returned10 Of the 105 who sought to go to countries other than Syria 38 36 percent were intercepted Of the 67 not intercepted seven were arrested by authorities in other countries one was captured by Americans in Afghanistan 19 28 percent were killed while abroad and ten remain at large Not all of these joined jihadist groups or received any kind of military training Thirty 28 percent of the total returned to the United States Of these 28 were ultimately arrested and two were killed 9 US House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighters Travel September 2015 10 Jenkins When Jihadis Come Marching Home See also Center on National Security at Fordham Law By the Numbers ISIS Cases in the United States March 1 2014June 22 2015 New York June 25 2015 15 after their return About onethird of those who returned were involved in terrorist attacks or plots after their return11 I suspect that a smaller percentage of those going to Syria will return The previous cohorts going to other countries included some who were going for the express purpose of obtaining training before returning Those now going to Syria especially those joining ISIL are inclined to see it as a permanent move Some of these returnees may engage in terrorist plotting Fortunately the numbers of Americans are not great although even one determined terrorist can be dangerous Intercepting returning Americans and other foreign fighters will be a priority Countering Violent Extremism Dissuading young men and women from going down destructive paths is an appealing idea that the White House and both parties in Congress can agree on for different reasons It can augment the United States current law enforcement efforts and military operations in the Middle East It can challenge what some see as a broader threat posed by selfisolating communities where extremist ideologies can more easily take root Those uncomfortable with domestic intelligence activities and counterterrorist operations see countering violent extremism as an attractive alternative to spying on and incarcerating people at home or bombing them abroad The current legislative push is therefore understandable Creating a highlevel federal office dedicated to countering violent extremism and recruitment by violent extremist groups would provide leadership energy and order to what is currently seen as a messy and incoherent effort However there are also reasons for caution I have both philosophical and practical concerns The United States has adopted a preventive approach to dealing with terrorist threatswe want authorities to intervene before bombs go off and have changed the law to permit earlier intervention The intention to commit a terrorist crime suffices for criminal prosecution Countering violent extremism represents a further push toward intervention even before an individual thinks about committing a terrorist crime It penetrates the realm of ideas ideologies and manners of thinking of a particular group or individual 11 These figures represent an update from an earlier report See Brian Michael Jenkins When Jihadis Come Marching Home The Terrorist Threat Posed by Westerners Returning from Syria and Iraq Santa Monica Calif RAND Corporation PE1301RC 2014 16 The definition of terrorist crime in the US criminal code includes a motive componentwhat terrorists hope to achieve by their actions makes it terrorismbut it does not touch ideology I know that the authors of this effort are sensitive to civil liberties concerns but we would want to be careful about creating government offices whose job it is to patrol ideologies even those deemed extreme or violent On a more practical level whether efforts to counter violent extremism can protect individuals from exposure to violent ideologies effectively identify those believed to be prone to radicalize predict their proclivity for violence or prevent them from acting remains to be seen I am skeptical We have not yet sorted out exactly what we mean by countering violent extremism Some see it as combatting terrorist ideologies with narratives focusing on American values but the current impetus seeks more active intervention Some notions of countering violent extremism aim at altering beliefs others aim more narrowly at preventing criminal behavior Some aim at communities judged to be vulnerable others address individual vulnerabilities Some rely on countermessaging or propagandizing others on personal counseling and coaching Several countries are pursuing ambitious programs from which much can be learned but it is not clear that their experience is applicable to the United States The United States gained some experience of its own in responding to the flow of American recruits to the conflict in Somalia and has recently embarked on some pilot projects But we do not yet have agreement on a coherent national strategy We are learning more about why and how individuals embrace violent ideologies and act on them which is a separate decision However I am not sure that we know enough now to prescribe an effective strategy to interrupt this process Standing up a new federal entity seems premature Before we build an automobile plant we need to know how to build an automobile Countering violent extremism is a response to a specific problemthe recruitment of Americans by jihadist extremists It merits more study to formulate focused solutions a task force to ensure a coordinated campaign and perhaps some different experimental models to see what works not a permanent federal office In some of the other countries that have implemented prevention programs terrorist recruiting reflects conditions in isolated and marginalized immigrant diasporasit is a community issue In the United States radicalization and selfrecruitment to violence appear to reflect individual 17 circumstancespersonal discontents identity issues adopted grievances dissatisfaction life crisesrequiring a retail bespoke approach That kind of intense personal counseling requires more resources than community immunizations Our theoretical model for countering violent extremism may be wrong The innocent are not being exposed to Internet poison that turns them into terrorists Large numbers of curious kids may visit terrorist websites between looking at pornography and playing violent video games They do not become terrorists Those who do are often troubled individuals seeking ideologies that resonate with and reinforce their feelings of anger and aggression They are unlikely to be receptive to external persuasion and are not easily knocked off course Again it is important to keep in mind the very small numbers of Americans who are responding to exhortations from ISIL or al Qaeda The total number of persons providing material support to terrorists attempting to join terrorist fronts abroad or plot terrorist attacks at home runs to several hundred Does that warrant another federal entity The fact that so few individuals are responding to terrorist appeals is good news for the country but it also means that the yields of efforts to counter violent extremism will be very low Even if largely successful major expenditures of resources will make no more than tiny contributions to overall security It is difficult to know whether or how well the programs abroad are working The metrics are murky And it is impossible to count things that do not occur We run the danger that the requirement for metrics will lead to measuring our own inputsif we are doing twice as much we must be doing twice as well Creating new federal entities invariably sets off turf wars Should the Department of Justice take the lead in countering violent extremism Or does it belong in the Department of Homeland Security What is the appropriate federal role in a process that will be largely local What role will civil society advocates and community representatives play Who does what A collaborative group involving the Department of Homeland Security the Department of Justice and the National Counterterrorism Center is already functioning though critics would say it is too intelligence and law enforcement oriented Do we need more Radicalization and recruitment to violence is a complex process and it does not follow a linear path Responsibilities cannot be divided sequentially While countering violent extremist programs should not be seen merely as a forum for recruiting confidential informants which will taint the 18 effort countering extremism intelligence collection and criminal investigations while separate functions will occur concurrently in the same space Countering violent extremism like domestic intelligence efforts will inevitably be seen to stigmatize certain susceptible communities This can be ameliorated but not eliminated We should avoid creating a new federal entity to deal with one portion of the population Proposals have been made already to avoid appearances of discrimination by broadening the mandate of the proposed entity to include white supremacists antifederalgovernment extremists and other potential sources of political violence Broadening the mandate will dilute the effort Avoiding allegations of profiling can easily lead to selfimposed quotas to assure that the communities and subjects of attention represent a broad spectrum of American violence A federal entity for the prevention of extremist violence will generate a population that justifies federal attention The number of kids at risk will grow We can easily create a situation wherein the country is addressing and alienating large audiences in order to identify and dissuade very small numbers of individuals from embracing ideologically motivated violence This will bring marginal gains when acts of mass violence by individuals without ideological pretensions are responsible for far more bloodshed A better investment would be to shift efforts from the front end of the trajectory of radical violence to the back end Those who have gone to Syria have identified themselves as violenceprone or at least tolerant of extreme violence They are the most determined individuals They may acquire additional skills while abroad Their fanaticism may be reinforced and any selfimposed constraints may be flattened by their experience Intercepting them is a priority This requires intelligence efforts and moreeffective screening at ports of entry A number of individuals now in prison for terroristrelated crimes are coming to the ends of their sentences13 In the American justice system pleabargaining based on cooperation occurs prior to sentencing In some cases authorities appear to have moved away from pushing for maximum sentences in terrorist crimes and are supporting comparatively more lenient pretrial arrangements and lower sentences in return for cooperation More efforts need to be made after sentencing to deradicalize inmates They represent a potential danger upon release but they also are a potential resource that can be exploited to assist in efforts to discourage others from following their path 13 Michael A Brown has raised this issue in a recent article in The Hill Michael A Brown Whats Next on the Convicted Terrorists Timeline The Hill November 4 2015 19 Both interception and deradicalization efforts have the advantage of smaller populations and in the case of inmates a captive population compared with the many thousands that will comprise the audience of efforts to counter violent extremism The targets of interception and de radicalization also pose greater immediate dangers Without abandoning the idea of countering violent extremism interception and deradicalization for now appear to be better investments